1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 1
This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents
►B COMMISSIONRECOMMENDATION
of8January1998
oninterconnectioninaliberalised telecommunications market
(Part1—Interconnectionpricing)
(TextwithEEArelevance)
(98/195/EC)
(OJ L 73, 12.3.1998, p. 42)
Amended by:
Official Journal
No page date
►M1Commission Recommendation of 29 July 1998 (98/511/EC) L 228 30 15.8.1998
NB: This consolidated version contains references to the European unit of account and/or the ecu, which from 1 January 1999
should be understood as references to the euro — Council Regulation (EEC) No 3308/80 (OJ L 345, 20.12.1980, p. 1) andCouncil Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 (OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 1).
▼B
COMMISSIONRECOMMENDATION
of8January1998
oninterconnectioninaliberalised telecommunicationsmarket
(Part1—Interconnectionpricing)
(TextwithEEArelevance)
(98/195/EC)
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
Having regard to Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in telecommunica-
tions withregard to ensuring universal service and interoperabilitythrough the application of the principles of open network provision(ONP)(
1), and in particular Article 7(5) thereof,
Whereas Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending
Directive 90/388/EEC withregard to th e implementation of full compe-tition in telecommunications markets(
2), abolishes special and
exclusive rights as regards the provision of telecommunications
networks and services;
Whereas it is Community policy to create an open and competitive
market in the telecommunications sector; whereas for new entrants inthe telecommunications market seeking to compete with the incumbentoperators, interconnection to the existing public switched telecommuni-cations networks is essential, and interconnection charges represent one
of the biggest items of expenditure for new market entrants; whereas
the Community has agreed a regulatory framework for interconnectionas set out in Directive 97/33/EC;
Whereas Directive 97/33/EC gives national regulatory authorities for
telecommunications (NRAs) an important role in securing adequateinterconnection of networks, in accordance withCommunity law,taking into account recommendations defined by the Commission soas to facilitate the development of a genuine European home market
(recital 12); whereas, in particular, Article 7(5) of Directive 97/33/EC
calls upon the Commission to draw up recommendations on costaccounting systems and accounting separation; whereas, in accordancewith the principle of subsidiarity, the setting of tariffs for interconnec-tion is a responsibility of the Member States;
Whereas Article 7(2) of Directive 97/33/EC requires that certain orga-
nisations notified by their NRA as having significant market power
(hereinafter referred to as ‘notified operators’) follow the principles of
transparency and cost orientation for interconnection charges, andstates that the burden of proof that charges are cost-oriented lies withthe organisation providing interconnection to its network;
Whereas the Commission considers that that most appropriate approach
to interconnection pricing is one based on forward-looking long-runaverage incremental costs, since this is most compatible with a compe-
titive market; whereas this approach does not preclude the use of
justified ‘mark-ups’ as a means of recovering the forward-looking jointand common costs of an efficient operator as would arise under compe-titive conditions;
Whereas until interconnection charges based on forward-looking long-
run average incremental costs are put in place, it is appropriate topublishinternational comparisons of interconnection ch arges as a
means of assisting national regulatory authorities in ensuring the imple-
mentation of cost-oriented interconnection to the networks of notifiedoperators;1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 2
(1) OJ L 199, 26. 7. 1997, p. 32.
(2) OJ L 74, 22. 3. 1996, p. 13.
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Whereas Article 7(5) of Directive 97/33/EC calls for NRAs to ensure
that the cost accounting systems used by the organisations concernedare suitable to ensure transparency and cost orientation, but does not
specify a particular cost accounting system; whereas an approach to
interconnection pricing based on forward-looking long-run averageincremental costs implies an accounting system based on current costsrather than historic costs; whereas activity based accounts can be usedto build a ‘top-down’ model of the long-run average incremental cost
of interconnection;
Whereas the cost of terminating a call from an interconnected network
should not depend on the type of network on which the call originated;whereas the principle of non-discrimination means that the interconnec-tion tariffs for call termination services provided by notified operatorsshould not in general discriminate between calls originating from fixednetworks and calls originating from mobile networks, nor between calls
originating from networks in the same Member State and calls origi-
nating from networks in other Member States;
Whereas Member State may make the provision of telecommunications
services, including the establishment and/or operation of telecommuni-cations networks required for the provision of such services, subject toauthorisations in accordance with Directive 97/13/EC of the EuropeanParliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common frame-
work for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of
telecommunications services(
1); whereas the general principles of the
Treaty and the particular requirements of the Directive 97/33/EC,mean thal all points of interconnection open to national operatorsshould also be open to autorised operators in other Member States
who wish to deliver cross-border traffic; whereas the established prac-
tice that existing network operators can deliver traffic to other MemberStates without needing authorisations in the destination Member State,or needing to be established in the destination Member State, is consis-tent with the principle that delivery of traffic to a Member State doesnot constitute the offering of a service in that Member State;
Whereas Directive 97/33/EC allows Member States to establish
mechanisms for sharing the net cost of universal service obligations
between organisations operating public telecommunications networksand/or pubicly available voice telephony services;
Whereas Article 12(1) of Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of 13 December 1995 on the application ofopen network provision to voice telephony(
2) requires tariffs for use
of the fixed public telephone network and the voice telephony service
to follow the basic principles of cost orientation and transparency;
whereas contributions by interconnected parties to ‘access deficit’ typeschemes are only permissible when tariff constraints are imposed byNRAs on the grounds of affordability and accessibility of telephoneservice in accordance withArticle 12(2) of Directive 95/62/EC;whereas the Commission has indicated that it believes such schemes
should disappear by 1 January 2000(
3);
Whereas the application of the principles set out in this recommenda-
tion is without prejudice to the duty of the Member States and ofundertakings to fully comply withth e EU competition rules, takingaccount of the specific positions set out in the communication fromthe Commission on the application of the competition rules to accessagreements in the telecommunications sector(
4);1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 3
(1) OJ L 117, 7. 5. 1997, p. 15.
(2) OJ L 321, 30. 12. 1995, p. 6.
(3) COM(96) 608, 27.11.1996, Commission communication on assessment
criteria for national schemes for the costing and financing of universal
service in telecommunications and guidelines for the Member States on
operation of suchsch emes.
(4) OJ C 76, 11. 3. 1997, p. 9.
▼B
Whereas the advisory committee set up by Article 9(1) of Directive 90/
387/EEC on the establishment of the internal market for telecommuni-cations services through the implementation of open network
provision(
1) (‘the ONP Committee’) has given broad support to the
principles contained in this recommendation, and the Commission hastaken utmost account of the views expressed,
MAKES THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION:
1. This recommendation concerns the interconnection of telecommu-
nications networks, and in particular the pricing of calltermination on the networks of operators designated by their
national regulatory authority as having significant market power
(hereinafter referred to as ‘notified operators’) in accordance withDirective 97/33/EC.
2. Article 7(2) of Directive 97/33/EC requires the interconnection
charges of notified operators to follow the principles of cost orien-
tation and transparency. The principle of cost orientation whenapplied to interconnection means that interconnection chargesshould reflect the way in which the costs of interconnection areactually incurred. Notified operators should be able to recover theone-off incremental cost required to connect the networks, and the
incremental capacity costs imposed by the interconnecting traffic.
Annex I of this recommendation provides further details on the
type of costs associated withcall termination.
3. Interconnection costs should be calculated on the basis of forward-
looking long run average incremental costs, since these costsclosely approximate those of an efficient operator employingmodern technology. Interconnection charges which are based onsuchcosts may include justified ‘mark-ups’ to cover a portion of
the forward-looking joint and common costs of an efficient
operator, as would arise under competitive conditions.
4. The interconnection charges based on ‘best current practice’ given
below provide guidance to NRAs when assessing the interconnec-tion charges for call termination proposed by notified operators,
until calculated costs for interconnection based on forward-looking,
long-run average incremental costs are available.
Based on the data given in Annex II of this recommendation, the
following ‘best current practice’ charges are recommended
maximum interconnection charges for the period starting 1 January
1998.1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 4
(1) OJ L 192, 24. 7. 1990, p. 1.
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4a. Based on the data given in Annex II, the following ‘best current
practice’ charges are recommended maximum interconnection
charges for the period starting 1 January 1999:
‘Best current practice’ interconnection charges
5. It is recommended that where charges lie outside the ranges of
‘best current practice’ charges given in point 4, national regulatory
authorities use their rights under Article 7(2) of the Directive 97/
33/EC to request full justification of the proposed charges, and ifappropriate, to require retrospective changes to interconnectioncharges. The ranges of ‘best current practice’ charges given inpoint 4 are considered to be wide enoughto cover recognised costdifferences between Member States.1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 5
▼M1
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6. The use of forward-looking, long-run average incremental costs
implies a cost accounting system using activity-based allocationsof current costs, rather than historic costs. It is recommended that
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) set deadlines for their noti-
fied operators for the implementation of new costs accountingsystems based on current costs, where such systems are not alreadyin place. Activity-based costing systems, in which costs are allo-cated to each product and/or service on the basis of the
underlying cost drivers and activities of an efficient operator, are
recommended in order to minimise the joint and common coststhat cannot be directly allocated.
7. In keeping withcurrent practive for cross-border interconnection
between operators of established networks, and the principle of
non-discrimination, operators authorised in one Member State thatmerely interconnect to deliver traffic to another Member State, andthat do not offer services or operate infrastructure in that otherMember State, should not need to be authorised or established inthat other Member State.
It is recommended that the reference interconnection offer of noti-
fied organisations should include — as a discrete unbundledelement of the interconnection offer — terms and conditions andtariffs for the transmission link between the actual point of inter-
connection and the border of the Member State.
8. Without prejudice to the principle of non-discrimination, any
contributions to access deficits or universal service paid by organi-sations operating public telecommunications networks and/or voicetelephony services operators in a Member State (which in accor-
dance withCommunity law must be separated from
interconnection charges), should not be imposed on organisationswhich merely interconnect to deliver traffic to a Member Stateand do not actually offer telecommunications services in thatMember State, nor be imposed indirectly on consumers in other
Member States.
9. This recommendation, and in particular the ‘best current practice
charges’ in point 4 and the data in Annex II, will be reviewed bythe Commission by ►
M131 July 1999 ◄at the latest, and
updated where necessary.
10. This recommendation is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 8 January 1998.
For the Commission
Martin BANGEMANN
Member of the Commission1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 6
▼B
ANNEX I
COMPONENTS OF INTERCONNECTION CHARGES FOR CALL
TERMINATION
Directive 97/33/EC requires the interconnection charges of notified operators to
follow the principles of cost orientation. This Annex considers the implications
of this requirement for the components of an interconnection charge for call
termination.
1.Pricingthelocalloopforinterconnectionpurposes
The local loop refers to the final links between the customer and the local
exchange. In a fixed network using wired or wireless local loops, the cost of
an unswitched local loop is largely a one-off cost, with periodic maintenance
costs. Where call termination is being purchased, the ‘lowest’ place in the
network where this can occur is on the main network side of the local switch(1).
Interconnection at this point may impose additional switch capacity costs, but
there is no additional capacity cost or investment requirement relating to those
components of the local loop which are dedicated to a particular customer (i.e.
the pair of copper wires in a traditional network).
It follows from the principle of cost orientation that since the provision of inter-
connection does not lead to any increase of costs in the dedicated components of
the local loop of the terminating network, the calculation of interconnection
charges should not include any component relating to the direct cost of the
subscriber-dedicated components of the local loop. The cost of those compo-
nents in the unswitched local loop that are dedicated to a particular customer
should therefore be recovered from that customer through a subscriber line
charge, or as a combination of this and revenues from other services, to the
extent that competition permits.
A difficulty arises if the incumbent is prevented from rebalancing its tariffs by
regulatory measures and thus cannot charge an economic price to its own custo-
mers to cover the cost of the local loop. This gives rise to the so-called ‘access
deficit’. In a monopoly environment the operator compensates for the deficit in
the ‘access network’ (i.e. the local loop) by charging prices in excess of
economic cost for other services, such as international calls. With cost-oriented
interconnection, competitors are able to capture some of this long distance and
international traffic, and the incumbent's ability to compensate for the access
deficit is reduced. An access deficit scheme involves contributions being
imposed on other operators to compensate the incumbent for the loss of
revenues that would have been used to fund this deficit.
Access deficit contribution schemes always provide inefficient investment
signals, and raise overall industry costs. They are also administratively cumber-
some, and lack transparency. As mentioned in the ‘Guidelines on costing and
pricing of universal service’ published by the Commission in November
1996(2) it is expected that access deficit type schemes will only be applied on
a temporary basis, up to the year 2000, by which time a sufficient level of re-
balancing should have been completed in all Member States.
In accordance withth e Interconnection Directive, any contribution to ‘access
deficits’ paid by interconnecting parties must be clearly separated from the
interconnection charges. Payment of ‘access deficit contributions’ by intercon-
nected parties is only permissible under Community law where Member States
impose regulatory constraints on the retail tariffs of notified operators. Where an
operator is not prevented by regulatory measures from rebalancing its tariffs,
and ‘access deficit’ charge is not justified.
2.Pricing uncompletedcallsforinterconnectionpurposes
Uncompleted busy hour calls that originate from interconnected networks may
impose additional capacity costs on a terminating network. In some cases,
however, the reason for call failure could be lack of performance of the incum-
bent's own network. The Interconnection Directive places the onus of proof
regarding costs on the network operator, so any operator seeking to include in
its interconnection tariffs a fee for uncompleted calls would have to demonstrate
that lack of performance of its own network had not been a reason for call
failure.1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 7
(1) The provision of ‘unbundled’ local loop, whereby a new entrant takes over and has
exclusive use of a local loop installed by an incumbent, for an appropriate fee, is notstrictly ‘interconnection’ in EU terms.
(
2) COM(96) 608, 27. 11. 1996.
▼B
3.Callset-upchargesforinterconnectionpurposes
In a fixed network, switchcosts are mainly driven by two factors — call dura-
tion and call events (i.e. signalling and call set-up). A great deal of information
is required to determine the proper balance in terms of cost causation between
these two types of costs. Partly because of this, it is common for regulatory
authorities to allow recovery of switching costs only on the basis of duration
of completed calls. A charge for call set-up could only be considered to be a
valid component of an interconnection tariff if the operator could demonstrate
the extent to which calls originating from interconnected networks imposed
incremental costs on the terminating network in terms of additional processing
power required to handle the additional call set-up attempts occurring during the
peak period. If a call set-up charge is used, the corresponding call duration
charges should be lower than when there is no call set-up charge.
4.Interconnectionchargesandretail pricing
Some countries have in the past calculated interconnection charges on the basis
of discounted retail tariffs. However, current retail tariffs are not necessarily
cost-oriented, and this approach would in most cases be incompatible with the
requirements of Community law.
Even if retail tariffs were cost-oriented, the approach is not desirable because it
tends to lock new entrants into the same retail tariff structure as that of the
incumbent, thus preventing the development by new entrants of innovative retail
tariff schemes targeted at different types of user. The variety and choice of retail
tariff schemes currently available on mobile networks in Member States shows
there is considerable scope for innovative retail tariffing as a means of providing
consumer choice and increasing the market demand for telecommunications
services.
Where interconnection charges include time of day and day of week variations,
they should be applied in a non-discriminatory manner to new entrants and to
the incumbent's own traffic.1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 8
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ANNEX II
‘BESTPRACTICE’INTERCONNECTCHARGESANDTHEIRDERIVA-
TION
1.Approach
The approach taken is to use the interconnect charges in the three lowest cost
Member States (for which data was available at 1 September 1997) as the
starting point for a set of ‘best current practice’ figures at which to aim in the
short term.
The figure below shows the level of interconnection charges for Member States.
The costs in this figure refer to call termination on fixed networks at peak rates.
Call set-up charges are included where they exist, but other non-traffic-related
charges are in general not included. The figures do not include any ‘access
deficit’ type contributions or universal service contributions. These additional
contributions will not be required in many Member States, but where they are
required as part of the regulatory environment in a Member State, they must
be calculated and shown separately from the interconnection charge, in accor-
dance withth e Interconnection Directive.
Note that these figures concern one specific element of the cost of interconnec-
tion, i.e. the charge for call termination. They do not represent the full
interconnection charges that may be payable in a given country.
1997/1998—Interconnectionrates
Figure 1
Interconnectionchargesforlocal,singletransitanddoubletransitlevels,at
peakrates
(rate in ECU/100 per minute, based on a three minute call duration)1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 9
▼M1
Figure 1a:
Interconnectionratesforcalltermination(May1998)
The tables in section 3 give the data upon which this chart is based.
There are factors such as average density of connections, labour costs, geolo-
gical factors, permitted rate of return on capital employed(1), which vary
between EU Member States. While such variations will to some extent affect
the cost of interconnection, the differences are not considered to be large enough
to invalidate the ‘best current practice’ charges recommended here(2).
It is intended to review the figures in this recommendation during 1998, and it is
to be expected that the ‘best current practice’ interconnection charges will be
progressively reduced in the future to reflect both the downward trend in
network costs and better estimation of those costs. Currently interconnection
charges worldwide are reducing at about 8 % per annum.
It must be stressed that these ‘best current practice’ charges are higher — in
some cases considerably higher — than those which would be expected using
a bottom-up LRAIC calculation. Nevertheless given the situation in the EU as
of January 1998, it is considered that these ‘best current practice’ charges repre-
sent a realistic intermediate goal.
2.Derivationof‘bestcurrentpractice’ interconnectioncharges
The price ranges were derived from the tariffs that were available as of 1
September 1997. Changes in interconnection tariffs occurring after that date
have not been taken into account.
The top price in each range shown above corresponds to the charge that applied
at 1 September 97 in the third lowest-cost Member State, rounded up to the
nearest ECU/1 000.
The bottom price in each range corresponds to the charge that applied at 1
September 97 in the lowest cost Member State, rounded down to the nearest1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 10
(1) Historically, the real cost of capital has been higher in some countries, and some
regions of the world compared with other. Rates of return on capital employed maytherefore differ between states by several percentage points per annum.
(
2) The density of connections is largely reflected in access cost, a dedicated cost to the
end customer, rather than imposing great differences in interconnection rates. A similar
argument can be made regarding differences in geological factors.▼B
▼B
ECU/1 000, and withan adjustment to th e ‘double transit’ rate to take account
of the fact that in smaller Member States a distance component of less than
200 km may be appropriate.1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 11
3.DetailedcostdataforMember States
Interconnect charges per minute based on a three-minute call duration as of 1
January 1998 basic starting values in ECU cents (ECU/100)Exchange rates
to ECU at
September
1997Interconnection charges in local currencies
Date at which prices are effective, other supplementary information
Member State Local Single transitDouble
transit (1)
UK 0,64 0,91 1,74 0,68 Prices from October 1997 (GBP/100):
— local exchange = 0,434 per min.
— single tandem = 0,618 per min.— double tandem (> 200 km) = 1,177 per min.
Spain (
2) 1,51 (3) 1,51 4,22 166 Prices since April 1997 (ESP):
— local = not provided
— metropolitan = 2,5 per min.— national = 7 per min.
France 0,71 1,73 2,55 6,59 Prices for 1 January 1998 (FRF/100):
— local exchange = 4,69 per min.
— single tandem = 11,40 per min.— double tandem (> 200 km) = 16,77 per min.
Charges without ADC or USO contribution
Germany (
4) 1,00 (5) 1,71-2,16(6) 2,61 1,97 Prices for 1 January 1998 (DEM/100):
— city = 1,97 per min.
— Regio50 = 3,36 par min.
— Regio200 = 4,25 per min.
— national = 5,14 per min.
Finland 1,81 (3) 1,81 4,20(7) 5,88 Prices since September 1997 (FIM/100):
— local = not provided
— metropolitan = 20 per call + 4 per min.— national = 20 per call + 13,8 to 18 per min.
Denmark 0,98 1,82 2,22 7,49 Prices since September 1997 (DKK/100):
— local exchange = 4 per call + 6 per min.
— single tandem = 8 per call + 11 per min.— double tandem = 8 per call + 14 per min.▼B1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 12
Interconnect charges per minute based on a three-minute call duration as of 1
January 1998 basic starting values in ECU cents (ECU/100)Exchange rates
to ECU at
September
1997Interconnection charges in local currencies
Date at which prices are effective, other supplementary information
Member State Local Single transitDouble
transit (1)
Netherlands 2,00 (3) 2,00 2,52 2,21 Prices since July 1997 (NLG/100):
— local exchange = not provided
— local segment = 2,5 per call + 3,6 per min.— national = 3,2 per call + 4,5 per min.
Sweden 1,68 2,15 2,98 8,51 Prices since January 1997 (SEK/100):
— local exchange = 7 per call + 12 per min.
— single segment = 7 per call + 16 per min.— double segment = 7 per call + 23 per min.
Italy (*) 1,54 (
8) 2,52 1 921 Proposed tariffs for 1 January 1998 (ITL):
— local (only from 1 September 1998) = 29,6 per min.
— region = 48,4 per min.— national = not provided
Belgium (*) 2,78 (
3) 2,78 3,62 40 Proposed tariffs for 1 January 1998 (BEF):
— local = not provided
— region = 0,354 per call + 0,996 per min.— national = 0,460 per call + 1,294 per min.
Austria (*) 7,61 (
3) 7,61 8,41 13,79 Proposed tariffs for 1 January 1998 (ATS/100):
— local = not provided
— region = 1,05 per min.— national = 1,16 per min.
Source:OVUM and Commission services
(*) Initial tariffs proposed by the operator but not yet approved by the national regulatory authority.
(1) The ‘double transit’ rate includes a distance component for links of > 200 km.
(2) In Spain, until full liberalisation on 1 December 1998, (in accordance with the derogation granted under Directive 96/19/EC) this offer is only avai lable to a limited
number of authorised operators.
(3) In Spain, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria the lowest interconnection charge covers interconnection at a local or a tandem exchange. Thus the ‘local’ rate is the
same as the ‘single transit’ rate.
(4) Interconnection charges in Germany were not available on 1 September 1997 and have not been used in the derivation of ‘best current practice’ price ra nges. The four
zones in Germany, which are defined by distance, do not correspond on a 1:1 basis to the three bands in the table which are defined in technical terms.
(5) In Germany the local tariff is in general identical with the so-called City-zone, which also covers large cities, but might sometimes include single transit interconnection.▼B1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 13
(6) In Germany the single transit segment or metropolitan area is covered by two regional zones: Regio50 = 1,71 ECU/100 per minute and Regio200 = 2,16 ECU/ 100 per
minute (Regio200 might sometimes include double transit connection).
(7) The price range is between 3,48 and 4,20 according to traffic carried.
(8) In Italy local tariffs are only available from 1 September 1998.
In Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal, telecommunications organisations have not published interconnection prices, in accordance with th e derogations granted under
Directice 96/19/EC.▼B1998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 14
Table 1a:
DetailedinterconnectioncostdataforMember States(May1998)
Interconnect charges per minute, based on a 3 minute call duration
Basic starting in ECU-cents (i.e. ECU/100)
Prices are exclusive of VATExchange rates
to ECU
(May 1998)Interconnection charges in local currencies, date at which prices are
effective, other supplementary information
Member State Local Single transitDouble
transit (4)
Austria 1,80 (1) 1,80 2,37 13,9 Prices since 1.1.1998 (ATS):
— local = not provided
— region = 0,25 per min.— national = 0,33 per min.
Belgium 1,11 2,10 2,94 41 Prices since 1.1.1998 (BEF):
— local = 0,14 per call + 0,41 per min.
— region = 0,27 per call + 0,77 per min.— national = 0,38 per call + 1,08 per min.
Denmark 0,98 1,82 2,22 7,50 Prices since September 1997 (DKK/100):
— local exchange = 4 per call + 6 per min.
— single tandem = 8 per call + 11 per min.— double tandem = 8 per call + 14 per min.
Finland 1,42-1,58(
1) 1,42-1,58(2) 2,81-3,91(2) 6,01 Prices for 1.9.1998 (FIM/100):
— local = not provided
— teledistrict = 16,5 per call + 3 or 4 per min.— national = teledistrict + 8,8 to 14 per min.
France 0,70 1,71 2,52 6,63 Prices since 1 January 1998 (FF/100):
— local exchange = 4,69 per min.
— single tandem = 11,40 per min.
— double tandem (> 200 km) = 16,77 per min.
Germany (
5) 0,99 1,69-2,14 2,58 1,98 Prices since 1 January 1998 (DM/100):
— City = 1,97 per min.
— Regio50 = 3,36 per min.— Regio200 = 4,25 per min.— National = 5,14 per min.▼M11998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 15
Interconnect charges per minute, based on a 3 minute call duration
Basic starting in ECU-cents (i.e. ECU/100)
Prices are exclusive of VATExchange rates
to ECU
(May 1998)Interconnection charges in local currencies, date at which prices are
effective, other supplementary information
Member State Local Single transitDouble
transit (4)
Greece (*) 1,81 (1) 1,81 2,59 351 Prices proposed for mobile operators in 1998 (GRD):
— metropolitan = 1,7 per call + 5,8 per min.
— national = 2,4 per call + 8,3 per min.
Italy (*) 1,51 (3) 2,47 1 958 Proposed tariffs for 1.1.1998 (ITL):
— local (only from 1.9.1998) = 29,6 per min.
— region = 48,4 per min.— national = not provided
Ireland 2,20 4,15 5,18 0,79 Prices for mobile operators in 1998 (IRLP/100):
— local = 1,74 per min.
— single tandem = 3,28 per min.— national = 4,09 per min.
Luxembourg (*) 2,01 (
1) 2,01 2,01 41 Proposed prices for 1.7.1998 (LUF):
— any level: 0,825 per minute
Netherlands (6) 1,17 1,60 2,06 2,23 Priced as determined by OPTA (NLG/100):
— local exchange = 1,5 per call + 2,1 per min.
— metropolitan = 2,3 per call + 2,8 per min.— national = 3 per call + 3,6 per min.
Portugal (*)(
7) 1,20 2,37 18 203 Prices since 1997 for mobile operators (PTE):
— local = 2,43 per min.
— metropolitan = 4,86 per min.— national = 36,4 per min.
Spain 1,49 (
1) 1,49 4,17 168 Prices since April 1997 (ESP):
— local = not provided
— metropolitan = 2,5 per min.
— National = 7 per min.▼M11998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 16
Interconnect charges per minute, based on a 3 minute call duration
Basic starting in ECU-cents (i.e. ECU/100)
Prices are exclusive of VATExchange rates
to ECU
(May 1998)Interconnection charges in local currencies, date at which prices are
effective, other supplementary information
Member State Local Single transitDouble
transit (4)
Sweden 1,14 1,77 2,41 8,45 Prices since 1.1.1998 (SEK/100):
— local exchange = 7 per call + 7,3 per min.
— single segment = 7 per call + 12,6 per min.— double segment = 7 per call + 18 per min.
United Kingdom 0,61 0,87 1,69 0,68 Prices in May 1998 (GBP/100):
— local exchange = 0,4117 per min.
— single tandem = 0,5928 per min.
— double tandem (> 200 km) = 1,1518 per min.
Source:NRAs and Commission
Notes
(1) In Spain, Finland, Austria, Greece and Luxembourg the lowest interconnection charge covers interconnection at a local or a tandem exchange. Thus th e ‘local’ rate is the
same as the ‘single transit’ rate.
(2) In Finland there are two prices at single transit according to the teledistrict area number, and at double transit there is a price range depending on t he volume of traffic
carried.
(3) In Italy local tariffs are only available from 1 September 1998.
(4) The ‘double transit’ rate includes a distance component for links of > 200 km.
(5) The four price zones in Germany, which are defined by distance, do not correspond on a 1:1 basis to the three bands in the table which are defined in techn ical terms.
(6) In the Netherlands the interconnect prices for single transit and double transit are those set by NRA in a dispute settlement procedure. Since an appe al has been lodged
against this decision, other prices than those shown in the table currently apply for single and double transit (as of 1 March these are ECU 1,82 per minu te at single transit
and ECU 2,33 per minute at double transit).
(7) In Portugal, the interconnection tariffs shown are those applied by Portugal Telecom to mobile operators and they may be linked to the level of retail tariffs applied by
mobile operators. The situation is under review by the National Regulatory Authority (ICP).
(*) Last tariffs proposed by the operator but not yet approved by the national regulatory authority.▼M11998H0195 — EN — 03.08.1998 — 001.001 — 17