1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 1
This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents
►B COMMISSIONRECOMMENDATION
of8January1998
oninterconnectioninaliberalised telecommunications market
(Part1—Interconnectionpricing)
(TextwithEEArelevance)
(98/195/EC)
(OJ L 73, 12.3.1998, p. 42)
Amended by:
Official Journal
No page date
►M1Commission Recommendation of 29 July 1998 (98/511/EC) L 228 30 15.8.1998
►M2Commission Recommendation of 20 March 2000 (2000/263/EC) L 83 30 4.4.2000
NB: This consolidated version contains references to the European unit of account and/or the ecu, which from 1 January 1999
should be understood as references to the euro — Council Regulation (EEC) No 3308/80 (OJ L 345, 20.12.1980, p. 1) andCouncil Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 (OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 1).
▼B
COMMISSIONRECOMMENDATION
of8January1998
oninterconnectioninaliberalised telecommunicationsmarket
(Part1—Interconnectionpricing)
(TextwithEEArelevance)
(98/195/EC)
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
Having regard to Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in telecommunica-
tions with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperabilitythrough the application of the principlesof open network provis ion(ONP)(
1), and in particular Article 7(5) thereof,
Whereas Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending
Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full compe-tition in telecommunicationsmarkets (
2), abolishes special and
exclusive rights as regards the provision of telecommunications
networks and services;
Whereasit isCommunity policy to create an open and competitive
market in the telecommunicationss ector; whereasfor new entrantsinthe telecommunicationsmarket s eeking to compete with the incumbentoperators, interconnection to the existing public switched telecommuni-cations networks is essential, and interconnection charges represent one
of the biggest items of expenditure for new market entrants; whereas
the Community hasagreed a regulatory framework for interconnectionass et out in Directive 97/33/EC;
WhereasDirective 97/33/EC givesnational regulatory authoritiesfor
telecommunications (NRAs) an important role in securing adequateinterconnection of networks, in accordance with Community law,taking into account recommendations defined by the Commission soasto facilitate the development of a genuine European home market
(recital 12); whereas, in particular, Article 7(5) of Directive 97/33/EC
calls upon the Commission to draw up recommendations on costaccounting systems and accounting separation; whereas, in accordancewith the principle of subsidiarity, the setting of tariffs for interconnec-tion is a responsibility of the Member States;
WhereasArticle 7(2) of Directive 97/33/EC requiresthat certain orga-
nisations notified by their NRA as having significant market power
(hereinafter referred to as‘notified operators ’) follow the principlesof
transparency and cost orientation for interconnection charges, andstates that the burden of proof that charges are cost-oriented lies withthe organisation providing interconnection to its network;
Whereas the Commission considers that that most appropriate approach
to interconnection pricing isone bas ed on forward-looking long-runaverage incremental costs, since this is most compatible with a compe-
titive market; whereasthisapproach doesnot preclude the us e of
justified ‘mark-ups’ as a means of recovering the forward-looking jointand common costs of an efficient operator as would arise under compe-titive conditions;
Whereasuntil interconnection chargesbas ed on forward-looking long-
run average incremental costs are put in place, it is appropriate topublish international comparisons of interconnection charges as a
means of assisting national regulatory authorities in ensuring the imple-
mentation of cost-oriented interconnection to the networks of notifiedoperators;1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 2
(1) OJ L 199, 26. 7. 1997, p. 32.
(2) OJ L 74, 22. 3. 1996, p. 13.
▼B
WhereasArticle 7(5) of Directive 97/33/EC callsfor NRAsto ens ure
that the cost accounting systems used by the organisations concernedare suitable to ensure transparency and cost orientation, but does not
specify a particular cost accounting system; whereas an approach to
interconnection pricing based on forward-looking long-run averageincremental costs implies an accounting system based on current costsrather than historic costs; whereas activity based accounts can be usedto build a ‘top-down’ model of the long-run average incremental cost
of interconnection;
Whereasthe cos t of terminating a call from an interconnected network
should not depend on the type of network on which the call originated;whereasthe principle of non-dis crimination meansthat the interconnec-tion tariffsfor call termination s ervicesprovided by notified operatorsshould not in general discriminate between calls originating from fixednetworksand callsoriginating from mobile networks , nor between calls
originating from networksin the s ame Member State and callsorigi-
nating from networksin other Member States ;
WhereasMember State may make the provis ion of telecommunications
services, including the establishment and/or operation of telecommuni-cations networks required for the provision of such services, subject toauthorisations in accordance with Directive 97/13/EC of the EuropeanParliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common frame-
work for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of
telecommunicationss ervices (
1); whereasthe general principlesof the
Treaty and the particular requirementsof the Directive 97/33/EC,mean thal all pointsof interconnection open to national operatorsshould also be open to autorised operators in other Member States
who wish to deliver cross-border traffic; whereas the established prac-
tice that existing network operators can deliver traffic to other MemberStates without needing authorisations in the destination Member State,or needing to be established in the destination Member State, is consis-tent with the principle that delivery of traffic to a Member State doesnot constitute the offering of a service in that Member State;
Whereas Directive 97/33/EC allows Member States to establish
mechanisms for sharing the net cost of universal service obligations
between organisations operating public telecommunications networksand/or pubicly available voice telephony services;
WhereasArticle 12(1) of Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of 13 December 1995 on the application ofopen network provision to voice telephony(
2) requirestariffsfor us e
of the fixed public telephone network and the voice telephony service
to follow the basic principles of cost orientation and transparency;
whereascontributionsby interconnected partiesto ‘acces sdeficit’ typeschemes are only permissible when tariff constraints are imposed byNRAs on the grounds of affordability and accessibility of telephoneservice in accordance with Article 12(2) of Directive 95/62/EC;whereas the Commission has indicated that it believes such schemes
should disappear by 1 January 2000(
3);
Whereasthe application of the principless et out in thisrecommenda-
tion iswithout prejudice to the duty of the Member Statesand ofundertakingsto fully comply with the EU competition rules , takingaccount of the specific positions set out in the communication fromthe Commission on the application of the competition rules to accessagreementsin the telecommunicationss ector(
4);1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 3
(1) OJ L 117, 7. 5. 1997, p. 15.
(2) OJ L 321, 30. 12. 1995, p. 6.
(3) COM(96) 608, 27.11.1996, Commission communication on assessment
criteria for national schemes for the costing and financing of universal
service in telecommunications and guidelines for the Member States on
operation of such schemes.
(4) OJ C 76, 11. 3. 1997, p. 9.
▼B
Whereas the advisory committee set up by Article 9(1) of Directive 90/
387/EEC on the establishment of the internal market for telecommuni-cationss ervicesthrough the implementation of open network
provision(
1) (‘the ONP Committee’) hasgiven broad s upport to the
principlescontained in thisrecommendation, and the Commis s ion hastaken utmost account of the views expressed,
MAKES THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION:
1. Thisrecommendation concernsthe interconnection of telecommu-
nicationsnetworks , and in particular the pricing of calltermination on the networksof operatorsdes ignated by their
national regulatory authority ashaving s ignificant market power
(hereinafter referred to as‘notified operators ’) in accordance withDirective 97/33/EC.
2. Article 7(2) of Directive 97/33/EC requiresthe interconnection
chargesof notified operatorsto follow the principlesof cos t orien-
tation and transparency. The principle of cost orientation whenapplied to interconnection meansthat interconnection chargesshould reflect the way in which the costs of interconnection areactually incurred. Notified operatorss hould be able to recover theone-off incremental cost required to connect the networks, and the
incremental capacity costs imposed by the interconnecting traffic.
Annex I of thisrecommendation providesfurther detailson the
type of costs associated with call termination.
3. Interconnection costs should be calculated on the basis of forward-
looking long run average incremental costs, since these costsclosely approximate those of an efficient operator employingmodern technology. Interconnection chargeswhich are bas ed onsuch costs may include justified ‘mark-ups’ to cover a portion of
the forward-looking joint and common costs of an efficient
operator, as would arise under competitive conditions.
4. The interconnection charges based on ‘best current practice’ given
below provide guidance to NRAs when assessing the interconnec-tion charges for call termination proposed by notified operators,
until calculated costs for interconnection based on forward-looking,
long-run average incremental costs are available.
Based on the data given in Annex II of this recommendation, the
following ‘best current practice’ charges are recommended
maximum interconnection chargesfor the period s tarting 1 January
1998.1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 4
(1) OJ L 192, 24. 7. 1990, p. 1.
▼B
4a. Based on the data given in Annex II of this Recommendation, the
following ‘best current practice’ charges are recommendedmaximum interconnection chargesfor the period s tarting 1 January2000:
‘Best current practice’ interconnection charges
5. It isrecommended that where chargeslie outs ide the rangesof
‘best current practice’ charges given in point 4, national regulatoryauthoritiesus e their rightsunder Article 7(2) of the Directive 97/33/EC to request full justification of the proposed charges, and ifappropriate, to require retrospective changes to interconnectioncharges. The ranges of ‘best current practice’ charges given in1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 5
▼M2
▼B
▼B
point 4 are considered to be wide enough to cover recognised cost
differencesbetween Member States .
6. The use of forward-looking, long-run average incremental costs
implies a cost accounting system using activity-based allocationsof current costs, rather than historic costs. It is recommended thatnational regulatory authorities (NRAs) set deadlines for their noti-fied operatorsfor the implementation of new cos tsaccounting
systems based on current costs, where such systems are not already
in place. Activity-based costing systems, in which costs are allo-cated to each product and/or service on the basis of theunderlying cost drivers and activities of an efficient operator, arerecommended in order to minimise the joint and common costs
that cannot be directly allocated.
7. In keeping with current practive for cross-border interconnection
between operators of established networks, and the principle ofnon-discrimination, operators authorised in one Member State thatmerely interconnect to deliver traffic to another Member State, and
that do not offer services or operate infrastructure in that other
Member State, should not need to be authorised or established inthat other Member State.
It isrecommended that the reference interconnection offer of noti-
fied organisations should include — as a discrete unbundled
element of the interconnection offer — termsand conditionsandtariffs for the transmission link between the actual point of inter-connection and the border of the Member State.
8. Without prejudice to the principle of non-discrimination, any
contributionsto acces sdeficitsor univers al s ervice paid by organi-sations operating public telecommunications networks and/or voicetelephony services operators in a Member State (which in accor-dance with Community law must be separated frominterconnection charges), should not be imposed on organisations
which merely interconnect to deliver traffic to a Member State
and do not actually offer telecommunicationss ervicesin thatMember State, nor be imposed indirectly on consumers in otherMember States.
9.►
M2ThisRecommendation, in particular the need to continue
with publication of ‘best current practice’ charges and the metho-dology used, will be reviewed at the end of 2000. ◄
10. This recommendation is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 8 January 1998.
For the Commission
Martin BANGEMANN
Member of the Commission1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 6
▼B
ANNEX I
COMPONENTS OF INTERCONNECTION CHARGES FOR CALL
TERMINATION
Directive 97/33/EC requiresthe interconnection chargesof notified operatorsto
follow the principles of cost orientation. This Annex considers the implications
of thisrequirement for the componentsof an interconnection charge for call
termination.
1.Pricingthelocalloopforinterconnectionpurposes
The local loop refersto the final linksbetween the cus tomer and the local
exchange. In a fixed network using wired or wireless local loops, the cost of
an unswitched local loop is largely a one-off cost, with periodic maintenance
costs. Where call termination is being purchased, the ‘lowest’ place in the
network where this can occur is on the main network side of the local switch(1).
Interconnection at this point may impose additional switch capacity costs, but
there is no additional capacity cost or investment requirement relating to those
componentsof the local loop which are dedicated to a particular cus tomer (i.e.
the pair of copper wiresin a traditional network).
It follows from the principle of cost orientation that since the provision of inter-
connection does not lead to any increase of costs in the dedicated components of
the local loop of the terminating network, the calculation of interconnection
charges should not include any component relating to the direct cost of the
subscriber-dedicated components of the local loop. The cost of those compo-
nents in the unswitched local loop that are dedicated to a particular customer
should therefore be recovered from that customer through a subscriber line
charge, or as a combination of this and revenues from other services, to the
extent that competition permits.
A difficulty arises if the incumbent is prevented from rebalancing its tariffs by
regulatory measures and thus cannot charge an economic price to its own custo-
mers to cover the cost of the local loop. This gives rise to the so-called ‘access
deficit’. In a monopoly environment the operator compensates for the deficit in
the ‘access network’ (i.e. the local loop) by charging prices in excess of
economic cost for other services, such as international calls. With cost-oriented
interconnection, competitors are able to capture some of this long distance and
international traffic, and the incumbent's ability to compensate for the access
deficit is reduced. An access deficit scheme involves contributions being
imposed on other operators to compensate the incumbent for the loss of
revenuesthat would have been us ed to fund thisdeficit.
Access deficit contribution schemes always provide inefficient investment
signals, and raise overall industry costs. They are also administratively cumber-
some, and lack transparency. As mentioned in the ‘Guidelines on costing and
pricing of universal service’ published by the Commission in November
1996(2) it is expected that access deficit type schemes will only be applied on
a temporary basis, up to the year 2000, by which time a sufficient level of re-
balancing should have been completed in all Member States.
In accordance with the Interconnection Directive, any contribution to ‘access
deficits’ paid by interconnecting parties must be clearly separated from the
interconnection charges. Payment of ‘access deficit contributions’ by intercon-
nected parties is only permissible under Community law where Member States
impose regulatory constraints on the retail tariffs of notified operators. Where an
operator is not prevented by regulatory measures from rebalancing its tariffs,
and ‘access deficit’ charge is not justified.
2.Pricing uncompletedcallsforinterconnectionpurposes
Uncompleted busy hour calls that originate from interconnected networks may
impose additional capacity costs on a terminating network. In some cases,
however, the reason for call failure could be lack of performance of the incum-
bent'sown network. The Interconnection Directive placesthe onusof proof
regarding costs on the network operator, so any operator seeking to include in
itsinterconnection tariffsa fee for uncompleted callswould have to demons trate
that lack of performance of itsown network had not been a reas on for call
failure.1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 7
(1) The provision of ‘unbundled’ local loop, whereby a new entrant takes over and has
exclusive use of a local loop installed by an incumbent, for an appropriate fee, is notstrictly ‘interconnection’ in EU terms.
(
2) COM(96) 608, 27. 11. 1996.
▼B
3.Callset-upchargesforinterconnectionpurposes
In a fixed network, switch costs are mainly driven by two factors — call dura-
tion and call events (i.e. signalling and call set-up). A great deal of information
is required to determine the proper balance in terms of cost causation between
these two types of costs. Partly because of this, it is common for regulatory
authorities to allow recovery of switching costs only on the basis of duration
of completed calls. A charge for call set-up could only be considered to be a
valid component of an interconnection tariff if the operator could demonstrate
the extent to which callsoriginating from interconnected networksimpos ed
incremental costs on the terminating network in terms of additional processing
power required to handle the additional call set-up attempts occurring during the
peak period. If a call set-up charge is used, the corresponding call duration
charges should be lower than when there is no call set-up charge.
4.Interconnectionchargesandretail pricing
Some countries have in the past calculated interconnection charges on the basis
of discounted retail tariffs. However, current retail tariffs are not necessarily
cost-oriented, and this approach would in most cases be incompatible with the
requirementsof Community law.
Even if retail tariffs were cost-oriented, the approach is not desirable because it
tends to lock new entrants into the same retail tariff structure as that of the
incumbent, thuspreventing the development by new entrantsof innovative retail
tariff schemes targeted at different types of user. The variety and choice of retail
tariff schemes currently available on mobile networks in Member States shows
there is considerable scope for innovative retail tariffing as a means of providing
consumer choice and increasing the market demand for telecommunications
services.
Where interconnection chargesinclude time of day and day of week variations ,
they should be applied in a non-discriminatory manner to new entrants and to
the incumbent'sown traffic.1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 8
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ANNEX II
‘BESTPRACTICE’INTERCONNECTCHARGESANDTHEIRDERIVA-
TION
1.Approach
The approach taken is to use the interconnect charges in the three lowest cost
Member States(for which data wasavailable at 1 September 1997) asthe
starting point for a set of ‘best current practice’ figures at which to aim in the
short term.
The figure below shows the level of interconnection charges for Member States.
The costs in this figure refer to call termination on fixed networks at peak rates.
Call set-up charges are included where they exist, but other non-traffic-related
chargesare in general not included. The figuresdo not include any ‘acces s
deficit’ type contributions or universal service contributions. These additional
contributionswill not be required in many Member States , but where they are
required aspart of the regulatory environment in a Member State, they mus t
be calculated and shown separately from the interconnection charge, in accor-
dance with the Interconnection Directive.
Note that these figures concern one specific element of the cost of interconnec-
tion, i.e. the charge for call termination. They do not represent the full
interconnection chargesthat may be payable in a given country.
1997/1998—Interconnectionrates
Figure 1
Interconnectionchargesforlocal,singletransitanddoubletransitlevels,at
peakrates
(rate in ECU/100 per minute, based on a three minute call duration)1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 9
▼M2
Figure 1a:
Interconnectionratesforcall termination(1November1999)
The tables in section 3 give the data upon which this chart is based.
There are factors such as average density of connections, labour costs, geolo-
gical factors, permitted rate of return on capital employed(1), which vary
between EU Member States. While such variations will to some extent affect
the cost of interconnection, the differences are not considered to be large enough
to invalidate the ‘best current practice’ charges recommended here(2).
It isintended to review the figuresin thisrecommendation during 1998, and it is
to be expected that the ‘best current practice’ interconnection charges will be
progressively reduced in the future to reflect both the downward trend in
network costs and better estimation of those costs. Currently interconnection
chargesworldwide are reducing at about 8 % per annum.
It must be stressed that these ‘best current practice’ charges are higher — in
some cases considerably higher — than those which would be expected using
a bottom-up LRAIC calculation. Nevertheless given the situation in the EU as
of January 1998, it is considered that these ‘best current practice’ charges repre-
sent a realistic intermediate goal.
2.Derivationof‘bestcurrentpractice’ interconnectioncharges
The price rangeswere derived from the tariffsthat were available asof 1
September 1997. Changesin interconnection tariffsoccurring after that date
have not been taken into account.
The top price in each range shown above corresponds to the charge that applied
at 1 September 97 in the third lowest-cost Member State, rounded up to the
nearest ECU/1 000.
The bottom price in each range corresponds to the charge that applied at 1
September 97 in the lowest cost Member State, rounded down to the nearest
ECU/1 000, and with an adjustment to the ‘double transit’ rate to take account
of the fact that in smaller Member States a distance component of less than
200 km may be appropriate.1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 10
(1) Historically, the real cost of capital has been higher in some countries, and some
regionsof the world compared with other. Ratesof return on capital employed maytherefore differ between states by several percentage points per annum.
(
2) The density of connections is largely reflected in access cost, a dedicated cost to the
end customer, rather than imposing great differences in interconnection rates. A similar
argument can be made regarding differencesin geological factors .▼B
3.DetailedcostdataforMember States
Interconnect chargesper minute bas ed on a three-minute call duration asof 1
January 1998 basic starting values in ECU cents (ECU/100)Exchange rates
to ECU at
September
1997Interconnection chargesin local currencies
Date at which pricesare effective, other s upplementary information
Member State Local Single transitDouble
transit (1)
UK 0,64 0,91 1,74 0,68 Pricesfrom October 1997 (GBP/100):
— local exchange = 0,434 per min.
— single tandem = 0,618 per min.— double tandem (> 200 km) = 1,177 per min.
Spain (
2) 1,51 (3) 1,51 4,22 166 Pricess ince April 1997 (ESP):
— local = not provided
— metropolitan = 2,5 per min.— national = 7 per min.
France 0,71 1,73 2,55 6,59 Pricesfor 1 January 1998 (FRF/100):
— local exchange = 4,69 per min.
— single tandem = 11,40 per min.— double tandem (> 200 km) = 16,77 per min.
Chargeswithout ADC or USO contribution
Germany (
4) 1,00 (5) 1,71-2,16 (6) 2,61 1,97 Pricesfor 1 January 1998 (DEM/100):
— city = 1,97 per min.
— Regio50 = 3,36 par min.
— Regio200 = 4,25 per min.
— national = 5,14 per min.
Finland 1,81 (3) 1,81 4,20 (7) 5,88 Pricess ince September 1997 (FIM/100):
— local = not provided
— metropolitan = 20 per call + 4 per min.— national = 20 per call + 13,8 to 18 per min.
Denmark 0,98 1,82 2,22 7,49 Pricess ince September 1997 (DKK/100):
— local exchange = 4 per call + 6 per min.
— single tandem = 8 per call + 11 per min.— double tandem = 8 per call + 14 per min.▼B1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 11
Interconnect chargesper minute bas ed on a three-minute call duration asof 1
January 1998 basic starting values in ECU cents (ECU/100)Exchange rates
to ECU at
September
1997Interconnection chargesin local currencies
Date at which pricesare effective, other s upplementary information
Member State Local Single transitDouble
transit (1)
Netherlands2,00 (3) 2,00 2,52 2,21 Pricess ince July 1997 (NLG/100):
— local exchange = not provided
— local segment = 2,5 per call + 3,6 per min.— national = 3,2 per call + 4,5 per min.
Sweden 1,68 2,15 2,98 8,51 Pricess ince January 1997 (SEK/100):
— local exchange = 7 per call + 12 per min.
— single segment = 7 per call + 16 per min.— double segment = 7 per call + 23 per min.
Italy (*) 1,54 (
8) 2,52 1 921 Proposed tariffs for 1 January 1998 (ITL):
— local (only from 1 September 1998) = 29,6 per min.
— region = 48,4 per min.— national = not provided
Belgium (*) 2,78 (
3) 2,78 3,62 40 Proposed tariffs for 1 January 1998 (BEF):
— local = not provided
— region = 0,354 per call + 0,996 per min.— national = 0,460 per call + 1,294 per min.
Austria (*) 7,61 (
3) 7,61 8,41 13,79 Proposed tariffs for 1 January 1998 (ATS/100):
— local = not provided
— region = 1,05 per min.— national = 1,16 per min.
Source: OVUM and Commission services
(*) Initial tariffspropos ed by the operator but not yet approved by the national regulatory authority.
(1) The ‘double transit’ rate includes a distance component for links of > 200 km.
(2) In Spain, until full liberalisation on 1 December 1998, (in accordance with the derogation granted under Directive 96/19/EC) this offer is only avai lable to a limited
number of authorised operators.
(3) In Spain, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria the lowest interconnection charge covers interconnection at a local or a tandem exchange. Thus the ‘local’ rate isthe
same as the ‘single transit’ rate.
(4) Interconnection charges in Germany were not available on 1 September 1997 and have not been used in the derivation of ‘best current practice’ price ra nges. The four
zones in Germany, which are defined by distance, do not correspond on a 1:1 basis to the three bands in the table which are defined in technical terms.
(5) In Germany the local tariff is in general identical with the so-called City-zone, which also covers large cities, but might sometimes include single transit interconnection.▼B1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 12
(6) In Germany the single transit segment or metropolitan area is covered by two regional zones: Regio50 = 1,71 ECU/100 per minute and Regio200 = 2,16 ECU/ 100 per
minute (Regio200 might sometimes include double transit connection).
(7) The price range isbetween 3,48 and 4,20 according to traffic carried.
(8) In Italy local tariffsare only available from 1 September 1998.
In Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal, telecommunications organisations have not published interconnection prices, in accordance with th e derogationsgranted under
Directice 96/19/EC.▼B1998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 13
Table
InterconnectioncostdataforMemberStates(1November1999)
Interconnect chargesper minute bas ed on a three minute call duration
Basic starting values in cents per minute
Pricesare exclus ive of VAT Exchange rates
to euroInterconnection chargesin local currencies
Date at which pricesare effective
Other supplementary information
Member StatesLocal Single trans itDouble
transit (2)
Austria 1,82 (1) 1,82 2,40 13,76 Pricess ince January 1998 (ATS):
— local = not provided
— region = 0,25 per min.— national = 0,33 per min.
Belgium 1,07 1,80 2,56 40,34 Pricess ince January 1999 (BEF):
— local = 0,156 per call + 0,378 per min.
— region = 0,295 per call + 0,628 per min.— national = 0,418 per call + 0,894 per min.
Denmark (
5) 0,84 1,18 1,80 7,434 Pricess et by NRA from 1.10.1999 (DKK/100):
— local exchange = 4 per call + 4,9 min.
— single tandem = 6 per call + 6,8 per min.— double tandem = 6 per call + 11,4 per min.
Finland 1,43 (
1) 1,43 2,63-3,28 (3) 5,945 Pricess ince May 1999 (FIM/100):
— local = not provided
— teledistrict = 16,5 per call + 3 per min.— national = teledistrict + 7,15 to 11 per min.
France 0,61 1,50 2,23 6,559 Pricess ince January 1999 (FRF/100):
— local exchange = 4,03 per min.
— single tandem = 9,81 per min.
— double tandem (> 200 km) = 14,65 per min.
Germany (
4) 1,01 1,72-2,17 2,63 1,956 Pricess ince January 1998 (DEM/100):
— City = 1,97 per min.
— Regio 50 = 3,36 per min.— Regio 200 = 4,25 per min.— National = 5,14 per min.▼M21998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 14
Interconnect chargesper minute bas ed on a three minute call duration
Basic starting values in cents per minute
Pricesare exclus ive of VAT Exchange rates
to euroInterconnection chargesin local currencies
Date at which pricesare effective
Other supplementary information
Member StatesLocal Single trans itDouble
transit (2)
Greece (*) 1,93 (1) 1,93 2,76 329,3 Pricesfor mobile operators(GRD):
— metropolitan = 1,7 per call + 5,8 per min.
— national = 2,4 per call + 8,3 per min.
Italy (7) 1,00 1,60 2,29 1 936 Pricess ince July 1999 (ITL):
— local = 19,4 per min.
— single transit = 31 per min.— double transit = 44,4 per min.
Ireland 1,04 1,60 2,26 0,7876 Pricess ince 1 December 1998 (IEP/100):
— local = 0,82 per min.
— single transit = 1,27 per min.— double transit = 1,78 per min.
Luxembourg 2,25 (
1) 2,25 2,25 40,34 Pricess ince September 1998 (LUF):
— any level: 0,335 per call + 0,796 per min.
Netherlands(6) 1,00 1,41 1,70 2,204 Pricescharged s ince 1.7.1998 (NLG/100):
— local exchange = 1,5 per call + 1,7 per min.
— single transit = 2,1 per call + 2,4 per min.— double transit = 2,5 per call + 2,9 per min.
Portugal 0,99 1,63 2,58 200,5 Pricesdecided by ICP for 2000 (PTE):
— local = 2 per call + 1,32 per min.
— metropolitan = 2 per call + 2,60 per min.— national = 2 per call + 4,50 per min.
Spain 0,99 1,59 3,07 166,4 Pricess ince 1 December 1998 (ITL):
— local = 1,65 per min.
— single transit = 2,65 per min.
— double transit = 5,11 per min.▼M21998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 15
Interconnect chargesper minute bas ed on a three minute call duration
Basic starting values in cents per minute
Pricesare exclus ive of VAT Exchange rates
to euroInterconnection chargesin local currencies
Date at which pricesare effective
Other supplementary information
Member StatesLocal Single trans itDouble
transit (2)
Sweden (8) 0,86-0,90 1,16-1,21 1,59-1,67 9,09-8,68 Pricess ince March 1999 (SEK/100):
— local exchange = 4,2 per call + 6,4 per min.
— single segment = 4,9 per call + 8,9 per min.— double segment = 5,6 per call + 12,6 per min.
United Kingdom 0,54 0,82 1,71 0,641 Pricess ince March 1999 (GBP/100):
— local exchange = 0,3472 per min.
— single tandem = 0,5279 per min.
— double tandem (> 200 km) = 1,098 per min.
Source: Commission and national regulatory authorities.
Notes
(1) In Finland, Austria, Greece and Luxembourg the lowest interconnection charge covers interconnection at a local or a tandem exchange. Thus the ‘loca l’ rate isthe s ame as
the ‘single transit’ rate.
(2) The ‘double transit’ rate includes a distance component for links of > 200 km
(3) In Finland at double-transit there is a price range depending on the volume of traffic carried.
(4) The four distance-related tariff zones in Germany cannot be translated, in the ratio 1: 1, into the three technical element based areas defined in the Table. In Germany, the
local tariff area is identical to the so-called City Zone which always comprises several local networks, i.e., including also those of large cities. S ingle-transit interconnec-
tions are also established in this City Zone, specially in large cities. Therefore, in Germany, City Zone interconnections are also included within t he single-transit
interconnection services area. As concerning the Regio-200 Zone, double-transit interconnections are also established. Hence, apart from nation al interconnections,
Regio-200 interconnection services are also included within the double-transit interconnection services area.
(5) The Danish NRA set new tariffs from 1 October 1999. However, the Telecommunications Complaints Board is currently reviewing these new tariffs follo wing an appeal
over the NRA decision, and therefore these figures have not been used in the calculation of ‘best current practice’ for year 2000 (Previous tariffs sin ce 15 August 1999
were: Local = 0,93 cent per minute, Single-Transit = 1,67 cent per minute, Double-Transit = 1,91 cent per minute).
(6) At pres ent OPTA isdeciding on the final tariffsfor the period 1 July 1998 to 1 July 1999, and the preliminary tariffsfor the period 1 July 1999 to 1 July 2 000. Until these
preliminary tariffsare determined, KPN will have to offer the tariffsasmentioned in the Table. Thes e are the preliminary tariffsfor the period 1 Jul y 1998 to 1 July 1999,
asdetermined by OPTA las t year.
(7) Preliminary tariffs set by Italian NRA pending final decision.
(8) Price range reflects significant currecy fluctuations that have taken place in Sweden since new tariffs were set in March 1999 until November 1999. T he lowest figures
have been considered to derive ‘best current practice’.
(*) Tariffsnot yet approved by the national regulatory authority▼M21998H0195 — EN — 04.04.2000 — 002.001 — 16