01978A0116(01) — EN — 18.12.1981 — 001.001

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►B Amendment to the Agreement of 6 October 1959 ( 1 ), in the form of an exchange of letters, between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of Canada for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy (78/217/Euratom) (OJ L 065 8.3.1978, p. 16)

Amended by:









▼B

Amendment to the Agreement of 6 October 1959 ( 2 ), in the form of an exchange of letters, between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of Canada for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy

(78/217/Euratom)

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 16 January 1978

Mr Chargé d'Affaires,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 16 January 1978, stating the following:

‘Mr Commissioner,

As the Commission has been informed, the Canadian Government has decided to require more stringent safeguards in respect of sales abroad of Canadian material, equipment and information.

This decision implies an updating of the existing Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic-Energy of 6 October 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959) particularly in so far as it relates to safeguards.

The Canadian Government considers it necessary to come to an interim agreement through the present exchange of letters until the entire Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 has been updated, to provide for the requirement of the new Canadian safeguards policy by amending the relevant provisions of the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959.

Accordingly, I propose that the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 be amended to include the following provisions relating to safeguards:

(a) For the purposes of the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959, the phrase “machinery and plant” in paragraph (d) of Article XIV of the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 shall be deemed to include all items listed in Annex A to this letter.

(b) Equipment which a Member State has designed to the Commission as equipment designed, constructed or operated on the basis of or by the use of information obtained from Canada and which is within the jurisdiction of that Member State at the time of designation, shall be considered as equipment subject to the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959, as amended. Equipment which Canada has designated, as equipment designed, constructed or operated on the basis of or by the use of information obtained from that Member State shall be considered as equipment subject to the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959, as amended.

(c) Material which is subject to the terms of the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or for other military uses of nuclear energy or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device. The foregoing undertaking shall be verified within Canada by the IAEA pursuant to an agreement between Canada and the IAEA and within the Community by the Community and by the IAEA pursuant to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and the agreements concluded between the Community, its Member States and the IAEA or if at any time such verification procedures are not in effect, there shall be agreement between the Contracting Parties for the application of a safeguards system which conforms with IAEA safeguards principles and procedures.

Mr P. D. Lee

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Mission of Canada

to the European Communities

Rue de Loxum, 6 (fifth floor)

1000 Brussels

(d) Equipment or material transferred between Canada and the Community after the coming into force of this Agreement, shall be subject to the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 only if the supplying Contracting Party has so informed the other Contracting Party in writing prior to the transfer. In the case of transfer of equipment from the Community to Canada, notifications may also be given by a Member State.

(e) Material referred to in paragraph (c) shall be enriched beyond 20 % or reprocessed and plutonium or uranium enriched beyond 20 % shall be stored only according to conditions agreed upon in writing between the parties. (See Annex C — Interim Arrangement concerning enrichment, reprocessing and subsequent storage of nuclear material within the Community and Canada.)

(f) In no event shall a Contracting Party use the provisions of the present Agreement for the purpose of securing commercial advantages or for the purpose of interfering with the commercial relations of the other Contracting Party.

(g) The Community shall inform Member States of the levels of physical protection set out in Annex B to this letter which should be applied as minima to the material referred to in paragraph (c) above. Canada will apply such levels of physical protection as minima to material referred to in paragraph (c).

(h) Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the present Agreement which is not settled by negotiation or as may otherwise be agreed by the Contracting Parties concerned shall, on the request of either Contracting Party, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal which shall be composed of three arbitrators. Each Contracting Party shall designate one arbitrator and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, who shall be the chairman. If within 30 days of the request for arbitration either Contracting Party has not designated an arbitrator, either Contracting Party to the dispute may request the Secretary General of the OECD to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within 30 days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall be made by majority vote of all members of the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal, including all rulings concerning its constitution, procedure, jurisdiction and the division of the expenses of arbitration between the Contracting Parties shall be binding on both Contracting Parties and shall be implemented by them, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The remuneration of the arbitrators shall be determined on the same basis as that for ad hoc judges of the International Court of Justice.

(i) The provisions of paragraphs (a) to (h) above, inclusive, as well as Articles III, IX and XIV of the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 (as those Articles are amended by the proposals in this letter) shall in all circumstances remain in force so long as any equipment or material referred to in this letter or in the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 remains in existence or it is otherwise agreed.

If the foregoing is acceptable to the European Atomic Energy Community I have the honour to propose that this letter which is authentic in both English and French, together with Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall constitute an amendment to the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 which shall enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's reply and which shall continue in force so long as any equipment, material or facilities referred to in this letter or in the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 remain in existence or it is otherwise agreed.

Please accept, Mr Commissioner, the assurance of my highest consideration.









ANNEX A

1. Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year.

A nuclear reactor basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core.

It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as “zero energy reactors”.

2. React or pressure vessels: metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which are especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1 above and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the primary coolant.

A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is a major shop-fabricated part of a pressure vessel.

3. Reactor internals: (e.g. support columns and plates for the core and other vessel internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.).

4. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines: manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1 above capable of on-load operation or employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off-load fuelling operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally available.

5. Reactor control rods: rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1 above.

This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension structures therefor if supplied separately.

6. Reactor pressure tubes: tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1 above at an operating pressure in excess of 50 atmospheres.

7. Zirconium tubes: Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg per year especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1 above, and in which the relationship of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1: 500 parts by weight.

8. Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor.

A plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements includes the equipment and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material in fission product processing streams. In the present state of technology only two items of equipment are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase “and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor”. These items are:

(a) irradiated fuel element chopping machines: remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared to use in a reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods; and

(b) critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared to use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained.

9. Plants for the fabrication of fuel elements:

A plant for the fabrication of fuel elements includes the equipment:

(a) which normally comes in direct contact with or directly processes or controls, the production flow of nuclear material; or

(b) which seals the nuclear material within the cladding.

The whole set of items for the foregoing operations, as well as individual items intended for any of the foregoing operations, and for other fuel fabrication operations, such as checking the integrity of the cladding or the seal, and the finish treatment to the sealed fuel.

10. Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium:

Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium includes each of the major items of equipment especially designed or prepared for the separation process. Such items include:

— gaseous diffusion barrier,

— gaseous diffusion housings,

— gas centrifuge assemblies, corrosion resistant to UF 6 ,

— large UF 6 corrosion resistant axial or centrifugal compressors,

— special compressor seals for such compressors.

11. Plants for the production of heavy water:

A plant for the production of heavy water includes the plant and equipment specially designed for enrichment of deuterium or its compounds, as well as any significant fraction of the items essential to the operation of the plant.









ANNEX B

LEVELS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION

The levels of physical protection to be ensured by the appropriate governmental authorities in the use, storage and transportation of the materials of the attached table shall as a minimum include protection characteristics as follows:

Category III

Use and storage within an area to which access is controlled.

Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangements between sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement between States in cases of international transport specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.

Category II

Use and storage within a protected area to which access is controlled, i.e. an area under constant surveillance by guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of points of entry under appropriate control, or any area with an equivalent level of physical protection.

Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangement between sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement between States in cases of international transport specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.

Category I

Materials in this category shall be protected with highly reliable systems against unauthorized use as follows:

Use and storage within a highly protected area, i.e. a protected area as defined for Category II above, to which, in addition, access is restricted to persons whose trustworthiness has been determined and under surveillance by guards who are in close communication with appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in this context should have as their objective the detection and prevention of any assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material.

Transportation under special precautions as identified above for transportation of Category II and III materials and, in addition, under constant surveillance of escorts and under conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces.

Categorization of nuclear material







Material Form Category I II III 1. Plutonium () Unirradiated () 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g 500 g or less () 2. Uranium-235 Unirradiated () — uranium enriched to 20 % U-235 or more 5 kg or more Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg 1 kg or less — uranium enriched to 10 % U-235 but less than 20 % — 10 kg or more Less than 10 kg () — uranium enriched above natural, but less than 10% U-235 () — 10 kg or more 3. Uranium-233 Unirradiated () 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g 500 g or less 4. Irradiated fuel Depleted or natural uranium, thorium or low enriched fuel (less than 10% fissile content) () () ( 1 ) As identified in the Statute of the IAEA. ( 2 ) Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 100 rad/hour at one metre unshielded. ( 3 ) Less than a radiologically significant quantity should be exempted. ( 4 ) Natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium and quantities of uranium enriched to less than 10 % not falling in Category III should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice. ( 5 ) Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a different degree of physical protection. ( 6 ) Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 100 rad/hour at one metre unshielded.









ANNEX C

INTERIM ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING AND SUBSEQUENT STORAGE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AND CANADA

▼M1

Letter from the Government of Canada

Brussels, 18 December 1981

Sir,

1. I have the honour to refer to the 16 January 1978 exchange of letters between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (hereinafter referred to as the exchange of letters) amending the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy of 6 October 1959, (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement) particularly in so far as it relates to safeguards (followed by an additional exchange of letters). I specifically refer to paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters which states that:

“Material referred to in paragraph (c) shall be enriched beyond 20 % or reprocessed and plutonium or uranium enriched beyond 20 % shall be stored only according to conditions agreed upon in writing between the parties (see Annex C: Interim Arrangement concerning enrichment, reprocessing and subsequent storage of nuclear material within the Community and Canada).”

Paragraph 5 of Annex C states that the parties would commence negotiations as soon as possible after 31 December 1979, or the termination of the INFCE study, whichever was earlier, with a view to replacing the Interim Arrangement by other arrangements that would take into account inter alia any results of the INFCE studies in relation to the operations in question.

Wilhelm Haferkamp,

Vice President of the

Commission of the European Communities,

200 rue de la Loi,

B-1049 Brussels

2. These negotiations have now been completed and I have the honour to propose that the guidelines set forth below should cover reprocessing and plutonium storage and use:

(a) an effective commitment to non-proliferation should have been made and should continue to be maintained by the party envisaging reprocessing and plutonium storage and use;

(b) all nuclear material subject to a peaceful uses commitment in facilities involved in reprocessing and the storage and use of plutonium should be subject to IAEA safeguards;

(c) all nuclear material subject to a peaceful uses commitment in facilities involved in reprocessing and the subsequent storage and use activities, including related transport, should be subject to adequate physical protection measures;

(d) mutually satisfactory notification and material reporting procedures should be in place between the parties;

(e) a description of the current and planned nuclear energy programme including in particular a detailed description of the policy, legal and regulatory elements relevant to reprocessing and plutonium storage and use should be provided by the party envisaging such activities;

(f) the parties should agree to periodic and timely consultations at which inter alia the information provided under guideline (e) should be updated and significant changes in the nuclear energy programme would receive the fullest possible consideration;

(g) the reprocessing and plutonium storage should only take place when the information provided on the nuclear energy programme of the party in question has been received, when the undertakings, arrangements and other information called for by the guidelines are in place or have been received and when the parties have agreed that the reprocessing and plutonium storage are an integral part of the described nuclear energy programme; where it is proposed to carry out reprocessing or storage of plutonium when these conditions are not met, the operation should take place only when the parties have so agreed after consultation, which should take place promptly to consider any such proposal;

(h) the reprocessing and plutonium storage envisaged should only take place so long as the commitment of the party in question to non-proliferation does not change and so long as the commitment to periodic and timely consultations referred to in guideline (f) is honoured.

3. I note that Canada and the Community have agreed that the objectives of the above guidelines have been met.

In particular I note that Canada and the Community and its Member States, to the extent of their respective competences, have made an effective commitment to non-proliferation and have submitted all relevant material to IAEA safeguards, and to adequate physical protection measures, in paragraphs (c) and (g) of the exchange of letters completed by the letters from Member States' foreign ministers to Canadian ambassadors on physical protection. I also note that the Community has provided Canada with the description of the current and planned nuclear energy programmes of the Community and of its Member States and that the notification and material reporting procedures have been settled.

4. Finally I note that these arrangements take into account inter alia the results of INFCE's studies in relation to the operations in question, as envisaged in paragraph 5 of Annex C to the exchange of letters. I note that the parties, in particular, acknowledge that the separation, storage, transportation and use of plutonium require particular measures to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation; are determined to continue to support the development of international safeguards and other non-proliferation measures relevant to reprocessing and plutonium, including an effective and generally accepted international plutonium storage scheme; recognize the role of reprocessing in connection with the maximum use of available resources and the management of materials contained in spent fuel or other peaceful non-explosive uses, including research, in particular in the context of significant nuclear energy programmes; and desire the predictable and practical implementation of paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters taking into account both their determination to ensure the furtherance of the objective of non-proliferation and the long-term needs of the nuclear energy programmes of the parties.

5. I have the honour to inform the Commission that pursuant to the above, in accordance with paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters, the Government of Canada agrees that material subject to the Agreement may be reprocessed and plutonium stored within the framework of the current and planned nuclear energy programmes as described and up-dated from time to time by the Community and its Member States.

6. I have the honour to inform the Commission that the Agreement given by the Government of Canada in paragraph 5 will remain in force as long as the following conditions are met:

(i) that the Community maintain its commitment to non-proliferation with respect to guideline (a) which is set out in paragraph (c) of the exchange of letters, and

(ii) that the Community continue to consult with the Government of Canada, as provided for by the Agreement with a view to up-dating the described nuclear energy programmes and informing the Government of Canada of any significant changes.

7. Paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters provides that material subject to the Agreement shall be enriched beyond 20 % and that uranium enriched beyond 20 % shall be stored only according to conditions agreed upon in writing between the parties. I have the honour to propose that the parties agree to consult within 40 days of the receipt of a request from either party to consider proposals for conditions to be agreed upon in writing according to which material subject to the Agreement may be enriched beyond 20 % or uranium enriched beyond 20 % may be stored.

8. I have the honour to confirm that the documents containing the descriptions of current and planned nuclear energy programmes of the Community and its Member States shall remain confidential to the Contracting Parties.

9. If the foregoing is acceptable to the European Atomic Energy Community, I have the honour to propose that this letter, which is authentic in both English and French, together with Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall constitute the Agreement required by paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters, and replace both Annex C thereto and the 23 December 1980 exchange of letters. This Agreement shall take effect as of the date of Your Excellency's reply to this letter.

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Letter from the Community

Brussels, 18 December 1981

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of todays date which reads as follows:

“1. I have the honour to refer to the 16 January 1978 exchange of letters between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (hereinafter referred to as the exchange of letters) amending the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy of 6 October 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement) particularly in so far as it relates to safeguards (followed by an additional exchange of letters). I specifically refer to paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters which states that:

“Material referred to in paragraph (c) shall be enriched beyond 20 % or reprocessed and plutonium or uranium enriched beyond 20 % shall be stored only according to conditions agreed upon in writing between the parties (see Annex C: Interim Arrangement concerning enrichment, reprocessing and subsequent storage of nuclear material within the Community and Canada).”

Paragraph 5 of Annex C states that the parties would commence negotiations as soon as possible after 31 December 1979, or the termination of the INFCE study, whichever was earlier, with a view to replacing the Interim Arrangement by other arrangements that would take into account inter alia any results of the INFCE studies in relation to the operations in question.

2. These negotiations have now been completed and I have the honour to propose that the guidelines set forth below should cover reprocessing and plutonium storage and use:

(a) an effective commitment to non-proliferation should have been made and should continue to be maintained by the party envisaging reprocessing and plutonium storage and use;

(b) all nuclear material subject to a peaceful uses commitment in facilities involved in reprocessing and the storage and use of plutonium should be subject to IAEA safeguards;

(c) all nuclear material subject to a peaceful uses commitment in facilities involved in reprocessing and the subsequent storage and use activities, including related transport, should be subject to adequate physical protection measures;

(d) mutually satisfactory notification and material reporting procedures should be in place between the parties;

Mr Richard Tait,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,

Head of the Canadian Mission to the European Communities

(e) a description of the current and planned nuclear energy programme including in particular a detailed description of the policy, legal and regulatory elements relevant to reprocessing and plutonium storage and use should be provided by the party envisaging such activities;

(f) the parties should agree to periodic and timely consultations at which inter alia the information provided under guideline (e) above would be updated and significant changes in the nuclear energy programme would receive the fullest possible consideration;

(g) the reprocessing and plutonium storage should only take place when the information provided on the nuclear energy programme of the party in question has been received, when the undertakings, arrangements and other information called for by the guidelines are in place or have been received and when the parties have agreed that reprocessing and plutonium storage are an integral part of the described nuclear energy programme; where it is proposed to carry out reprocessing or storage of plutonium when these conditions are not met, the operation should take place only when the parties have so agreed after consultation, which should take place promptly to consider any such proposal;

(h) the reprocessing and plutonium storage envisaged should only take place so long as the commitment of the party in question to non-proliferation does not change and so long as the commitment to periodic and timely consultations referred to in guideline (f) is honoured.

3. I note that Canada and the Community have agreed that the objectives of the above guidelines have been met.

In particular I note that Canada and the Community and its Member States, to the extent of their respective competences, have made an effective commitment to non-proliferation and have submitted all relevant material to IAEA safeguards, and to adequate physical protection measures in paragraphs (c) and (g) of the exchange of letters completed by the letters from Member States' foreign ministers to Canadian ambassadors on physical protection. I also note that the Community has provided Canada with the description of the current and planned nuclear energy programmes of the Community and of its Member States and that the notification and material reporting procedures have been settled.

4. Finally I note that these arrangements take into account inter alia the results of INFCE's studies in relation to the operations in question as, envisaged in paragraph 5 of Annex C to the exchange of letters. I note that the parties, in particular acknowledge that the separation, storage transportation and use of plutonium require particular measures to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation; are determined to continue to support the development of international safeguards and other non-proliferation measures relevant to reprocessing and plutonium including an effective and generally accepted international plutonium storage scheme; recognize the role of reprocessing in connection with the maximum use of available resources and the management of materials contained in spent fuel or other peaceful non-explosive uses, including research, in particular in the context of significant nuclear energy programmes; and desire the predictable and practical implementation of paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters taking into account both their determination to ensure the furtherance of the objective of non-proliferation and the long-term needs of the nuclear energy programmes of the parties.

5. I have the honour to inform the Commission that pursuant to the above, in accordance with paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters, the Government of Canada agrees that material subject to the Agreement may be reprocessed and plutonium stored within the framework of the current and planned nuclear energy programmes as described and up-dated from time-to-time by the Community and its Member States.

6. I have the honour to inform the Commission that the agreement given by the Government of Canada in paragraph 5 will remain in force as long as the following conditions are met:

(i) that the Community maintain its commitment to non-proliferation with respect to guideline (a) which is set out in paragraph (c) of the exchange of letters, and

(ii) that the Community continue to consult with the Government of Canada, as provided for by the Agreement, with a view to up-dating the described nuclear energy programmes and informing the Government of Canada of any significant changes.

7. Paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters provides that material subject to the Agreement shall be enriched beyond 20 % and that uranium enriched beyond 20 % shall be stored only according to conditions agreed upon in writing between the parties. I have the honour to propose that the parties agree to consult within 40 days of the receipt of a request from either party to consider proposals for conditions to be agreed upon in writing according to which material subject to the Agreement may be enriched beyond 20 % or uranium enriched beyond 20 % may be stored.

8. I have the honour to confirm that the documents containing the descriptions of current and planned nuclear energy programmes of the Community and its Member States shall remain confidential to the Contracting Parties.

9. If the foregoing is acceptable to the European Atomic Energy Community, I have the honour to propose that this letter, which is authentic in both English and French, together with Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall constitute the agreement required by paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters and replace both Annex C thereto and the 23 December 1980 exchange of letters. This Agreement shall take effect as of the date of Your Excellency's reply to this letter.”

I have further the honour to inform Your Excellency that the European Atomic Energy Community takes note of the guidelines set forth by the Canadian Government in Your Excellency's letter and accepts that they should cover the reprocessing of material subject to the Agreement and the storage of plutonium so obtained and agrees that Your Excellency's letter and this reply shall constitute the agreement required by paragraph (e) of the exchange of letters and replace both Annex C thereto and the 23 December 1980 exchange of letters.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

▼B

’









ANNEX I

DECLARATION ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

‘The Member States and the Community are prepared to confirm to the Canadian Government that they recognize the legitimacy of transferring sensitive technology within the meaning of the London Guidelines on the conditions laid down therein. They note that Canada also intends to make transfers of CANDU technology (heavy water moderated pressure tube reactor technology and fuel element fabrication technology, D2O technology) and other technology specific to its fuel cycle to any Member State subject to certain conditions.

They consider that it is or will be for the Member States wishing to import such technology to conclude agreements with Canada comprising the commitments required by the Canadian Government in connection with these transfers.

However, these States must be entitled to transfer this technology to another Member State on condition that the second recipient Member State has provided the Canadian Government with the same commitments as those provided by the first Member State.

Accordingly, the Community and the Member States confirm that there is no obstacle to the conclusion of such agreements between Canada and any Member State of the Community wishing to conclude them, provided that these agreements are entirely consistent with the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.’









ANNEX II

TECHNICAL NOTE

1. ‘Pro rata’ principle

Where Canadian material is produced, processed or used together with material of other origin, materials produced as well as losses during the operation will be attributed to materials subject to the Canada/Euratom Agreement in proportion to the percentage of materials subject to that agreement initially included in the mixture. The words ‘produced, processed or used’ cover conversion, fabrication, enrichment, reprocessing and irradiation.

2. Interpretation with respect to double labelling

In many cases, material which originates in one of the Contracting Parties to the 1959 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, as amended, is sent to a third State for processing, including conversion, enrichment and fabrication, before delivery to the receiving Contracting Party. Such processed material is obtained by the receiving Contracting Party pursuant to the 1959 Agreement and is therefore subject to the provisions of that Agreement, as amended.

It is recognized that there is legitimate concern regarding the accumulation of safeguard provisions over nuclear material and the resulting administrative problems. These difficulties are being considered in international fora and suppliers and recipients should continue to seek mutually satisfactory solutions, both bilaterally and multilaterally.









ANNEX III

NOTE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION

From Euratom Member State Foreign Minister to Canadian Ambassadors.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of 6 October 1959, as amended (hereinafter referring to as the Agreement).

In addition to the obligations to Canada entered into under the Agreement, I have the honour to inform you that my Government confirms that the items referred to in the Agreement which are within the territory, jurisdiction or control of my Government shall be subject to the levels of physical protection described in the Agreement.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 16 January 1978

Mr Chargé d'Affaires,

I refer to the Agreement between us of 16 January 1978 and have the honour to state that during the Council consideration of that Agreement the following interpretation was given by the Council concerning the effect of the Agreement in relation to the period after the interim period:

‘In approving the exchange of letters between Canada and Euratom, the Council recognizes that the conditions under which:

— material covered by the Canada/Euratom Agreement shall be enriched beyond 20 % or reprocessed,

— and those under which uranium enriched beyond 20 % and plutonium shall be stored,

have been covered by an Agreement for an interim period.

For materials supplied after the end of the interim period, an agreement on the regime governing these sensitive operations remains to be concluded. The Council, therefore, recognizes that, for these materials, the parties have not accepted any obligation, either as to the supply of the materials or as to the fact that the regime to be negotiated, and which would govern the sensitive operations, would include any conditions, nor a fortiori as to the nature of any such conditions.’

I would be obliged if you would confirm that this interpretation is shared by the Canadian authorities.

Please accept, Mr Chargé d'Affaires, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Mr P. D. Lee

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Mission of Canada

to the European Communities

Rue de Loxum, 6 (fifth floor)

1000 Brussels

MISSION OF CANADA TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 16 January 1978

Mr Commissioner,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 16 January 1978, stating the following:

‘Mr Chargé d'Affaires,

I refer to the Agreement between us of 16 January 1978 and have the honour to state that during the Council consideration of that Agreement the following interpretation was given by the Council concerning the effect of the Agreement in relation to the period after the interim period:

“In approving the exchange of letters between Canada and Euratom, the Council recognizes that the conditions under which:

— material covered by the Canada/Euratom Agreement shall be enriched beyond 20 % or reprocessed,

— and those under which uranium enriched beyond 20 % and plutonium shall be stored, have been covered by an Agreement for an interim period.

For materials supplied after the end of the interim period, an agreement on the regime governing these sensitive operations remains to be concluded. The Council, therefore, recognizes that, for these materials, the parties have not accepted any obligation, either as to the supply of the materials or as to the fact that the regime to be negotiated, and which would govern the sensitive operations, would include any conditions, nor a fortiori as to the nature of any such conditions.”

I would be obliged if you would confirm that this interpretation is shared by the Canadian authorities.

Please accept, Mr Chargé d'Affaires, the assurance of my highest consideration.’

I have the honour to confirm that this interpretation is shared by the Canadian authorities.

Please accept, Mr Commissioner, the assurance of my highest consideration.

P. D. LEE

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Mr Guido Brunner

Commissioner

Commission of the European Communities

Rue de la Loi, 200

1049 Brussels