2010D0231 — EN — 26.04.2013 — 004.001

This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents

Amended by:









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COUNCIL DECISION 2010/231/CFSP

of 26 April 2010

concerning restrictive measures against Somalia and repealing Common Position 2009/138/CFSP







THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, Whereas: (1) On 10 December 2002, the Council adopted Common Position 2002/960/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia ( 1 ) following United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 733 (1992), 1356 (2001) and 1425 (2002) relating to an arms embargo against Somalia. (2) On 16 February 2009, the Council adopted Common Position 2009/138/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia and repealing Common Position 2002/960/CFSP ( 2 ), implementing UNSCR 1844 (2008) which introduced restrictive measures against those who seek to prevent or block a peaceful political process, or those who threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) of Somalia or the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia or in the region. (3) On 1 March 2010, the Council adopted Council Decision 2010/126/CFSP amending Common Position 2009/138/CFSP ( 3 ) and implementing UNSCR 1907 (2009) which called upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, all cargoes to and from Somalia, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under the general and complete arms embargo to Somalia established pursuant to paragraph 5 of UNSCR 733 (1992) and elaborated and amended by subsequent resolutions. (4) On 19 March 2010, the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Security Council’) adopted UNSCR 1916 (2010) which, inter alia, extended the mandate of the monitoring group referred to in paragraph 3 of UNSCR 1558 (2004) and decided to ease some restrictions and obligations under the sanctions regime to enable the delivery of supplies and technical assistance by international, regional and sub-regional organisations and to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance by the United Nations (UN). (5) On 12 April 2010, the Sanctions Committee established by paragraph 11 of UNSCR 751 (1992) concerning Somalia (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Sanctions Committee’) adopted the list of persons and entities which are subject to restrictive measures. (6) For the sake of clarity, the measures imposed by Common Position 2009/138/CFSP as amended by Council Decision 2010/126/CFSP and the exemptions provided for in UNSCR 1916 (2010) should be integrated into a single legal instrument. (7) Common Position 2009/138/CFSP should therefore be repealed. (8) This Decision respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ( 4 ) and notably the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the right to property and the right to the protection of personal data. This Decision should be applied in accordance with those rights and principles. (9) This Decision also fully respects the obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations and the legally binding nature of Security Council Resolutions. (10) The procedure for amending the ►M4 Annex I ◄ to this Decision should include providing to designated persons and entities the reasons for their listing as transmitted by the Sanctions Committee, so as to give them an opportunity to present observations. Where observations are submitted or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council should review its decision in the light of those observations and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly. (11) Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures, Whereas: HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:







Article 1

1. The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned to Somalia by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States shall be prohibited whether originating or not in their territories.

2. The direct or indirect supply to Somalia of technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to military activities, including in particular technical training and assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items mentioned in paragraph 1, by nationals of Member States or from the territories of the Member States, shall be prohibited.

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3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel of all types and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to military activities intended solely for the support of or use by AMISOM as stipulated in paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1744 (2007) or for the sole use of States and regional organisations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1851 (2008) and paragraph 10 of UNSCR 1846 (2008);

(b) the supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment, and the supply of direct or indirect technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to military activities intended solely for the support of, or use by, AMISOM’s strategic partners, operating solely under the African Union Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012, and in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM;

(c) the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel of all types and to the direct or indirect supply of technical advice intended solely for the purpose of helping to develop security sector institutions, consistent with the political process set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of UNSCR 1744 (2007) and in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee within five working days of receiving the relevant notification;

(d) the supply, sale or transfer of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, or of materiel intended for institution building programmes of the Union, or Member States, including in the field of security, carried out within the framework of the Peace and Reconciliation Process, as approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee, and of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by UN personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;

(e) the supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment, and the supply of direct or indirect technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to military activities, intended solely for the support of or use by UN personnel, including the UN Political Office for Somalia or its successor mission;

(f) the supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment, and the supply of direct or indirect technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to military activities intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to deliveries of the items set out in Annex II, if a notification to the Sanctions Committee has been made at least five days in advance in accordance with paragraph 38 of UNSCR 2093 (2013), including, if appropriate, as set out in paragraph 4 of this Article.

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4. A Member State, after having informed the Federal Government of Somalia of its intention to do so, may inform the Sanctions Committee, at least five days in advance, of any provision of assistance under point (f) of paragraph 3. Where a Member State chooses to provide such a notification it shall contain all relevant information, including, where applicable, the type and quantity of weapons, ammunitions, military equipment and materiel to be delivered, and the proposed date of delivery.

5. It shall be prohibited to supply, resale, transfer, or make available for use any weapons or military equipment, sold or supplied solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia to any individual or entity not in the service of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia.

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Article 1a

1. The direct or indirect import, purchase or transport of charcoal from Somalia, whether or not such charcoal originated in Somalia, shall be prohibited.

The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.

2. It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, related to the import, purchase or transport of charcoal from Somalia.

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Article 1b

Member States shall exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Somalia of items not subject to the measures set out in Article 1(1) and over the direct or indirect supply to Somalia of technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to military activities related to those items.

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Article 2

Restrictive measures as provided for in Articles 3, 5(1) and 6(1) and (2) shall be imposed against persons and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee as:

— engaging in, or providing support for, acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threaten the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, or threaten the Federal Government of Somalia or AMISOM by force,

— having acted in violation of the arms embargo or the arms resale and transfer restrictions or the prohibition against providing related assistance as referred to in Article 1,

— obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

— being political or military leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflicts in Somalia in violation of applicable international law,

— being responsible for violations of applicable international law in Somalia involving the targeting of civilians including children and women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual and gender-based violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and abduction and forced displacement.

The relevant persons and entities are listed in the Annex I.

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Article 3

Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical assistance or training, financial and other assistance including investment, brokering or other financial services, related to military activities or to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of weapons and military equipment, to persons or entities referred to in Article 2.

Article 4

1. Member States shall inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from Somalia in their territory, including at their airports and seaports, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited under Article 3.

2. Aircrafts and vessels transporting cargo to and from Somalia shall be subject to the requirement of additional pre-arrival or pre-departure information for all goods brought into or out of a Member State.

3. Member States shall, upon discovery, seize and dispose of (either by destroying or rendering inoperable) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited under Article 3.

Article 5

1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the persons referred to in Article 2.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.

3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the Sanctions Committee:

(a) determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation,

(b) determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia and stability in the region.

4. In cases where, pursuant to paragraph 3, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons designated by the Sanctions Committee, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned thereby.

Article 6

1. All funds and economic resources owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the persons or entities referred to in Article 2 or held by entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by them or by any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, as designated by the Sanctions Committee, shall be frozen. The persons and entities concerned are identified in the ►M4 Annex I ◄ .

2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the persons or entities referred to in paragraph 1.

3. Member States may allow for exemptions from the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 in respect of funds and economic resources which are:

(a) necessary for basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

(b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

(c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds and economic resources;

(d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, after notification by the Member State concerned to, and approval by, the Sanctions Committee;

(e) the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered before designation by the Sanctions Committee of the person or entity concerned, and is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in Article 2, after notification by the Member State concerned to the Sanctions Committee.

4. The exemptions referred to in paragraph 3(a), (b) and (c) may be made after notification to the Sanctions Committee by the Member State concerned of its intention to authorise, where appropriate, access to such funds and economic resources, and in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee within three working days of such notification.

5. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

(a) interest or other earnings on those accounts; or

(b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which those accounts became subject to restrictive measures,

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to paragraph 1.

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6. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the making available of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners, including bilaterally or multilaterally funded NGOs participating in the UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia.

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Article 7

The Council shall establish the list contained in the ►M4 Annex I ◄ and amend it in accordance with determinations made by either the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee.

Article 8

1. Where the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee lists a person or entity and has provided a statement of reasons for the designation, the Council shall include such person or entity in the ►M4 Annex I ◄ . The Council shall communicate its decision and the statement of reasons to the person or entity concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity an opportunity to present observations.

2. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity accordingly.

Article 9

The ►M4 Annex I ◄ shall include, where available, information provided by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned. With regard to persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address, if known and function or profession. With regard to entities such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business. The ►M4 Annex I ◄ shall also include the date of designation by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee.

Article 10

This Decision shall be reviewed, amended or repealed, as appropriate, in accordance with relevant decisions of the Security Council.

Article 11

Common Position 2009/138/CFSP is hereby repealed.

Article 12

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

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►M4 ANNEX I ◄

LIST OF PERSONS AND ENTITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2

I. Persons

1. Yasin Ali Baynah (a.k.a. a) Ali, Yasin Baynah, b) Ali, Yassin Mohamed, c) Baynah, Yasin, d) Baynah, Yassin, e) Baynax, Yasiin Cali, f) Beenah, Yasin, g) Beenah, Yassin, h) Beenax, Yasin, i) Beenax, Yassin, j) Benah, Yasin, k) Benah, Yassin, l) Benax, Yassin, m) Beynah, Yasin, n) Binah, Yassin, o) Cali, Yasiin Baynax) Date of birth: 24 December 1965. Nationality: Somalia. Alt. Nationality: Sweden. Location: Rinkeby, Stockholm, Sweden; Mogadishu, Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010. Yasin Ali Baynah has incited attacks against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). He has also mobilised support and raised funds on behalf of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia and Hisbul Islam, both of which have actively engaged in acts that threaten the peace and security of Somalia, including rejection of the Djibouti Agreement, and attacks on the TFG and AMISOM forces in Mogadishu.

2. Hassan Dahir Aweys (a.k.a. a) Ali, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, b) Awes, Hassan Dahir, c) Awes, Shaykh Hassan Dahir, d) Aweyes, Hassen Dahir, e) Aweys, Ahmed Dahir, f) Aweys, Sheikh, g) Aweys, Sheikh Hassan Dahir, h) Dahir, Aweys Hassan, i) Ibrahim, Mohammed Hassan, j) OAIS, Hassan Tahir, k) Uways, Hassan Tahir, l) ‘Hassan, Sheikh’) Date of birth: 1935. Citizen: Somalia. Nationality: Somalia. Location: Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010. Hassan Dahir Aweys has acted and continues to act as a senior political and ideological leader of a variety of armed opposition groups responsible for repeated violations of the general and complete arms embargo and/or acts that threaten the Djibouti peace agreement, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces. Between June 2006 and September 2007, AWEYSs served as chairman of the central committee of the Islamic Courts Union; in July 2008 he declared himself chairman of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Asmara wing; and in May 2009 he was named chairman of Hisbul Islam, an alliance of groups opposed to the TFG. In each of these positions, AWEYS’s statements and actions have demonstrated an unequivocal and sustained intention to dismantle the TFG and expel AMISOM by force from Somalia.

3. Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al-Turki (a.k.a. a) Al-Turki, Hassan, b) Turki, Hassan, c) Turki, Hassan Abdillahi Hersi, d) Turki, Sheikh Hassan, e) Xirsi, Xasan Cabdilaahi, f) Xirsi, Xasan Cabdulle) Date of birth: circa 1944. Place of birth: Ogaden Region, Ethiopia. Nationality: Somalia. Location: Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010. Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al-Turki has been a senior leader of an armed militia group since the mid-1990s and had engaged in numerous arms embargo violations. In 2006, al-Turki contributed forces to the Islamic Courts Union take-over of Mogadishu and emerged as a military leader in the group, aligned with al-Shabaab. Since 2006, al-Turki has made territory under his control available for training by various armed opposition groups including al-Shabaab. In September 2007, al-Turki appeared in an al-Jazeera news video showing militia training under his leadership.

4. Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamed (a.k.a. a) Abu Zubeyr, Muktar Abdirahman, b) Abuzubair, Muktar Abdulrahim, c) Aw Mohammed, Ahmed Abdi, d) Aw-Mohamud, Ahmed Abdi, e) ‘Godane’, f) ‘Godani’, g) ‘Mukhtar, Shaykh’, h) ‘Zubeyr, Abu’) Date of birth: 10 July 1977. Place of birth: Hargeysa, Somalia. Nationality: Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010. Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed is a senior leader of al-Shabaab and was publically named emir of the organisation in December 2007. He exercises command responsibility for al-Shabaab operations across Somalia. Aw-Mohamed has denounced the Djibouti peace process as a foreign conspiracy, and in a May 2009 audio recording to Somali media, he acknowledged that his forces were engaged in recent fighting in Mogadishu.

5. Fuad Mohamed Khalaf (a.k.a. a) Fuad Mohamed Khalif, b) Fuad Mohamed Qalaf, c) Fuad Mohammed Kalaf, d) Fuad Mohamed Kalaf, e) Fuad Mohammed Khalif, f) Fuad Khalaf, g) Fuad Shongale, h) Fuad Shongole, i) Fuad Shangole, j) Fuad Songale, k) Fouad Shongale, l) Fuad Muhammad Khalaf Shongole) Nationality: Somalia. Location: Mogadishu, Somalia. Alt. Location: Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010. Fuad Mohamed Khalaf has facilitated financial support to al-Shabaab; in May 2008, he held two fundraising events for al-Shabaab at mosques in Kismaayo, Somalia. In April 2008, Khalaf and several other individuals directed vehicle-borne explosive device attacks on Ethiopian bases and Somali Transitional Federal Government elements in Mogadishu, Somalia. In May 2008, Khalaf and a group of fighters attacked and captured a police station in Mogadishu, killing and wounding several soldiers.

6. Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud (a.k.a. a) Bashir Mohamed Mahmoud, b) Bashir Mahmud Mohammed, c) Bashir Mohamed Mohamud, d) Bashir Mohamed Mohamoud, e) Bashir Yare, f) Bashir Qorgab, g) Gure Gap, h) ‘Abu Muscab’, i) ‘Qorgab’) Date of birth: circa 1979-1982. Alt. Date of birth: 1982. Nationality: Somalia. Location: Mogadishu, Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010. Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud is a military commander of al-Shabaab. Mahamoud was also one of approximately ten members on al-Shabaab’s leadership council as of late 2008. Mahamoud and an associate were in charge of the 10 June 2009 mortar attack against the Somali Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu.

7. Mohamed Sa’id (a.k.a. a) ‘Atom’, b) Mohamed Sa’id Atom, c) Mohamed Siad Atom) Date of birth: circa 1966. Place of birth: Galgala, Somalia. Location: Galgala, Somalia. Alternative Location: Badhan, Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010. Mohamed Sa’id ‘Atom’ has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia. Atom has directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to Somalia arms or related matériel or advice, training, or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to military activities in violation of the arms embargo. Atom has been identified as one of the principal suppliers of arms and ammunition for al-Shabaab operations in the Puntland region. He is described as the leader of a militia that emerged in 2006 in the eastern Sanaag region of northern Somalia. The militia comprises as many as 250 fighters and has been implicated in incidents of kidnapping, piracy and terrorism, and imports its own weapons, in violation of the arms embargo. Atom has established his force as the principal military presence in the area, with a primary base near Galgala and a secondary base near Badhan. According to some information, Atom is aligned with al-Shabaab and may receive instructions from al-Shabaab leader Fu’aad Mohamed Khalaf. Furthermore, Atom is reportedly involved in arms trafficking into Somalia. Information from a number of sources indicates that his forces receive arms and equipment from Yemen and Eritrea. According to a December 2008 report, an eyewitness described six such shipments during a four-week period in early 2008, each sufficient to fill two pickup trucks with small arms, ammunition, and rocket-propelled grenades. According to a Bossaso businessman familiar with the arms trade, Atom’s consignments do not enter the arms market, suggesting that they are either retained for the use of his forces or are transferred to recipients in southern Somalia, where al-Shabaab operates. Atom’s forces were implicated in the kidnapping of a German aid worker, in the kidnapping of two Somalis near Bossaso, and in a bombing of Ethiopian migrants in Bossaso on 5 February 2008, which killed 20 people and wounded over 100 others. Atom’s militia may also have played a secondary role in the kidnapping of a German couple captured by pirates in June 2008.

8. Fares Mohammed Mana’a (a.k.a.: a) Faris Mana’a, b) Fares Mohammed Manaa) Date of birth: 8 February 1965. Place of birth: Sadah, Yemen. Passport No.: 00514146; Place of issue: Sanaa, Yemen. ID Card No.: 1417576; Place of issue: Al-Amana, Yemen; Date of issue: 7 January 1996. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010. Fares Mohammed Mana’a has directly or indirectly supplied, sold or transferred to Somalia arms or related material in violation of the arms embargo. Mana’a is a known arms trafficker. In October 2009, the Yemeni government released a blacklist of arms dealers with Mana’a ‘on top’ as part of an effort to stem the flood of weapons in the country, where weapons reportedly outnumber people. ‘Faris Mana’a is a major weapons trafficker, and that’s well known’, according to June 2009 reporting by a U.S. journalist who is a commentator on Yemeni affairs, authors a semi-annual country report, and has contributed to Jane’s Intelligence Group. In a December 2007 Yemen Times article, he is referenced as ‘Sheikh Fares Mohammed Mana’a, an arms dealer’. In a January 2008 Yemen Times article, he is referred to as ‘Sheikh Faris Mana’a, an arms tradesman’. As of mid-2008, Yemen continues to serve as a hub for illegal arms shipments to the Horn of Africa, particularly arms shipments by boat to Somalia. There are unconfirmed reports that Faris Mana’a has participated in shipments to Somalia on numerous occasions. In 2004, Mana was involved in weapons contracts from Eastern Europe for weapons allegedly marketed to Somali fighters. Despite the Somalia UN arms embargo since 1992, Mana’a’s interest in trafficking arms into Somalia can be traced back at least to 2003. Mana’a made an offer to buy thousands of arms in 2003 from Eastern Europe, and indicated that he planned to sell some of the arms in Somalia.

9. Hassan Mahat Omar (a.k.a.: a) Hassaan Hussein Adam, b) Hassane Mahad Omar, c) Xassaan Xuseen Adan, d) Asan Mahad Cumar, e) Abu Salman, f) Abu Salmaan, g) Sheikh Hassaan Hussein). Date of birth: 10 April 1979. Place of birth: Garissa, Kenya. Nationality: Possibly Ethiopian. Passport No.: A 1180173 Kenya, expiry 20 August 2017. ID Card No.: 23446085. Location: Nairobi, Kenya. Date of UN designation: 28 July 2011. Hassan Mahat Omar is engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia. He is an Imam and one of the leaders of Masjid-ul-Axmar, an informal Al-Shabaab affiliated centre in Nairobi. He is also involved in recruiting new members and soliciting funds for Al-Shabaab, including online at the Al-Shabaab affiliated website alqimmah.net. In addition, he has issued fatwas calling for attacks against the TFG on an Al-Shabaab chat room site.

10. Omar Hammami (a.k.a.: a) Abu Maansuur Al-Amriki, b) Abu Mansour Al-Amriki, c) Abu Mansuur Al-Amriki, d) Umar Hammami, e) Abu Mansur Al-Amriki). Date of birth: 6 May 1984. Place of birth: Alabama, United States. Nationality: United States. Also believed to hold Syrian nationality. Passport No.: 403062567 (US). Social Security No: 423-31-3021 (US). Location: Somalia. Other information: Married to a Somali woman. Lived in Egypt in 2005 and moved to Somalia in 2009. Date of UN designation: 28 July 2011. Omar Hammami is engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia. He is a senior member of Al-Shabaab. He is involved in recruitment, finance and payroll for foreign fighters in Somalia. He is described as an expert in explosives and warfare in general. Since October 2007 he has appeared in television reports and in Al-Shabaab propaganda videos. He has been shown in a video training Al-Shabaab fighters. He has also been shown in videos and on websites calling for more fighters to join Al-Shabaab.

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11. Jim’ale, Ali Ahmed Nur (aka (a) Jim’ale, Ahmed Ali, (b) Jim’ale, Ahmad Nur Ali, (c) Jim’ale, Sheikh Ahmed, (d) Jim’ale, Ahmad Ali, (e) Jim’ale, Shaykh Ahmed Nur) Date of birth: 1954. Place of birth: Eilbur, Somalia. Nationality: Somalia. Alt. nationality: Djibouti. Passport: A0181988 (Somalia), exp. 23 January 2011. Location: Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti. Date of UN designation: 17 February 2012. Ali Ahmed Nur Jim’ale (Jim’ale) has served in leadership roles with the former Somali Council of Islamic Courts, also known as the Somali Islamic Courts Union, which was a radical-Islamist element. The most radical elements of the Somali Islamic Courts Union eventually formed the group known as Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab was listed for targeted sanctions in April 2010 by the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (the ‘Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee’). The Committee listed Al-Shabaab for being an entity engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including but not limited to acts that pose a threat to Somali Transitional Federal Government. According to the 18 July 2011 report of the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee’s Monitoring Group (S/2011/433), Jim’ale is identified as a prominent businessman and figure in the Al-Shabaab charcoal-sugar trading cycle and benefitting from privileged relationships with Al-Shabaab. Jim’ale is identified as one of Al-Shabaab’s chief financiers and is ideologically aligned with Al-Shabaab. Jim’ale has provided key funding and political support for Hassan Dahir Aweys (‘Aweys’), who was also listed by the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee. Former Al-Shabaab Deputy Emir Muktar Robow reportedly continued to engage in political posturing within the Al-Shabaab organisation during the mid-2011. Robow engaged Aweys and Jim’ale in an effort to advance their shared objectives and consolidate their overall stance within the context of the Al-Shabaab leadership rift. As of fall 2007, Jim’ale established a front company in Djibouti for extremist activities called the Investors Group. The short-term goal of the group was, through the funding of extremist activities and weapons purchases, to destabilise Somaliland. The group assisted in smuggling small arms from Eritrea through Djibouti into the fifth region of Ethiopia where extremists received the shipment. As of mid-2008, Jim’ale continued to operate the Investors Group. As of late September 2010, Jim’ale established ZAAD, a mobile-to-mobile money-transfer business and struck a deal with Al-Shabaab to make money transfers more anonymous by eliminating the need to show identification. As of late 2009, Jim’ale had a known hawala fund where he collected zakat, which was provided to Al-Shabaab. As of December 2011, unidentified donors from the Middle East were transferring money to Jim’ale, who in turn used financial intermediaries to send the money to al-Shabaab. In 2009, Jim’ale worked with other like-minded individuals to undermine the Somali TFG by not participating in Somali reconciliation efforts. As of late 2011, Jim’ale actively supported al-Shabaab by offering free communications, use of vehicles, food aid and political advisement and set up fundraisers for al-Shabaab through various business groups.

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12. Aboud Rogo Mohammed (aka (a) Aboud Mohammad Rogo, (b) Aboud Seif Rogo, (c) Aboud Mohammed Rogo, (d) Sheikh Aboud Rogo, (e) Aboud Rogo Muhammad, (f) Aboud Rogo Mohamed) Date of birth: 11 November 1960. Alt. dates of birth: (a) 11 November 1967, (b) 11 November 1969, (c) 1 January 1969. Place of birth: Lamu Island, Kenya. Date of UN designation: 25 July 2012. Kenya-based extremist Aboud Rogo Mohammed has threatened the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, by providing financial, material, logistical, or technical support to al-Shabaab, an entity listed by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia and Resolution 1907 (2009) concerning Eritrea for engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia. Aboud Rogo Mohammed is an extremist Islamic cleric based in Kenya. He continues to exert influence over extremist groups in East Africa as part of his campaign to promote violence throughout East Africa. Aboud Rogo’s activities include fundraising for al-Shabaab. As the main ideological leader of Al Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Center, Aboud Rogo Mohammed has used the extremist group as a pathway for radicalisation and recruitment of principally Swahili-speaking Africans for carrying out violent militant activity in Somalia. In a series of inspirational lectures between February 2009 and February 2012, Aboud repeatedly called for the violent rejection of the Somali peace process. During these lectures, Rogo repeatedly called for the use of violence against both the United Nations and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Somalia, and urged his audiences to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab’s fight against the Kenyan Government. Aboud Rogo Mohammed also offers guidance on how Kenyan recruits joining al-Shabaab can evade detection by the Kenyan authorities, and which routes to follow when travelling from Mombasa and/or Lamu to Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia, notably Kismayo. He has facilitated the travel to Somalia of numerous Kenyan recruits for al-Shabaab. In September 2011, Rogo was recruiting individuals in Mombasa, Kenya, for travel into Somalia, presumably to conduct terrorist operations. In September 2008, Rogo held a fundraising meeting in Mombasa to help finance al-Shabaab activities in Somalia.

13. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (aka (a) Makaburi, (b) Sheikh Abubakar Ahmed, (c) Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, (d) Abu Makaburi Shariff, (e) Abubaker Shariff, (f) Abubakar Ahmed) Date of birth: 1962. Alt. date of birth: 1967. Place of birth: Kenya. Location: Majengo area, Mombasa, Kenya. Date of UN designation: 23 August 2012. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed is a leading facilitator and recruiter of young Kenyan Muslims for violent militant activity in Somalia, and a close associate of Aboud Rogo. He provides material support to extremist groups in Kenya (and elsewhere in East Africa). Through his frequent trips to Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia, including Kismayo, he has been able to maintain strong ties with senior Al-Shabaab members. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed is also engaged in the mobilisation and management of funding for Al-Shabaab, an entity listed by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia and Resolution 1907 (2009) concerning Eritrea for engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed has preached at mosques in Mombasa that young men should travel to Somalia, commit extremist acts, fight for Al-Qaida, and kill US citizens. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed was arrested in late December 2010 by Kenyan authorities on suspicion of involvement in the bombing of a Nairobi bus terminal. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed is also a leader of a Kenya-based youth organisation in Mombasa with ties to Al-Shabaab. As of 2010, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed acted as a recruiter and facilitator for Al-Shabaab in the Majengo area of Mombasa, Kenya.

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II. Entities

Al-Shabaab (a.k.a. a) Al-Shabab, b) Shabaab, c) The Youth, d) Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, e) Mujahideen Youth Movement, f) Mujahidin Youth Movement, g) MYM, h) Harakat Shabab Al-Mujahidin, i) Hizbul Shabaab, j) Hisb’ul Shabaab, k) Al-Shabaab Al-Islamiya, l) Youth Wing, m) Al-Shabaab Al-Islaam, n) Al-Shabaab Al-Jihaad, o) The Unity Of Islamic Youth, p) Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin,q) Harakatul Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin, r) Mujaahidiin Youth Movement)

Location: Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Al-Shabaab has engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including but not limited to: acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of August 18, 2008, or the political process; and, acts that threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), or other international peacekeeping operations related to Somalia.

Al-Shabaab has also obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

According to the statement by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia to the Security Council delivered on 29 July 2009, both Al-Shabaab and Hisb'ul Islam publicly and repeatedly claimed responsibility for the attacks by forces on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and AMISOM. Al-Shabaab had also claimed responsibility for the killing of TFG officials, and on 19 July 2009 had raided and shut down the field offices of UNOPS, UNDSS and UNDP in the Bay and Bakool regions, in violation of paragraph (c) of resolution 1844 (2008). Al-Shabaab has also repeatedly obstructed access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The United Nations Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, dated 20 July 2009, contained the following paragraphs involving the activities of al-Shabaab in Somalia:

Insurgent groups, such as al-Shabaab, are alleged to be extorting money from private companies and recruiting young people to join the fight against the Government in Mogadishu, including child soldiers. Al-Shabaab has confirmed the presence of foreign fighters within its ranks and has stated openly that it is working with al-Qaida in Mogadishu to remove the Government of Somalia. The foreign fighters, many of whom reportedly originate from Pakistan and Afghanistan, appear to be well trained and battle-tested. They have been observed wearing hoods and directing offensive operations against Government forces in Mogadishu and neighbouring regions.

Al-Shabaab has intensified its strategy to coerce and intimidate the Somali population, as reflected in the carefully selected high gain assassinations and arrests of clan elders, several of whom have been murdered. On 19 June 2009, Omar Hashi Aden, the Minister of National Security, was killed in a large-scale suicide car bomb in Beletwyne. Over 30 other people were killed in the attack, which was strongly condemned by the international community and a broad cross-section of Somali society.

According to the December 2008 report from the UN Security Council Somalia Monitoring Group (2008/769), al-Shabaab is responsible for a variety of attacks within Somalia over the last several years, including:

— The reported killing and beheading of a Somali driver working for the World Food Programme in September 2008,

— The bombing of a market in Puntland that killed 20 and wounded over 100 on 6 February 2008,

— A campaign of bombings and targeted killings in Somaliland intended to disrupt the 2006 parliamentary elections,

— The murders of several foreign aid workers in 2003 and 2004,

According to reporting, al-Shabaab raided United Nations compounds in Somalia on 20 July 2009, and issued a decree banning three agencies of the United Nations from the al-Shabaab controlled areas of Somalia. Additionally, Somali Transitional Federal Government forces fought al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam insurgents from 11-12 July 2009 resulting in the deaths of over 60 people. In the fighting on 11 July 2009, al-Shabaab landed four mortars inside Villa Somalia that resulted in the deaths of three African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) soldiers and injuries to eight others.

According to an article published by the British Broadcasting Corporation on 22 February 2009, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a suicide car bomb attack on an African Union military base in Mogadishu. According to the article, the African Union confirmed that 11 African Union peacekeepers were killed and 15 others were hurt.

According to an article published by Reuters on 14 July 2009, al-Shabaab militants made gains in 2009 in guerrilla-style attacks on Somali and African Union forces.

According to an article published by Voice of America on 10 July 2009, al-Shabaab was involved in an attack on Somali government forces in May 2009.

According to an article posted on the website of the Council on Foreign Relations authored on 27 February 2009, al-Shabaab has waged an insurgency against Somalia’s transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters since 2006. Al-Shabaab killed eleven Burundian soldiers in the deadliest attack on AU peacekeepers since their deployment and states that al-Shabaab engaged in heavy fighting that killed at least fifteen people in Mogadishu.

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ANNEX II

List of items referred to in Article 1(3)(f)

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);

2. Guns, howitzers, and cannons with a calibre greater than 12,7 mm, and ammunition and components specially designed for those. (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs, rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.);

3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm;

4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for those items;

5. Charges and devices intended for military use containing energetic materials; mines and related materiel;

6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability.