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for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links 
embedded in this document  
►B COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799  
of 18 March 2016  
implementing Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of 
tachographs and their components  
(Text with EEA relevance)  
(OJ L 139, 26.5.2016, p. 1)  
Amended by:  
Official Journal  
No page  date  
►M1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/502 of 28 February 
2018  L 85  1  28.3.2018  
Corrected by:  
►C1 Corrigendum, OJ L 146, 3.6.2016, p. 31 (2016/799)  02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 1
02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 2  
COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799  
of 18 March 2016  
implementing Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down the requirements for 
the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of 
tachographs and their components  
(Text with EEA relevance)  
Article 1  
Subject matter and scope  
1. This Regulation lays down the provisions necessary for the 
uniform application of the following aspects regarding tachographs:  
(a) recording of the position of the vehicle at certain points during the 
daily working period of the driver;  
(b) remote early detection of possible manipulation or misuse of smart 
tachographs;  
(c) interface with intelligent transport systems;  
(d) the administrative and technical requirements for the type-approval 
procedures of tachographs, including the security mechanisms.  
▼M1 
2. The construction, testing, installation, inspection, operation and 
repair of smart tachographs and their components, shall comply with 
the technical requirements set out in Annex IC to this Regulation.  
3. Tachographs other than smart tachographs shall continue, as 
regards construction, testing, installation, inspection, operation and 
repair, to comply with the requirements of either Annex I to Regulation 
(EU) No 165/2014 or Annex IB to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3821/85 (  1 ), as applicable.  
▼B 
4. Pursuant to Article 10d of Directive 96/53/EC, the remote early 
detection facility shall also transmit the weight data provided by an 
internal on-board weighing system, for the purpose of early fraud 
detection.  
▼M1 
5. This Regulation shall be without prejudice to Directive 
2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (  2 ). 
▼B 
Article 2  
Definitions  
For the purposes of this Regulation, the definitions laid down in 
Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 shall apply.  ▼B 
( 1 ) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 of 20 December 1985 on recording 
equipment in road transport (OJ L 370, 31.12.1985, p. 8). 
( 2 ) Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and 
repealing Directive 1999/5/EC (OJ L 153, 22.5.2014, p. 62).
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 3  
In addition, the following definitions shall apply:  
(1) ‘digital tachograph’ or ‘first generation tachograph’ means a digital 
tachograph other than a smart tachograph;  
(2) ‘external GNSS facility’ means a facility which contains the GNSS 
receiver when the vehicle unit is not a single unit, as well as other 
components needed to protect the communication of data about 
position to the rest of the vehicle unit;  
▼M1 
(3) ‘information folder’ means the complete folder, in electronic or 
paper form, containing all the information supplied by the manu ­
facturer or its agent to the type-approval authority for the purpose 
of the type-approval of a tachograph or a component thereof, 
including the certificates referred to in Article 12(3) of Regulation 
(EU) No 165/2014, the performance of the tests defined in Annex 
IC to this Regulation, as well as drawings, photographs, and other 
relevant documents;  
▼B 
(4) ‘information package’ means the information folder, in electronic 
or paper form, accompanied by any other documents added by the 
type-approval authority to the information folder in the course of 
carrying out their functions including, at the end of the type- 
approval process, the EC type-approval certificate of the 
tachograph or a component thereof;  
(5) ‘index to the information package’ means the document listing the 
numbered contents of the information package identifying all the 
relevant parts of this package. The format of that document shall 
distinguish the successive steps in the EC type-approval process, 
including the dates of any revisions and updating of that package;  
(6) ‘remote early detection facility’ means the equipment of the 
vehicle unit which is used to perform targeted roadside checks;  
▼M1 
(7) ‘smart tachograph’ or ‘second generation tachograph’ means a 
digital tachograph complying with Articles 8, 9 and 10 of Regu ­
lation (EU) No 165/2014 as well as with Annex IC to this Regu ­
lation;  
(8) ‘tachograph component’ means any of the following elements: the 
vehicle unit, the motion sensor, the record sheet, the external 
GNSS facility and the external remote early detection facility;  
▼B 
(9) ‘type-approval authority’ means the authority of a Member State 
competent to carry out the type-approval of the tachograph or of 
its components, the authorisation process, the issuing and, if appro ­
priate, withdrawing of type-approval certificates, acting as the 
contact point for the type-approval authorities of other Member 
States and ensuring that the manufacturers meet their obligations 
relating to the conformity with the requirement of this Regulation;  
▼M1 
(10) ‘vehicle unit’ means the tachograph excluding the motion sensor 
and the cables connecting the motion sensor.  
It may be a single unit or several units distributed in the vehicle 
and includes a processing unit, a data memory, a time 
measurement function, two smart card interface devices for 
driver and co-driver, a printer, a display, connectors and facilities  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 4  
for entering the user’s inputs, a GNSS receiver and a remote 
communication facility.  
The vehicle unit may be composed of the following components 
subject to type-approval:  
— vehicle unit, as a single component (including GNSS receiver 
and remote communication facility),  
— vehicle unit main body (including remote communication 
facility), and external GNSS facility,  
— vehicle unit main body (including GNSS receiver), and 
external remote communication facility,  
— vehicle unit main body, external GNSS facility, and external 
remote communication facility.  
If the vehicle unit is composed of several units distributed in the 
vehicle, the vehicle unit main body is the unit containing the 
processing unit, the data memory, and the time measurement 
function.  
‘vehicle unit (VU)’ is used for ‘vehicle unit’ or ‘vehicle unit main 
body’.  
▼B 
Article 3  
Location-based services  
1. Manufacturers shall ensure that smart tachographs are compatible 
with the positioning services provided by the Galileo and the European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (‘EGNOS’) systems.  
2. In addition to the systems referred to in paragraph 1, manufac ­
turers may also choose to ensure compatibility with other satellite navi ­
gation systems.  
Article 4  
Procedure for type-approval of a tachograph and tachograph 
components  
1. A manufacturer or its agent shall submit an application for type- 
approval of a tachograph or any of its components, or group of 
components, to the type-approval authorities designated by each 
Member State. It shall consist of an information folder containing the 
information for each of the components concerned including, where 
applicable, the type-approval certificates of other components 
necessary to complete the tachograph, as well as any other relevant 
documents.  
2. A Member State shall grant type-approval to any tachograph, 
component or group of components that conforms to the administrative 
and technical requirements referred to in Article 1(2) or (3), as 
applicable. In that case, the type-approval authority shall issue to the 
applicant a type-approval certificate that shall conform to the model laid 
down in Annex II to this Regulation.  
3. The type-approval authority may request the manufacturer or its 
agent to supply any additional information.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 5  
4. The manufacturer or its agent shall make available to the type- 
approval authorities, as well as to the entities responsible for issuing the 
certificates referred to in Article 12(3) of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, 
as many tachographs or tachograph components as are necessary to 
enable the type-approval procedure to be conducted satisfactorily.  
5. Where the manufacturer or its agent seeks a type-approval of 
certain components or groups of components of a tachograph, he 
shall provide the type-approval authorities with the other components, 
already type-approved, as well as other parts necessary for the 
construction of the complete tachograph, in order for those authorities 
to conduct the necessary tests.  
Article 5  
Modifications to type-approvals  
1. The manufacturer or its agent shall inform without delay the type- 
approval authorities that granted the original type-approval, about any 
modification in software or hardware of the tachograph or in the nature 
of the materials used for its manufacture which are recorded in the 
information package and shall submit an application for the modifi ­
cation of the type-approval.  
2. The type-approval authorities may revise or extend an existing 
type-approval, or issue a new type-approval according to the nature 
and characteristics of the modifications.  
A ‘revision’ shall be made where the type-approval authority considers 
that the modifications in software or hardware of the tachograph or in 
the nature of materials used for its manufacture are minor. In such cases, 
the type-approval authority shall issue the revised documents of the 
information package, indicating the nature of the modifications made 
and the date of their approval. An updated version of the information 
package in a consolidated form, accompanied by a detailed description 
of the modifications made, shall be sufficient to meet this requirement.  
An ‘extension’ shall be made where the type-approval authority 
considers that the modifications in software or hardware of the 
tachograph or in the nature of materials used for its manufacture are 
substantial. In such cases, it may request that new tests be conducted 
and inform the manufacturer or its agent accordingly. If those tests 
prove satisfactory, the type-approval authority shall issue a revised 
type-approval certificate containing a number referring to the 
extension granted. The type-approval certificate shall mention the 
reason of the extension and its date of issue.  
3. The index to the information package shall indicate the date of the 
most recent extension or revision of the type-approval, or the date of the 
most recent consolidation of the updated version of the type-approval.  
4. A new type-approval shall be necessary when the requested modi ­
fications to the type-approved tachograph or its components would lead 
to the issuance of a new security or interoperability certificate.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 6  
Article 6  
Entry into force  
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following 
that of its publication in the  Official Journal of the European Union . 
It shall apply from 2 March 2016.  
▼M1 
However, Annex IC shall apply from 15 June 2019 with the exception 
of Appendix 16 which shall apply from 2 March 2016.  
▼B 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in 
all Member States.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 7  
ANNEX I C  
Requirements for construction, testing, installation, and inspection  
INTRODUCTION  
1. DEFINITIONS  
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE 
RECORDING EQUIPMENT  
2.1 General characteristics  
2.2 Functions  
2.3 Modes of operation  
2.4 Security  
3. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
RECORDING EQUIPMENT  
3.1 Monitoring cards insertion and withdrawal  
3.2 Speed, position and distance measurement  
3.2.1 Measurement of distance travelled  
3.2.2 Measurement of speed  
3.2.3 Measurement of position  
3.3 Time measurement  
3.4 Monitoring driver activities  
3.5 Monitoring driving status  
3.6 Driver's entries  
3.6.1 Entry of places where daily work periods begin and/or end  
3.6.2 Manual entry of driver activities and driver consent for ITS 
interface  
3.6.3 Entry of specific conditions  
3.7 Company locks management  
3.8 Monitoring control activities  
3.9 Detection of events and/or faults  
3.9.1 ‘Insertion of a non-valid card’ event  
3.9.2 ‘Card conflict’ event  
3.9.3 ‘Time overlap’ event  
3.9.4 ‘Driving without an appropriate card’ event  
3.9.5 ‘Card insertion while driving’ event  
3.9.6 ‘Last card session not correctly closed’ event  
3.9.7 ‘Over speeding’ event  
3.9.8 ‘Power supply interruption’ event  
3.9.9 ‘Communication error with the remote communication facility’ 
event  
3.9.10 ‘Absence of position information from GNSS receiver’ event  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 8  
3.9.11 ‘Communication error with the external GNSS facility’ event  
3.9.12 ‘Motion data error’ event  
3.9.13 ‘Vehicle motion conflict’ event  
3.9.14 ‘Security breach attempt’ event  
3.9.15 ‘Time conflict’ event  
3.9.16 ‘Card’ fault  
3.9.17 ‘Recording equipment’ fault  
3.10 Built-in and self-tests  
3.11 Reading from data memory  
3.12 Recording and storing in the data memory  
3.12.1 Equipment identification data  
3.12.1.1 Vehicle unit identification data  
3.12.1.2 Motion sensor identification data  
3.12.1.3 Global Navigation Satellite Systems identification data  
3.12.2 Keys and certificates  
3.12.3 Driver or workshop card insertion and withdrawal data  
3.12.4 Driver activity data  
▼M1 
3.12.5 Places and positions where daily work periods begin, end and/or 
where 3 hours accumulated driving time is reached  
▼B 
3.12.6 Odometer data  
3.12.7 Detailed speed data  
3.12.8 Events data  
3.12.9 Faults data  
3.12.10 Calibration data  
3.12.11 Time adjustment data  
3.12.12 Control activity data  
3.12.13 Company locks data  
3.12.14 Download activity data  
3.12.15 Specific conditions data  
3.12.16 Tachograph card data  
3.13 Reading from tachograph cards  
3.14 Recording and storing on tachograph cards  
3.14.1 Recording and storing in first generation tachograph cards  
3.14.2 Recording and storing in second generation tachograph cards  
3.15 Displaying  
3.15.1 Default display  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 9  
3.15.2 Warning display  
3.15.3 Menu access  
3.15.4 Other displays  
3.16 Printing  
3.17 Warnings  
3.18 Data downloading to external media  
3.19 Remote communication for targeted roadside checks  
3.20 Output data to additional external devices  
3.21 Calibration  
3.22 Roadside calibration checking  
3.23 Time adjustment  
3.24 Performance characteristics  
3.25 Materials  
3.26 Markings  
4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
TACHOGRAPH CARDS  
4.1 Visible data  
4.2 Security  
4.3 Standards  
4.4 Environmental and electrical specifications  
4.5 Data storage  
4.5.1 Elementary files for identification and card management  
4.5.2 IC card identification  
4.5.2.1 Chip identification  
4.5.2.2 DIR (only present in second generation tachograph cards)  
4.5.2.3 ATR information (conditional, only present in second generation 
tachograph cards)  
4.5.2.4 Extended length information (conditional, only present in second 
generation tachograph cards)  
4.5.3 Driver card  
4.5.3.1 Tachograph application (accessible to first and second generation 
vehicle units)  
4.5.3.1.1 Application identification  
4.5.3.1.2 Key and certificates  
4.5.3.1.3 Card identification  
4.5.3.1.4 Card holder identification  
4.5.3.1.5 Card download  
4.5.3.1.6 Driving licence information  
4.5.3.1.7 Events data  
4.5.3.1.8 Faults data  
4.5.3.1.9 Driver activity data  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 10  
4.5.3.1.10 Vehicles used data  
4.5.3.1.11 Places where daily work periods start and/or end  
4.5.3.1.12 Card session data  
4.5.3.1.13 Control activity data  
4.5.3.1.14 Specific conditions data  
4.5.3.2 Tachograph generation 2 application (not accessible to first 
generation vehicle unit)  
4.5.3.2.1 Application identification  
4.5.3.2.2 Keys and certificates  
4.5.3.2.3 Card identification  
4.5.3.2.4 Card holder identification  
4.5.3.2.5 Card download  
4.5.3.2.6 Driving licence information  
4.5.3.2.7 Events data  
4.5.3.2.8 Faults data  
4.5.3.2.9 Driver activity data  
4.5.3.2.10 Vehicles used data  
4.5.3.2.11 Places and positions where daily work periods start and/or end  
4.5.3.2.12 Card session data  
4.5.3.2.13 Control activity data  
4.5.3.2.14 Specific conditions data  
4.5.3.2.15 Vehicle units used data  
▼M1 
4.5.3.2.16 Three hours accumulated driving places data  
▼B 
4.5.4 Workshop card  
4.5.4.1 Tachograph application (accessible to first and second generation 
vehicle units)  
4.5.4.1.1 Application identification  
4.5.4.1.2 Keys and certificates  
4.5.4.1.3 Card identification  
4.5.4.1.4 Card holder identification  
4.5.4.1.5 Card download  
4.5.4.1.6 Calibration and time adjustment data  
4.5.4.1.7 Events and faults data  
4.5.4.1.8 Driver activity data  
4.5.4.1.9 Vehicles used data  
4.5.4.1.10 Daily work periods start and/or end data  
4.5.4.1.11 Card session data  
4.5.4.1.12 Control activity data  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 11  
4.5.4.1.13 Specific conditions data  
4.5.4.2 Tachograph generation 2 application (not accessible to first 
generation vehicle unit)  
4.5.4.2.1 Application identification  
4.5.4.2.2 Keys and certificates  
4.5.4.2.3 Card identification  
4.5.4.2.4 Card holder identification  
4.5.4.2.5 Card download  
4.5.4.2.6 Calibration and time adjustment data  
4.5.4.2.7 Events and faults data  
4.5.4.2.8 Driver activity data  
4.5.4.2.9 Vehicles used data  
4.5.4.2.10 Daily work periods start and/or end data  
4.5.4.2.11 Card session data  
4.5.4.2.12 Control activity data  
4.5.4.2.13 Vehicle units used data  
▼M1 
4.5.4.2.14 Three hours accumulated driving places data  
▼B 
4.5.4.2.15 Specific conditions data  
4.5.5 Control card  
4.5.5.1 Tachograph application (accessible to first and second generation 
vehicle units)  
4.5.5.1.1 Application identification  
4.5.5.1.2 Keys and certificates  
4.5.5.1.3 Card identification  
4.5.5.1.4 Card holder identification  
4.5.5.1.5 Control activity data  
4.5.5.2 Tachograph G2 application (not accessible to first generation 
vehicle unit)  
4.5.5.2.1 Application identification  
4.5.5.2.2 Keys and certificates  
4.5.5.2.3 Card identification  
4.5.5.2.4 Card holder identification  
4.5.5.2.5 Control activity data  
4.5.6 Company card  
4.5.6.1 Tachograph application (accessible to first and second generation 
vehicle units)  
4.5.6.1.1 Application identification  
4.5.6.1.2 Keys and certificates  
4.5.6.1.3 Card identification  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 12  
4.5.6.1.4 Card holder identification  
4.5.6.1.5 Company activity data  
4.5.6.2 Tachograph G2 application (not accessible to first generation 
vehicle unit)  
4.5.6.2.1 Application identification  
4.5.6.2.2 Keys and certificates  
4.5.6.2.3 Card identification  
4.5.6.2.4 Card holder identification  
4.5.6.2.5 Company activity data  
5. INSTALLATION OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT  
5.1 Installation  
5.2 Installation plaque  
5.3 Sealing  
6. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS  
6.1 Approval of fitters, workshops and vehicle manufacturers  
▼M1 
6.2 Check of new or repaired components  
▼B 
6.3 Installation inspection  
6.4 Periodic inspections  
6.5 Measurement of errors  
6.6 Repairs  
7. CARD ISSUING  
8. TYPE-APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT AND 
TACHOGRAPH CARDS  
8.1 General points  
8.2 Security certificate  
8.3 Functional certificate  
8.4 Interoperability certificate  
8.5 Type-approval certificate  
8.6 Exceptional procedure: first interoperability certificates for 2nd 
generation recording equipment and tachograph cards  
INTRODUCTION  
The first generation digital tachograph system has been deployed since 1 May 
2006. It may be used until its end of life for domestic transportation. For inter ­
national transportation, instead, 15 years after the entry into force of this 
Commission Regulation, all vehicles shall be equipped with a compliant 
second generation smart tachograph, introduced by this Regulation.  
This Annex contains second generation recording equipment and tachograph 
cards requirements. Starting from its introduction date, second generation 
recording equipment shall be installed in vehicles registered for the first time, 
and second generation tachograph cards shall be issued.  
In order to foster a smooth introduction of the second generation tachograph 
system:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 13  
— second generation tachograph cards shall be designed to be also used in first 
generation vehicle units,  
— replacement of valid first generation tachograph cards at the introduction date 
shall not be requested.  
This will allow drivers to keep their unique driver card and use both systems 
with it.  
Second generation recording equipment shall however only be calibrated using 
second generation workshop cards.  
This Annex contains all requirements related to the interoperability between the 
first and the second generation tachograph system.  
Appendix 15 contains additional details about how the coexistence of the two 
systems shall be managed.  
List of Appendixes  
App 1: DATA DICTIONARY  
App 2: TACHOGRAPH CARDS SPECIFICATION  
App 3: PICTOGRAMS  
App 4: PRINTOUTS  
App 5: DISPLAY  
App 6: FRONT CONNECTOR FOR CALIBRATION AND DOWNLOAD  
App 7: DATA DOWNLOADING PROTOCOLS  
App 8: CALIBRATION PROTOCOL  
App 9: TYPE-APPROVAL AND LIST OF MINIMUM REQUIRED 
TESTS  
App 10: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS  
App 11: COMMON SECURITY MECHANISMS  
App 12: POSITIONING BASED ON GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE 
SYSTEM (GNSS)  
App 13: ITS INTERFACE  
App 14: REMOTE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION  
App 15: MIGRATION: MANAGING THE COEXISTENCE OF 
EQUIPMENT GENERATIONS  
App 16: ADAPTOR FOR M1 AND N1 CATEGORY VEHICLES  
1. DEFINITIONS  
In this Annex:  
(a) ‘activation’ means:  
the phase in which the tachograph becomes fully operational 
and implements all functions, including security functions, 
through the use of a workshop card;  
(b) ‘authentication’ means:  
a function intended to establish and verify a claimed identity;  
(c) ‘authenticity’ means:  
the property that information is coming from a party whose 
identity can be verified;  
(d) ‘built-in test (BIT)’ means:  
tests run at request, triggered by the operator or by external 
equipment;  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 14  
(e) ‘calendar day’ means:  
a day ranging from 00:00 hours to 24:00 hours. All calendar 
days relate to UTC time (Universal Time Coordinated);  
(f) ‘calibration’ of a smart tachograph means:  
updating or confirming vehicle parameters to be held in the 
data memory. Vehicle parameters include vehicle identifi ­
cation (VIN, VRN and registering Member State) and 
vehicle characteristics (w, k, l, tyre size, speed-limiting 
device setting (if applicable), current UTC time, current 
odometer value); during the calibration of a recording 
equipment, the types and identifiers of all type-approval 
relevant seals in place shall also be stored in the data 
memory;  
any update or confirmation of UTC time only, shall be 
considered as a time adjustment and not as a calibration, 
provided it does not contradict Requirement 409;  
calibrating recording equipment requires the use of a 
workshop card;  
(g) ‘card number’ means:  
a 16-alphanumerical character number that uniquely identifies 
a tachograph card within a Member State. The card number 
includes a card consecutive index (if applicable), a card re ­
placement index and a card renewal index;  
a card is therefore uniquely identified by the code of the 
issuing Member State and the card number;  
(h) ‘card consecutive index’ means:  
the 14th alphanumerical character of a card number that is 
used to differentiate the different cards issued to a company, a 
workshop or a control authority entitled to be issued several 
tachograph cards. The company, the workshop or the control 
authority is uniquely identified by the 13 first characters of 
the card number;  
(i) ‘card renewal index’ means:  
the 16th alphanumerical character of a card number which is 
incremented each time a tachograph card is renewed;  
(j) ‘card replacement index’ means:  
the 15th alpha-numerical character of a card number which is 
incremented each time a tachograph card is replaced;  
(k) ‘characteristic coefficient of the vehicle’ means:  
the numerical characteristic giving the value of the output 
signal emitted by the part of the vehicle linking it with the 
recording equipment (gearbox output shaft or axle) while the 
vehicle travels a distance of one kilometre under standard test 
conditions as defined under requirement 414. The char ­
acteristic coefficient is expressed in impulses per kilometre 
(w = … imp/km);  
(l) ‘company card’ means:  
a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State 
to a transport undertaking needing to operate vehicles fitted 
with a tachograph, which identifies the transport undertaking 
and allows for the displaying, downloading and printing of 
the data, stored in the tachograph, which have been locked by 
that transport undertaking;  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 15  
(m) ‘constant of the recording equipment’ means:  
the numerical characteristic giving the value of the input 
signal required to show and record a distance travelled of 
one kilometre; this constant shall be expressed in impulses 
per kilometre (k = … imp/km);  
(n) ‘continuous driving time’ is computed within the recording 
equipment as (  1 ): 
the continuous driving time is computed as the current 
accumulated driving times of a particular driver, since the 
end of his last AVAILABILITY or BREAK/REST or 
UNKNOWN (  2 ) period of 45 minutes or more (this period 
may have been split according to Regulation (EC) No 
561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (  3 )). 
The computations involved take into account, as needed, past 
activities stored on the driver card. When the driver has not 
inserted his card, the computations involved are based on the 
data memory recordings related to the current period where 
no card was inserted and related to the relevant slot;  
(o) ‘control card’ means:  
a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State 
to a national competent control authority which identifies the 
control body and, optionally, the control officer, and which 
allows access to the data stored in the data memory or in the 
driver cards and, optionally, in the workshop cards for 
reading, printing and/or downloading;  
It shall also give access to the roadside calibration checking 
function and to data on the remote early detection communi ­
cation reader;  
(p) ‘cumulative break time’ is computed within the recording 
equipment as (  1 ): 
the cumulative break from driving time is computed as the 
current accumulated AVAILABILITY or BREAK/REST or 
UNKNOWN (  2 ) times of 15 minutes or more of a particular 
driver, since the end of his last AVAILABILITY or 
BREAK/REST or UNKNOWN (  3 ) period of 45 minutes or 
more (this period may have been split according to Regu ­
lation (EC) No 561/2006).  
The computations involved take into account, as needed, past 
activities stored on the driver card. Unknown periods of 
negative duration (start of unknown period > end of 
unknown period) due to time overlaps between two 
different sets of recording equipment, are not taken into 
account for the computation.  ▼B 
( 1 ) This way of computing the continuous driving time and the cumulative break time serves 
in the recording equipment for computing the continuous driving time warning. It does 
not prejudge the legal interpretation to be made of these times. Alternative ways of 
computing the continuous driving time and the cumulative break time may be used to 
replace these definitions if they have been made obsolete by updates in other relevant 
legislation. 
( 2 ) UNKNOWN periods correspond to periods where the driver card was not inserted in the 
recording equipment and for which no manual entry of driver activities was made. 
( 3 ) Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road 
transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 
and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1).
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 16  
When the driver has not inserted his card, the computations 
involved are based on the data memory recordings related to 
the current period where no card was inserted and related to 
the relevant slot;  
(q) ‘data memory’ means:  
an electronic data storage device built into the recording 
equipment;  
(r) ‘digital signature’ means:  
data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a 
block of data that allows the recipient of the block of data 
to prove the authenticity and integrity of the block of data;  
(s) ‘downloading’ means:  
the copying, together with the digital signature, of a part, or 
of a complete set, of data files recorded in the data memory 
of the vehicle unit or in the memory of a tachograph card, 
provided that this process does not alter or delete any stored 
data;  
manufacturers of smart tachograph vehicle units and manu ­
facturers of equipment designed and intended to download 
data files shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
downloading of such data can be performed with the 
minimum delay by transport undertakings or drivers;  
The downloading of the detailed speed file may not be 
necessary to establish compliance with Regulation (EC) No 
561/2006, but may be used for other purposes such as 
accident investigation;  
(t) ‘driver card’ means:  
a tachograph card, issued by the authorities of a Member 
State to a particular driver, which identifies the driver and 
allows for the storage of driver activity data;  
(u) ‘effective circumference of the wheels’ means:  
the average of the distances travelled by each of the wheels 
moving the vehicle (driving wheels) in the course of one 
complete rotation. The measurement of these distances shall 
be made under standard test conditions as defined under 
requirement 414 and is expressed in the form ‘l = … mm’. 
Vehicle manufacturers may replace the measurement of these 
distances by a theoretical calculation which takes into account 
the distribution of the weight on the axles, vehicle unladen in 
normal running order (  1 ). The methods for such theoretical 
calculation are subject to approval by a competent Member 
State authority and can take place only before tachograph 
activation;  
(v) ‘event’ means:  
an abnormal operation detected by the smart tachograph 
which may result from a fraud attempt;  
(w) ‘external GNSS facility’ means  
a facility which contains the GNSS receiver when the vehicle 
unit is not a single unit as well as other components needed 
to protect the communication of position data to the rest of 
the vehicle unit;  ▼B 
( 1 ) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1230/2012 of 12 December 2012 implementing Regu ­
lation (EC) No 661/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to 
type-approval requirements for masses and dimensions of motor vehicles and their 
trailers and amending Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (OJ L 353, 21.12.2012, p. 31) as last amended.
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 17  
(x) ‘fault’ means:  
abnormal operation detected by the smart tachograph which 
may come from an equipment malfunction or failure;  
(y) ‘GNSS receiver’ means:  
an electronic device that receives and digitally processes the 
signals from one or more Global Navigation Satellite 
System(s) (GNSS in English) in order to provide position, 
speed and time information;  
(z) ‘installation’ means:  
the mounting of a tachograph in a vehicle;  
(aa) ‘interoperability’ means:  
the capacity of systems and the underlying business processes 
to exchange data and to share information;  
(bb) ‘interface’ means:  
a facility between systems which provides the media through 
which they can connect and interact;  
(cc) ‘position’ means:  
geographical coordinates of the vehicle at a given time;  
(dd) ‘motion sensor’ means:  
a part of the tachograph, providing a signal representative of 
vehicle speed and/or distance travelled;  
(ee) ‘non-valid card’ means:  
a card detected as faulty, or which initial authentication 
failed, or whose start of validity date is not yet reached, or 
whose expiry date has passed;  
(ff) ‘open standard’ means:  
a standard set out in a standard specification document 
available freely or at a nominal charge which it is permissible 
to copy, distribute or use for no fee or for a nominal fee;  
(gg) ‘out of scope’ means:  
when the use of the recording equipment is not required, 
according to the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006;  
(hh) ‘over speeding’ means:  
exceeding the authorised speed of the vehicle, defined as any 
period of more than 60 seconds during which the vehicle's 
measured speed exceeds the limit for setting the speed limi ­
tation device laid down in Council Directive 92/6/EEC (  1 ), as 
last amended;  
(ii) ‘periodic inspection’ means:  
a set of operations performed to check that the tachograph 
works properly, that its settings correspond to the vehicle 
parameters, and that no manipulation devices are attached 
to the tachograph;  ▼B 
( 1 ) Council Directive 92/6/EEC of 10 February 1992 on the installation and use of speed 
limitation devices for certain categories of motor vehicles in the Community (OJ L 57, 
2.3.1992, p. 27).
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 18  
(jj) ‘printer’ means:  
component of the recording equipment which provides 
printouts of stored data;  
(kk) ‘remote early detection communication’ means:  
communication between the remote early detection communi ­
cation facility and the remote early detection communication 
reader during targeted roadside checks with the aim of 
remotely detecting possible manipulation or misuse of 
recording equipment;  
▼M1 
(ll) ‘remote communication facility’ or ‘remote early detection 
facility’ means:  
the equipment of the vehicle unit which is used to perform 
targeted roadside checks;  
▼B 
(mm) ‘remote early detection communication reader’ means:  
the system used by control officers for targeted roadside 
checks.  
(nn) ‘renewal’ means:  
issue of a new tachograph card when an existing card reaches 
its expiry date, or is malfunctioning and has been returned to 
the issuing authority. Renewal always implies the certainty 
that two valid cards do not coexist;  
(oo) ‘repair’ means:  
any repair of a motion sensor or of a vehicle unit or of a 
cable that requires the disconnection of its power supply, or 
its disconnection from other tachograph components, or the 
opening of the motion sensor or vehicle unit;  
(pp) ‘card replacement’ means:  
issue of a tachograph card in replacement of an existing card, 
which has been declared lost, stolen or malfunctioning and 
has not been returned to the issuing authority. Replacement 
always implies a risk that two valid cards may coexist;  
(qq) ‘security certification’ means:  
process to certify, by a common criteria certification body, 
that the recording equipment (or component) or the 
tachograph card under investigation fulfils the security 
requirements defined in the relative protection profiles;  
(rr) ‘self test’ means:  
tests run cyclically and automatically by the recording 
equipment to detect faults;  
(ss) ‘time measurement’ means:  
a permanent digital record of the coordinated universal date 
and time (UTC);  
▼M1 
(tt) ‘time adjustment’ means:  
an adjustment of current time; this adjustment can be 
automatic at regular intervals, using the time provided by 
the GNSS receiver as a reference, or performed in calibration 
mode;  
▼B 
(uu) ‘tyre size’ means:  
the designation of the dimensions of the tyres (external 
driving wheels) in accordance with Council Directive 
92/23/EEC (  1 ) as last amended;  ▼B 
( 1 ) Council Directive 92/23/EEC of 31 March 1992 relating to tyres for motor vehicles and 
their trailers and to their fitting (OJ L 129, 14.5.1992, p. 95).
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 19  
(vv) ‘vehicle identification’ means:  
numbers identifying the vehicle: vehicle registration number 
(VRN) with indication of the registering Member State and 
vehicle identification number (VIN) (  1 ); 
(ww) for computing sake in the recording equipment ‘week’ means:  
the period between 00:00 hours UTC on Monday and 24:00 
UTC on Sunday;  
(xx) ‘workshop card’ means:  
a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State 
to designated staff of a tachograph manufacturer, a fitter, a 
vehicle manufacturer or a workshop, approved by that 
Member State, which identifies the cardholder and allows 
for the testing, calibration and activation of tachographs, 
and/or downloading from them;  
(yy) ‘adaptor’ means:  
a device, providing a signal permanently representative of 
vehicle speed and/or distance travelled, other than the one 
used for the independent movement detection, and which is:  
▼M1 
— installed and used only in M1 and N1 type vehicles (as 
defined in Annex II to Directive 2007/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (  2 ), as last 
amended),  
▼B 
— installed where it is not mechanically possible to install 
any other type of existing motion sensor which is 
otherwise compliant with the provisions of this Annex 
and its Appendixes 1 to 15,  
— installed between the vehicle unit and where the speed/ 
distance impulses are generated by integrated sensors or 
alternative interfaces,  
— seen from a vehicle unit, the adaptor behaviour is the 
same as if a motion sensor, compliant with the provisions 
of this Annex and its Appendixes 1 to 16, was connected 
to the vehicle unit;  
use of such an adaptor in those vehicles described above shall 
allow for the installation and correct use of a vehicle unit 
compliant with all the requirements of this Annex,  
for those vehicles, the smart tachograph includes cables, an 
adaptor, and a vehicle unit;  ▼B 
( 1 ) Council Directive 76/114/EEC of 18 December 1975 on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to statutory plates and inscriptions for motor vehicles and 
their trailers, and their location and method of attachment (OJ L 24, 30.1.1976, p. 1). 
( 2 ) Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 
2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and 
of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles 
(Framework Directive) (OJ L 263, 9.10.2007, p. 1).
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 20  
(zz) ‘data integrity’ means:  
the accuracy and consistency of stored data, indicated by an 
absence of any alteration in data between two updates of a 
data record. Integrity implies that the data is an exact copy of 
the original version, e.g. that it has not been corrupted in the 
process of being written to, and read back from, a tachograph 
card or a dedicated equipment or during transmission via any 
communications channel;  
(aaa) ‘data privacy’ means:  
the overall technical measures taken to ensure the proper 
implementation of the principles laid down in Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (  1 ) 
as well as of those laid down in Directive 2002/58/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (  2 ); 
(bbb) ‘smart tachograph’ system means:  
the recording equipment, tachograph cards and the set of all 
directly or indirectly interacting equipment during their 
construction, installation, use, testing and control, such as 
cards, remote communication reader and any other 
equipment for data downloading, data analysis, calibration, 
generating, managing or introducing security elements, etc.;  
(ccc) ‘introduction date’:  
36 months after the entry into force of the detailed provisions 
referred to in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council (  3 ) 
This is the date after which vehicles registered for the first 
time:  
— shall be fitted with a tachograph connected to a posi ­
tioning service based on a satellite navigation system,  
— shall be able to communicate data for targeted roadside 
checks to competent control authorities while the vehicle 
is in motion,  
— and may be equipped with standardised interfaces 
allowing the data recorded or produced by tachographs 
to be used in operational mode, by an external device.  
(ddd) ‘protection profile’ means:  
a document used as part of certification process according 
Common Criteria, providing implementation independent 
specification of information assurance security requirements;  ▼B 
( 1 ) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31). 
( 2 ) Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 
31.7.2002, p. 37). 
( 3 ) Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, repealing Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation 
of certain social legislation relating to road transport (OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 1).
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 21  
(eee) ‘GNSS accuracy’:  
in the context of recording the position from a Global Navi ­
gation Satellite System (GNSS) with tachographs, means the 
value of the horizontal dilution of precision (HDOP) 
calculated as the minimum of the HDOP values collected 
on the available GNSS systems;  
▼M1 
(fff) ‘accumulated driving time’ means:  
a value representing the total accumulated number of minutes 
of driving of a particular vehicle.  
The accumulated driving time value is a free running count of 
all minutes regarded as DRIVING by the monitoring of 
driving activities function of the recording equipment, and 
is only used for triggering the recording of the vehicle 
position, every time a multiple of three hours of accumulated 
driving is reached. The accumulation is started at the 
recording equipment activation. It is not affected by any 
other condition, like out of scope or ferry/train crossing.  
The accumulated driving time value is not intended to be 
displayed, printed, or downloaded.  
▼B 
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE 
RECORDING EQUIPMENT  
2.1 General characteristics  
The purpose of the recording equipment is to record, store, display, 
print, and output data related to driver activities.  
Any vehicle fitted with the recording equipment complying with the 
provisions of this Annex, must include a speed display and an 
odometer. These functions may be included within the recording 
equipment.  
(1) The recording equipment includes cables, a motion sensor, 
and a vehicle unit.  
(2) The interface between motion sensors and vehicle units shall 
comply with the requirements specified in Appendix 11.  
(3) The vehicle unit shall be connected to global navigation 
satellite system(s), as specified in Appendix 12.  
(4) The vehicle unit shall communicate with remote early 
detection communication readers, as specified in 
Appendix 14.  
(5) The vehicle unit may include an ITS interface, which is 
specified in Appendix 13  
The recording equipment may be connected to other facilities 
through additional interfaces and/or through the optional ITS 
interface.  
(6) Any inclusion in or connection to the recording equipment of 
any function, device, or devices, approved or otherwise, shall 
not interfere with, or be capable of interfering with, the 
proper and secure operation of the recording equipment and 
the provisions of this Regulation.  
Recording equipment users identify themselves to the 
equipment via tachograph cards.  
(7) The recording equipment provides selective access rights to 
data and functions according to user's type and/or identity.  
The recording equipment records and stores data in its data memory, 
in the remote communication facility and in tachograph cards.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 22  
This is done in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (  1 ), with 
Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (  2 ) and in compliance with Article 7 of 
Regulation (EU) No. 165/2014.  
2.2 Functions  
(8) The recording equipment shall ensure the following functions:  
— monitoring cards insertions and withdrawals,  
— speed, distance and position measurement,  
— time measurement,  
— monitoring driver activities,  
— monitoring driving status,  
— drivers manual entries:  
— entry of places where daily work periods begin and/or 
end, 
— manual entry of driver activities,  
— entry of specific conditions,  
— company locks management,  
— monitoring control activities,  
— detection of events and/or faults,  
— built-in and self-tests,  
— reading from data memory,  
— recording and storing in data memory,  
— reading from tachograph cards,  
— recording and storing in tachograph cards,  
— displaying,  
— printing,  
— warning,  
— data downloading to external media,  
— remote communication for targeted roadside checks,  
— output data to additional facilities,  
— calibration,  
— roadside calibration check,  
— time adjustment.  
2.3 Modes of operation  
(9) The recording equipment shall possess four modes of oper ­
ation:  
— operational mode,  
— control mode,  
— calibration mode,  
— company mode.  
(10) The recording equipment shall switch to the following mode 
of operation according to the valid tachograph cards inserted 
into the card interface devices. In order to determine the 
mode of operation, the tachograph card generation is irrel ­
evant, provided the inserted card is valid. A first generation 
workshop card shall always be considered as non-valid when 
it is inserted in a second generation VU.  ▼B 
( 1 ) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p.31. 
( 2 ) OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p.37
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 23  
Mode of operation  Driver slot  
No card  Driver card  Control card  Workshop card  Company card
 Co-driver slot No card  Operational  Operational  Control  Calibration  Company  
Driver card  Operational  Operational  Control  Calibration  Company  
Control card  Control  Control  Control (*)  Operational  Operational  
Workshop card  Calibration  Calibration  Operational  Calibration (*)  Operational  
Company card  Company  Company  Operational  Operational  Company (*)  
(*) In these situations the recording equipment shall use only the tachograph card inserted in the driver slot.  
(11) The recording equipment shall ignore non-valid cards 
inserted, except displaying, printing or downloading data 
held on an expired card which shall be possible.  
(12) All functions listed in 2.2. shall work in any mode of 
operation with the following exceptions:  
— the calibration function is accessible in the calibration 
mode only,  
— the roadside calibration checking function is accessible in 
the control mode only,  
— the company locks management function is accessible in 
the company mode only,  
— the monitoring of control activities function is operational 
in the control mode only,  
— The downloading function is not accessible in the opera ­
tional mode (except as provided for in requirement 193), 
and except downloading a driver card when no other card 
type is inserted into the VU.  
(13) The recording equipment can output any data to display, 
printer or external interfaces with the following exceptions:  
— in the operational mode, any personal identification 
(surname and first name(s)) not corresponding to a 
tachograph card inserted shall be blanked and any card 
number not corresponding to a tachograph card inserted 
shall be partially blanked (every odd character — from 
left to right — shall be blanked),  
— in the company mode, driver related data (requirements 
102, 105 and 108) can be output only for periods where 
no lock exists or no other company holds a lock (as 
identified by the first 13 digits of the company card 
number),  
— when no card is inserted in the recording equipment, 
driver related data can be output only for the current 
and 8 previous calendar days,  
— personal data originating from the VU shall not be output 
through ITS interface of the VU unless the consent of the 
driver to whom the data relates is verified,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 24  
— the vehicle units have a normal operations validity period 
of 15 years, starting with the vehicle unit certificates 
effective date, but vehicle units can be used for additional 
3 months, for data downloading only.  
▼B 
2.4 Security  
▼M1 
The system security aims at protecting the data memory in such a 
way as to prevent unauthorised access to and manipulation of the 
data and detecting any such attempts, protecting the integrity and 
authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor and the 
vehicle unit, protecting the integrity and authenticity of data 
exchanged between the recording equipment and the tachograph 
cards, protecting the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged 
between the vehicle unit and the external GNSS facility, if any, 
protecting the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data 
exchanged through the remote early detection communication for 
control purposes, and verifying the integrity and authenticity of 
data downloaded.  
▼B 
(14) In order to achieve the system security, the following 
components shall meet the security requirements specified 
in their Protection Profiles, as required in Appendix 10:  
— vehicle unit,  
— tachograph card,  
— motion sensor,  
— external GNSS facility (this Profile is only needed and 
applicable for the external GNSS variant).  
3. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
RECORDING EQUIPMENT  
3.1 Monitoring cards insertion and withdrawal  
(15) The recording equipment shall monitor the card interface 
devices to detect card insertions and withdrawals.  
(16) Upon card insertion the recording equipment shall detect 
whether the card inserted is a valid tachograph card and in 
such a case identify the card type and the card generation.  
If a card with the same card number and a higher renewal 
index has already been inserted in the recording equipment, 
the card shall be declared as non-valid.  
If a card with the same card number and renewal index but 
with a higher replacement index has already been inserted in 
the recording equipment, the card shall be declared as non- 
valid.  
(17) First generation tachograph cards shall be considered as non- 
valid by the recording equipment, after the possibility of 
using first generation tachograph cards has been suppressed 
by a workshop, in compliance with Appendix 15 (req. 
MIG003).  
(18) First generation workshop cards which are inserted in the 
second generation recording equipment shall be considered 
as non-valid.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 25  
(19) The recording equipment shall be so designed that the 
tachograph cards are locked in position on their proper 
insertion into the card interface devices.  
(20) The release of tachograph cards may function only when the 
vehicle is stopped and after the relevant data have been stored 
on the cards. The release of the card shall require positive 
action by the user.  
3.2 Speed, position and distance measurement  
(21) The motion sensor (possibly embedded in the adaptor) is the 
main source for speed and distance measurement.  
(22) This function shall continuously measure and be able to 
provide the odometer value corresponding to the total 
distance travelled by the vehicle using the pulses provided 
by the motion sensor.  
(23) This function shall continuously measure and be able to 
provide the speed of the vehicle using the pulses provided 
by the motion sensor.  
(24) The speed measurement function shall also provide the 
information whether the vehicle is moving or stopped. The 
vehicle shall be considered as moving as soon as the function 
detects more than 1 imp/sec for at least 5 seconds from the 
motion sensor, otherwise the vehicle shall be considered as 
stopped.  
(25) Devices displaying speed (speedometer) and total distance 
travelled (odometer) installed in any vehicle fitted with a 
recording equipment complying with the provisions of this 
Regulation, shall comply with the requirements relating to 
maximum tolerances (see 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) laid down in this 
Annex.  
(26) To detect manipulation of motion data, information from the 
motion sensor shall be corroborated by vehicle motion 
information derived from the GNSS receiver and optionally 
by other source(s) independent from the motion sensor.  
(27) This function shall measure the position of the vehicle in 
order to allow for the automatic recording of:  
— positions where the driver and/or the co-driver begins his 
daily work period;  
▼M1 
— positions where the accumulated driving time reaches a 
multiple of three hours;  
▼B 
— positions where the driver and/or the co-driver ends his 
daily work period.  
3.2.1  Measurement of distance travelled  
(28) The distance travelled may be measured either:  
— so as to cumulate both forward and reverse movements, 
or 
— so as to include only forward movement.  
(29) The recording equipment shall measure distance from 0 to 
9 999 999,9 km.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 26  
(30) Distance measured shall be within the following tolerances 
(distances of at least 1 000 m.):  
— ± 1 % before installation,  
— ± 2 % on installation and periodic inspection,  
— ± 4 % in use.  
(31) Distance measured shall have a resolution better than or equal 
to 0,1 km.  
3.2.2  Measurement of speed  
(32) The recording equipment shall measure speed from 0 to 
220 km/h.  
(33) To ensure a maximum tolerance on speed displayed of 
± 6 km/h in use, and taking into account:  
— a ± 2 km/h tolerance for input variations (tyre variations, 
…), 
— a ± 1 km/h tolerance in measurements made during instal ­
lation or periodic inspections,  
the recording equipment shall, for speeds between 20 and 180 
km/h, and for characteristic coefficients of the vehicle 
between 4 000 and 25 000 imp/km, measure the speed with 
a tolerance of ± 1 km/h (at constant speed).  
Note:  The resolution of data storage brings an additional 
tolerance of ± 0,5 km/h to speed stored by the recording 
equipment.  
(34) The speed shall be measured correctly within the normal 
tolerances within 2 seconds of the end of a speed change 
when the speed has changed at a rate up to 2 m/s  2 . 
(35) Speed measurement shall have a resolution better than or 
equal to 1 km/h.  
3.2.3  Measurement of position  
(36) The recording equipment shall measure the absolute position 
of the vehicle using the GNSS receiver.  
(37) The absolute position is measured in geographical coordinates 
of latitude and longitude in degrees and minutes with a 
resolution of 1/10 of a minute.  
3.3 Time measurement  
(38) The time measurement function shall measure permanently 
and digitally provide UTC date and time.  
(39) UTC date and time shall be used for dating data inside the 
recording equipment (recordings, data exchange) and for all 
printouts specified in Appendix 4 ‘Printouts’.  
(40) In order to visualise the local time, it shall be possible to 
change the offset of the time displayed, in half hour steps. No 
other offsets than negative or positive multiples of half hours 
shall be allowed;  
(41) Time drift shall be within ± 2 seconds per day in type 
approval conditions, in the absence of any time adjustment.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 27  
(42) Time measured shall have a resolution better than or equal to 
1 second.  
(43) Time measurement shall not be affected by an external power 
supply cut-off of less than 12 months in type approval 
conditions.  
3.4 Monitoring driver activities  
(44) This function shall permanently and separately monitor the 
activities of one driver and one co-driver.  
(45) Driver activity shall be DRIVING, WORK, AVAILABILITY 
or BREAK/REST.  
(46) It shall be possible for the driver and/or the co-driver to 
manually select WORK, AVAILABILITY or BREAK/REST.  
(47) When the vehicle is moving, DRIVING shall be selected 
automatically for the driver and AVAILABILITY shall be 
selected automatically for the co-driver.  
(48) When the vehicle stops, WORK shall be selected auto ­
matically for the driver.  
▼M1 
(49) The first change of activity to BREAK/REST or AVAIL ­
ABILITY arising within 120 seconds of the automatic 
change to WORK due to the vehicle stop shall be assumed 
to have happened at the time of vehicle stop (therefore 
possibly cancelling the change to WORK).  
▼B 
(50) This function shall output activity changes to the recording 
functions at a resolution of one minute.  
(51) Given a calendar minute, if DRIVING is registered as the 
activity of both the immediately preceding and the immedi ­
ately succeeding minute, the whole minute shall be regarded 
as DRIVING.  
(52) Given a calendar minute that is not regarded as DRIVING 
according to requirement 051, the whole minute shall be 
regarded to be of the same type of activity as the longest 
continuous activity within the minute (or the latest of the 
equally long activities).  
(53) This function shall also permanently monitor the continuous 
driving time and the cumulative break time of the driver.  
3.5 Monitoring driving status  
(54) This function shall permanently and automatically monitor 
the driving status.  
(55) The driving status CREW shall be selected when two valid 
driver cards are inserted in the equipment, the driving status 
SINGLE shall be selected in any other case.  
3.6 Driver's entries  
3.6.1  Entry of places where daily work periods begin and/or end  
(56) This function shall allow for the entry of places where, 
according to the driver and/or the co-driver, his daily work 
periods begin and/or end.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 28  
(57) Places are defined as the country and, in addition where 
applicable, the region, which are entered or confirmed 
manually.  
(58) At the time of a driver card withdrawal, the recording 
equipment shall prompt the (co-)driver to enter a ‘place 
where the daily work period ends’.  
▼M1 
(59) The driver shall then enter the current place of the vehicle, 
which shall be considered as a temporary entry.  
Under the following conditions temporary entry made at last 
card withdrawal is validated (i.e. shall not be overwritten 
anymore):  
— entry of a place where the current daily work period 
begins during manual entry according to requirement (61);  
— the next entry of a place where the current daily work 
period begins if the card holder doesn’t enter any place 
where the work period begins or ended during the manual 
entry according to requirement (61).  
Under the following conditions temporary entry made at last 
card withdrawal is overwritten and the new value is validated:  
— the next entry of a place where the current daily work 
period ends if the card holder doesn’t enter any place 
where the work period begins or ended during the 
manual input according to requirement (61).  
▼B 
(60) It shall be possible to input places where daily work periods 
begin and/or end through commands in the menus. If more 
than one such input is done within one calendar minute, only 
the last begin place input and the last end place input done 
within that time shall be kept recorded.  
3.6.2  Manual entry of driver activities and driver consent for ITS 
interface  
(61) Upon driver (or workshop) card insertion, and only at this 
time, the recording equipment shall allow manual entries of 
activities. Manual entries of activities shall be performed 
using local time and date values of the time zone (UTC 
offset) currently set for the vehicle unit.  
At driver or workshop card insertion the cardholder shall be 
reminded of:  
— the date and time of his last card withdrawal;  
— optionally: the local time offset currently set for the 
vehicle unit.  
At the first insertion of a given driver card or workshop card 
currently unknown to the vehicle unit, the cardholder shall be 
invited to express his consent for tachograph related personal 
data output through the optional ITS interface.  
At any moment, the driver (resp. workshop) consent can be 
enabled or disabled through commands in the menu, provided 
the driver (resp. workshop) card is inserted.  
It shall be possible to input activities with the following 
restrictions:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 29  
— Activity type shall be WORK, AVAILABILITY or 
BREAK/REST;  
— Start and end times for each activity shall be within the 
period of the last card withdrawal — current insertion 
only;  
— Activities shall not be allowed to overlap mutually in 
time.  
It shall be possible to make manual entries, if required, at the 
first insertion of a previously unused driver (or workshop) 
card.  
The procedure for manual entries of activities shall include as 
many consecutive steps as necessary to set a type, a start time 
and an end time for each activity. For any part of the time 
period between last card withdrawal and current card 
insertion, the cardholder shall have the option not to 
declare any activity.  
During the manual entries associated with card insertion and 
if applicable, the card holder shall have the opportunity to 
input:  
▼M1 
— a place where a previous daily work period ended, asso ­
ciated to the relevant time (thus overwriting and vali ­
dating the entry made at the last card withdrawal),  
— a place where the current daily work period begins, asso ­
ciated to the relevant time (thus validating a temporary 
entry made at last card withdrawal).  
▼B 
If the card holder doesn't enter any place where the work 
period begins or ended, during the manual entries associated 
with card insertion, this shall be considered as a declaration 
that his work period has not changed since the last card with ­
drawal. The next entry of a place where a previous daily 
work period ends shall then overwrite the temporary entry 
made at the last card withdrawal.  
If a place is entered, it shall be recorded in the relevant 
tachograph card.  
Manual entries shall be interrupted if:  
— the card is withdrawn or,  
— the vehicle is moving and the card is in the driver slot.  
Additional interruptions are allowed, e.g. a timeout after a 
certain period of user inactivity. If manual entries are inter ­
rupted, the recording equipment shall validate any complete 
place and activity entries (having either unambiguous place 
and time, or activity type, begin time and end time) already 
made.  
If a second driver or workshop card is inserted while manual 
entries of activities are in progress for a previously inserted 
card, the manual entries for this previous card shall be 
allowed to be completed before manual entries start for the 
second card.  
The cardholder shall have the option to insert manual entries 
according to the following minimum procedure:  
— Enter activities manually, in chronological order, for the 
period last card withdrawal — current insertion.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 30  
— Begin time of the first activity shall be set to card with ­
drawal time. For each subsequent entry, the start time 
shall be preset to immediately follow the end time of 
the previous entry. Activity type and end time shall be 
selected for each activity.  
The procedure shall end when the end time of a manually 
entered activity equals the card insertion time. The recording 
equipment may then optionally allow the card holder to 
modify any activity manually entered, until validation by 
selection of a specific command. Thereafter, any such modi ­
fication shall be forbidden.  
3.6.3  Entry of specific conditions  
(62) The recording equipment shall allow the driver to enter, in 
real time, the following two specific conditions:  
— ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ (begin, end)  
— ‘FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING’ (begin, end).  
A ‘FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING’ may not occur if an ‘OUT 
OF SCOPE’ condition is opened.  
An opened ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ condition must be auto ­
matically closed, by the recording equipment, if a driver 
card is inserted or withdrawn.  
An opened ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ condition shall inhibit the 
following events and warnings:  
— Driving without an appropriate card,  
— Warnings associated with continuous driving time.  
The FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING begin flag shall be set 
before shutting down the engine on the ferry/train.  
An opened FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING must end when 
any of following options occurs:  
— The driver manually ends the FERRY/TRAIN 
CROSSING  
— The driver ejects his card  
An opened FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING shall end when it is 
no longer valid based on the rules stated in Regulation (EC) 
No. 561/2006.  
3.7 Company locks management  
(63) This function shall allow the management of the locks placed 
by a company to restrict data access in company mode to 
itself.  
(64) Company locks consist in a start date/time (lock-in) and an 
end date/time (lock-out) associated with the identification of 
the company as denoted by the company card number (at 
lock-in).  
(65) Locks may be turned ‘in’ or ‘out’ in real time only.  
(66) Locking-out shall only be possible for the company whose 
lock is ‘in’ (as identified by the first 13 digits of the company 
card number), or,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 31  
(67) Locking-out shall be automatic if another company locks in.  
(68) In the case where a company locks in and where the previous 
lock was for the same company, then it will be assumed that 
the previous lock has not been turned ‘out’ and is still ‘in’.  
3.8 Monitoring control activities  
(69) This function shall monitor DISPLAYING, PRINTING, VU 
and card DOWNLOADING, and ROADSIDE CALI ­
BRATION check activities carried while in control mode.  
(70) This function shall also monitor OVER SPEEDING 
CONTROL activities while in control mode. An over 
speeding control is deemed to have happened when, in 
control mode, the ‘over speeding’ printout has been sent to 
the printer or to the display, or when ‘events and faults’ data 
have been downloaded from the VU data memory.  
3.9 Detection of events and/or faults  
(71) This function shall detect the following events and/or faults:  
3.9.1  ‘Insertion of a non-valid card’ event  
(72) This event shall be triggered at the insertion of any non-valid 
card, at the insertion of a driver card already replaced and/or 
when an inserted valid card expires.  
3.9.2  ‘Card conflict’ event  
(73) This event shall be triggered when any of the valid cards 
combination noted X in the following table arises:  
Card conflict  Driver slot  
No card  Driver card  Control card  Workshop card  Company card
 Co-driver slot No card  
Driver card  X  
Control card  X  X  X  
Workshop card  X  X  X  X  
Company card  X  X  X  
3.9.3  ‘Time overlap’ event  
(74) This event shall be triggered when the date / time of last 
withdrawal of a driver card, as read from the card, is later 
than the current date / time of the recording equipment in 
which the card is inserted.  
3.9.4  ‘Driving without an appropriate card’ event  
(75) This event shall be triggered for any valid tachograph cards 
combination noted X in the following table, when driver 
activity changes to DRIVING, or when there is a change of 
the mode of operation while driver activity is DRIVING:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 32  
Driving without an appropriate 
card Driver slot  
No (or non-valid) 
card Driver card  Control card  Workshop card  Company card
 Co-driver slot No (or non-valid) 
card X X  X  
Driver card  X  X  X  X  
Control card  X  X  X  X  X  
Workshop card  X  X  X  X  
Company card  X  X  X  X  X  
3.9.5  ‘Card insertion while driving’ event  
(76) This event shall be triggered when a tachograph card is 
inserted in any slot, while driver activity is DRIVING.  
3.9.6  ‘Last card session not correctly closed’ event  
(77) This event shall be triggered when at card insertion the 
recording equipment detects that, despite the provisions laid 
down in paragraph 3.1., the previous card session has not 
been correctly closed (the card has been withdrawn before 
all relevant data have been stored on the card). This event 
shall be triggered by driver and workshop cards only.  
3.9.7  ‘Over speeding’ event  
(78) This event shall be triggered for each over speeding.  
3.9.8  ‘Power supply interruption’ event  
(79) This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration or 
control mode, in case of any interruption exceeding 200 milli ­
seconds of the power supply of the motion sensor and/or of 
the vehicle unit. The interruption threshold shall be defined 
by the manufacturer. The drop in power supply due to the 
starting of the engine of the vehicle shall not trigger this 
event.  
3.9.9  ‘Communication error with the remote communication facility’ 
event  
(80) This event shall be triggered,  while not in calibration mode , 
when the remote communication facility does not 
acknowledge the successful reception of remote communi ­
cation data sent from the vehicle unit for more than three 
attempts.  
3.9.10  ‘Absence of position information from GNSS receiver’ event  
(81) This event shall be triggered,  while not in calibration mode , 
in case of absence of position information originating from 
the GNSS receiver (whether internal or external) for more 
than three hours of accumulated driving time.  
3.9.11  ‘Communication error with the external GNSS facility’ event  
(82) This event shall be triggered,  while not in calibration mode , 
in case of interruption of the communication between the 
external GNSS facility and the vehicle unit for more than 
20 continuous minutes, when the vehicle is moving.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 33  
3.9.12  ‘Motion data error’ event  
(83) This event shall be triggered,  while not in calibration mode , 
in case of interruption of the normal data flow between the 
motion sensor and the vehicle unit and/or in case of data 
integrity or data authentication error during data exchange 
between the motion sensor and the vehicle unit.  
3.9.13  ‘Vehicle motion conflict’ event  
(84) This event shall be triggered,  while not in calibration mode , 
in case motion information calculated from the motion sensor 
is contradicted by motion information calculated from the 
internal GNSS receiver or from the external GNSS facility 
and optionally by other independent sources, as specified in 
Appendix 12. This event shall not be triggered during a 
ferry/train crossing, an OUT OF SCOPE condition, or when 
the position information from the GNSS receiver is not 
available.  
3.9.14  ‘Security breach attempt’ event  
(85) This event shall be triggered for any other event affecting the 
security of the motion sensor and/or of the vehicle unit and/or 
the external GNSS facility as required in Appendix 10, while 
not in calibration mode.  
▼M1 
3.9.15  ‘Time conflict’ event  
(86) This event shall be triggered,  while not in calibration mode , 
when the VU detects a discrepancy of more than 1 minute 
between the time of the vehicle unit’s time measurement 
function and the time originating from the GNSS receiver. 
This event is recorded together with the internal clock value 
of the vehicle unit and comes together with an automatic time 
adjustment. After a time conflict event has been triggered, the 
VU will not generate other time conflict events for the next 
12 hours. This event shall not be triggered in cases where no 
valid GNSS signal was detectable by the GNSS receiver for 
30 days or more.  
▼B 
3.9.16  ‘Card’ fault  
(87) This fault shall be triggered when a tachograph card failure 
occurs during operation.  
3.9.17  ‘Recording equipment’ fault  
(88) This fault shall be triggered for any of these failures, while 
not in calibration mode:  
— VU internal fault  
— Printer fault  
— Display fault  
— Downloading fault  
— Sensor fault  
— GNSS receiver or external GNSS facility fault  
— Remote Communication facility fault  
▼M1 
— ITS interface fault (if applicable)  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 34  
3.10 Built-in and self-tests  
(89) ►M1 The recording equipment shall detect faults through 
self-tests and built-in-tests, according to the following 
table: ◄ 
Sub-assembly to test  Self-test  Built-in-test  
Software  Integrity  
Data memory  Access  Access, data integrity  
Card interface devices  Access  Access  
Keyboard  Manual check  
Printer  (up to manufacturer)  Printout  
Display  Visual check  
Downloading 
(performed only during 
downloading)  Proper operation  
Sensor  Proper operation  Proper operation  
Remote communication 
facility  Proper operation  Proper operation  
GNSS facility  Proper operation  Proper operation  
▼M1 
ITS interface (optional)  Proper operation  
▼B 
3.11 Reading from data memory  
(90) The recording equipment shall be able to read any data stored 
in its data memory.  
3.12 Recording and storing in the data memory  
For the purpose of this paragraph,  
— ‘365 days’ is defined as 365 calendar days of average drivers' 
activity in a vehicle. The average activity per day in a vehicle is 
defined as at least 6 drivers or co-drivers, 6 card insertion with ­
drawal cycles, and 256 activity changes. ‘365 days’ therefore 
include at least 2 190 (co-)drivers, 2 190 card insertion with ­
drawal cycles, and 93 440 activity changes,  
▼M1 
— the average number of positions per day is defined as at least 6 
positions where the daily work period begins, 6 positions when 
the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours, 
and 6 positions where the daily work period ends, so that ‘365 
days’ include at least 6 570 positions,  
▼B 
— times are recorded with a resolution of one minute, unless 
otherwise specified,  
— odometer values are recorded with a resolution of one kilometre,  
— speeds are recorded with a resolution of 1 km/h,  
— positions (latitudes and longitudes) are recorded in degrees and 
minutes, with a resolution of 1/10 of minute, with the associated 
GNSS accuracy and acquisition time.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 35  
(91) Data stored into the data memory shall not be affected by an 
external power supply cut-off of less than twelve months in 
type approval conditions. In addition, data stored in the 
external remote communication facility, as defined in 
Appendix 14, shall not be affected by power-supply cut-off 
of less than 28 days.  
(92) The recording equipment shall be able to record and store 
implicitly or explicitly in its data memory the following:  
3.12.1  Equipment identification data  
3.12.1.1 V e h i c l e u n i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n d a t a  
(93) The recording equipment shall be able to store in its data 
memory the following vehicle unit identification data:  
— name of the manufacturer,  
— address of the manufacturer,  
— part number,  
— serial number,  
— VU generation,  
— ability to use first generation tachograph cards,  
— software version number,  
— software version installation date,  
— year of equipment manufacture,  
— approval number,  
(94) Vehicle unit identification data are recorded and stored once 
and for all by the vehicle unit manufacturer, except the 
software related data and the approval number which may 
be changed in case of software upgrade and the ability to 
use first generation tachograph cards.  
3.12.1.2 M o t i o n s e n s o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n d a t a  
(95) The motion sensor shall be able to store in its memory the 
following identification data:  
— name of the manufacturer,  
— serial number,  
— approval number,  
— embedded security component identifier (e.g. internal 
chip/processor part number),  
— operating system identifier (e.g. software version number).  
(96) Motion sensor identification data are recorded and stored 
once and for all in the motion sensor, by the motion sensor 
manufacturer.  
(97) The vehicle unit shall be able to record and store in its data 
memory the following data related to the 20 most recent 
pairing of motion sensors (if several pairings happen within 
one calendar day, only the first and the last one of the day 
shall be stored):  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 36  
The following data shall be recorded for each of these 
pairings:  
— motion sensor identification data:  
— serial number  
— approval number  
— motion sensor pairing data:  
— pairing date.  
3.12.1.3 G l o b a l N a v i g a t i o n S a t e l l i t e S y s t e m s i d e n t i f i ­
c a t i o n d a t a  
(98) The external GNSS facility shall be able to store in its 
memory the following identification data:  
— name of the manufacturer,  
— serial number,  
— approval number,  
— embedded security component identifier (e.g. internal 
chip/processor part number),  
— operating system identifier (e.g. software version number).  
(99) The identification data are recorded and stored once and for 
all in the external GNSS facility, by the external GNSS 
facility manufacturer.  
(100) The vehicle unit shall be able to record and store in its data 
memory the following data related to the 20 most recent 
couplings of external GNSS facilities (if several couplings 
happen within one calendar day, only the first and the last 
one of the day shall be stored).  
The following data shall be recorded for each of these coup ­
lings:  
— external GNSS facility identification data:  
— serial number,  
— approval number,  
— external GNSS facility coupling data:  
— coupling date  
3.12.2  Keys and certificates  
(101) The recording equipment shall be able to store a number of 
cryptographic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 
11 part A and part B.  
3.12.3  Driver or workshop card insertion and withdrawal data  
(102) For each insertion and withdrawal cycle of a driver or 
workshop card in the equipment, the recording equipment 
shall record and store in its data memory:  
— the card holder's surname and first name(s) as stored in 
the card,  
— the card's number, issuing Member State and expiry date 
as stored in the card,  
— the card generation,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 37  
— the insertion date and time,  
— the vehicle odometer value at card insertion,  
— the slot in which the card is inserted,  
— the withdrawal date and time,  
— the vehicle odometer value at card withdrawal,  
— the following information about the previous vehicle used 
by the driver, as stored in the card:  
— VRN and registering Member State,  
— VU generation (when available),  
— card withdrawal date and time,  
— a flag indicating whether, at card insertion, the card 
holder has manually entered activities or not.  
(103) The data memory shall be able to hold these data for at least 
365 days.  
(104) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace 
oldest data.  
3.12.4  Driver activity data  
(105) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory whenever there is a change of activity for the 
driver and/or the co-driver, and/or whenever there is a 
change of driving status, and/or whenever there is an 
insertion or withdrawal of a driver or workshop card:  
— the driving status (CREW, SINGLE),  
— the slot (DRIVER, CO-DRIVER),  
— the card status in the relevant slot (INSERTED, NOT 
INSERTED),  
— the activity (DRIVING, AVAILABILITY, WORK, 
BREAK/REST),  
— the date and time of the change.  
INSERTED means that a valid driver or workshop card is 
inserted in the slot. NOT INSERTED means the opposite i.e. 
no valid driver or workshop card is inserted in the slot (e.g. a 
company card is inserted or no card is inserted)  
Activity data manually entered by a driver are not recorded in 
the data memory.  
(106) The data memory shall be able to hold driver activity data for 
at least 365 days.  
(107) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace 
oldest data.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 38  
3.12.5  Places and positions where daily work periods begin, end and/or 
where 3 hours accumulated driving time is reached  
(108) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory:  
— places and positions where the driver and/or co-driver 
begins his daily work period;  
— positions where the accumulated driving time reaches a 
multiple of three hours;  
— places and positions where the driver and/or the co-driver 
ends his daily work period.  
▼B 
(109) When the position of the vehicle is not available from the 
GNSS receiver at these times, the recording equipment shall 
use the latest available position, and the related date and time.  
(110) Together with each place or position, the recording equipment 
shall record and store in its data memory:  
— the (co-)driver card number and card issuing Member 
State,  
— the card generation,  
— the date and time of the entry,  
▼M1 
— the type of entry (begin, end or 3 hours accumulated 
driving time),  
▼B 
— the related GNSS accuracy, date and time if applicable;  
— the vehicle odometer value.  
▼M1 
(111) The data memory shall be able to hold places and positions 
where daily work periods begin, end and/or where 3 hours 
accumulated driving time is reached for at least 365 days.  
▼B 
(112) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace 
oldest data.  
3.12.6  Odometer data  
(113) The recording equipment shall record in its data memory the 
vehicle odometer value and the corresponding date at 
midnight every calendar day.  
(114) The data memory shall be able to store midnight odometer 
values for at least 365 calendar days.  
(115) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace 
oldest data.  
3.12.7  Detailed speed data  
▼M1 
(116) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory the instantaneous speed of the vehicle and the 
corresponding date and time at every second of at least the 
last 24 hours that the vehicle has been moving.  
▼B 
3.12.8  Events data  
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a 
resolution of 1 second.  
(117) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory the following data for each event detected 
according to the following storage rules:  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 39  
Event  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per event  
Insertion of a non-valid card  — the 10 most recent events.  — date and time of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of the card 
creating the event. 
— number of similar events that day  
Card conflict  — the 10 most recent events.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of the two cards 
creating the conflict.  
Driving without an appro ­
priate card  — the longest event for each of the 10 
last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
Card insertion while driving  — the last event for each of the 10 last 
days of occurrence,  — date and time of the event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation, 
— number of similar events that day  
Last card session not corre- 
ctly closed  — the 10 most recent events.  — date and time of card insertion, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation, 
— last session data as read from the card: 
— date and time of card insertion, 
— VRN, Member State of registration 
and VU generation.  
Over speeding (1)  — the most serious event for each of 
the 10 last days of occurrence (i.e. 
the one with the highest average 
speed), 
— the 5 most serious events over the 
last 365 days. 
— the first event having occurred after 
the last calibration  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— maximum speed measured during the 
event, 
— arithmetic average speed measured 
during the event, 
— card type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of the driver card (if 
applicable), 
— number of similar events that day.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 40  
Event  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per event  
Power supply interruption (2)  — the longest event for each of the 10 
last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
Communication error with 
the remote communication 
facility  — the longest event for each of the 10 
last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
Absence of position 
information from GNSS 
receiver  — the longest event for each of the 10 
last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
▼M1 
Communication error with 
the external GNSS facility  — the longest event for each of the 10 
last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
▼B 
Motion data error  — the longest event for each of the 10 
last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
Vehicle motion conflict  — the longest event for each of the 10 
last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— number of similar events that day.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 41  
Event  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per event  
Security breach attempt  — the 10 most recent events per type 
of event.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event (if 
relevant), 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— type of event.  
▼M1 
Time conflict  — the most serious event for each of 
the 10 last days of occurrence (i.e. 
the ones with the greatest difference 
between recording equipment date 
and time, and GNSS date and time). 
— the 5 most serious events over the 
last 365 days.  — recording equipment date and time 
— GNSS date and time, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation of any card 
inserted at beginning and/or end of the 
event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
▼B 
(1) The recording equipment shall also record and store in its 
data memory:  
— the date and time of the last OVER SPEEDING 
CONTROL,  
— the date and time of the first over speeding following 
this OVER SPEEDING CONTROL,  
— the number of over speeding events since the last 
OVER SPEEDING CONTROL.  
(2) These data may be recorded at power supply reconnection 
only, times may be known with an accuracy to the 
minute.  
3.12.9  Faults data  
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a 
resolution of 1 second.  
(118) The recording equipment shall attempt to record and store in 
its data memory the following data for each fault detected 
according to the following storage rules:  
Fault  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per fault  
Card fault  — the 10 most recent driver card faults.  — date and time of beginning of fault, 
— date and time of end of fault, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation.  
Recording equipment 
faults  — the 10 most recent faults for each type 
of fault, 
— the first fault after the last calibration.  — date and time of beginning of fault, 
— date and time of end of fault, 
— type of fault, 
— card(s) type, number and issuing 
Member State and generation of any 
card inserted at beginning and/or end 
of the fault.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 42  
3.12.10  Calibration data  
(119) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory data relevant to:  
— known calibration parameters at the moment of activation,  
— its very first calibration following its activation,  
— its first calibration in the current vehicle (as identified by 
its VIN),  
— the 20 most recent calibrations (if several calibrations 
happen within one calendar day, only the first and the 
last one of the day shall be stored).  
(120) The following data shall be recorded for each of these cali ­
brations:  
— purpose of calibration (activation, first installation, instal ­
lation, periodic inspection),  
— workshop name and address,  
— workshop card number, card issuing Member State and 
card expiry date,  
— vehicle identification,  
— parameters updated or confirmed: w, k, l, tyre size, speed 
limiting device setting, odometer (old and new values), 
date and time (old and new values),  
— the types and identifiers of all the seals in place.  
(121) In addition, the recording equipment shall record and store in 
its data memory its ability to use first generation tachograph 
cards (still activated or not).  
(122) The motion sensor shall record and store in its memory the 
following motion sensor installation data:  
— first pairing with a VU (date, time, VU approval number, 
VU serial number),  
— last pairing with a VU (date, time, VU approval number, 
VU serial number).  
(123) The external GNSS facility shall record and store in its 
memory the following external GNSS facility installation 
data:  
— first coupling with a VU (date, time, VU approval 
number, VU serial number),  
— last coupling with a VU (date, time, VU approval number, 
VU serial number).  
3.12.11  Time adjustment data  
(124) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory data relevant to time adjustments performed in cali ­
bration mode outside the frame of a regular calibration (def. 
f)): 
— the most recent time adjustment,  
— the 5 largest time adjustments.  
(125) The following data shall be recorded for each of these time 
adjustments:  
— date and time, old value,  
— date and time, new value,  
— workshop name and address,  
— workshop card number, card issuing Member State, card 
generation and card expiry date.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 43  
3.12.12  Control activity data  
(126) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory the following data relevant to the 20 most recent 
control activities:  
— date and time of the control,  
— control card number, card issuing Member State and card 
generation,  
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or VU 
downloading and/or card downloading and/or roadside 
calibration checking).  
(127) In case of downloading, the dates of the oldest and of the 
most recent days downloaded shall also be recorded.  
3.12.13  Company locks data  
(128) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory the following data relevant to the 255 most recent 
company locks:  
— lock-in date and time,  
— lock-out date and time,  
— company card number, card issuing Member State and 
card generation,  
— company name and address.  
Data previously locked by a lock removed from memory due 
to the limit above, shall be treated as not locked.  
3.12.14  Download activity data  
(129) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data 
memory the following data relevant to the last data memory 
downloading to external media while in company or in cali ­
bration mode:  
— date and time of downloading,  
— company or workshop card number, card issuing Member 
State and card generation,  
— company or workshop name.  
3.12.15  Specific conditions data  
(130) The recording equipment shall record in its data memory the 
following data relevant to specific conditions:  
— date and time of the entry,  
— type of specific condition.  
(131) The data memory shall be able to hold specific conditions 
data for at least 365 days (with the assumption that on 
average, 1 condition is opened and closed per day). When 
storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace oldest 
data.  
3.12.16  Tachograph card data  
(132) The recording equipment shall be able to store the following 
data related to the different tachograph cards in which had 
been used in the VU:  
— the tachograph card number and its serial number,  
— the manufacturer of the tachograph card,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 44  
— the tachograph card type,  
— the tachograph card version.  
(133) The recording equipment shall be able to store at least 88 
such records.  
3.13 Reading from tachograph cards  
(134) The recording equipment shall be able to read from first and 
second generation tachograph cards, where applicable, the 
necessary data:  
— to identify the card type, the card holder, the previously 
used vehicle, the date and time of the last card withdrawal 
and the activity selected at that time,  
— to check that last card session was correctly closed,  
— to compute the driver's continuous driving time, cumu ­
lative break time and cumulated driving times for the 
previous and the current week,  
— to print requested printouts related to data recorded on a 
driver card,  
— to download a driver card to external media.  
This requirement only applies to first generation tachograph 
cards if their use has not been suppressed by a workshop.  
(135) In case of a reading error, the recording equipment shall try 
again, three times maximum, the same read command, and 
then if still unsuccessful, declare the card faulty and non- 
valid.  
3.14 Recording and storing on tachograph cards  
3.14.1  Recording and storing in first generation tachograph cards  
(136) Provided first generation tachograph cards use has not been 
suppressed by a workshop, the recording equipment shall 
record and store data exactly in the same way as a first 
generation recording equipment would do.  
(137) The recording equipment shall set the ‘card session data’ in 
the driver or workshop card right after the card insertion.  
(138) The recording equipment shall update data stored on valid 
driver, workshop, company and/or control cards with all 
necessary data relevant to the period while the card is 
inserted and relevant to the card holder. Data stored on 
these cards are specified in Chapter 4.  
(139) The recording equipment shall update driver activity and 
places data (as specified in 4.5.3.1.9 and 4.5.3.1.11), stored 
on valid driver and/or workshop cards, with activity and 
places data manually entered by the cardholder.  
(140) All events not defined for the first generation recording 
equipment, shall not be stored on the driver and workshop 
cards.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 45  
(141) Tachograph cards data update shall be such that, when 
needed and taking into account card actual storage capacity, 
most recent data replace oldest data.  
(142) In the case of a writing error, the recording equipment shall 
try again, three times maximum, the same write command 
and then if still unsuccessful, declare the card faulty and 
non-valid.  
(143) Before releasing a driver card and after all relevant data have 
been stored on the card, the recording equipment shall reset 
the ‘card session data’.  
3.14.2  Recording and storing in second generation tachograph cards  
(144) Second generation tachograph cards shall contain 2 different 
card applications, the first of which shall be exactly the same 
as the TACHO application of first generation tachograph 
cards, and the second the ‘TACHO_G2’ application, as 
specified in Chapter 4 and Appendix 2.  
(145) The recording equipment shall set the ‘card session data’ in 
the driver or workshop card right after the card insertion.  
(146) The recording equipment shall update data stored on the 2 
card applications of valid driver, workshop, company and/or 
control cards with all necessary data relevant to the period 
while the card is inserted and relevant to the card holder. 
Data stored on these cards are specified in Chapter 4.  
(147) The recording equipment shall update driver activity places 
and positions data (as specified in 4.5.3.1.9, 4.5.3.1.11, 
4.5.3.2.9 and 4.5.3.2.11), stored on valid driver and/or 
workshop cards, with activity and places data manually 
entered by the cardholder.  
(148) Tachograph cards data update shall be such that, when 
needed and taking into account card actual storage capacity, 
most recent data replace oldest data.  
(149) In the case of a writing error, the recording equipment shall 
try again, three times maximum, the same write command 
and then if still unsuccessful, declare the card faulty and 
non-valid.  
(150) Before releasing a driver card and after all relevant data have 
been stored on the 2 card applications of the card, the 
recording equipment shall reset the ‘card session data’.  
3.15 Displaying  
(151) The display shall include at least 20 characters.  
(152) The minimum character size shall be 5 mm high and 3.5 mm 
wide.  
(153) The display shall support the characters specified in Appendix 
1 Chapter 4 ‘Character sets’. The display may use simplified 
glyphs (e.g. accented characters may be displayed without 
accent, or lower case letters may be shown as upper case 
letters).  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 46  
(154) The display shall be provided with adequate non-dazzling 
lighting.  
(155) Indications shall be visible from outside the recording 
equipment.  
(156) The recording equipment shall be able to display:  
— default data,  
— data related to warnings,  
— data related to menu access,  
— other data requested by a user.  
Additional information may be displayed by the recording 
equipment, provided that it is clearly distinguishable from 
information required above.  
(157) The display of the recording equipment shall use the 
pictograms or pictograms combinations listed in Appendix 
3. Additional pictograms or pictograms combinations may 
also be provided by the display, if clearly distinguishable 
from the aforementioned pictograms or pictograms 
combinations.  
(158) The display shall always be ON when the vehicle is moving.  
(159) The recording equipment may include a manual or automatic 
feature to turn the display OFF when the vehicle is not 
moving.  
Displaying format is specified in Appendix 5.  
3.15.1  Default display  
(160) When no other information needs to be displayed, the 
recording equipment shall display, by default, the following:  
— the local time (as a result of UTC time + offset as set by 
the driver),  
— the mode of operation,  
— the current activity of the driver and the current activity of 
the co-driver,  
— information related to the driver:  
— if his current activity is DRIVING, his current continuous 
driving time and his current cumulative break time,  
— if his current activity is not DRIVING, the current 
duration of this activity (since it was selected) and his 
current cumulative break time.  
(161) Display of data related to each driver shall be clear, plain and 
unambiguous. In the case where the information related to the 
driver and the co-driver cannot be displayed at the same time, 
the recording equipment shall display by default the 
information related to the driver and shall allow the user to 
display the information related to the co-driver.  
(162) In the case where the display width does not allow displaying 
by default the mode of operation, the recording equipment 
shall briefly display the new mode of operation when it 
changes.  
(163) The recording equipment shall briefly display the card holder 
name at card insertion.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 47  
(164) When an ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ or FERRY/TRAIN condition is 
opened, then the default display must show using the relevant 
pictogram that the particular condition is opened (it is 
acceptable that the driver's current activity may not be 
shown at the same time).  
3.15.2  Warning display  
(165) The recording equipment shall display warning information 
using primarily the pictograms of Appendix 3, completed 
where needed by additional numerically coded information. 
A literal description of the warning may also be added in the 
driver's preferred language.  
3.15.3  Menu access  
(166) The recording equipment shall provide necessary commands 
through an appropriate menu structure.  
3.15.4  Other displays  
(167) It shall be possible to display selectively on request:  
— the UTC date and time, and local time offset,  
— the content of any of the six printouts under the same 
formats as the printouts themselves,  
— the continuous driving time and cumulative break time of 
the driver,  
— the continuous driving time and cumulative break time of 
the co-driver,  
— the cumulated driving time of the driver for the previous 
and the current week,  
— the cumulated driving time of the co-driver for the 
previous and the current week,  
optional:  
— the current duration of co-driver activity (since it was 
selected),  
— the cumulated driving time of the driver for current week,  
— the cumulated driving time of the co-driver for the current 
daily work period,  
— the cumulated driving time of the driver for the current 
daily work period.  
(168) Printout content display shall be sequential, line by line. If the 
display width is less than 24 characters the user shall be 
provided with the complete information through an appro ­
priate mean (several lines, scrolling, …).  
Printout lines devoted to hand-written information may be 
omitted for display.  
3.16 Printing  
(169) The recording equipment shall be able to print information 
from its data memory and/or from tachograph cards in 
accordance with the seven following printouts:  
— driver activities from card daily printout,  
— driver activities from Vehicle Unit daily printout,  
— events and faults from card printout,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 48  
— events and faults from Vehicle Unit printout,  
— technical data printout,  
— over speeding printout.  
— tachograph card data history for a given VU (see chapter 
3.12.16)  
The detailed format and content of these printouts are 
specified in Appendix 4.  
Additional data may be provided at the end of the printouts.  
Additional printouts may also be provided by the recording 
equipment, if clearly distinguishable from the seven afore ­
mentioned printouts.  
(170) The ‘driver activities from card daily printout’ and ‘Events 
and faults from card printout’ shall be available only when a 
driver card or a workshop card is inserted in the recording 
equipment. The recording equipment shall update data stored 
on the relevant card before starting printing.  
(171) In order to produce the ‘driver activities from card daily 
printout’ or the ‘events and faults from card printout’, the 
recording equipment shall:  
— either automatically select the driver card or the workshop 
card if one only of these cards is inserted,  
— or provide a command to select the source card or select 
the card in the driver slot if two of these cards are 
inserted in the recording equipment.  
(172) The printer shall be able to print 24 characters per line.  
(173) The minimum character size shall be 2.1 mm high and 1.5 
mm wide.  
(174) The printer shall support the characters specified in Appendix 
1 Chapter 4 ‘Character sets’.  
(175) Printers shall be so designed as to produce these printouts 
with a degree of definition likely to avoid any ambiguity 
when they are read.  
(176) Printouts shall retain their dimensions and recordings under 
normal conditions of humidity (10-90 %) and temperature.  
(177) The type approved paper used by the recording equipment 
shall bear the relevant type approval mark and an indication 
of the type(s) of recording equipment with which it may be 
used.  
(178) Printouts shall remain clearly legible and identifiable under 
normal conditions of storage, in terms of light intensity, 
humidity and temperature, for at least two years.  
(179) Printouts shall conform at least to the test specifications 
defined in Appendix 9.  
(180) It shall also be possible to add hand-written notes, such as the 
driver's signature, to these documents.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 49  
(181) The recording equipment shall manage ‘paper out’ events 
while printing by, once paper has been re-loaded, restarting 
printing from printout beginning or by continuing printing 
and providing an unambiguous reference to previously 
printed part.  
3.17 Warnings  
(182) The recording equipment shall warn the driver when detecting 
any event and/or fault.  
(183) Warning of a power supply interruption event may be delayed 
until the power supply is reconnected.  
(184) The recording equipment shall warn the driver 15 minutes 
before and at the time of exceeding the maximum allowed 
continuous driving time.  
(185) Warnings shall be visual. Audible warnings may also be 
provided in addition to visual warnings.  
(186) Visual warnings shall be clearly recognisable by the user, 
shall be situated in the driver's field of vision and shall be 
clearly legible both by day and by night.  
(187) Visual warnings may be built into the recording equipment 
and/or remote from the recording equipment.  
(188) In the latter case it shall bear a ‘T’ symbol.  
(189) Warnings shall have a duration of at least 30 seconds, unless 
acknowledged by the user by hitting one or more specific 
keys of the recording equipment. This first acknowledgement 
shall not erase warning cause display referred to in next 
paragraph.  
(190) Warning cause shall be displayed on the recording equipment 
and remain visible until acknowledged by the user using a 
specific key or command of the recording equipment.  
(191) Additional warnings may be provided, as long as they do not 
confuse drivers in relation to previously defined ones.  
3.18 Data downloading to external media  
(192) The recording equipment shall be able to download on 
request data from its data memory or from a driver card to 
external storage media via the calibration/downloading 
connector. The recording equipment shall update data stored 
on the relevant card before starting downloading.  
(193) In addition and as an optional feature, the recording 
equipment may, in any mode of operation, download data 
through any another means to a company authenticated 
through this channel. In such a case, company mode data 
access rights shall apply to this download.  
(194) Downloading shall not alter or delete any stored data.  
(195) The calibration/downloading connector electrical interface is 
specified in Appendix 6.  
(196) Downloading protocols are specified in Appendix 7.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 50  
3.19 Remote communication for targeted roadside checks  
(197) When the ignition is on, the Vehicle Unit shall store every 60 
seconds in the remote communication facility the most recent 
data necessary for the purpose of targeted roadside checks. 
Such data shall be encrypted and signed as specified in 
Appendix 11 and Appendix 14.  
(198) Data to be checked remotely shall be available to remote 
communication readers through wireless communication, as 
specified in Appendix 14.  
(199) Data necessary for the purpose of targeted roadside checks 
shall be related to:  
— the latest security breach attempt,  
— the longest power supply interruption,  
— sensor fault,  
— motion data error,  
— vehicle motion conflict,  
— driving without a valid card,  
— card insertion while driving,  
— time adjustment data,  
— calibration data including the dates of the two latest stored 
calibration records,  
— vehicle registration number,  
— speed recorded by the tachograph.  
3.20 Output data to additional external devices  
▼M1 
(200) The recording equipment may also be equipped with stan ­
dardised interfaces allowing the data recorded or produced 
by tachograph to be used in operational or calibration 
mode, by an external facility.  
In Appendix 13, an optional ITS interface is specified and 
standardized. Other vehicle unit interfaces may co-exist, 
provided they fully comply with the requirements of 
Appendix 13 in term of minimum list of data, security and 
driver consent.  
The driver consent doesn’t apply to data transmitted by the 
recording equipment to the vehicle network. In case the 
personal data injected in the vehicle network are further 
processed outside the vehicle network, it is the responsibility 
of the vehicle manufacturer to have that personal data process 
compliant with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (‘General Data 
Protection Regulation’).  
The driver consent doesn’t apply either to tachograph data 
downloaded to a remote company (requirement 193), as this 
scenario is monitored by the company card access right.  
The following requirements apply to ITS data made available 
through that interface:  
— these data are a set of selected existing data from the 
tachograph data dictionary (Appendix 1),  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 51  
— a subset of these selected data are marked ‘personal data’,  
— the subset of ‘personal data’ is only available if the 
verifiable consent of the driver, accepting his personal 
data can leave the vehicle network, is enabled,  
— At any moment, the driver consent can be enabled or 
disabled through commands in the menu, provided the 
driver card is inserted,  
— the set and subset of data will be broadcasted via 
Bluetooth wireless protocol in the radius of the vehicle 
cab, with a refresh rate of 1 minute,  
— the pairing of the external device with the ITS interface 
will be protected by a dedicated and random PIN of at 
least 4 digits, recorded in and available through the 
display of each vehicle unit,  
— in any circumstances, the presence of the ITS interface 
cannot disturb or affect the correct functioning and the 
security of the vehicle unit.  
Other data may also be output in addition to the set of 
selected existing data, considered as the minimum list, 
provided they cannot be considered as personal data.  
The recording equipment shall have the capacity to 
communicate the driver consent status to other platforms in 
the vehicle network.  
When the ignition of the vehicle is ON, these data shall be 
permanently broadcasted.  
▼B 
(201) The serial link interface as specified in Annex 1B to Regu ­
lation (EEC) No. 3821/85, as last amended, can continue to 
equip tachographs for back compatibility. Anyhow, the driver 
consent is still required in case personal data are transmitted.  
3.21 Calibration  
(202) The calibration function shall allow:  
— to automatically pair the motion sensor with the VU,  
— to automatically couple the external GNSS facility with 
the VU if applicable,  
— to digitally adapt the constant of the recording equipment 
(k) to the characteristic coefficient of the vehicle (w),  
— to adjust the current time within the validity period of the 
inserted workshop card,  
— to adjust the current odometer value,  
— to update motion sensor identification data stored in the 
data memory,  
— to update, if applicable, external GNSS facility identifi ­
cation data stored in the data memory,  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 52  
— to update the types and identifiers of all the seals in place,  
— to update or confirm other parameters known to the 
recording equipment: vehicle identification, w, l, tyre 
size and speed limiting device setting if applicable.  
(203) In addition, the calibration function shall allow to supress the 
use of first generation tachograph cards in the recording 
equipment, provided the conditions specified in Appendix 
15 are met.  
(204) Pairing the motion sensor to the VU shall consist, at least, in:  
— updating motion sensor installation data held by the 
motion sensor (as needed),  
— copying from the motion sensor to the VU data memory 
the necessary motion sensor identification data.  
(205) Coupling the external GNSS facility to the VU shall consist, 
at least, in:  
— updating external GNSS facility installation data held by 
the external GNSS facility (as needed),  
— copying from the external GNSS facility to the VU data 
memory the necessary external GNSS facility identifi ­
cation data including the serial number of the external 
GNSS facility,  
The coupling shall be followed by the verification of the 
GNSS position information.  
(206) The calibration function shall be able to input necessary data 
through the calibration/downloading connector in accordance 
with the calibration protocol defined in Appendix 8. The cali ­
bration function may also input necessary data through other 
means.  
3.22 Roadside calibration checking  
(207) The roadside calibration checking function shall allow 
reading the motion sensor serial number (possibly 
embedded in the adaptor) and the external GNSS facility 
serial number (when applicable), connected to the vehicle 
unit, at the time of the request.  
(208) This reading shall at least be possible on the vehicle unit 
display through commands in the menus.  
(209) The roadside calibration checking function shall also allow 
controlling the selection of the I/O mode of the calibration 
I/O signal line specified in Appendix 6, via the K-line 
interface. This shall be done through the ECUAdjustment ­
Session, as specified in Appendix 8, section 7 Control of 
Test Pulses — Input output control functional unit.  
3.23 Time adjustment  
(210) The time adjustment function shall allow for automatically 
adjusting the current time. Two time sources are used in 
the recording equipment for time adjustment: 1) the internal 
VU clock, 2) the GNSS receiver.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 53  
(211) The time setting of the VU internal clock shall be auto ­
matically re-adjusted every 12 hours. When this re-adjustment 
is not possible because the GNSS signal is not available, the 
time setting shall be done as soon as the VU can access a 
valid time provided by GNSS receiver, according to the 
vehicle ignition conditions. The time reference for the 
automatic time setting of the VU internal clock shall be 
derived from the GNSS receiver.  
▼B 
(212) The time adjustment function shall also allow for triggered 
adjustment of the current time, in calibration mode.  
3.24 Performance characteristics  
(213) The Vehicle Unit shall be fully operational in the temperature 
range – 20 °C to 70 °C, the external GNSS facility in the 
temperature range – 20 °C to 70 °C, and the motion sensor in 
the temperature range – 40 °C to 135 °C. Data memory 
content shall be preserved at temperatures down to – 40 °C.  
(214) The tachograph shall be fully operational in the humidity 
range 10 % to 90 %.  
(215) The seals used in the smart tachograph shall withstand the 
same conditions than those applicable to the tachograph 
components to which they are affixed.  
(216) The recording equipment shall be protected against over- 
voltage, inversion of its power supply polarity, and short 
circuits.  
(217) Motion sensors shall either:  
— react to a magnetic field disturbing vehicle motion 
detection. In such circumstances, the vehicle unit will 
record and store a sensor fault (requirement 88) or,  
— have a sensing element that is protected from, or immune 
to, magnetic fields.  
(218) The recording equipment and the external GNSS facility shall 
conform to international regulation UN ECE R10 and shall be 
protected against electrostatic discharges and transients.  
3.25 Materials  
(219) All the constituent parts of the recording equipment shall be 
made of materials of sufficient stability and mechanical 
strength and with stable electrical and magnetic character ­
istics.  
(220) For normal conditions of use, all the internal parts of the 
equipment shall be protected against damp and dust.  
(221) The Vehicle Unit and the external GNSS facility shall meet 
the protection grade IP 40 and the motion sensor shall meet 
the protection grade IP 64, as per standard IEC 60529:1989 
including A1:1999 and A2:2013.  
(222) The recording equipment shall conform to applicable 
technical specifications related to ergonomic design.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 54  
(223) The recording equipment shall be protected against accidental 
damage.  
3.26 Markings  
(224) If the recording equipment displays the vehicle odometer 
value and speed, the following details shall appear on its 
display:  
— near the figure indicating the distance, the unit of 
measurement of distance, indicated by the abbreviation 
‘km’,  
— near the figure showing the speed, the entry ‘km/h’.  
The recording equipment may also be switched to display the 
speed in miles per hour, in which case the unit of 
measurement of speed shall be shown by the abbreviation 
‘mph’. The recording equipment may also be switched to 
display the distance in miles, in which case the unit of 
measurement of distance shall be shown by the abbreviation 
‘mi’. 
▼M1 
(225) A descriptive plaque shall be affixed to each separate 
component of the recording equipment and shall show the 
following details:  
— name and address of the manufacturer,  
— manufacturer's part number and year of manufacture,  
— serial number,  
— type-approval mark.  
(226) When physical space is not sufficient to show all above 
mentioned details, the descriptive plaque shall show at 
least: the manufacturer's name or logo and the part number.  
▼B 
4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
TACHOGRAPH CARDS  
4.1 Visible data  
The front page shall contain:  
(227) the words ‘Driver card’ or ‘Control card’ or ‘Workshop card’ 
or ‘Company card’ printed in capital letters in the official 
language or languages of the Member State issuing the 
card, according to the type of the card.  
(228) the name of the Member State issuing the card (optional);  
(229) the distinguishing sign of the Member State issuing the card, 
printed in negative in a blue rectangle and encircled by 12 
yellow stars. The distinguishing signs shall be as follows: 
B 
BG 
CZ 
CY Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Cyprus  LV 
L 
LT 
M Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Lithuania 
Malta  
DK Denmark  NL  The Netherlands  
D 
EST Germany 
Estonia  A 
PL Austria 
Poland  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 55  
GR Greece  P 
RO 
SK 
SLO  Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia  
E Spain  FIN  Finland  
F 
HR 
H France 
Croatia 
Hungary  S Sweden  
IRL Ireland  UK  The United Kingdom  
I Italy  
(230) information specific to the card issued, numbered as follows:  
Driver card  Control Card  Company or Workshop card  
1. surname of the driver  control body name  company or workshop name  
2. first name(s) of the driver  surname of the controller 
(if applicable)  surname of card holder 
(if applicable)  
3. birth date of the driver  first name(s) of the 
controller 
(if applicable)  first name(s) of card holder 
(if applicable)  
4.a card start of validity date  
4.b card expiry date  
4.c the name of the issuing authority (may be printed on reverse page)  
4.d a different number from the one under heading 5, for administrative purposes (optional)  
5. a Driving licence number 
(at the date of issue of the 
driver card)  — —  
5. b Card number  
6. Photograph of the driver  photograph of the 
controller (optional)  photograph of the fitter 
(optional)-  
7. Signature of the holder (optional)  
8. Normal place of residence, 
or postal address of the 
holder (optional).  Postal address of control 
body  postal address of company or 
workshop  
(231) dates shall be written using a ‘dd/mm/yyyy’ or ‘dd.mm.yyyy’ 
format (day, month, year).  
The reverse page shall contain:  
(232) an explanation of the numbered items which appear on the 
front page of the card;  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 56  
(233) with the specific written agreement of the holder, information 
which is not related to the administration of the card may also 
be added, such addition will not alter in any way the use of 
the model as a tachograph card.  
(234) Tachograph cards shall be printed with the following back ­
ground predominant colours:  
— driver card: white,  
— control card: blue,  
— workshop card: red,  
— company card: yellow.  
(235) Tachograph cards shall bear at least the following features for 
protection of the card body against counterfeiting and 
tampering:  
— a security design background with fine guilloche patterns 
and rainbow printing,  
— in the area of the photograph, the security design back ­
ground and the photograph shall overlap,  
— at least one two-coloured microprint line.  
▼M1
 
▼B 
(236) After consulting the Commission, Member States may add 
colours or markings, such as national symbols and security 
features, without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Annex.  
(237) Temporary cards referred to in Article 26.4 of Regulation 
(EU) No. 165/2014 shall comply with the provisions of this 
Annex.  
4.2 Security  
The system security aims at protecting integrity and authenticity of 
data exchanged between the cards and the recording equipment, 
protecting the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded from 
the cards, allowing certain write operations onto the cards to 
recording equipment only, decrypting certain data, ruling out any 
possibility of falsification of data stored in the cards, preventing 
tampering and detecting any attempt of that kind.  
(238) In order to achieve the system security, the tachograph cards 
shall meet the security requirements defined in Appendixes 
10 and 11.  
(239) Tachograph cards shall be readable by other equipment such 
as personal computers.  
4.3 Standards  
(240) Tachograph cards shall comply with the following standards:  
— ISO/IEC 7810 Identification cards — Physical character ­
istics,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 57  
— ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards — Integrated circuit 
cards:  
— Part 1: Physical characteristics,  
— Part 2: Dimensions and position of the contacts 
(ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007),  
— Part 3: Electrical interface and transmission protocols 
(ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006),  
— Part 4: Organisation, security and commands for inter ­
change (ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 + Cor 1:2014),  
— Part 6: Interindustry data elements for interchange 
(ISO/IEC 7816-6:2004 + Cor 1:2006),  
— Part 8: Commands for security operations (ISO/IEC 
7816-8:2004).  
— Tachograph cards shall be tested in accordance to 
ISO/IEC 10373-3:2010 Identification cards — Test 
methods — Part 3: Integrated circuit cards with contacts 
and related interface devices.  
4.4 Environmental and electrical specifications  
(241) Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly in 
all the climatic conditions normally encountered in 
Community territory and at least in the temperature range – 
25 °C to + 70 °C with occasional peaks of up to + 85 °C, 
‘occasional’ meaning not more than 4 hours each time and 
not over 100 times during the life time of the card.  
(242) Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly in 
the humidity range 10 % to 90 %.  
(243) Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly for a 
five-year period if used within the environmental and elec ­
trical specifications.  
(244) During operation, tachograph cards shall conform to ECE 
R10, related to electromagnetic compatibility, and shall be 
protected against electrostatic discharges.  
4.5 Data storage  
For the purpose of this paragraph,  
— times are recorded with a resolution of one minute, unless 
otherwise specified,  
— odometer values are recorded with a resolution of one kilometre,  
— speeds are recorded with a resolution of 1 km/h,  
— positions (latitudes and longitudes) are recorded in degrees and 
minutes with a resolution of 1/10 of minute.  
The tachograph cards functions, commands and logical structures, 
fulfilling data storage requirements are specified in Appendix 2.  
If not otherwise specified, data storage on tachograph cards shall be 
organized in such a way, that new data replaces stored oldest data in 
case the foreseen memory size for the particular records is 
exhausted.  
(245) This paragraph specifies minimum storage capacity for the 
various application data files. Tachograph cards shall be 
able to indicate to the recording equipment the actual 
storage capacity of these data files.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 58  
(246) Any additional data that may be stored on tachograph cards, 
related to other applications possibly borne by the card, shall 
be stored in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC and with 
Directive 2002/58/EC and in compliance with Article 7 of 
Regulation (EU) No. 165/2014.  
(247) Each Master File (MF) of any tachograph card shall contain 
up to five Elementary Files (EF) for card management, appli ­
cation and chip identifications, and two Dedicated Files (DF):  
— DF Tachograph, which contains the application accessible 
to first generation vehicle units, which is also present in 
first generation tachograph cards,  
— DF Tachograph_G2, which contains the application only 
accessible to second generation vehicle units, which is 
only present in second generation tachograph cards.  
The full details of the tachograph cards structure are specified 
in Appendix 2.  
4.5.1  Elementary files for identification and card management  
4.5.2  IC card identification  
(248) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the following smart 
card identification data:  
— clock stop,  
— card serial number (including manufacturing references),  
— card type approval number,  
— card personaliser identification (ID),  
— embedder ID,  
— IC identifier.  
4.5.2.1 C h i p i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
(249) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the following Inte ­
grated Circuit (IC) identification data:  
— IC serial number,  
— IC manufacturing references.  
4.5.2.2 D I R ( o n l y p r e s e n t i n s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n 
t a c h o g r a p h c a r d s )  
(250) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the application identi ­
fication data objects specified in Appendix 2.  
4.5.2.3 A T R i n f o r m a t i o n ( c o n d i t i o n a l , o n l y p r e s e n t i n 
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n t a c h o g r a p h c a r d s )  
(251) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the following 
extended length information data object:  
— in the case the tachograph card supports extended length 
fields, the extended length information data object 
specified in Appendix 2.  
4.5.2.4 E x t e n d e d l e n g t h i n f o r m a t i o n ( c o n d i t i o n a l , o n l y 
p r e s e n t i n s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n t a c h o g r a p h c a r d s )  
(252) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the following 
extended length information data objects:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 59  
— in the case the tachograph card supports extended length 
fields, the extended length information data objects 
specified in Appendix 2.  
4.5.3  Driver card  
4.5.3.1 T a c h o g r a p h a p p l i c a t i o n ( a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t a n d 
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )  
4.5.3.1.1 Application identification  
(253) The driver card shall be able to store the following appli ­
cation identification data:  
— tachograph application identification,  
— type of tachograph card identification.  
4.5.3.1.2 Key and certificates  
(254) The driver card shall be able to store a number of crypto ­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11 
part A.  
4.5.3.1.3 Card identification  
(255) The driver card shall be able to store the following card 
identification data:  
— card number,  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,  
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.  
4.5.3.1.4 Card holder identification  
(256) The driver card shall be able to store the following card 
holder identification data:  
— surname of the holder,  
— first name(s) of the holder,  
— date of birth,  
— preferred language.  
4.5.3.1.5 Card download  
(257) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to card download:  
— date and time of last card download (for other purposes 
than control).  
(258) The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.  
4.5.3.1.6 Driving licence information  
(259) The driver card shall be able to store the following driving 
licence data:  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name,  
— driving licence number (at the date of the issue of the 
card).  
4.5.3.1.7 Events data  
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be stored with a 
resolution of 1 second.  
(260) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the 
following events detected by the recording equipment while 
the card was inserted:  
— Time overlap (where this card is the cause of the event),  
— Card insertion while driving (where this card is the 
subject of the event),  
— Last card session not correctly closed (where this card is 
the subject of the event),  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 60  
— Power supply interruption,  
— Motion data error,  
— Security breach attempts.  
(261) The driver card shall be able to store the following data for 
these events:  
— Event code,  
— Date and time of beginning of the event (or of card 
insertion if the event was on-going at that time),  
— Date and time of end of the event (or of card withdrawal 
if the event was on-going at that time),  
— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which 
the event happened.  
Note: For the ‘Time overlap’ event:  
— Date and time of beginning of the event shall correspond 
to the date and time of the card withdrawal from the 
previous vehicle,  
— Date and time of end of the event shall correspond to the 
date and time of card insertion in current vehicle,  
— Vehicle data shall correspond to the current vehicle 
raising the event.  
Note: For the ‘Last card session not correctly closed’ event:  
— date and time of beginning of event shall correspond to 
the card insertion date and time of the session not 
correctly closed,  
— date and time of end of event shall correspond to the card 
insertion date and time of the session during which the 
event was detected (current session),  
— Vehicle data shall correspond to the vehicle in which the 
session was not correctly closed.  
(262) The driver card shall be able to store data for the six most 
recent events of each type (i.e. 36 events).  
4.5.3.1.8 Faults data  
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a 
resolution of 1 second.  
(263) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the 
following faults detected by the recording equipment while 
the card was inserted:  
▼M1 
— Card fault (where this card is the subject of the fault),  
▼B 
— Recording equipment fault.  
(264) The driver card shall be able to store the following data for 
these faults:  
— Fault code,  
— Date and time of beginning of the fault (or of card 
insertion if the fault was on-going at that time),  
— Date and time of end of the fault (or of card withdrawal if 
the fault was on-going at that time),  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 61  
— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which 
the fault happened.  
(265) The driver card shall be able to store data for the twelve most 
recent faults of each type (i.e. 24 faults).  
4.5.3.1.9 Driver activity data  
(266) The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar day 
where the card has been used or for which the driver has 
entered activities manually, the following data:  
— the date,  
— a daily presence counter (increased by one for each of 
these calendar days),  
— the total distance travelled by the driver during this day,  
— a driver status at 00:00,  
— whenever the driver has changed of activity, and/or has 
changed of driving status, and/or has inserted or 
withdrawn his card:  
— the driving status (CREW, SINGLE),  
— the slot (DRIVER, CO-DRIVER),  
— the card status (INSERTED, NOT INSERTED),  
— the activity (DRIVING, AVAILABILITY, WORK, 
BREAK/REST),  
— the time of the change.  
(267) The driver card memory shall be able to hold driver activity 
data for at least 28 days (the average activity of a driver is 
defined as 93 activity changes per day).  
(268) The data listed under requirements 261, 264 and 266 shall be 
stored in a way allowing the retrieval of activities in the order 
of their occurrence, even in case of a time overlap situation.  
4.5.3.1.10 Vehicles used data  
(269) The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar day 
where the card has been used, and for each period of use of a 
given vehicle that day (a period of use includes all 
consecutive insertion / withdrawal cycle of the card in the 
vehicle, as seen from the card point of view), the following 
data:  
— date and time of first use of the vehicle (i.e. first card 
insertion for this period of use of the vehicle, or 00h00 if 
the period of use is on-going at that time),  
— vehicle odometer value at that time,  
— date and time of last use of the vehicle, (i.e. last card 
withdrawal for this period of use of the vehicle, or 
23h59 if the period of use is on-going at that time),  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 62  
— vehicle odometer value at that time,  
— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle.  
(270) The driver card shall be able to store at least 84 such records.  
4.5.3.1.11 Places where daily work periods start and/or end  
(271) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to places where daily work periods begin and/or 
end, entered by the driver:  
— the date and time of the entry (or the date/time related to 
the entry if the entry is made during the manual entry 
procedure),  
— the type of entry (begin or end, condition of entry),  
— the country and region entered,  
— the vehicle odometer value.  
(272) The driver card memory shall be able to hold at least 42 pairs 
of such records.  
4.5.3.1.12 Card session data  
(273) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the 
vehicle which opened its current session:  
— date and time the session was opened (i.e. card insertion) 
with a resolution of one second,  
— VRN and registering Member State.  
4.5.3.1.13 Control activity data  
(274) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to control activities:  
— date and time of the control,  
— control card number and card issuing Member State,  
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or VU 
downloading and/or card downloading (see note)),  
— Period downloaded, in case of downloading,  
— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle in 
which the control happened.  
Note: card downloading will only be recorded if performed 
through a recording equipment.  
(275) The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.  
4.5.3.1.14 Specific conditions data  
(276) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to specific conditions entered while the card was 
inserted (whatever the slot):  
— Date and time of the entry,  
— Type of specific condition.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 63  
(277) The driver card shall be able to store at least 56 such records.  
4.5.3.2 T a c h o g r a p h g e n e r a t i o n 2 a p p l i c a t i o n ( n o t 
a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t )  
4.5.3.2.1 Application identification  
(278) The driver card shall be able to store the following appli ­
cation identification data:  
— tachograph application identification,  
— type of tachograph card identification.  
4.5.3.2.2 Keys and certificates  
(279) The driver card shall be able to store a number of crypto ­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11 part 
B. 
4.5.3.2.3 Card identification  
(280) The driver card shall be able to store the following card 
identification data:  
— card number,  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,  
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.  
4.5.3.2.4 Card holder identification  
(281) The driver card shall be able to store the following card 
holder identification data:  
— surname of the holder,  
— first name(s) of the holder,  
— date of birth,  
— preferred language.  
4.5.3.2.5 Card download  
(282) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to card download:  
— date and time of last card download (for other purposes 
than control).  
(283) The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.  
4.5.3.2.6 Driving licence information  
(284) The driver card shall be able to store the following driving 
licence data:  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name,  
— driving licence number (at the date of the issue of the 
card).  
4.5.3.2.7 Events data  
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be stored with a 
resolution of 1 second.  
(285) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the 
following events detected by the recording equipment while 
the card was inserted:  
— Time overlap (where this card is the cause of the event),  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 64  
— Card insertion while driving (where this card is the 
subject of the event),  
— Last card session not correctly closed (where this card is 
the subject of the event),  
— Power supply interruption,  
— Communication error with the remote communication 
facility,  
— Absence of position information from GNSS receiver 
event,  
— Communication error with the external GNSS facility  
— Motion data error,  
— Vehicle motion conflict,  
— Security breach attempts,  
— Time conflict.  
(286) The driver card shall be able to store the following data for 
these events:  
— Event code,  
— Date and time of beginning of the event (or of card 
insertion if the event was on-going at that time),  
— Date and time of end of the event (or of card withdrawal 
if the event was on-going at that time),  
— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which 
the event happened.  
Note: For the ‘Time overlap’ event:  
— Date and time of beginning of the event shall correspond 
to the date and time of the card withdrawal from the 
previous vehicle,  
— Date and time of end of the event shall correspond to the 
date and time of card insertion in current vehicle,  
— Vehicle data shall correspond to the current vehicle 
raising the event.  
Note: For the ‘Last card session not correctly closed’ event:  
— date and time of beginning of event shall correspond to 
the card insertion date and time of the session not 
correctly closed,  
— date and time of end of event shall correspond to the card 
insertion date and time of the session during which the 
event was detected (current session),  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 65  
— Vehicle data shall correspond to the vehicle in which the 
session was not correctly closed.  
(287) The driver card shall be able to store data for the six most 
recent events of each type (i.e. 66 events).  
4.5.3.2.8 Faults data  
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a 
resolution of 1 second.  
(288) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the 
following faults detected by the recording equipment while 
the card was inserted:  
▼M1 
— Card fault (where this card is the subject of the fault),  
▼B 
— Recording equipment fault.  
(289) The driver card shall be able to store the following data for 
these faults:  
— Fault code,  
— Date and time of beginning of the fault (or of card 
insertion if the fault was on-going at that time),  
— Date and time of end of the fault (or of card withdrawal if 
the fault was on-going at that time),  
— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which 
the fault happened.  
(290) The driver card shall be able to store data for the twelve most 
recent faults of each type (i.e. 24 faults).  
4.5.3.2.9 Driver activity data  
(291) The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar day 
where the card has been used or for which the driver has 
entered activities manually, the following data:  
— the date,  
— a daily presence counter (increased by one for each of 
these calendar days),  
— the total distance travelled by the driver during this day,  
— a driver status at 00:00,  
— whenever the driver has changed of activity, and/or has 
changed of driving status, and/or has inserted or 
withdrawn his card:  
— the driving status (CREW, SINGLE)  
— the slot (DRIVER, CO-DRIVER),  
— the card status (INSERTED, NOT INSERTED),  
— the activity (DRIVING, AVAILABILITY, WORK, 
BREAK/REST).  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 66  
— the time of the change,  
(292) The driver card memory shall be able to hold driver activity 
data for at least 28 days (the average activity of a driver is 
defined as 93 activity changes per day).  
(293) The data listed under requirements 286, 289 and 291 shall be 
stored in a way allowing the retrieval of activities in the order 
of their occurrence, even in case of a time overlap situation.  
4.5.3.2.10 Vehicles used data  
(294) The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar day 
where the card has been used, and for each period of use of a 
given vehicle that day (a period of use includes all 
consecutive insertion / withdrawal cycle of the card in the 
vehicle, as seen from the card point of view), the following 
data:  
— date and time of first use of the vehicle (i.e. first card 
insertion for this period of use of the vehicle, or 00h00 if 
the period of use is on-going at that time),  
— vehicle odometer value at that first use time,  
— date and time of last use of the vehicle, (i.e. last card 
withdrawal for this period of use of the vehicle, or 
23h59 if the period of use is on-going at that time),  
— vehicle odometer value at that last use time,  
— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle,  
— VIN of the vehicle.  
(295) The driver card shall be able to store at least 84 such records.  
4.5.3.2.11 Places and positions where daily work periods start and/or end  
(296) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to places where daily work periods begin and/or 
end, entered by the driver:  
— the date and time of the entry (or the date/time related to 
the entry if the entry is made during the manual entry 
procedure),  
— the type of entry (begin or end, condition of entry),  
— the country and region entered,  
— the vehicle odometer value,  
— the vehicle position,  
— the GNSS accuracy, date and time when the position was 
determined.  
(297) The driver card memory shall be able to hold at least 84 pairs 
of such records.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 67  
4.5.3.2.12 Card session data  
(298) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the 
vehicle which opened its current session:  
— date and time the session was opened (i.e. card insertion) 
with a resolution of one second,  
— VRN and registering Member State.  
4.5.3.2.13 Control activity data  
(299) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to control activities:  
— date and time of the control,  
— control card number and card issuing Member State,  
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or VU 
downloading and/or card downloading (see note)),  
— Period downloaded, in case of downloading,  
— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle in 
which the control happened.  
Note: security requirements imply that card downloading will 
only be recorded if performed through a recording equipment.  
(300) The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.  
4.5.3.2.14 Specific conditions data  
(301) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to specific conditions entered while the card was 
inserted (whatever the slot):  
— Date and time of the entry,  
— Type of specific condition.  
(302) The driver card shall be able to store at least 56 such records.  
4.5.3.2.15 Vehicle units used data  
(303) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to the different vehicle units in which the card was 
used:  
— the date and time of the beginning of the period of use of 
the vehicle unit (i.e. first card insertion in the vehicle unit 
for the period),  
— the manufacturer of the vehicle unit,  
— the vehicle unit type,  
— the vehicle unit software version number.  
(304) The driver card shall be able to store at least 84 such records.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 68  
4.5.3.2.16 Three hours accumulated driving places data  
(305) The driver card shall be able to store the following data 
related to the position of the vehicle where the accumulated 
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours:  
— the date and time when the accumulated driving time 
reaches a multiple of three hours,  
— the position of the vehicle,  
— the GNSS accuracy, date and time when the position was 
determined,  
— the vehicle odometer value.  
(306) The driver card shall be able to store at least 252 such 
records.  
▼B 
4.5.4  Workshop card  
4.5.4.1 T a c h o g r a p h a p p l i c a t i o n ( a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t a n d 
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )  
4.5.4.1.1 Application identification  
(307) The workshop card shall be able to store the following appli ­
cation identification data:  
— tachograph application identification,  
— type of tachograph card identification.  
4.5.4.1.2 Keys and certificates  
(308) The workshop card shall be able to store a number of crypto ­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11 
part A.  
(309) The workshop card shall be able to store a Personal Identifi ­
cation Number (PIN code).  
4.5.4.1.3 Card identification  
(310) The workshop card shall be able to store the following card 
identification data:  
— card number,  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,  
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.  
4.5.4.1.4 Card holder identification  
(311) The workshop card shall be able to store the following card 
holder identification data:  
— workshop name,  
— workshop address,  
— surname of the holder,  
— first name(s) of the holder,  
— preferred language.  
4.5.4.1.5 Card download  
(312) The workshop card shall be able to store a card download 
data record in the same manner as a driver card.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 69  
4.5.4.1.6 Calibration and time adjustment data  
(313) The workshop card shall be able to hold records of cali ­
brations and/or time adjustments performed while the card 
is inserted in a recording equipment.  
(314) Each calibration record shall be able to hold the following 
data:  
— Purpose of calibration (activation, first installation, instal ­
lation, periodic inspection,),  
— Vehicle identification,  
— Parameters updated or confirmed (w, k, l, tyre size, speed 
limiting device setting, odometer (new and old values), 
date and time (new and old values)),  
— Recording equipment identification (VU part number, VU 
serial number, motion sensor serial number).  
(315) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 88 such 
records.  
(316) The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the total 
number of calibrations performed with the card.  
(317) The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the number 
of calibrations performed since its last download.  
4.5.4.1.7 Events and faults data  
(318) The workshop card shall be able to store events and faults 
data records in the same manner as a driver card.  
(319) The workshop card shall be able to store data for the three 
most recent events of each type (i.e. 18 events) and the six 
most recent faults of each type (i.e. 12 faults).  
4.5.4.1.8 Driver activity data  
(320) The workshop card shall be able to store driver activity data 
in the same manner as a driver card.  
(321) The workshop card shall be able to hold driver activity data 
for at least 1 day of average driver activity.  
4.5.4.1.9 Vehicles used data  
(322) The workshop card shall be able to store vehicles used data 
records in the same manner as a driver card.  
(323) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 4 such 
records.  
4.5.4.1.10 Daily work periods start and/or end data  
(324) The workshop card shall be able to store daily works period 
start and/or end data records in the same manner as a driver 
card.  
(325) The workshop card shall be able to hold at least 3 pairs of 
such records.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 70  
4.5.4.1.11 Card session data  
(326) The workshop card shall be able to store a card session data 
record in the same manner as a driver card.  
4.5.4.1.12 Control activity data  
(327) The workshop card shall be able to store a control activity 
data record in the same manner as a driver card.  
4.5.4.1.13 Specific conditions data  
(328) The workshop card shall be able to store data relevant to 
specific conditions in the same manner as the driver card.  
(329) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 2 such 
records.  
4.5.4.2 T a c h o g r a p h g e n e r a t i o n 2 a p p l i c a t i o n ( n o t 
a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t )  
4.5.4.2.1 Application identification  
(330) The workshop card shall be able to store the following appli ­
cation identification data:  
— tachograph application identification,  
— type of tachograph card identification.  
4.5.4.2.2 Keys and certificates  
(331) The workshop card shall be able to store a number of crypto ­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11 
part B.  
(332) The workshop card shall be able to store a Personal Identifi ­
cation Number (PIN code).  
4.5.4.2.3 Card identification  
(333) The workshop card shall be able to store the following card 
identification data:  
— card number,  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,  
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.  
4.5.4.2.4 Card holder identification  
(334) The workshop card shall be able to store the following card 
holder identification data:  
— workshop name,  
— workshop address,  
— surname of the holder,  
— first name(s) of the holder,  
— preferred language.  
4.5.4.2.5 Card download  
(335) The workshop card shall be able to store a card download 
data record in the same manner as a driver card.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 71  
4.5.4.2.6 Calibration and time adjustment data  
(336) The workshop card shall be able to hold records of cali ­
brations and/or time adjustments performed while the card 
is inserted in a recording equipment.  
(337) Each calibration record shall be able to hold the following 
data:  
— purpose of calibration (activation, first installation, instal ­
lation, periodic inspection,),  
— vehicle identification,  
— parameters updated or confirmed (w, k, l, tyre size, speed 
limiting device setting, odometer (new and old values), 
date and time (new and old values),  
— recording equipment identification (VU part number, VU 
serial number, motion sensor serial number, remote 
communication facility serial number and external 
GNSS facility serial number, if applicable),  
— seal type and identifier of all seals in place,  
— ability of the VU to use first generation tachograph cards 
(enabled or not).  
(338) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 88 such 
records.  
(339) The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the total 
number of calibrations performed with the card.  
(340) The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the number 
of calibrations performed since its last download.  
4.5.4.2.7 Events and faults data  
(341) The workshop card shall be able to store events and faults 
data records in the same manner as a driver card.  
(342) The workshop card shall be able to store data for the three 
most recent events of each type (i.e. 33 events) and the six 
most recent faults of each type (i.e. 12 faults).  
4.5.4.2.8 Driver activity data  
(343) The workshop card shall be able to store driver activity data 
in the same manner as a driver card.  
(344) The workshop card shall be able to hold driver activity data 
for at least 1 day of average driver activity.  
4.5.4.2.9 Vehicles used data  
(345) The workshop card shall be able to store vehicles used data 
records in the same manner as a driver card.  
(346) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 4 such 
records.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 72  
4.5.4.2.10 Daily work periods start and/or end data  
(347) The workshop card shall be able to store daily works period 
start and/or end data records in the same manner as a driver 
card.  
(348) The workshop card shall be able to hold at least 3 pairs of 
such records.  
4.5.4.2.11 Card session data  
(349) The workshop card shall be able to store a card session data 
record in the same manner as a driver card.  
4.5.4.2.12 Control activity data  
(350) The workshop card shall be able to store a control activity 
data record in the same manner as a driver card.  
4.5.4.2.13 Vehicle units used data  
(351) The workshop card shall be able to store the following data 
related to the different vehicle units in which the card was 
used:  
— the date and time of the beginning of the period of use of 
the vehicle unit (i.e. first card insertion in the vehicle unit 
for the period),  
— the manufacturer of the vehicle unit,  
— the vehicle unit type,  
— the vehicle unit software version number.  
(352) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 4 such 
records.  
▼M1 
4.5.4.2.14 Three hours accumulated driving places data  
(353) The workshop card shall be able to store the following data 
related to the position of the vehicle where the accumulated 
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours:  
— the date and time when the accumulated driving time 
reaches a multiple of three hours,  
— the position of the vehicle,  
— the GNSS accuracy, date and time when the position was 
determined,  
— the vehicle odometer value.  
(354) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 18 such 
records.  
▼B 
4.5.4.2.15 Specific conditions data  
(355) The workshop card shall be able to store data relevant to 
specific conditions in the same manner as the driver card.  
(356) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 2 such 
records.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 73  
4.5.5  Control card  
4.5.5.1 T a c h o g r a p h a p p l i c a t i o n ( a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t a n d 
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )  
4.5.5.1.1 Application identification  
(357) The control card shall be able to store the following appli ­
cation identification data:  
— tachograph application identification,  
— type of tachograph card identification.  
4.5.5.1.2 Keys and certificates  
(358) The control card shall be able to store a number of crypto ­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11 
part A.  
4.5.5.1.3 Card identification  
(359) The control card shall be able to store the following card 
identification data:  
— card number,  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,  
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if any).  
4.5.5.1.4 Card holder identification  
(360) The control card shall be able to store the following card 
holder identification data:  
— control body name,  
— control body address,  
— surname of the holder,  
— first name(s) of the holder,  
— preferred language.  
4.5.5.1.5 Control activity data  
(361) The control card shall be able to store the following control 
activity data:  
— date and time of the control,  
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or VU 
downloading and/or card downloading and/or roadside 
calibration checking),  
— period downloaded (if any),  
— VRN and Member State registering authority of the 
controlled vehicle,  
— card number and card issuing Member State of the driver 
card controlled.  
(362) The control card shall be able to hold at least 230 such 
records.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 74  
4.5.5.2 T a c h o g r a p h G 2 a p p l i c a t i o n ( n o t a c c e s s i b l e t o 
f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t )  
4.5.5.2.1 Application identification  
(363) The control card shall be able to store the following appli ­
cation identification data:  
— tachograph application identification,  
— type of tachograph card identification.  
4.5.5.2.2 Keys and certificates  
(364) The control card shall be able to store a number of crypto ­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11 
part B.  
4.5.5.2.3 Card identification  
(365) The control card shall be able to store the following card 
identification data:  
— card number,  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,  
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if any).  
4.5.5.2.4 Card holder identification  
(366) The control card shall be able to store the following card 
holder identification data:  
— control body name,  
— control body address,  
— surname of the holder,  
— first name(s) of the holder,  
— preferred language.  
4.5.5.2.5 Control activity data  
(367) The control card shall be able to store the following control 
activity data:  
— date and time of the control,  
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or VU 
downloading and/or card downloading and/or roadside 
calibration checking)  
— period downloaded (if any),  
— VRN and Member State registering authority of the 
controlled vehicle,  
— card number and card issuing Member State of the driver 
card controlled.  
(368) The control card shall be able to hold at least 230 such 
records.  ▼B
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4.5.6  Company card  
4.5.6.1 T a c h o g r a p h a p p l i c a t i o n ( a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t a n d 
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )  
4.5.6.1.1 Application identification  
(369) The company card shall be able to store the following appli ­
cation identification data:  
— tachograph application identification,  
— type of tachograph card identification.  
4.5.6.1.2 Keys and Certificates  
(370) The company card shall be able to store a number of crypto ­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11 
part A.  
4.5.6.1.3 Card identification  
(371) The company card shall be able to store the following card 
identification data:  
— card number,  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,  
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if any).  
4.5.6.1.4 Card holder identification  
(372) The company card shall be able to store the following card 
holder identification data:  
— company name,  
— company address.  
4.5.6.1.5 Company activity data  
(373) The company card shall be able to store the following 
company activity data:  
— date and time of the activity,  
— type of the activity (VU locking in and/or out, and/or VU 
downloading and/or card downloading)  
— period downloaded (if any),  
— VRN and Member State registering authority of vehicle,  
— card number and card issuing Member State (in case of 
card downloading).  
(374) The company card shall be able to hold at least 230 such 
records.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 76  
4.5.6.2 T a c h o g r a p h G 2 a p p l i c a t i o n ( n o t a c c e s s i b l e t o 
f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t )  
4.5.6.2.1 Application identification  
(375) The company card shall be able to store the following appli ­
cation identification data:  
— tachograph application identification,  
— type of tachograph card identification.  
4.5.6.2.2 Keys and certificates  
(376) The company card shall be able to store a number of crypto ­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11 part 
B. 
4.5.6.2.3 Card identification  
(377) The company card shall be able to store the following card 
identification data:  
— card number,  
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,  
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if any).  
4.5.6.2.4 Card holder identification  
(378) The company card shall be able to store the following card 
holder identification data:  
— company name,  
— company address.  
4.5.6.2.5 Company activity data  
(379) The company card shall be able to store the following 
company activity data:  
— date and time of the activity,  
— type of the activity (VU locking in and/or out, and/or VU 
downloading and/or card downloading)  
— period downloaded (if any),  
— VRN and Member State registering authority of vehicle,  
— card number and card issuing Member State (in case of 
card downloading).  
(380) The company card shall be able to hold at least 230 such 
records.  
5. INSTALLATION OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT  
5.1 Installation  
(381) New recording equipment shall be delivered non-activated to 
fitters or vehicle manufacturers, with all calibration 
parameters, as listed in Chapter 3.21, set to appropriate and 
valid default values. Where no particular value is appropriate, 
literal parameters shall be set to strings of ‘?’ and numeric 
parameters shall be set to ‘0’. Delivery of security relevant 
parts of the recording equipment can be restricted if required 
during security certification.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 77  
(382) Before its activation, the recording equipment shall give 
access to the calibration function even if not in calibration 
mode.  
(383) Before its activation, the recording equipment shall neither 
record nor store data referred by points 3.12.3, 3.12.9 and 
3.12.12 to 3.12.15 inclusive.  
(384) During installation, vehicle manufacturers shall pre-set all 
known parameters.  
(385) Vehicle manufacturers or fitters shall activate the installed 
recording equipment at the latest before the vehicle is used 
in scope of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006.  
(386) The activation of the recording equipment shall be triggered 
automatically by the first insertion of a valid workshop card 
in either of its card interface devices.  
(387) Specific pairing operations required between the motion 
sensor and the vehicle unit, if any, shall take place auto ­
matically before or during activation.  
(388) In a similar way, specific coupling operations between the 
external GNSS facility and the vehicle unit, if any, shall 
take place automatically before or during activation.  
(389) After its activation, the recording equipment shall fully 
enforce functions and data access rights.  
(390) After its activation, the recording equipment shall 
communicate to the remote communication facility the 
secured data necessary for the purpose of targeted roadside 
checks.  
(391) The recording and storing functions of the recording 
equipment shall be fully operational after its activation.  
(392) Installation shall be followed by a calibration. The first cali ­
bration may not necessarily include entry of the vehicle regis ­
tration number (VRN), when it is not known by the approved 
workshop having to undertake this calibration. In these 
circumstances, it shall be possible, for the vehicle owner, 
and at this time only, to enter the VRN using his Company 
Card prior to using the vehicle in scope of Regulation (EC) 
No 561/2006 (e.g by using commands through an appropriate 
menu structure of the vehicle unit's man-machine inter ­
face.) (  1 ). Any update or confirmation of this entry shall 
only be possible using a Workshop Card.  
(393) The installation of an external GNSS facility requires the 
coupling with the vehicle unit and the subsequent verification 
of the GNSS position information.  
(394) The recording equipment must be positioned in the vehicle in 
such a way as to allow the driver to access the necessary 
functions from his seat.  ▼B 
( 1 ) OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p.1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 78  
5.2 Installation plaque  
(395) After the recording equipment has been checked on instal ­
lation, an installation plaque, engraved or printed in a 
permanent way, which is clearly visible and easily accessible 
shall be affixed onto the recording equipment. In cases where 
this is not possible, the plaque shall be affixed to the vehicle's 
‘B’ pillar so that it is clearly visible. For vehicles that do not 
have a ‘B’ pillar, the installation plaque should be affixed to 
the doorframe on the driver's side of the vehicle and be 
clearly visible in all cases.  
After every inspection by an approved fitter or workshop, a 
new plaque shall be affixed in place of the previous one.  
▼M1 
(396) The plaque shall bear at least the following details:  
— name, address or trade name of the approved fitter or 
workshop,  
— characteristic coefficient of the vehicle, in the form ‘w = 
… imp/km’,  
— constant of the recording equipment, in the form ‘k = … 
imp/km’,  
— effective circumference of the wheel tyres in the form ‘l = 
… mm’,  
— tyre size,  
— the date on which the characteristic coefficient of the 
vehicle and the effective circumference of the wheel 
tyres were measured,  
— the vehicle identification number,  
— the presence (or not) of an external GNSS facility,  
— the serial number of the external GNSS facility, if 
applicable,  
— the serial number of the remote communication device, if 
any, 
— the serial number of all the seals in place,  
— the part of the vehicle where the adaptor, if any, is 
installed,  
— the part of the vehicle where the motion sensor is 
installed, if not connected to the gear-box or an adaptor 
is not being used,  
— a description of the colour of the cable between the 
adaptor and that part of the vehicle providing its 
incoming impulses,  
— the serial number of the embedded motion sensor of the 
adaptor.  
▼B 
(397) For M1 and N1 vehicles only, and which are fitted with an 
adaptor in conformity with Commission Regulation (EC) No 
68/2009 (  1 ) as last amended and where it is not possible to 
include all the information necessary, as described in 
Requirement 396, a second, additional, plaque may be used. 
In such cases, this additional plaque shall contain at least the 
last four indents described in Requirement 396.  ▼B 
( 1 ) Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2009 of 23 January 2009 adapting for the ninth time 
to technical progress Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in 
road transport (OJ L 21, 24.1.2009, p. 3).
02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 79  
This second, additional plaque, if used, shall be affixed next 
to or beside the first primary plaque described in 
Requirement 396, and shall have the same protection level. 
Furthermore the secondary plaque shall also bear the name, 
address or trade name of the approved fitter or workshop 
that carried out the installation, and the date of installation.  
5.3 Sealing 
(398) The following parts shall be sealed:  
— Any connection which, if disconnected, would cause 
undetectable alterations to be made or undetectable 
data loss (this may e.g. apply for the motion sensor 
fitting on the gearbox, the adaptor for M1/N1 vehicles, 
the external GNSS connection or the vehicle unit);  
— The installation plaque, unless it is attached in such a 
way that it cannot be removed without the markings 
thereon being destroyed.  
▼M1 
(398a) The seals mentioned above shall be certified according to the 
standard EN 16882:2016.  
▼B 
(399) The seals mentioned above may be removed:  
— In case of emergency,  
— To install, to adjust or to repair a speed limitation device 
or any other device contributing to road safety, provided 
that the recording equipment continues to function 
reliably and correctly and is resealed by an approved 
fitter or workshop (in accordance with Chapter 6) im ­
mediately after fitting the speed limitation device or any 
other device contributing to road safety or within seven 
days in other cases.  
(400) On each occasion that these seals are broken a written 
statement giving the reasons for such action shall be 
prepared and made available to the competent authority.  
(401) Seals shall hold an identification number, allocated by its 
manufacturer. This number shall be unique and distinct from 
any other seal number allocated by any other seals manu ­
facturer.  
▼M1 
This unique identification number is defined as: 
MMNNNNNNNN by non-removable marking, with MM 
as unique manufacturer identification (database registration 
to be managed by EC) and NNNNNNNN seal alpha- 
numeric number, unique in the manufacturer domain.  
▼B 
(402) The seals shall have a free space where approved fitters, 
workshops or vehicle manufacturers can add a special 
mark according the Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) No 
165/2014.  
This mark shall not cover the seal identification number.  
▼M1 
(403) Seals manufacturers shall be registered in a dedicated 
database when they get a seal model certified according to 
EN 16882:2016 and shall make their identification seals 
numbers public through a procedure to be established by 
the European Commission.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 80  
(404) Approved workshops and vehicle manufacturers shall, in the 
frame of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, only use seals 
certified according to EN 16882:2016 from those of the 
seals manufacturers listed in the database mentioned above.  
▼B 
(405) Seal manufacturers and their distributors shall maintain full 
traceability records of the seals sold to be used in the frame 
of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 and shall be prepared to 
produce them to competent national authorities whenever 
need be.  
(406) Seals unique identification numbers shall be visible on the 
installation plaque.  
6. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS  
Requirements on the circumstances in which seals may be removed, 
as referred to in Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, are 
defined in Chapter 5.3 of this annex.  
6.1 Approval of fitters, workshops and vehicle manufacturers  
The Member States approve, regularly control and certify the bodies 
to carry out:  
— installations,  
— checks,  
— inspections,  
— repairs.  
Workshop cards shall be issued only to fitters and/or workshops 
approved for the activation and/or the calibration of recording 
equipment in conformity with this annex and, unless duly justified:  
— who are not eligible for a company card;  
— and whose other professional activities do not present a potential 
compromise of the overall security of the system as required in 
Appendix 10.  
▼M1 
6.2 Check of new or repaired components  
(407) Every individual device, whether new or repaired, shall be 
checked in respect of its proper operation and the accuracy 
of its reading and recordings, within the limits laid down in 
Chapter 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.3.  
▼B 
6.3 Installation inspection  
▼M1 
(408) When being fitted to a vehicle, the whole installation 
(including the recording equipment) shall comply with the 
provisions relating to maximum tolerances laid down in 
Chapter 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.3. The whole installation 
shall be sealed in accordance with Chapter 5.3 and it shall 
include a calibration.  
▼B 
6.4 Periodic inspections  
(409) Periodic inspections of the equipment fitted to the vehicles 
shall take place after any repair of the equipment, or after 
any alteration of the characteristic coefficient of the vehicle 
or of the effective circumference of the tyres, or after 
equipment UTC time is wrong by more than 20 minutes, 
or when the VRN has changed, and at least once within two 
years (24 months) of the last inspection.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 81  
(410) These inspections shall include the following checks:  
— that the recording equipment is working properly, 
including the data storage in tachograph cards function 
and the communication with remote communication 
readers,  
— that compliance with the provisions of chapter 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2 on the maximum tolerances on installation is 
ensured,  
— that compliance with the provisions of chapter 3.2.3 and 
3.3 is ensured,  
— that the recording equipment carries the type approval 
mark,  
— that the installation plaque, as defined by Requirement 
396, and the descriptive plaque, as defined by 
Requirement 225, are affixed,  
— the tyre size and the actual circumference of the tyres,  
— that there are no manipulation devices attached to the 
equipment,  
— that seals are correctly placed, in good state, that their 
identification numbers are valid (referenced seal manu ­
facturer in the EC database) and that their identification 
numbers correspond to the installation plaque markings 
(see requirement 401).  
(411) If one of the events listed in Chapter 3.9 (Detection of 
Events and/or Faults) is found to have occurred since the 
last inspection and is considered by tachograph manufac ­
turers and/or national authorities as potentially putting the 
security of the equipment at risk, the workshop shall:  
a. make a comparison between the motion sensor identifi ­
cation data of the motion sensor plugged into the gearbox 
with that of the paired motion sensor registered in the 
vehicle unit;  
b. check if the information recorded on the installation 
plaque matches with the information contained within 
the vehicle unit record;  
c. check if the motion sensor serial number and approval 
number, if printed on the body of the motion sensor, 
matches the information stored in the recording 
equipment data memory;  
d. compare identification data marked on the descriptive 
plaque of the external GNSS facility, if any, to the 
ones stored in the vehicle unit data memory;  
(412) Workshops shall keep traces in their inspection reports of 
any findings concerning broken seals or manipulations 
devices. These reports shall be kept by workshops for at 
least 2 years and made available to the Competent 
Authority whenever requested to do so.  
(413) These inspections shall include a calibration and a 
preventive replacement of the seals whose fitting is under 
the responsibility of workshops.  
6.5 Measurement of errors  
(414) The measurement of errors on installation and during use 
shall be carried out under the following conditions, which 
are to be regarded as constituting standard test conditions:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 82  
— vehicle unladen, in normal running order,  
— tyre pressures in accordance with the manufacturer's 
instructions,  
— tyre wear, within the limits allowed by national law,  
— vehicle movement:  
— the vehicle shall advance under its own engine power in 
a straight line on level ground and at a speed of 50 ± 5 
km/h. The measuring distance shall be at least 1 000 m.  
— provided that it is of comparable accuracy, alternative 
methods, such as a suitable test bench, may also be 
used for the test.  
6.6 Repairs  
(415) Workshops shall be able to download data from the 
recording equipment to give the data back to the appropriate 
transport company.  
(416) Approved workshops shall issue to transport companies a 
certificate of data un-downloadability where the malfunction 
of the recording equipment prevents previously recorded 
data to be downloaded, even after repair by this 
workshop. The workshops will keep a copy of each issued 
certificate for at least two years.  
7. CARD ISSUING  
The card issuing processes set-up by the Member States shall 
conform to the following:  
(417) The card number of the first issue of a tachograph card to an 
applicant shall have a consecutive index (if applicable) and a 
replacement index and a renewal index set to “0”.  
(418) The card numbers of all non-personal tachograph cards 
issued to a single control body or a single workshop or a 
single transport company shall have the same first 13 digits, 
and shall all have a different consecutive index.  
(419) A tachograph card issued in replacement of an existing 
tachograph card shall have the same card number than the 
replaced one except the replacement index which shall be 
raised by “1” (in the order 0, …, 9, A, …, Z).  
(420) A tachograph card issued in replacement of an existing 
tachograph card shall have the same card expiry date as 
the replaced one.  
(421) A tachograph card issued in renewal of an existing 
tachograph card shall have the same card number as the 
renewed one except the replacement index which shall be 
reset to “0” and the renewal index which shall be raised by 
“1” (in the order 0, …, 9, A, …, Z).  
(422) The exchange of an existing tachograph card, in order to 
modify administrative data, shall follow the rules of the 
renewal if within the same Member State, or the rules of 
a first issue if performed by another Member State.  
(423) The ‘card holder surname’ for non-personal workshop or 
control cards shall be filled with workshop or control 
body name or with the fitter or control officer's name 
would Member States so decide.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 83  
(424) Member States shall exchange data electronically in order to 
ensure the uniqueness of driver cards that they issue in 
accordance with Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 
165/2014.  
8. TYPE-APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT AND 
TACHOGRAPH CARDS  
8.1 General points  
▼M1 
For the purpose of this chapter, the words ‘recording equipment’ 
mean ‘recording equipment or its components’. No type approval is 
required for the cable(s) linking the motion sensor to the VU, the 
external GNSS facility to the VU or the external remote communi ­
cation facility to the VU. The paper, for use by the recording 
equipment, shall be considered as a component of the recording 
equipment.  
Any manufacturer may ask for type approval of recording 
equipment component(s) with any other recording equipment 
component(s), provided each component complies with the 
requirements of this annex. Alternately, manufacturers may also 
ask for type approval of recording equipment.  
As described in definition (10) in Article 2 of this Regulation, 
vehicle units have variants in components assembly. Whatever the 
vehicle unit components assembly, the external antenna and (if 
applicable) the antenna splitter connected to the GNSS receiver or 
to the remote communication facility are not part of the vehicle unit 
type approval.  
Nevertheless, manufacturers having obtained type approval for 
recording equipment shall maintain a publicly available list of 
compatible antennas and splitters with each type approved vehicle 
unit, external GNSS facility and external remote communication 
facility.  
▼B 
(425) Recording equipment shall be submitted for approval 
complete with any integrated additional devices.  
(426) Type approval of recording equipment and of tachograph 
cards shall include security related tests, functional tests 
and interoperability tests. Positive results to each of these 
tests are stated by an appropriate certificate.  
▼M1 
(427) Member States type approval authorities will not grant a 
type approval certificate as long as they do not hold:  
— a security certificate (if requested by this Annex),  
— a functional certificate,  
— and an interoperability certificate (if requested by this 
Annex)  
for the recording equipment or the tachograph card, subject 
of the request for type approval.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 84  
(428) Any modification in software or hardware of the equipment 
or in the nature of materials used for its manufacture shall, 
before being used, be notified to the authority which granted 
type-approval for the equipment. This authority shall 
confirm to the manufacturer the extension of the type 
approval, or may require an update or a confirmation of 
the relevant functional, security and/or interoperability 
certificates.  
(429) Procedures to upgrade in-situ recording equipment software 
shall be approved by the authority which granted type 
approval for the recording equipment. Software upgrade 
must not alter nor delete any driver activity data stored in 
the recording equipment. Software may be upgraded only 
under the responsibility of the equipment manufacturer.  
(430) Type approval of software modifications aimed to upgrade a 
previously type approved recording equipment may not be 
refused if such modifications only apply to functions not 
specified in this Annex. Software upgrade of a recording 
equipment may exclude the introduction of new character 
sets, if not technically feasible.  
8.2 Security certificate  
(431) The security certificate is delivered in accordance with the 
provisions of Appendix 10 of this Annex. Recording 
equipment components to be certified are vehicle unit, 
motion sensor, external GNSS facility and tachograph cards.  
(432) In the exceptional circumstance that the security certification 
authorities refuse to certify new equipment on the ground of 
obsolescence of the security mechanisms, type approval 
shall continue to be granted only in these specific and 
exceptional circumstances, and when no alternative 
solution, compliant with the Regulation, exists.  
(433) In this circumstance the Member State concerned shall, 
without delay, inform the European Commission, which 
shall, within twelve calendar months of the grant of the 
type approval, launch a procedure to ensure that the level 
of security is restored to its original levels.  
8.3 Functional certificate  
(434) Each candidate for type approval shall provide the Member 
State's type approval authority with all the material and 
documentation that the authority deems necessary.  
(435) Manufacturers shall provide the relevant samples of type 
approval candidate products and associated documentation 
required by laboratories appointed to perform functional 
tests, and within one month of the request being made. 
Any costs resulting from this request shall be borne by 
the requesting entity. Laboratories shall treat all commer ­
cially sensitive information in confidence.  
(436) A functional certificate shall be delivered to the manu ­
facturer only after all functional tests specified in 
Appendix 9, at least, have been successfully passed.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 85  
(437) The type approval authority delivers the functional 
certificate. This certificate shall indicate, in addition to the 
name of its beneficiary and the identification of the model, a 
detailed list of the tests performed and the results obtained.  
(438) The functional certificate of any recording equipment 
component shall also indicate the type approval numbers 
of the other type approved compatible recording 
equipment components tested for its certification.  
(439) The functional certificate of any recording equipment 
component shall also indicate the ISO or CEN standard 
against which the functional interface has been certified.  
8.4 Interoperability certificate  
(440) Interoperability tests are carried out by a single laboratory 
under the authority and responsibility of the European 
Commission.  
(441) The laboratory shall register interoperability test requests 
introduced by manufacturers in the chronological order of 
their arrival.  
(442) Requests will be officially registered only when the 
laboratory is in possession of:  
— the entire set of material and documents necessary for 
such interoperability tests,  
— the corresponding security certificate,  
— the corresponding functional certificate,  
The date of the registration of the request shall be notified to 
the manufacturer.  
(443) No interoperability tests shall be carried out by the 
laboratory, for recording equipment or tachograph cards 
that have not been granted a security certificate and a func ­
tional certificate, except in the exceptional circumstances 
described in Requirement 432.  
(444) Any manufacturer requesting interoperability tests shall 
commit to leave to the laboratory in charge of these tests 
the entire set of material and documents which he provided 
to carry out the tests.  
(445) The interoperability tests shall be carried out, in accordance 
with the provisions of Appendix 9 of this Annex, with 
respectively all the types of recording equipment or 
tachograph cards:  
— for which type approval is still valid or,  
— for which type approval is pending and that have a valid 
interoperability certificate.  
(446) The interoperability tests shall cover all generations of 
recording equipment or tachograph cards still in use.  
(447) The interoperability certificate shall be delivered by the 
laboratory to the manufacturer only after all required inter ­
operability tests have been successfully passed.  
(448) If the interoperability tests are not successful with one or 
more of the recording equipment or tachograph card(s), the 
interoperability certificate shall not be delivered, until the 
requesting manufacturer has realised the necessary modifi ­
cations and has succeeded the interoperability tests. The 
laboratory shall identify the cause of the problem with the  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 86  
help of the manufacturers concerned by this interoperability 
fault and shall attempt to help the requesting manufacturer 
in finding a technical solution. In the case where the manu ­
facturer has modified its product, it is the manufacturer's 
responsibility to ascertain from the relevant authorities that 
the security certificate and the functional certificates are still 
valid.  
(449) The interoperability certificate is valid for six months. It is 
revoked at the end of this period if the manufacturer has not 
received a corresponding type approval certificate. It is 
forwarded by the manufacturer to the type approval 
authority of the Member State who has delivered the func ­
tional certificate.  
(450) Any element that could be at the origin of an interoperability 
fault shall not be used for profit or to lead to a dominant 
position.  
8.5 Type-approval certificate  
(451) The type approval authority of the Member State may 
deliver the type approval certificate as soon as it holds the 
three required certificates.  
(452) The type approval certificate of any recording equipment 
component shall also indicate the type approval numbers 
of the other type approved interoperable recording 
equipment.  
(453) The type approval certificate shall be copied by the type 
approval authority to the laboratory in charge of the inter ­
operability tests at the time of deliverance to the manufac ­
turer.  
(454) The laboratory competent for interoperability tests shall run 
a public web site on which will be updated the list of 
recording equipment or tachograph cards models:  
— for which a request for interoperability tests have been 
registered,  
— having received an interoperability certificate (even 
provisional),  
— having received a type approval certificate.  
8.6 Exceptional procedure: first interoperability certificates for 2  nd 
generation recording equipment and tachograph cards  
(455) Until four months after a first couple of 2  nd generation 
recording equipment and 2  nd generation tachograph cards 
(driver, workshop, control and company cards) have been 
certified to be interoperable, any interoperability certificate 
delivered (including the first ones), regarding requests 
registered during this period, shall be considered provisional.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 87  
(456) If at the end of this period, all products concerned are 
mutually interoperable, all corresponding interoperability 
certificates shall become definitive.  
(457) If during this period, interoperability faults are found, the 
laboratory in charge of interoperability tests shall identify 
the causes of the problems with the help of all manufac ­
turers involved and shall invite them to realize the necessary 
modifications.  
(458) If at the end of this period, interoperability problems still 
remain, the laboratory in charge of interoperability tests, 
with the collaboration of the manufacturers concerned and 
with the type approval authorities who delivered the 
corresponding functional certificates shall find out the 
causes of the interoperability faults and establish which 
modifications should be made by each of the manufacturers 
concerned. The search for technical solutions shall last for a 
maximum of two months, after which, if no common 
solution is found, the Commission, after having consulted 
the laboratory in charge of interoperability tests, shall decide 
which equipment(s) and cards get a definitive interoper ­
ability certificate and state the reasons why.  
(459) Any request for interoperability tests, registered by the 
laboratory between the end of the four month period after 
the first provisional interoperability certificate has been 
delivered and the date of the decision by the Commission 
referred to in requirement 455, shall be postponed until the 
initial interoperability problems have been solved. Those 
requests are then processed in the chronological order of 
their registration.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 88  
Appendix 1  
DATA DICTIONARY  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Approach for definitions of data types  
1.2. References  
2. DATA TYPE DEFINITIONS  
2.1. ActivityChangeInfo  
2.2. Address  
2.3. AESKey  
2.4. AES128Key  
2.5. AES192Key  
2.6. AES256Key  
2.7. BCDString  
2.8. CalibrationPurpose  
2.9. CardActivityDailyRecord  
2.10. CardActivityLengthRange  
2.11. CardApprovalNumber  
2.12. CardCertificate  
2.13. CardChipIdentification  
2.14. CardConsecutiveIndex  
2.15. CardControlActivityDataRecord  
2.16. CardCurrentUse  
2.17. CardDriverActivity  
2.18. CardDrivingLicenceInformation  
2.19. CardEventData  
2.20. CardEventRecord  
2.21. CardFaultData  
2.22. CardFaultRecord  
2.23. CardIccIdentification  
2.24. CardIdentification  
2.25. CardMACertificate  
2.26. CardNumber  
2.27. CardPlaceDailyWorkPeriod  
2.28. CardPrivateKey  
2.29. CardPublicKey  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 89  
2.30. CardRenewalIndex  
2.31. CardReplacementIndex  
2.32. CardSignCertificate  
2.33. CardSlotNumber  
2.34. CardSlotsStatus  
2.35. CardSlotsStatusRecordArray  
2.36. CardStructureVersion  
2.37. CardVehicleRecord  
2.38. CardVehiclesUsed  
2.39. CardVehicleUnitRecord  
2.40. CardVehicleUnitsUsed  
2.41. Certificate  
2.42. CertificateContent  
2.43. CertificateHolderAuthorisation  
2.44. CertificateRequestID  
2.45. CertificationAuthorityKID  
2.46. CompanyActivityData  
2.47. CompanyActivityType  
2.48. CompanyCardApplicationIdentification  
2.49. CompanyCardHolderIdentification  
2.50. ControlCardApplicationIdentification  
2.51. ControlCardControlActivityData  
2.52. ControlCardHolderIdentification  
2.53. ControlType  
2.54. CurrentDateTime  
2.55. CurrentDateTimeRecordArray  
2.56. DailyPresenceCounter  
2.57. Datef  
2.58. DateOfDayDownloaded  
2.59. DateOfDayDownloadedRecordArray  
2.60. Distance  
2.61. DriverCardApplicationIdentification  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 90  
2.62. DriverCardHolderIdentification  
▼M1 
2.63. Reserved for future use  
▼B 
2.64. EGFCertificate  
2.65. EmbedderIcAssemblerId  
2.66. EntryTypeDailyWorkPeriod  
2.67. EquipmentType  
2.68. EuropeanPublicKey  
2.69. EventFaultRecordPurpose  
2.70. EventFaultType  
2.71. ExtendedSealIdentifier  
2.72. ExtendedSerialNumber  
2.73. FullCardNumber  
2.74. FullCardNumberAndGeneration  
2.75. Generation  
2.76. GeoCoordinates  
2.77. GNSSAccuracy  
▼M1 
2.78. GNSSAccumulatedDriving  
2.79. GNSSAccumulatedDrivingRecord  
▼B 
2.80. GNSSPlaceRecord  
2.81. HighResOdometer  
2.82. HighResTripDistance  
2.83. HolderName  
2.84. InternalGNSSReceiver  
2.85. K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment  
2.86. KeyIdentifier  
2.87. KMWCKey  
2.88. Language  
2.89. LastCardDownload  
2.90. LinkCertificate  
2.91. L-TyreCircumference  
2.92. MAC  
2.93. ManualInputFlag  
2.94. ManufacturerCode  
2.95. ManufacturerSpecificEventFaultData  
2.96. MemberStateCertificate  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 91  
2.97. MemberStateCertificateRecordArray  
2.98. MemberStatePublicKey  
2.99. Name  
2.100. NationAlpha  
2.101. NationNumeric  
2.102. NoOfCalibrationRecords  
2.103. NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload  
2.104. NoOfCardPlaceRecords  
2.105. NoOfCardVehicleRecords  
2.106. NoOfCardVehicleUnitRecords  
2.107. NoOfCompanyActivityRecords  
2.108. NoOfControlActivityRecords  
2.109. NoOfEventsPerType  
2.110. NoOfFaultsPerType  
▼M1 
2.111. NoOfGNSSADRecords  
▼B 
2.112. NoOfSpecificConditionRecords  
2.113. OdometerShort  
2.114. OdometerValueMidnight  
2.115. OdometerValueMidnightRecordArray  
2.116. OverspeedNumber  
2.117. PlaceRecord  
2.118. PreviousVehicleInfo  
2.119. PublicKey  
2.120. RecordType  
2.121. RegionAlpha  
2.122. RegionNumeric  
2.123. RemoteCommunicationModuleSerialNumber  
2.124. RSAKeyModulus  
2.125. RSAKeyPrivateExponent  
2.126. RSAKeyPublicExponent  
2.127. RtmData  
2.128. SealDataCard  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 92  
2.129. SealDataVu  
2.130. SealRecord  
2.131. SensorApprovalNumber  
2.132. SensorExternalGNSSApprovalNumber  
2.133. SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord  
2.134. SensorExternalGNSSIdentification  
2.135. SensorExternalGNSSInstallation  
2.136. SensorExternalGNSSOSIdentifier  
2.137. SensorExternalGNSSSCIdentifier  
2.138. SensorGNSSCouplingDate  
2.139. SensorGNSSSerialNumber  
2.140. SensorIdentification  
2.141. SensorInstallation  
2.142. SensorInstallationSecData  
2.143. SensorOSIdentifier  
2.144. SensorPaired  
2.145. SensorPairedRecord  
2.146. SensorPairingDate  
2.147. SensorSCIdentifier  
2.148. SensorSerialNumber  
2.149. Signature  
2.150. SignatureRecordArray  
2.151. SimilarEventsNumber  
2.152. SpecificConditionRecord  
2.153. SpecificConditions  
2.154. SpecificConditionType  
2.155. Speed  
2.156. SpeedAuthorised  
2.157. SpeedAverage  
2.158. SpeedMax  
2.159. TachographPayload  
▼M1 
2.160. Reserved for future use  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 93  
2.161. TDesSessionKey  
2.162. TimeReal  
2.163. TyreSize  
2.164. VehicleIdentificationNumber  
2.165. VehicleIdentificationNumberRecordArray  
2.166. VehicleRegistrationIdentification  
2.167. VehicleRegistrationNumber  
2.168. VehicleRegistrationNumberRecordArray  
2.169. VuAbility  
2.170. VuActivityDailyData  
2.171. VuActivityDailyRecordArray  
2.172. VuApprovalNumber  
2.173. VuCalibrationData  
2.174. VuCalibrationRecord  
2.175. VuCalibrationRecordArray  
2.176. VuCardIWData  
2.177. VuCardIWRecord  
2.178. VuCardIWRecordArray  
2.179. VuCardRecord  
2.180. VuCardRecordArray  
2.181. VuCertificate  
2.182. VuCertificateRecordArray  
2.183. VuCompanyLocksData  
2.184. VuCompanyLocksRecord  
2.185. VuCompanyLocksRecordArray  
2.186. VuControlActivityData  
2.187. VuControlActivityRecord  
2.188. VuControlActivityRecordArray  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 94  
2.189. VuDataBlockCounter  
2.190. VuDetailedSpeedBlock  
2.191. VuDetailedSpeedBlockRecordArray  
2.192. VuDetailedSpeedData  
2.193. VuDownloadablePeriod  
2.194. VuDownloadablePeriodRecordArray  
2.195. VuDownloadActivityData  
2.196. VuDownloadActivityDataRecordArray  
2.197. VuEventData  
2.198. VuEventRecord  
2.199. VuEventRecordArray  
2.200. VuFaultData  
2.201. VuFaultRecord  
2.202. VuFaultRecordArray  
▼M1 
2.203. VuGNSSADRecord  
2.204. VuGNSSADRecordArray  
▼B 
2.205. VuIdentification  
2.206. VuIdentificationRecordArray  
2.207. VuITSConsentRecord  
2.208. VuITSConsentRecordArray  
2.209. VuManufacturerAddress  
2.210. VuManufacturerName  
2.211. VuManufacturingDate  
2.212. VuOverSpeedingControlData  
2.213. VuOverSpeedingControlDataRecordArray  
2.214. VuOverSpeedingEventData  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 95  
2.215. VuOverSpeedingEventRecord  
2.216. VuOverSpeedingEventRecordArray  
2.217. VuPartNumber  
2.218. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodData  
2.219. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord  
2.220. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecordArray  
2.221. VuPrivateKey  
2.222. VuPublicKey  
2.223. VuSerialNumber  
2.224. VuSoftInstallationDate  
2.225. VuSoftwareIdentification  
2.226. VuSoftwareVersion  
2.227. VuSpecificConditionData  
2.228. VuSpecificConditionRecordArray  
2.229. VuTimeAdjustmentData  
▼M1 
2.230. Reserved for future use  
2.231. Reserved for future use  
▼B 
2.232. VuTimeAdjustmentRecord  
2.233. VuTimeAdjustmentRecordArray  
2.234. WorkshopCardApplicationIdentification  
2.235. WorkshopCardCalibrationData  
2.236. WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord  
2.237. WorkshopCardHolderIdentification  
2.238. WorkshopCardPIN  
2.239. W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant  
2.240. VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecord  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 96  
2.241. VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecordArray  
2.242. VuSensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecordArray  
2.243. VuSensorPairedRecordArray  
3. VALUE AND SIZE RANGE DEFINITIONS  
4. CHARACTER SETS  
5. ENCODING  
6. OBJECT IDENTIFIERS UND APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS  
6.1. Object Identifiers  
6.2. Application Identifiers  
1. INTRODUCTION  
This appendix specifies data formats, data elements, and data structures 
for use within the recording equipment and tachograph cards.  
1.1. Approach for definitions of data types  
This appendix uses Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) to define 
data types. This enables simple and structured data to be defined 
without implying any specific transfer syntax (encoding rules) which 
will be application and environment dependent.  
ASN.1 type naming conventions are done in accordance with ISO/IEC 
8824-1. This implies that:  
— where possible, the meaning of the data type is implied through the 
names being selected,  
— where a data type is a composition of other data types, the data type 
name is still a single sequence of alphabetical characters 
commencing with a capital letter, however capitals are used within 
the name to impart the corresponding meaning,  
— in general, the data types names are related to the name of the data 
types from which they are constructed, the equipment in which data 
is stored and the function related to the data.  
If an ASN.1 type is already defined as part of another standard and if it 
is relevant for usage in the recording equipment, then this ASN.1 type 
will be defined in this appendix.  
To enable several types of encoding rules, some ASN.1 types in this 
appendix are constrained by value range identifiers. The value range 
identifiers are defined in paragraph 3 and Appendix 2.  
1.2. References  
The following references are used in this Appendix:  
ISO 639 Code for the representation of names of languages. 
First Edition: 1988.  
ISO 3166 Codes for the representation of names of countries 
and their subdivisions — Part 1: Country codes, 2013  
ISO 3779 Road vehicles — Vehicle identification number 
(VIN) — Content and structure. 2009  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 97  
ISO/IEC 7816-5 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 
5: Registration of application providers.  
Second edition: 2004.  
ISO/IEC 7816-6 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 
6: Interindustry data elements for interchange, 2004 + 
Technical Corrigendum 1: 2006  
ISO/IEC 8824-1 Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation 
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation. 2008 + 
Technical Corrigendum 1: 2012 and Technical Corri ­
gendum 2: 2014.  
ISO/IEC 8825-2 Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules: 
Specification of Packed Encoding Rules (PER). 2008.  
ISO/IEC 8859-1 Information technology — 8 bit single-byte coded 
graphic character sets — Part 1: Latin alphabet 
No.1. First edition: 1998.  
ISO/IEC 8859-7 Information technology — 8 bit single-byte coded 
graphic character sets — Part 7: Latin/Greek 
alphabet. 2003.  
ISO 16844-3 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Motion 
Sensor Interface. 2004 + Technical Corrigendum 1: 
2006..  
TR-03110-3 BSI / ANSSI Technical Guideline TR-03110-3, 
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine 
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token — 
Part 3 Common Specifications, version 2.20, 3. 
February 2015  
2. DATA TYPE DEFINITIONS  
For any of the following data types, the default value for an ‘unknown’ 
or a ‘not applicable’ content will consist in filling the data element with 
‘FF’ bytes.  
All data types are used for Generation 1 and Generation 2 applications 
unless otherwise specified.  
▼M1 
For card data types used for Generation 1 and Generation 2 applications, 
the size specified in this Appendix is the one for Generation 2 appli ­
cation. The size for Generation 1 application is supposed to be already 
known by the reader. The Annex IC requirement numbers related to 
such data types cover both Generation 1 and Generation 2 applications.  
▼B 
2.1. ActivityChangeInfo  
This data type enables to code, within a two bytes word, a slot status at 
00:00 and/or a driver status at 00:00 and/or changes of activity and/or 
changes of driving status and/or changes of card status for a driver or a 
co-driver. This data type is related to Annex 1C requirements 105, 266, 
291, 320, 321, 343, and 344.
  
Value assignment — Octet Aligned : ‘scpaattttttttttt’B (16 bits)  
For Data Memory recordings (or slot status):  
‘s’B Slot:  
‘0’B: DRIVER,  
‘1’B: CO-DRIVER,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 98  
‘c’B Driving status:  
‘0’B: SINGLE,  
‘1’B: CREW,  
‘p’B Driver (or workshop) card status in the relevant slot:  
‘0’B: INSERTED, a card is inserted,  
‘1’B: NOT INSERTED, no card is inserted (or a card 
is withdrawn),  
‘aa’B Activity:  
‘00’B: BREAK/REST,  
‘01’B: AVAILABILITY,  
‘10’B: WORK,  
‘11’B: DRIVING,  
‘ttttttttttt’B Time of the change: Number of minutes since 00h00 
on the given day.  
For Driver (or Workshop) card recordings (and driver status):  
‘s’B Slot (not relevant when ‘p’=1 except note below):  
‘0’B: DRIVER,  
‘1’B: CO-DRIVER,  
‘c’B Driving status (case ‘p’=0) or  
Following activity status (case ‘p’=1):  
‘0’B: SINGLE,  
‘0’B: UNKNOWN  
‘1’B: CREW,  
‘1’B: KNOWN (=manually entered)  
‘p’B Card status:  
‘0’B: INSERTED, the card is inserted in a recording 
equipment,  
‘1’B: NOT INSERTED, the card is not inserted (or 
the card is withdrawn),  
‘aa’B Activity (not relevant when ‘p’=1 and ‘c’=0 except 
note below):  
‘00’B: BREAK/REST,  
‘01’B: AVAILABILITY,  
‘10’B: WORK,  
‘11’B: DRIVING,  
‘ttttttttttt’B Time of the change: Number of minutes since 00h00 
on the given day.  ▼B
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Note for the case ‘card withdrawal’:  
When the card is withdrawn:  
— ‘s’ is relevant and indicates the slot from which the card is with ­
drawn,  
— ‘c’ must be set to 0,  
— ‘p’ must be set to 1,  
— ‘aa’ must code the current activity selected at that time,  
As a result of a manual entry, the bits ‘c’ and ‘aa’ of the word (stored in 
a card) may be overwritten later to reflect the entry.  
2.2. Address  
An address.
  
codePage  specifies a character set defined in Chapter 4,  
address  is an address encoded using the specified character set.  
2.3. AESKey  
Generation 2:  
An AES key with a length of 128, 192 or 256 bits.
  
Value assignment : not further specified.  
2.4. AES128Key  
Generation 2:  
An AES128 key.
  
length  denotes the length of the AES128 key in octets.  
aes128Key  is an AES key with a length of 128 bits.  
Value assignment:  
The length shall have the value 16.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 100  
2.5. AES192Key  
Generation 2:  
An AES192 key.
  
length  denotes the length of the AES192 key in octets.  
aes192Key  is an AES key with a length of 192 bits.  
Value assignment:  
The length shall have the value 24.  
2.6. AES256Key  
Generation 2:  
An AES256 key.
  
length  denotes the length of the AES256 key in octets.  
aes256Key  is an AES key with a length of 256 bits.  
Value assignment:  
The length shall have the value 32.  
2.7. BCDString  
BCDString is applied for Binary Code Decimal (BCD) representation. 
This data type is used to represent one decimal digit in one semi octet (4 
bits). BCDString is based on the ISO/IEC 8824-1 ‘CharacterStringType’.
  
BCDString uses an ‘hstring’ notation. The leftmost hexadecimal digit 
shall be the most significant semi octet of the first octet. To produce a 
multiple of octets, zero trailing semi octets shall be inserted, as needed, 
from the leftmost semi octet position in the first octet.  
Permitted digits are: 0, 1, .. 9.  
2.8. CalibrationPurpose  
Code explaining why a set of calibration parameters was recorded. This 
data type is related to Annex 1B requirements 097 and 098 and Annex 
1C requirements 119.
  ▼B
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Value assignment:  
Generation 1:  
‘00’H reserved value,  
‘01’H activation: recording of calibration parameters known, 
at the moment of the VU activation,  
‘02’H first installation: first calibration of the VU after its 
activation,  
‘03’H installation: first calibration of the VU in the current 
vehicle,  
‘04’H periodic inspection.  
Generation 2:  
In addition to generation 1 the following values are used:  
‘05’H entry of VRN by company,  
‘06’H time adjustment without calibration,  
‘07’H to ‘7F’H RFU,  
‘80’H to ‘FF’H Manufacturer specific.  
2.9. CardActivityDailyRecord  
Information, stored in a card, related to the driver activities for a 
particular calendar day. This data type is related to Annex 1C 
requirements 266, 291, 320 and 343.
  
activityPreviousRecordLength  is the total length in bytes of the 
previous daily record. The maximum value is given by the length of 
the OCTET STRING containing these records (see CardActivityLeng ­
thRange Appendix 2 paragraph 4). When this record is the oldest daily 
record, the value of activityPreviousRecordLength must be set to 0.  
activityRecordLength  is the total length in bytes of this record. The 
maximum value is given by the length of the OCTET STRING 
containing these records.  
activityRecordDate  is the date of the record.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 102  
activityDailyPresenceCounter  is the daily presence counter for the card 
this day.  
activityDayDistance  is the total distance travelled this day.  
activityChangeInfo  is the set of ActivityChangeInfo data for the driver 
this day. It may contain at maximum 1440 values (one activity change 
per minute). This set always includes the activityChangeInfo coding the 
driver status at 00:00.  
2.10.  CardActivityLengthRange  
Number of bytes in a driver or a workshop card, available to store driver 
activity records.
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  
2.11.  CardApprovalNumber  
Type approval number of the card.
  
Value assignment:  
The approval number shall be provided as published on the 
corresponding European Commission web site, i.e. for example 
including hyphens if any. The approval number shall be left-aligned.  
2.12.  CardCertificate  
Generation 1:  
Certificate of the public key of a card.
  
2.13.  CardChipIdentification  
Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the card's 
Integrated Circuit (IC) (Annex 1C requirement 249). The icSerialNumber 
together with the icManufacturingReferences identifies the card chip 
uniquely. The icSerialNumber alone does not uniquely identify the 
card chip.
  
icSerialNumber  is the IC serial number.  
icManufacturingReferences  is the IC manufacturer specific identifier.  
2.14.  CardConsecutiveIndex  
A card consecutive index (definition h)).
  
Value assignment : (see Annex 1C chapter 7)  
Order for increase: ‘0, …, 9, A, …, Z, a, …, z’  ▼B
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2.15.  CardControlActivityDataRecord  
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the last 
control the driver has been subject to (Annex 1C requirements 274, 
299, 327, and 350).
  
controlType  is the type of the control.  
controlTime  is the date and time of the control.  
controlCardNumber  is the FullCardNumber of the control officer 
having performed the control.  
controlVehicleRegistration  is the VRN and registering Member State of 
the vehicle in which the control happened.  
controlDownloadPeriodBegin  and  controlDownloadPeriodEnd  is the 
period downloaded, in case of downloading.  
2.16.  CardCurrentUse  
Information about the actual usage of the card (Annex 1C requirement 
273, 298, 326, and 349).
  
sessionOpenTime  is the time when the card is inserted for the current 
usage. This element is set to zero at card removal.  
sessionOpenVehicle  is the identification of the currently used vehicle, 
set at card insertion. This element is set to zero at card removal.  
2.17.  CardDriverActivity  
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the 
activities of the driver (Annex 1C requirements 267, 268, 292, 293, 
321 and 344).
  
activityPointerOldestDayRecord  is the specification of the begin of the 
storage place (number of bytes from the beginning of the string) of the 
oldest complete day record in the activityDailyRecords string. The 
maximum value is given by the length of the string.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 104  
activityPointerNewestRecord  is the specification of the begin of the 
storage place (number of bytes from the beginning of the string) of 
the most recent day record in the activityDailyRecords string. The 
maximum value is given by the length of the string.  
activityDailyRecords  is the space available to store the driver activity 
data (data structure: CardActivityDailyRecord) for each calendar day 
where the card has been used.  
Value assignment : this octet string is cyclically filled with records of 
CardActivityDailyRecord. At the first use storing is started at the first 
byte of the string. All new records are appended at the end of the 
previous one. When the string is full, storing continues at the first 
byte of the string independently of a break being inside a data 
element. Before placing new activity data in the string (enlarging 
current activityDailyRecord, or placing a new activityDailyRecord) that 
replaces older activity data, activityPointerOldestDayRecord must be 
updated to reflect the new location of the oldest complete day record, 
and activityPreviousRecordLength of this (new) oldest complete day 
record must be reset to 0.  
2.18.  CardDrivingLicenceInformation  
Information, stored in a driver card, related to the card holder driver 
licence data (Annex 1C requirement 259 and 284).
  
drivingLicenceIssuingAuthority  is the authority responsible for issuing 
the driving licence.  
drivingLicenceIssuingNation  is the nationality of the authority that 
issued the driving licence.  
drivingLicenceNumber  is the number of the driving licence.  
▼M1 
2.19.  CardEventData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the events 
associated with the card holder (Annex IC requirements 260 and 318).
  
CardEventData  is a sequence, ordered by ascending value of Event ­
FaultType, of cardEventRecords (except security breach attempts related 
records which are gathered in the last set of the sequence).  
cardEventRecords  is a set of event records of a given event type (or 
category for security breach attempts events).  
Generation 2:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 105  
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the events 
associated with the card holder (Annex IC requirements 285 and 341).
  
CardEventData  is a sequence, ordered by ascending value of Event ­
FaultType, of cardEventRecords (except security breach attempts related 
records which are gathered in the last set of the sequence).  
cardEventRecords  is a set of event records of a given event type (or 
category for security breach attempts events).  
▼B 
2.20.  CardEventRecord  
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to an event 
associated to the card holder (Annex 1C requirements 261, 286, 318 and 
341).
  
eventType  is the type of the event.  
eventBeginTime  is the date and time of beginning of event.  
eventEndTime  is the date and time of end of event.  
eventVehicleRegistration  is the VRN and registering Member State of 
vehicle in which the event happened.  
2.21.  CardFaultData  
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the faults 
associated to the card holder (Annex 1C requirements 263, 288, 318, and 
341).
  
CardFaultData  is a sequence of Recording Equipment faults set of 
records followed by card faults set of records.  
cardFaultRecords  is a set of fault records of a given fault category 
(Recording Equipment or card).  
2.22.  CardFaultRecord  
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to a fault 
associated to the card holder (Annex 1C requirement 264, 289, 318, and 
341).
  
faultType  is the type of the fault.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 106  
faultBeginTime  is the date and time of beginning of fault.  
faultEndTime  is the date and time of end of fault.  
faultVehicleRegistration  is the VRN and registering Member State of 
vehicle in which the fault happened.  
2.23.  CardIccIdentification  
Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the inte ­
grated circuit (IC) card (Annex 1C requirement 248).
  
clockStop  is the Clockstop mode as defined in appendix 2.  
cardExtendedSerialNumber  is the IC card unique serial number as 
further specified by the ExtendedSerialNumber data type.  
cardApprovalNumber  is the type approval number of the card.  
cardPersonaliserID  is the card personaliser ID encoded as Manufac ­
turerCode.  
embedderIcAssemblerId  provides information about the embedder/IC 
assembler.  
icIdentifier  is the Identifier of the IC on the card and its IC manu ­
facturer as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-6.  
2.24.  CardIdentification  
Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the card 
(Annex 1C requirements 255, 280, 310, 333, 359, 365, 371, and 377).
  
cardIssuingMemberState  is the code of the Member State issuing the 
card.  
cardNumber  is the card number of the card.  
cardIssuingAuthorityName  is the name of the authority having issued 
the Card.  
cardIssueDate  is the issue date of the Card to the current holder.  
cardValidityBegin  is the first date of validity of the card.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 107  
cardExpiryDate  is the date when the validity of the card ends.  
2.25.  CardMACertificate  
Generation 2:  
Certificate of the card public key for mutual authentication with a VU. 
The structure of this certificate is specified in Appendix 11.
  
2.26.  CardNumber  
A card number as defined by definition g).
  
driverIdentification  is the unique identification of a driver in a Member 
State.  
ownerIdentification  is the unique identification of a company or a 
workshop or a control body within a member state.  
cardConsecutiveIndex  is the card consecutive index.  
cardReplacementIndex  is the card replacement index.  
cardRenewalIndex  is the card renewal index.  
The first sequence of the choice is suitable to code a driver card number, 
the second sequence of the choice is suitable to code workshop, control, 
and company card numbers.  
2.27.  CardPlaceDailyWorkPeriod  
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the places 
where daily work periods begin and/or end (Annex 1C requirements 272, 
297, 325, and 348).
  
placePointerNewestRecord  is the index of the last updated place 
record.  
Value assignment : Number corresponding to the numerator of the place 
record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of the place records in 
the structure.  
placeRecords  is the set of records containing the information related to 
the places entered.  ▼B
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2.28.  CardPrivateKey  
Generation 1:  
The private key of a card.
  
2.29.  CardPublicKey  
The public key of a card.
  
▼M1 
2.30.  CardRenewalIndex  
A card renewal index (definition i)).
  
Value assignment : (see this Annex chapter 7).  
‘0’ First issue.  
Order for increase: ‘0, …, 9, A, …, Z’  
▼B 
2.31.  CardReplacementIndex  
A card replacement index (definition j)).
  
Value assignment : (see this Annex chapter VII).  
‘0’ Original card.  
Order for increase: ‘0, …, 9, A, …, Z’  
2.32.  CardSignCertificate  
Generation 2:  
Certificate of the card public key for signature. The structure of this 
certificate is specified in Appendix 11.
  
2.33.  CardSlotNumber  
Code to distinguish between the two slots of a Vehicle Unit.
  
Value assignment : not further specified.  
2.34.  CardSlotsStatus  
Code indicating the type of cards inserted in the two slots of the vehicle 
unit.
 ▼B
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Value assignment — Octet Aligned : ‘ccccdddd’B  
‘cccc’B Identification of the type of card inserted in the co- 
driver slot,  
‘dddd’B Identification of the type of card inserted in the driver 
slot, 
with the following identification codes:  
‘0000’B no card is inserted,  
‘0001’B a driver card is inserted,  
‘0010’B a workshop card is inserted,  
‘0011’B a control card is inserted,  
‘0100’B a company card is inserted.  
2.35.  CardSlotsStatusRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The CardSlotsStatus plus metadata as used in the download protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (CardSlotsStatus).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the CardSlotsStatus in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of CardSlotsStatus records.  
2.36.  CardStructureVersion  
Code indicating the version of the implemented structure in a tachograph 
card.
  
Value assignment : ‘aabb’H:  
‘aa’H Index for changes of the structure.  
‘00’H for Generation 1 applications  
‘01’H for Generation 2 applications  
‘bb’H Index for changes concerning the use of the data 
elements defined for the structure given by the high 
byte.  
‘00’H for this version of Generation 1 applications  
‘00’H for this version of Generation 2 applications  ▼B
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2.37.  CardVehicleRecord  
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to a period of 
use of a vehicle during a calendar day (Annex 1C requirements 269, 
294, 322, and 345).  
Generation 1:
  
vehicleOdometerBegin  is the vehicle odometer value at the beginning 
of the period of use of the vehicle.  
vehicleOdometerEnd  is the vehicle odometer value at the end of the 
period of use of the vehicle.  
vehicleFirstUse  is the date and time of the beginning of the period of 
use of the vehicle.  
vehicleLastUse  is the date and time of the end of the period of use of 
the vehicle.  
vehicleRegistration  is the VRN and the registering Member State of the 
vehicle.  
vuDataBlockCounter  is the value of the VuDataBlockCounter at last 
extraction of the period of use of the vehicle.  
Generation 2:
  
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:  
VehicleIdentificationNumber  is the vehicle identification number 
referring to the vehicle as a whole.  
2.38.  CardVehiclesUsed  
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the vehicles 
used by the card holder (Annex 1C requirements 270, 295, 323, and 
346).
  
vehiclePointerNewestRecord  is the index of the last updated vehicle 
record.  ▼B
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Value assignment : Number corresponding to the numerator of the 
vehicle record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of the 
vehicle records in the structure.  
cardVehicleRecords  is the set of records containing information on 
vehicles used.  
2.39.  CardVehicleUnitRecord  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to a vehicle 
unit that was used (Annex 1C requirement 303 and 351).
  
timeStamp  is the beginning of the period of use of the vehicle unit (i.e. 
first card insertion in the vehicle unit for the period).  
manufacturerCode  identifies the manufacturer of the Vehicle Unit.  
deviceID  identifies the Vehicle Unit type of a manufacturer. The value 
is manufacturer specific.  
vuSoftwareVersion  is the software version number of the Vehicle Unit.  
2.40.  CardVehicleUnitsUsed  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the vehicle 
units used by the card holder (Annex 1C requirement 306 and 352).
  
vehicleUnitPointerNewestRecord  is the index of the last updated 
vehicle unit record.  
Value assignment : Number corresponding to the numerator of the 
vehicle unit record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of the 
vehicle unit records in the structure.  
cardVehicleUnitRecords  is the set of records containing information on 
vehicle units used.  
2.41.  Certificate  
The certificate of a public key issued by a Certification Authority.  
Generation 1:
  ▼B
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Value assignment : digital signature with partial recovery of a Certifi ­
cateContent according to Appendix 11 common security mechanisms: 
Signature (128 bytes) || Public Key remainder (58 bytes) || Certification 
Authority Reference (8 bytes).  
Generation 2:
  
Value assignment: See Appendix 11  
2.42.  CertificateContent  
Generation 1:  
The (clear) content of the certificate of a public key according to 
Appendix 11 common security mechanisms.
  
certificateProfileIdentifier  is the version of the corresponding 
certificate.  
Value assignment : ‘01h’ for this version.  
certificationAuthorityReference  identifies the Certification Authority 
issuing the certificate. It also references the Public Key of this Certifi ­
cation Authority.  
certificateHolderAuthorisation  identifies the rights of the certificate 
holder.  
certificateEndOfValidity  is the date when the certificate expires admin ­
istratively.  
certificateHolderReference  identifies the certificate holder. It also 
references his Public Key.  
publicKey  is the public key that is certified by this certificate.  
2.43.  CertificateHolderAuthorisation  
Identification of the rights of a certificate holder.
  
Generation 1:  
tachographApplicationID  is the application identifier for the 
tachograph application.  
Value assignment : ‘FFh’ ‘54h’ ‘41h’ ‘43h’ ‘48h’ ‘4Fh’. This AID is a 
proprietary non registered application identifier in accordance with 
ISO/IEC 7816-5.  
equipmentType  is the identification of the type of equipment to which 
the certificate is intended.  
Value assignment : in accordance with EquipmentType data type.  0 if 
certificate is the one of a Member State.  ▼B
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Generation 2:  
tachographApplicationID  denotes the 6 most significant bytes of the 
generation 2 tachograph card application identifier (AID). The AID for 
the tachograph card application is specified in chapter 6.2.  
Value assignment:  ‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’.  
equipmentType  is the identification of the type of equipment as 
specified for generation 2 to which the certificate is intended.  
Value assignment : in accordance with EquipmentType data type.  
2.44.  CertificateRequestID  
Unique identification of a certificate request. It can also be used as a 
Vehicle Unit Public Key Identifier if the serial number of the vehicle 
Unit to which the key is intended is not known at certificate generation 
time.
  
requestSerialNumber  is a serial number for the certificate request, 
unique for the manufacturer and the month below.  
requestMonthYear  is the identification of the month and the year of the 
certificate request.  
Value assignment : BCD coding of Month (two digits) and Year (two 
last digits).  
crIdentifier : is an identifier to distinguish a certificate request from an 
extended serial number.  
Value assignment : ‘FFh’.  
manufacturerCode : is the numerical code of the manufacturer 
requesting the certificate.  
2.45.  CertificationAuthorityKID  
Identifier of the Public Key of a Certification Authority (a Member State 
or the European Certification Authority).
  
nationNumeric  is the numerical nation code of the Certification Auth ­
ority.  
nationAlpha  is the alphanumerical nation code of the Certification 
Authority.  ▼B
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keySerialNumber  is a serial number to distinguish the different keys of 
the Certification Authority in the case keys are changed.  
additionalInfo  is a two byte field for additional coding (Certification 
Authority specific).  
caIdentifier  is an identifier to distinguish a Certification Authority Key 
Identifier from other Key Identifiers.  
Value assignment : ‘01h’.  
2.46.  CompanyActivityData  
Information, stored in a company card, related to activities performed 
with the card (Annex 1C requirement 373 and 379).
  
companyPointerNewestRecord  is the index of the last updated 
companyActivityRecord.  
Value assignment : Number corresponding to the numerator of the 
company activity record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of 
the company activity record in the structure.  
companyActivityRecords  is the set of all company activity records.  
companyActivityRecord  is the sequence of information related to one 
company activity.  
companyActivityType  is the type of the company activity.  
companyActivityTime  is the date and time of the company activity.  
cardNumberInformation  is the card number and the card issuing 
Member State of the card downloaded, if any.  
vehicleRegistrationInformation  is the VRN and registering Member 
State of the vehicle downloaded or locked in or out.  
downloadPeriodBegin  and  downloadPeriodEnd  is the period down ­
loaded from the VU, if any.  
2.47.  CompanyActivityType  
Code indicating an activity carried out by a company using its company 
card.
 ▼B
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2.48.  CompanyCardApplicationIdentification  
Information, stored in a company card related to the identification of the 
application of the card (Annex 1C requirement 369 and 375).
  
typeOfTachographCardId  is specifying the implemented type of card.  
cardStructureVersion  is specifying the the version of the structure that 
is implemented in the card.  
noOfCompanyActivityRecords  is the number of company activity 
records the card can store.  
2.49.  CompanyCardHolderIdentification  
Information, stored in a company card, related to the cardholder identi ­
fication (Annex 1C requirement 372 and 378).
  
companyName  is the name of the holder company.  
companyAddress  is the address of the holder company.  
cardHolderPreferredLanguage  is the preferred language of the card 
holder.  
2.50.  ControlCardApplicationIdentification  
Information, stored in a control card related to the identification of the 
application of the card (Annex 1C requirement 357 and 363).
  
typeOfTachographCardId  is specifying the implemented type of card.  
cardStructureVersion  is specifying the version of the structure that is 
implemented in the card.  
noOfControlActivityRecords  is the number of control activity records 
the card can store.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 116  
2.51.  ControlCardControlActivityData  
Information, stored in a control card, related to control activity 
performed with the card (Annex 1C requirement 361 and 367).
  
controlPointerNewestRecord  is the index of the last updated control 
activity record.  
Value assignment : Number corresponding to the numerator of the 
control activity record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of 
the control activity record in the structure.  
controlActivityRecords  is the set of all control activity records.  
controlActivityRecord  is the sequence of information related to one 
control.  
controlType  is the type of the control.  
controlTime  is the date and time of the control.  
controlledCardNumber  is the card number and the card issuing 
Member State of the card controlled.  
controlledVehicleRegistration  is the VRN and registering Member 
State of the vehicle in which the control happened.  
controlDownloadPeriodBegin  and  controlDownloadPeriodEnd  is the 
period eventually downloaded.  
2.52.  ControlCardHolderIdentification  
Information, stored in a control card, related to the identification of the 
cardholder (Annex 1C requirement 360 and 366).
  
controlBodyName  is the name of the control body of the card holder.  
controlBodyAddress  is the address of the control body of the card 
holder.  
cardHolderName  is the name and first name(s) of the holder of the 
Control Card.  ▼B
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cardHolderPreferredLanguage  is the preferred language of the card 
holder.  
2.53.  ControlType  
Code indicating the activities carried out during a control. This data type 
is related to Annex 1C requirements 126, 274, 299, 327, and 350.
  
Generation 1:  
Value assignment — Octet aligned : ‘cvpdxxxx’B (8 bits)  
‘c’B card downloading:  
‘0’B: card not downloaded during this control activity,  
‘1’B: card downloaded during this control activity  
‘v’B VU downloading:  
‘0’B: VU not downloaded during this control activity,  
‘1’B: VU downloaded during this control activity  
‘p’B printing:  
‘0’B: no printing done during this control activity,  
‘1’B: printing done during this control activity  
‘d’B display:  
‘0’B: no display used during this control activity,  
‘1’B: display used during this control activity  
‘xxxx’B Not used.  
Generation 2:  
Value assignment — Octet aligned : ‘cvpdexxx’B (8 bits)  
‘c’B card downloading:  
‘0’B: card not downloaded during this control activity,  
‘1’B: card downloaded during this control activity  
‘v’B VU downloading:  
‘0’B: VU not downloaded during this control activity,  
‘1’B: VU downloaded during this control activity  
‘p’B printing:  
‘0’B: no printing done during this control activity,  
‘1’B: printing done during this control activity  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 118  
‘d’B display:  
‘0’B: no display used during this control activity,  
‘1’B: display used during this control activity  
‘e’B roadside calibration checking:  
‘0’B: calibration parameters not checked during this 
control activity,  
‘1’B: calibration parameters checked during this control 
activity  
‘xxx’B RFU.  
2.54.  CurrentDateTime  
The current date and time of the recording equipment.
  
Value assignment : not further specified.  
2.55.  CurrentDateTimeRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The current date and time plus metadata as used in the download 
protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (CurrentDateTime).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the CurrentDateTime in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of current date and time records.  
2.56.  DailyPresenceCounter  
Counter, stored in a driver or workshop card, increased by one for each 
calendar day the card has been inserted in a VU. This data type is 
related to Annex 1C requirements 266, 299, 320, and 343.
  
Value assignment : Consecutive Number with maximum value = 9 999, 
starting again with 0. At the time of first issuing of the card the number 
is set to 0.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 119  
2.57.  Datef  
Date expressed in a readily printable numeric format.
  
Value assignment:  
yyyy Year  
mm Month  
dd Day  
‘00000000’H denotes explicitly no date.  
2.58.  DateOfDayDownloaded  
Generation 2:  
The date and time of the download.
  
Value assignment : not further specified.  
2.59.  DateOfDayDownloadedRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The date and time of the download plus metadata as used in the 
download protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (DateOfDayDownloaded).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the CurrentDateTime in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of date and time of the download records.  
2.60.  Distance  
A distance travelled (result of the calculation of the difference between 
two vehicle's odometer values in kilometers).
  
Value assignment : Unsigned binary. Value in km in the operational 
range 0 to 9 999 km.  
2.61.  DriverCardApplicationIdentification  
Information, stored in a driver card related to the identification of the 
application of the card (Annex 1C requirement 253 and 278).  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 120  
Generation 1:
  
typeOfTachographCardId  is specifying the implemented type of card.  
cardStructureVersion  is specifying the the version of the structure that 
is implemented in the card.  
noOfEventsPerType  is the number of events per type of event the card 
can record.  
noOfFaultsPerType  is the number of faults per type of fault the card 
can record.  
activityStructureLength  indicates the number of bytes available for 
storing activity records.  
noOfCardVehicleRecords  is the number of vehicle records the card can 
contain.  
noOfCardPlaceRecords  is the number of places the card can record.  
Generation 2:  
▼M1
 
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:  
noOfGNSSADRecords  is the number of GNSS accumulated driving 
records the card can store.  
noOfSpecificConditionRecords  is the number of specific condition 
records the card can store.  
noOfCardVehicleUnitRecords  is the number of vehicle units used 
records the card can store.  
▼B 
2.62.  DriverCardHolderIdentification  
Information, stored in a driver card, related to the identification of the 
cardholder (Annex 1C requirement 256 and 281).
  
cardHolderName  is the name and first name(s) of the holder of the 
Driver Card.  
cardHolderBirthDate  is the date of birth of the holder of the Driver 
Card.  ▼B
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cardHolderPreferredLanguage  is the preferred language of the card 
holder.  
▼M1 
2.63.  Reserved for future use  
▼B 
2.64.  EGFCertificate  
Generation 2:  
Certificate of the external GNSS facility public key for mutual auth ­
entication with a VU. The structure of this certificate is specified in 
Appendix 11.
  
2.65.  EmbedderIcAssemblerId  
Provides information about the IC embedder.
  
countryCode  is the 2 letter country code of the module embedder 
according to ISO 3166.  
moduleEmbedder  identifies the module embedder.  
manufacturerInformation  for manufacturer internal usage.  
2.66.  EntryTypeDailyWorkPeriod  
Code to distinguish between begin and end for an entry of a daily work 
period place and condition of the entry.  
Generation 1
  
Value assignment : according to ISO/IEC8824-1.  
Generation 2
  
Value assignment : according to ISO/IEC8824-1.  
2.67.  EquipmentType  
Code to distinguish different types of equipment for the tachograph 
application.
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 122  
Generation 1:
  
Value assignment : According to ISO/IEC8824-1.  
Value 0 is reserved for the purpose of designating a Member State or 
Europe in the CHA field of certificates.  
Generation 2:  
▼M1 
The same values as in generation 1 are used with the following 
additions:
  
Note 1:  The generation 2 values for the Plaque, Adapter and the 
External GNSS connection as well as the generation 1 values for the 
Vehicle Unit and Motion Sensor may be used in SealRecord, i.e. if 
applicable.  
Note 2:  In the CardHolderAuthorisation (CHA) field of a generation 2 
certificate, the values (1), (2), and (6) are to be interpreted as indicating 
a certificate for Mutual Authentication for the respective equipment type. 
For indicating the respective certificate for creating a digital signature, 
the values (17), (18) or (19) must be used.  
▼B 
2.68.  EuropeanPublicKey  
Generation 1:  
The European public key.
  
2.69.  EventFaultRecordPurpose  
Code explaining why an event or a fault has been recorded.
  
Value assignment:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 123
  
one of the 10 most recent (or last) events or faults 
the longest event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence 
one of the 5 longest events over the last 365 days 
the last event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence 
the most serious event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence 
one of the 5 most serious events over the last 365 days 
the first event or fault having occurred after the last calibration 
an active/on-going event or fault 
RFU 
manufacturer specific  
2.70.  EventFaultType  
Code qualifying an event or a fault.
  
Value assignment:  
Generation 1:
  
General events, 
No further details, 
Insertion of a non valid card, 
Card conflict, 
Time overlap, 
Driving without an appropriate card, 
Card insertion while driving, 
Last card session not correctly closed, 
Over speeding, 
Power supply interruption, 
Motion data error, 
Vehicle Motion Conflict, 
RFU,
  
Vehicle unit related security breach attempt events, 
No further details, 
Motion sensor authentication failure, 
Tachograph card authentication failure, 
Unauthorised change of motion sensor, 
Card data input integrity error 
Stored user data integrity error, 
Internal data transfer error, 
Unauthorised case opening, 
Hardware sabotage, 
RFU,
  
Sensor related security breach attempt events, 
No further details, 
Authentication failure, 
Stored data integrity error, 
Internal data transfer error, 
Unauthorised case opening, 
Hardware sabotage, 
RFU,
  
Recording equipment faults, 
No further details, 
VU internal fault, 
Printer fault, 
Display fault, 
Downloading fault, 
Sensor fault, 
RFU,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 124
  
Card faults, 
No further details, 
RFU,
  
RFU,
  
Manufacturer specific.  
▼M1 
Generation 2:
  
General events, 
No further details, 
Insertion of a non valid card, 
Card conflict, 
Time overlap, 
Driving without an appropriate card, 
Card insertion while driving, 
Last card session not correctly closed, 
Over speeding, 
Power supply interruption, 
Motion data error, 
Vehicle Motion Conflict, 
Time conflict (GNSS versus VU internal clock), 
Communication error with the remote communication facility, 
Absence of position information from GNSS receiver, 
Communication error with the external GNSS facility, 
RFU,
  
Vehicle unit related security breach attempt events, 
No further details, 
Motion sensor authentication failure, 
Tachograph card authentication failure, 
Unauthorised change of motion sensor, 
Card data input integrity error 
Stored user data integrity error, 
Internal data transfer error, 
Unauthorised case opening, 
Hardware sabotage, 
Tamper detection of GNSS, 
External GNSS facility authentication failure, 
External GNSS facility certificate expired, 
RFU,
  
Sensor related security breach attempt events, 
No further details, 
Authentication failure, 
Stored data integrity error, 
Internal data transfer error, 
Unauthorised case opening, 
Hardware sabotage, 
RFU,  ▼B
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Recording equipment faults, 
No further details, 
VU internal fault, 
Printer fault, 
Display fault, 
Downloading fault, 
Sensor fault, 
Internal GNSS receiver, 
External GNSS facility, 
Remote communication facility, 
ITS interface, 
RFU,
  
Card faults, 
No further details, 
RFU,
  
RFU,
  
Manufacturer specific.  
2.71.  ExtendedSealIdentifier  
Generation 2:  
The extended seal identifier uniquely identifies a seal (Annex IC 
requirement 401).
  
manufacturerCode  is a code of the manufacturer of the seal.  
sealIdentifier  is an identifier for the seal which is unique for the manu ­
facturer.  
▼B 
2.72.  ExtendedSerialNumber  
Unique identification of an equipment. It can also be used as an 
equipment Public Key Identifier.  
Generation 1:
  
serialNumber  is a serial number for the equipment, unique for the 
manufacturer, the equipment's type and the month and year below.  
monthYear  is the identification of the month and the year of manu ­
facturing (or of serial number assignment).  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 126  
Value assignment : BCD coding of Month (two digits) and Year (two 
last digits).  
type is an identifier of the type of equipment.  
Value assignment : manufacturer specific, with ‘FFh’ reserved value.  
manufacturerCode : is the numerical code identifying a manufacturer of 
type approved equipment.  
Generation 2:
  
serialNumber  see Generation 1  
monthYear  see Generation 1  
type indicates the type of equipment  
manufacturerCode : see Generation 1.  
2.73.  FullCardNumber  
Code fully identifying a tachograph card.
  
cardType  is the type of the tachograph card.  
cardIssuingMemberState  is the code of the Member State having 
issued the card.  
cardNumber  is the card number.  
2.74.  FullCardNumberAndGeneration  
Generation 2:  
Code fully identifying a tachograph card and its generation.
  
fullcardNumber  identifies the tachograph card.  
generation  indicates the generation of the tachograph card used.  
2.75.  Generation  
Generation 2:  
Indicates the generation of tachograph used.
  
Value assignment:  
‘00’H RFU  
‘01’H Generation 1  
‘02’H Generation 2  
‘03’H .. ‘FF’H RFU  ▼B
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2.76.  GeoCoordinates  
Generation 2:  
The geo-coordinates are encoded as integers. These integers are 
multiples of the ±DDMM.M encoding for the latitude and 
±DDDMM.M for the longitude. Here ±DD respectively ±DDD 
denotes the degrees and MM.M the minutes.
  
latitude  is encoded as a multiple (factor 10) of the ±DDMM.M repre ­
sentation.  
longitude  is encoded as a multiple (factor 10) of the ±DDDMM.M 
representation.  
2.77.  GNSSAccuracy  
Generation 2:  
The accuracy of the GNSS position data (definition eee)). This accuracy 
is encoded as integer and is a multiple (factor 10) of the X.Y value 
provided by the GSA NMEA sentence.
  
▼M1 
2.78.  GNSSAccumulatedDriving  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the GNSS 
position of the vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple 
of three hours (Annex IC requirement 306 and 354).
  
gnssADPointerNewestRecord  is the index of the last updated GNSS 
accumulated driving record.  
Value assignment  is the number corresponding to the numerator of the 
GNSS accumulated driving record, beginning with '0' for the first 
occurrence of the GNSS accumulated driving record in the structure.  
gnssAccumulatedDrivingRecords  is the set of records containing the 
date and time the accumulated driving reaches a multiple of three hours 
and information on the position of the vehicle.  
2.79.  GNSSAccumulatedDrivingRecord  
Generation 2:  ▼B
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Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the GNSS 
position of the vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple 
of three hours (Annex IC requirement 305 and 353)
  
timeStamp  is the date and time when the accumulated driving time 
reaches a multiple of three hours.  
gnssPlaceRecord  contains information related to the position of the 
vehicle.  
vehicleOdometerValue  is the odometer value when the accumulated 
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours.  
▼B 
2.80.  GNSSPlaceRecord  
Generation 2:  
Information related to the GNSS position of the vehicle (Annex 1C 
requirements 108, 109, 110, 296, 305, 347, and 353).
  
timeStamp  is the date and time when the GNSS position of the vehicle 
was determined.  
gnssAccuracy  is the accuracy of the GNSS position data.  
geoCoordinates  is the recorded location using GNSS.  
2.81.  HighResOdometer  
Odometer value of the vehicle: Accumulated distance travelled by the 
vehicle during its operation.
  
Value assignment : Unsigned binary. Value in 1/200 km in the operating 
range 0 to 21 055 406 km.  
2.82.  HighResTripDistance  
A distance travelled during all or part of a journey.
  
Value assignment : Unsigned binary. Value in 1/200 km in the operating 
range 0 to 21 055 406 km.  
2.83.  HolderName  
The surname and first name(s) of a card holder.
  
holderSurname  is the surname (family name) of the holder. This 
surname does not include titles.  
Value assignment : When a card is not personal, holderSurname 
contains the same information as companyName or workshopName or 
controlBodyName.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 129  
holderFirstNames  is the first name(s) and initials of the holder.  
2.84.  InternalGNSSReceiver  
Generation 2:  
Information if the GNSS receiver is internal or external to the vehicle 
unit. True means that the GNSS receiver is internal to the VU. False 
means that the GNSS receiver is external.
  
2.85.  K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment  
Constant of the recording equipment (definition m)).
  
Value assignment : Pulses per kilometer in the operating range 0 to 
64 255 pulses/km.  
▼M1 
2.86.  KeyIdentifier  
A unique identifier of a Public Key used to reference and select the key. 
It also identifies the holder of the key.
  
The first choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Vehicle Unit, 
of a tachograph card or of an external GNSS facility.  
The second choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Vehicle 
Unit (in cases where the serial number of the Vehicle Unit cannot be 
known at certificate generation time).  
The third choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Member 
State.  
▼B 
2.87.  KMWCKey  
Generation 2:  
AES key and its associated key version used for VU — Motion Sensor 
pairing. For details see Appendix 11.
  
kMWCKey  is the length of the AES key concatenated with the key 
which is used for VU — Motion Sensor pairing.  
keyVersion  denotes the key version of the AES key.  
2.88.  Language  
Code identifying a language.
  
Value assignment : Two-letter lower-case coding according to ISO 639.  ▼B
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2.89.  LastCardDownload  
Date and time, stored on a driver card, of last card download (for other 
purposes than control) Annex 1C requirement 257 and 282. This date is 
updateable by a VU or any card reader.
  
Value assignment : not further specified.  
2.90.  LinkCertificate  
Generation 2:  
The link certificate between European Root CA key pairs.
  
2.91.  L-TyreCircumference  
Effective circumference of the wheel tyres (definition u)).
  
Value assignment : Unsigned binary, value in 1/8 mm in the operating 
range 0 to 8 031 mm.  
▼M1 
2.92.  MAC  
Generation 2:  
A cryptographic check sum of 8, 12 or 16 bytes length corresponding to 
the cipher suites specified in Appendix 11.
  
▼B 
2.93.  ManualInputFlag  
Code identifying whether a cardholder has manually entered driver 
activities at card insertion or not (Annex 1B requirement 081 and 
Annex 1C requirement 102).
  
Value assignment : not further specified.  
2.94.  ManufacturerCode  
Code identifying a manufacturer of type approved equipment.
  
The laboratory competent for interoperability tests maintains and 
publishes the list of manufacturer codes on its web site (Annex 1C 
requirement 454).  
ManufacturerCodes are provisionally assigned to developers of 
tachograph equipment on application to the laboratory competent for 
interoperability tests.  ▼B
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2.95.  ManufacturerSpecificEventFaultData  
Generation 2:  
Manufacturer specific error codes simplify the error analysis and main ­
tenance of vehicle units.
  
manufacturerCode  identifies the manufacturer of the Vehicle Unit.  
manufacturerSpecificErrorCode  is an error code specific to the manu ­
facturer.  
2.96.  MemberStateCertificate  
The certificate of the public key of a member state issued by the 
European certification authority.
  
2.97.  MemberStateCertificateRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The member state certificate plus metadata as used in the download 
protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (MemberStateCertificate).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the MemberStateCertificate in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records. The value 
shall be set to 1 as the certficates may have different lengths.  
records  is the set of member state certificates.  
2.98.  MemberStatePublicKey  
Generation 1:  
The public key of a Member State.
  
2.99.  Name  
A name.
  
codePage  specifies a character set defined in Chapter 4,  
name  is a name encoded using the specified character set.  ▼B
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2.100.  NationAlpha  
Alphabetic reference to a country shall be in accordance with the distin ­
guishing signs used on vehicles in international traffic (United Nations 
Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, 1968).
  
The Nation Alpha and Numeric codes shall be held on a list maintained 
on the website of the laboratory appointed to carry out interoperability 
testing, as set out in Annex 1C requirement 440.  
2.101.  NationNumeric  
Numerical reference to a country.
  
Value assignment : see data type 2.100 (NationAlpha).  
Any amendment or updating of the Nation Alpha or Numeric specifi ­
cation described in the above paragraph shall only be made out after the 
appointed laboratory has obtained the views of type approved digital and 
smart tachograph vehicle unit manufacturers.  
2.102.  NoOfCalibrationRecords  
Number of calibration records, a workshop card can store.  
Generation 1:
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  
Generation 2:
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  
2.103.  NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload  
Counter indicating the number of calibrations performed with a 
workshop card since its last download (Annex 1C requirement 317 
and 340).
  
Value assignment : Not specified further.  
2.104.  NoOfCardPlaceRecords  
Number of place records a driver or workshop card can store.  
Generation 1:
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  
Generation 2:
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  ▼B
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2.105.  NoOfCardVehicleRecords  
Number of vehicles used records a driver or workshop card can store.
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  
2.106.  NoOfCardVehicleUnitRecords  
Generation 2:  
Number of vehicle units used records a driver or workshop card can 
store.
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  
2.107.  NoOfCompanyActivityRecords  
Number of company activity records, a company card can store.
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  
2.108.  NoOfControlActivityRecords  
Number of control activity records, a control card can store.
  
Value assignment : see Appendix 2.  
2.109.  NoOfEventsPerType  
Number of events per type of event a card can store.
  
Value assignment:  see Appendix 2.  
2.110.  NoOfFaultsPerType  
Number of faults per type of fault a card can store.
  
Value assignment:  see Appendix 2.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 134  
2.111.  NoOfGNSSADRecords  
Generation 2:  
Number of GNSS accumulated driving records a card can store.
  
Value assignment:  see Appendix 2.  
▼B 
2.112.  NoOfSpecificConditionRecords  
Generation 2:  
Number of specific condition records a card can store.
  
Value assignment:  see Appendix 2.  
2.113.  OdometerShort  
Odometer value of the vehicle in a short form.
  
Value assignment : Unsigned binary. Value in km in the operating range 
0 to 9 999 999 km.  
2.114.  OdometerValueMidnight  
The vehicle's odometer value at midnight on a given day (Annex 1B 
requirement 090 and Annex 1C requirement 113).
  
Value assignment : not further specified.  
2.115.  OdometerValueMidnightRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The OdometerValueMidnight plus metadata used in the download 
protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (OdometerValueMidnight).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the OdometerValueMidnight in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of OdometerValueMidnight records.  ▼M1
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2.116.  OverspeedNumber  
Number of over speeding events since the last over speeding control.
  
Value assignment : 0 means that no over speeding event has occurred 
since the last over speeding control, 1 means that one over speeding 
event has occurred since the last over speeding control …255 means that 
255 or more over speeding events have occurred since the last over 
speeding control.  
2.117.  PlaceRecord  
Information related to a place where a daily work period begins or ends 
(Annex 1C requirements 108, 271, 296, 324, and 347).  
Generation 1:
  
entryTime  is a date and time related to the entry.  
entryTypeDailyWorkPeriod  is the type of entry.  
dailyWorkPeriodCountry  is the country entered.  
dailyWorkPeriodRegion  is the region entered.  
vehicleOdometerValue  is the odometer value at the time of place entry.  
Generation 2:
  
In addition to Generation 1 the following component is used:  
entryGNSSPlaceRecord  is the recorded location and time.  ▼B
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2.118.  PreviousVehicleInfo  
Information related to the vehicle previously used by a driver when 
inserting his card in a vehicle unit (Annex 1B requirement 081 and 
Annex 1C requirement 102).  
Generation 1:
  
vehicleRegistrationIdentification  is the VRN and the registering 
Member State of the vehicle.  
cardWithdrawalTime  is the card withdrawal date and time.  
Generation 2:
  
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:  
vuGeneration  identifies the generation of the vehicle unit.  
2.119.  PublicKey  
Generation 1:  
A public RSA key.
  
rsaKeyModulus  is the Modulus of the key pair.  
rsaKeyPublicExponent  is the public exponent of the key pair.  
2.120.  RecordType  
Generation 2:  
Reference to a record type. This data type is used in RecordArrays.
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 137  
Value assignment:
  
► (1) M1 ActivityChangeInfo, 
CardSlotsStatus, 
CurrentDateTime, 
MemberStateCertificate, 
OdometerValueMidnight, 
DateOfDayDownloaded, 
SensorPaired, 
Signature, 
SpecificConditionRecord, 
VehicleIdentificationNumber, 
VehicleRegistrationNumber, 
VuCalibrationRecord, 
VuCardIWRecord, 
VuCardRecord, 
VuCertificate, 
VuCompanyLocksRecord, 
VuControlActivityRecord, 
VuDetailedSpeedBlock, 
VuDownloadablePeriod, 
VuDownloadActivityData, 
VuEventRecord,  
►M1 VuGNSSADRecord, ◄ 
VuITSConsentRecord, 
VuFaultRecord, 
VuIdentification, 
VuOverSpeedingControlData, 
VuOverSpeedingEventRecord, 
VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord, 
VuTimeAdjustmentGNSSRecord, 
VuTimeAdjustmentRecord, 
VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecord, 
SensorPairedRecord, 
SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord, 
RFU, 
Manufacturer specific.  
2.121.  RegionAlpha  
Alphabetic reference to a region within a specified country.
  
Generation 1:  
Value assignment:
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 138  
Generation 2:  
The RegionAlpha codes shall be held on a list maintained on the website 
of the laboratory appointed to carry out interoperability testing.  
2.122.  RegionNumeric  
Numerical reference to a region within a specified country.
  
Generation 1:  
Value assignment:
  
Generation 2:  
The RegionNumeric codes shall be held on a list maintained on the 
website of the laboratory appointed to carry out interoperability testing.  
2.123.  RemoteCommunicationModuleSerialNumber  
Generation 2:  
Serial number of the Remote Communication Module.
  
2.124.  RSAKeyModulus  
Generation 1:  
The modulus of a RSA key pair.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
2.125.  RSAKeyPrivateExponent  
Generation 1:  
The private exponent of a RSA key pair.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 139  
2.126.  RSAKeyPublicExponent  
Generation1:  
The public exponent of a RSA key pair.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
2.127.  RtmData  
Generation2:  
For the definition of this data type see Appendix 14.  
2.128.  SealDataCard  
Generation 2:  
This data type stores information about the seals that are attached to the 
different components of a vehicle and is intended for storage on a card. 
This data type is related to Annex 1C requirement 337.
  
noOfSealRecords  is the number of records in sealRecords.  
sealRecords  is a set of seal records.  
2.129.  SealDataVu  
Generation 2:  
This data type stores information about the seals that are attached to the 
different components of a vehicle and is intended for storage in a 
Vehicle Unit.
  
sealRecords  is a set of seal records. If there are less than 5 seals 
available the value of the EquipmentType in all unused sealRecords 
shall be set to 16, i.e. unused.  
2.130.  SealRecord  
Generation 2:  
This data type stores information about a seal that is attached to a 
component. This data type is related to Annex 1C requirement 337.
  
equipmentType  identifies the type of equipment the seal is attached to.  
extendedSealIdentifier  is the identifier of the seal attached to the 
equipment.  ▼B
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2.131.  SensorApprovalNumber  
Type approval number of the sensor.  
Generation 1:
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
Generation 2:
  
Value assignment:  
The approval number shall be provided as published on the 
corresponding European Commission web site, i.e. for example 
including hyphens if any. The approval number shall be left-aligned.  
2.132.  SensorExternalGNSSApprovalNumber  
Generation 2:  
Type approval number of the external GNSS facility.
  
Value assignment:  
The approval number shall be provided as published on the 
corresponding European Commission web site, i.e. for example 
including hyphens if any. The approval number shall be left-aligned.  
2.133.  SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of the 
external GNSS facility coupled with the vehicle unit (Annex 1C 
requirement 100).
  
sensorSerialNumber  is the serial number of the external GNSS facility 
coupled with the vehicle unit.  
sensorApprovalNumber  is the approval number of this external GNSS 
facility.  
sensorCouplingDate  is a date of coupling of this external GNSS facility 
with the vehicle unit.  
2.134.  SensorExternalGNSSIdentification  
Generation 2:  
Information related to the identification of the external GNSS facility 
(Annex 1C requirement 98).  ▼B
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sensorSerialNumber  is the extended serial number of the external 
GNSS facility.  
sensorApprovalNumber  is the approval number of the external GNSS 
facility.  
sensorSCIdentifier  is the identifier of the security component of the 
external GNSS facility.  
sensorOSIdentifier  is the identifier of the operating system of the 
external GNSS facility.  
2.135.  SensorExternalGNSSInstallation  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in an external GNSS facility, related to the instal ­
lation of the external GNSS sensor (Annex 1C requirement 123).
  
sensorCouplingDateFirst  is the date of the first coupling of external 
GNSS facility with a vehicle unit.  
firstVuApprovalNumber  is the approval number of the first vehicle 
unit coupled with the external GNSS facility.  
firstVuSerialNumber  is the serial number of the first vehicle unit paired 
with the external GNSS facility.  
sensorCouplingDateCurrent  is the date of the current coupling of 
external GNSS facility with a vehicle unit.  
currentVuApprovalNumber  is the approval number of the vehicle unit 
currently coupled with the external GNSS facility.  
currentVUSerialNumber  is the serial number of the vehicle unit 
currently coupled with the external GNSS facility.  ▼B
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2.136.  SensorExternalGNSSOSIdentifier  
Generation 2:  
Identifier of the operating system of the external GNSS facility.
  
Value assignment : manufacturer specific.  
2.137.  SensorExternalGNSSSCIdentifier  
Generation 2:  
This type is used e.g. to identify the cryptographic module of the 
external GNSS facility.  
Identifier of the security component of the external GNSS facility.
  
Value assignment : component manufacturer specific.  
2.138.  SensorGNSSCouplingDate  
Generation 2:  
Date of a coupling of the external GNSS facility with a vehicle unit.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
2.139.  SensorGNSSSerialNumber  
Generation 2:  
This type is used to store the serial number of the GNSS receiver both 
when it is inside the VU and when it is outside the VU.  
Serial number of the GNSS receiver.
  
2.140.  SensorIdentification  
Information, stored in a motion sensor, related to the identification of the 
motion sensor (Annex 1B requirement 077 and Annex 1C requirement 
95).
 
sensorSerialNumber  is the extended serial number of the motion sensor 
(includes part number and manufacturer code).  
sensorApprovalNumber  is the approval number of the motion sensor.  
sensorSCIdentifier  is the identifier of the security component of the 
motion sensor.  ▼B
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sensorOSIdentifier  is the identifier of the operating system of the 
motion sensor.  
2.141.  SensorInstallation  
Information, stored in a motion sensor, related to the installation of the 
motion sensor (Annex 1B requirement 099 and Annex 1C requirement 
122).
  
sensorPairingDateFirst  is the date of the first pairing of the motion 
sensor with a vehicle unit.  
firstVuApprovalNumber  is the approval number of the first vehicle 
unit paired with the motion sensor.  
firstVuSerialNumber  is the serial number of the first vehicle unit paired 
with the motion sensor.  
sensorPairingDateCurrent  is the date of the current pairing of the 
motion sensor with the vehicle unit.  
currentVuApprovalNumber  is the approval number of the vehicle unit 
currently paired with the motion sensor.  
currentVUSerialNumber  is the serial number of the vehicle unit 
currently paired with the motion sensor.  
2.142.  SensorInstallationSecData  
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to the security data 
needed for pairing motion sensors to vehicle units (Annex 1C 
requirement 308 and 331).  
Generation 1:
  
Value assignment : in accordance with ISO 16844-3.  
Generation 2:  
As described in Appendix 11 a workshop card shall store up to three 
keys for VU Motion Sensor pairing. These keys have different key 
versions.
  ▼B
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2.143.  SensorOSIdentifier  
Identifier of the operating system of the motion sensor.
  
Value assignment : manufacturer specific.  
2.144.  SensorPaired  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of the 
motion sensor paired with the vehicle unit (Annex 1B requirement 079).
  
sensorSerialNumber  is the serial number of the motion sensor currently 
paired with the vehicle unit.  
sensorApprovalNumber  is the approval number of the motion sensor 
currently paired with the vehicle unit.  
sensorPairingDateFirst  is the date of the first pairing with a vehicle 
unit of the motion sensor currently paired with the vehicle unit.  
2.145.  SensorPairedRecord  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of a 
motion sensor paired with the vehicle unit (Annex 1C requirement 97).
  
sensorSerialNumber  is the serial number of a motion sensor paired 
with the vehicle unit.  
sensorApprovalNumber  is the approval number of this motion sensor.  
sensorPairingDate  is a date of pairing of this motion sensor with the 
vehicle unit.  
2.146.  SensorPairingDate  
Date of a pairing of the motion sensor with a vehicle unit.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  ▼B
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2.147.  SensorSCIdentifier  
Identifier of the security component of the motion sensor.
  
Value assignment : component manufacturer specific.  
2.148.  SensorSerialNumber  
Serial number of the motion sensor.
  
2.149.  Signature  
A digital signature.  
Generation 1:
  
Value assignment : in accordance with Appendix 11 Common security 
mechanisms.  
Generation 2:
  
Value assignment : in accordance with Appendix 11 Common security 
mechanisms.  
2.150.  SignatureRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
A set of signatures plus metadata used in the download protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (Signature).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the Signature in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records. The value 
shall be set to 1 as the signatures may have different lengths.  
records  is the set of signatures.  
2.151.  SimilarEventsNumber  
The number of similar events for one given day (Annex 1B requirement 
094 and Annex 1C requirement 117).
  
Value assignment:  0 is not used, 1 means that only one event of that 
type has occurred and has been stored on that day, 2 means that 2 events 
of that type has occurred on that day (one only has been stored), …255 
means that 255 or more events of that type have occurred on that day.  ▼B
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2.152.  SpecificConditionRecord  
Information, stored in a driver card, a workshop card or a vehicle unit, 
related to a specific condition (requirements Annex 1C 130, 276, 301, 
328, and 355).
  
entryTime  is the date and time of the entry.  
specificConditionType  is the code identifying the specific condition.  
2.153.  SpecificConditions  
Information, stored in a driver card, a workshop card or a vehicle unit, 
related to a specific condition (Annex 1C requirement 131, 277, 302, 
329, and 356).  
Generation 2:
  
conditionPointerNewestRecord  is the index of the last updated specific 
condition record.  
Value assignment : Number corresponding to the numerator of the 
specific condition record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence 
of the specific condition record in the structure.  
specificConditionRecords  is the set of records containing information 
on the specific conditions recorded.  
2.154.  SpecificConditionType  
Code identifying a specific condition (Annex 1B requirements 050b, 
105a, 212a and 230a and Annex 1C requirements 62).
  
Generation 1:  
Value assignment:  
‘00’H RFU  
‘01’H Out of scope — Begin  
‘02’H Out of scope — End  
‘03’H Ferry / Train crossing  
‘04’H .. ‘FF’H RFU  
Generation 2:  
Value assignment:  
‘00’H RFU  
‘01’H Out of scope — Begin  
‘02’H Out of scope — End  
‘03’H Ferry / Train crossing — Begin  
‘04’H Ferry / Train crossing — End  
‘05’H .. ‘FF’H RFU  ▼B
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2.155.  Speed  
Speed of the vehicle (km/h).
  
Value assignment : kilometers per hour in the operational range 0 to 
220 km/h.  
2.156.  SpeedAuthorised  
Maximum authorised Speed of the vehicle (definition hh)).
  
2.157.  SpeedAverage  
Average speed in a previously defined duration (km/h).
  
2.158.  SpeedMax  
Maximum speed measured in a previously defined duration.
  
2.159.  TachographPayload  
Generation 2:  
For the definition of this data type see Appendix 14.  
▼M1 
2.160.  Reserved for future use  
▼B 
2.161.  TDesSessionKey  
Generation 1:  
A triple DES session key.
  
Value assignment : not further specified.  
▼M1 
2.162.  TimeReal  
Code for a combined date and time field, where the date and time are 
expressed as seconds past 00h.00m.00s. on 1 January 1970 UTC.
  
Value assignment  – Octet aligned : Number of seconds since midnight 
1 January 1970 UTC.  
The max. possible date/time is in the year 2106.  
▼B 
2.163.  TyreSize  
Designation of tyre dimensions.
  
Value assignment : in accordance with Directive 92/23 (EEC) 31/03/92 
O.J. L129 p.95.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 148  
2.164.  VehicleIdentificationNumber  
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) referring to the vehicle as a whole, 
normally chassis serial number or frame number.
  
Value assignment : As defined in ISO 3779.  
2.165.  VehicleIdentificationNumberRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The Vehicle Idenification Number plus metadata as used in the 
download protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VehicleIdentification ­
Number).  Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VehicleIdentificationNumber in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of vehicle identification numbers.  
2.166.  VehicleRegistrationIdentification  
Identification of a vehicle, unique for Europe (VRN and Member State).
  
vehicleRegistrationNation  is the nation where the vehicle is registered.  
vehicleRegistrationNumber  is the registration number of the vehicle 
(VRN).  
2.167.  VehicleRegistrationNumber  
Registration number of the vehicle (VRN). The registration number is 
assigned by the vehicle licensing authority.
  
codePage  specifies a character set defined in Chapter 4,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 149  
vehicleRegNumber  is a VRN encoded using the specified character set.  
Value assignment : Country specific.  
2.168.  VehicleRegistrationNumberRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The Vehicle Registration Number plus metadata as used in the download 
protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VehicleRegistration ­
Number).  Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VehicleRegistrationNumber in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of vehicle registration numbers.  
2.169.  VuAbility  
Generation 2:  
Information stored in a VU on the ability of the VU to use generation 1 
tachograph cards or not (Annex 1C requirement 121).
  
Value assignment  — Octet Aligned:  ‘xxxxxxxa’B (8 bits)  
For the ability to support of generation 1:  
‘a’B Ability to support generation 1 tachograph cards:  
‘0’ B Generation 1 is supported,  
‘1’B Generation1 is not supported,  
‘xxxxxxx’B RFU  
2.170.  VuActivityDailyData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a VU, related to changes of activity and/or 
changes of driving status and/or changes of card status for a given 
calendar day (Annex 1B requirement 084 and Annex 1C requirement 
105, 106, 107) and to slots status at 00:00 that day.
  ▼B
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noOfActivityChanges  is the number of ActivityChangeInfo words in 
the activityChangeInfos set.  
activityChangeInfos  is the set of ActivityChangeInfo words stored in 
the VU for the day. It always includes two ActivityChangeInfo words 
giving the status of the two slots at 00:00 that day.  
2.171.  VuActivityDailyRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a VU, related to changes of activity and/or 
changes of driving status and/or changes of card status for a given 
calendar day (Annex 1C requirement 105, 106, 107) and to slots 
status at 00:00 that day.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (ActivityChangeInfo).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the ActivityChangeInfo in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of ActivityChangeInfo words stored in the VU for the 
day. It always includes two ActivityChangeInfo words giving the status 
of the two slots at 00:00 that day.  
2.172.  VuApprovalNumber  
Type approval number of the vehicle unit.  
Generation 1:
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
Generation 2:
  
Value assignment:  
The approval number shall be provided as published on the 
corresponding European Commission web site, i.e. for example 
including hyphens if any. The approval number shall be left-aligned.  
2.173.  VuCalibrationData  
Generation 1:  ▼B
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Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the calibrations of the 
recording equipment (Annex 1B requirement 098).
  
noOfVuCalibrationRecords  is the number of records contained in the 
vuCalibrationRecords set.  
vuCalibrationRecords  is the set of calibration records.  
2.174.  VuCalibrationRecord  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related a calibration of the 
recording equipment (Annex 1B requirement 098 and Annex 1C 
requirement 119 and 120).  
Generation 1:
  
calibrationPurpose  is the purpose of the calibration.  
workshopName, workshopAddress  are the workshop name and 
address.  
workshopCardNumber  identifies the workshop card used during the 
calibration.  
workshopCardExpiryDate  is the card expiry date.  
vehicleIdentificationNumber  is the VIN.  
vehicleRegistrationIdentification  contains the VRN and registering 
Member State.  
wVehicleCharacteristicConstant  is the characteristic coefficient of the 
vehicle.  
kConstantOfRecordingEquipment  is the constant of the recording 
equipment.  ▼B
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lTyreCircumference  is the effective circumference of the wheel tyres.  
tyreSize  is the designation of the dimension of the tyres mounted on the 
vehicle  
authorisedSpeed  is the authorised speed of the vehicle.  
oldOdometerValue, newOdometerValue  are the old and new values of 
the odometer.  
oldTimeValue, newTimeValue  are the old and new values of date and 
time.  
nextCalibrationDate  is the date of the next calibration of the type 
specified in CalibrationPurpose to be carried out by the authorised 
inspection authority.  
Generation 2:
  
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:  
sealDataVu  gives information about the seals that are attached to 
different components of the vehicle.  
2.175.  VuCalibrationRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the calibrations of the 
recording equipment (Annex 1C requirement 119 and 120).  ▼B
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recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuCalibrationRecord).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuCalibrationRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of calibration records.  
2.176.  VuCardIWData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to insertion and withdrawal 
cycles of driver cards or of workshop cards in the vehicle unit (Annex 
1B requirement 081 and Annex 1C requirement 103).
  
noOfIWRecords  is the number of records in the set vuCardIWRecords.  
vuCardIWRecords  is a set of records related to card insertion with ­
drawal cycles.  
2.177.  VuCardIWRecord  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to an insertion and with ­
drawal cycle of a driver card or of a workshop card in the vehicle unit 
(Annex 1B requirement 081 and Annex 1C requirement 102).  
Generation 1:
  
cardHolderName  is the driver or workshop card holder's surname and 
first names as stored in the card.  
fullCardNumber  is the type of card, its issuing Member State and its 
card number as stored in the card.  ▼B
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cardExpiryDate  is the card's expiry date as stored in the card.  
cardInsertionTime  is the insertion date and time.  
vehicleOdometerValueAtInsertion  is the vehicle odometer value at 
card insertion.  
cardSlotNumber  is the slot in which the card is inserted.  
cardWithdrawalTime  is the withdrawal date and time.  
vehicleOdometerValueAtWithdrawal  is the vehicle odometer value at 
card withdrawal.  
previousVehicleInfo  contains information about the previous vehicle 
used by the driver, as stored in the card.  
manualInputFlag  is a flag identifying if the cardholder has manually 
entered driver activities at card insertion.  
Generation 2:
  
Instead of fullCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes use of 
the following data element.  
fullCardNumberAndGeneration  is the type of card, its issuing 
Member State, its card number and generation as stored in the card.  
2.178.  VuCardIWRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to insertion and withdrawal 
cycles of driver cards or of workshop cards in the vehicle unit (Annex 
1C requirement 103).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuCardIWRecord).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuCardIWRecord in bytes.  ▼B
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noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of records related to card insertion withdrawal cycles.  
▼M1 
2.179.  VuCardRecord  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, about a tachograph card used 
(Annex IC requirement 132).
  
cardNumberAndGenerationInformation  is the full card number and 
generation of the card used (data type 2.74).  
cardExtendedSerialNumber  as read from the file EF_ICC under the 
MF of the card.  
cardStructureVersion  as read from the file EF_Application_Identifi ­
cation under the DF_Tachograph_G2.  
cardNumber  as read from the file EF_Identification under the 
DF_Tachograph_G2.  
▼B 
2.180.  VuCardRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information stored in a vehicle unit about the tachograph cards used 
with this VU. This information is intended for the analysis of VU — 
card problems (Annex 1C requirement 132).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuCardRecord).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuCardRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of records related to the tachograph cards used with the 
VU. ▼B
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2.181.  VuCertificate  
Certificate of the public key of a vehicle unit.
  
2.182.  VuCertificateRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The VU certificate plus metadata as used in the download protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuCertificate).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuCertificate in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records. The value 
shall be set to 1 as the certificates may have different lengths.  
records  is a set of VU certificates.  
2.183.  VuCompanyLocksData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to company locks (Annex 
1B requirement 104).
  
noOfLocks  is the number of locks listed in vuCompanyLocksRecords.  
vuCompanyLocksRecords  is the set of company locks records.  
2.184.  VuCompanyLocksRecord  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to one company lock 
(Annex 1B requirement 104 and Annex 1C requirement 128).  
Generation 1:
  ▼B
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lockInTime, lockOutTime  are the date and time of lock-in and lock- 
out. 
companyName, companyAddress  are the company name and address 
related with the lock-in.  
companyCardNumber  identifies the card used at lock-in.  
Generation 2:
  
Instead of companyCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes 
use of the following data element.  
companyCardNumberAndGeneration  identifies the card including its 
generation used at lock-in.  
2.185.  VuCompanyLocksRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to company locks (Annex 
1C requirement 128).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuCompanyLocksRecord).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuCompanyLocksRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records. Value 0..255.  
records  is the set of company locks records.  
2.186.  VuControlActivityData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to controls performed using 
this VU (Annex 1B requirement 102).
  ▼B
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noOfControls  is the number of controls listed in vuControlActivityRe ­
cords.  
vuControlActivityRecords  is the set of control activity records.  
2.187.  VuControlActivityRecord  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a control performed using 
this VU (Annex 1B requirement 102 and Annex 1C requirement 126).  
Generation 1:
  
controlType  is the type of the control.  
controlTime  is the date and time of the control.  
controlCardNumber  identifies the control card used for the control.  
downloadPeriodBeginTime  is the begin time of the downloaded period, 
in case of downloading.  
downloadPeriodEndTime  is the end time of the downloaded period, in 
case of downloading.  
Generation 2:
  
Instead of controlCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes use 
of the following data element.  
controlCardNumberAndGeneration  identifies the control card 
including its generation used for the control.  
2.188.  VuControlActivityRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to controls performed using 
this VU (Annex 1C requirement 126).  ▼B
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recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuControlActivityRecord).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuControlActivityRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of VU control activity records.  
2.189.  VuDataBlockCounter  
Counter, stored in a card, identifying sequentially the insertion with ­
drawal cycles of the card in vehicle units.
  
Value assignment : Consecutive Number with max, value 9 999, starting 
again with 0.  
2.190.  VuDetailedSpeedBlock  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the vehicle's detailed 
speed for a minute during which the vehicle has been moving 
(Annnex 1B requirement 093 and Annex 1C requirement 116).
  
speedBlockBeginDate  is the date and time of the first speed value 
within the block.  
speedsPerSecond  is the chronological sequence of measured speeds 
every seconds for the minute starting at speedBlockBeginDate 
(included).  
2.191.  VuDetailedSpeedBlockRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the detailed speed of the 
vehicle.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuDetailedSpeedBlock).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  ▼B
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recordSize  is the size of the VuDetailedSpeedBlock in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of detailed speed blocks.  
2.192.  VuDetailedSpeedData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the detailed speed of the 
vehicle.
  
noOfSpeedBlocks  is the number of speed blocks in the vuDetailed ­
SpeedBlocks set.  
vuDetailedSpeedBlocks  is the set of detailed speed blocks.  
2.193.  VuDownloadablePeriod  
Oldest and latest dates for which a vehicle unit holds data related to 
drivers activities (Annex 1B requirements 081, 084 or 087 and Annex 
1C requirements 102, 105, 108).
  
minDownloadableTime  is the oldest card insertion or activity change or 
place entry date and time stored in the VU.  
maxDownloadableTime  is the latest card withdrawal or activity change 
or place entry date and time stored in the VU.  
2.194.  VuDownloadablePeriodRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The VUDownloadablePeriod plus metadata used in the download 
protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuDownloadablePeriod).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  ▼B
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recordSize  is the size of the VuDownloadablePeriod in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of VuDownloadablePeriod records.  
2.195.  VuDownloadActivityData  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to its last download (Annex 
1B requirement 105 and Annex 1C requirement 129).  
Generation 1:
  
downloadingTime  is the date and time of downloading.  
fullCardNumber  identifies the card used to authorise the download.  
companyOrWorkshopName  is the company or workshop name.  
Generation 2:
  
Instead of fullCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes use of 
the following data element.  
fullCardNumberAndGeneration  identifies the card including its 
generation used to authorise the download.  
2.196.  VuDownloadActivityDataRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information related to the last VU download (Annex 1C requirement 
129).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuDownloadActivityData).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuDownloadActivityData in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  ▼B
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records  is the set of download activity data records.  
2.197.  VuEventData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to events (Annex 1B 
requirement 094 except over speeding event).
  
noOfVuEvents  is the number of events listed in the vuEventRecords 
set. 
vuEventRecords  is a set of events records.  
2.198.  VuEventRecord  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to an event (Annex 1B 
requirement 094 and Annex 1C requirement 117 except over speeding 
event).  
Generation 1:
  
eventType  is the type of the event.  
eventRecordPurpose  is the purpose for which this event has been 
recorded.  
eventBeginTime  is the date and time of beginning of event.  
eventEndTime  is the date and time of end of event.  
cardNumberDriverSlotBegin  identifies the card inserted in the driver 
slot at the beginning of the event.  
cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin  identifies the card inserted in the co- 
driver slot at the beginning of the event.  
cardNumberDriverSlotEnd  identifies the card inserted in the driver 
slot at the end of the event.  
cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd  identifies the card inserted in the co- 
driver slot at the end of the event.  
similarEventsNumber  is the number of similar events that day.  
This sequence can be used for all events other than over speeding 
events.  ▼B
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Generation 2:
  
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:  
manufacturerSpecificEventFaultData  contains additional, manu ­
facturer specific information about the event.  
Instead of cardNumberDriverSlotBegin, cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin, 
cardNumberDriverSlotEnd, and cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd the 
generation 2 data structure makes use of the following data elements:  
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotBegin  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the 
event.  
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotBegin  identifies the card including 
its generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot at the beginning 
of the event.  
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotEnd  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the end of the event.  
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotEnd  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot at the end of the event.  
If the event is a time conflict the eventBeginTime and eventEndTime are 
to be interpreted as follows:  
eventBeginTime  is the recording equipment date and time.  
eventEndTime  is the GNSS date and time.  
2.199.  VuEventRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to events (Annex 1C 
requirement 117 except over speeding event).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuEventRecord).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  ▼B
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recordSize  is the size of the VuEventRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of events records.  
2.200.  VuFaultData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to faults (Annex 1B 
requirement 096).
  
noOfVuFaults  is the number of faults listed in the vuFaultRecords set.  
vuFaultRecords  is a set of faults records.  
2.201.  VuFaultRecord  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a fault (Annex 1B 
requirement 096 and Annex 1C requirement 118).  
Generation 1:
  
faultType  is the type of recording equipment fault.  
faultRecordPurpose  is the purpose for which this fault has been 
recorded.  
faultBeginTime  is the date and time of beginning of fault.  
faultEndTime  is the date and time of end of fault.  
cardNumberDriverSlotBegin  identifies the card inserted in the driver 
slot at the beginning of the fault.  
cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin  identifies the card inserted in the co- 
driver slot at the beginning of the fault.  
cardNumberDriverSlotEnd  identifies the card inserted in the driver 
slot at the end of the fault.  
cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd  identifies the card inserted in the co- 
driver slot at the end of the fault.  ▼B
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Generation 2:
  
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:  
manufacturerSpecificEventFaultData  contains additional, manu ­
facturer specific information about the fault.  
Instead of cardNumberDriverSlotBegin, cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin, 
cardNumberDriverSlotEnd, and cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd the 
generation 2 data structure makes use of the following data elements:  
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotBegin  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the 
fault.  
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotBegin  identifies the card including 
its generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot at the beginning 
of the fault.  
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotEnd  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the end of the fault.  
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotEnd  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot at the end of the fault.  
2.202.  VuFaultRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to faults (Annex 1C 
requirement 118).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuFaultRecord).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuFaultRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of faults records.  ▼B
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2.203.  VuGNSSADRecord  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the GNSS position of the 
vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours 
(Annex IC requirement 108, 110).
  
timeStamp  is the date and time when the accumulated driving time 
reaches a multiple of three hours.  
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlot  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the driver slot.  
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlot  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot.  
gnssPlaceRecord  contains information related to the position of the 
vehicle.  
vehicleOdometerValue  is the odometer value when the accumulated 
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours.  
2.204.  VuGNSSADRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the GNSS position of the 
vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours 
(Annex IC requirement 108 and 110).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuGNSSADRecord).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType.  
recordSize  is the size of the VuGNSSADRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of GNSS accumulated driving records.  
▼B 
2.205.  VuIdentification  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of the 
vehicle unit (Annex 1B requirement 075 and Annex 1C requirement 93 
and 121).  ▼M1
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Generation 1:
  
vuManufacturerName  is the name of the manufacturer of the vehicle 
unit. 
vuManufacturerAddress  is the address of the manufacturer of the 
vehicle unit.  
vuPartNumber  is the part number of the vehicle unit.  
vuSerialNumber  is the serial number of the vehicle unit.  
vuSoftwareIdentification  identifies the software implemented in the 
vehicle unit.  
vuManufacturingDate  is the manufacturing date of the vehicle unit.  
vuApprovalNumber  is the type approval number of the vehicle unit.  
Generation 2:
  
In addition to generation 1 the following data element are used:  
vuGeneration  identifies the generation of the vehicle unit.  
vuAbility  provides information whether the VU supports generation 1 
tachograph cards or not.  
2.206.  VuIdentificationRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The VuIdentification plus metadata used in the download protocol.  ▼B
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recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuIdentification).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuIdentification in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of VuIdentification records.  
2.207.  VuITSConsentRecord  
Generation 2:  
Information stored in a vehicle unit, related to the consent of a driver to 
use Intelligent Transport Systems.
  
cardNumberAndGen  identifies the card including its generation. This 
must be a driver card or a workshop card.  
consent  is a flag which indicates whether the driver has given his 
consent on the usage of Intelligent Transport Systems with this 
vehicle / vehicle unit.  
Value assignment:  
TRUE indicates the driver's consent to use Intelligent Transport 
Systems  
FALSE indicates the driver's denial to use Intelligent Transport 
Systems  
2.208.  VuITSConsentRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to drivers' consent on the 
usage of Intelligent Transport Systems (Annex 1C requirement 200).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuITSConsentRecord).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuITSConsentRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is the set of ITS consent records.  ▼B
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2.209.  VuManufacturerAddress  
Address of the manufacturer of the vehicle unit.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
2.210.  VuManufacturerName  
Name of the manufacturer of the vehicle unit.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
2.211.  VuManufacturingDate  
Date of manufacture of the vehicle unit.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
2.212.  VuOverSpeedingControlData  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events 
since the last over speeding control (Annex 1B requirement 095 and 
Annex 1C requirement 117).
  
lastOverspeedControlTime  is the date and time of the last over 
speeding control.  
firstOverspeedSince  is the date and time of the first over speeding 
following this over speeding control.  
numberOfOverspeedSince  is the number of over speeding events since 
the last over speeding control.  
2.213.  VuOverSpeedingControlDataRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
The VuOverSpeedingControlData plus metadata used in the download 
protocol.
  ▼B
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recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuOverSpeedingControl ­
Data).  Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuOverSpeedingControlData in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of over speeding control data records.  
2.214.  VuOverSpeedingEventData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events 
(Annex 1B requirement 094).
  
noOfVuOverSpeedingEvents  is the number of events listed in the 
vuOverSpeedingEventRecords set.  
vuOverSpeedingEventRecords  is a set of over speeding events records.  
2.215.  VuOverSpeedingEventRecord  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events 
(Annex 1B requirement 094 and Annex 1C requirement 117).
  
eventType  is the type of the event.  
eventRecordPurpose  is the purpose for which this event has been 
recorded.  
eventBeginTime  is the date and time of beginning of event.  
eventEndTime  is the date and time of end of event.  
maxSpeedValue  is the maximum speed measured during the event.  
averageSpeedValue  is the arithmetic average speed measured during the 
event.  ▼B
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cardNumberDriverSlotBegin  identifies the card inserted in the driver 
slot at the beginning of the event.  
similarEventsNumber  is the number of similar events that day.  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events 
(Annex 1B requirement 094 and Annex 1C requirement 117).
  
Instead of cardNumberDriverSlotBegin, the generation 2 data structure 
makes use of the following data element:  
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotBegin  identifies the card including its 
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the 
event.  
2.216.  VuOverSpeedingEventRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events 
(Annex 1C requirement 117).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuOverSpeedingEventRe ­
cord).  Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuOverSpeedingEventRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of over speeding events records.  
2.217.  VuPartNumber  
Part number of the vehicle unit.
  
Value assignment : VU manufacturer specific.  ▼B
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2.218.  VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to places where drivers 
begin or end a daily work period (Annex 1B requirement 087 and 
Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
  
noOfPlaceRecords  is the number of records listed in the vuPlaceDaily ­
WorkPeriodRecords set.  
vuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecords  is a set of place related records.  
2.219.  VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a place where a driver 
begins or ends a daily work period (Annex 1B requirement 087 and 
Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
  
fullCardNumber  is the driver's card type, card issuing Member State 
and card number.  
placeRecord  contains the information related to the place entered.  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a place where a driver 
begins or ends a daily work period (Annex 1B requirement 087 and 
Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
  
Instead of fullCardNumber, the generation 2 data structure makes use of 
the following data element:  
fullCardNumberAndGeneration  is the type of card, its issuing 
Member State, its card number and generation as stored in the card.  ▼B
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2.220.  VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to places where drivers 
begin or end a daily work period (Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriod ­
Record).  Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of place related records.  
2.221.  VuPrivateKey  
Generation 1:  
The private key of a vehicle unit.
  
2.222.  VuPublicKey  
Generation 1:  
The public key of a vehicle unit.
  
2.223.  VuSerialNumber  
Serial number of the vehicle unit (Annex 1B requirement 075 and 
Annex 1C requirement 93).
  
2.224.  VuSoftInstallationDate  
Date of installation of the vehicle unit software version.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  ▼B
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2.225.  VuSoftwareIdentification  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the software installed.
  
vuSoftwareVersion  is the software version number of the Vehicle Unit.  
vuSoftInstallationDate  is the software version installation date.  
2.226.  VuSoftwareVersion  
Software version number of the vehicle unit.
  
Value assignment : Unspecified.  
2.227.  VuSpecificConditionData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to specific conditions.
  
noOfSpecificConditionRecords  is the number of records listed in the 
specificConditionRecords set.  
specificConditionRecords  is a set of specific conditions related records.  
2.228.  VuSpecificConditionRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to specific conditions 
(Annex 1C requirement 130).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (SpecificConditionRecord).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the SpecificConditionRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of specific conditions related records.  ▼B
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2.229.  VuTimeAdjustmentData  
Generation 1:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to time adjustments 
performed outside the frame of a regular calibration (Annex 1B 
requirement 101).
  
noOfVuTimeAdjRecords  is the number of records in vuTimeAdjust ­
mentRecords.  
vuTimeAdjustmentRecords  is a set of time adjustment records.  
▼M1 
2.230.  Reserved for future use  
2.231.  Reserved for future use  
▼B 
2.232.  VuTimeAdjustmentRecord  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related a time adjustment 
performed outside the frame of a regular calibration (Annex 1B 
requirement 101 and Annex 1C requirement 124 and 125).  
Generation 1:
  
oldTimeValue, newTimeValue  are the old and new values of date and 
time.  
workshopName, workshopAddress  are the workshop name and 
address.  
workshopCardNumber  identifies the workshop card used to perform 
the time adjustment.  
Generation 2:
  
Instead of workshopCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes 
use of the following data element.  
workshopCardNumberAndGeneration  identifies the workshop card 
including its generation used to perform the time adjustment.  ▼B
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2.233.  VuTimeAdjustmentRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to time adjustments 
performed outside the frame of a regular calibration (Annex 1C 
requirement 124 and 125).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuTimeAdjustmentRecord).  
Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuTimeAdjustmentRecord in bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of time adjustment records.  
2.234.  WorkshopCardApplicationIdentification  
Information, stored in a workshop card related to the identification of the 
application of the card (Annex 1C requirement 307 and 330).  
Generation 1:
  
typeOfTachographCardId  is specifying the implemented type of card.  
cardStructureVersion  is specifying the the version of the structure that 
is implemented in the card.  
noOfEventsPerType  is the number of events per type of event the card 
can record.  
noOfFaultsPerType  is the number of faults per type of fault the card 
can record.  
activityStructureLength  indicates the number of bytes available for 
storing activity records.  
noOfCardVehicleRecords  is the number of vehicle records the card can 
contain.  ▼B
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noOfCardPlaceRecords  is the number of places the card can record.  
noOfCalibrationRecords  is the number of calibration records the card 
can store.  
Generation 2:  
▼M1
 
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:  
noOfGNSSADRecords  is the number of GNSS accumulated driving 
records the card can store.  
noOfSpecificConditionRecords  is the number of specific condition 
records the card can store.  
noOfCardVehicleUnitRecords  is the number of vehicle units used 
records the card can store.  
▼B 
2.235.  WorkshopCardCalibrationData  
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to workshop activity 
performed with the card (Annex 1C requirements 314, 316, 337, and 
339).
  
calibrationTotalNumber  is the total number of calibrations performed 
with the card.  
calibrationPointerNewestRecord  is the index of the last updated cali ­
bration record.  
Value assignment : Number corresponding to the numerator of the cali ­
bration record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of the cali ­
bration records in the structure.  
calibrationRecords  is the set of records containing calibration and/or 
time adjustment information.  
2.236.  WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord  
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to a calibration 
performed with the card (Annex 1C requirement 314 and 337).  ▼B
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Generation 1:
  
calibrationPurpose  is the purpose of the calibration.  
vehicleIdentificationNumber  is the VIN.  
vehicleRegistration  contains the VRN and registering Member State.  
wVehicleCharacteristicConstant  is the characteristic coefficient of the 
vehicle.  
kConstantOfRecordingEquipment  is the constant of the recording 
equipment.  
lTyreCircumference  is the effective circumference of the wheel tyres.  
tyreSize  is the designation of the dimensions of the tyres mounted on 
the vehicle.  
authorisedSpeed  is the maximum authorised speed of the vehicle.  
oldOdometerValue, newOdometerValue  are the old and new values of 
the odometer.  
oldTimeValue, newTimeValue  are the old and new values of date and 
time.  
nextCalibrationDate  is the date of the next calibration of the type 
specified in CalibrationPurpose to be carried out by the authorised 
inspection authority.  
vuPartNumber, vuSerialNumber  and  sensorSerialNumber  are the 
data elements for recording equipment identification.  ▼B
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Generation 2:
  
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:  
sensorGNSSSerialNumber  which identifies an external GNSS facility.  
rcmSerialNumber  which identifies a Remote Communication Module.  
sealDataCard  gives information about the seals that are attached to 
different components of the vehicle.  
2.237.  WorkshopCardHolderIdentification  
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to the identification of 
the cardholder (Annex 1C requirement 311 and 334).
  
workshopName  is name of the workshop of the card holder.  
workshopAddress  is the address of the workshop of the card holder.  
cardHolderName  is the name and first name(s) of the holder (e.g. the 
name of the mechanic).  
cardHolderPreferredLanguage  is the preferred language of the card 
holder.  
2.238.  WorkshopCardPIN  
Personal identification number of the Workshop Card (Annex 1C 
requirement 309 and 332).
  
Value assignment : The PIN known to the cardholder, right padded with 
‘FF’ bytes up to 8 bytes.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 180  
2.239.  W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant  
Characteristic coefficient of the vehicle (definition k)).
  
Value assignment : Impulses per kilometer in the operating range 0 to 
64 255 pulses/km.  
2.240.  VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecord  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to Power Supply Inter ­
ruption events (Annex 1C requirement 117).
  
eventType  is the type of the event.  
eventRecordPurpose  is the purpose for which this event has been 
recorded.  
eventBeginTime  is the date and time of beginning of event.  
eventEndTime  is the date and time of end of event.  
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotBegin  identifies the card including its 
generation inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the event.  
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotEnd  identifies the card including its 
generation inserted in the driver slot at the end of the event.  
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotBegin  identifies the card including 
its generation inserted in the co-driver slot at the beginning of the event.  
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotEnd  identifies the card including its 
generation inserted in the co-driver slot at the end of the event.  
similarEventsNumber  is the number of similar events that day.  ▼B
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2.241.  VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to Power Supply Inter ­
ruption events (Annex 1C requirement 117).
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (VuPowerSupplyInterrupt ­
ionRecord).  Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecord in 
bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of power supply interruption events records.  
2.242.  VuSensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
A set of SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord plus metadata used in the 
download protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (SensorExternalGNSSCouple ­
dRecord).  Value Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord in 
bytes.  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of Sensor External GNSS Coupled records.  
2.243.  VuSensorPairedRecordArray  
Generation 2:  
A set of SensorPairedRecord plus metadata used in the download 
protocol.
  
recordType  denotes the type of the record (SensorPairedRecord).  Value 
Assignment : See RecordType  
recordSize  is the size of the SensorPairedRecord in bytes.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 182  
noOfRecords  is the number of records in the set records.  
records  is a set of sensor paired records.  
3. VALUE AND SIZE RANGE DEFINITIONS  
Definition of variable values used for definitions in paragraph 2.
  
4. CHARACTER SETS  
IA5Strings use the ASCII characters as defined by ISO/IEC 8824-1. For 
readability and for easy referencing the value assignment is given below. 
The ISO/IEC 8824-1 supersedes this informative note in case of 
discrepancy.
  
Other character strings (Address, Name, VehicleRegistrationNumber) 
use, in addition, characters from the decimal character code range 161 — 
255 of the following 8-bit, standard character sets, specified by the Code 
Page number: 
Standard Character Set  Code Page 
(Decimal)  
ISO/IEC 8859-1 Latin-1 Western European  1  
ISO/IEC 8859-2 Latin-2 Central European  2  
ISO/IEC 8859-3 Latin-3 South European  3  
ISO/IEC 8859-5 Latin / Cyrillic  5  
ISO/IEC 8859-7 Latin / Greek  7  
ISO/IEC 8859-9 Latin-5 Turkish  9  
ISO/IEC 8859-13 Latin-7 Baltic Rim  13  
ISO/IEC 8859-15 Latin-9  15  
ISO/IEC 8859-16 Latin-10 South Eastern European  16  
KOI8-R Latin / Cyrillic  80  
KOI8-U Latin / Cyrillic  85  
5. ENCODING  
When encoded with ASN.1 encoding rules, all data types defined shall 
be encoded according to ISO/IEC 8825-2, aligned variant.  
6. OBJECT IDENTIFIERS UND APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS  
6.1. Object Identifiers  
The Object Identifiers (OIDs) listed in this chapter are only relevant for 
generation 2. These OIDs are specified in TR-03110-3 and repeated here  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 183  
for the sake of completeness. These OIDs are contained in the subtree of 
bsi-de:
  
VU Authentication protocol identifiers
  
Example:  Suppose VU Authentication is to be done with 
SHA-384, then the object identifier to use is (in ASN.1 notation)
  
. The value of this 
object identifier in dot notation is
  .  
Dot notation  Byte notation
  
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 02 02 03’
  
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 02 02 04’
  
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 02 02 05’  
Chip Authentication protocol identifiers
  
Example:  Suppose Chip Authentication is to be done by using the 
ECDH algorithm, resulting in an AES session key length of 128 bits. 
This session key will subsequently be used in the CBC mode of 
operation to ensure data confidentiality and with the CMAC algorithm 
to ensure data authenticity. Therefore, the object identifier to use is (in 
ASN.1 notation)
  . 
The value of this object identifier in dot notation is
  
. 
Dot notation  Byte notation
  
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 03 02 02’
  
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 03 02 03’
  
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 03 02 04’  ▼B
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6.2. Application Identifiers  
Generation 2:  
The Application Identifier (AID) for the External GNSS Facility (Gen ­
eration 2) is given by ‘FF 44 54 45 47 4D’. This is a proprietary AID 
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.  
Note:  The last 5 bytes encode DTEGM for smart Tachograph External 
GNSS Facility.  
The Application Identifier for the generation 2 tachograph card appli ­
cation is given by ‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’. This is a proprietary AID 
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.  ▼B
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Appendix 2  
TACHOGRAPH CARDS SPECIFICATION  
TABLE OF CONTENT 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Abbreviations  
1.2. References  
2. ELECTRICAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS  
2.1. Supply Voltage and Current Consumption  
2.2. Programming Voltage V  pp 
2.3. Clock generation and Frequency  
2.4. I/O Contact  
2.5. States of the Card  
3. HARDWARE AND COMMUNICATION  
3.1. Introduction  
3.2. Transmission Protocol  
3.2.1 Protocols 
3.2.2 ATR 
3.2.3 PTS 
3.3. Access Rules 
3.4. Commands and error codes overview  
3.5. Command descriptions  
3.5.1 SELECT 
3.5.2 READ BINARY  
3.5.3 UPDATE BINARY  
3.5.4 GET CHALLENGE 
3.5.5 VERIFY 
3.5.6 GET RESPONSE 
3.5.7 PSO: VERIFY CERTIFICATE 
3.5.8 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 
3.5.9 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 
3.5.10 GENERAL AUTHENTICATE 
3.5.11 MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
3.5.12 PSO: HASH  
3.5.13 PERFORM HASH OF FILE  ▼B
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3.5.14 PSO: COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE  
3.5.15 PSO: VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE  
3.5.16 PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE  
4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS STRUCTURE  
4.1. Master File MF 
4.2. Driver card applications  
4.2.1 Driver card application generation 1  
4.2.2 Driver card application generation 2  
4.3. Workshop card applications  
4.3.1 Workshop card application generation 1  
4.3.2 Workshop card application generation 2  
4.4. Control card applications  
4.4.1 Control Card application generation 1  
4.4.2 Control card application generation 2  
4.5. Company card applications  
4.5.1 Company card application generation 1  
4.5.2 Company card application generation 2  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Abbreviations 
For the purpose of this appendix, the following abbreviations apply.  
AC Access conditions 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard  
AID Application Identifier  
ALW Always 
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit (structure of a command)  
ATR Answer To Reset 
AUT Authenticated.  
C6, C7 Contacts No 6 and 7 of the card as described in ISO/IEC 
7816-2  
cc clock cycles  
▼M1 
CHA Certificate Holder Authorisation  
▼B 
CHV Card holder Verification Information  
CLA Class byte of an APDU command  
▼M1 
DO Data Object  
▼B 
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication  
DF Dedicated File. A DF can contain other files (EF or DF)  
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography  
EF Elementary File 
etu elementary time unit  ▼B
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G1 Generation 1  
G2 Generation 2  
IC Integrated Circuit  
ICC Integrated Circuit Card  
ID Identifier  
IFD Interface Device  
IFS Information Field Size  
IFSC Information Field Size for the card  
IFSD Information Field Size Device (for the Terminal)  
INS Instruction byte of an APDU command  
Lc Length of the input data for a APDU command  
Le Length of the expected data (output data for a command)  
MF Master File (root DF)  
NAD Node Address used in T=1 protocol  
NEV Never  
P1-P2 Parameter bytes  
PIN Personal Identification Number  
PRO SM Protected with secure messaging  
PTS Protocol Transmission Selection  
RFU Reserved for Future Use  
RST Reset (of the card)  
SFID Short EF Identifier  
SM Secure Messaging  
SW1-SW2 Status bytes  
TS Initial ATR character  
VPP Programming Voltage  
VU Vehicle Unit  
XXh Value XX in hexadecimal notation  
‘XXh’ Value XX in hexadecimal notation  
|| Concatenation symbol 03||04=0304  ▼B
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1.2. References  
The following references are used in this Appendix:  
ISO/IEC 7816-2 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — 
Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts. 
ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007.  
ISO/IEC 7816-3 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — 
Part 3: Electrical interface and transmission 
protocols. ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006.  
ISO/IEC 7816-4 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — 
Part 4: Organization, security and commands for 
interchange. ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 + Cor 1: 2014.  
ISO/IEC 7816-6 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — 
Part 6: Interindustry data elements for interchange. 
ISO/IEC 7816-6:2004 + Cor 1: 2006.  
ISO/IEC 7816-8 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — 
Part 8: Commands for security operations. ISO/IEC 
7816-8:2004.  
ISO/IEC 9797-2 Information technology — Security techniques — 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 2: 
Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function. 
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011  
2. ELECTRICAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS  
TCS_01 All electronic signals shall be in accordance with ISO/IEC 
7816-3 unless specified otherwise.  
TCS_02 The location and dimensions of the card contacts shall 
comply with the ISO/IEC 7816-2.  
2.1. Supply Voltage and Current Consumption  
TCS_03 The card shall work according to specifications within the 
consumption limits specified in ISO/IEC 7816-3.  
TCS_04 The card shall work with Vcc = 3V (± 0,3V) or with Vcc = 
5V (± 0,5V).  
Voltage selection shall be performed according to ISO/IEC 
7816-3.  
2.2. Programming Voltage V  pp 
TCS_05 The card shall not require a programming voltage at pin 
C6. It is expected that pin C6 is not connected in an IFD. 
Contact C6 may be connected to V  cc in the card but shall 
not be connected to ground. This voltage should not be 
interpreted in any case.  
2.3. Clock generation and Frequency  
TCS_06 The card shall operate within a frequency range of 1 to 5 
MHz and may support higher frequencies. Within one card 
session the clock frequency may vary ± 2 %. The clock 
frequency is generated by the Vehicle Unit and not the 
card itself. The duty cycle may vary between 40 and 60 %.  
TCS_07 Under conditions contained into the card file EF ICC, the 
external clock can be stopped. The first byte of the EF ICC 
file body codes the Clockstop mode conditions:  ▼B
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Low High  
Bit 3  Bit 2  Bit 1  
0 0  1  Clockstop allowed, no preferred level  
0 1  1  Clockstop allowed, high level preferred  
1 0  1  Clockstop allowed, low level preferred  
0 0  0  Clockstop not allowed  
0 1  0  Clockstop only allowed on high level  
1 0  0  Clockstop only allowed on low level  
Bits 4 to 8 are not used.  
2.4. I/O Contact  
TCS_08 The I/O contact C7 is used to receive data from and to 
transmit data to the IFD. During operation only either the 
card or the IFD shall be in transmit mode. Should both 
units be in transmit mode no damage shall occur to the 
card. Unless transmitting, the card shall enter the 
reception mode.  
2.5. States of the Card  
TCS_09 The card works in two states while the supply voltage is 
applied:  
Operation state while executing commands or interfacing 
with Digital Unit,  
Idle state at all other times; in this state all data shall be 
retained by the card.  
3. HARDWARE AND COMMUNICATION  
3.1. Introduction  
This paragraph describes the minimum functionality required by 
Tachograph cards and VUs to ensure correct operation and interoper ­
ability.  
Tachograph cards are as compliant as possible with the available 
ISO/IEC applicable norms (especially ISO/IEC 7816). However, 
commands and protocols are fully described in order to specify 
some restricted usage or some differences if they exist. The 
commands specified are fully compliant with the referred norms 
except where indicated.  
3.2. Transmission Protocol  
TCS_10 The Transmission protocol shall be compliant with 
ISO/IEC 7816-3 for T = 0 and T = 1. In particular, the 
VU shall recognise waiting time extensions sent by the 
card.  
3.2.1  Protocols  
TCS_11 The card shall provide both protocol  T=0  and protocol  
T=1. In addition the card may support further contact- 
oriented protocols.  
TCS_12  T=0  is the default protocol, a  PTS  command is therefore 
necessary to change the protocol to  T=1 . ▼B
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TCS_13 Devices shall support  direct convention  in both protocols: 
the direct convention is hence mandatory for the card.  
TCS_14 The  Information Field Size Card  byte shall be presented 
at the ATR in character TA3. This value shall be at least 
‘F0h’ (=240 bytes).  
The following restrictions apply to the protocols:  
TCS_15  T=0  
— The interface device shall support an answer on I/O 
after the rising edge of the signal on RST from 400 cc.  
— The interface device shall be able to read characters 
separated with 12 etu.  
— The interface device shall read an erroneous character 
and its repetition if separated with 13 etu. If an 
erroneous character is detected, the Error signal on 
I/O can occur between 1 etu and 2 etu. The device 
shall support a 1 etu delay.  
— The interface device shall accept a 33 bytes ATR 
(TS+32)  
— If TC1 is present in the ATR, the Extra Guard Time 
shall be present for characters sent by the interface 
device although characters sent by the card can still 
be separated with 12 etu. This is also true for the 
ACK character sent by the card after a P3 character 
emitted by the interface device.  
— The interface device shall take into account a NUL 
character emitted by the card.  
— The interface device shall accept the complementary 
mode for ACK.  
— The get-response command cannot be used in chaining 
mode to get a data which length could exceed 255 
bytes.  
TCS_16  T=1  
— NAD byte: not used (NAD shall be set to ‘00’).  
— S-block ABORT: not used.  
— S-block VPP state error: not used.  
— The total chaining length for a data field will not 
exceed 255 bytes (to be ensured by the IFD).  
— The Information Field Size Device (IFSD) shall be 
indicated by the IFD immediately after the ATR: the 
IFD shall transmit the S-Block IFS request after the 
ATR and the card shall send back S-Block IFS. The 
recommended value for IFSD is 254 bytes.  
— The card will not ask for an IFS readjustment.  ▼B
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3.2.2  ATR  
TCS_17 The device checks ATR bytes, according to ISO/IEC 7816- 
3. No verification shall be done on ATR Historical Char ­
acters.  
Example of Basic Biprotocol ATR according to ISO/IEC 
7816-3  
Character  Value  Remarks  
TS ‘3Bh’  Indicates direct convention.  
T0 ‘85h’  TD1 present; 5 historical bytes are presents.  
TD1 ‘80h’  TD2 present; T=0 to be used  
TD2 ‘11h’  TA3 present; T=1 to be used  
TA3 ‘XXh’ (at least ‘F0h’)  Information Field Size Card ( IFSC)  
TH1 to TH5  ‘XXh’  Historical characters  
TCK  ‘XXh’  Check Character (exclusive OR)  
TCS_18 After the Answer To Reset (ATR), the Master File (MF) is 
implicitly selected and becomes the Current Directory.  
3.2.3  PTS  
TCS_19 The default Protocol is T=0. To set the T=1 protocol, a 
PTS (also known as PPS) must be sent to the card by the 
device.  
TCS_20 As both T=0 and T=1 protocols are mandatory for the card, 
the basic PTS for protocol switching is mandatory for the 
card.  
The PTS can be used, as indicated in ISO/IEC 7816-3, to 
switch to higher baud rates than the default one proposed 
by the card in the ATR if any (TA(1) byte).  
Higher baud rates are optional for the card.  
TCS_21 If no other baud rate than the default one are supported (or 
if the selected baud rate is not supported), the card shall 
respond to the PTS correctly according to ISO/IEC 7816-3 
by omitting the PPS1 byte.  
Examples of basic PTS for protocol selection are the 
following:  
Character  Value  Remarks  
PPSS  ‘FFh’  The Initiate Character.  
PPS0  ‘00h’ or ‘01h’  PPS1 to PPS3 are not present; ‘00h’ to select T0, ‘01h’ to 
select T1.  
PK ‘XXh’  Check Character: ‘XXh’ = ‘FFh’ if PPS0 = ‘00h’, 
‘XXh’ = ‘FEh’ if PPS0 = ‘01h’.  ▼B
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3.3. Access Rules  
TCS_22 An access rule specifies for an access mode, i.e. command, 
the corresponding security conditions. If these security 
conditions are fulfilled the corresponding command is 
processed.  
TCS_23 The following security conditions are used for the 
tachograph card:  
Abbreviation  Meaning  
ALW  The action is always possible and can be executed without any restriction. 
Command and response APDU are sent in plain text, i.e. without secure 
messaging.  
NEV  The action is never possible.  
PLAIN-C  The command APDU is sent in plain, i.e. without secure messaging.  
PWD  The action may only be executed if the workshop card PIN has been 
successfully verified, i.e. if the card internal security status ‘PIN_Verified’ 
is set. The command must be sent without secure messaging.  
EXT-AUT-G1  The action may only be executed if the External Authenticate command for 
the generation 1 authentication (see also Appendix 11 Part A) has been 
successfully performed.  
SM-MAC-G1  The APDU (command and response) must be applied with generation 1 
secure messaging in authentication-only mode (see Appendix 11 Part A).  
SM-C-MAC-G1  The command APDU must be applied with generation 1 secure messaging in 
authentication only mode (see Appendix 11 Part A).  
SM-R-ENC-G1  The response APDU must be applied with generation 1 secure messaging in 
encryption mode (see Appendix 11 Part A), i.e. no message authentication 
code is returned.  
SM-R-ENC- 
MAC-G1  The response APDU must be applied with generation 1 secure messaging in 
encrypt-then-authenticate mode (see Appendix 11 Part A).  
SM-MAC-G2  The APDU (command and response) must be applied with generation 2 
secure messaging in authentication-only mode (see Appendix 11 Part B).  
SM-C-MAC-G2  The command APDU must be applied with generation 2 secure messaging in 
authentication only mode (see Appendix 11 Part B).  
SM-R-ENC- 
MAC-G2  The response APDU must be applied with generation 2 secure messaging in 
encrypt-then-authenticate mode (see Appendix 11 Part B).  
▼M1 
TCS_24 These security conditions can be linked in the following 
ways:  
AND: All security conditions must be fulfilled  
OR: At least one security condition must be fulfilled  
The access rules for the file system, i.e. the SELECT, 
READ BINARY and UPDATE BINARY command, are 
specified in chapter 4. The access rules for the remaining 
commands are specified in the following tables. The term 
‘not applicable’ is used if there is no requirement to support 
the command. In this case the command may or may not be 
supported, but the access condition is out of scope.  ▼B
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TCS_25 In the DF Tachograph G1 application the following access 
rules are used:  
▼M1 
Command  Driver Card  Workshop Card  Control Card  Company Card  
External Authenticate  
— For generation 1 authenti ­
cation  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
— For generation 2 authenti ­
cation  ALW  PWD  ALW  ALW  
Internal Authenticate  ALW  PWD  ALW  ALW  
General Authenticate  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
Get Challenge  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
MSE:SET AT  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
MSE:SET DST  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
Process DSRC Message  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PSO: Compute Digital Signature  ALW OR 
SM-MAC- 
G2 ALW OR 
SM-MAC- 
G2 Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PSO: Hash  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  ALW  Not applicable  
PERFORM HASH of FILE  ALW OR 
SM-MAC- 
G2 ALW OR 
SM-MAC- 
G2 Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PSO: Verify Certificate  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
PSO: Verify Digital Signature  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  ALW  Not applicable  
Verify  Not 
applicable  ALW  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
▼B 
TCS_26 In the DF Tachograph_G2 application the following access 
rules are used:  
▼M1 
Command  Driver Card  Workshop Card  Control Card  Company Card  
External Authenticate  
— For generation 1 authenti ­
cation  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
— For generation 2 authenti ­
cation  ALW  PWD  ALW  ALW  ▼B
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Command  Driver Card  Workshop Card  Control Card  Company Card  
Internal Authenticate  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
General Authenticate  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
Get Challenge  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
MSE:SET AT  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
MSE:SET DST  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
Process DSRC Message  Not 
applicable  ALW  ALW  Not applicable  
PSO: Compute Digital Signature  ALW OR 
SM-MAC- 
G2 ALW OR 
SM-MAC- 
G2 Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PSO: Hash  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  ALW  Not applicable  
PERFORM HASH of FILE  ALW OR 
SM-MAC- 
G2 ALW OR 
SM-MAC- 
G2 Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PSO: Verify Certificate  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
PSO: Verify Digital Signature  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  ALW  Not applicable  
Verify  Not 
applicable  ALW  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
▼B 
TCS_27 In the MF the following access rules are used:  
▼M1 
Command  Driver Card  Workshop Card  Control Card  Company Card  
External Authenticate  
— For generation 1 authenti ­
cation  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
— For generation 2 authenti ­
cation  ALW  PWD  ALW  ALW  
Internal Authenticate  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
General Authenticate  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
Get Challenge  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
MSE:SET AT  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
MSE:SET DST  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  ▼M1
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Command  Driver Card  Workshop Card  Control Card  Company Card  
Process DSRC Message  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PSO: Compute Digital Signature  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PSO: Hash  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PERFORM HASH of FILE  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
PSO: Verify Certificate  ALW  ALW  ALW  ALW  
PSO: Verify Digital Signature  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
Verify  Not 
applicable  ALW  Not 
applicable  Not applicable  
▼B 
TCS_28 A tachograph card may or may not accept a command with 
a higher level of security than the one specified in the 
security conditions. I.e. if the security condition is ALW 
(or PLAIN-C) the card may accept a command with secure 
messaging (encryption and / or authentication mode). If the 
security condition requires secure messaging with authenti ­
cation mode, the tachograph card may accept a command 
with secure messaging of the same generation in authenti ­
cation and encryption mode.  
Note:  The command descriptions provide more information 
on the support of the commands for the different 
tachograph card types and the different DFs.  
3.4. Commands and error codes overview  
Commands and file organisation are deduced from and complies with 
ISO/IEC 7816-4.  
This section describes the following APDU command-response pairs. 
The command variants which are supported by a generation 1 and 2 
application are specified in the corresponding command descriptions.  
Command  INS  
SELECT  ‘A4h’  
READ BINARY  ‘B0h’, ‘B1h’  
UPDATE BINARY  ‘D6h’, ‘D7h’  
GET CHALLENGE  ‘84h’  
VERIFY  ‘20h’  
GET RESPONSE  ‘C0h’  ▼M1
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Command  INS  
PERFORM SECURITY OPER ­
ATION  ‘2Ah’  
— VERIFY CERTIFICATE  
— COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNA- 
TURE  
— VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNA- 
TURE  
— HASH  
— PERFORM HASH OF FILE  
— PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE  
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE  ‘88h’  
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE  ‘82h’  
MANAGE SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT  ‘22h’  
— SET DIGITAL SIGNATURE 
TEMPLATE  
— SET AUTHENTICATION 
TEMPLATE  
GENERAL AUTHENTICATE  ‘86h’  
▼M1 
TCS_29 The status words SW1 SW2 are returned in any response 
message and denote the processing state of the command.  
SW1  SW2  Meaning  
90 00  Normal processing.  
61 XX  Normal processing. XX = number of response bytes available.  
62 81  Warning processing. Part of returned data may be corrupted  
63 00  Authentication failed (Warning)  
63 CX  Wrong CHV (PIN). Remaining attempts counter provided by ‘X’.  
64 00  Execution error - State of non-volatile memory unchanged. 
Integrity error.  
65 00  Execution error - State of non-volatile memory changed  
65 81  Execution error - State of non-volatile memory changed – 
Memory failure  
66 88  Security error: wrong cryptographic checksum (during Secure 
Messaging) or 
wrong certificate (during certificate verification) 
or 
wrong cryptogram (during external authenti ­
cation) or 
wrong signature (during signature verification)  ▼B
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SW1  SW2  Meaning  
67 00  Wrong length (wrong Lc or Le)  
68 83  Last command of the chain expected  
69 00  Forbidden command (no response available in T=0)  
69 82  Security status not satisfied.  
69 83  Authentication method blocked.  
69 85  Conditions of use not satisfied.  
69 86  Command not allowed (no current EF).  
69 87  Expected Secure Messaging Data Objects missing  
69 88  Incorrect Secure Messaging Data Objects  
6A 80  Incorrect parameters in data field  
6A 82  File not found.  
6A 86  Wrong parameters P1-P2.  
6A 88  Referenced data not found.  
6B 00  Wrong parameters (offset outside the EF).  
6C XX  Wrong length, SW2 indicates the exact length. No data field is 
returned.  
6D 00  Instruction code not supported or invalid.  
6E 00  Class not supported.  
6F 00  — Other checking errors  
Additional status words as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 can 
be returned, if their behaviour is not explicitly mentioned in 
this appendix.  
For example the following status words can be optionally 
returned:  
6881: Logical channel not supported  
6882: Secure messaging not supported  
▼B 
TCS_30 If more than one error condition is fulfilled in one 
command APDU the card may return any of the appro ­
priate status words.  
3.5. Command descriptions  
The mandatory commands for the Tachograph cards are described in 
this chapter.  
Additional relevant details, related to cryptographic operations 
involved, are given in Appendix 11 Common security mechanisms 
for Tachograph Generation 1 and Generation 2.  
All commands are described independently of the used protocol (T=0 
or T=1). The APDU bytes CLA, INS, P1, P2, Lc and Le are always 
indicated. If Lc or Le is not needed for the described command, the 
associated length, value and description are empty.  ▼M1
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TCS_31 If both length bytes (Lc and Le) are requested, the 
described command has to be split in two parts if the 
IFD is using protocol T=0: the IFD sends the command 
as described with P3=Lc + data and then sends a GET 
RESPONSE (see § 3.5.6) command with P3=Le.  
TCS_32 If both length bytes are requested, and Le=0 (secure mess ­
aging):  
— When using protocol T=1, the card shall answer to 
Le=0 by sending all available output data.  
— When using protocol T=0, the IFD shall send the first 
command with P3=Lc + data, the card shall answer (to 
this implicit Le=0) by the Status bytes ‘ 61La ’, where 
La is the number of response bytes available. The IFD 
shall then generate a GET RESPONSE command with 
P3 = La to read the data.  
TCS_33 A tachograph card may support extended length fields 
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 as an optional feature. A 
tachograph card that supports extended length fields shall  
— Indicate the extended length field support in the ATR  
— Provide the supported buffer sizes by means of the 
extended length information in the EF ATR/INFO see 
TCS_146.  
— Indicate whether it supports extended length fields for T 
= 1 and / or T = 0 in the EF Extended Length, see 
TCS_147.  
— Support extended length fields for the tachograph appli ­
cation generation 1 and 2.  
Notes:  
All commands are specified for short length fields. The 
usage of extended length APDUs is clear from ISO/IEC 
7816-4.  
In general the commands are specified for the plain mode, 
i.e. without secure messaging, as the secure messaging 
layer is specified in Appendix 11. It is clear from the 
access rules for a command whether the command shall 
support secure messaging or not and whether the 
command shall support generation 1 and / or generation 
2 secure messaging. Some command variants are 
described with secure messaging to illustrate the usage of 
secure messaging.  
TCS_34 The VU shall perform the complete generation 2 VU — 
card mutual authentication protocol for a session including 
the certificate verification (if required) either in the DF 
Tachograph, the DF Tachograph_G2 or the MF.  
3.5.1  SELECT  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted 
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.  ▼B
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The SELECT command is used:  
— to select an application DF (selection by name must be used)  
— to select an elementary file corresponding to the submitted file ID  
3.5.1.1 S e l e c t i o n b y n a m e ( A I D )  
This command allows selecting an application DF in the card.  
TCS_35 This command can be performed from anywhere in the file 
structure (after the ATR or at any time).  
TCS_36 The selection of an application resets the current security 
environment. After performing the application selection, no 
current public key is selected anymore. The EXT-AUT-G1 
access condition is also lost. If the command was 
performed without secure messaging, the former secure 
messaging session keys are no longer available.  
TCS_37  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘A4h’  
P1 1  ‘04h’  Selection by name (AID)  
P2 1  ‘0Ch’  No response expected  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Number of bytes sent to the card (length of the AID): 
‘06h’ for the Tachograph application  
#6-#(5+NN)  NN  ‘XX..XXh’  AID: ‘FF 54 41 43 48 4F’ for the Generation 1 
tachograph application 
AID: ‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’ for the Generation 2 
tachograph application  
No response to the SELECT command is needed (Le 
absent in T=1, or no response asked in T=0).  
TCS_38  Response Message (no response asked)  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the application corresponding with the AID is not 
found, the processing state returned is ‘ 6A82 ’. 
— In T=1, if the byte Le is present, the state returned is 
‘6700 ’. 
— In T=0, if a response is asked after the SELECT 
command, the state returned is ‘ 6900 ’. 
▼M1 
— If the selected application is considered to be corrupted 
(integrity error is detected within the file attributes), the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6500 ’. ▼B
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3.5.1.2 S e l e c t i o n o f a n E l e m e n t a r y F i l e u s i n g i t s F i l e 
I d e n t i f i e r  
TCS_39  Command Message  
TCS_40 A tachograph card shall support the generation 2 secure 
messaging as specified in Appendix 11 Part B for this 
command variant.  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘A4h’  
P1 1  ‘02h’  Selection of an EF under the current DF  
P2 1  ‘0Ch’  No response expected  
Lc 1  ‘02h’  Number of bytes sent to the card  
#6-#7  2  ‘XXXXh’  File Identifier  
No response to the SELECT command is needed (Le 
absent in T=1, or no response asked in T=0).  
TCS_41  Response Message (no response asked)  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the file corresponding with the file identifier is not 
found, the processing state returned is ‘ 6A82 ’. 
— In T=1, if the byte Le is present, the state returned is 
‘6700 ’. 
— In T=0, if a response is asked after the SELECT 
command, the state returned is ‘ 6900 ’. 
▼M1 
— If the selected file is considered to be corrupted 
(integrity error is detected within the file attributes), 
the processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6500 ’. 
▼B 
3.5.2  READ BINARY  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted 
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.  
The READ BINARY command is used to read data from a trans ­
parent file.  
The response of the card consists of returning the data read, optionally 
encapsulated in a secure messaging structure.  
3.5.2.1 C o m m a n d w i t h o f f s e t i n P 1 - P 2  
This command enables the IFD to read data from the EF currently 
selected, without secure messaging.  
Note:  This command without secure messaging can only be used to 
read a file that supports the ALW security condition for the Read 
access mode.  ▼B
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TCS_42  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘B0h’  Read Binary  
P1 1  ‘XXh’  Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Most 
Significant Byte  
P2 1  ‘XXh’  Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Least 
Significant Byte  
Le 1  ‘XXh’  Length of data expected. Number of Bytes to be read.  
Note:  bit 8 of P1 must be set to 0.  
TCS_43  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#X  X  ‘XX..XXh’  Data read  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is 
‘6986 ’. 
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not 
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘ 6982 ’. 
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF 
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is 
‘6B00 ’. 
— If the size of the data to be read is not compatible with 
the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6700 ’ or ‘ 6Cxx ’ where 
‘xx’ indicates the exact length.  
▼M1 
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, 
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and 
unrecoverable, the processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ 
or ‘6500 ’. 
▼B 
— If an integrity error is detected within the stored data, 
the card shall return the demanded data, and the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6281 ’. 
3.5.2.1.1 C o m m a n d w i t h s e c u r e m e s s a g i n g ( e x a m p l e s )  
This command enables the IFD to read data from the EF currently 
selected with secure messaging, in order to verify the integrity of the 
data received and to protect the confidentiality of the data if the 
security condition SM-R-ENC-MAC-G1 (generation 1) or SM-R- 
ENC-MAC-G2 (generation 2) is applied.  
TCS_44  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘0Ch’  Secure Messaging asked  
INS 1  ‘B0h’  Read Binary  ▼B
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Byte  Length  Value  Description  
P1 1  ‘XXh’  P1 ( offset in bytes from the beginning of the file): Most 
Significant Byte  
P2 1  ‘XXh’  P2 ( offset in bytes from the beginning of the file): Least 
Significant Byte  
Lc 1  ‘XXh’  Length of input data for secure messaging  
#6 1  ‘97h’  T  LE : Tag for expected length specification.  
#7 1  ‘01h’  L  LE : Length of expected length  
#8 1  ‘NNh’  Expected length specification (original Le): Number of 
Bytes to be read  
#9 1  ‘8Eh’  T  CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#10 1  ‘XXh’  L  CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum 
‘04h’ for Generation 1 secure messaging (see Appendix 
11 Part A) 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for 
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  
#11-#(10+L)  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
Le 1  ‘00h’  As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4  
TCS_45  Response Message if SM-R-ENC-MAC-G1 (generation 
1) / SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2 (generation 2) is not required 
and if Secure Messaging input format is correct:  
▼M1 
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1 1  ‘81h’  T  PV : Tag for plain value data  
#2 L  ‘NNh’ or 
‘81 NNh’  L PV : length of returned data (=original Le). 
L is 2 bytes if L  PV >127 bytes.  
#(2+L) - #(1+L+NN)  NN  ‘XX..XXh’  Plain Data value  
#(2+L+NN)  1  ‘99h’  Tag for Processing Status (SW1-SW2) – 
optional for generation 1 secure messaging  
#(3+L+NN)  1  ‘02h’  Length of Processing Status – optional for 
generation 1 secure messaging  
#(4+L+NN) - #(5+L+NN)  2  ‘XX XXh’  Processing Status of the unprotected 
response APDU – optional for generation 1 
secure messaging  
#(6+L+NN)  1  ‘8Eh’  TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#(7+L+NN)  1  ‘XXh’  LCC: Length of following cryptographic 
checksum 
‘04h’ for Generation 1 secure messaging 
(see Appendix 11 Part A) 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES 
key length for Generation 2 secure 
messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  ▼B
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Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#(8+L+NN)-#(7+M+L+NN)  M  ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
▼B 
TCS_46  Response Message if SM-R-ENC-MAC-G1 (generation 
1) / SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2 (generation 2) is required and 
if Secure Messaging input format is correct:  
▼M1 
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1 1  ‘87h’  T  PI CG  : Tag for encrypted data (cryptogram)  
#2 L  ‘MMh’ or 
‘81 MMh’  L PI CG  : length of returned encrypted data 
(different of original Le of the command 
due to padding). 
L is 2 bytes if LPI CG > 127 bytes.  
#(2+L)-#(1+L+MM)  MM  ‘01XX..XXh’  Encrypted Data: Padding Indicator and 
cryptogram  
#(2+L+MM)  1  ‘99h’  Tag for Processing Status (SW1-SW2) – 
optional for generation 1 secure messaging  
#(3+L+MM)  1  ‘02h’  Length of Processing Status – optional for 
generation 1 secure messaging  
#(4+L+MM) - #(5+L+MM)  2  ‘XX XXh’  Processing Status of the unprotected 
response APDU – optional for generation 1 
secure messaging  
#(6+L+MM)  1  ‘8Eh’  TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#(7+L+MM)  1  ‘XXh’  LCC: Length of following cryptographic 
checksum 
‘04h’ for Generation 1 secure messaging 
(see Appendix 11 Part A) 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES 
key length for Generation 2 secure 
messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  
#(8+L+MM)- 
#(7+N+L+MM)  N ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
▼B 
The READ BINARY command may return regular 
processing states listed in TCS_43 under Tag ‘99h’ as 
described in TCS_59 using the secure messaging 
response structure.  
Additionally, some errors specifically related to secure 
messaging can happen. In that case, the processing state 
is simply returned, with no secure messaging structure 
involved:  ▼M1
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TCS_47  Response Message if incorrect Secure Messaging input 
format  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If no current session key is available, the processing 
state ‘ 6A88 ’ is returned. It happens either if the 
session key has not already been generated or if the 
session key validity has expired (in this case the IFD 
must re-run a mutual authentication process to set a 
new session key).  
— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are 
missing in the secure messaging format, the processing 
state ‘ 6987 ’ is returned: this error happens if an 
expected tag is missing or if the command body is 
not properly constructed.  
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6988 ’: this error happens if all the required 
tags are present but some lengths are different from the 
ones expected.  
— If the verification of the cryptographic checksum fails, 
the processing state returned is ‘ 6688 ’. 
3.5.2.2 C o m m a n d w i t h s h o r t E F ( E l e m e n t a r y F i l e ) 
i d e n t i f i e r  
This command variant enables the IFD to select an EF by means of a 
short EF identifier and read data from this EF.  
TCS_48 A tachograph card shall support this command variant for 
all Elementary Files with a specified short EF identifier. 
These short EF identifiers are specified in chapter 4.  
TCS_49  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘B0h’  Read Binary  
P1 1  ‘XXh’  Bit 8 is set to 1 
Bit 7 and 6 are set to 00 
Bit 5 — 1 encode the short EF identifier of the 
corresponding EF  
P2 1  ‘XXh’  Encodes an offset from 0 to 255 bytes in the EF 
referenced by P1  
Le 1  ‘XXh’  Length of data expected. Number of Bytes to be read.  
Note:  The short EF identifiers used for the Generation 2 
tachograph application are specified in chapter 4.  
If P1 encodes a short EF identifier and the command is 
successful, the identified EF becomes the currently selected 
EF (current EF).  ▼B
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TCS_50  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#L  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Data read  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the file corresponding with the short EF identifier is 
not found, the processing state returned is ‘ 6A82 ’. 
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not 
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘ 6982 ’. 
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF 
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is 
‘6B00 ’. 
— If the size of the data to be read is not compatible with 
the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6700 ’ or ‘ 6Cxx ’ where 
‘xx’ indicates the exact length.  
▼M1 
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, 
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and 
unrecoverable, the processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ 
or ‘6500 ’. 
▼B 
— If an integrity error is detected within the stored data, 
the card shall return the demanded data, and the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6281 ’. 
3.5.2.3 C o m m a n d w i t h o d d i n s t r u c t i o n b y t e  
This command variant enables the IFD to read data from an EF with 
32 768 bytes or more.  
TCS_51 A tachograph card which supports EFs with 32 768 bytes 
or more shall support this command variant for these EFs. 
A tachograph card may or may not support this command 
variant for other EFs with the exception of the EF 
Sensor_Installation_Data see TCS_156 and TCS_160.  
TCS_52  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘B1h’  Read Binary  
P1 1  ‘00h’  Current EF  
P2 1  ‘00h’  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Lc Length of offset data object.  
#6-#(5+NN)  NN  ‘XX..XXh’  Offset data object: 
Tag ‘54h’ 
Length ‘01h’ or ‘02h’ 
Value offset  
▼M1 
Le 1  'XXh'  As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4  ▼B
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The IFD shall encode the offset data object's length with a 
minimum possible number of octets, i.e. using the length 
byte ‘01h’ the IFD shall encode an offset from 0 to 255 
and using the length byte ‘02h’ an offset from ‘256’ up to 
‘65 535’ bytes.  
▼M1 
In case of T = 0 the card assumes the value Le = ‘00h’ if 
no secure messaging is applied.  
In case of T = 1 the processing state returned is ‘6700’ if 
Le=‘01h’.  
▼B 
TCS_53  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#L  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Data read encapsulated in a discretionary data object 
with tag ‘53h’.  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is 
‘6986 ’. 
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not 
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘ 6982 ’. 
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF 
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is 
‘6B00 ’. 
— If the size of the data to be read is not compatible with 
the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6700 ’ or ‘ 6Cxx ’ where 
‘xx’ indicates the exact length.  
▼M1 
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, 
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and 
unrecoverable, the processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ 
or ‘6500 ’. 
▼B 
— If an integrity error is detected within the stored data, 
the card shall return the demanded data, and the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6281 ’. 
3.5.2.3.1 C o m m a n d w i t h s e c u r e m e s s a g i n g ( e x a m p l e )  
The following example illustrates the usage of secure messaging if the 
security condition SM-MAC-G2 applies.  
TCS_54 Command message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘0Ch’  Secure Messaging asked  
INS 1  ‘B1h’  Read Binary  
P1 1  ‘00h’  Current EF  
P2 1  ‘00h’  
Lc 1  ‘XXh’  Length of the secured data field  ▼B
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Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#6 1  ‘B3h’  Tag for plain value data encoded in BER-TLV  
#7 1  ‘NNh’  L  PV : length of transmitted data  
#(8)-#(7+NN)  NN  ‘XX..XXh’  Plain Data encoded in BER-TLV, i.e. the offset data 
object with tag ‘54’  
#(8+NN)  1  ‘97h’  T  LE : Tag for expected length specification.  
#(9+NN)  1  ‘01h’  L  LE : Length of expected length  
#(10+NN)  1  ‘XXh’  Expected length specification (original Le): Number of 
bytes to be read  
#(11+NN)  1  ‘8Eh’  T  CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#(12+NN)  1  ‘XXh’  L  CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for 
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  
#(13+NN)- 
#(12+M+NN)  M ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
Le 1  ‘00h’  As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4  
TCS_55 Response message if the command is successful  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1 1  ‘B3h’  Plain Data encoded in BER-TLV  
#2 L  ‘NNh’ or 
‘81 NNh’  L PV : length of returned data (=original Le). 
L is 2 bytes if L  PV >127 bytes.  
#(2+L)- 
#(1+L+NN)  NN ‘XX..XXh’  Plain Data value encoded in BER-TLV, i.e. data read 
encapsulated in a discretionary data object with tag 
‘53h’.  
#(2+L+NN)  1  ‘99h’  Processing Status of the unprotected response APDU  
#(3+L+NN)  1  ‘02h’  Length of Processing Status  
#(4+L+NN) — 
#(5+L+NN)  2 ‘XX XXh’  Processing Status of the unprotected response APDU  
#(6+L+NN)  1  ‘8Eh’  T  CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#(7+L+NN)  1  ‘XXh’  L  CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for 
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  
#(8+L+NN)- 
#(7+M+L+ 
NN) M ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
3.5.3  UPDATE BINARY  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted 
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.  
The UPDATE BINARY command message initiates the update (erase 
+ write) of the bits already present in an EF binary with the bits given 
in the command APDU.  ▼B
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3.5.3.1 C o m m a n d w i t h o f f s e t i n P 1 - P 2  
This command enables the IFD to write data into the EF currently 
selected, without the card verifying the integrity of data received.  
Note:  This command without secure messaging can only be used to 
update a file that supports the ALW security condition for the Update 
access mode.  
TCS_56  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘D6h’  Update Binary  
P1 1  ‘XXh’  Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Most 
Significant Byte  
P2 1  ‘XXh’  Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Least 
Significant Byte  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Lc Length of data to Update. Number of bytes to be 
written.  
#6-#(5+NN)  NN  ‘XX..XXh’  Data to be written  
Note:  bit 8 of P1 must be set to 0.  
TCS_57  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is 
‘6986 ’. 
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not 
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘ 6982 ’. 
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF 
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is 
‘6B00 ’. 
— If the size of the data to be written is not compatible 
with the size of the EF (Offset + Lc > EF size) the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6700 ’. 
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, 
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and 
unrecoverable, the processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ 
or ‘6500 ’. 
— If writing is unsuccessful, the processing state returned 
is ‘6581 ’. 
3.5.3.1.1 C o m m a n d w i t h s e c u r e m e s s a g i n g ( e x a m p l e s )  
This command enables the IFD to write data into the EF currently 
selected, with the card verifying the integrity of data received. As no 
confidentiality is required, the data are not encrypted.  ▼B
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TCS_58  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘0Ch’  Secure Messaging asked  
INS 1  ‘D6h’  Update Binary  
P1 1  ‘XXh’  Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: 
Most Significant Byte  
P2 1  ‘XXh’  Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: 
Least Significant Byte  
Lc 1  ‘XXh’  Length of the secured data field  
#6 1  ‘81h’  T  PV : Tag for plain value data  
#7 L  ‘NNh’ or 
‘81 NNh’  L PV : length of transmitted data. 
L is 2 bytes if L  PV > 127 bytes.  
#(7+L)- 
#(6+L+NN)  NN ‘XX..XXh’  Plain Data value (Data to be written)  
#(7+L+NN)  1  ‘8Eh’  T  CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#(8+L+NN)  1  ‘XXh’  L  CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum‘04h’ 
for Generation 1 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 
Part A) 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for 
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  
#(9+L+NN)- 
#(8+M+L+ 
NN) M ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
Le 1  ‘00h’  As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4  
TCS_59  Response message if correct Secure Messaging input 
format  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1 1  ‘99h’  T  SW : Tag for Status Words (to be protected by CC)  
#2 1  ‘02h’  L  SW : length of returned Status Words  
#3-#4  2  ‘XXXXh’  Processing Status of the unprotected response APDU  
#5 1  ‘8Eh’  T  CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#6 1  ‘XXh’  L  CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum 
‘04h’ for Generation 1 secure messaging (see Appendix 
11 Part A) 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for 
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  
#7-#(6+L)  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
The ‘regular’ processing states, described for the UPDATE 
BINARY command with no secure messaging (see 
§3.5.3.1), can be returned using the response message 
structure described above.  ▼B
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Additionally, some errors specifically related to secure 
messaging can happen. In that case, the processing state 
is simply returned, with no secure messaging structure 
involved:  
TCS_60  Response Message if error in secure messaging  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If no current session key is available, the processing 
state ‘ 6A88 ’ is returned.  
— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are 
missing in the secure messaging format, the processing 
state ‘ 6987 ’ is returned: this error happens if an 
expected tag is missing or if the command body is 
not properly constructed.  
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6988 ’: this error happens if all the required 
tags are present but some lengths are different from the 
ones expected.  
— If the verification of the cryptographic checksum fails, 
the processing state returned is ‘ 6688 ’. 
3.5.3.2 C o m m a n d w i t h s h o r t E F i d e n t i f i e r  
This command variant enables the IFD to select an EF by means of a 
short EF identifier and write data from this EF.  
TCS_61 A tachograph card shall support this command variant for 
all Elementary Files with a specified short EF identifier. 
These short EF identifiers are specified in chapter 4.  
TCS_62  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘D6h’  Update Binary  
P1 1  ‘XXh’  Bit 8 is set to 1 
Bit 7 and 6 are set to 00 
Bit 5 — 1 encode the short EF identifier of the 
corresponding EF  
P2 1  ‘XXh’  Encodes an offset from 0 to 255 bytes in the EF 
referenced by P1  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Lc Length of data to Update. Number of bytes to be 
written.  
#6-#(5+NN)  NN  ‘XX..XXh’  Data to be written  
TCS_63  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
Note:  The short EF identifiers used for the generation 2 
tachograph application are specified in chapter 4.  
If P1 encodes a short EF identifier and the command is 
successful, the identified EF becomes the currently selected 
EF (current EF).  ▼B
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— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the file corresponding with the short EF identifier is 
not found, the processing state returned is ‘ 6A82 ’. 
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not 
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘ 6982 ’. 
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF 
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is 
‘6B00 ’. 
— If the size of the data to be written is not compatible 
with the size of the EF (Offset + Lc > EF size) the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6700 ’. 
▼M1 
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, 
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and 
unrecoverable, the processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ 
or ‘6500 ’. 
▼B 
— If writing is unsuccessful, the processing state returned 
is ‘6581 ’. 
3.5.3.3 C o m m a n d w i t h o d d i n s t r u c t i o n b y t e  
This command variant enables the IFD to write data to an EF with 
32 768 bytes or more.  
TCS_64 A tachograph card which supports EFs with 32 768 bytes 
or more shall support this command variant for these EFs. 
A tachograph card may or may not support this command 
variant for other EFs.  
TCS_65  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘D7h’  Update Binary  
P1 1  ‘00h’  Current EF  
P2 1  ‘00h’  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Lc Length of data in the command data field  
#6-#(5+NN)  NN  ‘XX..XXh’  Offset data object with tag ‘54h’ || Discretionary data 
object with tag ‘53h’ that encapsulates the data to be 
written  
The IFD shall encode the offset data object's and the 
discretionary data object's length with the minimum 
possible number of octets, i.e. using the length byte ‘01h’ 
the IFD shall encode an offset / length from 0 to 255 and 
using the length byte ‘02h’ an offset / length from ‘256’ up 
to ‘65 535’ bytes.  
TCS_66  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  ▼B
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— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is 
‘6986 ’. 
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not 
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘ 6982 ’. 
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF 
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is 
‘6B00 ’. 
— If the size of the data to be written is not compatible 
with the size of the EF (Offset + Lc > EF size) the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6700 ’. 
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, 
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and 
unrecoverable, the processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ 
or ‘6500 ’. 
— If writing is unsuccessful, the processing state returned 
is ‘6581 ’. 
3.5.3.3.1 C o m m a n d w i t h s e c u r e m e s s a g i n g ( e x a m p l e )  
The following example illustrates the usage of secure messaging if the 
security condition SM-MAC-G2 applies.  
TCS_67 Command message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘0Ch’  Secure Messaging asked  
INS 1  ‘D7h’  Update Binary  
P1 1  ‘00h’  Current EF  
P2 1  ‘00h’  
Lc 1  ‘XXh’  Length of the secured data field  
#6 1  ‘B3h’  Tag for plain value data encoded in BER-TLV  
#7 L  ‘NNh’ or 
‘81 NNh’  L PV : length of transmitted data. 
L is 2 bytes if L  PV > 127 bytes.  
#(7+L)- 
#(6+L+NN)  NN ‘XX..XXh’  Plain Data encoded in BER-TLV, i.e. offset data object 
with tag ‘54h’ || Discretionary data object with tag ‘53h’ 
that encapsulates the data to be written  
#(7+L+NN)  1  ‘8Eh’  T  CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#(8+L+NN)  1  ‘XXh’  L  CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for 
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  
#(9+L+NN)- 
#(8+M+L+ 
NN) M ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
Le 1  ‘00h’  As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4  ▼B
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TCS_68 Response message if the command is successful  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1 1  ‘99h’  T  SW : Tag for Status Words (to be protected by CC)  
#2 1  ‘02h’  L  SW : length of returned Status Words  
#3-#4  2  ‘XXXXh’  Processing Status of the unprotected response APDU  
#5 1  ‘8Eh’  T  CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum  
#6 1  ‘XXh’  L  CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum 
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for 
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)  
#7-#(6+L)  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Cryptographic checksum  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
3.5.4  GET CHALLENGE  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted 
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.  
The GET CHALLENGE command asks the card to issue a challenge 
in order to use it in a security related procedure in which a 
cryptogram or some ciphered data are sent to the card.  
TCS_69 The Challenge issued by the card is only valid for the next 
command, which uses a challenge, sent to the card.  
TCS_70  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘84h’  INS  
P1 1  ‘00h’  P1  
P2 1  ‘00h’  P2  
Le 1  ‘08h’  Le (Length of Challenge expected).  
TCS_71  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#8  8  ‘XX..XXh’  Challenge  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If Le is different from ‘08h’, the processing state is 
‘6700 ’. 
— If parameters P1-P2 are incorrect, the processing state is 
‘6A86 ’. ▼B
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3.5.5  VERIFY  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted 
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.  
Only the workshop card is required to support this command.  
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this 
command, but for these cards no reference CHV is personalized. 
Therefore these cards cannot perform this commend successfully. 
For other types of tachograph cards than workshop cards the 
behavior, i.e. the error code returned, is out of the scope of this 
specification, if this command is sent.  
The Verify command initiates the comparison in the card of the CHV 
(PIN) data sent from the command with the reference CHV stored in 
the card.  
▼M1 
TCS_72 The PIN entered by the user must be ASCII encoded and 
right padded with ‘FFh’ bytes up to a length of 8 bytes by 
the IFD, see also the data type WorkshopCardPIN in 
Appendix 1.  
▼B 
TCS_73 The tachograph applications generation 1 and 2 shall use 
the same reference CHV.  
TCS_74 The tachograph card shall check whether the command is 
encoded correctly. If the command is not encoded correctly 
the card shall not compare the CHV values, not decrement 
the remaining CHV attempt counter and not reset the 
security status ‘PIN_Verified’, but abort the command. A 
command is encoded correctly, if the CLA, INS, P1, P2, Lc 
bytes have the specified values, Le is absent, and the 
command data field has the correct length.  
TCS_75 If the command is successful, the remaining CHV attempt 
counter is reinitialised. The initial value of the remaining 
CHV attempt counter is 5. If the command is successful the 
card shall set the internal security status ‘PIN_Verified’. 
The card shall reset this security status, if the card is 
reset or if the CHV code transmitted in the command 
does not match the stored reference CHV.  
Note:  Using the same reference CHV and a global security 
status prevents that a workshop employee must re-enter the 
PIN after a selection of another tachograph application DF.  
TCS_76 An unsuccessful comparison is recorded in the card, i.e. the 
remaining CHV attempts counter shall be decremented by 
one, in order to limit the number of further attempts of the 
use of the reference CHV.  
TCS_77  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘20h’  INS  
P1 1  ‘00h’  P1  ▼B
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Byte  Length  Value  Description  
P2 1  ‘00h’  P2 (the verified CHV is implicitly known)  
Lc 1  ‘08h’  Length of CHV code transmitted  
#6-#13  8  ‘XX..XXh’  CHV  
TCS_78  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the reference CHV is not found, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6A88 ’. 
— If the CHV is blocked, (the remaining attempt counter 
of the CHV is null), the processing state returned is 
‘6983 ’. Once in that state, the CHV can never be 
successfully presented anymore.  
— If the comparison is unsuccessful, the remaining 
attempt Counter is decreased and the status ‘ 63CX ’ is 
returned (X>0 and X equals the remaining CHV 
attempts counter.  
— If the reference CHV is considered corrupted, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6581 ’. 
— If Lc is different from ‘08h’, the processing state is 
‘6700 ’. 
3.5.6  GET RESPONSE  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.  
This command (only necessary and available for T=0 Protocol) is 
used to transmit prepared data from the card to the interface device 
(case where a command had included both Lc and Le).  
The GET RESPONSE command has to be issued immediately after 
the command preparing the data, otherwise, the data are lost. After the 
execution of the GET RESPONSE command (except if the error 
‘61xx ’ or ‘ 6Cxx ’ occur, see below), the previously prepared data 
are no longer available.  
TCS_79  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘C0h’  
P1 1  ‘00h’  
P2 1  ‘00h’  
Le 1  ‘XXh’  Number of bytes expected  ▼B
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TCS_80  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#X  X  ‘XX..XXh’  Data  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If no data have been prepared by the card, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6900 ’ or ‘ 6F00 ’. 
— If Le exceeds the number of available bytes or if Le is 
null, the processing state returned is ‘ 6Cxx ’, where xx 
denotes the exact number of available bytes. In that 
case, the prepared data are still available for a 
subsequent GET RESPONSE command.  
— If Le is not null and is smaller than the number of 
available bytes, the required data are sent normally by 
the card, and the processing state returned is ‘ 61xx ’, 
where ‘xx’ indicates a number of extra bytes still 
available by a subsequent GET RESPONSE command.  
— If the command is not supported (protocol T=1), the 
card returns ‘ 6D00 ’. 
3.5.7  PSO: VERIFY CERTIFICATE  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8, but has a restricted 
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.  
The VERIFY CERTIFICATE command is used by the card to obtain 
a Public Key from the outside and to check its validity.  
3.5.7.1 G e n e r a t i o n 1 C o m m a n d — R e s p o n s e p a i r  
TCS_81 This command variant is only supported by a generation 1 
tachograph application.  
TCS_82 When a VERIFY CERTIFICATE command is successful, 
the Public Key is stored for a future use in the Security 
environment. This key shall be explicitly set for the use in 
security related commands (INTERNAL AUTH ­
ENTICATE, EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE or VERIFY 
CERTIFICATE) by the MSE command (see § 3.5.11) 
using its key identifier.  
TCS_83 In any case, the VERIFY CERTIFICATE command uses 
the public key previously selected by the MSE command to 
open the certificate. This public key must be the one of a 
Member State or of Europe.  
TCS_84  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘2Ah’  Perform Security Operation  
P1 1  ‘00h’  P1  ▼B
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Byte  Length  Value  Description  
P2 1  ‘AEh’  P2: non BER-TLV coded data (concatenation of data 
elements)  
Lc 1  ‘C2h’  Lc: Length of the certificate, 194 bytes  
#6-#199  194  ‘XX..XXh’  Certificate: concatenation of data elements (as described 
in Appendix 11)  
TCS_85  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the certificate verification fails, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6688 ’. The verification and unwrapping 
process of the certificate is described in Appendix 11 
for G1 and G2.  
— If no Public Key is present in the Security 
Environment, ‘ 6A88 ’ is returned.  
— If the selected public key (used to unwrap the 
certificate) is considered corrupted, the processing 
state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6581 ’. 
— Generation 1 only: If the selected public key (used to 
unwrap the certificate) has a CHA.LSB 
(
 ) 
different from ‘00’ (i.e. is not the one of a Member 
State or of Europe), the processing state returned is 
‘6985 ’. 
3.5.7.2 G e n e r a t i o n 2 C o m m a n d — R e s p o n s e p a i r  
Depending on the curve size ECC certificates may be so long that 
they cannot be transmitted in a single APDU. In this case command 
chaining according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 must be applied and the cer ­
tificate transmitted in two consecutive PSO: Verify Certificate 
APDUs.  
The certificate structure and the domain parameters are defined in 
Appendix 11.  
TCS_86 The command can be performed in the MF, DF 
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_33.  
TCS_87  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘X0h’  CLA byte indicating command chaining: 
‘00h’ the only or last command of the chain 
‘10h’ not the last command of a chain  
INS 1  ‘2Ah’  Perform Security Operation  
P1 1  ‘00h’  
P2 1  ‘BEh’  Verify self-descriptive certificate  ▼B
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Byte  Length  Value  Description  
Lc 1  ‘XXh’  Length of the command data field, see TCS_88 and 
TCS_89.  
#6-#5+L  L  ‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded data: ECC Certificate Body data 
object as first data object concatenated with the ECC 
Certificate Signature data object as second data object 
or a part of this concatenation. The tag ‘7F21’ and the 
corresponding length shall not be transmitted. 
The order of these data objects is fixed.  
TCS_88 For short length APDUs the following provisions apply: 
The IFD shall use the minimum number of APDUs 
required to transmit the command payload and transmit 
the maximum number of bytes in the first command 
APDU according to the value of the Information Field 
Size Card Byte, see TCS_14. If the IFD behaves differ ­
ently, the behavior of the card is out of scope.  
TCS_89 For extended length APDUs the following provisions 
apply: If the certificate does not fit into a single APDU, 
the card shall support command chaining. The IFD shall 
use the minimum number of APDUs required to transmit 
the command payload and transmit the maximum number 
of bytes in the first command APDU. If the IFD behaves 
differently, the behavior of the card is out of scope.  
Note:  According to Appendix 11 the card stores the certifi ­
cate or the relevant contents of the certificate and updates 
its currentAuthenticatedTime.  
The response message structure and status words are as 
defined in TCS_85.  
TCS_90 In addition to the error codes listed in TCS_85, the card 
may return the following error codes:  
— If the selected public key (used to unwrap the 
certificate) has a CHA.LSB (CertificateHolderAuthori ­
sation.equipmentType) that is not suitable for the cer ­
tificate verification according to Appendix 11, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6985 ’. 
— If the currentAuthenticatedTime of the card is later than 
the Certificate Expiration Date, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6985 ’. 
— If the last command of the chain is expected, the card 
returns ‘ 6883 ’. 
— If incorrect parameters are sent in the command data 
field, the card returns ‘ 6A80 ’ (also used in case the data 
objects are not sent in the specified order).  ▼B
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3.5.8  INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.  
TCS_91 All tachograph cards shall support this command in the DF 
Tachograph generation 1. The command may or may not 
be accessible in the MF and / or the DF Tachograph_G2. If 
so, the command shall terminate with a suitable error code 
as the private key of the card (Card.SK) for the generation 
1 authentication protocol is only accessible in the 
DF_Tachograph generation 1.  
Using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the 
IFD can authenticate the card. The authentication process 
is described in Appendix 11. It includes the following 
statements:  
TCS_92 The INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command uses the 
card Private Key (implicitly selected) to sign authentication 
data including K1 (first element for session key agreement) 
and RND1, and uses the Public Key currently selected 
(through the last MSE command) to encrypt the signature 
and form the authentication token (more details in 
Appendix 11).  
TCS_93  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  CLA  
INS 1  ‘88h’  INS  
P1 1  ‘00h’  P1  
P2 1  ‘00h’  P2  
Lc 1  ‘10h’  Length of data sent to the card  
#6 — #13  8  ‘XX..XXh’  Challenge used to authenticate the card  
#14 -#21  8  ‘XX..XXh’  VU.CHR (see Appendix 11)  
Le 1  ‘80h’  Length of the data expected from the card  
TCS_94  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#128  128  ‘XX..XXh’  Card authentication token (see Appendix 11)  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If no Public Key is present in the Security 
Environment, the processing state returned is ‘ 6A88 ’. 
— If no Private Key is present in the Security 
Environment, the processing state returned is ‘ 6A88 ’. 
— If VU.CHR does not match the current public key 
identifier, the processing state returned is ‘ 6A88 ’. ▼B
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— If the selected private key is considered corrupted, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6581 ’. 
▼M1 
TCS_95 If the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is 
successful, the current generation 1 session key, if 
existing, is erased and no longer available. In order to 
have a new generation 1 session key available, the 
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command for the 
generation 1 authentication mechanism must be 
successfully performed.  
Note:  For generation 2 session keys see Appendix 11 
CSM_193 and CSM_195. If generation 2 session keys 
are established and the tachograph card receives the plain 
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command APDU, it aborts 
the generation 2 secure messaging session and destroys the 
generation 2 session keys.  
▼B 
3.5.9  EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.  
Using the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the card can 
authenticate the IFD. The authentication process is described in 
Appendix 11 for Tachograph G1 and G2 (VU authentication).  
TCS_96 The command variant for the generation 1 mutual authenti ­
cation mechanism is only supported by a generation 1 
tachograph application.  
▼M1 
TCS_97 The command variant for the second generation VU-card 
mutual authentication can be performed in the MF, DF 
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34. If 
this generation 2 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 
command is successful, the current generation 1 session 
key, if existing, is erased and no longer available.  
Note:  For generation 2 session keys see Appendix 11 
CSM_193 and CSM_195. If generation 2 session keys 
are established and the tachograph card receives the plain 
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command APDU, it aborts 
the generation 2 secure messaging session and destroys the 
generation 2 session keys.  
▼B 
TCS_98  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  CLA  
INS 1  ‘82h’  INS  
P1 1  ‘00h’  Keys and algorithms implicitly known  
P2 1  ‘00h’  
Lc 1  ‘XXh’  Lc (Length of the data sent to the card )  
#6-#(5+L)  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Generation 1 authentication: Cryptogram (see Appendix 
11 Part A) 
Generation 2 authentication: Signature generated by the 
IFD (see Appendix 11 Part B)  ▼B
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TCS_99  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the CHA of the currently set public key is not the 
concatenation of the Tachograph application AID and 
of a VU equipment Type, the processing state returned 
is ‘6F00 ’. 
— If the command is not immediately preceded with a 
GET CHALLENGE command, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6985 ’. 
The Generation 1 Tachograph application may return the 
following additional error codes:  
— If no Public Key is present in the Security 
Environment, ‘ 6A88 ’ is returned.  
— If no Private Key is present in the Security 
Environment, the processing state returned is ‘ 6A88 ’. 
— If the verification of the cryptogram is wrong, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6688 ’. 
— If the selected private key is considered corrupted, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6581 ’. 
The command variant for the Generation 2 authentication 
may return the following additional error code:  
— If signature verification failed, the card returns ‘ 6300 ’. 
3.5.10  GENERAL AUTHENTICATE  
This command is used for the generation 2 chip authentication 
protocol specified in Appendix 11 Part B and is compliant with 
ISO/IEC 7816-4.  
TCS_100 The command can be performed in the MF, DF 
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34.  
TCS_101  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘86h’  
P1 1  ‘00h’  Keys and protocol implicitly known  
P2 1  ‘00h’  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Lc: length of subsequent data field  
#6-#(5+L)  L  ‘7Ch’ + L  7C + 
‘80h’ + L  80 + 
‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded ephemeral public key value (see 
Appendix 11) 
The VU shall send the data objects in this order.  
▼M1 
5 + L + 1  1  ‘00h’  As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4  ▼B
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TCS_102  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#L  L  ‘7Ch’ + L  7C + ‘81h’ 
+ ‘08h’ + ‘XX..XXh’ 
+ ‘82h’ + L  82 + 
‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded Dynamic Authentication 
Data: nonce and authentication token (see 
Appendix 11)  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— The card returns ‘ 6A80 ’ to indicate incorrect parameters 
in data field.  
— The card returns ‘ 6982 ’ if the External Authenticate 
command has not been performed successfully  
The response Dynamic Authentication Data object ‘7Ch’  
— must be present if the operation is successful, i.e. the 
Status Words are ‘ 9000 ’, 
— must be absent in case of an execution error or 
checking error, i.e. if the Status Words are in the 
range ‘ 6400 ’ — ‘ 6FFF ’, and  
— may be absent in case of a warning, i.e. if the Status 
Words are in the range ‘ 6200 ’ — ‘ 63FF ’. 
3.5.11  MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
This command is used to set a public key for authentication purpose.  
3.5.11.1 G e n e r a t i o n 1 C o m m a n d — R e s p o n s e p a i r  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4. The use of this 
command is restricted regarding the related standard.  
TCS_103 This command is only supported by a generation 1 
tachograph application.  
TCS_104 The key referenced in the MSE data field remains the 
current public key until the next correct MSE command, 
a DF is selected or the card is reset.  
TCS_105 If the key referenced is not (already) present into the card, 
the security environment remains unchanged.  
TCS_106  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  CLA  
INS 1  ‘22h’  INS  
P1 1  ‘C1h’  P1: referenced key valid for all cryptographic operations  
P2 1  ‘B6h’  P2 (referenced data concerning Digital Signature)  
Lc 1  ‘0Ah’  Lc: length of subsequent data field  
#6 1  ‘83h’  Tag for referencing a public key in asymmetric cases  ▼B
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Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#7 1  ‘08h’  Length of the key reference (key identifier)  
#8-#15  8  ‘XX..XXh’  Key identifier as specified in Appendix 11  
TCS_107  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the referenced key is not present into the card, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6A88 ’. 
— If some expected data objects are missing in the secure 
messaging format, the processing state ‘ 6987 ’ is 
returned. This can happen if the tag ‘83h’ is missing.  
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6988 ’. This can happen if the length of the 
key identifier is not ‘08h’.  
— If the selected key is considered corrupted, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6581 ’. 
3.5.11.2 G e n e r a t i o n 2 C o m m a n d — R e s p o n s e p a i r s  
For the Generation 2 authentication the tachograph card supports the 
following MSE: Set command versions which are compliant with 
ISO/IEC 7816-4. These command versions are not supported for the 
Generation 1 authentication.  
3.5.11.2.1 M S E : S E T A T f o r C h i p A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  
The following MSE:SET AT command is used to select the 
parameters for the Chip Authentication that is performed by a 
subsequent General Authenticate command.  
TCS_108 The command can be performed in the MF, DF 
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34.  
TCS_109  MSE:SET AT Command Message for Chip Authenti ­
cation  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘22h’  
P1 1  ‘41h’  Set for internal authentication  
P2 1  ‘A4h’  Authentication  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Lc: length of subsequent data field  
#6-#(5+L)  L  ‘80h’ + ‘0Ah’ 
+ ‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded cryptographic mechanism reference: 
Object Identifier of Chip Authentication (value only, Tag 
‘06h’ is omitted). 
See Appendix 1 for the values of object identifiers; the 
byte notation shall be used. See Appendix 11 for 
guidance on how to select one of these object identifiers.  ▼B
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3.5.11.2.2 M S E : S E T A T f o r V U A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  
The following MSE:SET AT command is used to select the 
parameters and keys for the VU Authentication that is performed by 
a subsequent External Authenticate command.  
TCS_110 The command can be performed in the MF, DF 
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34.  
TCS_111  MSE:SET AT Command Message for VU Authenti ­
cation  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘22h’  
P1 1  ‘81h’  Set for external authentication  
P2 1  ‘A4h’  Authentication  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Lc: length of subsequent data field  
#6-#(5+L)  L  ‘80h’ + ‘0Ah’ 
+ ‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded cryptographic mechanism reference: 
Object Identifier of VU Authentication (value only, Tag 
‘06h’ is omitted). 
See Appendix 1 for the values of object identifiers; the 
byte notation shall be used. See Appendix 11 for 
guidance on how to select one of these object identifiers.  
‘83h’ + ‘08h’ 
+ ‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded reference of the VU public key by 
the Certificate Holder Reference mentioned in its certifi ­
cate. 
‘91h’ + L  91 + 
‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded compressed representation of the 
ephemeral public key of the VU that will be used 
during Chip Authentication (see Appendix 11)  
3.5.11.2.3 M S E : S E T D S T  
The following MSE:SET DST command is used to set a public key 
either  
— for the verification of a signature that is provided in a subsequent 
PSO: Verify Digital Signature command or  
— for the signature verification of a certificate that is provided in a 
subsequent PSO: Verify Certificate command  
TCS_112 The command can be performed in the MF, DF 
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_33.  
TCS_113  MSE:SET DST Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  
INS 1  ‘22h’  
P1 1  ‘81h’  Set for verification  
P2 1  ‘B6h’  Digital Signature  ▼B
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Byte  Length  Value  Description  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Lc: length of subsequent data field  
#6-#(5+L)  L  ‘83h’ + ‘08h’ 
+ ‘XX...XXh’  DER-TLV encoded reference of a public key, i.e. the 
Certificate Holder Reference in the certificate of the 
public key (see Appendix 11)  
For all command versions the response message structure and status 
words are given by:  
TCS_114  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
The protocol has been selected and initialised.  
— ‘6A80 ’ indicates incorrect parameters in the command 
data field.  
— ‘6A88 ’ indicates that referenced data (i.e. a referenced 
key) is not available.  
▼M1 
— If the currentAuthenticatedTime of the card is later than 
the Expiration Date of the selected public key, the 
processing state returned is  ‘6A88’.  
Note:  In the case of a MSE: SET AT for VU Auth ­
entication command, the referenced key is a VU_MA 
public key. The card shall set the VU_MA public key for 
use, if available in its memory, which matches the Certifi ­
cate Holder Reference (CHR) given in the command data 
field (the card can identify VU_MA public keys by means 
of the certificate's CHA field). A card shall return ‘6A 88’ 
to this command in case only the VU_Sign public key or 
no public key of the Vehicle Unit is available. See the 
definition of the CHA field in Appendix 11 and of data 
type equipmentType in Appendix 1.  
Similarly, in case an MSE: SET DST command referencing 
an EQT (i.e. a VU or a card) is sent to a control card, 
according to CSM_234 the referenced key is always an 
EQT_Sign key that has to be used for the verification of 
a digital signature. According to Figure 13 in Appendix 11, 
the control card will always have stored the relevant 
EQT_Sign public key. In some cases, the control card 
may have stored the corresponding EQT_MA public key. 
The control card shall always set the EQT_Sign public key 
for use when it receives an MSE: SET DST command.  
▼B 
3.5.12  PSO: HASH  
This command is used to transfer to the card the result of a hash 
calculation on some data. This command is used for the verification of 
digital signatures. The hash value is stored temporarily for the 
subsequent command PSO: Verify Digital Signature  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this 
command is restricted regarding the related standard.  ▼B
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Only the control card is required to support this command in the DF 
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2.  
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this 
command. The command may or may not be accessible in the MF.  
The control card application generation 1 supports only SHA-1.  
TCS_115 The temporarily stored hash value shall be deleted if a new 
hash value is computed by means of the PSO: HASH 
command, if a DF is selected, and if the tachograph card 
is reset.  
TCS_116  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  CLA  
INS 1  ‘2Ah’  Perform Security Operation  
P1 1  ‘90h’  Return Hash code  
P2 1  ‘A0h’  Tag: data field contains DOs relevant for hashing  
Lc 1  ‘XXh’  Length Lc of the subsequent data field  
#6 1  ‘90h’  Tag for the hash code  
#7 1  ‘XXh’  Length L of the hash code: 
‘14h’ in Generation 1 application (see Appendix 11 
Part A) 
‘20h’, ‘30h’ or ‘40h’ in Generation 2 application (see 
Appendix 11 Part B)  
#8-#(7+L)  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Hash code  
TCS_117  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are 
missing, the processing state ‘ 6987 ’ is returned. This 
can happen if one of the tag ‘90h’ is missing.  
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6988 ’. This error happens if the required 
tag is present but with a length different from ‘14h’ for 
SHA-1, ‘20h’ for SHA-256, ‘30h’ for SHA-384, ‘40h’ 
for SHA-512 (Generation 2 application).  
3.5.13  PERFORM HASH of FILE  
This command is not compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. Thus the CLA 
byte of this command indicates that there is a proprietary use of the 
PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION / HASH.  
Only the driver card and the workshop card are required to support 
this command in the DF Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2.  ▼B
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Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this 
command. If a company or control card implements this command, 
the command shall be implemented as specified in this chapter.  
The command may or may not be accessible in the MF. If so, the 
command shall be implemented as specified in this chapter, i.e. shall 
not allow the calculation of a hash value, but terminate with a suitable 
error code.  
TCS_118 The PERFORM HASH of FILE command is used to hash 
the data area of the currently selected transparent EF.  
TCS_119 A tachograph card shall support this command only for the 
EFs that are listed in chapter 4 under the DF_Tachograph 
and DF_Tachograph_G2 with the following exception. A 
tachograph card shall not support the command for the EF 
Sensor_Installation_Data of DF Tachograph_G2..  
TCS_120 The result of the hash operation is stored temporarily in the 
card. It can then be used to get a digital signature of the 
file, using the PSO: COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE 
command.  
▼M1 
TCS_121 The temporarily stored hash of file value shall be deleted if 
a new hash of file value is computed by means of the 
PERFORM HASH of FILE command, if a DF is 
selected, and if the tachograph card is reset.  
▼B 
TCS_122 The Tachograph Generation 1 application shall support 
SHA-1.  
▼M1 
TCS_123 The Tachograph Generation 2 application shall support the 
SHA-2 algorithm (SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512), 
specified by the cipher suite in Appendix 11 Part B for 
the card signature key Card_Sign.  
▼B 
TCS_124  Command Message  
▼M1 
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘80h’  CLA  
INS 1  ‘2Ah’  Perform Security Operation  
P1 1  ‘90h’  Tag: Hash  
P2 1  ‘00h’  Algorithm implicitly known 
For the Tachograph Generation 1 application: SHA-1 
For the Tachograph Generation 2 application: SHA-2 
algorithm (SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512) defined 
by the cipher suite in Appendix 11 Part B for the card 
signature key Card_Sign  
▼B 
TCS_125  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the current EF does not allow this command (EF 
Sensor_Installation_Data in DF Tachograph_G2), the 
processing state ‘ 6985 ’ is returned.  ▼B
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— If the selected EF is considered corrupted (file attributes 
or stored data integrity errors), the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6581 ’. 
— If the selected file is not a transparent file or if there is 
no current EF, the processing state returned is ‘ 6986 ’. 
3.5.14  PSO: COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE  
▼M1 
This command is used to compute the digital signature of previously 
computed hash code (see PERFORM HASH of FILE, §3.5.13).  
Only the driver card and the workshop card are required to support 
this command in the DF Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2.  
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this 
command. In case of the Generation 2 tachograph application, only 
the driver card and the workshop card have a generation 2 signature 
key, other cards are not able to successfully perform the command 
and terminate with a suitable error code.  
The command may or may not be accessible in the MF. If the 
command is not accessible in the MF, it shall terminate with a 
suitable error code.  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this 
command is restricted regarding the related standard.  
▼B 
TCS_126 This command shall not compute a digital signature of 
previously computed hash code with the PSO: HASH 
command.  
TCS_127 The card private key is used to compute the digital 
signature and is implicitly known by the card.  
TCS_128 The Generation 1 tachograph application performs a digital 
signature using a padding method compliant with PKCS1 
(see Appendix 11 for details).  
TCS_129 The Generation 2 tachograph application computes an 
elliptic curve based digital signature (see Appendix 11 for 
details).  
TCS_130  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  CLA  
INS 1  ‘2Ah’  Perform Security Operation  
P1 1  ‘9Eh’  Digital signature to be returned  
P2 1  ‘9Ah’  Tag: data field contains data to be signed. As no data 
field is included, the data are supposed to be already 
present in the card (hash of file)  
Le 1  ‘NNh’  Length of the expected signature  ▼B
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TCS_131  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#L  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Signature of the previously computed hash  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the implicitly selected private key is considered as 
corrupted, the processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or 
‘6581 ’. 
— If the hash which was computed in a previous Perform 
Hash of File command is not available, the processing 
state returned is ‘ 6985 ’. 
3.5.15  PSO: VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE  
This command is used to verify the digital signature, provided as an 
input, whose hash is known to the card. The signature algorithm is 
implicitly known by the card.  
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this 
command is restricted regarding the related standard.  
Only the control card is required to support this command in the DF 
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2.  
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this 
command. The command may or may not be accessible in the MF.  
TCS_132 The VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE command always 
uses the public key selected by the previous Manage 
Security Environment MSE: Set DST command and the 
previous hash code entered by a PSO: HASH command.  
TCS_133  Command Message  
▼M1 
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘00h’  CLA  
INS 1  ‘2Ah’  Perform Security Operation  
P1 1  ‘00h’  
P2 1  ‘A8h’  Tag: data field contains DOs relevant for verification  
Lc 1  ‘XXh’  Length Lc of the subsequent data field  
#6 1  ‘9Eh’  Tag for Digital Signature  
#7 or 
#7-#8  L ‘NNh’ or 
‘81 NNh’  Length of digital signature (L is 2 bytes if the digital 
signature is longer than 127 bytes): 
128 bytes coded in accordance with Appendix 11 Part A 
for Tachograph Generation 1 application. 
Depending on the selected curve for Tachograph 
Generation 2 application (see Appendix 11 Part B).  
#(7+L)- 
#(6+L+NN)  NN ‘XX..XXh’  Digital signature content  ▼B
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TCS_134  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the verification of the signature fails, the processing 
state returned is ‘ 6688 ’. The verification process is 
described in Appendix 11.  
— If no public key is selected, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6A88 ’. 
— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are 
missing, the processing state ‘ 6987 ’ is returned. This 
can happen if one of the required tag is missing.  
— If no hash code is available to process the command (as 
a result of a previous PSO: Hash command), the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6985 ’. 
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state 
returned is ‘ 6988 ’. This can happen if one of the 
required data objects length is incorrect.  
— If the selected public key is considered corrupted, the 
processing state returned is ‘ 6400 ’ or ‘ 6581 ’. 
▼M1 
— If the selected public key (used to verify the digital 
signature) has a CHA.LSB (CertificateHolderAuthori ­
sation.equipmentType) that is not suitable for the 
digital signature verification according to Appendix 
11, the processing state returned is ‘ 6985 ’. 
▼B 
3.5.16  PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE  
This command is used to verify the integrity and authenticity of the 
DSRC message and to decipher the data communicated from a VU to 
a control authority or a workshop over the DSRC link. The card 
derives the encryption key and the MAC key used to secure the 
DSRC message as described in Appendix 11 Part B chapter 13.  
Only the control card and the workshop card are required to support 
this command in the DF Tachograph_G2.  
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this 
command, but shall not have a DSRC master key. Therefore these 
cards cannot perform the command successfully, but terminate with a 
suitable error code.  
The command may or may not be accessible in the MF and / or the 
DF Tachograph. If so, the command shall terminate with a suitable 
error code.  
TCS_135 The DSRC master key is accessible only in the DF Tacho ­
graph_G2, i.e. the control and workshop card shall support 
a successful execution of the command only in the DF 
Tachograph_G2.  ▼B
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TCS_136 The command shall only decrypt the DSRC data and verify 
the cryptographic checksum, but not interpret the input 
data.  
TCS_137 The order of the data objects in the command data field is 
fixed by this specification.  
TCS_138  Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘80h’  Proprietary CLA  
INS 1  ‘2Ah’  Perform Security Operation  
P1 1  ‘80h’  Response data: plain value  
P2 1  ‘B0h’  Command data: plain value encoded in BER-TLV and 
including SM DOs  
Lc 1  ‘NNh’  Length Lc of the subsequent data field  
#6-#(5+L)  L  ‘87h’ + L  87 + 
‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded padding-content indicator byte 
followed by encrypted tachograph payload. For the 
padding-content indicator byte the value ‘00h’ (‘no 
further indication’ according to ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 
Table 52) shall be used. For the encryption mechanism 
see Appendix 11, Part B chapter 13. 
Allowed values for the length L  87 are the multiples of 
the AES block length plus 1 for the padding-content 
indicator byte, i.e. from 17 bytes up to and including 
193 bytes.  
Note:  See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 Table 49 for the SM 
data object with tag ‘87h’.  
‘81h’ + ‘10h’  DER-TLV encoded Control Reference Template for 
Confidentiality nesting the concatenation of the 
following data elements (see Appendix 1 DSRCSecur ­
ityData and Appendix 11 Part B chapter 13): 
— 4 byte time stamp 
— 3 byte counter 
— 8 byte VU serial number 
— 1 byte DSRC master key version  
Note:  See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 Table 49 for the SM 
data object with tag ‘81h’.  
‘8Eh’ + L  8E + 
‘XX..XXh’  DER-TLV encoded MAC over the DSRC message. For 
the MAC algorithm and calculation see Appendix 11, 
Part B chapter 13.  
Note:  See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 Table 49 for the SM 
data object with tag ‘8Eh’.  
▼M1 
5 + L + 1  1  ‘00h’  As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4  ▼B
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TCS_139  Response Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#L  L  ‘XX..XXh’  Absent (in case of an error) or deciphered data (padding 
removed)  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— ‘6A80 ’ indicates incorrect parameters in the command 
data field (also used in case the data objects are not sent 
in the specified order).  
— ‘6A88 ’ indicates that referenced data is not available, 
i.e. the referenced DSRC master key is not available.  
— ‘6900 ’ indicates that the verification of the crypto ­
graphic checksum or the decryption of the data failed.  
▼M1 
— ‘6985 ’ indicates that the 4-byte time stamp provided in 
the command data field is earlier than cardValid ­
ityBegin or later than cardExpiryDate.  
▼B 
4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS STRUCTURE  
This paragraph specifies the file structures of the Tachograph cards for 
storage of accessible data.  
It does not specify card manufacturer dependent internal structures, 
such as e.g. file headers, nor storage and handling of data elements 
needed for internal use only such as
  
,
 ,
  or
  .  
TCS_140 A generation 2 tachograph card shall host the Master File 
MF and a generation 1 and a generation 2 tachograph 
application of the same type (e.g. driver card applications).  
TCS_141 A tachograph card shall support at least the minimum 
number of records specified for the corresponding appli ­
cations and shall not support more records than the 
maximum number of records specified for the 
corresponding applications.  
The maximum and minimum numbers of records are 
specified in this chapter for the different applications.  
For the security conditions used in the access rules 
throughout this chapter please refer to chapter 3.3. In 
general the access mode ‘read’ denotes the READ 
BINARY command with even and if supported odd INS 
byte with the exception of the EF Sensor_Installation_Data 
on the workshop card, see TCS_156 and TCS_160. The 
access mode ‘update’ denotes the Update Binary command 
with even and if supported odd INS byte and the access 
mode ‘select’ the SELECT command.  ▼B
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4.1. Master File MF  
TCS_142 After its personalisation, the master file MF shall have the 
following permanent file structure and file access rules:  
Note:  The short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal 
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in binary.
  
The following abbreviation for the security condition is 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
TCS_143 All EF structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_144 The Master File MF shall have the following data structure:
  
TCS_145 The elementary file EF DIR shall contain the following 
application related data objects: ‘61 08 4F 06 FF 54 41 
43 48 4F 61 08 4F 06 FF 53 4D 52 44 54’  
TCS_146 The elementary file EF ATR/INFO shall be present if the 
tachograph card indicates in its ATR that it supports 
extended length fields. In this case the EF ATR/INFO 
shall contain the extended length information data object 
(DO‘7F66’) as specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 clause 
12.7.1.  
TCS_147 The elementary file EF Extended_Length shall be present if 
the tachograph card indicates in its ATR that it supports 
extended length fields. In this case the EF shall contain the 
following data object: ‘02 01 xx’ where the value ‘xx’ 
indicates whether extended length fields are supported for 
the T = 1 and / or T = 0 protocol.  
The value ‘01’ indicates extended length field support for 
the T = 1 protocol.  ▼B
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The value ‘10’ indicates extended length field support for 
the T = 0 protocol.  
The value ‘11’ indicates extended length field support for 
the T = 1 and the T = 0 protocol.  
4.2. Driver card applications  
4.2.1  Driver card application generation 1  
TCS_148 After its personalisation, the driver card application 
generation 1 shall have the following permanent file 
structure and file access rules:
  
The following abbreviations for the security conditions are 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC2 ALW OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC3 SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
TCS_149 All EF structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_150 The driver card application generation 1 shall have the 
following data structure:  ▼B
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▼B
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▼B
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TCS_151 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table 
above, are the minimum and maximum record number 
values the driver card data structure must use for a 
generation 1 application:
  
4.2.2  Driver card application generation 2  
TCS_152 After its personalisation, the driver card application 
generation 2 shall have the following permanent file 
structure and file access rules.  
Note:  The short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal 
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in binary.
  
The following abbreviation for the security condition is 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
TCS_153 All EF structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_154 The driver card application generation 2 shall have the 
following data structure:  ▼B
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► (1) M1 ▼B
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▼B
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► (1) M1 
TCS_155 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table 
above, are the minimum and maximum record number 
values the driver card data structure must use for a 
generation 2 application:
  
► (1) M1 
4.3. Workshop card applications  
4.3.1  Workshop card application generation 1  
TCS_156 After its personalisation, the workshop card application 
generation 1 shall have the following permanent file 
structure and file access rules:  ▼B
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The following abbreviations for the security conditions are 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC2 ALW OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC3 SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
▼M1 
SC4 For the READ BINARY command with even INS 
byte:  
(SM-C-MAC-G1 AND SM-R-ENC-MAC-G1) OR  
(SM-C-MAC-G2 AND SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2)  
For the READ BINARY command with odd INS 
byte (if supported): NEV  
▼B 
TCS_157 All EF structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_158 The workshop card application generation 1 shall have the 
following data structure:  ▼B
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▼B
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▼B
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TCS_159 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table 
above, are the minimum and maximum record number 
values the workshop card data structure must use for a 
generation 1 application:
  
4.3.2  Workshop card application generation 2  
TCS_160 After its personalisation, the workshop card application 
generation 2 shall have the following permanent file 
structure and file access rules.  
Note:  The short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal 
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in binary.
  ▼B
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The following abbreviations for the security conditions are 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC5 For the Read Binary command with even INS byte: 
SM-C-MAC-G2 AND SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2  
For the Read Binary command with odd INS byte (if 
supported): NEV 
TCS_161 All EFs structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_162 The workshop card application generation 2 shall have the 
following data structure:
  
► (1) (2) M1 ▼B
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► (1) M1 ▼B
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► (1) M1 ▼B
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TCS_163 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table 
above, are the minimum and maximum record number 
values the workshop card data structure must use for a 
generation 2 application:
  
► (1) M1 
4.4. Control card applications  
4.4.1  Control Card application generation 1  
TCS_164 After its personalisation, the control card application 
generation 1 shall have the following permanent file 
structure and file access rules:
  
The following abbreviations for the security conditions are 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC2 ALW OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC3 SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC6 EXT-AUT-G1 OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
TCS_165 All EF structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_166 The control card application generation 1 shall have the 
following data structure:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 249
  
TCS_167 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table 
above, are the minimum and maximum record number 
values the control card data structure must use for a 
generation 1 application:
  
4.4.2  Control card application generation 2  
TCS_168 After its personalisation, the control card application 
generation 2 shall have the following permanent file 
structure and file access rules.  
Note:  The short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal 
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in binary.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 250
  
The following abbreviation for the security condition is 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
TCS_169 All EF structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_170 The control card application generation2 shall have the 
following data structure:
  
TCS_171 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table 
above, are the minimum and maximum record number 
values the control card data structure must use for a 
generation 2 application:  ▼B
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4.5. Company card applications  
4.5.1  Company card application generation 1  
TCS_172 After its personalisation, the company card application 
generation 1 shall have the following permanent file 
structure and file access rules:
  
The following abbreviations for the security conditions are 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC2 ALW OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC3 SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
SC6 EXT-AUT-G1 OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2  
TCS_173 All EF structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_174 The company card application generation 1 shall have the 
following data structure:
  ▼B
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TCS_175 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table 
above, are the minimum and maximum record number 
values the company card data structure must use for a 
generation 1 application:
  
4.5.2  Company card application generation 2  
TCS_176 After its personalisation, the company card application 
generation 2 shall have the following permanent file 
structure and file access rules.  
Note:  The short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal 
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in binary.
  
The following abbreviation for the security condition is 
used in this table:  
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2  
TCS_177 All EF structures shall be transparent.  
TCS_178 The company card application generation 2 shall have the 
following data structure:
  ▼B
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TCS_179 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table 
above, are the minimum and maximum record number 
values the company card data structure must use for a 
generation 2 application:
  ▼B
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Appendix 3  
PICTOGRAMS  
PIC_001 The tachograph may optionally use the following pictograms and 
pictogram combinations (or pictograms and combination similar 
enough to be unambiguously identifiable with these):  
1. BASIC PICTOGRAMS  
People  Actions  Modes of operation
  
Company  Company mode
  
Controller  Control  Control mode
  
Driver  Driving  Operational mode
  
Workshop/test station  Inspection/calibration  Calibration mode
  
Manufacturer  
Activities  Duration
  
Available  Current availability period
  
Driving  Continuous driving time
  
Rest Current rest period
  
Other Work  Current work period
  
Break  Cumulative break time
  
Unknown  
Equipment  Functions
  
Driver slot
  
Co-driver slot
  
Card
  
Clock
  
Display  Displaying
  
External storage  Downloading
  
Power supply
  
Printer/printout  Printing
  
Sensor
  
Tyre size
  
Vehicle/vehicle unit
  
GNSS facility
  
Remote Detection facility
  
ITS interface  ▼B
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Specific conditions
  
Out of scope
  
Ferry/train crossing  
Miscellaneous
  
Events
  Faults
  
Start of daily work period
  End of daily work period
  
Location
  
Manual entry of driver activities
  
Security
  
Speed
  
Time
  
Total/summary  
Qualifiers  
24h Daily
  
Weekly
  
Two weeks
  
From or to  
2. PICTOGRAM COMBINATIONS  
Miscellaneous
  
Control place
  
Location start of daily work period
  Location end of daily work 
period  
▼M1
 
Position after 3 hours accumulated 
driving time  
▼B
 
From time
  To time
 
From vehicle
  
Out of scope begin
  Out of scope end 
Cards
  
Driver card
  
Company card
  
Control card
  
Workshop card
  
No card  ▼B
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Driving
  
Crew driving
  
Driving time for one week
  
Driving time for two weeks  
Printouts
  
Driver activities from card daily printout
  
Driver activities from VU daily printout
  
Events and faults from card printout
  
Events and faults from VU printout
  
Technical data printout
  
Over speeding printout  
Events
  
Insertion of a non valid card
  
Card conflict
  
Time overlap
  
Driving without an appropriate card
  
Card insertion while driving
  
Last card session not correctly closed
  
Over speeding
  
Power supply interruption
  
Motion data error
  
Vehicle motion conflict
  
Security breach  
▼M1
 
Time conflict or time adjustment (by workshop)  
▼B
 
Over speeding control  
▼M1
 
Absence of position information from GNSS receiver or Communication 
error with the external GNSS facility
  
Communication error with the remote communication facility  
▼B 
Faults
  
Card fault (driver slot)
  
Card fault (co-driver slot)
  
Display fault  ▼B
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Downloading fault
  
Printer fault
  
Sensor fault
  
VU internal fault
  
GNSS fault
  
Remote Detection fault  
Manual entries procedure
  
Still same daily work period ?
  
End of previous work period ?
  
Confirm or enter location of end of work period
  
Enter start time
  
Enter location of start of work period.  
Note:  Additional pictogram combinations to form printout blocks or 
record identifiers are defined in Appendix 4.  ▼B
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Appendix 4  
PRINTOUTS  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
1. GENERALITIES  
2. DATA BLOCKS SPECIFICATION  
3. PRINTOUT SPECIFICATIONS  
3.1. Driver Activities from Card Daily Printout  
3.2. Driver Activities from VU Daily Printout  
3.3. Events and Faults from Card Printout  
3.4. Events and Faults from VU Printout  
3.5. Technical data Printout  
3.6. Over speeding Printout  
3.7 History of inserted cards  
1. GENERALITIES  
Each printout is built up by chaining various data blocks, possibly 
identified with a block identifier.  
A data block contains one or more records, possibly identified with a 
record identifier.  
PRT_001 When a block identifier immediately precedes a record ident ­
ifier, the record identifier is not printed.  
PRT_002 In the case where a data item is unknown, or must not be 
printed for data access rights reasons, spaces are printed 
instead.  
PRT_003 If the content of a complete line is unknown, or need not to 
be printed, then the complete line is omitted.  
PRT_004 Numerical data fields are printed right aligned, with a space 
separator for thousands and millions, and without leading 
zeros.  
PRT_005 String data fields are printed left aligned and filled up with 
spaces to data item length, or truncated to data item length 
when needed (names and addresses).  
PRT_006 In case of a line-break due to a long text a special character 
(dot at middle line-height, ‘•’) should be printed as first 
character in the new line.  
2. DATA BLOCKS SPECIFICATION  
In this chapter the following format notation conventions have been 
used:  
— Characters printed in  bold  denote plain text to be printed (printing 
remains in normal characters),  ▼B
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— Normal characters denote variables (pictograms or data) to be 
replaced by their values for printing,  
— Variable names have been padded with underscores to show the data 
item length available for the variable,  
— Dates are specified with a ‘dd/mm/yyyy’ (day, month, year) format. 
A ‘dd.mm.yyyy’ format may also be used,  
— The term ‘card identification’ denotes the composition of: the type 
of card through a card pictograms combination, the card issuing 
Member State code, a forward slash character and the card 
number with the replacement index and the renewal index 
separated with a space: 
P
 x  x  x  / x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x
 Card Pictogram 
combination  
Issuing Member 
State code First 14 characters of card number 
(possibly including a consecutive index)
 
Replacement index  
Renewal index ▼B
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PRT_007 Printouts shall use the following data blocks and/or data records, in 
accordance with the following meanings and formats:
  ▼B
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▼B
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► (1) (2) M1 ▼B
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▼B
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▼B
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▼B
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3. PRINTOUT SPECIFICATIONS  
In this chapter the following notation conventions have been used: 
N Print block or record number N  
N Print block or record number N repeated as many times as necessary  
X/Y Print blocks or records X and/or Y as needed, and repeating as many 
times as necessary.  
3.1. Driver Activities from Card Daily Printout  
PRT_008 The driver activities from card daily printout shall be in 
accordance with the following format: 
1 Date and time at which the document is printed  
2 Type of printout  
3 Controller identification (if a control card is inserted in the VU)  
3 Driver identification (from card subject of the printout + GEN)  
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)  
5 VU identification (VU from which printout is taken + GEN)  
6 Last calibration of this VU  
7 Last control the inspected driver has been subject to  
8 Driver activities delimiter  
8a Out of scope condition in the beginning of this day  
8.1a/8.1b/8.1c/8.2/ 
8.3/8.3a/8.4  Activities of the driver in order of occurrence  
11 Daily summary delimiter  ▼B
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11.4 Places entered in chronological order  
▼M1 
11.5 Positions after 3 hours accumulated driving time in chronological 
order  
▼B 
11.6 Activity totals  
12.1 Events or faults from card delimiter  
12.4 Event/Fault records (Last 5 events or faults stored in the card)  
13.1 Events or faults from VU delimiter  
13.4 Event/Fault records (Last 5 events or faults stored or on-going in the 
VU) 
22.1 Control place  
22.2 Controller's signature  
22.5 Driver's signature  
3.2. Driver Activities from VU Daily Printout  
PRT_009 The driver activities from VU daily printout shall be in 
accordance with the following format:  
▼M1 
1 Date and time at which the document is printed  
2 Type of printout  
3 Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU + 
GEN)  
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)  
5 VU identification (VU from which printout is taken + GEN)  
6 Last calibration of this VU  
7 Last control on this tachograph  
9 Driver activities delimiter  
10 Driver slot delimiter (slot 1)  
10a Out of scope condition in the beginning of this day  
10.1 / 10.2 / 10.3 / 
10.3a / 10.4  Activities in chronological order (driver slot)  
10 Co-driver slot delimiter (slot 2)  
10a Out of scope condition in the beginning of this day  
10.1 / 10.2 / 
10.3 / 10.3a / 10.4  Activities in chronological order (co-driver slot)  
11 Daily summary delimiter  
11.1 Summary of periods without card in driver slot  ▼B
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11.4 Places entered in chronological order  
11.5 Positions after 3 hours accumulated driving time in chro ­
nological order  
11.7 Activity totals  
11.2 Summary of periods without card in co-driver slot  
11.4 Places entered in chronological order  
11.5 Positions after 3 hours accumulated driving time in chro ­
nological order  
11.8 Activity totals  
11.3 Summary of activities for a driver both slots included  
11.4 Places entered by this driver in chronological order  
11.5 Positions after 3 hours accumulated driving time in chro ­
nological order  
11.9 Activity totals for this driver  
13.1 Events faults delimiter  
13.4 Event/Fault records (Last 5 events or faults stored or on- 
going in the VU)  
22.1 Control place  
22.2 Controller’s signature  
22.3 From time (space available for a driver without a card to 
indicate  
22.4 To time which periods are relevant to himself)  
22.5 Driver's signature  
▼B 
3.3. Events and Faults from Card Printout  
PRT_010 The events and faults from card printout shall be in 
accordance with the following format: 
1 Date and time at which the document is printed  
2 Type of printout  
3 Controller identification (if a control card is inserted in the VU + 
GEN)  
3 Driver identification (from card subject of the printout)  
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)  
12.2 Events delimiter  
12.4 Event records (all events stored on the card)  
12.3 Faults delimiter  
12.4 Fault records (all faults stored on the card)  
22.1 Control place  
22.2 Controller's signature  
22.5 Driver's signature  ▼M1
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3.4. Events and Faults from VU Printout  
PRT_011 The events and faults from VU printout shall be in 
accordance with the following format: 
1 Date and time at which the document is printed  
2 Type of printout  
3 Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU + GEN)  
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)  
13.2 Events delimiter  
13.4 Event records (All Events stored or on-going in the VU)  
13.3 Faults delimiter  
13.4 Fault records (All Faults stored or on-going in the VU)  
22.1 Control place  
22.2 Controller's signature  
22.5 Driver's signature  
3.5. Technical data Printout  
PRT_012 The technical data printout shall be in accordance with the 
following format: 
1 Date and time at which the document is printed  
2 Type of printout  
3 Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU + GEN)  
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)  
14 VU identification  
15 Sensor identification  
15.1 Sensor Pairing data (all data available in chronological order)  
16 GNSS identification  
16.1 External GNSS facility coupling data (all data available in chro ­
nological order)  
17 Calibration data delimiter  
17.1 Calibration records (all records available in chronological order)  
18 Time adjustment delimiter  
18.1 Time adjustment records (all records available from time adjustment 
and from calibration data records)  
19 Most recent event and Fault recorded in the VU  ▼B
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3.6. Over speeding Printout  
PRT_013 The over speeding printout shall be in accordance with the 
following format: 
1 Date and time at which the document is printed  
2 Type of printout  
3 Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU + GEN)  
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)  
20 Over speeding control information  
21.1 Over speeding data identifier  
21.4/21.5  First over speeding after the last calibration  
21.2 Over speeding data identifier  
21.4/21.5  The 5 most serious over speeding events over the last 365 days  
21.3 Over speeding data identifier  
21.4/21.5  The most serious over speeding for each of the last 10 days of 
occurrence  
22.1 Control place  
22.2 Controller's signature  
22.5 Driver's signature  
3.7. Historic of inserted cards  
▼M1 
PRT_014 The historic of inserted cards printout shall be in accordance 
with the following format: 
1 Date and time at which the document is printed  
2 Type of printout  
3 Card holder identifications (of all cards inserted in the VU)  
23 Most recent card inserted in the VU  
23.1 Inserted cards (up to 88 records)  
12.3 Faults delimiter  ▼B
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Appendix 5  
DISPLAY  
In this appendix the following format notation conventions have been used:  
— characters printed in  bold  denote plain text to be displayed (display remains 
in normal character),  
— normal characters denote variables (pictograms or data) to be replaced by 
their values for displaying:  
— dd mm yyyy: day, month, year,  
— hh: hours,  
— mm: minutes,  
— D: duration pictogram,  
— EF: event or fault pictograms combination,  
— O: mode of operation pictogram.  
DIS_001 The tachograph shall display data using the following formats:  
Data  Format  
Default display  
Local time
  
Mode of operation
  
Information related to the driver
  
Information related to the co-driver
  
Out of scope condition opened
  
Warning display  
Exceeding continuous driving time
  
Event or fault
  
Other displays  
UTC date
  
time 
Driver's continuous driving time and cumulative break time
  
Co-driver's continuous driving time and cumulative break 
time
 
Driver's cumulated driving time for the previous and the 
current week
  
Co-driver's cumulated driving time for the previous and the 
current week
  ▼B
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Appendix 6  
FRONT CONNECTOR FOR CALIBRATION AND DOWNLOAD  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
1. HARDWARE  
1.1. Connector  
1.2. Contact allocation  
1.3. Block diagram  
2. DOWNLOADING INTERFACE  
3. CALIBRATION INTERFACE  
1. HARDWARE  
1.1. Connector  
INT_001 The downloading/calibration connector shall be a 6 pin 
connector, accessible on the front panel without the need to 
disconnect any part of the tachograph, and shall comply with 
the following drawing (all dimensions in millimetres):
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 273  
The following diagram shows a typical 6 pin mating plug:
  
1.2. Contact allocation  
INT_002 Contacts shall be allocated in accordance with the following 
table:  
Pin Description  Remark  
1 Battery minus  Connected to the battery minus of the vehicle  
2 Data communication  K-line (ISO 14230-1)  
3 RxD — Downloading  Data input to tachograph  
4 Input/output signal  Calibration  ▼B
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Pin Description  Remark  
5 Permanent power output  The voltage range is specified to be that of the vehicle 
power minus 3V to allow for the voltage drop across the 
protective circuitry 
Output 40 mA  
6 TxD — Downloading  Data output from tachograph  
1.3. Block diagram  
INT_003 The block diagram shall comply with the following:
  
2. DOWNLOADING INTERFACE  
INT_004 The downloading interface shall comply to RS232 specifications.  
INT_005 The downloading interface shall use one start bit, 8 data bits 
LSB first, one even parity bit and 1 stop bit.
  
Data byte organisation  
Start bit: one bit with logic level 0;  
Data bits: transmitted with LSB first;  
Parity bit: even parity  
Stop bit: one bit with logic level 1  
When numerical data composed by more than one byte are transmitted, the 
most significant byte is transmitted first and the least significant byte last.  
INT_006 Transmission baud rates shall be adjustable from 9 600 bps to 
115 200 bps. Transmission shall be achieved at the highest 
possible transmission speed, the initial baud rate after a start 
of communication being set at 9 600 bps.  ▼B
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3. CALIBRATION INTERFACE  
INT_007 The data communication shall comply to ISO 14230-1 Road 
vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Keyword protocol 2000 — 
Part 1: Physical layer, First edition: 1999.  
INT_008 The input/output signal shall comply with the following elec ­
trical specification:  
Parameter  Minimum  Typical  Maximum  Remark  
U low (in) 1,0 V  I = 750 μA 
U high (in) 4 V  I = 200 μA 
Frequency  4 kHz  
U low (out)  1,0 V  I = 1 mA  
U high (out)  4 V  I = 1 mA  
INT_009 The input/output signal shall comply with the following timing 
diagrams:
  ▼B
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Appendix 7  
DATA DOWNLOADING PROTOCOLS  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Scope  
1.2. Acronyms and notations  
2. V.U. DATA DOWNLOADING  
2.1. Download procedure  
2.2. Data download protocol  
2.2.1 Message structure  
2.2.2 Message types  
2.2.2.1 Start Communication Request (SID 81)  
2.2.2.2 Positive Response Start Communication (SID C1)  
2.2.2.3 Start Diagnostic Session Request (SID 10)  
2.2.2.4 Positive Response Start Diagnostic (SID 50)  
2.2.2.5 Link Control Service (SID 87)  
2.2.2.6 Link Control Positive Response (SID C7)  
2.2.2.7 Request Upload (SID 35)  
2.2.2.8 Positive Response Request Upload (SID 75)  
2.2.2.9 Transfer Data Request (SID 36)  
2.2.2.10 Positive Response Transfer Data (SID 76)  
2.2.2.11 Request Transfer Exit (SID 37)  
2.2.2.12 Positive Response Request Transfer Exit (SID 77)  
2.2.2.13 Stop Communication Request (SID 82)  
2.2.2.14 Positive Response Stop Communication (SID C2)  
2.2.2.15 Acknowledge Sub Message (SID 83)  
2.2.2.16 Negative Response (SID 7F)  
2.2.3 Message flow  
2.2.4 Timing  ▼B
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2.2.5 Error handling  
2.2.5.1 Start Communication phase  
2.2.5.2 Communication phase  
2.2.6 Response Message content  
2.2.6.1 Positive Response Transfer Data Overview  
2.2.6.2 Positive Response Transfer Data Activities  
2.2.6.3 Positive Response Transfer Data Events and Faults  
2.2.6.4 Positive Response Transfer Data Detailed Speed  
2.2.6.5 Positive Response Transfer Data Technical Data  
2.3. ESM File storage  
3. TACHOGRAPH CARDS DOWNLOADING PROTOCOL  
3.1. Scope  
3.2. Definitions  
3.3. Card Downloading  
3.3.1 Initialisation sequence  
3.3.2 Sequence for un-signed data files  
3.3.3 Sequence for Signed data files  
3.3.4 Sequence for resetting the calibration counter.  
3.4. Data storage format  
3.4.1 Introduction  
3.4.2 File format  
4. DOWNLOADING A TACHOGRAPH CARD VIA A 
VEHICLE UNIT.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
This appendix specifies the procedures to follow in order to perform 
the different types of data download to an External Storage Medium, 
together with the protocols that must be implemented to assure the 
correct data transfer and the full compatibility of the downloaded 
data format to allow any controller to inspect these data and be able 
to control their authenticity and their integrity before analysing them.  
▼M1 
1.1. Scope  
Data may be downloaded to an ESM:  
— from a Vehicle Unit by an Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE) 
connected to the VU,  
— from a tachograph card by an IDE fitted with a card interface 
device (IFD),  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 278  
— from a tachograph card via a vehicle unit by an IDE connected to 
the VU.  
To give the possibility to verify the authenticity and integrity of down ­
loaded data stored on an ESM, data is downloaded with a signature 
appended in accordance with Appendix 11 Common Security Mech ­
anisms. The source equipment (VU or card) identification and its 
security certificates (Member state and equipment) are also down ­
loaded. The verifier of the data must possess independently a trusted 
European public key.  
Data downloaded from a VU are signed using Appendix 11 Common 
Security Mechanisms Part B (Second-generation tachograph system), 
except when drivers' control is performed by a non EU control auth ­
ority, using a first generation control card, in which case data are 
signed using Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms Part A 
(First-generation tachograph system), as requested by Appendix 15 
Migration, requirement MIG_015.  
This Appendix specifies therefore two types of data downloads from 
the VU:  
— Generation 2 type of VU data download, providing the generation 2 
data structure, signed using Appendix 11 Common Security Mech ­
anisms Part B,  
— Generation 1 type of VU data download, providing the generation 1 
data structure, signed using Appendix 11 Common Security Mech ­
anisms Part A.  
Similarly, there are two types of data downloads from second 
generation driver cards inserted in a VU, as specified in paragraphs 
3 and 4 of this Appendix.  
▼B 
1.2. Acronyms and notations  
The following acronyms are used in this appendix:  
AID Application Identifier  
ATR  Answer To Reset  
CS Checksum byte  
DF Dedicated File  
DS_ Diagnostic Session  
EF Elementary File  
ESM  External Storage Medium  
FID File Identifier (File ID)  
FMT  Format Byte (first byte of message header)  
ICC Integrated Circuit Card  
IDE Intelligent Dedicated Equipment: The equipment used to 
perform data downloading to the ESM (e.g. Personal 
Computer)  
IFD Interface Device  
KWP  Keyword Protocol 2000  
LEN  Length Byte (last byte of message header)  
PPS Protocol Parameter Selection  
PSO  Perform Security Operation  
SID Service Identifier  
SRC  Source byte  
TGT  Target Byte  ▼M1
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TLV  Tag Length Value  
TREP  Transfer Response Parameter  
TRTP  Transfer Request Parameter  
VU Vehicle Unit  
2. V.U. DATA DOWNLOADING  
2.1. Download procedure  
In order to carry on a VU data download, the operator must perform 
the following operations:  
— Insert his tachograph card inside a card slot of the VU (*);  
— Connect the IDE to the VU download connector;  
— Establish the connection between the IDE and the VU;  
— Select on the IDE the data to download and send the request to the 
VU; 
— Close the download session.  
2.2. Data download protocol  
The protocol is structured on a master-slave basis, with the IDE playing 
the master role and the VU playing the slave role.  
The message structure, types and flow are principally based on the 
Keyword Protocol 2000 (KWP) (ISO 14230-2 Road vehicles — Diag ­
nostic systems — Keyword protocol 2000 — Part2: Data link layer).  
The application layer is principally based on the current draft to date of 
ISO 14229-1 (Road vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Part 1: Diag ­
nostic services, version 6 of 22 February 2001).  
2.2.1  Message structure  
DDP_002 All the messages exchanged between the IDE and the VU 
are formatted with a structure consisting of three parts:  
— Header composed by a Format byte (FMT), a Target 
byte (TGT), a Source byte (SRC) and possibly a 
Length byte (LEN),  
— Data field composed by a Service Identifier byte (SID) 
and a variable number of data bytes, which can include 
an optional diagnostic session byte (DS_) or an optional 
transfer parameter byte (TRTP or TREP).  
— Checksum composed by a Checksum byte (CS).  
Header  Data field  Checksum  
FMT  TGT  SRC  LEN  SID  DATA  …  …  …  CS  
4 bytes  Max 255 bytes  1 byte  
The TGT and SRC byte represent the physical address of 
the recipient and originator of the message. Values are F0 
Hex for the IDE and EE Hex for the VU.  
The LEN byte is the length of the Data field part.  ▼B 
(*) The card inserted will trigger the appropriate access rights to the downloading function 
and to the data. It shall, however, be possible to download data from a driver card 
inserted into one of the VU slots when no other card type is inserted in the other slot.
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 280  
The Checksum byte is the 8 bit sum series modulo 256 of 
all the bytes of the message excluding the CS itself.  
FMT, SID, DS_, TRTP and TREP bytes are defined later in 
this document.  
DDP_003 In the case where the data to be carried by the message is 
longer than the space available in the data field part, the 
message is actually sent in several sub messages. Each sub 
message bears a header, the same SID, TREP and a 2-byte 
sub message counter indicating the sub message number 
within the total message. To enable error checking and 
abort the IDE acknowledges every sub message. The IDE 
can accept the sub message, ask for it to be re-transmitted, 
request the VU to start again or abort the transmission.  
DDP_004 If the last sub message contains exactly 255 bytes in the 
data field, a final sub message with an empty (except SID 
TREP and sub message counter) data field must be 
appended to show the end of the message.  
Example:  
Header  SID  TREP  Message  CS  
4 Bytes  Longer than 255 Bytes  
Will be transmitted as:  
Header  SID  TREP  00  01  Sub message 1  CS  
4 Bytes  255 Bytes  
Header  SID  TREP  00  02  Sub message 2  CS  
4 Bytes  255 Bytes  
… 
Header  SID  TREP  xx  yy  Sub message n  CS  
4 Bytes  Less than 255 Bytes  
or as:  
Header  SID  TREP  00  01  Sub message 1  CS  
4 Bytes  255 Bytes  
Header  SID  TREP  00  02  Sub message 2  CS  
4 Bytes  255 Bytes  
… 
Header  SID  TREP  xx  yy  Sub message n  CS  
4 Bytes  255 Bytes  
Header  SID  TREP  xx  yy + 1  CS  
4 Bytes  4 bytes  ▼B
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2.2.2 Message types 
The communication protocol for data download between the VU and 
the IDE requires the exchange of 8 different message types.  
The following table summarises these messages.  
▼M1 
Message Structure  Max 4 Bytes Header Max 255 Bytes Data 1 Byte 
Check­
Sum 
IDE -> <- VU FMT TGT SRC LEN SID DS_ / TRTP DATA CS  
Start Communication Request  81 EE F0 81 E0 
Positive Response Start 
Communication  80 F0 EE 03 C1 EA, 8F 9B 
Start Diagnostic Session 
Request 80 EE F0 02 10 81 F1 
Positive Response Start 
Diagnostic  80 F0 EE 02 50 81 31 
Link Control Service  
Verify Baud Rate (stage 1)  
9 600 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01,01,01 EC 
19 200 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01,01,02 ED 
38 400 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01,01,03 EE 
57 600 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01,01,04 EF 
115 200 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01,01,05 F0 
Positive Response Verify Baud 
Rate 80 F0 EE 02 C7 01 28 
Transition Baud Rate (stage 2)  80 EE F0 03 87 02,03 ED 
Request Upload  80 EE F0 0A 35 00,00,00,00, 
00,FF,FF, 
FF,FF  99 
Positive Response Request 
Upload 80 F0 EE 03 75 00,FF D5 
Transfer Data Request  
Overview 80 EE F0 02 36 01 or 21 97 
Activities  80 EE F0 06 36 02 or 22 Date  CS 
Events & Faults  80 EE F0 02 36 03 or 23 Date 99 
Detailed Speed  80 EE F0 02 36 04 or 24 Date 9 A 
Technical Data  80 EE F0 02 36 05 or 25 Date 9B 
Card download 80 EE F0 02 36 06 Slot CS 
Positive Response Transfer 
Data 80 F0 EE Len 76 TREP Data CS 
Request Transfer Exit 80 EE F0 01 37 96 
Positive Response Request 
Transfer Exit  80 F0 EE 01 77 D6  ▼B
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Message Structure  Max 4 Bytes Header  Max 255 Bytes Data  1 Byte 
Check­
Sum 
IDE ->  <- VU  FMT  TGT  SRC  LEN  SID  DS_ / TRTP  DATA  CS  
Stop Communication Request  80  EE  F0  01  82  E1  
Positive Response Stop 
Communication  80 F0  EE  01  C2  21  
Acknowledge sub message  80  EE  F0  Len  83  Data  CS  
Negative responses  
General reject  80  F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  10  CS  
Service not supported  80  F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  11  CS  
Sub function not supported  80  F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  12  CS  
Incorrect Message Length  80  F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  13  CS  
Conditions not correct or 
Request sequence error  80 F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  22  CS  
Request out of range  80  F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  31  CS  
Upload not accepted  80  F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  50  CS  
Response pending  80  F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  78  CS  
Data not available  80  F0  EE  03  7F  Sid Req  FA  CS  
▼B 
Notes:  
▼M1 
— TRTP 21 to 25 are used for Generation 2 type of VU data 
download requests, TRTP 01 to 05 are used for Generation 1 
type of VU data download requests, which can only be accepted 
by the VU in the frame of drivers' control performed by a non EU 
control authority, using a first generation control card.  
— TRTP 11 to 19 and 31 to 39 are reserved for manufacturer specific 
download requests.  
▼B 
— Sid Req = the Sid of the corresponding request.  
— TREP = the TRTP of the corresponding request.  
— Dark cells denote that nothing is transmitted.  
— The term upload (as seen from the IDE) is used for compatibility 
with ISO 14229. It means the same as download (as seen from the 
VU).  
— Potential 2-byte sub message counters are not shown in this table.  
— Slot is the slot number, either “1” (card on driver slot) or “2” (card 
on co-driver slot)  
— In case the slot is not specified, the VU shall select slot 1 if a card 
is inserted in this slot and it shall select slot 2 only in case it is 
specifically selected by the user.  
2.2.2.1 S t a r t C o m m u n i c a t i o n R e q u e s t ( S I D 8 1 )  
DDP_005 This message is issued by the IDE to establish the 
communication link with the VU. Initial communications 
are always performed at 9 600 baud (until baud rate is 
eventually changed using the appropriate Link control 
services).  ▼M1
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2.2.2.2 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e S t a r t C o m m u n i c a t i o n ( S I D C 1 )  
DDP_006 This message is issued by the VU to answer positively to a 
start communication request. It includes the 2 key bytes 
‘EA’ ‘8F’ indicating that the unit supports protocol with 
header including target source and length information.  
2.2.2.3 S t a r t D i a g n o s t i c S e s s i o n R e q u e s t ( S I D 1 0 )  
DDP_007 The Start Diagnostic Session request message is issued by 
the IDE in order to request a new diagnostic session with 
the VU. The sub function ‘default session’ (81 Hex) 
indicates a standard diagnostic session is to be opened.  
2.2.2.4 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e S t a r t D i a g n o s t i c ( S I D 5 0 )  
DDP_008 The Positive Response Start Diagnostic message is sent by 
the VU to answer positively to Diagnostic Session Request.  
2.2.2.5 L i n k C o n t r o l S e r v i c e ( S I D 8 7 )  
DDP_052 The Link Control Service is used by the IDE to initiate a 
change in baud rate. This takes place in two steps. In step 
one the IDE proposes the baud rate change, indicating the 
new rate. On receipt of a positive message from the VU the 
IDE sends out confirmation of the baud rate change to the 
VU (step two). The IDE then changes to the new baud rate. 
After receipt of the confirmation the VU changes to the new 
baud rate  
2.2.2.6 L i n k C o n t r o l P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e ( S I D C 7 )  
DDP_053 The Link Control Positive Response is issued by the VU to 
answer positively to Link Control Service request (step one). 
Note that no response is given to the confirmation request 
(step two).  
2.2.2.7 R e q u e s t U p l o a d ( S I D 3 5 )  
DDP_009 The Request Upload message is issued by the IDE to 
specify to the VU that a download operation is requested. 
To meet the requirements of ISO14229 data is included 
covering address, the size and format details for the data 
requested. As these are not known to the IDE prior to a 
download, the memory address is set to 0, format is 
unencrypted and uncompressed and the memory size is set 
to the maximum.  
2.2.2.8 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e R e q u e s t U p l o a d ( S I D 7 5 )  
DDP_010 The Positive Response Request Upload message is sent by 
the VU to indicate to the IDE that the VU is ready to 
download data. To meet the requirements of ISO 14229 
data is included in this positive response message, indicating 
to the IDE that further Positive Response Transfer Data 
messages will include 00FF hex bytes maximum.  ▼B
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2.2.2.9 T r a n s f e r D a t a R e q u e s t ( S I D 3 6 )  
▼M1 
DDP_011 The Transfer Data Request is sent by the IDE to specify to 
the VU the type of data that are to be downloaded. A one 
byte Transfer Request Parameter (TRTP) indicates the type 
of transfer.  
There are six types of data transfer. For VU data download, 
two different TRTP values can be used for each transfer 
type:  
Data transfer type  TRTP value for 
generation 1 type of 
VU data download  TRTP value for 
generation 2 type of 
VU data download  
Overview  01  21  
Activities of a 
specified date  02 22  
Events and faults  03  23  
Detailed speed  04  24  
Technical data  05  25  
Data transfer 
type TRTP value  
Card download  06  
DDP_054 It is mandatory for the IDE to request the overview data 
transfer (TRTP 01 or 21) during a download session as this 
only will ensure that the VU certificates are recorded within 
the downloaded file (and allow for verification of digital 
signature).  
In the second case (TRTP 02 or 22) the Transfer Data 
Request message includes the indication of the calendar 
day (
  format) to be downloaded.  
▼B 
2.2.2.10 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a ( S I D 7 6 )  
DDP_012 The Positive Response Transfer Data is sent by the VU in 
response to the Transfer Data Request. The message 
contains the requested data, with a Transfer Response 
Parameter (TREP) corresponding to the TRTP of the 
request.  
▼M1 
DDP_055 In the first case (TREP 01 or 21), the VU will send data 
helping the IDE operator to choose the data he wants to 
download further. The information contained within this 
message is:  
— Security certificates,  ▼B
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— Vehicle identification,  
— VU current date and time,  
— Min and Max downloadable date (VU data),  
— Indication of cards presence in the VU,  
— Previous download to a company,  
— Company locks,  
— Previous controls.  
▼B 
2.2.2.11 R e q u e s t T r a n s f e r E x i t ( S I D 3 7 )  
DDP_013 The Request Transfer Exit message is sent by the IDE to 
inform the VU that the download session is terminated.  
2.2.2.12 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e R e q u e s t T r a n s f e r E x i t ( S I D 7 7 )  
DDP_014 The Positive Response Request Transfer Exit message is 
sent by the VU to acknowledge the Request Transfer Exit.  
2.2.2.13 S t o p C o m m u n i c a t i o n R e q u e s t ( S I D 8 2 )  
DDP_015 The Stop Communication Request message is sent by the 
IDE to disconnect the communication link with the VU.  
2.2.2.14 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e S t o p C o m m u n i c a t i o n ( S I D C 2 )  
DDP_016 The Positive Response Stop Communication message is sent 
by the VU to acknowledge the Stop Communication 
Request.  
2.2.2.15 A c k n o w l e d g e S u b M e s s a g e ( S I D 8 3 )  
DDP_017 The Acknowledge Sub Message is sent by the IDE to 
confirm receipt of each part of a message that is being 
transmitted as several sub messages. The data field 
contains the SID received from the VU and a 2-byte code 
as follows:  
— MsgC+1 Acknowledges correct receipt of sub message 
number MsgC.  
Request from the IDE to the VU to send next sub 
message  
— MsgC indicates a problem with the receipt of sub 
message number MsgC.  
Request from the IDE to the VU to send the sub 
message again.  
— FFFF requests termination of the message.  
This can be used by the IDE to end the transmission of 
the VU message for any reason.  
The last sub message of a message (LEN byte < 255) may 
be acknowledged using any of these codes or not acknowl ­
edged.  
The VU responses that will consist of several sub messages 
are: 
— Positive Response Transfer Data (SID 76)  ▼M1
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2.2.2.16 N e g a t i v e R e s p o n s e ( S I D 7 F )  
DDP_018 The Negative Response message is sent by the VU in 
response to the above request messages when the VU 
cannot satisfy the request. The data fields of the message 
contains the SID of the response (7F), the SID of the 
request, and a code specifying the reason of the negative 
response. The following codes are available:  
— 10 general reject  
The action cannot be performed for a reason not covered 
below.  
— 11 service not supported  
The SID of the request is not understood.  
— 12 sub function not supported  
The DS_ or TRTP of the request is not understood, or 
there are no further sub messages to be transmitted.  
— 13 incorrect message length  
The length of the received message is wrong.  
— 22 conditions not correct or request sequence error  
The required service is not active or the sequence of 
request messages is not correct.  
— 31 Request out of range  
The request parameter record (data field) is not valid.  
— 50 upload not accepted  
The request cannot be performed (VU in a non appro ­
priate mode of operation or internal fault of the VU).  
— 78 response pending  
The action requested cannot be completed in time and 
the VU is not ready to accept another request.  
▼M1 
— FA data not available  
The data object of a data transfer request are not 
available in the VU (e.g. no card is inserted, generation 
1 type of VU data download requested outside the frame 
of a driver’s control by a non EU control authority…).  
▼B 
2.2.3  Message flow  
A typical message flow during a normal data download procedure is 
the following:  
IDE VU  
Start Communication Request  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response  
Start Diagnostic Service Request  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response  
Request Upload  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response  ▼B
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IDE VU  
Transfer Data Request Overview  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response  
Transfer Data Request #2  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response #1  
Acknowledge Sub Message #1  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response #2  
Acknowledge Sub Message #2  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response #m  
Acknowledge Sub Message #m  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response (Data Field < 255 Bytes)  
Acknowledge Sub Message (optional)  ⇨  
… 
Transfer Data Request #n  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response  
Request Transfer Exit  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response  
Stop Communication Request  ⇨ 
⇦  Positive Response  
2.2.4  Timing  
DDP_019 During normal operation the timing parameters shown in the 
following figure are relevant:  
Figure 1  
Message flow, timing
  
Where:  
P1 = Inter byte time for VU response.  
P2 = Time between end of IDE request and start of VU 
response, or between end of IDE acknowledge and 
start of next VU response.  
P3 = Time between end of VU response and start of new 
IDE request, or between end of VU response and start 
of IDE acknowledge, or between end of IDE request 
and start of new IDE request if VU fails to respond.  
P4 = Inter byte time for IDE request.  
P5 = Extended value of P3 for card downloading.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 288  
The allowed values for the timing parameters are showed in 
the following table (KWP extended timing parameters set, 
used in case of physical addressing for faster communi ­
cation).  
Timing Parameter  Lower limit 
Value (ms)  Upper limit 
Value (ms)  
P1 0  20  
P2 20  1 000 (*)  
P3 10  5 000  
P4 5  20  
P5 10  20 minutes  
(*) If the VU responds with a Negative Response containing a code meaning ‘request correctly received, 
response pending’, this value is extended to the same upper limit value of P3.  
2.2.5  Error handling  
If an error occurs during the message exchange, the message flow 
scheme is modified depending on which equipment has detected the 
error and on the message generating the error.  
In figure 2 and figure 3 the error handling procedures for the VU and 
the IDE are respectively shown.  
2.2.5.1 S t a r t C o m m u n i c a t i o n p h a s e  
DDP_020 If the IDE detects an error during the Start Communication 
phase, either by timing or by the bit stream, then it will wait 
for a period P3 min before issuing again the request.  
DDP_021 If the VU detects an error in the sequence coming from the 
IDE, it shall send no response and wait for another Start 
Communication Request message within a period P3 max.  
2.2.5.2 C o m m u n i c a t i o n p h a s e  
Two different error handling areas can be defined:  
1. The VU detects an IDE transmission error.  
DDP_022 For every received message the VU shall detect timing 
errors, byte format errors (e.g. start and stop bit viol ­
ations) and frame errors (wrong number of bytes 
received, wrong checksum byte).  
DDP_023 If the VU detects one of the above errors, then it sends 
no response and ignores the message received.  
DDP_024 The VU may detect other errors in the format or content 
of the received message (e.g. message not supported) 
even if the message satisfies the length and checksum 
requirements; in such a case, the VU shall respond to 
the IDE with a Negative Response message specifying 
the nature of the error.  ▼B
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Figure 2  
VU error handling
  
2. The IDE detects a VU transmission error.  
DDP_025 For every received message the IDE shall detect timing 
errors, byte format errors (e.g. start and stop bit viol ­
ations) and frame errors (wrong number of bytes 
received, wrong checksum byte).  
DDP_026 The IDE shall detect sequence errors, e.g. incorrect sub 
message counter increments in successive received 
messages.  
DDP_027 If the IDE detects an error or there was no response from 
the VU within a P2 max period, the request message will 
be sent again for a maximum of three transmissions in 
total. For the purposes of this error detection a sub 
message acknowledge will be considered as a request to 
the VU.  ▼B
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DDP_028 The IDE shall wait at least for a period of P3 min before 
beginning each transmission; the wait period shall be 
measured from the last calculated occurrence of a stop 
bit after the error was detected.  
Figure 3  
IDE error handling
  
2.2.6  Response Message content  
This paragraph specifies the content of the data fields of the various 
positive response messages.  
Data elements are defined in Appendix 1 data dictionary.  
Remark: For generation 2 downloads, each top-level data element is 
represented by a record array, even if it contains only one record. A 
record array starts with a header; this header contains the record type, 
the record size and the number of records. Record arrays are named by 
‘…RecordArray’ (with header) in the following tables.  
2.2.6.1 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a O v e r v i e w  
DDP_029  ►M1 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer 
Data Overview’ message shall provide the following data 
in the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 01 
or 21 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and 
counting: ◄ ▼B
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Data structure generation 1 (TREP 01 Hex)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
VU Security certificates
  
Vehicle identification
  
VU current date and time
  
Downloadable period
  
Type of cards inserted in the VU
  
Previous VU download
  
All company locks stored. If the section is 
empty, only noOfLocks = 0 is sent.
  
All control records stored in the VU. If the 
section is empty, only noOfControls = 0 is sent
  
RSA signature of all data (except certificates) 
starting from VehicleIdentificationNumber down 
to last byte of last VuControlActivityData.  
▼M1 
Data structure generation 2 (TREP 21 Hex)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
Member state certificate
  
VU certificate
  
Vehicle identification
  
Vehicle registration number
  
VU current date and time
  
Downloadable period
  
Type of cards inserted in the VU
  
Previous VU download
  
All company locks stored. If the section is 
empty, an array header with noOfRecords = 0 
is sent
  
All control records stored in the VU. If the 
section is empty, an array header with noOf ­
Records = 0 is sent
  
ECC signature of all preceding data except the 
certificates.  
2.2.6.2 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a A c t i v i t i e s  
DDP_030  ►M1 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer 
Data Activities’ message shall provide the following data 
in the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 
02 or 22 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and 
counting: ◄ ▼M1
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Data structure generation 1 (TREP 02 Hex)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
Date of day downloaded
  
Odometer at end of downloaded day
  
Cards insertion withdrawal cycles data. 
— If this section contains no available data, only noOf ­
VuCardIWRecords = 0 is sent. 
— When a VuCardIWRecord lies across 00:00 (card 
insertion on previous day) or across 24:00 (card 
withdrawal the following day) it shall appear in 
full within the two days involved.
  
Slots status at 00:00 and activity changes recorded for 
the day downloaded.
  
Places related data recorded for the day downloaded. If the 
section is empty, only noOfPlaceRecords = 0 is sent.
  
Specific conditions data recorded for the day down ­
loaded. If the section is empty, only noOfSpecificCon ­
ditionRecords=0 is sent
  
RSA signature of all data starting from TimeReal down 
to last byte of last specific condition record.  
▼M1 
Data structure generation 2 (TREP 22 Hex)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
Date of day downloaded
  
Odometer at end of downloaded day
  
Cards insertion withdrawal cycles data. 
— If this section contains no available data, an array 
header with noOfRecords = 0 is sent. 
— When a VuCardIWRecord lies across 00:00 (card 
insertion on previous day) or across 24:00 (card 
withdrawal the following day) it shall appear in 
full within the two days involved.
  
Slots status at 00:00 and activity changes recorded for 
the day downloaded.
  
Places related data recorded for the day downloaded. If 
the section is empty, an array header with noOfRecords 
= 0 is sent.  
▼M1
 
GNSS positions of the vehicle when the accumulated 
driving time of the vehicle reaches a multiple of three 
hours. If the section is empty, an array header with 
noOfRecords = 0 is sent.  ▼M1
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Data element  Comment
  
Specific conditions data recorded for the day down ­
loaded. If the section is empty, an array header with 
noOfRecords =0 is sent
  
ECC signature of all preceding data.  
2.2.6.3 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a E v e n t s a n d F a u l t s  
DDP_031  ►M1 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer 
Data Events and Faults’ message shall provide the 
following data in the following order under the SID 76 
Hex, the TREP 03 or 23 Hex and appropriate sub 
message splitting and counting: ◄ 
▼M1 
Data structure generation 1 (TREP 03 Hex)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
All faults stored or on-going in the VU. 
If the section is empty, only noOfVuFaults = 0 is 
sent.
 
All events (except over speeding) stored or on- 
going in the VU. 
If the section is empty, only noOfVuEvents = 0 
is sent.
  
Data related to last over speeding control (default 
value if no data).
  
All over speeding events stored in the VU. 
If the section is empty, only noOfVuOverSpeed ­
ingEvents = 0 is sent.
  
All time adjustment events stored in the VU 
(outside the frame of a full calibration). 
If the section is empty, only noOfVuTimeAdj ­
Records = 0 is sent.
  
RSA signature of all data starting from noOfVu ­
Faults down to last byte of last time adjustment 
record  
▼M1 
Data structure generation 2 (TREP 23 Hex)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
All faults stored or on-going in the VU. 
If the section is empty, an array header with 
noOfRecords = 0 is sent.
  
All events (except over speeding) stored or on- 
going in the VU. 
If the section is empty, an array header with 
noOfRecords = 0 is sent.
  
Data related to last over speeding control (default 
value if no data).
  
All over speeding events stored in the VU. 
If the section is empty, an array header with 
noOfRecords = 0 is sent.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 294  
Data element  Comment
  
All time adjustment events stored in the VU 
(outside the frame of a full calibration). 
If the section is empty, an array header with 
noOfRecords = 0 is sent.  
▼M1 __________  
▼B
 
ECC signature of all preceding data.  
2.2.6.4 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a D e t a i l e d S p e e d  
DDP_032  ►M1 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer 
Data Detailed Speed’ message shall provide the following 
data in the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 
04 or 24 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and 
counting: ◄ 
▼M1 
Data structure generation 1 (TREP 04)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
All detailed speed stored in the VU (one speed 
block per minute during which the vehicle has 
been moving) 
60 speed values per minute (one per second).
  
RSA signature of all data starting from noOf ­
SpeedBlocks down to last byte of last speed 
block.  
▼M1 
Data structure generation 2 (TREP 24)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
All detailed speed stored in the VU (one speed 
block per minute during which the vehicle has 
been moving) 
60 speed values per minute (one per second).
  
ECC signature of all preceding data.  
2.2.6.5 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a T e c h n i c a l D a t a  
DDP_033  ►M1 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer 
Data Technical Data’ message shall provide the following 
data in the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 
05 or 25 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and 
counting: ◄ ▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 295  
Data structure generation 1 (TREP 05)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
All calibration records stored in the VU.
  
RSA signature of all data starting from vuManu ­
facturerName down to last byte of last VuCali ­
brationRecord.  
▼M1 
Data structure generation 2 (TREP 25)  
▼B 
Data element  Comment
  
All MS pairings stored in the VU
  
All external GNSS facility couplings stored in 
the VU
  
All calibration records stored in the VU.
  
All card insertion data stored in the VU.
  
ECC signature of all preceding data.  
2.3. ESM File storage  
DDP_034 When a download session has included a VU data transfer, 
the IDE shall store within one single physical file all data 
received from the VU during the download session within 
Positive Response Transfer Data messages. Data stored 
excludes message headers, sub-message counters, empty 
sub-messages and checksums but include the SID and 
TREP (of the first sub-message only if several sub-mess ­
ages).  
3. TACHOGRAPH CARDS DOWNLOADING PROTOCOL  
3.1. Scope 
This paragraph describes the direct card data downloading of a 
tachograph card to an IDE. The IDE is not part of the secure 
environment; therefore no authentication between the card and the 
IDE is performed.  
3.2. Definitions  
Download session : Each time a download of the ICC data is 
performed. The session covers the complete 
procedure from the reset of the ICC by an 
IFD until the deactivation of the ICC 
(withdraw of the card or next reset).  ▼M1
02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 296  
Signed Data File : A file from the ICC. The file is transferred to 
the IFD in plain text. On the ICC the file is 
hashed and signed and the signature is trans ­
ferred to the IFD.  
3.3. Card Downloading  
▼M1 
DDP_035 The download of a tachograph card includes the following 
steps:  
— Download the common information of the card in the 
EFs
 and
  This information is optional and is 
not secured with a digital signature.  
— (for first and second generation tachograph cards) 
Download EFs within
  :  
— Download the EFs
  and
  
This information is not 
secured with a digital signature.  
It is mandatory to download these files for each 
download session.  
— Download the other application data EFs (within
  
) except EF
  
. This information is secured 
with a digital signature, using Appendix 11 Common 
Security Mechanisms Part A.  
— It is mandatory to download at least the EFs
  
and
 
for each download session.  
— When downloading a driver card it is also mandatory 
to download the following EFs:
  
— (for second generation tacograph cards only) Except 
when a download of a driver card inserted in a VU 
is performed during drivers' control by a non 
EU control authority, using a first generation 
control card, download EFs within
  
: 
— Download the EFs CardSignCertificate, CA_Cer ­
tificate and Link_Certificate (if present). This 
information is not secured with a digital 
signature.  
It is mandatory to download these files for each 
download session.  
— Download the other application data EFs (within
  
) except EF
  
. This information is 
secured with a digital signature, using 
Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms 
Part B.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 297  
— It is mandatory to download at least the EFs
  
and
 
for each download 
session.  
— When downloading a driver card it is also 
mandatory to download the following EFs:
  
— When downloading a driver card, update the
  
date in EF
  
, in the
  
and, if applicable,
  DFs.  
— When downloading a workshop card, reset the 
calibration counter in EF
  
in the
  and, if applicable,
  
DFs.  
— When downloading a workshop card the EF
  
in the
  
and, if applicable,
  
DFs shall not be down ­
loaded.  
▼B 
3.3.1  Initialisation sequence  
DDP_036 The IDE shall initiate the sequence as follows:  
Card  Direction  IDE/IFD  Meaning/Remarks  
⇦ Hardware reset  
ATR ⇨ 
It is optional to use PPS to switch to a higher baud rate as 
long as the ICC supports it.  
3.3.2  Sequence for un-signed data files  
DDP_037  ►M1 The sequence to download EFs ICC, IC, Card_Cer ­
tificate (or CardSignCertificate for DF Tachograph_G2), 
CA_Certificate and Link_Certificate (for DF Tacho ­
graph_G2 only) is as follows: ◄ 
Card  Direction  IDE/IFD  Meaning/Remarks  
⇦ Select File  Select by File identifiers  
OK ⇨ 
⇦ Read Binary  If the file contains more data 
than the buffer size of the 
reader or the card the 
command has to be repeated 
until the complete file is read.  
File Data 
OK ⇨ Store data to ESM  according to  3.4 Data storage 
format  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 298  
Note 1:  Before selecting the Card_Certificate (or CardSign ­
Certificate) EF, the Tachograph Application must be 
selected (selection by AID).  
Note 2:  Selecting and reading a file may also be performed 
in one step using a Read Binary command with a short EF 
identifier.  
3.3.3  Sequence for Signed data files  
DDP_038 The following sequence shall be used for each of the 
following files that has to be downloaded with their 
signature:  
▼M1 
Card  Dir  IDE / IFD  Meaning / Remarks
  
Select File  
OK
 
Perform Hash of File  — Calculates the hash value 
over the data content of 
the selected file using the 
prescribed hash 
algorithm in accordance 
with Appendix 11, part 
A or B. This command 
is not an ISO-Command.  
Calculate Hash of File 
and store Hash value 
temporarily  
OK
 
Read Binary  If the file contains more data 
than the buffer of the reader 
or the card can hold, the 
command has to be repeated 
until the complete file is read.  
File Data 
OK
 Store received data to ESM  according to  3.4 Data storage 
format
  
PSO: Compute Digital 
Signature  
Perform Security 
Operation ‘Compute 
Digital Signature’ using 
the temporarily stored 
Hash value  
Signature 
OK
 Append data to the previous 
stored data on the ESM  according to  3.4 Data storage 
format  
▼B 
Note:  Selecting and reading a file may also be performed in 
one step using a Read Binary command with a short EF 
identifier. In this case the EF may be selected and read 
before the command Perform Hash of File is applied.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 299  
3.3.4  Sequence for resetting the calibration counter.  
DDP_039 The sequence to reset the
  
counter in the EF
  in a workshop card is 
the following:  
Card  Dir  IDE/IFD  Meaning/Remarks  
⇦ Select File  EF Card_Down- 
load Select by File identifiers  
OK ⇨ 
⇦  Update Binary  
NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload 
= ‘00 00’  
resets card download 
number  
OK ⇨  
Note:  Selecting and updating a file may also be performed 
in one step using an Update Binary command with a short 
EF identifier.  
3.4. Data storage format  
3.4.1  Introduction  
DDP_040 The downloaded data has to be stored according to the 
following conditions:  
— The data shall be stored transparent. This means that the 
order of the bytes as well as the order of the bits inside 
the byte that are transferred from the card has to be 
preserved during storage.  
— All files of the card downloaded within a download 
session are stored in one file on the ESM.  
3.4.2  File format  
DDP_041 The file format is a concatenation of several TLV objects.  
DDP_042 The tag for an EF shall be the FID plus the appendix „00“.  
DDP_043 The tag of an EF's signature shall be the FID of the file plus 
the appendix „01“.  
DDP_044 The length is a two byte value. The value defines the 
number of bytes in the value field. The value „FF FF“ in 
the length field is reserved for future use.  
DDP_045 When a file is not downloaded nothing related to the file 
shall be stored (no tag and no zero length).  
▼M1 
DDP_046 A signature shall be stored as the next TLV object directly 
after the TLV object that contains the data of the file.  
Definition  Meaning  Length  
FID (2 Bytes) || ‘00’  Tag for EF (FID) in the
  
or for 
common information of the 
card 3 Bytes  
FID (2 Bytes) || ‘01’  Tag for Signature of EF 
(FID) in the
  
DF 3 Bytes  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 300  
Definition  Meaning  Length  
FID (2 Bytes) || ‘02’  Tag for EF (FID) in the
  
DF 3 Bytes  
FID (2 Bytes) || ‘03’  Tag for Signature of EF 
(FID) in the
  
DF 3 Bytes  
xx xx  Length of Value field  2 Bytes  
Example of data in a download file on an ESM:  
Tag Length  Value
  
— Data of EF ICC
  
— Data of EF Card_Certificate  
— …
  
Data of EF
  (in the
  
DF)
 
Signature of EF
  (in 
the
 DF)
  
Data of EF
  in the
  
DF
 
Signature of EF
  in 
the
 DF  
▼B 
4. DOWNLOADING A TACHOGRAPH CARD VIA A VEHICLE 
UNIT.  
DDP_047 The VU must allow for downloading the content of a driver 
card inserted to a connected IDE.  
DDP_048 The IDE shall send a ‘Transfer Data Request Card 
Download’ message to the VU to initiate this mode (see 
2.2.2.9).  
▼M1 
DDP_049 First generation driver cards: Data shall be downloaded 
using the first generation data download protocol, and 
downloaded data shall have the same format as data down ­
loaded from a first generation vehicle unit.  
Second generation driver cards: the VU shall then download 
the whole card, file by file, in accordance with the card 
downloading protocol defined in paragraph 3, and forward 
all data received from the card to the IDE within the appro ­
priate TLV file format (see 3.4.2) and encapsulated within a 
‘Positive Response Transfer Data’ message.  
▼B 
DDP_050 The IDE shall retrieve card data from the ‘Positive 
Response Transfer Data’ message (stripping all headers, 
SIDs, TREPs, sub message counters, and checksums) and 
store them within one single physical file as described in 
paragraph 2.3.  
DDP_051 The VU shall then, as applicable, update the
  
or the
  
file of the driver card.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 301  
Appendix 8  
CALIBRATION PROTOCOL  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
1. INTRODUCTION  
2. TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES  
3. OVERVIEW OF SERVICES  
3.1. Services available  
3.2. Response codes  
4. COMMUNICATION SERVICES  
4.1. StartCommunication Service  
4.2. StopCommunication Service  
4.2.1 Message description  
4.2.2 Message format  
4.2.3 Parameter Definition  
4.3. TesterPresent Service  
4.3.1 Message description  
4.3.2 Message format  
5. MANAGEMENT SERVICES  
5.1. StartDiagnosticSession service  
5.1.1 Message description  
5.1.2 Message format  
5.1.3 Parameter definition  
5.2. SecurityAccess service  
5.2.1 Message Description  
5.2.2 Message format — SecurityAccess — requestSeed  
5.2.3 Message format — SecurityAccess — sendKey  
6. DATA TRANSMISSION SERVICES  
6.1. ReadDataByIdentifier service  
6.1.1 Message description  
6.1.2 Message format  
6.1.3 Parameter Definition  
6.2. WriteDataByIdentifier service  
6.2.1 Message description  
6.2.2 Message format  
6.2.3 Parameter definition  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 302  
7. CONTROL OF TEST PULSES — INPUT/OUTPUT CONTROL 
FUNCTIONAL UNIT  
7.1. InputOutputControlByIdentifier service  
7.1.1 Message description  
7.1.2 Message format  
7.1.3 Parameter definition  
8. DATARECORDS FORMATS  
8.1. Transmitted parameter ranges  
8.2. dataRecords formats  
1. INTRODUCTION  
This appendix describes how data is exchanged between a vehicle unit 
and a tester via the K-line which forms part of the calibration interface 
described in Appendix 6. It also describes control of the input/output 
signal line on the calibration connector.  
Establishing K-line communications is described in Section 4 ‘Com ­
munication Services’.  
This appendix uses the idea of diagnostic ‘sessions’ to determine the 
scope of K-line control under different conditions. The default session 
is the ‘StandardDiagnosticSession’ where all data can be read from a 
vehicle unit but no data can be written to a vehicle unit.  
Selection of the diagnostic session is described in Section 5 ‘Man ­
agement Services’.  
This appendix has to be considered as relevant for both generations of 
VUs and of workshop cards, in compliance with the interoperability 
requirements laid down in this Regulation.  
CPR_001 The ‘ECUProgrammingSession’ allows data entry into the 
vehicle unit. In the case of entry of calibration data, the 
vehicle unit must, in addition be in the CALIBRATION 
mode of operation.  
Data transfer via K-line is described in Section 6 ‘Data 
Transmission Services’. Formats of data transferred are 
detailed in Section 8 ‘dataRecords formats’.  
CPR_002 The ‘ECUAdjustmentSession’ allows the selection of the 
I/O mode of the calibration I/O signal line via the K-line 
interface. Control of the calibration I/O signal line is 
described in section 7 ‘Control of Test Pulses — Input/ 
Output Control functional unit’.  
CPR_003 Throughout this document the address of the tester is 
referred to as ‘tt’. Although there may be preferred 
addresses for testers, the VU shall respond correctly to 
any tester address. The physical address of the VU is 0xEE.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 303  
2. TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES  
The protocols, messages and error codes are principally based on a 
draft of ISO 14229-1 (Road vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Part 
1: Diagnostic services, version 6 of 22 February 2001).  
Byte encoding and hexadecimal values are used for the service identi ­
fiers, the service requests and responses, and the standard parameters.  
The term ‘tester’ refers to the equipment used to enter programming/ 
calibration data into the VU.  
The terms ‘client’ and ‘server’ refer to the tester and the VU respect ­
ively.  
The term ECU means ‘Electronic Control Unit’ and refers to the VU.  
References:  
▼M1 
ISO 14230-2: Road Vehicles -Diagnostic Systems — Keyword 
Protocol 2000- Part 2: Data Link Layer.  
First edition: 1999.  
▼B 
3. OVERVIEW OF SERVICES  
3.1. Services available  
The following table provides an overview of the services that will be 
available in the tachograph and are defined in this document.  
CPR_004 The table indicates the services that are available in an 
enabled diagnostic session.  
— The  1st column  lists the services that are available.  
— The  2nd column  includes the section number in this 
appendix where of service is further defined.  
— The  3rd column  assigns the service identifier values for 
request messages.  
— The  4th column  specifies the services of the  ‘Standard ­
DiagnosticSession’ (SD)  which must be implemented in 
each VU.  
— The  5th column  specifies the services of the  ‘ECUAd ­
justmentSession’ (ECUAS)  which must be implemen ­
ted to allow control of the I/O signal line in the front 
panel calibration connector of the VU.  
— The  6th column  specifies the services of the  ‘ECUPro ­
grammingSession’ (ECUPS)  which must be implemen ­
ted to allow for programming of parameters in the VU.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 304  
Table 1  
Service Identifier value summary table  
Diagnostic Sessions  
Diagnostic Service Name  Section 
No. SId Req.Value  SD  ECUAS  ECUPS  
StartCommunication  4.1  81  ■ ■ ■ 
StopCommunication  4.2  82  ■ 
TesterPresent  4.3  3E  ■ ■ ■ 
StartDiagnosticSession  5.1  10  ■ ■ ■ 
SecurityAccess  5.2  27  ■ ■ ■ 
ReadDataByIdentifier  6.1  22  ■ ■ ■ 
WriteDataByIdentifier  6.2  2E  ■ 
InputOutputControlByIdentifier  7.1  2F  ■ 
■ This symbol indicates that the service is mandatory in this diagnostic session. 
No symbol indicates that this service is not allowed in this diagnostic session.  
3.2. Response codes  
Response codes are defined for each service.  
4. COMMUNICATION SERVICES  
Some services are necessary to establish and maintain communication. 
They do not appear on the application layer. The services available are 
detailed in the following table:  
Table 2  
Communication Services  
Service name  Description  
StartCommunication  The client requests to start a communi ­
cation session with a server(s).  
StopCommunication  The client requests to stop the current 
communication session.  
TesterPresent  The client indicates to the server that it 
is still present.  
CPR_005 The StartCommunication Service is used for starting a 
communication. In order to perform any service, communi ­
cation must be initialised and the communication parameters 
need to be appropriate for the desired mode.  
4.1. StartCommunication Service  
CPR_006 Upon receiving a StartCommunication indication primitive, 
the VU shall check if the requested communication link can 
be initialised under the present conditions. Valid conditions 
for the initialisation of a communication link are described 
in document ISO 14230-2.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 305  
CPR_007 Then the VU shall perform all actions necessary to initialise 
the communication link and send a StartCommunication 
response primitive with the Positive Response parameters 
selected.  
CPR_008 If a VU that is already initialised (and has entered any 
diagnostic session) receives a new StartCommunication 
Request (e.g. due to error recovery in the tester) the 
request shall be accepted and the VU shall be reinitialised.  
CPR_009 If the communication link cannot be initialised for any 
reason, the VU shall continue operating as it was immedi ­
ately prior to the attempt to initialise the communication 
link..  
CPR_010 The StartCommunication Request message must be 
physically addressed.  
CPR_011 Initialising the VU for services is performed through a ‘fast 
initialisation’ method,  
— There is a bus-idle time prior to any activity.  
— The tester then sends an initialisation pattern.  
— All information which is necessary to establish 
communication is contained in the response of the VU.  
CPR_012 After completion of the initialisation,  
— All communication parameters are set to values defined 
in Table 4 according to the key bytes.  
— The VU is waiting for the first request of the tester.  
— The VU is in the default diagnostic mode, i.e. Standard ­
DiagnosticSession.  
— The calibration I/O signal line is in the default state, i.e. 
disabled state.  
CPR_014 The data rate on the K-line shall be 10 400 Baud.  
CPR_016 The fast initialisation is started by the tester transmitting a 
Wake up pattern (Wup) on the K-line. The pattern begins 
after the idle time on K-line with a low time of Tinil. The 
tester transmits the first bit of the StartCommunication 
Service after a time of Twup following the first falling edge.
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 306  
CPR_017 The timing values for the fast initialisation and communi ­
cations in general are detailed in the tables below. There are 
different possibilities for the idle time:  
— First transmission after power on, Tidle = 300 ms.  
— After completion of a StopCommunication Service, 
Tidle = P3 min.  
— After stopping communication by time-out P3 max, 
Tidle = 0.  
Table 3  
Timing values for fast initialisation  
Parameter  min value  max value  
Tinil  25 ± 1 ms  24 ms  26 ms  
Twup  50 ± 1 ms  49 ms  51 ms  
Table 4  
Communication timing values  
Timing 
Parameter  Parameter Description  lower limit 
values [ms]  upper limit 
values [ms]  
min. max.  
P1 Inter byte time for VU response  0  20  
P2 Time between tester request and 
VU response or two VU responses  25 250  
P3 Time between end of VU responses 
and start of new tester request  55 5 000  
P4 Inter byte time for tester request  5  20  
CPR_018 The message format for fast initialisation is detailed in the 
following tables. (NOTE: Hex means hexadecimal)  
Table 5  
StartCommunication Request Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  81 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  EE  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  tt  SRC  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 307  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#4 StartCommunication Request 
Service Id  81 SCR  
#5 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 6  
StartCommunication Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 StartCommunication Positive 
Response Service Id  C1 SCRPR  
#6 Key byte 1  EA  KB1  
#7 Key byte 2  8F  KB2  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
CPR_019 There is no negative response to the StartCommunication 
Request message, if there is no positive response message 
to be transmitted then the VU is not initialised, nothing is 
transmitted and it remains in its normal operation.  
4.2. StopCommunication Service  
4.2.1  Message description  
The purpose of this communication layer service is to terminate a 
communication session.  
CPR_020 Upon receiving a StopCommunication indication primitive, 
the VU shall check if the current conditions allow to 
terminate this communication. In this case the VU shall 
perform all actions necessary to terminate this communi ­
cation.  
CPR_021 If it is possible to terminate the communication, the VU 
shall issue a StopCommunication response primitive with 
the Positive Response parameters selected, before the 
communication is terminated.  
CPR_022 If the communication cannot be terminated by any reason, 
the VU shall issue a StopCommunication response primitive 
with the Negative Response parameter selected.  
CPR_023 If time-out of P3 max is detected by the VU, the communi ­
cation shall be terminated without any response primitive 
being issued.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 308  
4.2.2  Message format  
CPR_024 The message formats for the StopCommunication primitives 
are detailed in the following tables.  
Table 7  
StopCommunication Request Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  EE  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  tt  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  01  LEN  
#5 StopCommunication Request 
Service Id  82 SPR  
#6 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 8  
StopCommunication Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  01  LEN  
#5 StopCommunication Positive 
Response Service Id  C2 SPRPR  
#6 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 9  
StopCommunication Negative Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 309  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#5 negative Response Service Id  7F  NR  
#6 StopCommunication Request 
Service Identification  82 SPR  
#7 responseCode = generalReject  10  RC_GR  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
4.2.3  Parameter Definition  
This service does not require any parameter definition.  
4.3. TesterPresent Service  
4.3.1  Message description  
The TesterPresent service is used by the tester to indicate to the server 
that it is still present, in order to prevent the server from automatically 
returning to normal operation and possibly stopping the communi ­
cation. This service, sent periodically, keeps the diagnostic session/ 
communication active by resetting the P3 timer each time a request 
for this service is received.  
4.3.2  Message format  
CPR_079 The message formats for the TesterPresent primitives are 
detailed in the following tables.  
Table 10  
TesterPresent Request Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical addressing  80  FMT  
#2 Target address byte  EE  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  tt  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  02  LEN  
#5 TesterPresent Request Service Id  3E  TP  
#6 Sub Function = response- 
Required =  [ yes  01  RESPREQ_Y  
no ] 02  RESPREQ_NO  
#7 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
CPR_080 If the responseRequired parameter is set to ‘yes’, then the 
server shall respond with the following positive response 
message. If set to ‘no’, then no response is sent by the 
server.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 310  
Table 11  
TesterPresent Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  01  LEN  
#5 TesterPresent Positive 
Response Service Id  7E TPPR  
#6 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
CPR_081 The service shall support the following negative responses 
codes:  
Table 12  
TesterPresent Negative Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical addressing  80  FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 negative Response Service Id  7F  NR  
#6 TesterPresent Request Service Identi ­
fication  3E TP  
#7 respon ­
seCode =  [SubFunctionNotSup ­
ported-InvalidFormat  12 RC_SFNS_IF  
incorrectMessage ­
Length]  13 RC_IML  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 311  
5. MANAGEMENT SERVICES  
The services available are detailed in the following table:  
Table 13  
Management Services  
Service name  Description  
StartDiagnosticSession  The client requests to start a diagnostic 
session with a VU.  
SecurityAccess  The client requests access to functions 
restricted to authorised users.  
5.1. StartDiagnosticSession service  
5.1.1  Message description  
CPR_025 The service StartDiagnosticSession is used to enable 
different diagnostic sessions in the server. A diagnostic 
session enables a specific set of services according to 
Table 17. A session can enable vehicle manufacturer 
specific services which are not part of this document. Im ­
plementation rules shall conform to the following require ­
ments:  
— There shall be always exactly one diagnostic session 
active in the VU,  
— The VU shall always start the StandardDiagnostic ­
Session when powered up. If no other diagnostic 
session is started, then the StandardDiagnosticSession 
shall be running as long as the VU is powered,  
— If a diagnostic session which is already running has been 
requested by the tester, then the VU shall send a positive 
response message,  
— Whenever the tester requests a new diagnostic session, 
the VU shall first send a StartDiagnosticSession positive 
response message before the new session becomes active 
in the VU. If the VU is not able to start the requested 
new diagnostic session, then it shall respond with a 
StartDiagnosticSession negative response message, and 
the current session shall continue.  
CPR_026 A diagnostic session shall only be started if communication 
has been established between the client and the VU.  
CPR_027 The timing parameters defined in Table 4 shall be active 
after a successful StartDiagnosticSession with the diagnos ­
ticSession parameter set to ‘StandardDiagnosticSession’ in 
the request message if another diagnostic session was 
previously active.  
5.1.2  Message format  
CPR_028 The message formats for the StartDiagnosticSession 
primitives are detailed in the following tables.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 312  
Table 14  
StartDiagnosticSession Request Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  EE  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  tt  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  02  LEN  
#5 StartDiagnosticSession 
Request Service Id  10 STDS  
#6 diagnosticSession = [one value 
from Table 17]  xx DS_…  
#7 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 15  
StartDiagnosticSession Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  02  LEN  
#5 StartDiagnosticSession 
Positive Response Service Id  50 STDSPR  
#6 diagnosticSession = [same 
value as in byte #6 Table 14]  xx DS_…  
#7 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 16  
StartDiagnosticSession Negative Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical addressing  80  FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 313  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 Negative Response Service Id  7F  NR  
#6 StartDiagnosticSession Request 
Service Id  10 STDS  
#7 Respon ­
seCode =  [subFunctionNotSup ­
ported (  a ) 12 RC_SFNS  
incorrectMessage ­
Length (  b ) 13 RC_IML  
conditionsNotCor ­
rect (  c ) 22 RC_CNC  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
( a ) – the value inserted in byte #6 of the request message is not supported, i.e. not in 
Table 17, 
( b ) – the length of the message is wrong, 
( c ) – the criteria for the request StartDiagnosticSession are not met.  
5.1.3  Parameter definition  
CPR_029 The parameter  diagnosticSession (DS_)  is used by the Start ­
DiagnosticSession service to select the specific behaviour of 
the server(s). The following diagnostic sessions are specified 
in this document:  
Table 17  
Definition of diagnosticSession Values  
Hex Description  Mnemonic  
81 StandardDiagnosticSession  
This diagnostic session enables all services 
specified in  Table 1 column 4 “SD” . These 
services allow reading of data from a server 
(VU). This diagnostic Session is active after the 
initialisation has been successfully completed 
between client (tester) and server (VU). This 
diagnostic session may be overwritten by other 
diagnostic sessions specified in this section.  SD 
85 ECUProgrammingSession  
This diagnostic session enables all services 
specified in  Table 1 column 6 “ECUPS” . These 
services support the memory programming of a 
server (VU) This diagnostic session may be 
overwritten by other diagnostic sessions speci- 
fied in this section..  ECUPS  ▼B
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Hex Description  Mnemonic  
87 ECUAdjustmentSession  
This diagnostic session enables all services 
specified in  Table 1 column 5 “ECUAS” . 
These services support the input/output control 
of a server (VU). This diagnostic session may be 
overwritten by other diagnostic sessions speci- 
fied in this section.  ECUAS  
5.2. SecurityAccess service  
Writing of calibration data is not possible unless the VU is in CALI ­
BRATION mode. In addition to insertion of a valid workshop card into 
the VU, it is necessary to enter the appropriate PIN into the VU before 
access to the CALIBRATION mode is granted.  
When the VU is in CALIBRATION or CONTROL mode, access to the 
calibration input/output line is also possible.  
The SecurityAccess service provides a means to enter the PIN and to 
indicate to the tester whether or not the VU is in CALIBRATION 
mode.  
It is acceptable that the PIN may be entered through alternative 
methods.  
5.2.1  Message Description  
The SecurityAccess service consists of a SecurityAccess ‘requestSeed’ 
message, eventually followed by a SecurityAccess ‘sendKey’ message. 
The SecurityAccess service must be carried out after the StartDiagnos ­
ticSession service.  
CPR_033 The tester shall use the SecurityAccess ‘requestSeed’ 
message to check if the vehicle unit is ready to accept a 
PIN. 
CPR_034 If the vehicle unit is already in CALIBRATION mode, it 
shall answer the request by sending a ‘seed’ of 0x0000 
using the service SecurityAccess Positive Response.  
CPR_035 If the vehicle unit is ready to accept a PIN for verification 
by a workshop card, it shall answer the request by sending a 
‘seed’ greater than 0x0000 using the service SecurityAccess 
Positive Response.  
CPR_036 If the vehicle unit is not ready to accept a PIN from the 
tester, either because the workshop card inserted is not 
valid, or because no workshop card has been inserted, or 
because the vehicle unit expects the PIN from another 
method, it shall answer the request with a Negative 
Response with a response code set to conditionsNotCorrec ­
tOrRequestSequenceError.  
CPR_037 The tester shall then, eventually, use the SecurityAccess 
‘sendKey’ message to forward a PIN to the Vehicle Unit. 
To allow time for the card authentication process to take 
place, the VU shall use the negative response code request ­
CorrectlyReceived-ResponsePending to extend the time to 
respond. However, the maximum time to respond shall not 
exceed 5 minutes. As soon as the requested service has been  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 315  
completed, the VU shall send a positive response message 
or negative response message with a response code different 
from this one. The negative response code requestCorrect ­
lyReceived-ResponsePending may be repeated by the VU 
until the requested service is completed and the final 
response message is sent.  
CPR_038 The vehicle unit shall answer to this request using the 
service SecurityAccess Positive Response only when in 
CALIBRATION mode.  
CPR_039 In the following cases, the vehicle unit shall answer to this 
request with a Negative Response with a response code set 
to: 
— subFunctionNot supported: Invalid format for the 
subfunction parameter (accessType),  
— conditionsNotCorrectOrRequestSequenceError: Vehicle 
unit not ready to accept a PIN entry,  
— invalidKey: PIN not valid and number of PIN checks 
attempts not exceeded,  
— exceededNumberOfAttempts: PIN not valid and number 
of PIN checks attempts exceeded,  
— generalReject: Correct PIN but mutual authentication 
with workshop card failed.  
5.2.2  Message format — SecurityAccess — requestSeed  
CPR_040 The message formats for the SecurityAccess ‘requestSeed’ 
primitives are detailed in the following tables.  
Table 18  
SecurityAccess Request- requestSeed Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  EE  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  tt  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  02  LEN  
#5 SecurityAccess Request 
Service Id  27 SA  
#6 accessType — requestSeed  7D  AT_RSD  
#7 Checksum  00-FF  CS  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 316  
Table 19  
SecurityAccess — requestSeed Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  04  LEN  
#5 SecurityAccess Positive 
Response Service Id  67 SAPR  
#6 accessType — requestSeed  7D  AT_RSD  
#7 Seed High  00-FF  SEEDH  
#8 Seed Low  00-FF  SEEDL  
#9 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 20  
SecurityAccess Negative Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical addressing  80  FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 negativeResponse Service Id  7F  NR  
#6 SecurityAccess Request Service Id  27  SA  
#7 respon ­
seCode =  [conditionsNotCorrec ­
tOrRequestSequen ­
ceError  22 RC_CNC  
incorrectMessage ­
Length]  13 RC_IML  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 317  
5.2.3  Message format — SecurityAccess — sendKey  
CPR_041 The message formats for the SecurityAccess ‘sendKey’ 
primitives are detailed in the following tables.  
Table 21  
SecurityAccess Request — sendKey Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  EE  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  tt  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  m+2  LEN  
#5 SecurityAccess Request 
Service Id  27 SA  
#6 accessType — sendKey  7E  AT_SK  
#7 to #m + 6  Key #1 (High)  xx  KEY  
… …  
Key #m (low, m must be a 
minimum of 4, and a 
maximum of 8)  xx 
#m + 7  Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 22  
SecurityAccess — sendKey Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  02  LEN  
#5 SecurityAccess Positive 
Response Service Id  67 SAPR  
#6 accessType — sendKey  7E  AT_SK  
#7 Checksum  00-FF  CS  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 318  
Table 23  
SecurityAccess Negative Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical addressing  80  FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 NegativeResponse Service Id  7F  NR  
#6 SecurityAccess Request Service Id  27  SA  
#7 Respon ­
seCode =  [generalReject  10  RC_GR  
subFunctionNotSup ­
ported  12 RC_SFNS  
incorrectMessage ­
Length  13 RC_IML  
conditionsNotCorrec ­
tOrRequestSequen ­
ceError  22 RC_CNC  
invalidKey  35  RC_IK  
exceededNumberOf ­
Attempts  36 RC_ENA  
requestCorrectlyRe ­
ceived-Response ­
Pending]  78 RC_RCR_RP  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
6. DATA TRANSMISSION SERVICES  
The services available are detailed in the following table:  
Table 24  
Data Transmission Services  
Service name  Description  
ReadDataByIdentifier  The client requests the transmission of the 
current value of a record with access by 
recordDataIdentifier.  
WriteDataByIdentifier  The client requests to write a record 
accessed by recordDataIdentifier.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 319  
6.1. ReadDataByIdentifier service  
6.1.1  Message description  
CPR_050 The ReadDataByIdentifier service is used by the client to 
request data record values from a server. The data are 
identified by a recordDataIdentifier. It is the VU manufac ­
turer's responsibility that the server conditions are met when 
performing this service.  
6.1.2  Message format  
CPR_051 The message formats for the ReadDataByIdentifier 
primitives are detailed in the following tables.  
Table 25  
ReadDataByIdentifier Request Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  EE  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  tt  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 ReadDataByIdentifier 
Request Service Id  22 RDBI  
#6 to #7  recordDataIdentifier = [a value 
fromTable 28]  xxxx  RDI_…  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 26  
ReadDataByIdentifier Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  m+3  LEN  
#5 ReadDataByIdentifier Positive 
Response Service Id  62 RDBIPR  
#6 and #7  recordDataIdentifier = [the same 
value as bytes #6 and #7 Table 
25] xxxx  RDI_...  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 320  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#8 to #m + 7  dataRecord[] =  [data#1  xx  DREC_DAT ­
A1 
: :  :  
data#m]  xx  DREC_DAT ­
Am 
#m + 8  Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 27  
ReadDataByIdentifier Negative Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical addressing  80  FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 NegativeResponse Service Id  7F  NR  
#6 ReadDataByIdentifier Request 
Service Id  22 RDBI  
#7 Response ­
Code=  [requestOutO ­
fRange  31 RC_ROOR  
incorrectMessage ­
Length  13 RC_IML  
conditionsNotCor ­
rect] 22 RC_CNC  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
6.1.3  Parameter Definition  
CPR_052 The parameter  recordDataIdentifier (RDI_)  in the ReadDa ­
taByIdentifier request message identifies a data record.  
CPR_053 recordDataIdentifier values defined by this document are 
shown in the table below.  
The recordDataIdentifier table consists of four columns and 
multiple lines.  
— The  1st column (Hex)  includes the ‘Hex Value’ 
assigned to the recordDataIdentifier specified in the 
3rd column.  
— The  2nd column (Data element)  specifies the data 
element of Appendix 1 on which the recordDataI ­
dentifier is based (transcoding is sometimes necessary).  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 321  
— The  3rd column (Description)  specifies the 
corresponding recordDataIdentifier name.  
— The  4th column (Mnemonic)  specifies the mnemonic of 
this recordDataIdentifier.  
Table 28  
Definition of recordDataIdentifier values  
Hex Data element  recordDataIdentifier Name 
(see format in Section 8.2)  Mnemonic  
F90B
  TimeDate  RDI_TD  
F912
  HighResolutionTotalVehicle- 
Distance  RDI_HRTVD  
F918
  Kfactor  RDI_KF  
F91C
  LfactorTyreCircumference  RDI_LF  
F91D
  WvehicleCharacteristicFactor  RDI_WVCF  
F921
  TyreSize  RDI_TS  
F922
  NextCalibrationDate  RDI_NCD  
F92C
  SpeedAuthorised  RDI_SA  
F97D
  RegisteringMemberState  RDI_RMS  
F97E
  VehicleRegistrationNumber  RDI_ VRN  
F190
  VIN  RDI_ VIN  
CPR_054 The parameter  dataRecord (DREC_)  is used by the Read ­
DataByIdentifier positive response message to provide the 
data record value identified by the recordDataIdentifier to 
the client (tester). Data formats are specified in section 8. 
Additional user optional dataRecords including VU specific 
input, internal and output data may be implemented, but are 
not defined in this document.  
6.2. WriteDataByIdentifier service  
6.2.1  Message description  
CPR_056 The WriteDataByIdentifier service is used by the client to 
write data record values to a server. The data are identified 
by a recordDataIdentifier. It is the VU manufacturer's 
responsibility that the server conditions are met when 
performing this service. To update the parameters listed in 
Table 28 the VU must be in CALIBRATION mode.  
6.2.2  Message format  
CPR_057 The message formats for the WriteDataByIdentifier 
primitives are detailed in the following tables.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 322  
Table 29  
WriteDataByIdentifier Request Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  EE  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  tt  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  m + 3  LEN  
#5 WriteDataByIdentifier Request 
Service Id  2E WDBI  
#6 to #7  recordDataIdentifier = [a value 
from Table 28]  xxxx  RDI_…  
#8 to m + 7  dataRecord[] =  [data#1  xx  DREC_DAT ­
A1 
: :  :  
data#m]  xx  DREC_DAT ­
Am 
#m + 8  Checksum  00-FF  CS  
Table 30  
WriteDataByIdentifier Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 WriteDataByIdentifier 
Positive Response Service Id  6E WDBIPR  
#6 to #7  recordDataIdentifier = [the 
same value as bytes #6 and 
#7 Table 29]  xxxx  RDI_…  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 323  
Table 31  
WriteDataByIdentifier Negative Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex 
Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical addressing  80  FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 NegativeResponse Service Id  7F  NR  
#6 WriteDataByIdentifier Request 
Service Id  2E WDBI  
#7 Response ­
Code=  [requestOutO ­
fRange  31 RC_ROOR  
incorrectMessage ­
Length  13 RC_IML  
conditionsNotCor ­
rect] 22 RC_CNC  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
6.2.3  Parameter definition  
The parameter  recordDataIdentifier (RDI_)  is defined in Table 28.  
The parameter  dataRecord (DREC_)  is used by the WriteDataByI ­
dentifier request message to provide the data record values identified 
by the recordDataIdentifier to the server (VU). Data formats are 
specified in section 8.  
7. CONTROL OF TEST PULSES — INPUT/OUTPUT CONTROL 
FUNCTIONAL UNIT  
The services available are detailed in the following table:  
Table 32  
Input/Output Control functional unit  
Service name  Description  
InputOutputControl ­
ByIdentifier  The client requests the control of an input/ 
output specific to the server.  
7.1. InputOutputControlByIdentifier service  
7.1.1  Message description  
There is a connection via the front connector which allows test pulses 
to be controlled or monitored using a suitable tester.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 324  
CPR_058 This calibration I/O signal line can be configured by K-line 
command using the InputOutputControlByIdentifier service 
to select the required input or output function for the line. 
The available states of the line are:  
— disabled,  
— speedSignalInput, where the calibration I/O signal line is 
used to input a speed signal (test signal) replacing the 
motion sensor speed signal, this function is not available 
in CONTROL mode,  
— realTimeSpeedSignalOutputSensor, where the calibration 
I/O signal line is used to output the speed signal of the 
motion sensor,  
— RTCOutput, where the calibration I/O signal line is used 
to output the UTC clock signal, this function is not 
available in CONTROL mode.  
CPR_059 The vehicle unit must have entered an adjustment session 
and must be in CALIBRATION or CONTROL mode to 
configure the state of the line. When the VU is in CALI ­
BRATION mode, the four states of the line can be selected 
(disabled, speedSignalInput, realTimeSpeedSignalOutput ­
Sensor, RTCOutput). When the VU is in CONTROL 
mode, only two states of the lines can be selected (disabled, 
realTimeSpeedOutputSensor). On exit of the adjustment 
session or of the CALIBRATION or CONTROL mode 
the vehicle unit must ensure the calibration I/O signal line 
is returned to the ‘disabled’ (default) state.  
CPR_060 If speed pulses are received at the real time speed signal 
input line of the VU while the calibration I/O signal line is 
set to input then the calibration I/O signal line shall be set to 
output or returned to the disabled state.  
CPR_061 The sequence shall be:  
— Establish communications by StartCommunication 
Service  
— Enter an adjustment session by StartDiagnosticSession 
Service and be in CALIBRATION or CONTROL 
mode of operation (the order of these two operation is 
not important).  
— Change the state of the output by InputOutputControl ­
ByIdentifier Service.  
7.1.2  Message format  
CPR_062 The message formats for the InputOutputControlByIdentifier 
primitives are detailed in the following tables.  ▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 325  
Table 33 
InputOutputControlByIdentifier Request Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing 80 FMT 
#2 Target address byte  EE TGT 
#3 Source address byte  tt SRC 
#4 Additional length byte  xx LEN 
#5 InputOutputControlByI ­
dentifier Request Sid 2F IOCBI 
#6 and #7 InputOutputIdentifier = [Cali ­
brationInputOutput]  F960 IOI_CIO 
#8 or 
#8 to #9 ControlOptionRecord = [ COR_… 
inputOutputControlParameter 
— one value from Table 36  xx IOCP_… 
controlState — one value from 
Table 37 (see note below)]  xx CS_… 
#9 or #10 Checksum 00-FF CS 
Note: The controlState parameter is present only in some 
cases (see 7.1.3). 
Table 34 
InputOutputControlByIdentifier Positive Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing 80 FMT 
#2 Target address byte  tt TGT 
#3 Source address byte  EE SRC 
#4 Additional length byte  xx LEN 
#5 inputOutputControlByI ­
dentifier Positive Response 
SId 6F IOCBIPR 
#6 and #7 inputOutputIdentifier = [Cali ­
brationInputOutput]  F960 IOI_CIO 
#8 or 
#8 to #9 controlStatusRecord = [ CSR_ 
inputOutputControlParameter 
(same value as byte #8 Table 
33) xx IOCP_… 
controlState (same value as 
byte #9 Table 33)] (if applic ­
able) xx CS_… 
#9 or #10 Checksum 00-FF CS  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 326  
Table 35  
InputOutputControlByIdentifier Negative Response Message  
Byte #  Parameter Name  Hex Value  Mnemonic  
#1 Format byte — physical 
addressing  80 FMT  
#2 Target address byte  tt  TGT  
#3 Source address byte  EE  SRC  
#4 Additional length byte  03  LEN  
#5 negativeResponse Service Id  7F  NR  
#6 inputOutputControlByIdentifier 
Request SId  2F IOCBI  
#7 responseCode=[  
incorrectMessageLength  13  RC_IML  
conditionsNotCorrect  22  RC_CNC  
requestOutOfRange  31  RC_ROOR  
deviceControlLimitsExceeded]  7A  RC_DCLE  
#8 Checksum  00-FF  CS  
7.1.3  Parameter definition  
CPR_064 The parameter  inputOutputControlParameter (IOCP_)  is 
defined in the following table.  
Table 36  
Definition of inputOutputControlParameter values  
Hex Description  Mnemonic  
00 ReturnControlToECU  
This value shall indicate to the server (VU) that 
the tester does no longer have control about the 
calibration I/O signal line.  RCTECU  
01 ResetToDefault  
This value shall indicate to the server (VU) that it 
is requested to reset the calibration I/O signal line 
to its default state.  RTD ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 327  
Hex Description  Mnemonic  
03 ShortTermAdjustment  
This value shall indicate to the server (VU) that it 
is requested to adjust the calibration I/O signal 
line to the value included in the controlState 
parameter.  STA  
CPR_065 The parameter  controlState  is present only when the input ­
OutputControlParameter is set to ShortTermAdjustment and 
is defined in the following table:  
Table 37  
Definition of controlState values  
Mode  Hex Value  Description  
Disable  00  I/O line is disabled (default state)  
Enable  01  Enable calibration I/O line as speedSigna ­
lInput  
Enable  02  Enable calibration I/O line as realTime ­
SpeedSignalOutputSensor  
Enable  03  Enable calibration I/O line as RTCOutput  
8. DATARECORDS FORMATS  
This section details:  
— general rules that shall be applied to ranges of parameters trans ­
mitted by the vehicle unit to the tester,  
— formats that shall be used for data transferred via the Data Trans ­
mission Services described in section 6.  
CPR_067 All parameters identified shall be supported by the VU.  
CPR_068 Data transmitted by the VU to the tester in response to a 
request message shall be of the measured type (i.e. current 
value of the requested parameter as measured or observed by 
the VU).  
8.1. Transmitted parameter ranges  
CPR_069 Table 38 defines the ranges used to determine the validity of 
a transmitted parameter.  
CPR_070 The values in the range ‘error indicator’ provide a means for 
the vehicle unit to immediately indicate that valid parametric 
data is not currently available due to some type of error in 
the tachograph.  
CPR_071 The values in the range ‘not available’ provide a means for 
the vehicle unit to transmit a message which contains a 
parameter that is not available or not supported in that 
module. The values in the range ‘not requested’ provide a 
means for a device to transmit a command message and 
identify those parameters where no response is expected 
from the receiving device.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 328  
CPR_072 If a component failure prevents the transmission of valid 
data for a parameter, the error indicator as described in 
Table 38 should be used in place of that parameter's data. 
However, if the measured or calculated data has yielded a 
value that is valid yet exceeds the defined parameter range, 
the error indicator should not be used. The data should be 
transmitted using the appropriate minimum or maximum 
parameter value.  
Table 38  
dataRecords ranges  
Range Name  1 byte 
(Hex value)  2 bytes 
(Hex value)  4 bytes 
(Hex Value)  ASCII  
Valid signal  00 to FA  0000 to FAFF  00000000 to FAFFFFFF  1 to 254  
Parameter specific indicator  FB  FB00 to FBFF  FB000000 to FBFFFFFF  none  
Reserved range for future 
indicator bits  FC to FD  FC00 to FDFF  FC000000 to FDFFFFFF  none  
Error indicator  FE  FE00 to FEFF  FE000000 to FEFFFFFF  0  
Not available or not requested  FF  FF00 to FFFF  FF000000 to FFFFFFFF  FF  
CPR_073 For parameters coded in ASCII, the ASCII character ‘*’ is 
reserved as a delimiter.  
8.2. dataRecords formats  
Table 39 to Table 42 below detail the formats that shall be used via the 
ReadDataByIdentifier and WriteDataByIdentifier Services.  
CPR_074 Table 39 provides the length, resolution and operating range 
for each parameter identified by its recordDataIdentifier:  
Table 39  
Format of dataRecords  
Parameter Name  Data length (bytes)  Resolution  Operating range  
TimeDate  8  See details in Table 40  
HighResolutionTotalVehicleD ­
istance  4 5 m/bit gain, 0 m offset  0 to + 21 055 406 km  
Kfactor  2  0,001 pulse/m/bit gain, 0 offset  0 to 64,255 pulse/m  
LfactorTyreCircumference  2  0,125 10  – 3 m/bit gain, 0 offset  0 to 8,031 m  
WvehicleCharacteristicFactor  2  0,001 pulse/m/bit gain, 0 offset  0 to 64,255 pulse/m  
TyreSize  15  ASCII  ASCII  
NextCalibrationDate  3  See details in Table 41  
SpeedAuthorised  2  1/256 km/h/bit gain, 0 offset  0 to 250,996 km/h  ▼B
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Parameter Name  Data length (bytes)  Resolution  Operating range  
RegisteringMemberState  3  ASCII  ASCII  
VehicleRegistrationNumber  14  See details in Table 42  
VIN 17  ASCII  ASCII  
CPR_075 Table 40 details the formats of the different bytes of the 
TimeDate parameter:  
Table 40  
Detailed format of TimeDate (recordDataIdentifier value # F90B)  
Byte  Parameter defi ­
nition  Resolution  Operating range  
1 Seconds  0,25 s/bit gain, 0 s offset  0 to 59,75 s  
2 Minutes  1 min/bit gain, 0 min offset  0 to 59 min  
3 Hours  1 h/bit gain, 0 h offset  0 to 23 h  
4 Month  1 month/bit gain, 0 month offset  1 to 12 month  
5 Day  0,25 day/bit gain, 0 day offset 
(see NOTE below Table 41)  0,25 to 31,75 
day 
6 Year  1 year/bit gain, + 1985 year 
offset 
(see NOTE below Table 41)  1985 to 2235 
year 
7 Local Minute 
Offset  1 min/bit gain, – 125 min offset  – 59 to + 59 
min 
8 Local Hour 
Offset  1 h/bit gain, – 125 h offset  – 23 to + 23 h  
CPR_076 Table 41 details the formats of the different bytes of the NextCalibrationDate 
parameter.  
Table 41  
Detailed format of NextCalibrationDate (recordDataIdentifier value # 
F922)  
Byte  Parameter defi ­
nition  Resolution  Operating range  
1 Month  1 month/bit gain, 0 month offset  1 to 12 month  
2 Day  0,25 day/bit gain, 0 day offset 
(see NOTE below)  0,25 to 31,75 
day 
3 Year  1 year/bit gain, + 1985 year 
offset 
(see NOTE below)  1985 to 2235 
year ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 330  
NOTE concerning the use of the ‘Day’ parameter:  
1) A value of 0 for the date is null. The values 1, 2, 3, and 4 are used 
to identify the first day of the month; 5, 6, 7, and 8 identify the 
second day of the month; etc.  
2) This parameter does not influence or change the hours parameter 
above.  
NOTE concerning the use of byte ‘Year’ parameter:  
A value of 0 for the year identifies the year 1985; a value of 1 
identifies 1986; etc.  
CPR_078 Table 42 details the formats of the different bytes of the 
VehicleRegistrationNumber parameter:  
Table 42  
Detailed format of VehicleRegistrationNumber (recordDataIdentifier 
value # F97E)  
Byte  Parameter definition  Resolution  Operating range  
1 Code Page (as defined in 
Appendix 1)  ASCII  01 to 0A  
2 - 14  Vehicle Registration Number 
(as defined in Appendix 1)  ASCII  ASCII  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 331  
Appendix 9  
TYPE APPROVAL LIST OF MINIMUM REQUIRED TESTS  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
1. INTRODUCTION  
2. VEHICLE UNIT FUNCTIONAL TESTS  
3. MOTION SENSOR FUNCTIONAL TESTS  
4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS FUNCTIONAL TESTS  
5. EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY TESTS  
▼M1 
6. EXTERNAL REMOTE COMMUNICATION FACILITY TESTS  
▼B 
7. PAPER FUNCTIONAL TESTS  
8. INTEROPERABILITY TESTS  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Type approval  
The EC type approval for a recording equipment (or component) or a 
tachograph card is based on:  
▼M1 
— a  security certification , based on Common Criteria specifications, 
against a security target fully compliant with Appendix 10 to this 
Annex,  
▼B 
— a  functional certification  performed by a Member State authority 
certifying that the item tested fulfils the requirements of this Annex in 
terms of functions performed, measurement accuracy and environmental 
characteristics,  
— an  interoperability certification  performed by the competent body 
certifying that the recording equipment (or tachograph card) is fully 
interoperable with the necessary tachograph card (or recording 
equipment) models (see Chapter 8 of this Annex).  
This Appendix specifies which tests, as a minimum, must be performed by a 
Member State authority during the functional tests, and which tests, as a 
minimum, must be performed by the competent body during the interoper ­
ability tests. Procedures to follow to carry out the tests or the type of tests 
are not specified further.  
The security certification aspects are not covered by this Appendix. If some 
tests requested for type approval are performed during the security 
evaluation and certification process, then these tests do not need to be 
performed again. In this case, only the results of these security tests may 
be inspected. For information, the requirements expected to be tested (or 
closely related to tests expected to be performed) during the security certifi ­
cation, are marked with a ‘*’ in this Appendix.  
The numbered requirements refer to the Annex corpus, while the other 
requirements refer to the other appendixes (e.g. PIC_001 refers to 
requirement PIC_001 of Appendix 3 Pictograms).  
This Appendix considers separately the type approval of the motion sensor, 
of the vehicle unit, and of the external GNSS facility as components of the 
recording equipment. Each component will get its own type approval  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 332  
certificate in which the other compatible components will be indicated. The 
functional test of the motion sensor (or external GNSS facility) is done 
together with the vehicle unit and vice versa.  
Interoperability between every model of motion sensor (resp. external GNSS 
facility) and every model of vehicle unit is not required. In that case the 
type approval for a motion sensor (resp. external GNSS facility) can be 
granted only in combination with the type approval of the relevant 
vehicle unit and vice versa.  
1.2. References  
The following references are used in this Appendix:  
IEC 60068-2-1: Environmental testing — Part 2-1: Tests — Test A: Cold  
IEC 60068-2-2: Basic environmental testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests 
B: dry heat (sinusoidal).  
IEC 60068-2-6: Environmental testing — Part 2: Tests — Test Fc: 
Vibration  
IEC 60068-2-14: Environmental testing; Part 2-14: Tests; Test N: Change of 
temperature  
IEC 60068-2-27: Environmental testing. Part 2: Tests. Test Ea and guidance: 
Shock  
IEC 60068-2-30: Environmental testing — Part 2-30: Tests — Test Db: 
Damp heat, cyclic (12 h + 12 h cycle)  
IEC 60068-2-64: Environmental testing — Part 2-64: Tests — Test Fh: 
Vibration, broadband random and guidance  
IEC 60068-2-78 Environmental testing — Part 2-78: Tests — Test Cab: 
Damp heat, steady state  
ISO 16750-3 — Mechanical loads (2012-12)  
ISO 16750-4 — Climatic loads(2010-04).  
ISO 20653: Road vehicles — Degree of protection (IP code) — Protection 
of electrical equipment against foreign objects, water and access  
ISO 10605:2008 + Technical Corrigendum:2010 + AMD1:2014 Road 
vehicles — Test methods for electrical disturbances from electrostatic 
discharge  
ISO 7637-1:2002 + AMD1: 2008 Road vehicles — Electrical disturbances 
from conduction and coupling — Part 1: Definitions and general consider ­
ations.  
ISO 7637-2 Road vehicles — Electrical disturbances from conduction and 
coupling — Part 2: Electrical transient conduction along supply lines only.  
ISO 7637-3 Road vehicles — Electrical disturbances from conduction and 
coupling — Part 3: Electrical transient transmission by capacitive and 
inductive coupling via lines other than supply lines.  
ISO/IEC 7816-1 Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with 
contacts — Part 1: Physical characteristics..  ▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 333  
ISO/IEC 7816-2 Information technology — Identification cards — Inte ­
grated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 2: Dimensions and location 
of the contacts.  
ISO/IEC 7816-3 Information technology — Identification cards — Inte ­
grated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 3: Electronic signals and trans ­
mission protocol.  
ISO/IEC 10373-1:2006 + AMD1:2012 Identification cards — Test methods 
— Part 1: General characteristics  
ISO/IEC 10373-3:2010 + Technical Corrigendum:2013 Identification cards 
— Test methods — Part 3: Integrated circuit cards with contacts and related 
interface devices  
ISO 16844-3:2004, Cor 1:2006 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — 
Part 3: Motion sensor interface (with vehicle units).  
ISO 16844-4 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 4: CAN 
interface  
ISO 16844-6 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 6: Diagnostics  
ISO 16844-7 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 7: Parameters  
ISO 534 Paper and board — Determination of thickness, density and 
specific volume  
UN ECE R10 Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with 
regard to electromagnetic compatibility (United Nation Economic 
Commission for Europe)  
2. VEHICLE UNIT FUNCTIONAL TESTS  
▼M1 
No Test Description Related requirements  
1. Administrative examination 
1.1 Documentation  Correctness of documentation  
1.2 Manufacturer test 
results Results of manufacturer test performed during inte ­
gration. 
Paper demonstrations.  88, 89,91 
2. Visual inspection 
2,1 Compliance with documentation  
2.2 Identification / markings  224 to 226 
2.3 Materials  219 to 223 
2.4 Sealing  398, 401 to 405 
2.5 External interfaces  
3. Functional tests 
3.1 Functions provided 02, 03, 04, 05, 07, 382 
3.2 Modes of operation 09 to 11*, 134, 135 
3.3 Functions and data access rights  12* 13*, 382, 383, 386 to 
389 
3.4 Monitoring cards insertion and withdrawal  15, 16, 17, 18, 19*, 20*, 
134 
3.5 Speed and distance measurement  21 to 31 ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 334  
No Test Description Related requirements  
3.6 Time measurement (test performed at 20 °C)  38 to 43 
3.7 Monitoring driver activities  44 to 53, 134 
3.8 Monitoring driving status  54, 55, 134 
3.9 Manual entries  56 to 62 
3.10 Company locks management  63 to 68 
3.11 Monitoring control activities  69, 70 
3.12 Detection of events and/or faults  71 to 88, 134 
3.13 Equipment identification data  93*, 94*, 97, 100 
3.14 Driver card insertion and withdrawal data  102* to 104* 
3.15 Driver activity data  105* to 107* 
3.16 Places and positions data  108* to 112* 
3.17 Odometer data  113* to 115* 
3.18 Detailed speed data  116* 
3.19 Events data  117* 
3.20 Faults data  118* 
3.21 Calibration data  119* to 121* 
3.22 Time adjustment data  124*, 125* 
3.23 Control activity data  126*, 127* 
3.24 Company locks data  128* 
3.25 Download activity data  129* 
3.26 Specific conditions data  130*, 131* 
3.27 Recording and storing on tachographs cards  136, 137, 138*, 139*, 
141*, 142, 143 
144, 145, 146*, 147*, 
148*, 149, 150  
3.28 Displaying 90, 134, 
151 to 168, 
PIC_001, DIS_001  
3.29 Printing 90, 134, 
169 to 181, PIC_001, 
PRT_001 to PRT_014 
3.30 Warning  134, 182 to 191, 
PIC_001  ▼M1
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No Test Description Related requirements  
3.31 Data downloading to external media  90, 134, 192 to 196 
3.32 Remote communication for targeted roadside checks  197 to 199 
3.33 Output data to additional external devices  200, 201 
3.34 Calibration  202 to 206*, 383, 384, 
386 to 391 
3.35 Roadside calibration checking  207 to 209 
3.36 Time adjustment  210 to 212* 
3.37 Non-interference of additional functions  06, 425 
3.38 Motion sensor interface  02, 122 
3.39 External GNSS facility  03, 123 
3.40 Verify that the VU detects, records and stores the event(s) and/or fault(s) 
defined by the VU manufacturer when a paired motion sensor reacts to 
magnetic fields disturbing vehicle motion detection.  217 
3.41 Cypher suite and standardized domain parameters  CSM_48, CSM_50  
4. Environmental tests 
4.1 Temperature  Verify functionality through: 
Test according to ISO 16750-4, Chapter 5.1.1.2: 
Low temperature operation test (72 h @ – 20 °C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-1: Environmental 
testing - Part 2-1: Tests - Test A: Cold 
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.2.2: 
High temperature operation test (72 h at 70 °C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-2: Basic environ ­
mental testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests B: 
dry heat 
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.3.2: Rapid 
change of temperature with specified transition 
duration (– 20 °C/70 °C, 20 cycles, dwell time 2h 
at each temperature) 
A reduced set of tests (among those defined in 
section 3 of this table) can be carried out at the 
lower temperature, the higher temperature and 
during the temperature cycles  213 
4.2 Humidity  Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a cyclic 
damp (heat test) through IEC 60068-2-30, test Db, 
six 24 hours cycles, each temperature varying from 
+25 °C to + 55 °C and a relative humidity of 97 % 
at + 25 °C and equal to 93 % at +55 °C  214 ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 336  
No Test Description Related requirements  
4.3 Mechanical  1. Sinusoidal vibrations. 
verify that the vehicle unit can withstand sinu ­
soidal vibrations with the following character ­
istics: 
constant displacement between 5 and 11 Hz: 
10mm peak 
constant acceleration between 11 and 300 Hz: 5g 
This requirement is verified through IEC 60068- 
2-6, test Fc, with a minimum test duration of 3 × 
12 hours (12 hours per axis) 
ISO 16750-3 does not require a sinusoidal 
vibration test for devices located in the 
decoupled vehicle cab. 
2. Random vibrations: 
Test according to ISO 16750-3: Chapter 4.1.2.8: 
Test VIII: Commercial vehicle, decoupled vehicle 
cab 
Random vibration test, 10…2000 Hz, RMS 
vertical 21,3 m/s  2 , RMS longitudinal 11,8 m/s  2 , 
RMS lateral 13,1 m/s  2 , 3 axes, 32 h per axis, 
including temperature cycle – 20…70 °C. 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-64: Environmen ­
tal testing - Part 2-64: Tests - Test Fh: Vibration, 
broadband random and guidance 
3. Shocks: 
mechanical shock with 3 g half sinus according 
ISO 16750. 
The tests described above are performed on different 
samples of the equipment type being tested.  219 
4.4 Protection against 
water and foreign 
bodies  Test according to ISO 20653: Road vehicles – 
Degree of protection (IP code) – Protection of elec ­
trical equipment against foreign objects, water and 
access (No change in parameters); Minimum value 
IP 40  220, 221 
4.5 Over-voltage 
protection  Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a power 
supply of: 
24 V versions: 34V at + 40 °C 1 hour 
12V versions: 17V at + 40 °C 1 hour 
(ISO 16750-2)  216 ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 337  
No Test Description Related requirements  
4.6 Reverse polarity 
protection  Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand an 
inversion of its power supply 
(ISO 16750-2) 216 
4.7 Short-circuit 
protection  Verify that input output signals are protected against 
short circuits to power supply and ground 
(ISO 16750-2) 216 
5. EMC tests 
5.1 Radiated emissions 
and susceptibility  Compliance with Regulation ECE R10  218 
5.2 Electrostatic 
discharge Compliance with ISO 10605:2008 + 
Technical Corrigendum:2010 + 
AMD1:2014: +/– 4 kV for contact and +/– 8 kV for 
air discharge  218 
5.3 Conducted transient 
susceptibility on 
power supply For 24V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-2 + 
ECE Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3: 
pulse 1a: Vs=450V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 2a: Vs=+37V Ri=2 ohms 
pulse 2b: Vs=+20V Ri=0,05 ohms 
pulse 3a: Vs=– 150V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 3b: Vs=+150V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 4: Vs=– 16V Va=– 12V t6=100ms 
pulse 5: Vs=+120V Ri=2,2 ohms td=250ms 
For 12V versions: compliance with ISO 7637– 1 + 
ECE Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3: 
pulse 1: Vs=– 75V Ri=10 ohms 
pulse 2a: Vs=+37V Ri=2 ohms 
pulse 2b: Vs=+10V Ri=0,05 ohms 
pulse 3a: Vs=– 112V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 3b: Vs=+75V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 4: Vs=– 6V Va=– 5V t6=15ms 
pulse 5: Vs=+65V Ri=3ohms td=100ms 
Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units 
designed to be installed in vehicles for which no 
external common protection against load dump is 
implemented 
For load dump proposal, refer to ISO 16750-2, 4th 
edition, chapter 4.6.4.  218 ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 338  
3. MOTION SENSOR FUNCTIONAL TESTS  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
1. Administrative examination  
1.1 Documentation  Correctness of documentation  
2. Visual inspection  
2.1. Compliance with documentation  
2.2. Identification/markings  225, 226,  
2.3 Materials  219 to 223  
2.4. Sealing  398, 401 to 405  
3. Functional tests  
3.1 Sensor identification data  95 to 97*  
3.2 Motion sensor — vehicle unit pairing  122*, 204  
3.3 Motion detection 
Motion measurement accuracy  30 to 35  
3.4 Vehicle unit interface  02  
3.5 Check that the motion sensor is immune to constant magnetic field. Alter ­
natively, verify that the motion sensor reacts to constant magnetic fields 
disturbing vehicle motion detection so that a connected VU can detect, record 
and store sensor faults  217 
4. Environmental tests  
4.1 Operating temperature  Verify functionality (as defined in test No 3.3) 
in temperature range [– 40°C; + 135°C] 
through: 
IEC 60068-2-1 test Ad, with a test duration of 
96 hours at the lowest temperature To  min , 
IEC 60068-2-2 test Bd, with a test duration of 
96 hours at the highest temperature To  max 
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.1.2: 
Low temperature operation test (24 h @ – 
40 °C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-1: Environmen ­
tal testing — Part 2-1: Tests — Test A: Cold 
IEC 68-2-2 test Bd, with a test duration of 96 
hours at the lowest temperature of – 40°C. 
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.2.2: 
High temperature operation test (96 h @ 
135 °C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-2: Basic envi ­
ronmental testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests 
B: dry heat  213 ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 339  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
4.2 Temperature cycles  Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.3.2: 
Rapid change of temperature with specified tran ­
sition duration (– 40°C/135 °C, 20 cycles, dwell 
time 30 min at each temperature) 
IEC 60068-2-14: Environmental testing; Part 2- 
14: Tests; Test N: Change of temperature  213 
4.3 Humidity cycles  Verify functionality (as defined in test No. 3.3) 
through IEC 60068-2-30, test Db, six 24 hours 
cycles, each temperature varying from + 25°C to 
+ 55°C and a relative humidity of 97 % at + 
25°C and equal to 93 % at + 55°C  214 
4.4 Vibration  ISO 16750-3: Chapter 4.1.2.6: Test VI: 
Commercial vehicle, engine, gearbox 
Mixed mode vibration test including 
a) Sinusoidal vibration test, 20…520 Hz, 11,4 
… 120 m/s  2 , <= 0,5 oct/min 
b) Random vibration test, 10…2 000 Hz, RMS 
177 m/s  2 
94 h per axis, including temperature cycle – 
20…70°C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-80: Environmen ­
tal testing — Part 2-80: Tests — Test Fi: 
Vibration — Mixed mode  219 
4.5 Mechanical shock  ISO 16750-3: Chapter 4.2.3: Test VI: Test for 
devices in or on the gearbox 
half-sinusoidal shock, acceleration to be agreed 
in the range 3 000…15 000 m/s  2 , pulse duration 
to be agreed, however < 1 ms, number of 
shocks: to be agreed 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-27: Environmen ­
tal testing. Part 2: Tests. Test Ea and guidance: 
Shock  219 
4.6 Protection against water and 
foreign bodies  Test according to ISO 20653: Road vehicles — 
Degree of protection (IP code) — Protection of 
electrical equipment against foreign objects, 
water and access 
(Target value IP 64)  220, 221  
4.7 Reverse polarity protection  Verify that the motion sensor can withstand an 
inversion of its power supply  216 
4.8 Short circuit protection  Verify that input output signals are protected 
against short circuits to power supply and 
ground  216 ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 340  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
5. EMC  
5.1 radiated emissions and 
susceptibility  Verify compliance with Regulation ECE R10  218  
5.2 Electrostatic discharge  Compliance with ISO 10605:2008 + Technical 
Corrigendum:2010 + AMD1:2014: +/– 4kV for 
contact and +/– 8kV for air discharge  218 
5.3 Conducted transient suscepti ­
bility on data lines)  For 24V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-2 
+ ECE Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3: 
pulse 1a: Vs = – 450 V Ri = 50 ohms 
pulse 2a: Vs = + 37 V Ri = 2 ohms 
pulse 2b: Vs = + 20 V Ri = 0,05 ohms 
pulse 3a: Vs = – 150 V Ri = 50 ohms 
pulse 3b: Vs = + 150 V Ri = 50 ohms 
pulse 4: Vs= – 16 V Va = – 12 V t6 = 100ms 
pulse 5: Vs = + 120 V Ri = 2,2 ohms td = 
250ms 
For 12V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-1 
+ ECE Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3: 
pulse 1: Vs = – 75 V Ri = 10 ohms 
pulse 2a: Vs = + 37 V Ri = 2 ohms 
pulse 2b: Vs = + 10 V Ri = 0,05 ohms 
pulse 3a: Vs = – 112 V Ri = 50 ohms 
pulse 3b: Vs = + 75 V Ri = 50 ohms 
pulse 4: Vs= – 6 V Va=-5 V t6 = 15 ms 
pulse 5: Vs = + 65 V Ri = 3 ohms td = 100 ms 
Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units 
designed to be installed in vehicles for which 
no external common protection against load 
dump is implemented 
For load dump proposal, refer to ISO 16750-2, 
4th edition, chapter 4.6.4  218 
4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS FUNCTIONAL TESTS  
Tests according to this Section 4,  
no. 5 ‘Protocol tests’,  
no. 6 ‘Card structure’ and  
no. 7 ‘Functional tests’  
can be performed by the evaluator or certifier during the Common Criteria 
(CC) security certification process for the chip module.  
Tests number 2.3 and 4.2 are the same. These are the mechanical tests of the 
combination card body and chip module. If one of these components (card 
body, chip module) is changed, then these tests are necessary.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 341  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
1. Administrative examination  
1.1 Documentation  Correctness of documentation  
2 Card Body  
2.1 Printed Design  Make sure that all features for protection and visible 
data are correctly printed on the card and compliant. 
[Designator] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 227) 
The front page shall contain: 
the words ‘Driver card’ or ‘Control card’ or 
‘Workshop card’ or ‘Company card’ printed in 
capital letters in the official language or languages 
of the Member State issuing the card, according to 
the type of the card. 
[Member State name] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 228) 
The front page shall contain: 
the name of the Member State issuing the card 
(optional). 
[Sign] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 229) 
The front page shall contain: 
the distinguishing sign of the Member State issuing 
the card, printed in negative in a blue rectangle and 
encircled by 12 yellow stars. 
[Enumeration] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 232) 
The reverse page shall contain: 
an explanation of the numbered items which appear 
on the front page of the card. 
[Colour] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 234) 
Tachograph cards shall be printed with the following 
background predominant colours: 
— driver card: white, 
— workshop card: red, 
— control card: blue, 
— company card: yellow.  227 to 229, 232, 234 
to 236  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 342  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
[Security] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 235) 
Tachograph cards shall bear at least the following 
features for protection of the card body against 
counterfeiting and tampering: 
— a security design background with fine guilloche 
patterns and rainbow printing, 
— at least one two-coloured microprint line. 
[Markings] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 236) 
Member States may add colours or markings, such as 
national symbols and security features. 
[Approval mark] 
Tachograph cards shall contain an approval mark. 
The approval mark shall be made up of: 
— a rectangle, within which shall be placed the letter 
‘e’ followed by a distinguishing number or letter 
for the country which has issued the approval, 
— an approval number corresponding to the number 
of the approval certificate for a tachograph card, 
placed at any point within the immediate 
proximity of this rectangle.  
2.2 Mechanical Tests  
[Card size] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[5] Dimension of card, 
[5.1] Card size, 
[5.1.1] Card dimensions and tolererances, 
card type ID-1 Unused card 
[Card edges] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[5] Dimension of card, 
[5.1] Card size, 
[5.1.2] Card edges  240, 243 
ISO/IEC 7810  ▼B
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No Test  Description  Related requirements  
[Card construction] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[6] Card construction 
[Card materials] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[7] Card materials 
[Bending stiffness] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.1] Bending stiffness 
[Toxicity] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.3] Toxicity 
[Resistance to chemicals] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.4] Resistance to chemicals 
[Card stability] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.5] Card dimensional stability and warpage with 
temperature and humidity  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 344  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
[Light] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.6] Light 
[Durability] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical 
specifications’, 241) 
Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating 
correctly for a five-year period if used within the 
environmental and electrical specifications. 
[Peel strength] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.8] Peel strength 
[Adhesion or blocking] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.9] Adhesion or blocking 
[Warpage] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.11] Overall card warpage 
[Resistance to heat] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.12] Resistance to heat  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 345  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
[Surface distortions] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.13] Surface distortions 
[Contamination] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical 
characteristics, 
[8] Card characteristics, 
[8.14] Contamination and interaction of card 
components  
2.3 Mechanical tests with 
chip module embedded  [Bending] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification 
cards — Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: 
Criteria for cards containing integrated circuits 
[9.2] Dynamic bending stress 
Total number of bending cycles: 4 000. 
[Torsion] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification cards 
— Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: Criteria for 
cards containing integrated circuits 
[9.3] Dynamic torsional stress 
Total number of torsion cycles: 4 000.  ISO/IEC 7810  
3 Module  
3.1 Module  Module is the chip encapsulation and the contact 
plate. 
[Surface profile] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7816-1:2011, Identification cards — Inte ­
grated circuit cards — Part 1: Cards with contacts 
— Physical characteristics 
[4.2] Surface profile of contacts  ISO/IEC 7816  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 346  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
[Mechanical strength] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7816-1:2011, Identification cards — Inte ­
grated circuit cards — Part 1: Cards with contacts 
— Physical characteristics 
[4.3] Mechanical strength (of a card and contacts) 
[Electrical resistance] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7816-1:2011, Identification cards — Inte- 
grated circuit cards — Part 1: Cards with contacts — 
Physical characteristics 
[4.4] Electrical resistance (of contacts) 
[Dimension] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007, Identification cards — Inte- 
grated circuit cards — Part 2: Cards with contacts — 
Dimension and location of the contacts 
[3] Dimension of the contacts 
[Location] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007, Identification cards — Inte- 
grated circuit cards — Part 2: Cards with contacts — 
Dimension and location of the contacts 
[4] Number and location of the contacts 
In case of modules with six contacts, contact ‘C4’ and 
‘C8’ are not part of this test requirement.  
4 Chip  
4.1 Chip  
[Operating temperature] 
The Tachograph card chip shall operate in an 
ambient temperature range between – 25 °C and 
+ 85 °C.  241 to 244 
ECE R10 
ISO/IEC 7810 
ISO/IEC 10373  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 347  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
[Temperature and humidity] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and elec ­
trical specifications’, 241) 
Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating 
correctly in all the climatic conditions normally 
encountered in Community territory and at least 
in the temperature range – 25°C to + 70°C with 
occasional peaks of up to + 85°C, ‘occasional’ 
meaning not more than 4 hours each time and 
not over 100 times during the life time of the card. 
The Tachograph cards are exposed in consecutive 
steps to the following temperatures and humidities 
for the given time. After each step the Tachograph 
cards are tested for electrical functionality. 
1. Temperature of – 20 °C for 2 h. 
2. Temperature of +/– 0 °C for 2 h. 
3. Temperature of + 20 °C, 50 % RH, for 2 h. 
4. Temperature of + 50 °C, 50 % RH, for 2 h. 
5. Temperature of + 70 °C, 50 % RH, for 2 h. 
The temperature is increased intermittently to + 
85 °C, 50 % RH, for 60 min. 
6. Temperature of + 70 °C, 85 % RH, for 2 h. 
The temperature is increased intermittently to + 
85 °C, 85 % RH, for 30 min. 
[Humidity] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical 
specifications’, 242) 
Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating 
correctly in the humidity range 10 % to 90 %. 
[Electromagnetic compatibility — EMC] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical 
specifications’ 244) 
During operation, Tachograph cards shall conform to 
ECE R10 related to electromagnetic compatibility.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 348  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
[Static electricity] 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical 
specifications’, 244) 
During operation, Tachograph cards shall be protected 
against electrostatic discharges. 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification cards 
— Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: Criteria for 
cards containing integrated circuits 
[9.4] Static electricity 
[9.4.1] Contact IC cards 
Test voltage: 4 000 V. 
[X-rays] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification cards 
— Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: Criteria for 
cards containing integrated circuits 
[9.1] X-rays 
[Ultraviolet light] 
ISO/IEC 10373-1:2006, Identification cards — Test 
methods — Part 1: General characteristics 
[5.11] Ultraviolet light 
[3-wheel] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 10373-1:2006/Amd. 1:2012, Identification 
cards — Test methods — Part 1: General character- 
istics, Amendment 1 
[5.22] ICC — Mechanical strength: 3 wheel test for 
ICCs with contacts 
[Wrapping] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
MasterCard CQM V2.03:2013 
[11.1.3] R-L3-14-8: Wrapping Test Robustness 
[13.2.1.32] TM-422: Mechanical Reliability: Wrap- 
ping Test  ▼B
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No Test  Description  Related requirements  
4.2 Mechanical tests chip 
module embedded in 
the card body-> same 
as 2.3  [Bending] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification 
cards — Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: 
Criteria for cards containing integrated circuits 
[9.2] Dynamic bending stress 
Total number of bending cycles: 4 000. 
[Torsion] 
Tachograph cards must conform to standard 
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification cards 
— Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: Criteria for 
cards containing integrated circuits 
[9.3] Dynamic torsional stress 
Total number of torsion cycles: 4 000.  ISO/IEC 7810  
5 Protocol tests  
5.1 ATR  Check that the ATR is compliant  ISO/IEC 7816-3 
TCS_14, TCS_17, 
TCS_18  
5.2 T=0  Check that T=0 protocol is compliant  ISO/IEC 7816-3 
TCS_11, TCS_12, 
TCS_13, TCS_15  
5.3 PTS  Check that the PTS command is compliant by setting 
T=1 from T=0.  ISO/IEC 7816-3 
TCS_12, TCS_19, 
TCS_20, TCS_21  
5.4 T=1  Check that T=1 protocol is compliant  ISO/IEC 7816-3 
TCS_11, TCS_13, 
TCS_16  
6 Card structure  
6.1 Test that the file structure of the card is compliant by 
checking the presence of the mandatory files in the 
card and their access conditions  TCS_22 to TCS_28 
TCS_140 to TCS_179  
7 Functional tests  
7.1 Normal processing  Test at least once each allowed usage of each 
command (ex: test the UPDATE BINARY command 
with CLA = ‘00’, CLA = ‘0C’ and with different 
P1,P2 and Lc parameters) 
Check that the operations have actually been 
performed in the card (ex: by reading the file the 
command has been performed on)  TCS_29 to TCS_139  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 350  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
7.2 Error messages  Test at least once each error message (as specified in 
Appendix 2) for each command 
Test at least once every generic error (except ‘ 6400 ’ 
integrity errors checked during security certification)  
7.3 Cypher suite and standardized domain parameters  CSM_48, CSM_50  
8 Personalisation  
8.1 Optical personalisation  Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 230) 
The front page shall contain: 
information specific to the card issued. 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 231) 
The front page shall contain: 
dates using a ‘dd/mm/yyyy’ or ‘dd.mm.yyyy’ format 
(day, month, year). 
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 235) 
Tachograph cards shall bear at least the following 
features for protection of the card body against 
counterfeiting and tampering: 
— in the area of the photograph, the security design 
background and the photograph shall overlap.  230, 231, 235  
5. EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY TESTS  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
1. Administrative examination  
1.1 Documentation  Correctness of documentation  
2. Visual inspection for external GNSS facility  
2.1. Compliance with documentation  
2.2. Identification/markings  224 to 226  
2.3 Materials  219 to 223  
3. Functional tests  
3.1 Sensor identification data  98,99  
3.2 External GNSS module — vehicle unit coupling  123, 205  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 351  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
3.3 GNSS position  36, 37  
3.4 Vehicle unit interface when the GNSS receiver is external to the Vehicle Unit  03  
3.5 Cypher suite and standardized domain parameters  CSM_48, CSM_50  
4. Environmental tests  
4.1 Temperature  Verify functionality through: 
Test according to ISO 16750-4, Chapter 5.1.1.2: Low 
temperature operation test (72 h @ – 20 °C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-1: Environmental testing — 
Part 2-1: Tests — Test A: Cold 
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.2.2: High 
temperature operation test (72 h @ 70 °C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-2: Basic environmental 
testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests B: dry heat 
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.3.2: Rapid change 
of temperature with specified transition duration (– 20 °C/ 
70 °C, 20 cycles, dwell time 1 h at each temperature) 
A reduced set of tests (among those defined in section 3 of 
this table) can be carried out at the lower temperature, the 
higher temperature and during the temperature cycles  213 
4.2 Humidity  Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a cyclic damp 
(heat test) through IEC 60068-2-30, test Db, six 24 hours 
cycles, each temperature varying from + 25 °C to + 55 °C 
and a relative humidity of 97 % at + 25 °C and equal to 
93 % at + 55 °C  214 
4.3 Mechanical  1. Sinusoidal vibrations. 
verify that the vehicle unit can withstand sinusoidal 
vibrations with the following characteristics: 
constant displacement between 5 and 11 Hz: 10 mm peak 
constant acceleration between 11 and 300 Hz: 5g 
This requirement is verified through IEC 60068-2-6, test 
Fc, with a minimum test duration of 3 × 12 hours (12 
hours per axis) 
ISO 16750-3 does not require a sinusoidal vibration test 
for devices located in the decoupled vehicle cab.  219 ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 352  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
2. Random vibrations: 
Test according to ISO 16750-3: Chapter 4.1.2.8: Test VIII: 
Commercial vehicle, decoupled vehicle cab 
Random vibration test, 10…2 000 Hz, RMS vertical 21,3 
m/s  2 , RMS longitudinal 11,8 m/s  2 , RMS lateral 13,1 m/s  2 , 
3 axes, 32 h per axis, including temperature cycle – 
20…70°C. 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-64: Environmental testing 
— Part 2-64: Tests — Test Fh: Vibration, broadband 
random and guidance 
3. Shocks: 
mechanical shock with 3g half sinus according ISO 16750. 
The tests described above are performed on different samples 
of the equipment type being tested.  
4.4 Protection 
against water 
and foreign 
bodies  Test according to ISO 20653: Road vehicles — Degree of 
protection (IP code) — Protection of electrical equipment 
against foreign objects, water and access (No change in 
parameters)  220, 221  
4.5 Over-voltage 
protection  Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a power supply of:  216  
24 V versions:  34 V at + 40 °C 1 
hour 
12V versions:  17 V at + 40 °C 1 
hour 
( ISO 16750-2, chapter 4.3)  
4.6 Reverse polarity 
protection  Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand an inversion of its 
power supply 
(ISO 16750-2, chapter 4.7)  216 
4.7 Short-circuit 
protection  Verify that input output signals are protected against short 
circuits to power supply and ground 
(ISO 16750-2, chapter 4.10])  216 
5 EMC tests  
5.1 Radiated 
emissions and 
susceptibility  Compliance with Regulation ECE R10  218  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 353  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
5.2 Electrostatic 
discharge  Compliance with ISO 10605:2008 + Technical Corri ­
gendum: 2010 + AMD1:2014: +/– 4kV for contact and 
+/– 8kV for air discharge  218 
5.3 Conducted 
transient suscep ­
tibility on power 
supply  For 24V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-2 + ECE 
Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3: 
pulse 1a: Vs = – 450V Ri = 50 ohms 
pulse 2a: Vs= + 37V Ri = 2 ohms 
pulse 2b: Vs= + 20V Ri = 0,05 ohms 
pulse 3a: Vs= – 150V Ri = 50 ohms 
pulse 3b: Vs=+ 150V Ri = 50 ohms 
pulse 4: Vs = – 16 V Va = – 12V t6 = 100 ms 
pulse 5: Vs= + 120 V Ri = 2,2 ohms td = 250 ms 
For 12V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-1 + ECE 
Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3: 
pulse 1: Vs= – 75V Ri=10 ohms 
pulse 2a: Vs= + 37V Ri=2 ohms 
pulse 2b: Vs= + 10V Ri=0,05 ohms 
pulse 3a: Vs= – 112V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 3b: Vs= + 75V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 4: Vs= – 6V Va=-5V t6=15ms 
pulse 5: Vs= + 65V Ri=3ohms td=100ms 
Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units designed to be 
installed in vehicles for which no external common 
protection against load dump is implemented 
For load dump proposal, refer to ISO 16750-2, 4th edition, 
chapter 4.6.4.  218 
▼M1 
6. EXTERNAL REMOTE COMMUNICATION FACILITY TEST  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
1. Administrative examination  
1.1 Documentation  Correctness of docu ­
mentation  
2. Visual inspection  
2.1. Compliance with documentation  
2.2. Identification / markings  225, 226  
2.3 Materials  219 to 223  
3. Functional tests  
3.1 Remote communication for targeted roadside checks  4, 197 to 199  
3.2 Recording and storing in data memory  91  
3.3 Communication with Vehicle Unit  Appendix 14 DSC_66 
to DSC_70, DSC_71 
to DSC_76  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 354  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
4. Environmental tests  
4.1 Temperature  Verify functionality through: 
Test according to ISO 16750-4, Chapter 5.1.1.2: Low 
temperature operation test (72 h @ – 20 °C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-1: Environmental testing 
- Part 2-1: Tests - Test A: Cold 
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.2.2: High 
temperature operation test (72 h @ 70 °C) 
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-2: Basic environmental 
testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests B: dry heat 
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.3.2: Rapid 
change of temperature with specified transition duration 
(– 20 °C/70 °C, 20 cycles, dwell time 1 h at each 
temperature) 
A reduced set of tests (among those defined in section 3 
of this table) can be carried out at the lower temperature, 
the higher temperature and during the temperature cycles  213 
4.2 Protection against 
water and foreign 
bodies  Test according to ISO 20653: Road vehicles – Degree of 
protection (IP code) – Protection of electrical equipment 
against foreign objects, water and access (targeted value 
IP40)  220, 221  
5 EMC tests  
5.1 Radiated emissions 
and susceptibility  Compliance with Regulation ECE R10  218  
5.2 Electrostatic 
discharge  Compliance with ISO 10605:2008 + Technical Corrigen ­
dum:2010 + AMD1:2014: +/– 4 kV for contact and +/– 
8 kV for air discharge  218 
5.3 Conducted transient 
susceptibility on 
power supply  For 24V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-2 + ECE 
Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3: 
pulse 1a: Vs=– 450V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 2a: Vs=+37V Ri=2 ohms 
pulse 2b: Vs=+20V Ri=0,05 ohms 
pulse 3a: Vs=– 150V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 3b: Vs=+150V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 4: Vs=– 16V Va=-12V t6=100ms 
pulse 5: Vs=+120V Ri=2,2 ohms td=250ms 
For 12V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-1 + ECE 
Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3: 
pulse 1: Vs=-75V Ri=10 ohms 
pulse 2a: Vs=+37V Ri=2 ohms 
pulse 2b: Vs=+10V Ri=0,05 ohms 
pulse 3a: Vs=– 112V Ri=50 ohms  218 ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 355  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
pulse 3b: Vs=+75V Ri=50 ohms 
pulse 4: Vs=– 6V Va=– 5V t6=15ms 
pulse 5: Vs=+65V Ri=3ohms td=100ms 
Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units designed to 
be installed in vehicles for which no external common 
protection against load dump is implemented 
For load dump proposal, refer to ISO 16750-2, 4th 
edition, chapter 4.6.4.  
▼B 
7. PAPER FUNCTIONAL TESTS  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
1. Administrative examination  
1.1 Documentation  Correctness of documentation  
2 General Tests  
2.1 Number of characters 
per line  Visual inspection of printouts.  172  
2.2 Minimum character 
size Visual inspection of printout and character inspection.  173  
2.3 Supported character 
sets The printer shall support characters specified in 
Appendix 1 Chapter 4 ‘Character sets’.  174 
2.4 Printouts definition  Check of tachograph type approval and visual 
inspection of printouts  174 
2.5 Legibility and identi ­
fication of printouts  Inspection of printouts 
Demonstrated by test reports and test protocols by 
manufacturer. 
All homologation number(s) of tachographs with which 
the printer paper may be used are imprinted on the 
paper.  175, 177, 178  
2.6 Addition of hand ­
written notes  Visual inspection: Field for signature of the driver is 
available. 
Fields for additional other handwritten entries are avail ­
able.  180 
2.7 Additional details on 
paper faces.  Paper's face and reverse side may feature additional 
details and information. 
These additional details and information may not 
interfere with the legibility of the printouts. 
Visual inspection.  177, 178  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 356  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
3 Storage Tests  
3.1 Dry Heat  Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 
3 % relative humidity 
Test environment: 72 hours at + 70 °C ± 2 °C 
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % 
relative humidity  176, 178 
IEC 60068-2-2-Bb  
2.2 Damp Heat  Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % 
±3 % relative humidity 
Test environment: 144 hours at + 55 °C ± 2 °C and 
93 % ± 3 % r.h. 
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % 
relative humidity  176, 178 
IEC 60068-2-78-Cab  
4 Paper In-Service Tests  
4.1 Humidity resistance 
background 
(unprinted paper)  Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % 
±3 % relative humidity 
Test environment: 144 hours at + 55 °C ± 2 °C and 
93 % ± 3 % r.h. 
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % 
relative humidity  176, 178 
IEC 60068-2-78-Cab  
4.2 Printability  Preconditioning: 24 hours at + 40 °C ± 2 °C/93 % ± 
3 % relative humidity 
Test environment: printout produced at + 23 °C ± 2 °C 
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % 
relative humidity  176, 178  
4.3 Heat resistance  Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 
3 % relative humidity 
Test environment: 2 hours at + 70 °C ± 2 °C, dry heat 
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % 
relative humidity  176, 178 
IEC 60068-2-2-Bb  
4.4 Low temperature 
resistance  Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 
3 % relative humidity 
Test environment: 24 hours – 20 °C ± 3 °C, dry cold 
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % 
relative humidity  176, 178 
ISO 60068-2-1-Ab  
4.5 Light resistance  Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 
3 % relative humidity 
Test environment: 100 hours under 5 000 Lux illumi ­
nation at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % relative humidity 
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % 
relative humidity  176, 178  
Legibility criteria for tests 3.x and 4.x:  
Printout legibility is assured if optical densities comply with the following 
limits:  
Printed characters: min. 1,0  
Background (unprinted paper): max. 0,2  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 357  
Optical densities of the resulting printouts shall be measured according to 
DIN EN ISO 534.  
Printouts shall show no dimensional changes and remain clearly legible.  
8. INTEROPERABILITY TESTS  
▼M1 
No Test  Description  
8.1 Interoperability tests between vehicle units and tachograph cards  
1 Mutual authentication  Check that the mutual authentication between the vehicle unit and 
the tachograph card runs normally  
2 Write/read tests  Execute a typical activity scenario on the vehicle unit. The scenario 
shall be adapted to the type of card being tested and involve writings 
in as many EFs as possible in the card 
Verify through a vehicle unit downloading that all corresponding 
recordings have been properly made 
Verify through a card downloading that all corresponding recordings 
have been properly made 
Verify through daily printouts that all corresponding recordings can 
be properly read  
8.2 Interoperability tests between vehicle units and motion sensors  
1 Pairing  Check that the pairing between the vehicle units and the motion 
sensors runs normally  
2 Activity tests  Execute a typical activity scenario on the motion sensor. The 
scenario shall involve a normal activity and creating as many 
events or faults as possible. 
Verify through a vehicle unit downloading that all corresponding 
recordings have been properly made 
Verify through a card downloading that all corresponding recordings 
have been properly made 
Verify through a daily printout that all corresponding recordings can 
be properly read  
8.3 Interoperability tests between vehicle units and external GNSS facilities (when applicable)  
1 Mutual authentication  Check that the mutual authentication (coupling) between the vehicle 
unit and the external GNSS module runs normally.  
2 Activity tests  Execute a typical activity scenario on the external GNSS facility. The 
scenario shall involve a normal activity and creating as many events 
or faults as possible. 
Verify through a vehicle unit downloading that all corresponding 
recordings have been properly made 
Verify through a card downloading that all corresponding recordings 
have been properly made 
Verify through a daily printout that all corresponding recordings can 
be properly read  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 358  
Appendix 10  
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS  
This appendix specifies the IT security requirements for the smart tachograph 
system components (second-generation tachograph).  
SEC_001 The following components of the smart tachograph system shall be 
security certified according to the Common Criteria scheme:  
— vehicle unit  
— tachograph card,  
— motion sensor,  
— external GNSS facility.  
SEC_002 The minimum IT security requirements to be met by each component 
needing to be security certified shall be defined in a component 
Protection Profile, according to the Common Criteria scheme.  
SEC_003 The European Commission shall make sure that four Protection 
Profiles compliant with this Annex are sponsored, developed, 
approved by the governmental IT security certification bodies 
organised within the Joint Interpretation Working Group (JIWG) 
which is supporting the mutual recognition of certificates under the 
umbrella of the European SOGIS-MRA (Agreement on Mutual 
Recognition of Information Technology Security Evaluation Certifi ­
cates) and registered:  
— Protection Profile for vehicle unit,  
— Protection Profile for tachograph card,  
— Protection Profile for motion sensor,  
— Protection Profile for external GNSS facility.  
The Protection Profile for vehicle unit shall address the cases when the VU is 
designed to be used or not with an external GNSS facility. In the former case, the 
security requirements of the external GNSS facility are provided in the dedicated 
Protection Profile.  
SEC_004 Component manufacturers shall refine and complete the appropriate 
component Protection Profile as necessary, without amending or 
deleting existing threats, objectives, procedural means and security 
enforcing functions specifications, in order to build a Security 
Target against which they shall seek the security certification of the 
component.  
SEC_005 Strict conformance of such specific Security Target with the 
corresponding Protection Profile must be stated during the evaluation 
process.  
SEC_006 The assurance level for each Protection Profile shall be EAL4 
augmented by the assurance components ATE_DPT.2 and 
AVA_VAN.5.  ▼B
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Appendix 11  
COMMON SECURITY MECHANISMS  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
PREAMBLE  
PART A FIRST-GENERATION TACHOGRAPH SYSTEM  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. References  
1.2. Notations and abbreviated terms  
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS  
2.1. Cryptographic systems  
2.2. Cryptographic algorithms  
2.2.1 RSA algorithm  
2.2.2 Hash algorithm  
2.2.3 Data Encryption Algorithm  
3. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES  
3.1. Keys generation and distribution  
3.1.1 RSA Keys generation and distribution  
3.1.2 RSA Test keys  
3.1.3 Motion sensor keys  
3.1.4 T-DES session keys generation and distribution  
3.2. Keys  
3.3. Certificates  
3.3.1 Certificates content  
3.3.2 Certificates issued  
3.3.3 Certificate verification and unwrapping  
4. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM  
5. VU-CARDS DATA TRANSFER CONFIDENTIALITY, 
INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS  
5.1. Secure Messaging  
5.2. Treatment of Secure Messaging errors  
5.3. Algorithm to compute Cryptographic Checksums  
5.4. Algorithm to compute cryptograms for confidentiality DOs  
6. DATA DOWNLOAD DIGITAL SIGNATURE MECHANISMS  
6.1. Signature generation  ▼B
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6.2. Signature verification  
PART B SECOND-GENERATION TACHOGRAPH SYSTEM  
7. INTRODUCTION  
7.1. References  
7.2. Notations and Abbreviations  
7.3. Definitions  
8. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS  
8.1. Cryptographic Systems  
8.2. Cryptographic Algorithms  
8.2.1 Symmetric Algorithms  
8.2.2 Asymmetric Algorithms and Standardized Domain Parameters  
8.2.3 Hashing algorithms  
8.2.4 Cipher Suites  
9. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES  
9.1. Asymmetric Key Pairs and Public Key Certificates  
9.1.1 General  
9.1.2 European Level  
9.1.3 Member State Level  
9.1.4 Equipment Level: Vehicle Units  
9.1.5 Equipment Level: Tachograph Cards  
9.1.6 Equipment Level: External GNSS Facilities  
9.1.7 Overview: Certificate Replacement  
9.2. Symmetric Keys  
9.2.1 Keys for Securing VU — Motion Sensor Communication  
9.2.2 Keys for Securing DSRC Communication  
9.3. Certificates  
9.3.1 General  
9.3.2 Certificate Content  
9.3.3 Requesting Certificates  
10. VU- CARD MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SECURE 
MESSAGING  
10.1. General  
10.2. Mutual Certificate Chain Verification  
10.2.1 Card Certificate Chain Verification by VU  ▼B
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10.2.2 VU Certificate Chain Verification by Card  
10.3. VU Authentication  
10.4. Chip Authentication and Session Key Agreement  
10.5. Secure Messaging  
10.5.1 General  
10.5.2 Secure Message Structure  
10.5.3 Secure Messaging Session Abortion  
11. VU — EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY COUPLING, MUTUAL 
AUTHENTICATION AND SECURE MESSAGING  
11.1. General  
11.2. VU and External GNSS Facility Coupling  
11.3. Mutual Certificate Chain Verification  
11.3.1 General  
11.3.2 During VU — EGF Coupling  
11.3.3 During Normal Operation  
11.4. VU Authentication, Chip Authentication and Session Key 
Agreement  
11.5. Secure Messaging  
12. VU — MOTION SENSOR PAIRING AND COMMUNICATION  
12.1. General  
12.2. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing Using Different Key Generations  
12.3. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing and Communication using AES  
12.4. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing For Different Equipment Gener ­
ations  
13. SECURITY FOR REMOTE COMMUNICATION OVER DSRC  
13.1. General  
13.2. Tachograph Payload Encryption and MAC Generation  
13.3. Verification and Decryption of Tachograph Payload  
14. SIGNING DATA DOWNLOADS AND VERIFYING 
SIGNATURES  
14.1. General  
14.2. Signature generation  
14.3. Signature verification  ▼B
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PREAMBLE  
This Appendix specifies the security mechanisms ensuring  
— mutual authentication between different components of the tachograph 
system.  
— confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and/or non-repudiation of data trans ­
ferred between different components of the tachograph system or downloaded 
to external storage media.  
This Appendix consists of two parts. Part A defines the security mechanisms for 
the first-generation tachograph system (digital tachograph). Part B defines the 
security mechanisms for the second-generation tachograph system (smart tacho ­
graph).  
The mechanisms specified in Part A of this Appendix shall apply if at least one 
of the components of the tachograph system involved in a mutual authentication 
and/or data transfer process is of the first generation.  
The mechanisms specified in Part B of this Appendix shall apply if both 
components of the tachograph system involved in the mutual authentication 
and/or data transfer process are of the second generation.  
Appendix 15 provides more information regarding the use of first generation 
components in combination with second-generation components.  
PART A  
FIRST-GENERATION TACHOGRAPH SYSTEM  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. References  
The following references are used in this Appendix:  
SHA-1 National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).  FIPS Publication 180-1: Secure Hash 
Standard . April 1995.  
PKCS1 RSA Laboratories. PKCS # 1:  RSA Encryption 
Standard . Version 2.0. October 1998.  
TDES National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).  FIPS Publication 46-3: Data Encryption 
Standard . Draft 1999.  
TDES-OP ANSI X9.52, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm 
Modes of Operation. 1998.  
ISO/IEC 7816-4 Information Technology — Identification cards — 
Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 4: 
Interindustry commands for interexchange. First 
edition: 1995 + Amendment 1: 1997.  
ISO/IEC 7816-6 Information Technology — Identification cards — 
Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 6: 
Interindustry data elements. First edition: 1996 + 
Cor 1: 1998.  
ISO/IEC 7816-8 Information Technology — Identification cards — 
Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 8: 
Security related interindustry commands. First edition 
1999.  
ISO/IEC 9796-2 Information Technology — Security techniques — 
Digital signature schemes giving message recovery 
— Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash function. First 
edition: 1997.  ▼B
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ISO/IEC 9798-3 Information Technology — Security techniques — 
Entity authentication mechanisms — Part 3: Entity 
authentication using a public key algorithm. Second 
edition 1998.  
ISO 16844-3 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 3: 
Motion sensor interface.  
1.2. Notations and abbreviated terms  
The following notations and abbreviated terms are used in this Appendix:  
(K a , K  b , K  c ) a key bundle for use by the Triple Data Encryption 
Algorithm,  
CA Certification Authority,  
CAR Certification Authority Reference,  
CC Cryptographic Checksum,  
CG Cryptogram,  
CH Command Header,  
CHA Certificate Holder Authorisation,  
CHR Certificate Holder Reference,  
D() Decryption with DES,  
DE Data Element,  
DO Data Object,  
d RSA private key, private exponent,  
e RSA public key, public exponent,  
E() Encryption with DES,  
EQT Equipment,  
Hash()  hash value, an output of  Hash , 
Hash  hash function,  
KID Key Identifier,  
Km TDES key. Master Key defined in ISO 16844-3.  
Km  VU TDES key inserted in vehicle units.  
Km  WC TDES key inserted in workshop cards.  
m message representative, an integer between 0 and  n-1, 
n RSA keys, modulus,  
PB Padding Bytes,  
PI Padding Indicator byte (for use in Cryptogram for 
confidentiality DO),  
PV Plain Value,  
s signature representative, an integer between 0 and  n-1, 
SSC Send Sequence Counter,  
SM Secure Messaging,  
TCBC TDEA Cipher Block Chaining Mode of Operation  ▼B
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TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm,  
TLV Tag Length Value,  
VU Vehicle Unit,  
X.C the certificate of user X issued by a certification auth ­
ority,  
X.CA a certification authority of user X,  
X.CA.PK  o X.C the operation of unwrapping a certificate to extract a 
public key. It is an infix operator, whose left operand 
is the public key of a certification authority, and 
whose right operand is the certificate issued by that 
certification authority. The outcome is the public key 
of the user X whose certificate is the right operand,  
X.PK RSA public key of a user X,  
X.PK[I] RSA encipherment of some information I, using the 
public key of user X,  
X.SK RSA private key of a user X,  
X.SK[I] RSA encipherment of some information I, using the 
private key of user X,  
‘xx’ an Hexadecimal value,  
|| concatenation operator.  
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS  
2.1. Cryptographic systems  
CSM_001 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use a classical RSA 
public-key cryptographic system to provide the following 
security mechanisms:  
— authentication between vehicle units and cards,  
— transport of Triple-DES session keys between vehicle 
units and tachograph cards,  
— digital signature of data downloaded from vehicle units or 
tachograph cards to external media.  
CSM_002 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use a Triple DES 
symmetric cryptographic system to provide a mechanism for 
data integrity during user data exchange between vehicle 
units and tachograph cards, and to provide, where applicable, 
confidentiality of data exchange between vehicle units and 
tachograph cards.  
2.2. Cryptographic algorithms  
2.2.1  RSA algorithm  
CSM_003 The RSA algorithm is fully defined by the following 
relations:  ▼B
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X.SK[ m] = s = m d mod n 
X.PK[ s] = m = s e mod n 
A more comprehensive description of the RSA function can 
be found in reference [PKCS1]. Public exponent, e, for RSA 
calculations is an integer between 3 and n-1 satisfying gcd(e, 
lcm(p-1, q-1))=1.  
2.2.2  Hash algorithm  
CSM_004 The digital signature mechanisms shall use the SHA-1 hash 
algorithm as defined in reference [SHA-1].  
2.2.3  Data Encryption Algorithm  
CSM_005 DES based algorithms shall be used in Cipher Block 
Chaining mode of operation.  
3. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES  
3.1. Keys generation and distribution  
3.1.1  RSA Keys generation and distribution  
CSM_006 RSA keys shall be generated through three functional hier ­
archical levels:  
— European level,  
— Member State level,  
— Equipment level.  
CSM_007 At European level, a single European key pair (EUR.SK and 
EUR.PK) shall be generated. The European private key shall 
be used to certify the Member States public keys. Records of 
all certified keys shall be kept. These tasks shall be handled 
by a European Certification Authority, under the authority 
and responsibility of the European Commission.  
CSM_008 At Member State level, a Member State key pair (MS.SK 
and MS.PK) shall be generated. Member States public keys 
shall be certified by the European Certification Authority. 
The Member State private key shall be used to certify 
public keys to be inserted in equipment (vehicle unit or 
tachograph card). Records of all certified public keys shall 
be kept with the identification of the equipment to which it is 
intended. These tasks shall be handled by a Member State 
Certification Authority. A Member State may regularly 
change its key pair.  
CSM_009 At equipment level, one single key pair (EQT.SK and 
EQT.PK) shall be generated and inserted in each equipment. 
Equipment public keys shall be certified by a Member State 
Certification Authority. These tasks may be handled by 
equipment manufacturers, equipment personalisers or 
Member State authorities. This key pair is used for authenti ­
cation, digital signature and encipherement services  
CSM_010 Private keys confidentiality shall be maintained during gener ­
ation, transport (if any) and storage.  ▼B
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The following picture summarises the data flow of this 
process:
  
3.1.2  RSA Test keys  
CSM_011 For the purpose of equipment testing (including interoper ­
ability tests) the European Certification Authority shall 
generate a different single European test key pair and at 
least two Member State test key pairs, the public keys of 
which shall be certified with the European private test key. 
Manufacturers shall insert, in equipment undergoing type 
approval tests, test keys certified by one of these Member 
State test keys.  
3.1.3  Motion sensor keys  
The confidentiality of the three Triple DES keys described below shall be 
appropriately maintained during generation, transport (if any) and 
storage.  
In order to support tachograph components compliant with ISO 16844, 
the European Certification Authority and the Member State Certification 
Authorities shall, in addition, ensure the following:  
CSM_036 The European Certification authority shall generate KmVU 
and KmWC, two independent and unique Triple DES keys, 
and generate Km as:  Km = Km  VU XOR Km  WC . The 
European Certification Authority shall forward these keys, 
under appropriately secured procedures, to Member States 
Certification Authorities at their request.  ▼B
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CSM_037 Member States Certification Authorities shall:  
— use Km to encrypt motion sensor data requested by 
motion sensor manufacturers (data to be encrypted with 
Km is defined in ISO 16844-3),  
— forward Km  VU to vehicle unit manufacturers, under 
appropriately secured procedures, for insertion in 
vehicle units,  
— ensure that Km  WC will be inserted in all workshop cards 
(
 in
  
elementary file) during card personalisation.  
3.1.4  T-DES session keys generation and distribution  
CSM_012 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall, as a part of the 
mutual authentication process, generate and exchange 
necessary data to elaborate a common Triple DES session 
key. This exchange of data shall be protected for confiden ­
tiality through an RSA crypt-mechanism.  
CSM_013 This key shall be used for all subsequent cryptographic oper ­
ations using secure messaging. Its validity shall expire at the 
end of the session (withdrawal of the card or reset of the 
card) and/or after 240 use (one use of the key = one 
command using secure messaging sent to the card and asso ­
ciated response).  
3.2. Keys  
CSM_014 RSA keys shall have (whatever the level) the following 
lengths: modulus  n 1 024 bits, public exponent  e 64 bits 
maximum, private exponent  d 1 024 bits.  
CSM_015 Triple DES keys shall have the form (K  a , K  b , K  a ) where K  a 
and K  b are independent 64 bits long keys. No parity error 
detecting bits shall be set.  
3.3. Certificates  
CSM_016 RSA Public key certificates shall be ‘non self-descriptive’ 
‘Card Verifiable’ certificates (Ref.: ISO/IEC 7816-8)  
3.3.1  Certificates content  
CSM_017 RSA Public key certificates are built with the following data 
in the following order:  
Data  Format  Bytes  Obs  
CPI INTEGER  1  Certificate Profile Identifier 
(‘01’ for this version)  
CAR  OCTET 
STRING  8 Certification Authority 
Reference  
CHA  OCTET 
STRING  7 Certificate Holder Author ­
isation  ▼B
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Data  Format  Bytes  Obs  
EOV  TimeReal  4  Certificate end of validity. 
Optional, ‘FF’ padded if 
not used.  
CHR  OCTET 
STRING  8 Certificate Holder 
Reference  
n OCTET 
STRING  128 Public key (modulus)  
e OCTET 
STRING  8 Public Key (public 
exponent)  
164 
Notes:  
1. The ‘Certificate Profile Identifier’ (CPI) delineates the exact structure 
of an authentication certificate. It can be used as an equipment 
internal identifier of a relevant headerlist which describes the concat ­
enation of Data Elements within the certificate.  
The headerlist associated with this certificate content is as follows: 
‘4D’  ‘16’  ‘5F 
29’ ‘01’ ‘42’  ‘08’  ‘5F 
4B’ ‘07’ ‘5F 
24’ ‘04’ ‘5F 
20’ ‘08’ ‘7F 
49’ ‘05’ ‘81’  ‘81 
80’ ‘82’ ‘08’
 Extended Headerlist Tag  
Length of header list  
CPI Tag  
CPI Length  
CAR Tag  
CAR Length  
CHA Tag  
CHA Length  
EOV Tag  
EOV Length  
CHR Tag  
CHR Length  
Public Key Tag (Constructed)  
Length of subsequent DOs  
modulus Tag  
modulus length  
public exponent Tag  
public exponent length 
2. The ‘Certification Authority Reference’ (CAR) has the purpose of 
identifying the certificate issuing CA, in such a way that the Data 
Element can be used at the same time as an Authority Key Identifier 
to reference the Public Key of the Certification Authority (for coding, 
see Key Identifier below).  
3. The ‘Certificate Holder Authorisation’ (CHA) is used to identify the 
rights of the certificate holder. It consists of the Tachograph Appli ­
cation ID and of the type of equipment to which the certificate is 
intended (according to
  data element, ‘00’ for a 
Member State).  ▼B
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4. The ‘Certificate Holder Reference’ (CHR) has the purpose of iden ­
tifying uniquely the certificate holder, in such a way that the Data 
Element can be used at the same time as a Subject Key Identifier to 
reference the Public Key of the certificate holder.  
5. Key Identifiers uniquely identify certificate holder or certification 
authorities. They are coded as follows:  
5.1 Equipment (VU or Card): 
Data  Equipment 
serial number  Date  Type  Manufacturer  
Length  4 Bytes  2 Bytes  1 Byte  1 Byte  
Value  Integer  mm yy BCD coding  Manufacturer 
specific  Manufacturer 
code  
In the case of a VU, the manufacturer, when requesting certifi ­
cates, may or may not know the identification of the equipment in 
which the keys will be inserted.  
In the first case, the manufacturer will send the equipment identi ­
fication with the public key to its Member State authority for 
certification. The certificate will then contain the equipment 
identification, and the manufacturer must ensure that keys and 
certificate are inserted in the intended equipment. The Key 
identifier has the form shown above.  
In the later case, the manufacturer must uniquely identify each 
certificate request and send this identification with the public key 
to its Member State authority for certification. The certificate will 
contain the request identification. The manufacturer must feed 
back its Member State authority with the assignment of key to 
equipment (i.e. certificate request identification, equipment identi ­
fication) after key installation in the equipment. The key identifier 
has the following form: 
Data  Certificate 
request serial 
number  Date  Type  Manufacturer  
Length  4 Bytes  2 Bytes  1 Byte  1 Byte  
Value  Integer  mm yy BCD coding  ‘FF’  Manufacturer 
code ▼B
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5.2 Certification Authority: 
Data  Authority Identifi ­
cation  Key serial 
number  Additional 
info Identifier  
Length  4 Bytes  1 Byte  2 Bytes  1 Byte  
Value  1 Byte nation 
numerical code 
3 Bytes nation 
alphanumerical 
code  Integer  additional 
coding 
(CA specific) 
‘FF FF’ if not 
used ‘01’ 
The key serial number is used to distinguish the different keys of 
a Member State, in the case the key is changed.  
6. Certificate verifiers shall implicitly know that the public key certified 
is an RSA key relevant to authentication, digital signature verification 
and encipherement for confidentiality services (the certificate contains 
no Object Identifier to specify it).  
3.3.2  Certificates issued  
CSM_018 The certificate issued is a digital signature with partial 
recovery of the certificate content in accordance with 
ISO/IEC 9796-2 (except for its annex A4), with the ‘Certifi ­
cation Authority Reference’ appended.  
X.C = X.CA.SK[‘6A’ || C  r || Hash (Cc) || ‘BC’] || C  n || X.CAR 
With certificate content = Cc =  C  r || C  n 
106 bytes  58 bytes  
Notes:  
1. This certificate is 194 bytes long.  
2. CAR, being hidden by the signature, is also appended to the 
signature, such that the Public Key of the Certification Authority 
may be selected for the verification of the certificate.  
3. The certificate verifier shall implicitly know the algorithm used by the 
Certification Authority to sign the certificate.  
4. The headerlist associated with this issued certificate is as follows: 
‘7F 21’  ‘09’  ‘5F 37’  ‘81 80’  ‘5F 38’  ‘3A’  ‘42’  ‘08’
 CV Certificate Tag (Constructed)  
Length of subsequent DOs  
Signature Tag  
Signature Length  
Remainder Tag  
Remainder Length  
CAR Tag  
CAR Length ▼B
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3.3.3  Certificate verification and unwrapping  
Certificate verification and unwrapping consists in verifying the signature 
in accordance with ISO/IEC 9796-2, retrieving the certificate content and 
the public key contained: X.PK = X.CA.PK  o X.C, and verifying the 
validity of the certificate.  
CSM_019 It involves the following steps:  
Verify signature and retrieve content: 
— from X.C retrieve Sign, C  n ' and CAR':  X.C =  Sign  ||  C  n ' ||  CAR'  
128 Bytes  58 Bytes  8 Bytes  
— from CAR' select appropriate Certification Authority 
Public Key (if not done before through other means)  
— open Sign with CA Public Key: Sr'= X.CA.PK [Sign],  
— check Sr' starts with ‘6A’ and ends with ‘BC’ 
— compute C  r ' and H' from: Sr' =  ‘6A’  || C  r ' ||  H'  ||  ‘BC’  
106 Bytes  20 Bytes  
— Recover certificate content C' = C  r ' || C  n ', 
— check  Hash (C') = H'  
If the checks are OK the certificate is a genuine one, its 
content is C'.  
Verify validity. From C':  
— if applicable, check End of validity date,  
Retrieve and store public key, Key Identifier, Certificate 
Holder Authorisation and Certificate End of Validity from C':  
— X.PK =  n || e 
— X.KID = CHR  
— X.CHA = CHA  
— X.EOV = EOV  
4. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM  
Mutual authentication between cards and VUs is based on the following 
principle:  
Each party shall demonstrate to the other that it owns a valid key pair, 
the public key of which has been certified by a Member State certifi ­
cation authority, itself being certified by the European certification auth ­
ority.  
Demonstration is made by signing with the private key a random number 
sent by the other party, who must recover the random number sent when 
verifying this signature.  
The mechanism is triggered at card insertion by the VU. It starts with the 
exchange of certificates and unwrapping of public keys, and ends with 
the setting of a session key.  ▼B
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CSM_020 The following protocol shall be used (arrows indicate 
commands and data exchanged (see Appendix 2)):
  ▼B
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▼B
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5. VU-CARDS DATA TRANSFER CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY 
AND AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS  
5.1. Secure Messaging  
CSM_021 VU-Cards data transfers integrity shall be protected through 
Secure Messaging in accordance with references [ISO/IEC 
7816-4] and [ISO/IEC 7816-8].  
CSM_022 When data need to be protected during transfer, a Crypto ­
graphic Checksum Data Object shall be appended to the Data 
Objects sent within the command or the response. The 
Cryptographic Checksum shall be verified by the receiver.  
CSM_023 The cryptographic checksum of data sent within a command 
shall integrate the command header, and all data objects sent 
(=>CLA = ‘0C’, and all data objects shall be encapsulated 
with tags in which b1=1).  
CSM_024 The response status-information bytes shall be protected by a 
cryptographic checksum when the response contains no data 
field.  
CSM_025 Cryptographic checksums shall be 4 Bytes long.  
The structure of commands and responses when using secure 
messaging is therefore the following:  
The DOs used are a partial set of the Secure Messaging DOs 
described in ISO/IEC 7816-4:  
Tag Mnemonic  Meaning  
‘81’ T  PV Plain Value not BER-TLV coded data (to be 
protected by CC)  
‘97’ T  LE Value of Le in the unsecured command (to be 
protected by CC)  
‘99’ T  SW Status-Info (to be protected by CC)  
‘8E’ T  CC Cryptographic Checksum  
‘87’ T  PI CG  Padding Indicator Byte || Cryptogram (Plain Value 
not coded in BER-TLV)  ▼B
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Given an unsecured command response pair:  
Command header  Command body  
CLA  INS  P1  P2  [L  c field]  [Data field]  [L  e field]  
four bytes  L bytes, denoted as B  1 to B  L 
Response body  Response trailer  
[Data field]  SW1  SW2  
L r data bytes  two bytes  
The corresponding secured command response pair is:  
Secured command:  
Command header (CH)  Command body  
CLA  INS  P1  P2  [New L  c field]  [New Data field]  [New L  e 
field]  
‘OC’  Length of New 
Data field  T PV L PV PV T  LE L LE L e T CC L CC CC ‘00’  
‘81’ L  c Data field  ‘97’  ‘01’  L  e ‘8E’ ‘04’  CC  
Data to be integrated in checksum = CH || PB || T  PV || L  PV || 
PV || T  LE || L  LE || L  e || PB  
PB = Padding Bytes (80 .. 00) in accordance with ISO-IEC 
7816-4 and ISO 9797 method 2.  
DOs PV and LE are present only when there is some 
corresponding data in the unsecured command.  
Secured response:  
1. Case where response data field is not empty and needs not 
to be protected for confidentiality:  
Response body  Response trailer  
[New Data field]  new SW1 SW2  
T PV L PV PV T  CC L CC CC 
‘81’ L  r Data field  ‘8E’  ‘04’  CC  
Data to be integrated in checksum = T  PV || L PV || PV || PB  
2. Case where response data field is not empty and needs to 
be protected for confidentiality:  ▼B
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Response body  Response trailer  
[New Data field]  new SW1 SW2  
T PI CG  L PI 
CG PI CG  T  CC L CC CC 
‘87’ PI || CG  ‘8E’  ‘04’  CC  
Data to be carried by CG: non BER-TLV coded data and 
padding bytes.  
Data to be integrated in checksum = T  PI CG  || L  PI CG  || 
PI CG || PB  
3. Case where response data field is empty:  
Response body  Response trailer  
[New Data field]  new SW1 SW2  
T SW L SW SW T  CC L CC CC 
‘99’ ‘02’  New SW1 SW2  ‘8E’  ‘04’  CC  
Data to be integrated in checksum = T  SW || L  SW || SW || 
PB 
5.2. Treatment of Secure Messaging errors  
CSM_026 When the tachograph card recognises an SM error while 
interpreting a command, then the status bytes must be 
returned without SM. In accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4, 
the following status bytes are defined to indicate SM errors:  
‘66 88’: Verification of Cryptographic Checksum failed,  
‘69 87’: Expected SM Data Objects missing,  
‘69 88’: SM Data Objects incorrect.  
CSM_027 When the tachograph card returns status bytes without SM 
DOs or with an erroneous SM DO, the session must be 
aborted by the VU.  
5.3. Algorithm to compute Cryptographic Checksums  
CSM_028 Cryptographic checksums are built using a retail MACs in 
accordance with ANSI X9.19 with DES:  
— Initial stage: The initial check block y0 is E(Ka, SSC).  
— Sequential stage: The check blocks y1, .., yn are 
calculated using Ka.  
— Final stage: The cryptographic checksum is calculated 
from the last check block yn as follows: E(Ka, D(Kb, 
yn)).  
where E() means encryption with DES, and D() means 
decryption with DES.  
The four most significant bytes of the cryptographic 
checksum are transferred  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 377  
CSM_029 The Send Sequence Counter (SSC) shall be initiated during 
key agreement procedure to:  
Initial SSC: Rnd3 (4 least significant bytes) || Rnd1 (4 least 
significant bytes).  
CSM_030 The Send Sequence Counter shall be increased by 1 each 
time before a MAC is calculated (i.e. the SSC for the first 
command is Initial SSC + 1, the SSC for the first response is 
Initial SSC + 2).  
The following figure shows the calculation of the retail 
MAC:
  
5.4. Algorithm to compute cryptograms for confidentiality DOs  
CSM_031 Cryptograms are computed using TDEA in TCBC mode of 
operation in accordance with references [TDES] and [TDES- 
OP] and with the Null vector as Initial Value block.  
The following figure shows the application of keys in TDES:
  ▼B
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6. DATA DOWNLOAD DIGITAL SIGNATURE MECHANISMS  
CSM_032 The Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE) stores data 
received from an equipment (VU or card) during one 
download session within one physical data file. This file 
must contain the certificates MS  i .C and EQT.C. The file 
contains digital signatures of data blocks as specified in 
Appendix 7 Data Downloading Protocols.  
CSM_033 Digital signatures of downloaded data shall use a digital 
signature scheme with appendix such, that downloaded data 
may be read without any decipherment if desired.  
6.1. Signature generation  
CSM_034 Data signature generation by the equipment shall follow the 
signature scheme with appendix defined in reference 
[PKCS1] with the SHA-1 hash function:  
Signature = EQT.SK[‘00’ || ‘01’ ||  PS || ‘00’ || DER(SHA-1 
(Data))]  
PS = Padding string of octets with value ‘FF’ such that 
length is 128.  
DER(SHA-1( M)) is the encoding of the algorithm ID for the 
hash function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of 
type DigestInfo (distinguished encoding rules):  
‘30’||‘21’||‘30’||‘09’||‘06’||‘05’|| ‘2B’||‘0E’||‘03’||‘02’||‘1A’||‘05 ­ 
’||‘00’||‘04’||‘14’||Hash Value.  
6.2. Signature verification  
CSM_035 Data signature verification on downloaded data shall follow 
the signature scheme with appendix defined in reference 
[PKCS1] with the SHA-1 hash function.  
The European public key EUR.PK needs to be known inde ­
pendently (and trusted) by the verifier.  
The following table illustrates the protocol an IDE carrying a 
Control card can follow to verify the integrity of data down ­
loaded and stored on the ESM (External Storage media). The 
control card is used to perform the decipherement of digital 
signatures. This function may in this case not be implemen ­
ted in the IDE.  
The equipment that has downloaded and signed the data to 
be analysed is denoted EQT.  ▼B
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PART B  
SECOND-GENERATION TACHOGRAPH SYSTEM  
7. INTRODUCTION  
7.1. References  
The following references are used in this part of this Appendix.  
AES National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
FIPS PUB 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 
November 26, 2001  
DSS National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 
2013  
ISO 7816-4 ISO/IEC 7816-4, Identification cards — Integrated circuit 
cards — Part 4: Organization, security and commands for 
interchange. Third edition 2013-04-15  
ISO 7816-8 ISO/IEC 7816-8, Identification cards — Integrated circuit 
cards — Part 8: Commands for security operations. 
Second edition 2004-06-01  ▼B
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ISO 8825-1 ISO/IEC 8825-1, Information technology — ASN.1 
encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules 
(BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distin ­
guished Encoding Rules (DER). Fourth edition, 2008- 
12-15  
ISO 9797-1 ISO/IEC 9797-1, Information technology — Security 
techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) 
— Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher. Second 
edition, 2011-03-01  
ISO 10116 ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology — Security tech ­
niques — Modes of operation of an  n-bit block cipher. 
Third edition, 2006-02-01  
ISO 16844-3 ISO/IEC 16844-3, Road vehicles — Tachograph systems 
— Part 3: Motion sensor interface. First edition 2004, 
including Technical Corrigendum 1 2006  
RFC 5480 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key 
Information, March 2009  
RFC 5639 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) — Brainpool 
Standard Curves and Curve Generation, 2010  
RFC 5869 HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation 
Function (HKDF), May 2010  
SHS National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard, March 2012  
SP 800-38B National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Special Publication 800-38B: Recommendation for Block 
Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Auth ­
entication, 2005  
TR-03111 BSI Technical Guideline TR-03111, Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography, version 2.00, 2012-06-28  
7.2. Notations and Abbreviations  
The following notations and abbreviated terms are used in this Appendix:  
AES Advanced Encryption Standard  
CA Certificate Authority  
CAR Certificate Authority Reference  
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (mode of operation)  
CH Command Header  
CHA Certificate Holder Authorisation  
CHR Certificate Holder Reference  
CV Constant Vector  
DER Distinguished Encoding Rules  
DO Data Object  
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication  
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography  
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm  
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (key agreement algorithm)  
EGF External GNSS Facility  
EQT Equipment  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 381  
IDE Intelligent Dedicated Equipment  
K M Motion Sensor Master Key, allowing the pairing of a 
Vehicle Unit to a Motion Sensor  
K M-VU  Key inserted in vehicle units, allowing a VU to derive the 
Motion Sensor Master Key if a workshop card is inserted 
into the VU  
K M-WC  Key inserted in workshop cards, allowing a VU to derive 
the Motion Sensor Master Key if a workshop card is 
inserted into the VU  
MAC Message Authentication Code  
MoS Motion Sensor  
MSB Most Significant Bit  
PKI Public Key Infrastructure  
RCF Remote Communication Facility  
SSC Send Sequence Counter  
SM Secure Messaging  
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard  
TLV Tag Length Value  
VU Vehicle Unit  
X.C the public key certificate of user X  
X.CA the certificate authority that issued the certificate of user X  
X.CAR the certificate authority reference mentioned in the certifi ­
cate of user X  
X.CHR the certificate holder reference mentioned in the certificate 
of user X  
X.PK public key of user X  
X.SK private key of user X  
X.PK  eph ephemeral public key of user X  
X.SK  eph ephemeral private key of user X  
‘xx’ a hexadecimal value  
|| concatenation operator  
7.3. Definitions  
The definitions of terms used in this Appendix are included in section I 
of Annex 1C.  
8. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS  
8.1. Cryptographic Systems  
CSM_38 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use an elliptic 
curve-based public-key cryptographic system to provide 
the following security services:  
— mutual authentication between a vehicle unit and a 
card, ▼B
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— agreement of AES session keys between a vehicle unit 
and a card,  
— ensuring the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation 
of data downloaded from vehicle units or tachograph 
cards to external media.  
CSM_39 Vehicle units and external GNSS facilities shall use an 
elliptic curve-based public-key cryptographic system to 
provide the following security services:  
— coupling of a vehicle unit and an external GNSS 
facility,  
— mutual authentication between a vehicle unit and an 
external GNSS facility,  
— agreement of an AES session key between a vehicle 
unit and an external GNSS facility.  
CSM_40 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use an AES-based 
symmetric cryptographic system to provide the following 
security services:  
— ensuring authenticity and integrity of data exchanged 
between a vehicle unit and a tachograph card,  
— where applicable, ensuring confidentiality of data 
exchanged between a vehicle unit and a tachograph 
card.  
CSM_41 Vehicle units and external GNSS facilities shall use an 
AES-based symmetric cryptographic system to provide 
the following security services:  
— ensuring authenticity and integrity of data exchanged 
between a vehicle unit and an external GNSS facility.  
CSM_42 Vehicle units and motion sensors shall use an AES-based 
symmetric cryptographic system to provide the following 
security services:  
— pairing of a vehicle unit and a motion sensor,  
— mutual authentication between a vehicle unit and a 
motion sensor,  
— ensuring confidentiality of data exchanged between a 
vehicle unit and a motion sensor.  
CSM_43 Vehicle units and control cards shall use an AES-based 
symmetric cryptographic system to provide the following 
security services on the remote communication interface:  
— ensuring confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of 
data transmitted from a vehicle unit to a control card.  
Notes:  
— Properly speaking, data is transmitted from a vehicle 
unit to a remote interrogator under the control of a 
control officer, using a remote communication facility 
that may be internal or external to the VU, see 
Appendix 14. However, the remote interrogator sends  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 383  
the received data to a control card for decryption and 
validation of authenticity. From a security point of 
view, the remote communication facility and the 
remote interrogator are fully transparent.  
— A workshop card offers the same security services for 
the DSRC interface as a control card does. This allows 
a workshop to validate the proper functioning of the 
remote communication interface of a VU, including 
security. Please refer to section 9.2.2 for more 
information.  
8.2. Cryptographic Algorithms  
8.2.1  Symmetric Algorithms  
CSM_44 Vehicle units, tachograph cards, motion sensors and 
external GNSS facilities shall support the AES algorithm 
as defined in [AES], with key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 
bits. 
8.2.2  Asymmetric Algorithms and Standardized Domain Parameters  
CSM_45 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS 
facilities shall support elliptic curve cryptography with a 
key size of 256, 384 and 512/521 bits.  
CSM_46 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS 
facilities shall support the ECDSA signing algorithm, as 
specified in [DSS].  
CSM_47 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS 
facilities shall support the ECKA-EG key agreement algo ­
rithm, as specified in [TR 03111].  
CSM_48 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS 
facilities shall support all standardized domain parameters 
specified in Table 1 below for elliptic curve cryptography.  
Table 1  
Standardized domain parameters  
Name  Size (bits)  Reference  Object identifier  
NIST P-256  256  [DSS], [RFC 5480]
  
BrainpoolP256r1  256  [RFC 5639]
  
NIST P-384  384  [DSS], [RFC 5480]
  
BrainpoolP384r1  384  [RFC 5639]
  
BrainpoolP512r1  512  [RFC 5639]
  
NIST P-521  521  [DSS], [RFC 5480]
  ▼B
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Note:  the object identifiers mentioned in the last column of 
Table 1 are specified in [RFC 5639] for the Brainpool 
curves and in [RFC 5480] for the NIST curves.
  
8.2.3  Hashing algorithms  
▼M1 
CSM_49 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS 
facilities shall support the SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA- 
512 algorithms specified in [SHS].  
▼B 
8.2.4  Cipher Suites  
CSM_50 In case a symmetric algorithm, an asymmetric algorithm 
and/or a hashing algorithm are used together to form a 
security protocol, their respective key lengths and hash 
sizes shall be of (roughly) equal strength. Table 2 shows 
the allowed cipher suites:  
Table 2  
Allowed cipher suites  
Cipher suite Id  ECC key size (bits)  AES key length (bits)  Hashing algo ­
rithm  MAC length 
(bytes)  
CS#1  256  128  SHA-256  8  
CS#2  384  192  SHA-384  12  
CS#3  512/521  256  SHA-512  16  
Note:  ECC keys sizes of 512 bits and 521 bits are considered to be equal in strength for all 
purposes within this Appendix.  
9. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES  
9.1. Asymmetric Key Pairs and Public Key Certificates  
9.1.1  General  
Note:  the keys described in this section are used for mutual authenti ­
cation and secure messaging between vehicle units and tachograph cards 
and between vehicle units and external GNSS facilities. These processes 
are described in detail in chapters 10 and 11 of this Appendix.  
CSM_51 Within the European Smart Tachograph system, ECC key 
pairs and corresponding certificates shall be generated and 
managed through three functional hierarchical levels:  
— European level,  
— Member State level,  
— Equipment level.  ▼B
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CSM_52 Within the entire European Smart Tachograph system, 
public and private keys and certificates shall be generated, 
managed and communicated using standardized and secure 
methods.  
9.1.2  European Level  
CSM_53 At European level, a single unique ECC key pair 
designated as EUR shall be generated. It shall consist of 
a private key (EUR.SK) and a public key (EUR.PK). This 
key pair shall form the root key pair of the entire European 
Smart Tachograph PKI. This task shall be handled by a 
European Root Certificate Authority (ERCA), under the 
authority and responsibility of the European Commission.  
CSM_54 The ERCA shall use the European private key to sign a 
(self-signed) root certificate of the European public key, 
and shall communicate this European root certificate to all 
Member States.  
CSM_55 The ERCA shall use the European private key to sign the 
certificates of the Member States public keys upon request. 
The ERCA shall keep records of all signed Member State 
public key certificates.  
CSM_56 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the ERCA shall 
generate a new European root key pair every 17 years. 
Whenever the ERCA generates a new European root key 
pair, it shall create a new self-signed root certificate for the 
new European public key. The validity period of a 
European root certificate shall be 34 years plus 3 months.  
Note:  The introduction of a new root key pair also implies 
that ERCA will generate a new motion sensor master key 
and a new DSRC master key, see sections 9.2.1.2 and 
9.2.2.2.  
CSM_57 Before generating a new European root key pair, the 
ERCA shall conduct an analysis of the cryptographic 
strength that is needed for the new key pair, given it 
should stay secure for the next 34 years. If found 
necessary, the ERCA shall switch to a cipher suite that 
is stronger than the current one, as specified in CSM_50.  
▼M1 
CSM_58 Whenever it generates a new European root key pair, the 
ERCA shall create a link certificate for the new European 
public key and sign it with the previous European private 
key. The validity period of the link certificate shall be 17 
years plus 3 months. This is shown in Figure 1 in section 
9.1.7 as well.  
▼B 
Note:  Since a link certificate contains the ERCA 
generation  X public key and is signed with the ERCA 
generation  X-1  private key, a link certificate offers 
equipment issued under generation  X-1  a method to trust 
equipment issued under generation  X. 
CSM_59 The ERCA shall not use the private key of a root key pair 
for any purpose after the moment a new root key certifi ­
cate becomes valid.  ▼B
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CSM_60 At any moment in time, the ERCA shall dispose of the 
following cryptographic keys and certificates:  
— The current EUR key pair and corresponding certificate  
— All previous EUR certificates to be used for the verifi ­
cation of MSCA certificates that are still valid  
— Link certificates for all generations of EUR certificates 
except the first one  
9.1.3  Member State Level  
CSM_61 At Member State level, all Member States required to sign 
tachograph card certificates shall generate one or more 
unique ECC key pairs designated as MSCA_Card. All 
Member States required to sign certificates for vehicle 
units or external GNSS facilities shall additionally 
generate one or more unique ECC key pairs designated 
as MSCA_VU-EGF.  
CSM_62 The task of generating Member State key pairs shall be 
handled by a Member State Certificate Authority (MSCA). 
Whenever a MSCA generates a Member State key pair, it 
shall send the public key to the ERCA in order to obtain a 
corresponding Member State certificate signed by the 
ERCA.  
CSM_63 An MSCA shall choose the strength of a Member State 
key pair equal to the strength of the European root key 
pair used to sign the corresponding Member State 
certificate.  
CSM_64 An MSCA_VU-EGF key pair, if present, shall consist of 
private key MSCA_VU-EGF.SK and public key 
MSCA_VU-EGF.PK. An MSCA shall use the 
MSCA_VU-EGF.SK private key exclusively to sign the 
public key certificates of vehicle units and external 
GNSS facilities.  
CSM_65 An MSCA_Card key pair shall consist of private key 
MSCA_Card.SK and public key MSCA_Card.PK. An 
MSCA shall use the MSCA_Card.SK private key 
exclusively to sign the public key certificates of 
tachograph cards.  
CSM_66 An MSCA shall keep records of all signed VU certificates, 
external GNSS facility certificates and card certificates, 
together with the identification of the equipment for 
which each certificate is intended.  
CSM_67 The validity period of an MSCA_VU-EGF certificate shall 
be 17 years plus 3 months. The validity period of an 
MSCA_Card certificate shall be 7 years plus 1 month.  
CSM_68 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the private key of a 
MSCA_VU-EGF key pair and the private key of a 
MSCA_Card key pair shall have a key usage period of 
two years.  ▼B
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CSM_69 An MSCA shall not use the private key of an MSCA_VU- 
EGF key pair for any purpose after the moment its usage 
period has ended. Neither shall an MSCA use the private 
key of an MSCA_Card key pair for any purpose after the 
moment its usage period has ended.  
CSM_70 At any moment in time, an MSCA shall dispose of the 
following cryptographic keys and certificates:  
— The current MSCA_Card key pair and corresponding 
certificate  
— All previous MSCA_Card certificates to be used for 
the verification of the certificates of tachograph cards 
that are still valid  
— The current EUR certificate necessary for the verifi ­
cation of the current MSCA certificate  
— All previous EUR certificates necessary for the verifi ­
cation of all MSCA certificates that are still valid  
CSM_71 If an MSCA is required to sign certificates for vehicle 
units or external GNSS facilities, it shall additionally 
dispose of the following keys and certificates:  
— The current MSCA_VU-EGF key pair and 
corresponding certificate  
— All previous MSCA_VU-EGF public keys to be used 
for the verification of the certificates of VUs or 
external GNSS facilities that are still valid  
9.1.4  Equipment Level: Vehicle Units  
▼M1 
CSM_72 Two unique ECC key pairs shall be generated for each 
vehicle unit, designated as VU_MA and VU_Sign. This 
task is handled by VU manufacturers. Whenever a VU key 
pair is generated, the party generating the key shall send 
the public key to its MSCA, in order to obtain a 
corresponding VU certificate signed by the MSCA. The 
private key shall be used only by the vehicle unit.  
▼B 
CSM_73 The VU_MA and VU_Sign certificates of a given vehicle 
unit shall have the same Certificate Effective Date.  
CSM_74 A VU manufacturer shall choose the strength of a VU key 
pair equal to the strength of the MSCA key pair used to 
sign the corresponding VU certificate.  
CSM_75 A vehicle unit shall use its VU_MA key pair, consisting of 
private key VU_MA.SK and public key VU_MA.PK, 
exclusively to perform VU Authentication towards 
tachograph cards and external GNSS facilities, as 
specified in sections 10.3 and 11.4 of this Appendix.  
CSM_76 A vehicle unit shall be capable of generating ephemeral 
ECC key pairs and shall use an ephemeral key pair 
exclusively to perform session key agreement with a 
tachograph card or external GNSS facility, as specified 
in sections 10.4 and 11.4 of this Appendix.  ▼B
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CSM_77 A vehicle unit shall use the private key VU_Sign.SK of its 
VU_Sign key pair exclusively to sign downloaded data 
files, as specified in chapter 14 of this Appendix. The 
corresponding public key VU_Sign.PK shall be used 
exclusively to verify signatures created by the vehicle unit.  
CSM_78 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the validity period 
of a VU_MA certificate shall be 15 years and 3 months. 
The validity period of a VU_Sign certificate shall also be 
15 years and 3 months.  
Notes:  
— The extended validity period of a VU_Sign certificate 
allows a Vehicle Unit to create valid signatures over 
downloaded data during the first three months after it 
has expired, as required in Regulation (EU) No 
581/2010.  
— The extended validity period of a VU_MA certificate 
is needed to allow the VU to authenticate to a control 
card or a company card during the first three months 
after it has expired, such that is it possible to perform a 
data download.  
CSM_79 A vehicle unit shall not use the private key of a VU key 
pair for any purpose after the corresponding certificate has 
expired.  
CSM_80 The VU key pairs (except ephemeral keys pairs) and 
corresponding certificates of a given vehicle unit shall 
not be replaced or renewed in the field once the vehicle 
unit has been put in operation.  
Notes:  
— Ephemeral key pairs are not included in this 
requirement, as a new ephemeral key pair is 
generated by a VU each time Chip Authentication 
and session key agreement is performed, see section 
10.4. Note that ephemeral key pairs do not have 
corresponding certificates.  
— This requirement does not forbid the possibility of 
replacing static VU key pairs during a refurbishment 
or repair in a secure environment controlled by the VU 
manufacturer.  
CSM_81 When put in operation, vehicle units shall contain the 
following cryptographic keys and certificates:  
— The VU_MA private key and corresponding certificate  
— The VU_Sign private key and corresponding certificate  
— The MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the 
MSCA_VU-EGF.PK public key to be used for verifi ­
cation of the VU_MA certificate and VU_Sign certifi ­
cate ▼B
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— The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key 
to be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF 
certificate  
— The EUR certificate whose validity period directly 
precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to 
be used to verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if 
existing  
— The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, 
if existing  
CSM_82 In addition to the cryptographic keys and certificates listed 
in CSM_81, vehicle units shall also contain the keys and 
certificates specified in Part A of this Appendix, allowing 
a vehicle unit to interact with first-generation tachograph 
cards.  
9.1.5  Equipment Level: Tachograph Cards  
▼M1 
CSM_83 One unique ECC key pair, designated as Card_MA, shall 
be generated for each tachograph card. A second unique 
ECC key pair, designated as Card_Sign, shall additionally 
be generated for each driver card and each workshop card. 
This task may be handled by card manufacturers or card 
personalisers. Whenever a card key pair is generated, the 
party generating the key shall send the public key to its 
MSCA, in order to obtain a corresponding card certificate 
signed by the MSCA. The private key shall be used only 
by the tachograph card.  
▼B 
CSM_84 The Card_MA and Card_Sign certificates of a given driver 
card or workshop card shall have the same Certificate 
Effective Date.  
CSM_85 A card manufacturer or card personaliser shall choose the 
strength of a card key pair equal to the strength of the 
MSCA key pair used to sign the corresponding card 
certificate.  
CSM_86 A tachograph card shall use its Card_MA key pair, 
consisting of private key Card_MA.SK and public key 
Card_MA.PK, exclusively to perform mutual authenti ­
cation and session key agreement towards vehicle units, 
as specified in sections 10.3 and 10.4 of this Appendix.  
CSM_87 A driver card or workshop card shall use the private key 
Card_Sign.SK of its Card_Sign key pair exclusively to 
sign downloaded data files, as specified in chapter 14 of 
this Appendix. The corresponding public key 
Card_Sign.PK shall be used exclusively to verify 
signatures created by the card.  
▼M1 
CSM_88 The validity period of a Card_MA certificate shall be as 
follows:  
— For driver cards: 5 years  
— For company cards: 5 years  
— For control cards: 2 years  
— For workshop cards: 1 year  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 390  
CSM_89 The validity period of a Card_Sign certificate shall be as 
follows: 
— For driver cards:  5 years and 1 
month  
— For workshop cards:  1 year and 1 
month  
Note:  the extended validity period of a Card_Sign certifi ­
cate allows a driver card to create valid signatures over 
downloaded data during the first month after it has 
expired. This is necessary in view of Regulation (EU) 
No 581/2010, which requires that a data download from 
a driver card must be possible up to 28 days after the last 
data has been recorded.  
CSM_90 The key pairs and corresponding certificates of a given 
tachograph card shall not be replaced or renewed once 
the card has been issued.  
CSM_91 When issued, tachograph cards shall contain the following 
cryptographic keys and certificates:  
— The Card_MA private key and corresponding certifi ­
cate 
— For driver cards and workshop cards additionally: the 
Card_Sign private key and corresponding certificate  
— The MSCA_Card certificate containing the 
MSCA_Card.PK public key to be used for verification 
of the Card_MA certificate and Card_Sign certificate  
— The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key 
to be used for verification of the MSCA_Card 
certificate.  
— The EUR certificate whose validity period directly 
precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to 
be used to verify the MSCA_Card certificate, if 
existing.  
— The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, 
if existing.  
▼M1 
— Additionally, for control cards, company cards and 
workshop cards only, and only if such cards are 
issued during the first three months of the validity 
period of a new EUR certificate: the EUR certificate 
that is two generations older, if existing.  
Note to last bullet:  For example, in the first three 
months of the ERCA(3) certificate (see Figure 1), the 
mentioned cards shall contain the ERCA(1) certificate. 
This is needed to ensure that these cards can be used to 
perform data downloads from ERCA(1) VUs whose 
normal 15-year life period plus the 3-months data 
downloading period expires during these months; see 
the last bullet of requirement 13) in Annex IC.  
▼B 
CSM_92 In addition to the cryptographic keys and certificates listed 
in CSM_91, tachograph cards shall also contain the keys 
and certificates specified in Part A of this Appendix, 
allowing these cards to interact with first-generation VUs.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 391  
9.1.6  Equipment Level: External GNSS Facilities  
▼M1 
CSM_93 One unique ECC key pair shall be generated for each 
external GNSS facility, designated as EGF_MA. This 
task is handled by external GNSS facility manufacturers. 
Whenever an EGF_MA key pair is generated, the party 
generating th e key shall send the public key to its MSCA 
in order to obtain a corresponding EGF_MA certificate 
signed by the MSCA. The private key shall be used 
only by the external GNSS facility.  
▼B 
CSM_94 An EGF manufacturer shall choose the strength of an 
EGF_MA key pair equal to the strength of the MSCA 
key pair used to sign the corresponding EGF_MA 
certificate.  
▼M1 
CSM_95 An external GNSS facility shall use its EGF_MA key pair, 
consisting of private key EGF_MA.SK and public key 
EGF_MA.PK, exclusively to perform mutual authenti ­
cation and session key agreement towards vehicle units, 
as specified in section 11.4 of this Appendix.  
▼B 
CSM_96 The validity period of an EGF_MA certificate shall be 15 
years.  
CSM_97 An external GNSS facility shall not use the private key of 
its EGF_MA key pair for coupling to a vehicle unit after 
the corresponding certificate has expired.  
Note:  as explained in section 11.3.3, an EGF may poten ­
tially use its private key for mutual authentication towards 
the VU it is already coupled to, even after the 
corresponding certificate has expired.  
CSM_98 The EGF_MA key pair and corresponding certificate of a 
given external GNSS facility shall not be replaced or 
renewed in the field once the EGF has been put in oper ­
ation.  
Note:  This requirement does not forbid the possibility of 
replacing EGF key pairs during a refurbishment or repair 
in a secure environment controlled by the EGF manufac ­
turer.  
CSM_99 When put in operation, an external GNSS facility shall 
contain the following cryptographic keys and certificates:  
— The EGF_MA private key and corresponding certifi ­
cate 
— The MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the 
MSCA_VU-EGF.PK public key to be used for verifi ­
cation of the EGF_MA certificate  
— The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key 
to be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF 
certificate  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 392  
— The EUR certificate whose validity period directly 
precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to 
be used to verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if 
existing  
— The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, 
if existing  
9.1.7  Overview: Certificate Replacement  
Figure 1 below shows how different generations of ERCA root certifi ­
cates, ERCA link certificates, MSCA certificates and equipment (VU and 
card) certificates are issued and used over time:  
▼M1 
Figure 1  
Issuance and usage of different generations of ERCA root certificates, ERCA link certificates, MSCA certificates 
and equipment certificates
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 393  
Notes to Figure 1:  
1. Different generations of the root certificate are indicated by a number 
in brackets. E.g. ERCA (1) is the first generation of ERCA root 
certificate; ERCA (2) is the second generation, etc.  
2. Other certificates are indicated by two numbers in brackets, the first 
one indicating the root certificate generation under which they are 
issued, the second one the generation of the certificate itself. E.g. 
MSCA_Card (1-1) is the first MSCA_Card certificate issued under 
ERCA (1); MSCA_Card (2-1) is the first MSCA_Card certificate 
issued under ERCA (2); MSCA_Card (2-last) is the last 
MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (2); Card_MA(2-1) is 
the first Card certificate for mutual authentication that is issued 
under ERCA (2), etc.  
3. The MSCA_Card (2-1) and MSCA_Card (1-last) certificates are 
issued at almost but not exactly the same date. MSCA_Card (2-1) 
is the first MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (2) and will be 
issued slightly later than MSCA_Card (1-last), the last MSCA_Card 
certificate under ERCA (1).  
4. As shown in the figure, the first VU and Card certificates issued 
under ERCA (2) will appear almost two years before the last VU 
and Card certificates issued under ERCA (1) will appear. This is 
because of the fact that VU and Card certificates are issued under 
an MSCA certificate, not directly under the ERCA certificate. The 
MSCA (2-1) certificate will be issued directly after ERCA (2) 
becomes valid, but the MSCA (1-last) certificate will be issued only 
slightly before that time, at the last moment the ERCA (1) certificate 
is still valid. Therefore, these two MSCA certificates will have almost 
the same validity period, despite the fact that they are of different 
generations.  
5. The validity period shown for cards is the one for driver cards (5 
years).  
▼M1 
6. To save space, the difference in validity period between the Card_MA 
and Card_Sign certificates is shown only for the first generation.  
▼B 
9.2. Symmetric Keys  
9.2.1  Keys for Securing VU — Motion Sensor Communication  
9.2.1.1  General  
Note:  readers of this section are supposed to be familiar with the contents 
of [ISO 16844-3] describing the interface between a vehicle unit and a 
motion sensor. The pairing process between a VU and a motion sensor is 
described in detail in chapter 12 of this Appendix.  
CSM_100 A number of symmetric keys is needed for pairing vehicle 
units and motion sensors, for mutual authentication between 
vehicle units and motion sensors and for encrypting 
communication between vehicle units and motion sensors, 
as shown in Table 3. All of these keys shall be AES keys, 
with a key length equal to the length of the motion sensor 
master key, which shall be linked to the length of the 
(foreseen) European root key pair as described in CSM_50.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 394  
Table 3  
Keys for securing vehicle unit — motion sensor communication  
Key Symbol  Generated by  Generation method  Stored by  
Motion Sensor Master 
Key — VU part  K M-VU  ERCA  Random  ERCA, MSCAs involved in 
issuing VUs certificates, VU 
manufacturers, vehicle units  
Motion Sensor Master 
Key — Workshop part  K M-WC  ERCA  Random  ERCA, MSCAs, card manufac ­
turers, workshop cards  
Motion Sensor Master 
Key K M Not independently 
generated  Calculated as K  M = K  M- 
VU XOR K  M-WC  ERCA, MSCAs involved in 
issuing motion sensors keys 
(optionally) (*)  
Identification Key  K  ID Not independently 
generated  Calculated as K  ID = K M 
XOR CV, where CV is 
specified in CSM_106  ERCA, MSCAs involved in 
issuing motion sensors keys 
(optionally) (*)  
Pairing Key  K  P Motion sensor 
manufacturer  Random  One motion sensor  
Session Key  K  S VU (during 
pairing of VU and 
motion sensor)  Random  One VU and one motion sensor  
(*) Storage of K  M and K  ID is optional, as these keys can be derived from K  M-VU  , K  M-WC  and CV.  
CSM_101 The European Root Certificate Authority shall generate K  M- 
VU and K  M-WC  , two random and unique AES keys from 
which the motion sensor master key K  M can be calculated 
as K  M-VU  XOR K  M-WC  . The ERCA shall communicate K  M, 
K M-VU  and K  M-WC  to Member State Certificate Authorities 
upon their request.  
CSM_102 The ERCA shall assign to each motion sensor master key 
K M a unique version number, which shall also be applicable 
for the constituting keys K  M-VU  and K  M-WC  and for the 
related identification key K  ID. The ERCA shall inform the 
MSCAs about the version number when sending K  M-VU  and 
K M-WC  to them.  
Note:  The version number is used to distinguish different 
generations of these keys, as explained in detail in section 
9.2.1.2.  
CSM_103 A Member State Certificate Authority shall forward K  M-VU,  
together with its version number, to vehicle unit manufac ­
turers upon their request. The VU manufacturers shall insert 
K M-VU  and its version number in all manufactured VUs.  
CSM_104 A Member State Certificate Authority shall ensure that K  M- 
WC , together with its version number, is inserted in every 
workshop card issued under its responsibility.  
Notes:  
— See the description of data type
  
in Appendix 2.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 395  
— as explained in section 9.2.1.2, in fact multiple gener ­
ations of K  M-WC  may have to be inserted in a single 
workshop card.  
CSM_105 In addition to the AES key specified in CSM_104, a MSCA 
shall ensure that the TDES key Km  WC, specified in 
requirement CSM_037 in Part A of this Appendix, is 
inserted in every workshop card issued under its responsi ­
bility.  
Notes:  
— This allows a second-generation workshop card to be 
used for coupling a first-generation VU.  
— A second-generation workshop card will contain two 
different applications, one complying with Part B of 
this Appendix and one complying with Part A. The 
latter will contain the TDES key Km  WC . 
CSM_106 An MSCA involved in issuing motion sensors shall derive 
the identification key from the motion sensor master key by 
XORing it with a constant vector CV. The value of CV shall 
be as follows:  
▼M1 
— For 128-bit motion sensor master keys: CV = ‘B6 44 2C 
45 0E F8 D3 62 0B 7A 8A 97 91 E4 5D 83’  
▼B 
— For 192-bit motion sensor master keys: CV = ‘72 AD 
EA FA 00 BB F4 EE F4 99 15 70 5B 7E EE BB 1C 54 
ED 46 8B 0E F8 25’  
— For 256-bit motion sensor master keys: CV = ‘1D 74 
DB F0 34 C7 37 2F 65 55 DE D5 DC D1 9A C3 23 D6 
A6 25 64 CD BE 2D 42 0D 85 D2 32 63 AD 60’  
Note:  the constant vectors have been generated as follows:  
Pi_10 = first 10 bytes of the decimal portion of the math ­
ematical constant π = ‘24 3F 6A 88 85 A3 08 D3 13 19’  
CV_128-bits = first 16 bytes of SHA-256(Pi_10)  
CV_192-bits = first 24 bytes of SHA-384(Pi_10)  
CV_256-bits = first 32 bytes of SHA-512(Pi_10)  
CSM_107  ►M1 Each Motion sensor manufacturer shall generate a 
random and unique pairing key K  P for every motion 
sensor, and shall send each pairing key to its Member 
State Certificate Authority. The MSCA shall encrypt each 
pairing key separately with the motion sensor master key 
K M and shall return the encrypted key to the motion sensor 
manufacturer. For each encrypted key, the MSCA shall 
notify the motion sensor manufacturer of the version 
number of the associated K  M . ◄ 
Note:  as explained in section 9.2.1.2, in fact a motion sensor 
manufacturer may have to generate multiple unique pairing 
keys for a single motion sensor.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 396  
CSM_108 Each motion sensor manufacturer shall generate a unique 
serial number for every motion sensor, and shall send all 
serial numbers to its Member State Certificate Authority. 
The MSCA shall encrypt each serial number separately 
with the identification key K  ID and shall return the 
encrypted serial number to the motion sensor manufacturer. 
For each encrypted serial number, the MSCA shall notify 
the motion sensor manufacturer of the version number of the 
associated K  ID . 
▼B 
CSM_109 For requirements CSM_107 and CSM_108, the MSCA shall 
use the AES algorithm in the Cipher Block Chaining mode 
of operation, as defined in [ISO 10116], with an interleave 
parameter  m = 1 and an initialization vector SV = ‘00’ {16}, 
i.e. sixteen bytes with binary value 0. When necessary, the 
MSCA shall use padding method 2 defined in [ISO 9797-1].  
CSM_110 The motion sensor manufacturer shall store the encrypted 
pairing key and the encrypted serial number in the 
intended motion sensor, together with the corresponding 
plain text values and the version number of K  M and K  ID 
used for encrypting.  
Note:  as explained in section 9.2.1.2, in fact a motion sensor 
manufacturer may have to insert multiple encrypted pairing 
keys and multiple encrypted serial numbers in a single 
motion sensor.  
CSM_111 In addition to the AES-based cryptographic material 
specified in CSM_110, a motion sensor manufacturer may 
also store in each motion sensor the TDES-based crypto ­
graphic material specified in requirement CSM_037 in Part 
A of this Appendix.  
Note:  doing so will allow a second-generation motion sensor 
to be coupled to a first-generation VU.  
CSM_112 The length of the session key K  S generated by a VU during 
the pairing to a motion sensor shall be linked to the length 
of its K  M-VU,  as described in CSM_50.  
9.2.1.2  Motion Sensor Master Key Replacement in Second-Generation 
Equipment  
CSM_113 Each motion sensor master key and all related keys (see 
Table 3) is associated to a particular generation of the 
ERCA root key pair. These keys shall therefore be 
replaced every 17 years. The validity period of each 
motion sensor master key generation shall begin one year 
before the associated ERCA root key pair becomes valid and 
shall end when the associated ERCA root key pair expires. 
This is depicted in Figure 2.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 397  
Figure 2  
Issuance and usage of different generations of the motion sensor master key in vehicle units, motions sensors and 
workshop cards
  
CSM_114 At least one year before generating a new European root key 
pair, as described in CSM_56, the ERCA shall generate a 
new motion sensor master key K  M by generating a new K  M- 
VU and K  M-WC  . The length of the motion sensor master key 
shall be linked to the foreseen strength of the new European 
root key pair, according to CSM_50. The ERCA shall 
communicate the new K  M , K  M-VU  and K  M-WC  to the 
MSCAs upon their request, together with their version 
number.  
CSM_115 An MSCA shall ensure that all valid generations of K  M-WC  
are stored in every workshop card issued under its authority, 
together with their version numbers, as shown in Figure 2.  
Note:  this implies that in the last year of the validity period 
of an ERCA certificate, workshop cards will be issued with 
three different generations of K  M-WC  , as shown in Figure 2.  
CSM_116 In relation to the process described in CSM_107 and 
CSM_108 above: An MSCA shall encrypt each pairing 
key K  P it receives from a motion sensor manufacturer 
separately with each valid generation of the motion sensor 
master key K  M . An MSCA shall also encrypt each serial 
number it receives from a motion sensor manufacturer 
separately with each valid generation of the identification 
key K  ID . A motion sensor manufacturer shall store all 
encryptions of the pairing key and all encryptions of the 
serial number in the intended motion sensor, together with 
the corresponding plain text values and the version 
number(s) of K  M and K  ID used for encrypting.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 398  
Note:  This implies that in the last year of the validity period 
of an ERCA certificate, motion sensors will be issued with 
encrypted data based on three different generations of K  M, 
as shown in Figure 2.  
CSM_117 In relation to the process described in CSM_107 above: 
Since the length of the pairing key K  P shall be linked to 
the length of K  M (see CSM_100), a motion sensor manu ­
facturer may have to generate up to three different pairing 
keys (of different lengths) for one motion sensor, in case 
subsequent generations of K  M have different lengths. In such 
a case, the manufacturer shall send each pairing key to the 
MSCA. The MSCA shall ensure that each pairing key is 
encrypted with the correct generation of the motion sensor 
master key, i.e. the one having the same length.  
Note:  In case the motion sensor manufacturer chooses to 
generate a TDES-based pairing key for a second-generation 
motion sensor (see CSM_111), the manufacturer shall 
indicate to the MSCA that the TDES-based motion sensor 
master key must be used for encrypting this pairing key. 
This is because the length of a TDES key may be equal 
to that of an AES key, so the MSCA cannot judge from the 
key length alone.  
CSM_118 Vehicle unit manufacturers shall insert only one generation 
of K  M-VU  in each vehicle unit, together with its version 
number. This K  M-VU  generation shall be linked to the 
ERCA certificate upon which the VU's certificates are 
based.  
Notes:  
— A vehicle unit based on the generation  X ERCA certifi ­
cate shall only contain the generation  X K M-VU,  even if it 
is issued after the start of the validity period of the 
generation  X+1  ERCA certificate. This is shown in 
Figure 2.  
— A VU of generation  X cannot be paired to a motion 
sensor of generation  X-1. 
— Since workshop cards have a validity period of one year, 
the result of CSM_113 — CSM_118 is that all 
workshop cards will contain the new K  M-WC  at the 
moment the first VU containing the new K  M-VU  is 
issued. Therefore, such a VU will always be able to 
calculate the new K  M. Moreover, by that time most 
new motion sensors will contain encrypted data based 
on the new K  M as well.  
9.2.2  Keys for Securing DSRC Communication  
9.2.2.1  General  
CSM_119 The authenticity and confidentiality of data communicated 
from a vehicle unit to a control authority over a DSRC 
remote communication channel shall be ensured by means 
of a set of VU-specific AES keys derived from a single 
DSRC master key, KM  DSRC  . ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 399  
CSM_120 The DSRC master key KM  DSRC  shall be an AES key that is 
securely generated, stored and distributed by the ERCA. The 
key length may be 128, 192 or 256 bits and shall be linked 
to the length of the European root key pair, as described in 
CSM_50.  
CSM_121 The ERCA shall communicate the DSRC master key to 
Member State Certificate Authorities upon their request in 
a secure manner, to allow them to derive VU-specific DSRC 
keys and to ensure that the DSRC master key is inserted in 
all control cards and workshop cards issued under their 
responsibility.  
CSM_122 The ERCA shall assign to each DSRC master key a unique 
version number. The ERCA shall inform the MSCAs about 
the version number when sending the DSRC master key to 
them.  
Note:  The version number is used to distinguish different 
generations of the DSRC master key, as explained in detail 
in section 9.2.2.2.  
▼M1 
CSM_123 For every vehicle unit, the vehicle unit manufacturer shall 
create a unique VU serial number and shall send this 
number to its Member State Certificate Authority in a 
request to obtain a set of two VU-specific DSRC keys. 
The VU serial number shall have data type
  
. 
Note:  
— This VU serial number shall be identical to the vuSer ­
ialNumber element of VuIdentification, see Appendix 1 
and to the Certificate Holder Reference in the VU’s 
certificates.  
— The VU serial number may not be known at the moment 
a vehicle unit manufacturer requests the VU-specific 
DSRC keys. In this case, the VU manufacturer shall 
send instead the unique certificate request ID it used 
when requesting the VU’s certificates; see CSM_153. 
This certificate request ID shall therefore be equal to 
the Certificate Holder Reference in the VU’s certificates.  
▼B 
CSM_124 Upon receiving a request for VU-specific DSRC keys, the 
MSCA shall derive two AES keys for the vehicle unit, 
called K_VU  DSRC  _ENC and K_VU  DSRC  _MAC. These 
VU-specific keys shall have the same length as the DSRC 
master key. The MSCA shall use the key derivation function 
defined in [RFC 5869]. The hash function that is necessary 
to instantiate the HMAC-Hash function shall be linked to 
the length of the DSRC master key, as described in 
CSM_50. The key derivation function in [RFC 5869] shall 
be used as follows:  
Step 1 (Extract):  
— PRK  = HMAC-Hash ( salt, IKM ) where  salt is an empty 
string ‘’ and  IKM  is KM  DSRC  . ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 400  
Step 2 (Expand):  
— OKM  = T(1) , where  
T(1) = HMAC-Hash ( PRK , T(0)  || info  || ‘01’) with  
— T(0)  = an empty string (‘’)  
— ►M1 info  = VU serial number or certificate request 
ID, as specified in CSM_123 ◄ 
— K_VU  DSRC  _ENC = first  L octets of  OKM  and 
K_VU  DSRC  _MAC = last  L octets of  OKM  
where  L is the required length of K_VU  DSRC  _ENC and 
K_VU  DSRC  _MAC in octets.  
CSM_125 The MSCA shall distribute K_VU  DSRC  _ENC and 
K_VU  DSRC  _MAC to the VU manufacturer in a secure 
manner for insertion in the intended vehicle unit.  
CSM_126 When issued, a vehicle unit shall have stored 
K_VU  DSRC  _ENC and K_VU  DSRC  _MAC in its secure 
memory, in order to be able to ensure the integrity, auth ­
enticity and confidentiality of data sent over the remote 
communication channel. A vehicle unit shall also store the 
version number of the DSRC master key used to derive 
these VU-specific keys.  
CSM_127 When issued, control cards and workshop cards shall have 
stored KM  DSRC  in their secure memory, in order to be able 
to verify the integrity and authenticity of data sent by a VU 
over the remote communication channel and to decrypt this 
data. Control cards and workshop cards shall also store the 
version number of the DSRC master key.  
Note:  as explained in section 9.2.2.2, in fact multiple gener ­
ations of KM  DSRC  may have to be inserted in a single 
workshop card or control card.  
▼M1 
CSM_128 The MSCA shall keep records of all VU-specific DSRC 
keys it generated, their version number and the VU serial 
number or certificate request ID used in deriving them.  
▼B 
9.2.2.2  DSRC Master Key Replacement  
CSM_129 Each DSRC master key is associated to a particular 
generation of the ERCA root key pair. The ERCA shall 
therefore replace the DSRC master key every 17 years. 
The validity period of each DSRC master key generation 
shall begin two years before the associated ERCA root 
key pair becomes valid and shall end when the associated 
ERCA root key pair expires. This is depicted in Figure 3.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 401  
Figure 3  
Issuance and usage of different generations of the DSRC master key in vehicle units, workshop cards and control 
cards
  
CSM_130 At least two years before generating a new European root 
key pair, as described in CSM_56, the ERCA shall generate 
a new DSRC master key. The length of the DSRC key shall 
be linked to the foreseen strength of the new European root 
key pair, according to CSM_50. The ERCA shall 
communicate the new DSRC master key to the MSCAs 
upon their request, together with its version number.  
CSM_131 An MSCA shall ensure that all valid generations of KM  DSRC  
are stored in every control card issued under its authority, 
together with their version numbers, as shown in Figure 3.  
Note:  this implies that in the last two years of the validity 
period of an ERCA certificate, control cards will be issued 
with three different generations of KM  DSRC  , as shown in 
Figure 3.  
CSM_132 An MSCA shall ensure that all generations of KM  DSRC  that 
have been valid for at least a year and are still valid, are 
stored in every workshop card issued under its authority, 
together with their version numbers, as shown in Figure 3.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 402  
Note:  this implies that in the last year of the validity period 
of an ERCA certificate, workshop cards will be issued with 
three different generations of KM  DSRC  , as shown in 
Figure 3.  
CSM_133 Vehicle unit manufacturers shall insert only one set of VU- 
specific DSRC keys into each vehicle unit, together with its 
version number. This set of keys shall be derived from the 
KM  DSRC  generation linked to the ERCA certificate upon 
which the VU's certificates are based.  
Notes:  
— This implies that a vehicle unit based on the generation  
X ERCA certificate shall only contain the generation  X 
K_VU  DSRC  _ENC and K_VU  DSRC  _MAC  , even if the VU 
is issued after the start of the validity period of the 
generation  X+1  ERCA certificate. This is shown in 
Figure 3.  
— Since workshop cards have a validity period of one year 
and control cards of two years, the result of CSM_131 
— CSM_133 is that all workshop cards and control 
cards will contain the new DSRC master key at the 
moment the first VU containing VU-specific keys 
based on that master key will be issued.  
9.3. Certificates  
9.3.1  General  
CSM_134 All certificates in the European Smart Tachograph system 
shall be self-descriptive, card-verifiable (CV) certificates 
according to [ISO 7816-4] and [ISO 7816-8].  
CSM_135  ►M1 The Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) according 
to [ISO 8825-1] shall be used to encode the data objects 
within certificates. Table 4 shows the full certificate 
encoding, including all tag and length bytes. ◄ 
Note:  this encoding results in a Tag-Length-Value (TLV) 
structure as follows:  
Tag: The tag is encoded in one or two octets and 
indicates the content.  
Length: The length is encoded as an unsigned integer in 
one, two, or three octets, resulting in a maximum 
length of 65 535 octets. The minimum number of 
octets shall be used.  
Value: The value is encoded in zero or more octets  
9.3.2  Certificate Content  
CSM_136 All certificates shall have the structure shown in the certifi ­
cate profile in Table 4.  
Table 4  
Certificate Profile version 1  
Field  Field ID  Tag  Length (bytes)  ASN.1 data type 
(see Appendix 1)  
ECC Certificate  C  ‘7F 21’  var  
ECC Certificate Body  B  ‘7F 4E’  var  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 403  
Field  Field ID  Tag  Length (bytes)  ASN.1 data type 
(see Appendix 1)  
Certificate Profile 
Identifier  CPI ‘5F 29’  ‘01’
  
Certificate Authority 
Reference  CAR  ‘42’  ‘08’
  
Certificate Holder 
Authorisation  CHA  ‘5F 4C’  ‘07’
  
Public Key  PK  ‘7F 49’  var  
Domain Parameters  DP  ‘06’  var
  
Public Point  PP  ‘86’  var
  
Certificate Holder 
Reference  CHR  ‘5F 20’  ‘08’
  
Certificate Effective 
Date  CEfD  ‘5F 25’  ‘04’
  
Certificate Expiration 
Date  CExD  ‘5F 24’  ‘04’
  
ECC Certificate 
Signature  S ‘5F 37’  var
  
Note:  the Field ID will be used in later sections of this 
Appendix to indicate individual fields of a certificate, e.g. 
X.CAR is the Certificate Authority Reference mentioned in 
the certificate of user X.  
9.3.2.1 Certificate Profile Identifier  
CSM_137 Certificates shall use a Certificate Profile Identifier to 
indicate the certificate profile used. Version 1, as specified 
in Table 4, shall be identified by a value of ‘00’.  
9.3.2.2 Certificate Authority Reference  
CSM_138 The Certificate Authority Reference shall be used to identify 
the public key to be used to verify the certificate signature. 
The Certificate Authority Reference shall therefore be equal 
to the Certificate Holder Reference in the certificate of the 
corresponding certificate authority.  
CSM_139 An ERCA root certificate shall be self-signed, i.e., the Cer ­
tificate Authority Reference and the Certificate Holder 
Reference in the certificate shall be equal.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 404  
CSM_140 For an ERCA link certificate, the Certificate Holder 
Reference shall be equal to the CHR of the new ERCA 
root certificate. The Certificate Authority Reference for a 
link certificate shall be equal to the CHR of the previous 
ERCA root certificate.  
9.3.2.3 Certificate Holder Authorisation  
▼M1 
CSM_141 The Certificate Holder Authorisation shall be used to 
identify the type of certificate. It consists of the six most 
significant bytes of the Tachograph Application ID, 
concatenated with the equipment type, which indicates the 
type of equipment for which the certificate is intended. In 
the case of a VU certificate, a driver card certificate or a 
workshop card certificate, the equipment type is also used to 
differentiate between a certificate for Mutual Authentication 
and a certificate for creating digital signatures (see section 
9.1 and Appendix 1, data type EquipmentType).  
▼B 
9.3.2.4 Public Key  
The Public Key nests two data elements: the standardized domain 
parameters to be used with the public key in the certificate and the 
value of the public point.  
CSM_142 The data element Domain Parameters shall contain one of 
the object identifiers specified in Table 1 to reference a set 
of standardized domain parameters.  
CSM_143 The data element Public Point shall contain the public point. 
Elliptic curve public points shall be converted to octet 
strings as specified in [TR-03111]. The uncompressed 
encoding format shall be used. When recovering an 
elliptic curve point from its encoded format, the validations 
described in [TR-03111] shall always be carried out.  
9.3.2.5 Certificate Holder Reference  
CSM_144 The Certificate Holder Reference is an identifier for the 
public key provided in the certificate. It shall be used to 
reference this public key in other certificates.  
CSM_145 For card certificates and external GNSS facility certificates, 
the Certificate Holder Reference shall have the
  
data type specified in 
Appendix 1.  
CSM_146 For vehicle units, the manufacturer, when requesting a 
certificate, may or may not know the manufacturer-specific 
serial number of the VU for which that certificate and the 
associated private key is intended. In the first case, the 
Certificate Holder Reference shall have the
  
data type specified in 
Appendix 1. In the latter case, the Certificate Holder 
Reference shall have the
  
data type specified in Appendix 1.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 405  
Note:  For a card certificate, the value of the CHR shall be 
equal to the value of the cardExtendedSerialNumber in 
EF_ICC; see Appendix 2. For an EGF certificate, the 
value of the CHR shall be equal to the value of the 
sensorGNSSSerialNumber in EF_ICC; see Appendix 14. 
For a VU certificate, the value of the CHR shall be equal 
to the vuSerialNumber element of VuIdentification, see 
Appendix 1, unless the manufacturer does not know the 
manufacturer-specific serial number at the time the certifi ­
cate is requested.  
▼B 
CSM_147 For ERCA and MSCA certificates, the Certificate Holder 
Reference shall have the
  
data type specified in Appendix 1.  
9.3.2.6 Certificate Effective Date  
▼M1 
CSM_148 The Certificate Effective Date shall indicate the starting date 
and time of the validity period of the certificate.  
▼B 
9.3.2.7 Certificate Expiration Date  
CSM_149 The Certificate Expiration Date shall indicate the end date 
and time of the validity period of the certificate.  
9.3.2.8 Certificate Signature  
CSM_150 The signature on the certificate shall be created over the 
encoded certificate body, including the certificate body tag 
and length. The signature algorithm shall be ECDSA, as 
specified in [DSS], using the hashing algorithm linked to 
the key size of the signing authority, as specified in 
CSM_50. The signature format shall be plain, as specified 
in [TR-03111].  
9.3.3  Requesting Certificates  
CSM_151  ►M1 When requesting a certificate, an MSCA shall send 
the following data to the ERCA: ◄ 
— The Certificate Profile Identifier of the requested certifi ­
cate 
— The Certificate Authority Reference expected to be used 
for signing the certificate.  
— The Public Key to be signed  
CSM_152 In addition to the data in CSM_151, an MSCA shall send 
the following data in a certificate request to the ERCA, 
allowing the ERCA to create the Certificate Holder 
Reference of the new MSCA certificate:  
— The numerical nation code of the Certification Authority 
(data type
  defined in Appendix 1)  
— The alphanumerical nation code of the Certification 
Authority (data type
  defined in 
Appendix 1)  
— The 1-byte serial number to distinguish the different 
keys of the Certification Authority in the case keys are 
changed  
— The two-byte field containing Certification Authority 
specific additional info  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 406  
CSM_153 An equipment manufacturer shall send the following data in 
a certificate request to an MSCA, allowing the MSCA to 
create the Certificate Holder Reference of the new 
equipment certificate:  
— If known (see CSM_154), a serial number for the 
equipment, unique for the manufacturer, the equipment's 
type and the month of manufacturing. Otherwise, a 
unique certificate request identifier.  
— The month and the year of equipment manufacturing or 
of the certificate request.  
The manufacturer shall ensure that this data is correct and that the 
certificate returned by the MSCA is inserted in the intended equipment.  
▼B 
CSM_154 In the case of a VU, the manufacturer, when requesting a 
certificate, may or may not know the manufacturer-specific 
serial number of the VU for which that certificate and the 
associated private key is intended. If known, the VU manu ­
facturer shall send the serial number to the MSCA. If not 
known, the manufacturer shall uniquely identify each certifi ­
cate request and send this certificate request serial number to 
the MSCA. The resulting certificate will then contain the 
certificate request serial number. After inserting the certifi ­
cate in a specific VU, the manufacturer shall communicate 
the connection between the certificate request serial number 
and the VU identification to the MSCA.  
10. VU- CARD MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SECURE 
MESSAGING  
10.1.  General  
CSM_155 On a high level, secure communication between a vehicle 
unit and a tachograph card shall be based on the following 
steps:  
— First, each party shall demonstrate to the other that it 
owns a valid public key certificate, signed by a Member 
State Certificate Authority. In turn, the MSCA public 
key certificate must be signed by the European root 
certificate authority. This step is called certificate chain 
verification and is specified in detail in section 10.2  
— Second, the vehicle unit shall demonstrate to the card 
that it is in possession of the private key corresponding 
to the public key in the presented certificate. It does so 
by signing a random number sent by the card. The card 
verifies the signature over the random number. If this 
verification is successful, the VU is authenticated. This 
step is called VU Authentication and is specified in 
detail in section 10.3.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 407  
— Third, both parties independently calculate two AES 
session keys using an asymmetric key agreement algo ­
rithm. Using one of these session keys, the card creates a 
message authentication code (MAC) over some data sent 
by the VU. The VU verifies the MAC. If this verifi ­
cation is successful, the card is authenticated. This step 
is called Card Authentication and is specified in detail in 
section 10.4.  
— Fourth, the VU and the card shall use the agreed session 
keys to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and auth ­
enticity of all exchanged messages. This is called 
Secure Messaging and is specified in detail in section 
10.5.  
CSM_156 The mechanism described in CSM_155 shall be triggered by 
the vehicle unit whenever a card is inserted into one of its 
card slots.  
10.2.  Mutual Certificate Chain Verification  
10.2.1  Card Certificate Chain Verification by VU  
CSM_157  ►M1 Vehicle units shall use the protocol depicted in 
Figure 4 for verifying a tachograph card’s certificate 
chain. For every certificate it reads from the card, the VU 
shall verify that the Certificate Holder Authorisation (CHA) 
field is correct:  
— The CHA field of the Card certificate shall indicate a 
card certificate for mutual authentication (see Appendix 
1, data type EquipmentType).  
— The CHA of the Card.CA certificate shall indicate an 
MSCA.  
— The CHA of the Card.Link certificate shall indicate the 
ERCA. ◄ 
Notes to Figure 4:  
— The Card certificates and public keys mentioned in the 
figure are those for mutual authentication. Section 9.1.5 
denotes these as Card_MA.  
— The Card.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in 
the figure are those for signing card certificates and it is 
indicated in the CAR of the Card certificate. Section 
9.1.3 denotes these as MSCA_Card.  
— The Card.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure is 
the European root certificate that is indicated in the CAR 
of the Card.CA certificate.  
— The Card.Link certificate mentioned in the figure is the 
card's link certificate, if present. As specified in section 
9.1.2, this is a link certificate for a new European root 
key pair created by the ERCA and signed by the 
previous European private key.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 408  
— The Card.Link.EUR certificate is the European root cer ­
tificate that is indicated in the CAR of the Card.Link 
certificate.  
CSM_158 As depicted in Figure 4, verification of the card's certificate 
chain shall begin upon card insertion. The vehicle unit shall 
read the card holder reference (
  ) 
from EF ICC. The VU shall check if it knows the card, 
i.e., if it has successfully verified the card's certificate 
chain in the past and stored it for future reference. If it 
does, and the card certificate is still valid, the process 
continues with the verification of the VU certificate chain. 
Otherwise, the VU shall successively read from the card the 
MSCA_Card certificate to be used for verifying the card 
certificate, the Card.CA. EUR certificate to be used for 
verifying the MSCA_Card certificate, and possibly the link 
certificate, until it finds a certificate it knows or it can 
verify. If such a certificate is found, the VU shall use that 
certificate to verify the underlying card certificates it has 
read from the card. If successful, the process continues 
with the verification of the VU certificate chain. If not 
successful, the VU shall ignore the card.  
Note:  There are three ways in which the VU may know the 
Card.CA.EUR certificate:  
— the Card.CA.EUR certificate is the same certificate as 
the VU's own EUR certificate;  
— the Card.CA.EUR certificate precedes the VU's own 
EUR certificate and the VU contained this certificate 
already at issuance (see CSM_81);  
— the Card.CA.EUR certificate succeeds the VU's own 
EUR certificate and the VU received a link certificate 
in the past from another tachograph card, verified it and 
stored it for future reference.  
CSM_159 As indicated in Figure 4, once the VU has verified the 
authenticity and validity of a previously unknown certificate, 
it may store this certificate for future reference, such that it 
does not need to verify that certificate's authenticity again if 
it is presented to the VU again. Instead of storing the entire 
certificate, a VU may choose to store only the contents of 
the Certificate Body, as specified in section 9.3.2.  
►M1 Whereas storing of all other types of certificate is 
optional, it is mandatory for a VU to store a new link 
certificate presented by a card. ◄ 
CSM_160 The VU shall verify the temporal validity of any certificate 
read from the card or stored in its memory, and shall reject 
expired certificates. For verifying the temporal validity of a 
certificate presented by the card a VU shall use its internal 
clock.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 409  
Figure 4  
Protocol for Card Certificate Chain Verification by VU
  
10.2.2  VU Certificate Chain Verification by Card  
CSM_161  ►M1 Tachograph cards shall use the protocol depicted in 
Figure 5 for verifying a VU's certificate chain. For every 
certificate presented by the VU, the card shall verify that the 
Certificate Holder Authorisation (CHA) field is correct:  
— The CHA of the VU.Link certificate shall indicate the 
ERCA.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 410  
— The CHA of the VU.CA certificate shall indicate an 
MSCA.  
— The CHA field of the VU certificate shall indicate a VU 
certificate for mutual authentication (see Appendix 1, 
data type EquipmentType). ◄ 
Figure 5  
Protocol for VU Certificate Chain Verification by Card
  
Notes to Figure 5:  
— The VU certificates and public keys mentioned in the figure are those 
for mutual authentication. Section 9.1.4 denotes these as VU_MA.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 411  
— The VU.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in the figure are 
those for signing VU and external GNSS facility certificates. Section 
9.1.3 denotes these as MSCA_VU-EGF.  
— The VU.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure is the European 
root certificate that is indicated in the CAR of the VU.CA certificate.  
— The VU.Link certificate mentioned in the figure is the VU's link 
certificate, if present. As specified in section 9.1.2, this is a link 
certificate for a new European root key pair created by the ERCA 
and signed by the previous European private key.  
— The VU.Link.EUR certificate is the European root certificate that is 
indicated in the CAR of the VU.Link certificate.  
CSM_162 As depicted in Figure 5, verification of the certificate chain 
of the vehicle unit shall begin with the vehicle unit 
attempting to set its own public key for use in the 
tachograph card. If this succeeds, it means that the card 
successfully verified the VU's certificate chain in the past, 
and has stored the VU certificate for future reference. In this 
case, the VU certificate is set for use and the process 
continues with VU Authentication. If the card does not 
know the VU certificate, the VU shall successively 
present the VU.CA certificate to be used for verifying its 
VU certificate, the VU.CA.EUR certificate to be used for 
verifying the VU.CA certificate, and possibly the link 
certificate, in order to find a certificate known or verifiable 
by the card. If such a certificate is found, the card shall use 
that certificate to verify the underlying VU certificates 
presented to it. If successful, the VU shall finally set its 
public key for use in the tachograph card. If not successful, 
the VU shall ignore the card.  
Note: There are three ways in which the card may know the 
VU.CA.EUR certificate:  
— the VU.CA.EUR certificate is the same certificate as the 
card's own EUR certificate;  
— the VU.CA.EUR certificate precedes the card's own 
EUR certificate and the card contained this certificate 
already at issuance (see CSM_91);  
— the VU.CA.EUR certificate succeeds the card's own 
EUR certificate and the card received a link certificate 
in the past from another vehicle unit, verified it and 
stored it for future reference.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 412  
CSM_163 The VU shall use the MSE: Set AT command to set its 
public key for use in the tachograph card. As specified in 
Appendix 2, this command contains an indication of the 
cryptographic mechanism that will be used with the key 
that is set. This mechanism shall be ‘VU Authentication 
using the ECDSA algorithm, in combination with the 
hashing algorithm linked to the key size of the VU's 
VU_MA key pair, as specified in CSM_50’.  
CSM_164 The MSE: Set AT command also contains an indication of 
the ephemeral key pair which the VU will use during 
session key agreement (see section 10.4). Therefore, 
before sending the MSE: Set AT command, the VU shall 
generate an ephemeral ECC key pair. For generating the 
ephemeral key pair, the VU shall use the standardized 
domain parameters indicated in the card certificate. The 
ephemeral key pair is denoted as (VU.SK  eph , VU.PK  eph , 
Card.DP). The VU shall take the x-coordinate of the 
ECDH ephemeral public point as the key identification; 
this is called the compressed representation of the public 
key and denoted as Comp(VU.PK  eph ). 
▼M1 
CSM_165 If the MSE: Set AT command is successful, the card shall 
set the indicated VU.PK for subsequent use during Vehicle 
Authentication, and shall temporarily store 
Comp(VU.PKeph). In case two or more successful MSE: 
Set AT commands are sent before session key agreement is 
performed, the card shall store only the last 
Comp(VU.PKeph) received. The card shall reset 
Comp(VU.PKeph) after a successful GENERAL AUTH ­
ENTICATE command.  
▼B 
CSM_166 The card shall verify the temporal validity of any certificate 
presented by the VU or referenced by the VU while stored 
in the card's memory, and shall reject expired certificates.  
CSM_167 For verifying the temporal validity of a certificate presented 
by the VU, each tachograph card shall internally store some 
data representing the current time. This data shall not be 
directly updatable by a VU. At issuance, the current time of 
a card shall be set equal to the Effective Date of the card's 
Card_MA certificate. A card shall update its current time if 
the Effective Date of an authentic ‘valid source of time’ 
certificate presented by a VU is more recent than the 
card's current time. In that case, the card shall set its 
current time to the Effective Date of that certificate. The 
card shall accept only the following certificates as a valid 
source of time:  
— Second-generation ERCA link certificates  
— Second-generation MSCA certificates  
— Second-generation VU certificates issued by the same 
country as the card's own card certificate(s).  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 413  
Note:  the last requirement implies that a card shall be able 
to recognize the CAR of the VU certificate, i.e. the 
MSCA_VU-EGF certificate. This will not be the same as 
the CAR of its own certificate, which is the MSCA_Card 
certificate.  
CSM_168 As indicated in Figure 5, once the card has verified the 
authenticity and validity of a previously unknown 
certificate, it may store this certificate for future reference, 
such that it does not need to verify that certificate's auth ­
enticity again if it is presented to the card again. Instead xof 
storing the entire certificate, a card may choose to store only 
the contents of the Certificate Body, as specified in section 
9.3.2.  
10.3.  VU Authentication  
CSM_169 Vehicle units and cards shall use the VU Authentication 
protocol depicted in Figure 6 to authenticate the VU 
towards the card. VU Authentication enables the tachograph 
card to explicitly verify that the VU is authentic. To do so, 
the VU shall use its private key to sign a challenge 
generated by the card.  
CSM_170  ►M1 Next to the card challenge, the VU shall include in 
the signature the certificate holder reference taken from the 
card certificate. ◄ 
Note:  This ensures that the card to which the VU auth ­
enticates itself is the same card whose certificate chain the 
VU has verified previously.  
CSM_171 The VU shall also include in the signature the identifier of 
the ephemeral public key Comp(VU.PK  eph ) which the VU 
will use to set up Secure Messaging during the Chip Auth ­
entication process specified in section 10.4.  
Note:  This ensures that the VU with which a card 
communicates during a Secure Messaging session is the 
same VU that was authenticated by the card.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 414  
Figure 6  
VU Authentication protocol
  
▼B 
CSM_172 If multiple GET CHALLENGE commands are sent by the 
VU during VU Authentication, the card shall return a new 
8-byte random challenge each time, but shall store only the 
last challenge.  
CSM_173 The signing algorithm used by the VU for VU Authenti ­
cation shall be ECDSA as specified in [DSS], using the 
hashing algorithm linked to the key size of the VU's 
VU_MA key pair, as specified in CSM_50. The signature 
format shall be plain, as specified in [TR-03111]. The VU 
shall send the resulting signature to the card.  
▼M1 
CSM_174 Upon receiving the VU’s signature in an EXTERNAL 
AUTHENTICATE command, the card shall  
— Calculate the authentication token by concatenating 
Card.CHR, the card challenge rcard and the identifier 
of the VU ephemeral public key Comp(VU.PKeph),  
— Verify the VU’s signature using the ECDSA algorithm, 
using the hashing algorithm linked to the key size of the 
VU’s VU_MA key pair as specified in CSM_50, in 
combination with VU.PK and the calculated authenti ­
cation token.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 415  
10.4.  Chip Authentication and Session Key Agreement  
CSM_175 Vehicle units and cards shall use the Chip Authentication 
protocol depicted in  Figure 7  to authenticate the card 
towards the VU. Chip Authentication enables the vehicle 
unit to explicitly verify that the card is authentic.  
Figure 7  
Chip Authentication and session key agreement
  
CSM_176 The VU and the card shall take the following steps:  
1. The vehicle unit initiates the Chip Authentication process 
by sending the MSE: Set AT command indicating ‘Chip 
Authentication using the ECDH algorithm resulting in an 
AES session key length linked to the key size of the 
card's Card_MA key pair, as specified in CSM_50’. 
The VU shall determine the key size of the card's key 
pair from the card certificate.  
▼M1 
2. The VU sends the public point VU.PK  eph of its 
ephemeral key pair to the card. The public point shall 
be converted to an octet string as specified in [TR- 
03111]. The uncompressed encoding format shall be 
used. As explained in CSM_164, the VU generated 
this ephemeral key pair prior to the verification of the 
VU certificate chain. The VU sent the identifier of the 
ephemeral public key Comp(VU.PK  eph ) to the card, and 
the card stored it.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 416  
3. The card computes Comp(VU.PK  eph ) from VU.PK  eph 
and compares this to the stored value of 
Comp(VU.PK  eph ). 
4. Using the ECDH algorithm in combination with the 
card's static private key and the VU's ephemeral public 
key, the card computes a secret K.  
5. The card chooses a random 8-byte nonce N  PICC and uses 
it to derive two AES session keys K  MAC and K  ENC from 
K. See CSM_179.  
▼M1 
6. Using K  MAC , the card computes an authentication token 
over the VU ephemeral public point: T  PICC = 
CMAC(K  MAC , VU.PK  eph ). The public point shall be in 
the format used by the VU (see bullet 2 above). The card 
sends N  PICC and T  PICC to the vehicle unit.  
▼B 
7. Using the ECDH algorithm in combination with the 
card's static public key and the VU's ephemeral private 
key, the VU computes the same secret K as the card did 
in step 4.  
8. The VU derives session keys K  MAC and K  ENC from K 
and N  PICC ; see CSM_179.  
9. The VU verifies the authentication token T  PICC . 
CSM_177 In step 3 above, the card shall compute Comp(VU.PKeph) 
as the x-coordinate of the public point in VU.PKeph.  
CSM_178 In steps 4 and 7 above, the card and the vehicle unit shall 
use the ECKA-EG algorithm as defined in [TR-03111].  
CSM_179 In steps 5 and 8 above, the card and the vehicle unit shall 
use the key derivation function for AES session keys 
defined in [TR-03111], with the following precisions and 
changes:  
— The value of the counter shall be ‘00 00 00 01’ for 
K ENC and ‘00 00 00 02’ for K  MAC.  
— The optional nonce  r shall be used and shall be equal to 
N PICC. 
— For deriving 128-bits AES keys, the hashing algorithm 
to be used shall be SHA-256.  
— For deriving 192-bits AES keys, the hashing algorithm 
to be used shall be SHA-384.  
— For deriving 256-bits AES keys, the hashing algorithm 
to be used shall be SHA-512.  
The length of the session keys (i.e. the length at which the 
hash is truncated) shall be linked to the size of the 
Card_MA key pair, as specified in CSM_50.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 417  
CSM_180 In steps 6 and 9 above, the card and the vehicle unit shall 
use the AES algorithm in CMAC mode, as specified in [SP 
800-38B]. The length of T  PICC shall be linked to the length 
of the AES session keys, as specified in CSM_50.  
10.5.  Secure Messaging  
10.5.1  General  
CSM_181 All commands and responses exchanged between a vehicle 
unit and a tachograph card after successful Chip Authenti ­
cation took place and until the end of the session shall be 
protected by Secure Messaging.  
CSM_182 Except when reading from a file with access condition SM- 
R-ENC-MAC-G2 (see Appendix 2, section 4), Secure 
Messaging shall be used in authentication-only mode. In 
this mode, a cryptographic checksum (a.k.a. MAC) is 
added to all commands and responses to ensure message 
authenticity and integrity.  
CSM_183 When reading data from a file with access condition SM-R- 
ENC-MAC-G2, Secure Messaging shall be used in encrypt- 
then-authenticate mode, i.e. the response data is encrypted 
first to ensure message confidentiality, and afterwards a 
MAC over the formatted encrypted data is calculated to 
ensure authenticity and integrity.  
CSM_184 Secure Messaging shall use AES as defined in [AES] with 
the session keys K  MAC and K  ENC that were agreed during 
Chip Authentication.  
CSM_185 An unsigned integer shall be used as the Send Sequence 
Counter (SSC) to prevent replay attacks. The size of the 
SSC shall be equal to the AES block size, i.e. 128 bits. 
The SSC shall be in MSB-first format. The Send 
Sequence Counter shall be initialized to zero (i.e. ‘00 00 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00’) when Secure 
Messaging is started. The SSC shall be increased every time 
before a command or response APDU is generated, i.e. 
since the starting value of the SSC in a SM session is 0, 
in the first command the value of the SSC will be 1. The 
value of SSC for the first response will be 2.  
CSM_186 For message encryption, K  ENC shall be used with AES in 
the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation, as 
defined in [ISO 10116], with an interleave parameter  m = 
1 and an initialization vector SV = E(K  ENC , SSC), i.e. the 
current value of the Send Sequence Counter encrypted with 
K ENC . 
CSM_187 For message authentication, K  MAC shall be used with AES 
in CMAC mode as specified in [SP 800-38B]. The length of 
the MAC shall be linked to the length of the AES session 
keys, as specified in CSM_50. The Send Sequence Counter 
shall be included in the MAC by prepending it before the 
datagram to be authenticated.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 418  
10.5.2  Secure Message Structure  
CSM_188 Secure Messaging shall make use only of the Secure 
Messaging data objects (see [ISO 7816-4]) listed in Table 
5. In any message, these data objects shall be used in the 
order specified in this table.  
Table 5  
Secure Messaging Data Objects  
Data Object Name  Tag  Presence (M)andatory, 
(C)onditional or (F)or ­
bidden in  
Commands  Responses  
Plain value not encoded in BER-TLV  ‘81’  C  C  
Plain value encoded in BER-TLV, but 
not including SM DOs  ‘B3’ C  C  
Padding-content indicator followed by 
cryptogram, plain value not encoded 
in BER-TLV  ‘87’ C  C  
Protected Le  ‘97’  C  F  
Processing Status  ‘99’  F  M  
Cryptographic Checksum  ‘8E’  M  M  
Note:  As specified in Appendix 2, tachograph cards may 
support the READ BINARY and UPDATE BINARY 
command with an odd INS byte (‘B1’ resp. ‘D7’). These 
command variants are required to read and update files with 
more than 32 768 bytes or more. In case such a variant is 
used, a data object with tag ‘B3’ shall be used instead of an 
object with tag ‘81’. See Appendix 2 for more information.  
CSM_189 All SM data objects shall be encoded in DER TLV as 
specified in [ISO 8825-1]. This encoding results in a Tag- 
Length-Value (TLV) structure as follows:  
Tag: The tag is encoded in one or two octets and 
indicates the content.  
Length: The length is encoded as an unsigned integer in 
one, two, or three octets, resulting in a maximum 
length of 65 535 octets. The minimum number of 
octets shall be used.  
Value: The value is encoded in zero or more octets  
CSM_190 APDUs protected by Secure Messaging shall be created as 
follows:  
— The command header shall be included in the MAC 
calculation, therefore value ‘0C’shall be used for the 
class byte CLA.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 419  
— As specified in Appendix 2, all INS bytes shall be even, 
with the possible exception of odd INS bytes for the 
READ BINARY and UPDATE BINARY commands.  
— The actual value of Lc will be modified to Lc' after 
application of secure messaging.  
— The Data field shall consist of SM data objects.  
— In the protected command APDU the new Le byte shall 
be set to ‘00’. If required, a data object ‘97’ shall be 
included in the Data field in order to convey the original 
value of Le.  
▼M1 
CSM_191 Any data object to be encrypted shall be padded according 
to [ISO 7816-4] using padding-content indicator ‘01’. For 
the calculation of the MAC, data objects in the APDU shall 
be padded according to [ISO 7816-4].  
Note:  Padding for Secure Messaging is always performed 
by the secure messaging layer, not by the CMAC or CBC 
algorithms.  
Summary and Examples  
A command APDU with applied Secure Messaging will have the 
following structure, depending on the case of the respective unsecured 
command (DO is data object):  
Case 1: CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘8E’ || Le  
Case 2: CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘97’ || DO‘8E’ || 
Le 
Case 3 (even INS byte): CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘81’ || DO‘8E’ || 
Le 
Case 3 (odd INS byte): CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘B3’ || DO‘8E’ || 
Le 
Case 4 (even INS byte): CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘81’ || DO‘97’ || 
DO‘8E’ || Le  
Case 4 (odd INS byte): CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘B3’ || DO‘97’ || 
DO‘8E’ || Le  
where Le = ‘00’ or ‘00 00’ depending on whether short length fields or 
extended length fields are used; see [ISO 7816-4].  
A response APDU with applied Secure Messaging will have the 
following structure, depending on the case of the respective unsecured 
response:  
Case 1 or 3: DO ‘99’ || DO ‘8E’ || 
SW1SW2  
Case 2 or 4 (even INS byte) without 
encryption: DO ‘81’ || DO ‘99’ || DO 
‘8E’ || SW1SW2  
Case 2 or 4 (even INS byte) with 
encryption: DO ‘87’ || DO ‘99’ || DO 
‘8E’ || SW1SW2  
Case 2 or 4 (odd INS byte) without 
encryption: DO ‘B3’ || DO ‘99’ || DO 
‘8E’ || SW1SW2  
Note:  Case 2 or 4 (odd INS byte) with encryption is never used in the 
communication between a VU and a card.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 420  
Below are three example APDU transformations for commands with 
even INS code. Figure 8 shows an authenticated Case 4 command 
APDU, Figure 9 shows an authenticated Case 1/Case 3 response 
APDU, and Figure 10 shows an encrypted and authenticated Case 
2/Case 4 response APDU.  
Figure 8  
Transformation of an authenticated Case 4 Command APDU
  
Figure 9  
Transformation of an authenticated Case 1 / Case 3 Response APDU
  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 421  
Figure 10  
Transformation of an encrypted and authenticated Case 2/Case 4 Response APDU
  
▼B 
10.5.3  Secure Messaging Session Abortion  
CSM_192 A vehicle unit shall abort an ongoing Secure Messaging 
session if and only if one of the following conditions occur:  
— it receives a plain response APDU,  
— it detects a Secure Messaging error in a response APDU:  
— An expected Secure Messaging data object is 
missing, the order of data objects is incorrect, or an 
unknown data object is included.  
— A Secure Messaging data object is incorrect, e.g. the 
MAC value is incorrect, the TLV structure is 
incorrect or the padding indicator in tag ‘87’ is not 
equal to ‘01’.  
— the card sends a status byte indicating it detected an SM 
error (see CSM_194),  
— the limit for the number of commands and associated 
responses within the current session is reached. For a 
given VU, this limit shall be defined by its manufacturer, 
taking into account the security requirements of the 
hardware used, with a maximum value of 240 SM 
commands and associated responses per session.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 422  
CSM_193 A tachograph card shall abort an ongoing Secure Messaging 
session if and only if one of the following conditions occur:  
— it receives a plain command APDU,  
— it detects a Secure Messaging error in a command 
APDU:  
— An expected Secure Messaging data object is 
missing, the order of data objects is incorrect, or an 
unknown data object is included.  
— A Secure Messaging data object is incorrect, e.g. the 
MAC value is incorrect or the TLV structure is 
incorrect.  
— it is depowered or reset,  
— the VU starts the VU Authentication process,  
— the limit for the number of commands and associated 
responses within the current session is reached. For a 
given card, this limit shall be defined by its manufac ­
turer, taking into account the security requirements of the 
hardware used, with a maximum value of 240 SM 
commands and associated responses per session.  
▼B 
CSM_194 Regarding SM error handling by a tachograph card:  
— If in a command APDU some expected Secure 
Messaging data objects are missing, the order of data 
objects is incorrect or unknown data objects are 
included, a tachograph card shall respond with status 
bytes ‘69 87’.  
— If a Secure Messaging data object in a command APDU 
is incorrect, a tachograph card shall respond with status 
bytes ‘69 88’.  
In such a case, the status bytes shall be returned without 
using SM.  
CSM_195 If a Secure Messaging session between a VU and a 
tachograph card is aborted, the VU and the tachograph 
card shall  
— securely destroy the stored session keys  
— immediately establish a new Secure Messaging session, 
as described in sections 10.2 — 10.5.  
CSM_196 If for any reason the VU decides to restart mutual authenti ­
cation towards an inserted card, the process shall restart with 
verification of the card certificate chain, as described in 
section 10.2, and shall continue as described in sections 
10.2 — 10.5.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 423  
11. VU — EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY COUPLING, MUTUAL AUTH ­
ENTICATION AND SECURE MESSAGING  
11.1.  General  
CSM_197 The GNSS facility used by a VU to determine its position 
may be internal, (i.e. built into the VU casing and not 
detachable), or it may be an external module. In the first 
case, there is no need to standardize the internal communi ­
cation between the GNSS facility and the VU, and the 
requirements in this chapter do not apply. In the latter 
case, communication between the VU and the external 
GNSS facility shall be standardized and protected as 
described in this chapter.  
CSM_198 Secure communication between a vehicle unit and an 
external GNSS facility shall take place in the same way as 
secure communication between a vehicle unit and a 
tachograph card, with the external GNSS facility (EGF) 
taking the role of the card. All requirements mentioned in 
chapter 10 for tachograph cards shall be satisfied by an EGF, 
taking into account the deviations, clarifications and 
additions mentioned in this chapter. In particular, mutual 
certificate chain verification, VU Authentication and Chip 
Authentication shall be performed as described in sections 
11.3 and 11.4.  
CSM_199 Communication between a vehicle unit and an EGF differs 
from communication between a vehicle unit and a card in 
the fact that a vehicle unit and an EGF must be coupled once 
in a workshop before the VU and the EGF can exchange 
GNSS-based data during normal operation. The coupling 
process is described in section 11.2.  
CSM_200 For communication between a vehicle unit and an EGF, 
APDU commands and responses based on [ISO 7816-4] 
and [ISO 7816-8] shall be used. The exact structure of 
these APDUs is defined in Appendix 2 of this Annex.  
11.2.  VU and External GNSS Facility Coupling  
CSM_201 A vehicle unit and an EGF in a vehicle shall be coupled by a 
workshop. Only a coupled vehicle unit and EGF shall be 
able to communicate during normal operation.  
CSM_202 Coupling of a vehicle unit and an EGF shall only be possible 
if the vehicle unit is in calibration mode. The coupling shall 
be initiated by the vehicle unit.  
CSM_203 A workshop may re-couple a vehicle unit to another EGF or 
to the same EGF at any time. During re-coupling, the VU 
shall securely destroy the existing EGF_MA certificate in its 
memory and shall store the EGF_MA certificate of the EGF 
to which it is being coupled.  
CSM_204 A workshop may re-couple an external GNSS facility to 
another VU or to the same VU at any time. During re- 
coupling, the EGF shall securely destroy the existing 
VU_MA certificate in its memory and shall store the 
VU_MA certificate of the VU to which it is being coupled.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 424  
11.3.  Mutual Certificate Chain Verification  
11.3.1  General  
CSM_205 Mutual certificate chain verification between a VU and an 
EGF shall take place only during the coupling of the VU and 
the EGF by a workshop. During normal operation of a 
coupled VU and EGF, no certificates shall be verified. 
Instead, the VU and EGF shall trust the certificates they 
stored during the coupling, after checking the temporal 
validity of these certificates. The VU and the EGF shall 
not trust any other certificates for protecting the VU — 
EGF communication during normal operation.  
11.3.2  During VU — EGF Coupling  
CSM_206 During the coupling to an EGF, a vehicle unit shall use the 
protocol depicted in Figure 4 (section 10.2.1) for verifying 
the external GNSS facility's certificate chain.  
Notes to Figure 4 within this context:  
— Communication control is out of the scope of this 
Appendix. However, an EGF is not a smart card and 
hence the VU will probably not send a Reset to initiate 
the communication and will not receive an ATR.  
— The Card certificates and public keys mentioned in the 
figure shall be interpreted as the EGF's certificates and 
public keys for mutual authentication. Section 9.1.6 
denotes these as EGF_MA.  
— The Card.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in 
the figure shall be interpreted as the MSCA's certificates 
and public keys for signing EGF certificates. Section 
9.1.3 denotes these as MSCA_VU-EGF.  
— The Card.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure 
shall be interpreted as the European root certificate that 
is indicated in the CAR of the MSCA_VU-EGF 
certificate.  
— The Card.Link certificate mentioned in the figure shall be 
interpreted as the EGF's link certificate, if present. As 
specified in section 9.1.2, this is a link certificate for a 
new European root key pair created by the ERCA and 
signed by the previous European private key.  
— The Card.Link.EUR certificate is the European root cer ­
tificate that is indicated in the CAR of the Card.Link 
certificate.  
— Instead of the
  , the VU 
shall read the
  from EF 
ICC.  
— Instead of selecting the Tachograph AID, the VU shall 
select the EGF AID.  
— ‘Ignore Card’ shall be interpreted as ‘Ignore EGF’.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 425  
CSM_207 Once it has verified the EGF_MA certificate, the vehicle unit 
shall store this certificate for use during normal operation; 
see section 11.3.3.  
CSM_208  ►M1 During the coupling to a VU, an external GNSS 
facility shall use the protocol depicted in Figure 5 (section 
10.2.2) for verifying the VU's certificate chain. ◄ 
Notes to Figure 5 within this context:  
— The VU shall generate a fresh ephemeral key pair using 
the domain parameters in the EGF certificate.  
— The VU certificates and public keys mentioned in the 
figure are those for mutual authentication. Section 9.1.4 
denotes these as VU_MA.  
— The VU.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in the 
figure are those for signing VU and external GNSS 
facility certificates. Section 9.1.3 denotes these as 
MSCA_VU-EGF.  
— The VU.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure is 
the European root certificate that is indicated in the CAR 
of the VU.CA certificate.  
— The VU.Link certificate mentioned in the figure is the 
VU's link certificate, if present. As specified in section 
9.1.2, this is a link certificate for a new European root 
key pair created by the ERCA and signed by the 
previous European private key.  
— The VU.Link.EUR certificate is the European root cer ­
tificate that is indicated in the CAR of the VU.Link 
certificate.  
CSM_209 In deviation from requirement CSM_167, an EGF shall use 
the GNSS time to verify the temporal validity of any certifi ­
cate presented.  
▼M1 
CSM_210 Once it has verified the VU_MA certificate, the external 
GNSS facility shall store this certificate for use during 
normal operation; see section 11.3.3.  
▼B 
11.3.3  During Normal Operation  
CSM_211  ►M1 During normal operation, a vehicle unit and an EGF 
shall use the protocol depicted in Figure 11 for verifying the 
temporal validity of the stored EGF_MA certificate and for 
setting the VU_MA public key for subsequent VU Auth ­
entication. No further mutual verification of the certificate 
chains shall take place during normal operation. ◄ 
Note that Figure 11 in essence consists of the first steps 
shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Again, note that since an 
EGF is not a smart card, the VU will probably not send a 
Reset to initiate the communication and will not receive an 
ATR. In any case this is out of the scope of this Appendix.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 426  
Figure 11  
Mutual verification of certificate temporal validity during normal VU — EGF operation
  
CSM_212 As shown in Figure 11, the vehicle unit shall log an error if 
the EGF_MA certificate is no longer valid. However, mutual 
authentication, key agreement and subsequent communi ­
cation via secure messaging shall proceed normally.  
11.4.  VU Authentication, Chip Authentication and Session Key Agreement  
CSM_213 VU Authentication, Chip Authentication and session key 
agreement between a VU and an EGF shall take place 
during coupling and whenever a Secure Messaging session 
is re-established during normal operation. The VU and the 
EGF shall carry out the processes described in sections 10.3 
and 10.4. All requirements in these sections shall apply.  
11.5.  Secure Messaging  
CSM_214 All commands and responses exchanged between a vehicle 
unit and an external GNSS facility after successful Chip 
Authentication took place and until the end of the session 
shall be protected by Secure Messaging.in authentication- 
only mode. All requirements in section 10.5 shall apply.  
CSM_215 If a Secure Messaging session between a VU and an EGF is 
aborted, the VU shall immediately establish a new Secure 
Messaging session, as described in section 11.3.3 and 11.4.  
12. VU — MOTION SENSOR PAIRING AND COMMUNICATION  
12.1.  General  
CSM_216 A vehicle unit and a motion sensor shall communicate using 
the interface protocol specified in [ISO 16844-3] during 
pairing and in normal operation, with the changes 
described in this chapter and in section 9.2.1.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 427  
Note:  readers of this chapter are supposed to be familiar with 
the contents of [ISO 16844-3].  
12.2.  VU — Motion Sensor Pairing Using Different Key Generations  
As explained in section 9.2.1, the motion sensor master key and all 
associated keys are regularly replaced. This leads to the presence of up 
to three motion sensor-related AES keys K  M-WC  (of consecutive key 
generations) in workshop cards. Similarly, in motion sensors up to 
three different AES-based encryptions of data (based on consecutive 
generations of the motion sensor master key K  M ) may be present. A 
vehicle unit contains only one motion sensor-related key K  M-VU.  
CSM_217 A second-generation VU and a second-generation motion 
sensor shall be paired as follows (compare Table 6 in [ISO 
16844-3]):  
1. A second-generation workshop card is inserted into the 
VU and the VU is connected to the motion sensor.  
2. The VU reads all available K  M-WC  keys from the 
workshop card, inspects their key version numbers and 
chooses the one matching the version number of the VU's 
K M-VU  key. If the matching K  M-WC  key is not present on 
the workshop card, the VU aborts the pairing process and 
shows an appropriate error message to the workshop card 
holder.  
3. The VU calculates the motion sensor master key K  M from 
K M-VU  and K  M-WC,  and the identification key K  ID from 
K M , as specified in section 9.2.1.  
4. The VU sends the instruction to initiate the pairing 
process towards the motion sensor, as described in [ISO 
16844-3], and encrypts the serial number it receives from 
the motion sensor with the identification key K  ID. The 
VU sends the encrypted serial number back to the 
motion sensor.  
5. The motion sensor matches the encrypted serial number 
consecutively with each of the encryptions of the serial 
number it holds internally. If it finds a match, the VU is 
authenticated. The motion sensor notes the generation of 
K ID used by the VU and returns the matching encrypted 
version of its pairing key; i.e. the encryption that was 
created using the same generation of K  M . 
6. The VU decrypts the pairing key using K  M , generates a 
session key K  S, encrypts it with the pairing key and sends 
the result to the motion sensor. The motion sensor 
decrypts K  S . 
7. The VU assembles the pairing information as defined in 
[ISO 16844-3], encrypts the information with the pairing 
key, and sends the result to the motion sensor. The 
motion sensor decrypts the pairing information.  
8. The motion sensor encrypts the received pairing 
information with the received K  S and returns this to the 
VU. The VU verifies that the pairing information is the 
same information which the VU sent to the motion  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 428  
sensor in the previous step. If it is, this proves that the 
motion sensor used the same K  S as the VU and hence in 
step 5 sent its pairing key encrypted with the correct 
generation of K  M . Hence, the motion sensor is authenti ­
cated.  
Note that steps 2 and 5 are different from the standard 
process in [ISO 16844-3]; the other steps are standard.  
Example:  Suppose a pairing takes place in the first year of 
the validity of the ERCA (3) certificate; see Figure 2 in 
section 9.2.1.2. Moreover  
— Suppose the motion sensor was issued in the last year of 
the validity of the ERCA (1) certificate. It will therefore 
contain the following keys and data:  
— N  s [1]: its serial number encrypted with generation 1 
of K  ID , 
— N  s [2]: its serial number encrypted with generation 2 
of K  ID , 
— N  s [3]: its serial number encrypted with generation 3 
of K  ID , 
— K  P [1]: its generation-1 pairing key (  1 ), encrypted with 
generation 1 of K  M , 
— K  P [2]: its generation-2 pairing key, encrypted with 
generation 2 of K  M , 
— K  P [3]: its generation-3 pairing key, encrypted with 
generation 3 of K  M , 
— Suppose that the workshop card was issued in the first 
year of the validity of the ERCA (3) certificate. It will 
therefore contain the generation 2 and generation 3 of the 
K M-WC  key. 
— Suppose the VU is a generation-2 VU, containing the 
generation 2 of K  M-VU.  
In this case, the following will happen in steps 2 — 5:  
— Step 2: The VU reads generation 2 and generation 3 of 
K M-WC  from the workshop card and inspects their 
version numbers.  
— Step 3: The VU combines the generation-2 K  M-WC  with 
its K  M-VU  to compute K  M and K  ID. 
— Step 4: The VU encrypts the serial number it receives 
from the motion sensor with K  ID. 
— Step 5: The motion sensor compares the received data 
with N  s [1] and doesn't find a match. Next, it compares 
the data with N  s [2] and finds a match. It concludes that 
the VU is a generation-2 VU, and therefore sends back 
K P [2]. ▼B 
( 1 ) Note that the generation-1, generation-2 and generation-3 pairing keys may actually be 
the same key, or may be three different keys having different lengths, as explained in 
CSM_117.
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 429  
12.3.  VU — Motion Sensor Pairing and Communication using AES  
CSM_218 As specified in Table 3 in section 9.2.1, all keys involved in 
the pairing of a (second-generation) vehicle unit and a 
motion sensor and in subsequent communication shall be 
AES keys, rather than double-length TDES keys as 
specified in [ISO 16844-3]. These AES keys may have a 
length of 128, 192 or 256 bits. Since the AES block size 
is 16 bytes, the length of an encrypted message must be a 
multiple of 16 bytes, compared to 8 bytes for TDES. 
Moreover, some of these messages will be used to 
transport AES keys, the length of which may be 128, 192 
or 256 bits. Therefore, the number of data bytes per 
instruction in Table 5 of [ISO 16844-3] shall be changed 
as shown in Table 6:  
▼M1 
Table 6  
Number of plaintext and encrypted data bytes per instruction defined in [ISO 16844-3]  
Instruction  Request / reply  Description of data  # of plaintext data 
bytes according to 
[ISO 16844-3]  # of plaintext data 
bytes using AES 
keys # of encrypted data bytes when 
using AES keys of bitlength  
128 192  256  
10 request  Authentication data + 
file number  8 8  16  16  16  
11 reply  Authentication data + 
file contents  16 or 32, depend 
on file  16 or32, depend on 
file 32 / 48  32 / 48  32 / 48  
41 request  MoS serial number  8  8  16  16  16  
41 reply  Pairing key  16  16 / 24 / 32  16  32  32  
42 request  Session key  16  16 / 24 / 32  16  32  32  
43 request  Pairing information  24  24  32  32  32  
50 reply  Pairing information  24  24  32  32  32  
70 request  Authentication data  8  8  16  16  16  
80 reply  MoS counter value + 
auth. data  8 8  16  16  16  
▼B 
CSM_219 The pairing information that is sent in instructions 43 (VU 
request) and 50 (MoS reply) shall be assembled as specified 
in section 7.6.10 of [ISO 16844-3], except that the AES 
algorithm shall be used instead of the TDES algorithm in 
the pairing data encryption scheme, thus resulting in two 
AES encryptions, and adopting the padding specified in 
CSM_220 to fit with the AES block size. The key K'  p 
used for this encryption shall be generated as follows:  
— In case the pairing key K  P is 16 bytes long: K'  p = K  P 
XOR (N  s ||N s ) ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 430  
— In case the pairing key K  P is 24 bytes long: K'  p = K  P 
XOR (N  s ||N s ||N s ) 
— In case the pairing key K  P is 32 bytes long: K'  p = K  P 
XOR (N  s ||N s ||N s ||N s ) 
where N  s is the 8-byte serial number of the motion sensor.  
CSM_220 In case the plaintext data length (using AES keys) is not a 
multiple of 16 bytes, padding method 2 defined in [ISO 
9797-1] shall be used.  
Note:  in [ISO 16844-3], the number of plaintext data bytes is 
always a multiple of 8, such that padding is not necessary 
when using TDES. The definition of data and messages in 
[ISO 16844-3] is not changed by this part of this Appendix, 
thus necessitating the application of padding.  
CSM_221 For instruction 11 and in case more than one block of data 
must be encrypted, the Cipher Block Chaining mode of 
operation shall be used as defined in [ISO 10116], with an 
interleave parameter  m = 1. The IV to be used shall be  
— For instruction 11: the 8-byte authentication block 
specified in section 7.6.3.3 of [ISO 16844-3], padded 
using padding method 2 defined in [ISO 9797-1]; see 
also section 7.6.5 and 7.6.6 of [ISO 16844-3].  
— For all other instructions in which more than 16 bytes are 
transferred, as specified in Table 6: ‘00’ {16}, i.e. 
sixteen bytes with binary value 0.  
Note:  As shown in section 7.6.5 and 7.6.6 of [ISO 16844-3], 
when the MoS encrypts data files for inclusion in instruction 
11, the authentication block is both  
— Used as the initialization vector for the CBC-mode 
encryption of the data files  
— Encrypted and included as the first block in the data that 
is sent to the VU.  
12.4.  VU — Motion Sensor Pairing For Different Equipment Generations  
CSM_222 As explained in section 9.2.1, a second-generation motion 
sensor may contain the TDES-based encryption of the 
pairing data (as defined in Part A of this Appendix), 
which allows the motion sensor to be paired to a first- 
generation VU. If this is the case, a first-generation VU 
and a second-generation motion sensor shall be paired as 
described in Part A of this Appendix and in [ISO 16844- 
3]. For the pairing process either a first-generation or a 
second-generation workshop card may be used.  
Notes:  
— It is not possible to pair a second-generation VU to a 
first-generation motion sensor.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 431  
— It is not possible to use a first-generation workshop card 
for coupling a second-generation VU to a motion sensor.  
13. SECURITY FOR REMOTE COMMUNICATION OVER DSRC  
13.1.  General  
As specified in Appendix 14, a VU regularly generates Remote 
Tachograph Monitoring (RTM) data and sends this data to the (internal 
or external) Remote Communication Facility (RCF). The remote 
communication facility is responsible for sending this data over the 
DSRC interface described in Appendix 14 to the remote interrogator. 
Appendix 1 specifies that the RTM data is the concatenation of:  
Encrypted tachograph payload  the encryption of the plaintext 
tachograph payload  
DSRC security data  described below  
The plaintext tachograph payload data format is specified in Appendix 1 
and further described in Appendix 14. This section describes the structure 
of the DSRC security data; the formal specification is in Appendix 1.  
CSM_223 The plaintext
  data communicated 
by a VU to a Remote Communication Facility (if the RCF is 
external to the VU) or from the VU to a remote interrogator 
over the DSRC interface (if the RCF is internal in the VU) 
shall be protected in encrypt-then-authenticate mode, i.e. the 
tachograph payload data is encrypted first to ensure message 
confidentiality, and afterwards a MAC is calculated to ensure 
data authenticity and integrity.  
CSM_224 The DSRC security data shall consist of the concatenation of 
the following data elements in the following order; see also 
Figure 12:  
Current date time  the current date and time of the VU (data type
  
) 
Counter  a 3-byte counter, see CSM_225  
▼M1 
VU serial number  the VU’s serial number or certificate request ID (data type 
VuSerialNumber or CertificateRequestID) – see CSM_123  
▼B 
DSRC master key version number  the 1-byte version number of the DSRC master key from 
which the VU-specific DSRC keys were derived, see 
section 9.2.2.  
MAC  the MAC calculated over all previous bytes in the RTM 
data.  
CSM_225 The 3-byte counter in the DSRC security data shall be in 
MSB-first format. The first time a VU calculates a set of 
RTM data after it is taken into production, it shall set the 
value of the counter to 0. The VU shall increase the value of 
the counter data by 1, each time before it calculates a next 
set of RTM data.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 432  
13.2.  Tachograph Payload Encryption and MAC Generation  
CSM_226 Given a plaintext data element with data type
  
as described in Appendix 14, a 
VU shall encrypt this data as shown in Figure 12: the 
VU's DSRC key for encryption K_VU  DSRC  _ENC (see 
section 9.2.2) shall be used with AES in the Cipher Block 
Chaining (CBC) mode of operation, as defined in [ISO 
10116], with an interleave parameter  m = 1. The initial ­
ization vector shall be equal to  IV = current date time  || 
‘00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ’ || counter , where  current 
date time  and counter  are specified in CSM_224. The data 
to be encrypted shall be padded using method 2 defined in 
[ISO 9797-1].  
CSM_227 A VU shall calculate the MAC in the DSRC security data as 
shown in Figure 12: the MAC shall be calculated over all 
preceding bytes in the RTM data, up to and including the 
DSRC master key version number, and including the tags 
and lengths of the data objects. The VU shall use its DSRC 
key for authenticity K_VU  DSRC  _MAC (see section 9.2.2) 
with the AES algorithm in CMAC mode as specified in 
[SP 800-38B]. The length of the MAC shall be linked to 
the length of the VU-specific DSRC keys, as specified in 
CSM_50.  
Figure 12  
Tachograph payload encryption and MAC generation
  
13.3.  Verification and Decryption of Tachograph Payload  
CSM_228 When a remote interrogator receives RTM data from a VU, 
it shall send the entire RTM data to a control card in the data 
field of a PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE command, as 
described in Appendix 2. Then:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 433  
1. The control card shall inspect the DSRC master key 
version number in the DSRC security data. If the 
control card does not know the indicated DSRC master 
key, it shall return an error specified in Appendix 2 and 
abort the process.  
▼M1 
2. The control card shall use the indicated DSRC master key 
in combination with the VU serial number or the certifi ­
cate request ID in the DSRC security data to derive the 
VU-specific DSRC keys K_VU  DSRC  _ENC and 
K_VU  DSRC  _MAC, as specified in CSM_124.  
▼B 
3. The control card shall use K_VU  DSRC  _MAC to verify the 
MAC in the DSRC security data, as specified in 
CSM_227. If the MAC is incorrect, the control card 
shall return an error specified in Appendix 2 and abort 
the process.  
4. The control card shall use K_VU  DSRC  _ENC to decrypt 
the encrypted tachograph payload, as specified in 
CSM_226. The control card shall remove the padding 
and shall return the decrypted tachograph payload data 
to the remote interrogator.  
CSM_229 In order to prevent replay attacks, the remote interrogator 
shall verify the freshness of the RTM data by verifying 
that the  current date time  in the DSRC security data does 
not deviate too much from the current time of the remote 
interrogator.  
Notes:  
— This requires the remote interrogator to have an accurate 
and reliable source of time.  
— Since Appendix 14 requires a VU to calculate a new set 
of RTM data every 60 seconds, and the clock of the VU 
is allowed to deviate 1 minute from the real time, a lower 
limit for the freshness of the RTM data is 2 minutes. The 
actual freshness to be required also depends on the 
accuracy of the clock of the remote interrogator.  
CSM_230 When a workshop verifies the correct functioning of the 
DSRC functionality of a VU, it shall send the entire RTM 
data received from the VU to a workshop card in the data 
field of a PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE command, as 
described in Appendix 2. The workshop card shall perform 
all checks and actions specified in CSM_228.  
14. SIGNING DATA DOWNLOADS AND VERIFYING SIGNATURES  
14.1.  General  
CSM_231 The Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE) shall store data 
received from a VU or a card during one download session 
within one physical data file. Data may be stored on an ESM 
(external storage medium). This file contains digital 
signatures over data blocks, as specified in Appendix 7. 
This file shall also contain the following certificates (refer 
to section 9.1):  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 434  
— In case of a VU download:  
— The VU_Sign certificate  
— The MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the 
public key to be used for verification of the 
VU_Sign certificate  
— In case of a Card download:  
— The Card_Sign certificate  
— The MSCA_Card certificate containing the public 
key to be used for verification of the Card_Sign cer ­
tificate  
CSM_232 The IDE shall also dispose of.  
— In case it uses a control card to verify the signature, as 
shown in Figure 13: The link certificate linking the latest 
EUR certificate to the EUR certificate whose validity 
period directly precedes it, if existing.  
— In case it verifies the signature itself: all valid European 
root certificates.  
Note:  the method the IDE uses to retrieve these certificates is 
not specified in this Appendix.  
14.2.  Signature generation  
CSM_233 The signing algorithm to create digital signatures over down ­
loaded data shall be ECDSA as specified in [DSS], using the 
hashing algorithm linked to the key size of the VU or the 
card, as specified in CSM_50. The signature format shall be 
plain, as specified in [TR-03111].  
14.3.  Signature verification  
CSM_234  ►M1 An IDE may perform verification of a signature over 
downloaded data itself or it may use a control card for this 
purpose. In case it uses a control card, signature verification 
shall take place as shown in Figure 13. For verifying the 
temporal validity of a certificate presented by the IDE, the 
control card shall use its internal current time, as specified in 
CSM_167. The control card shall update its current time if 
the Effective Date of an authentic ‘valid source of time’ 
certificate is more recent than the card’s current time. The 
card shall accept only the following certificates as a valid 
source of time:  
— Second-generation ERCA link certificates  
— Second-generation MSCA certificates  
— Second-generation VU_Sign or Card_Sign certificates 
issued by the same country as the control card’s own 
card certificate.  
In case it performs signature verification itself, the IDE shall 
verify the authenticity and validity of all certificates in the 
certificate chain in the data file, and it shall verify the 
signature over the data following the signature scheme 
defined in [DSS]. In both cases, for every certificate read 
from the data file, it is necessary to verify that the Certificate 
Holder Authorisation (CHA) field is correct:  
— The CHA field of the EQT certificate shall indicate a VU 
or Card (as applicable) certificate for signing (see 
Appendix 1, data type EquipmentType).  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 435  
— The CHA of the EQT.CA certificate shall indicate an 
MSCA.  
— The CHA of the EQT.Link certificate shall indicate the 
ERCA. ◄ 
Notes to Figure 13:  
— The equipment that signed the data to be analysed is 
denoted EQT.  
— The EQT certificates and public keys mentioned in the 
figure are those for signing, i.e. VU_Sign or Card_Sign.  
— The EQT.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in 
the figure are those for signing VU or Card certificates, 
as applicable.  
— The EQT.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure is 
the European root certificate that is indicated in the CAR 
of the EQT.CA certificate.  
— The EQT.Link certificate mentioned in the figure is the 
EQT's link certificate, if present. As specified in section 
9.1.2, this is a link certificate for a new European root 
key pair created by the ERCA and signed with the 
previous European private key.  
— The EQT.Link.EUR certificate is the European root cer ­
tificate that is indicated in the CAR of the EQT.Link 
certificate.  
CSM_235 For calculating the hash M sent to the control card in the 
PSO:Hash command, the IDE shall use the hashing 
algorithm linked to the key size of the VU or the card 
from which the data is downloaded, as specified in CSM_50.  
CSM_236 For verifying the EQT's signature, the control card shall 
follow the signature scheme defined in [DSS].  
Note:  This document does not specify any action to 
undertake if a signature over a downloaded data file 
cannot be verified or if the verification is unsuccessful.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 436  
Figure 13  
Protocol for verification of the signature over a downloaded data file
  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 437  
Appendix 12  
POSITIONING BASED ON GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE 
SYSTEM (GNSS)  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Scope  
1.2. Acronyms and notations  
2. SPECIFICATION OF THE GNSS RECEIVER  
3. NMEA SENTENCES  
4. VEHICLE UNIT WITH AN EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY  
4.1. Configuration  
4.1.1 Main components and interfaces  
4.1.2 External GNSS facility state at the end of production  
4.2. Communication between the external GNSS facility and the vehicle unit  
4.2.1 Communication Protocol  
4.2.2 Secure transfer of GNSS data  
4.2.3 Structure of the Read Record command  
4.3. Coupling, mutual authentication and session key agreement of the 
external GNSS facility with vehicle unit  
4.4. Error Handling  
4.4.1 Communication error with the external GNSS facility  
4.4.2 Breach of the physical integrity of the external GNSS facility  
4.4.3 Absence of position information from GNSS receiver  
4.4.4 External GNSS facility certificate expired  
5. VEHICLE UNIT WITHOUT AN EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY  
5.1. Configuration  
5.2. Error Handling  
5.2.1 Absence of position information from GNSS receiver  
6. GNSS TIME CONFLICT  
7. VEHICLE MOTION CONFLICT  
1. INTRODUCTION  
This Appendix provides the technical requirements for the GNSS data 
used by the Vehicle Unit, including the protocols that must be implemen ­
ted to assure the secure and correct data transfer of the positioning 
information.  
The main articles in this Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 driving these 
requirements are: ‘Article 8 Recording of the position of the vehicle at 
certain points during the daily working period’, ‘Article 10 Interface with 
Intelligent Transport Systems’ and ‘Article 11 Detailed provisions for 
smart tachographs’.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 438  
1.1. Scope  
GNS_1 The Vehicle Unit shall collect location data from at least one 
GNSS to support the implementation of Article 8.  
The Vehicle Unit may be with or without an external GNSS facility as 
described in Figure 1:  
Figure 1  
Different configurations for GNSS receiver
  
1.2. Acronyms and notations  
The following acronyms are used in this appendix:  
DOP Dilution of Precision  
EGF Elementary file GNSS Facility  
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service  
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System  
GSA GPS DOP and active satellites  
HDOP Horizontal Dilution of Precision  
ICD Interface Control Document  
NMEA National Marine Electronics Association  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 439  
PDOP Position Dilution of Precision  
RMC Recommended Minimum Specific  
SIS Signal in Space  
VDOP Vertical Dilution of Precision  
VU Vehicle Unit  
2. SPECIFICATION OF THE GNSS RECEIVER  
Regardless of the configuration of the Smart Tachograph with or without 
an external GNSS facility, the provision of accurate and reliable posi ­
tioning information is an essential element of the effective operation of 
the Smart Tachograph. Therefore, it is appropriate to require its compati ­
bility with the services provided by the Galileo and European Geos ­
tationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) programmes as set out 
in Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (  1 ). The system established under the Galileo programme is an 
independent global satellite navigation system and the one established 
under the EGNOS programme is a regional satellite navigation system 
improving the quality of the Global Positioning System signal.  
GNS_2 Manufacturers shall ensure that the GNSS receivers in the 
Smart Tachographs are compatible with the positioning 
services provided by the Galileo and the EGNOS systems. 
Manufacturers may also choose, in addition, compatibility 
with other satellite navigation systems.  
GNS_3 The GNSS receiver shall have the capability to support Auth ­
entication on the Open Service of Galileo when such service 
will be provided by the Galileo system and supported by GNSS 
receiver manufacturers. However, for smart tachographs 
introduced in the market before the previous conditions are 
satisfied and not having the capability to support Authenti ­
cation of the Open Service of Galileo, no retrofitting will be 
required.  
3. NMEA SENTENCES  
This section describes the NMEA sentences used in the functioning of 
the Smart Tachograph. This section is valid both for the configuration of 
the Smart Tachograph with or without an external GNSS facility.  
GNS_4 The location data is based on the NMEA sentence Recom ­
mended Minimum Specific (RMC) GNSS Data, which 
contains the Position information (Latitude, Longitude), Time 
in UTC format (hhmmss.ss), and Speed Over Ground in Knots 
plus additional values.  
The format of the RMC sentence is the following (as from NMEA V4.1 
standard):  ▼B 
( 1 ) Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 December 2013 on the implementation and exploitation of European satellite navi ­
gation systems and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 876/2002 and Regulation (EC) 
No 683/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, 
p. 1).
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 440  
Figure 2  
Structure of the RMC sentence
  
The Status gives indication if the GNSS signal is available. Until the 
value of the Status is not set to A, the received data (e.g., on Time or 
Latitude/Longitude) cannot be used to record the position of the vehicle 
in the VU.  
▼M1 
The resolution of the position is based on the format of the RMC 
sentence described above. The first part of the fields 3) and 5) are 
used to represent the degrees. The rest are used to represent the 
minutes with three decimals. So the resolution is 1/1000 of minute or 
1/60000 of degree (because one minute is 1/60 of a degree).  
GNS_5 The Vehicle Unit shall store in the VU database the position 
information for latitude and longitude with a resolution of 1/10 
of minute or 1/600 of a degree as described in Appendix 1 for 
type GeoCoordinates.  
The GPS DOP and active satellites (GSA) command can be 
used by the VU to determine and record the signal availability 
and accuracy. In particular the HDOP is used to provide an 
indication on the level of accuracy of the recorded location data 
(see 4.2.2). The VU will store the value of the Horizontal 
Dilution of Precision (HDOP) calculated as the minimum of 
the HDOP values collected on the available GNSS systems.  
The GNSS Id. indicates the corresponding NMEA Id. for every 
GNSS constellation and Satellite-Based Augmentation System 
(SBAS).  
Figure 3  
Structure of the GSA sentence
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 441  
GNS_6 The  GSA  sentence shall be stored with record number ‘02’ to 
‘06’. 
▼B 
GNS_7 The maximum size of the NMEA sentences (e.g., RMC, GSA 
or others), which can be used for the sizing of the read record 
command shall be 85 bytes (see Table 1).  
4. VEHICLE UNIT WITH AN EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY  
4.1. Configuration  
4.1.1  Main components and interfaces  
In this configuration, the GNSS receiver is a part of the external GNSS 
facility.  
GNS_8 The external GNSS facility must be powered with a specific 
vehicle interface.  
GNS_9 The external GNSS facility shall consist of the following 
components (see Figure 4):  
(a) A commercial GNSS receiver to provide the position data 
through the GNSS data interface. For example, the GNSS 
data interface can be NMEA standard V4.10 where The 
GNSS receiver acts as a talker and transmit NMEA 
sentences to the GNSS Secure Transceiver with a 
frequency of 1Hz for the pre-defined set of NMEA 
sentences, which must include at least the RMC and 
GSA sentences. The implementation of the GNSS data 
interface is a choice of the manufacturers of the external 
GNSS facility.  
(b) A transceiver unit (GNSS Secure Transceiver) with the 
capability to support standard ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 (see 
4.2.1) to communicate with the vehicle unit and support the 
GNSS data interface to the GNSS receiver. The unit is 
provided with a memory to store the identification data 
of the GNSS receiver and external GNSS facility.  
(c) An enclosure system with tamper detection function, which 
encapsulate both the GNSS receiver and the GNSS Secure 
Transceiver. The tamper detection function shall implement 
the security protection measures as requested in the 
Protection Profile of the Smart Tachograph.  
(d) A GNSS antenna installed on the vehicle and connected to 
the GNSS receiver through the enclosure system.  
GNS_10 The external GNSS facility has at least the following external 
interfaces:  
(a) the interface to the GNSS antenna installed on the vehicle 
truck, if an external antenna is used.  
(b) the interface to the Vehicle Unit.  
GNS_11 In the VU, the VU Secure Transceiver is the other end of the 
secure communication with the GNSS Secure Transceiver and 
it must support ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 for the connection to the 
external GNSS facility.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 442  
GNS_12 For the physical layer of the communication with the external 
GNSS facility, the vehicule unit shall support ISO/IEC 7816- 
12:2005 or another standard able to support ISO/IEC 7816- 
4:2013. (see 4.2.1).  
4.1.2  External GNSS facility state at the end of production  
GNS_13 The external GNSS facility shall store the following values in 
the non-volatile memory of the GNSS Secure Transceiver when 
it leaves the factory:  
— the EGF_MA key pair and corresponding certificate,  
— the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the MSCA_VU- 
EGF.PK public key to be used for verification of the 
EGF_MA certificate,  
— the EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key to 
be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate,  
— the EUR certificate whose validity period directly precedes 
the validity period of the EUR certificate to be used to 
verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if existing,  
— the link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, if 
existing,  
— the extended serial-number of the external GNSS facility,  
— operating system identifier of the GNSS facility,  
— type approval number of the external GNSS facility;  
— Identifier of the security component of the external GNSS 
module.  
4.2. Communication between the external GNSS facility and the vehicle 
unit 
4.2.1  Communication Protocol  
GNS_14 The communication protocol between the external GNSS 
facility and the vehicle unit shall support three functions:  
1. The collection and distribution of GNSS data (e.g., position, 
timing, speed),  
2. The collection of the configuration data of the external 
GNSS facility,  
3. The management protocol to support the coupling, mutual 
authentication and session key agreement between the 
external GNSS facility and the VU.  
GNS_15 The communication protocol shall be based on standard 
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 with the VU Secure Transceiver 
playing the master role and the GNSS Secure Transceiver 
playing the slave role. The physical connection between the 
external GNSS facility and the vehicule unit is based on 
ISO/IEC 7816-12:2005 or another standard able to support 
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013  ▼B
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GNS_16 In the communication protocol, extended length fields shall not 
be supported.  
▼B 
GNS_17 The communication protocol of ISO 7816 (both *-4:2013 and 
*-12:2005) between the external GNSS facility and the VU 
shall be set to T = 1.  
▼M1 
GNS_18 Regarding the functions 1) the collection and distribution of 
GNSS data and 2) the collection of the configuration data of 
the external GNSS facility and 3) management protocol, the 
GNSS Secure Transceiver shall simulate a smart card with a 
file system architecture composed by a Master File (MF), a 
Dedicated File (DF) with Application Identifier specified in 
Appendix 1 chapter 6.2 (‘FF 44 54 45 47 4D’) and with 3 
EFs containing certificates and one single Elementary File 
(EF.EGF) with file identifier equal to ‘2F2F’ as described in 
Table 1.  
▼B 
GNS_19 The GNSS Secure Transceiver shall store the data coming from 
the GNSS receiver and the configuration in the EF.EGF. This 
is a linear, variable-length record file with an identifier equal to 
‘2F2F’ in hexadecimal format.  
▼M1 
GNS_20 The GNSS Secure Transceiver shall use a memory to store the 
data and be able to perform at least 20 millions write/read 
cycles. Apart from this aspect, the internal design and im ­
plementation of the GNSS Secure Transceiver is left to the 
manufacturers.  
The mapping of record numbers and data is provided in Table 
1. Note that there are five GSA sentences for the GNSS 
constellations and Satellite-Based Augmentation System 
(SBAS).  
▼B 
GNS_21 The file structure is provided in Table 1. For the access 
conditions (ALW, NEV, SM-MAC) see Appendix 2 chapter 
3.5. 
Table 1  
File Structure  
Access conditions  
File File ID  Read  Update  Encrypted  
MF 3F00  
EF.ICC  0002  ALW  NEV 
(by VU)  No 
DF GNSS Facility  0501  ALW  NEV  No  
EF EGF_MACertificate  C100  ALW  NEV  No  
EF CA_Certificate  C108  ALW  NEV  No  
EF Link_Certificate  C109  ALW  NEV  No  
EF.EGF  2F2F  SM-MAC  NEV 
(by VU)  No ▼M1
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File / Data element  Record no  Size (bytes)  Default values  
Min Max  
MF 552  1 031  
EF.ICC  
sensorGNSSSerialNumber  8  8  
DF GNSS Facility  612  1 023  
EF EGF_MACertificate  204  341  
EGFCertificate  204  341  {00..00}  
EF CA_Certificate  204  341  
MemberStateCertificate  204  341  {00..00}  
EF Link_Certificate  204  341  
LinkCertificate  204  341  {00..00}  
EF.EGF  
RMC NMEA Sentence  ‘01’  85  85  
1st GSA NMEA Sentence  ‘02’  85  85  
2nd GSA NMEA Sentence  ‘03’  85  85  
3rd GSA NMEA Sentence  ‘04’  85  85  
4th GSA NMEA Sentence  ‘05’  85  85  
5th GSA NMEA Sentence  ‘06’  85  85  
Extended serial-number of the 
external GNSS facility defined in 
Appendix 1 as SensorGNSSSerial ­
Number.  ‘07’ 8  8  
Operating system identifier of the 
GNSS Secure Transceiver defined in 
Appendix 1 as SensorOSIdentifier.  ‘08’ 2  2  
Type approval number of the external 
GNSS facility defined in Appendix 1 
as SensorExternalGNSSApproval ­
Number.  ‘09’ 16  16  
Identifier of the security component 
of the external GNSS facility 
defined in Appendix 1 as Sensor ­
ExternalGNSSSCIdentifier  ‘10’ 8  8  
RFU — Reserved for Future Use  From ‘11’ to ‘FD’  
4.2.2  Secure transfer of GNSS data  
GNS_22 The secure transfer of GNSS position data shall be allowed 
only in the following conditions:  
1. The coupling process has been completed as described in 
Appendix 11. Common security mechanisms.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 445  
2. The periodic mutual authentication and session key 
agreement between the VU and the external GNSS facility 
also described in Appendix 11. Common security mech ­
anisms has been executed with the indicated frequency.  
GNS_23 Every T seconds, where T is a value lower or equal to 10, 
unless coupling or mutual authentication and session key 
agreement takes place, the VU requests from the external 
GNSS facility the position information on the basis of the 
following flow:  
1. The VU requests location data from the External GNSS 
facility together with Dilution of Precision data (from the 
GSA NMEA sentence). The VU Secure Transceiver shall 
use the ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 SELECT and READ 
RECORD(S) command in secure messaging authenti ­
cation-only mode as described in Appendix 11 section 
11.5 with the file identifier ‘2F2F’ and RECORD number 
equal to ‘01’ for RMC NMEA sentence and 
‘02’,‘03’,‘04’,‘05’,‘06’ for GSA NMEA sentence.  
2. The last location data received is stored in the EF with 
identifier ‘2F2F’ and the records described in Table 1 in 
the GNSS secure transceiver as the GNSS secure transceiver 
receives NMEA data with a frequency of at least 1 Hz from 
the GNSS receiver through the GNSS data interface.  
3. The GNSS Secure Transceiver sends the response to the VU 
Secure Transceiver by using the APDU response message in 
secure messaging authentication-only mode as described in 
Appendix 11 section 11.5.  
4. The VU Secure Transceiver checks the authenticity and 
integrity of the received response. In case of positive 
outcome, the location data is transferred to the VU 
processor through the GNSS data interface.  
▼M1 
5. The VU processor checks the received data extracting the 
information (e.g., latitude, longitude, time) from the RMC 
NMEA sentence. The RMC NMEA sentence includes the 
information if the position is valid. If the position is not 
valid, the location data is not available yet and it cannot be 
used to record the position of the vehicle. If the position is 
valid, the VU processor also extracts the values of HDOP 
from GSA NMEA sentences and calculate the minimum 
value on the available satellite systems (i.e., when the fix 
is available).  
▼B 
6. The VU processor stores the received and processed 
information such as latitude, longitude, time and speed in 
the VU in the format defined in Appendix 1 Data Dictionary 
as GeoCoordinates together with the value of HDOP 
calculated as the minimum of the HDOP values collected 
on the available GNSS systems.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 446  
4.2.3  Structure of the Read Record command  
This section describes in detail the structure of the Read Record 
command. Secure messaging (authentication-only mode) is added as 
described in Appendix 11 Common security mechanisms.  
GNS_24 The command shall support the Secure Messaging authenti ­
cation-only-mode, see Appendix 11.  
GNS_25 Command Message  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
CLA  1  ‘0Ch’  Secure messaging asked.  
INS 1  ‘B2h’  Read Record  
P1 1  ‘XXh’  Record number (‘00’ references the current 
record)  
P2 1  ‘04h’  Read the record with the record number 
indicated in P1  
Le 1  ‘XXh’  Length of data expected. Number of Bytes 
to be read.  
GNS_26 The record referenced in P1 becomes the current record.  
Byte  Length  Value  Description  
#1-#X  X  ‘XX..XXh’  Data read  
SW 2  ‘XXXXh’  Status Words (SW1,SW2)  
— If the command is successful, the GNSS secure transceiver 
returns ‘ 9000 ’. 
— If the current file is not record oriented, the GNSS secure 
transceiver returns  ‘6981’ . 
— If the command is used with P1 = ‘00’ but there is no 
current EF the GNSS secure transceiver returns  ‘6986’  
(command not allowed).  
— If the record is not found, the GNSS secure transceiver 
returns  ‘6A 83’ . 
— If the external GNSS facility has detected tampering, it 
shall return status words  ‘66 90’ . 
GNS_27 The GNSS Secure Transceiver shall support the following 
tachograph generation 2 commands specified in Appendix 2:  
Command  Reference  
Select  Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.1  
Read Binary  Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.2  
Get Challenge  Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.4  
PSO: Verify Certificate  Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.7  
External Authenticate  Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.9  
General Authenticate  Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.10  
MSE:SET  Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.11  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 447  
4.3. Coupling, mutual authentication and session key agreement of the 
external GNSS facility with vehicle unit  
The coupling, mutual authentication and session key agreement of the 
external GNSS facility with the vehicle unit is described in Appendix 11. 
Common security mechanisms, Chapter 11.  
4.4. Error Handling  
This section describes how potential error conditions by the external 
GNSS facility are addressed and recorded in the VU.  
4.4.1  Communication error with the external GNSS facility  
▼M1 
GNS_28 If the VU does not manage to communicate to the coupled 
external GNSS facility for more than 20 continuous minutes, 
the VU shall generate and record in the VU an event of type 
EventFaultType with the value of enum ‘0E’H Communication 
error with the external GNSS facility and with the timestamp 
set to the current time. The event will be generated only if the 
following two conditions are satisfied: (a) the Smart 
Tachograph is not in calibration mode and (b) the vehicle is 
moving. In this context, a communication error is triggered 
when the VU Secure Transceiver does not receive a response 
message after a request message as described in 4.2.  
▼B 
4.4.2  Breach of the physical integrity of the external GNSS facility  
▼M1 
GNS_29 If the external GNSS facility has been breached, the GNSS 
Secure Transceiver shall erase all its memory including crypto ­
graphic material. As described in GNS_25 and GNS_26, the 
VU shall detect tampering if the Response has status ‘6690’. 
The VU shall then generate an event of type EventFaultType 
enum ‘19’H Tamper detection of GNSS. Alternately, the 
external GNSS facility may not respond to any external 
request anymore.  
▼B 
4.4.3  Absence of position information from GNSS receiver  
▼M1 
GNS_30 If the GNSS Secure Transceiver does not receive data from the 
GNSS receiver for more than 3 continuous hours, the GNSS 
Secure Transceiver shall generate a response message to the 
READ RECORD command with RECORD number equal to 
‘01’ with a Data Field of 12 bytes all set to 0xFF. Upon 
reception of the Response message with this value of the 
data field, the VU shall generate and record an event of type 
EventFaultType enum ‘0D’H Absence of position information 
from GNSS receiver event with a timestamp equal to the 
current value of time only if the following two conditions are 
satisfied: a) the Smart Tachograph is not in calibration mode 
and b) the vehicle is moving.  
▼B 
4.4.4  External GNSS facility certificate expired  
GNS_31  ►M1 If the VU detects that the EGF certificate used for 
mutual authentication is not valid any longer, the VU shall 
generate and record a recording equipment event of type Event ­
FaultType enum ‘ 1B’H External GNSS facility certificate 
expired  with a timestamp equal to the current value of time. 
The VU shall still use the received GNSS position data. ◄ ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 448  
Figure 4  
Schema of the external GNSS facility
  
5. VEHICLE UNIT WITHOUT AN EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY  
5.1. Configuration  
In this configuration, the GNSS receiver is inside the Vehicle Unit as 
described in Figure 1.  
GNS_32 The GNSS receiver shall act as a talker and transmit NMEA 
sentences to the VU processor, which shall act as a listener 
with a frequency of 1/10 Hz or faster for the pre-defined set of 
NMEA sentences, which shall include at least the RMC and 
GSA sentences.  
GNS_33 An external GNSS antenna installed on the vehicle or an 
internal GNSS antenna shall be connected to the VU.  
5.2. Error Handling  
5.2.1  Absence of position information from GNSS receiver  
▼M1 
GNS_34 If the VU does not receive data from the GNSS receiver for 
more than 3 continous hours, the VU shall generate and record 
an event of type EventFaultType enum ‘0D’H Absence of 
position information from GNSS receiver event with a 
timestamp equal to the current value of time only if the 
following two conditions are satisfied: (a) the Smart 
Tachograph is not in calibration mode and (b) the vehicle is 
moving.  
6. GNSS TIME CONFLICT  
If the VU detects a discrepancy of more than 1 minute between the time 
of the vehicle unit's time measurement function and the time originating 
from the GNSS receiver, the VU will record an event of type Event ­
FaultType enum ‘ 0B’H Time conflict (GNSS versus VU internal clock) . 
After a time conflict event has been triggered, the VU will not check the 
time discrepancy for the next 12 hours. This event shall not be triggered 
in cases no valid GNSS signal was detectable by the GNSS receiver 
within the last 30 days.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 449  
7. VEHICLE MOTION CONFLICT  
GNS_35 The VU shall trigger and record an Vehicle Motion Conflict 
event (see in requirement 84 in this Annex) with a timestamp 
equal to the current value of time, in case motion information 
calculated from the motion sensor is contradicted by motion 
information calculated from the internal GNSS receiver or from 
the external GNSS facility. For the purpose of detecting such 
contradictions, the median value of the speed differences 
between these sources shall be used, as specified below:  
— every 10 seconds maximum, the absolute value of the 
difference between the vehicle speed estimated from the 
GNSS and the one estimated from the motion sensor 
shall be computed.  
— all the computed values in a time window containing the 
last five minutes of movement shall be used to compute the 
median value.  
— the median value shall be computed as the average of 80 % 
of the remaining values, after having eliminated the highest 
ones in absolute values  
The Vehicle Motion Conflict event shall be triggered if the 
median value is above 10 Km/h for five uninterrupted 
minutes of vehicle movement. Other independent sources of 
vehicle motion detection may optionnally be used, so that a 
more reliable detection of tachograph manipulations is 
provided. ( Note:  the use of the median on the last 5 minutes 
is applied to mitigate the risk of measurement outliers and 
transient values). This event shall not be triggered in the 
following conditions: (a) during a ferry/train crossing, (b) 
when the position information from the GNSS receiver shall 
not be available and (c) while in calibration mode.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 450  
Appendix 13  
ITS INTERFACE  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
1. INTRODUCTION  
2. SCOPE  
2.1. Acronyms, definitions and notations  
3. REFERENCED REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS  
4. INTERFACE WORKING PRINCIPLES  
4.1. Preconditions to data transfer via the ITS interface  
4.1.1 Data provided through the ITS interface  
4.1.2 Content of the Data  
4.1.3 ITS Applications  
4.2. Communication technology  
4.3. PIN authorization  
4.4. Message Format  
4.5. Driver consent  
4.6. Standard data retrieval  
4.7. Personal data retrieval  
4.8. Event and fault data retrieval  
1. INTRODUCTION  
This Appendix specifies the design and the procedures to follow in order 
to implement the interface with Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) as 
required in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No. 165/2014 ( the Regulation ). 
The Regulation  specifies that the tachographs of vehicles may be equipped 
with standardised interfaces allowing the data recorded or produced by 
tachograph to be used in operational mode, by an external device, 
provided that the following conditions are met:  
(a) the interface does not affect the authenticity and the integrity of the 
data of the tachograph;  
(b) the interface complies with the detailed provisions of Article 11 of 
the Regulation;  
(c) the external device connected to the interface has access to personal 
data, including geopositioning data, only after the verifiable consent 
of the driver to whom the data relates.  
2. SCOPE  
The scope of this Appendix is to specify how applications hosted on 
external devices can via a Bluetooth® connection obtain data ( the Data ) 
from a tachograph.  
The Data  available via this interface is described in the Annex 1 of the 
present document. This interface does not prohibit the implementation of 
other interfaces (e.g. via the CAN bus) to transmit the data of the VU to 
other vehicle processing units.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 451  
This Appendix specifies:  
— The Data  available through the ITS interface  
— The Bluetooth® profile that is used to transfer the data  
— The enquiry and download procedures and sequence of operations  
— The pairing mechanism between the tachograph and the external 
device  
— The consent mechanism available to the driver  
▼M1 
For clarification, this Appendix does  not specify:  
— The collection of  the Data  operation and management within the VU 
(which shall be specified elsewhere within  the Regulation  or otherwise 
shall be a function of product design).  
— The form of presentation of collected data to application hosted on the 
external device.  
— Data security provisions above what provides Bluetooth® (such as 
encryption) concerning the content of  the Data  (which shall be 
specified elsewhere within  the Regulation  [Appendix 11 Common 
Security Mechanisms]).  
— The Bluetooth® protocols used by the ITS interface  
▼B 
2.1. Acronyms, definitions and notations  
The following acronyms and definitions specific to this Appendix are used 
in this appendix:  
the Communication  exchange of information/data between a master unit 
(i.e. the tachographs) and an external unit through 
the ITS interface over Bluetooth®.  
the Data  Data sets as specified in Annex 1.  
the Regulation  Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in 
road transport, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the harmon ­
isation of certain social legislation relating to road 
transport  
BR Basic Rate  
EDR  Enhanced Data Rate  
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite System  
IRK  Identity Resolution Key  
ITS Intelligent Transport System  
LE Low Energy  
PIN Personal Identification Number  
PUC  Personal Unblocking Code  
SID Service Identifier  
SPP Serial Port Profile  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 452  
SSP Secure Simple Pairing  
TRTP  Transfer Request Parameter  
TREP  Transfer Response Parameter  
VU Vehicle Unit  
3. REFERENCED REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS  
The specification defined in this Appendix refers to and depends upon all 
or parts of the following regulations and standards. Within the clauses of 
this Appendix the relevant standards, or relevant clauses of standards, are 
specified. In the event of any contradiction the clauses of this Appendix 
shall take precedence.  
Regulations and standards referenced in this Appendix are:  
— Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording 
equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 
561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport.  
— Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social 
legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regu ­
lations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85.  
— ISO 16844 — 4: Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 4: Can 
interface  
— ISO 16844 — 7: Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 7: 
Parameters  
— Bluetooth® — Serial Port Profile — V1.2  
— Bluetooth® — Core Version 4.2  
— NMEA 0183 V4.1 protocol  
4. INTERFACE WORKING PRINCIPLES  
4.1. Preconditions to data transfer via the ITS interface  
The VU shall be responsible to keep updated and maintain the data to be 
stored in the VU, without any involvement of the ITS interface. The 
means by which this is achieved is internal to the VU, specified 
elsewhere in the Regulation, and is not specified in this Appendix.  
4.1.1  Data provided through the ITS interface  
The VU shall be responsible to update the data that will be available 
through the ITS interface at a frequency determined within VU 
procedures, without any involvement of ITS interface. The VU data 
shall be used as a basis to populate and update  the Data , the means by 
which this is achieved is specified elsewhere in  the Regulation  or if there 
is no such specification is a function of product design and is not specified 
in this Appendix.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 453  
4.1.2  Content of the Data  
The content of  the Data  shall be as specified in Annex 1 of this appendix.  
4.1.3  ITS Applications  
ITS applications will be using the data made available through the ITS 
interface for instance to optimize driver activities management while 
respecting the Regulation, to detect possible faults of the tachograph or 
to use the GNSS data. The specification of the applications is not within 
the scope of this Appendix.  
4.2. Communication technology  
The Data  exchange using the ITS interface shall be performed via a 
Bluetooth® interface compatible via version 4.2 or later. Bluetooth® 
operates in the unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band 
at 2.4 to 2.485 GHz. Bluetooth® 4.2 offers enhanced privacy and security 
mechanisms and increases speed and reliability of data transfers. For the 
purpose of this specification is Bluetooth® class 2 radio used with a range 
up to 10 meters. More information on Bluetooth® 4.2 is available on 
www.bluetooth.com (https://www.bluetooth.org/en-us/specification/ 
adopted-specifications?_ga=1.215147412.2083380574.1435305 676).  
The Communication  shall be established with the communications 
equipment after a pairing process has been completed by an authorized 
device. As Bluetooth® is using a master/slave model to control when and 
where devices can send data, the tachograph will play the role of master 
while the external device will be the slave.  
▼M1 
When an external device comes within range of the VU for the first time, 
the Bluetooth® pairing process can be initiated (see also annex 2). The 
devices share their addresses, names, and profiles and common secret key, 
which allows them to bond whenever they are together in the future. Once 
this step is completed, the external device is trusted and is in state to 
initiate requests to download data from the tachograph. It is not foreseen 
to add encryption mechanisms beyond what Bluetooth® provides. 
However, if additional security mechanisms are needed, this will be 
done in accordance with Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms.  
▼B 
The overall communication principle is described in the following figure.
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 454  
The SPP (Serial Port Profile) profile of Bluetooth® shall be used to 
transfer data from the VU to the external device.  
4.3. PIN authorization  
▼M1 
For security reasons, the VU will require a PIN code authorization system 
separated from the Bluetooth pairing. Each VU shall be able to generate 
PIN codes for authentication purposes composed of at least 4 digits. Every 
time an external device pairs with the VU, it must provide the correct PIN 
code before receiving any data.  
▼B 
Succeeding entering the PIN shall result in putting the device on the 
whitelist. The whitelist shall store at least 64 devices paired with the 
particular VU.  
Failing to provide the correct PIN code three times in a row shall result in 
putting temporarily the device on the blacklist. While blacklisted, every 
new attempt from the device shall be rejected. Further failure to provide 
the correct PIN code three times in a row shall result in increasingly 
longer ban duration (See table 1). Providing the correct PIN code shall 
reset the ban duration and the number of attempt. Figure 1 in Annex 2 
represents the sequence diagram of a PIN validation attempt.  
Table 1  
Ban duration depending on the number of consecutive failure to 
provide the correct PIN code  
Number of consecutive failure  Ban duration  
3 30 seconds  
6 5 minutes  
9 1 hour  
12 24 hours  
15 Permanent  
Failing to provide the correct PIN code fifteen times (5×3) in a row shall 
result in a permanent blacklisting of the ITS Unit. Only providing the 
correct PUC code shall overturn this permanent ban.  
The PUC code shall be composed of 8 digits and provided by the manu ­
facturer with the VU. Failing to provide the correct PUC code ten times in 
a row will irrevocably blacklist the ITS Unit.  
▼M1 
While the manufacturer may offer an option to change the PIN code 
directly through the VU, the PUC code shall not be alterable. 
Modifying the PIN code, if possible, shall require to enter the current 
PIN code directly in the VU.  
▼B 
Furthermore any devices stored in the whitelist shall be kept until manual 
removal of by the user (e.g. via the man-machine-interface of the VU or 
other means). By doing so lost or stolen ITS-units may be removed from 
the whitelist. Also, any ITS Unit leaving the Bluetooth connection range 
for more than 24 hours shall be automatically removed from the VU 
whitelist and must provide the correct PIN code again when the 
connection is established again.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 455  
The format of the messages between the VU interface and the VU are not 
provided but left to the discretion of the manufacturer. Said manufacturer 
shall however ensure the message format between the ITS Unit and the 
VU interface is respected (see ASN.1 specifications).  
Any data request shall thus be met with the proper verification of the 
sender's credential before any form of treatment. Figure 2 of Annex 2 
represents the sequence diagram for this procedure. Any blacklisted 
device shall receive an automatic rejection, any non-blacklisted non- 
whitelisted device shall receive a PIN request it needs to fulfill before 
resending its data request.  
4.4. Message Format  
All messages exchanged between the ITS Unit and the VU interface shall 
be formatted with a structure consisting of three parts: A header composed 
by a target byte (TGT), a source byte (SRC) and a length byte (LEN).  
The data field composed by a service identifier byte (SID) and a variable 
amount of data bytes (maximum 255).  
The checksum byte is the 1 byte sum series modulo 256 of all the bytes of 
the message excluding the CS itself.  
The message shall be Big Endian.  
Table 2  
General message format  
Header  Data Field  Checksum  
TGT  SRC  LEN  SID  TRTP  CC  CM  DATA  CS  
3 bytes  Max. 255 bytes  1 byte  
Header  
TGT and SRC: the ID of the Target (TGT) and Source (SRC) devices of 
the message. The VU Interface shall have the default ID “EE”. This ID 
cannot be changed. The ITS Unit shall use the default ID “A0” for its first 
message of the communication session. The VU Interface shall then assign 
an unique ID to the ITS Unit and informs it of this ID for future messages 
during the session.  
The LEN byte shall only take into account the ‘DATA’ part of the Data 
Field (see Table 2), the 4 first bytes are implicit.  
The VU Interface shall confirm the authenticity of the message's sender by 
cross-checking its own IDList with the Bluetooth data by checking the ITS 
Unit listed at the provided ID is currently in the range of the Bluetooth 
connection.  
Data Field  
Besides the SID, the Data Field shall also contain other parameters: a 
transfer request parameter (TRTP) and Counter bytes.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 456  
If the data to be handled is larger than the available space in one message, 
it will be split in several submessages. Each submessage shall have the 
same Header and SID, but will contain a 2-bytes counter, Counter Current 
(CC) and Counter Max (CM), to indicate the submessage number. To 
enable error checking and abort the receiving device acknowledges 
every submessage. The receiving device can accept the submessage, ask 
for it to be re-transmitted, request the sending device to start again or abort 
the transmission.  
▼B 
If not used, CC and CM shall be given the value 0xFF.  
For instance, the following message  
HEADER  SID  TRTP  CC  CM  DATA  CS  
3 bytes  Longer than 255 bytes  1 byte  
Shall be transmitted as such:  
HEADER  SID  TRTP  01  n  DATA  CS  
3 bytes  255 bytes  1 byte  
HEADER  SID  TRTP  02  n  DATA  CS  
3 bytes  255 bytes  1 byte  
… 
HEADER  SID  TRTP  N  N  DATA  CS  
3 bytes  Max. 255 bytes  1 byte  
Table 3 contains the messages the VU and the ITS Unit shall be able to 
exchange. The content of each parameter is given in hexadecimal. Aren't 
represented in the table CC and CM for clarity, see above for complete 
format.  
Table 3  
Detailed message content  
Message  Header  DATA  Checksum  
TGT  SRC  LEN  SID  TRTP  DATA  
RequestPIN  ITSID  EE  00  01  FF  
SendITSID  ITSID  EE  01  02  FF  ITSID  
SendPIN  EE  ITSID  04  03  FF  4*INTEGER (0..9)  
PairingResult  ITSID  EE  01  04  FF  BOOLEAN (T/F)  
SendPUC  EE  ITSID  08  05  FF  8*INTEGER (0..9)  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 457  
Message  Header  DATA  Checksum  
TGT  SRC  LEN  SID  TRTP  DATA  
BanLiftingResult  ITSID  EE  01  06  FF  BOOLEAN (T/F)  
RequestRejected  ITSID  EE  08  07  FF  Time  
RequestData  
standardTachData  EE  ITSID  01  08  01  
personalTachData  EE  ITSID  01  08  02  
gnssData  EE  ITSID  01  08  03  
standard­
EventData  EE ITSID  01  08  04  
personalE ­
ventData  EE ITSID  01  08  05  
standardFaultData  EE  ITSID  01  08  06  
manufacturerData  EE  ITSID  01  08  07  
ResquestAccepted  ITSID  EE  Len  09  TREP  Data  
DataUnavailable  
No data available  ITSID  EE  02  0A  TREP  10  
Personal data not 
shared  ITSID  EE  02  0A  TREP  11  
NegativeAnswer  
General reject  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  10  
Service not 
supported  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  11  
Sub function not 
supported  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  12  
Incorrect message 
length  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  13  
Conditions not 
correct or request 
sequence error  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  22  
Request out of 
range  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  31  
Response pending  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  78  
ITSID Mismatch  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  FC  
ITSID Not Found  ITSID  EE  02  0B  SID Req  FB  
RequestPIN (SID 01)  
This message is issued by the VU Interface if a non-blacklisted but non- 
whitelisted ITS unit is sending any data request.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 458  
SendITSID (SID 02)  
This message is issued by the VU Interface whenever a new device is 
sending a request. This device shall use the default ID “A0” before getting 
assigned an unique ID for the communication session.  
SendPIN (SID 03)  
This message is issued by the ITS Unit to be whitelisted from the VU 
interface. The content of this message is a 4 INTEGER between 0 and 9 
code.  
PairingResult (SID 04)  
This message is issued by the VU Interface to inform the ITS Unit if the 
PIN code it sent was correct. The content of this message shall be a 
BOOLEAN with the value ‘True’ if the PIN code was correct and 
‘False’ otherwise.  
SendPUC (SID 05)  
This message is issued by the ITS Unit to lift a blacklist sanction from the 
VU interface. The content of this message is a 8 INTEGER between 0 and 
9 code.  
BanLiftingResult (SID 06)  
This message is issued by the VU Interface to inform the ITS Unit if the 
PUC code it sent was correct. The content of this message shall be a 
BOOLEAN with the value ‘True’ if the PUC code was correct and ‘False’ 
otherwise.  
RequestRejected (SID 07)  
This message is issued by the VU Interface as a reply to any message 
from a blacklisted ITS Unit except ‘SendPUC’. The message shall contain 
the remaining time the ITS Unit is blacklisted, following the ‘Time’ 
sequence format as defined in Annex 3.  
RequestData (SID 08)  
This message for data accessing is issued by the ITS Unit. A one byte 
transfer request parameter (TRTP) indicates the type of data required. 
There are several types of data:  
— standardTachData (TRTP 01): Data available from the tachograph 
classified as non-personal.  
— personalTachData (TRTP 02): Data available from the tachograph 
classified as personal.  
— gnssData (TRTP 03): GNSS data, always personal.  
— standardEventData (TRTP 04): Recorded event data classified as non- 
personal.  
— personalEventData (TRTP 05): Recorded event data classified as 
personal.  
— standardFaultData (TRTP 06): Recorded faults classified as non- 
personal.  
— manufacturerData (TRTP 07): data made available by the manufac ­
turer.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 459  
See Annex 3 of this appendix for more information about the content of 
each data type.  
See Appendix 12 for more information about the format and content of 
GNSS data.  
See Annex IB and IC for more information about event data code and 
faults.  
ResquestAccepted (SID 09)  
This message is issued by the VU Interface if a ITS Unit ‘RequestData’ 
message has been accepted. This message contains a 1-byte TREP, which 
is the TRTP byte of the associated RequestData message, and all the data 
of the requested type.  
DataUnavailable (SID 0A)  
This message is issued by the VU Interface if, for a certain reason, the 
requested data aren't available to be sent to a whitelisted ITS Unit. The 
message contains a 1byte TREP which is the TRTP of the required data 
and a 1 byte error code specified in the table 3. The Following codes are 
available:  
— No data available (10): The VU interface can't access the VU data for 
unspecified reasons.  
— Personal data not shared (11): The ITS Unit tries to retrieve personal 
data when they are not shared.  
NegativeAnswer (SID 0B)  
These messages are issued by the VU Interface if a request cannot be 
completed for any other reason than the unavailability of the data. These 
messages are typically the result of a bad request format (Length, SID, 
ITSID…) but aren't limited to that. The TRTP in the Data Field contains 
the SID of the request. The Data Field contains a code identifying the 
reason of the negative answer. The following codes are available:  
— General Reject (code: 10)  
— The action can't be performed for a reason which isn't cited below nor 
in section (Enter  DataUnavailable  section number).  
— Service not supported (code: 11)  
— The request's SID isn't understood.  
— Sub function not supported (code: 12)  
— The request's TRTP isn't understood. It can be for instance missing or 
out of accepted values.  
— Incorrect message length (code: 13)  
— The length of the received message is wrong (mismatch between the 
LEN byte and the actual message length).  
— Conditions not correct or request sequence error (code: 22)  
— The required service is not active or the sequence of request messages 
is not correct  
— Request out of range (code: 33)  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 460  
— The request parameter record (data field) is not valid  
— Response pending (code: 78)  
— The action requested cannot be completed in time and the VU is not 
ready to accept another request.  
— ITSID  Mismatch (code: FB)  
— The SRC  ITSID  doesn't match the associated device after comparison 
with the Bluetooth information.  
— ITSID  Not Found (code: FC)  
— The SRC  ITSID  isn't associated with any device.  
Lines 1 through 72 ( FormatMessageModule ) of the ASN.1 code in 
Annex 3 specify the messages format as described in table 3. More 
details about the messages content is given below.  
4.5. Driver consent  
All the data available are classified as either standard or personal. Personal 
data shall only be accessible if the driver gave his/her consent, accepting 
his/her tachograph personal data can leave the vehicle network for third 
party applications.  
Driver consent is given when, at first insertion of a given driver card or 
workshop card currently unknown to the vehicle unit, the cardholder is 
invited to express his consent for tachograph related personal data output 
through the optional ITS interface. (see also Annex I C paragraph 3.6.2).  
The consent status (enabled/disabled) is recorded in the memory of the 
tachograph.  
In case of multiple drivers, only the personal data about the drivers who 
gave their consent shall be shared with the ITS interface. For instance, if 
there's two drivers in the vehicle, and only the first driver accepted to 
share his personal data, the ones concerning the second driver shall not be 
shared.  
4.6. Standard data retrieval  
Figure 3 of Annex 2 represents the sequence diagrams of a valid request 
sent by the ITS Unit to access standard data. The ITS Unit is properly 
whitelisted and isn't requesting personal data, no further verification is 
required. The diagrams consider the proper procedure illustrated in 
Figure 2 of Annex 2 has already been followed. They can be equated 
to the  REQUEST TREATMENT  gray box of Figure 2.  
Amongst available data, shall be considered standard:  
— standardTachData (TRTP 01)  
— StandardEventData (TRTP 04)  
— standardFaultData (TRTP 06)  
4.7. Personal data retrieval  
Figure 4 of Annex 2 represents the sequence diagram for personal data 
request processing. As previously stated, the VU interface shall only send 
personal data if the driver has given his explicit consent (see also 4.5). 
Otherwise, the request must be automatically rejected.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 461  
Amongst available data, shall be considered personal:  
— personalTachData (TRTP 02)  
— gnssData (TRTP 03)  
— personalEventData (TRTP 05)  
— manufacturerData (TRTP 07)  
4.8. Event and fault data retrieval  
ITS units shall be able to request events data containing the list of all the 
unexpected events. These data are considered standard or personal, see 
Annex 3. The content of each event is in accordance with the documen ­
tation provided in Annex 1 of this appendix.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 462  
ANNEX 1  
▼M1 
(1) LIST OF AVAILABLE DATA THROUGH THE ITS INTERFACE  
▼B 
Data  Source  Data classification (personal/ 
not personal)  
VehicleIdentificationNumber  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
CalibrationDate  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
TachographVehicleSpeed speed instant t  Vehicle Unit  personal  
Driver1WorkingState Selector driver  Vehicle Unit  personal  
Driver2WorkingState  Vehicle Unit  personal  
DriveRecognize Speed Threshold detected  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
Driver1TimeRelatedStates Weekly day time  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2TimeRelatedStates  Driver Card  personal  
DriverCardDriver1  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
DriverCardDriver2  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
OverSpeed  Vehicle Unit  personal  
TimeDate  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
HighResolutionTotalVehicleDistance  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
ServiceComponentIdentification  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
ServiceDelayCalendarTimeBased  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
Driver1Identification  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2Identification  Driver Card  personal  
NextCalibrationDate  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
Driver1ContinuousDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2ContinuousDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1CumulativeBreakTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2CumulativeBreakTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1CurrentDurationOfSelectedActivity  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2CurrentDurationOfSelectedActivity  Driver Card  personal  
SpeedAuthorised  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
TachographCardSlot1  Driver Card  not personal  
TachographCardSlot2  Driver Card  not personal  
Driver1Name  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2Name  Driver Card  personal  ▼B
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Data  Source  Data classification (personal/ 
not personal)  
OutOfScopeCondition  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
ModeOfOperation  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
Driver1CumulatedDrivingTimePreviousAndCur ­
rentWeek  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2CumulatedDrivingTimePreviousAndCur ­
rentWeek  Driver Card  personal  
EngineSpeed  Vehicle Unit  personal  
RegisteringMemberState  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
VehicleRegistrationNumber  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
Driver1EndOfLastDailyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2EndOfLastDailyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1EndOfLastWeeklyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2EndOfLastWeeklyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1EndOfSecondLastWeeklyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2EndOfSecondLastWeeklyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1CurrentDailyDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2CurrentDailyDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1CurrentWeeklyDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2CurrentWeeklyDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1TimeLeftUntilNewDailyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2TimeLeftUntilNewDailyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1CardExpiryDate  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2CardExpiryDate  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1CardNextMandatoryDownloadDate  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2CardNextMandatoryDownloadDate  Driver Card  personal  
TachographNextMandatoryDownloadDate  Vehicle Unit  not personal  
Driver1TimeLeftUntilNewWeeklyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2TimeLeftUntilNewWeeklyRestPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1NumberOfTimes9hDailyDrivingTimesEx ­
ceeded  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2NumberOfTimes9hDailyDrivingTimesEx ­
ceeced  Driver Card  personal  ▼B
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Data  Source  Data classification (personal/ 
not personal)  
Driver1CumulativeUninterruptedRestTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2CumulativeUninterruptedRestTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1MinimumDailyRest  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2MinimumDailyRest  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1MinimumWeeklyRest  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2MinimumWeeklyRest  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1MaximumDailyPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2MaximumDailyPeriod  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1MaximumDailyDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2MaximumDailyDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1NumberOfUsedReducedDailyRestPeriods  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2NumberOfUsedReducedDailyRestPeriods  Driver Card  personal  
Driver1RemainingCurrentDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
Driver2RemainingCurrentDrivingTime  Driver Card  personal  
GNSS position  Vehicle Unit  personal  
(2) CONTINUOUS GNSS DATA AVAILABLE AFTER DRIVER CONSENT  
See Appendix 12 — GNSS.  
(3) EVENT CODES AVAILABLE WITHOUT DRIVER CONSENT  
Event  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per event  
Insertion of a non-valid card  — the 10 most recent events.  — date and time of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of the card creating the 
event. 
— number of similar events that day  
Card conflict  — the 10 most recent events.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of the two cards creating the 
conflict.  
Last card session not 
correctly closed  — the 10 most recent events.  — date and time of card insertion, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation, 
— last session data as read from the card: 
— date and time of card insertion, 
— VRN, Member State of registration and 
VU generation.  ▼B
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Event  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per event  
Power supply interruption (2)  — the longest event for each of the 
10 last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
Communication error with 
the remote communication 
facility  — the longest event for each of the 
10 last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
Absence of position 
information from GNSS 
receiver  — the longest event for each of the 
10 last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
▼M1 
Communication error with 
the external GNSS facility  — the longest event for each of the 
10 last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
▼B 
Motion data error  — the longest event for each of the 
10 last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
Vehicle motion conflict  — the longest event for each of the 
10 last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— number of similar events that day.  ▼B
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Event  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per event  
Security breach attempt  the 10 most recent events per type of 
event.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event (if relevant), 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— type of event.  
Time conflict  — the longest event for each of the 
10 last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — recording equipment date and time 
— GNSS date and time, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
(4) EVENT CODES AVAILABLE WITH DRIVER CONSENT  
Event  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per event  
Driving without an appro ­
priate card  — the longest event for each of the 
10 last days of occurrence, 
— the 5 longest events over the last 
365 days.  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of any card inserted at 
beginning and/or end of the event, 
— number of similar events that day.  
Card insertion while driving  — the last event for each of the 10 
last days of occurrence,  — date and time of the event, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation, 
— number of similar events that day  
Over speeding (1)  — the most serious event for each of 
the 10 last days of occurrence 
(i.e. the one with the highest 
average speed), 
— the 5 most serious events over 
the last 365 days. 
— the first event having occurred 
after the last calibration  — date and time of beginning of event, 
— date and time of end of event, 
— maximum speed measured during the 
event, 
— arithmetic average speed measured during 
the event, 
— card type, number, issuing Member State 
and generation of the driver card (if applic ­
able), 
— number of similar events that day.  
(5) FAULT DATA CODES AVAILABLE WITHOUT DRIVER CONSENT  
Fault  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per fault  
Card fault  — the 10 most recent driver card 
faults.  — date and time of beginning of fault, 
— date and time of end of fault, 
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member 
State and generation.  ▼B
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Fault  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per fault  
Recording equipment faults  — the 10 most recent faults for 
each type of fault, 
— the first fault after the last cali ­
bration.  — date and time of beginning of fault, 
— date and time of end of fault, 
— type of fault, 
— card(s) type, number and issuing Member 
State and generation of any card inserted 
at beginning and/or end of the fault.  
This fault shall be triggered for any of these failures, while not in calibration 
mode:  
— VU internal fault  
— Printer fault  
— Display fault  
— Downloading fault  
— Sensor fault  
— GNSS receiver or external GNSS facility fault  
— Remote Communication facility fault  
▼M1 
— ITS interface fault (if applicable)  
▼B 
(6) MANUFACTURER SPECIFIC EVENTS AND FAULTS WITHOUT 
DRIVER CONSENT  
Event or Fault  Storage rules  Data to be recorded per event  
To be defined by Manufac ­
turer  To be defined by Manufacturer  To be defined by Manufacturer  ▼B
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ANNEX 2  
SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS OF MESSAGES EXCHANGES WITH THE ITS UNIT.  
Figure 1  
Sequence Diagram for PIN validation attempt
  ▼B
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Figure 2  
Sequence Diagram for ITS Unit's authorization verification
  ▼B
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Figure 3  
Sequence Diagram to process a request for data classified as non-personal (after correct PIN access)
  
Figure 4  
Sequence Diagram to process a request for data classified as personal (after correct PIN access)
  ▼B
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Figure 5  
Sequence Diagram for PUC validation attempt
  ▼B
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ANNEX 3  
ASN.1 SPECIFICATIONS
  ▼B
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▼B
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▼B
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▼B
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► (1) M1 ▼B
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► (1) (2) (3)  M1 ▼B
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► (1) M1 ▼B
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► (1) (2) M1 ▼B
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▼B
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▼B
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► (1) M1 ▼B
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▼B
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Appendix 14  
REMOTE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
1. INTRODUCTION  
2. SCOPE  
3. ACRONYMS, DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS  
4. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS  
4.1 Overview  
4.1.1 Preconditions to data transfer via 5.8 GHz DSRC interface  
4.1.2 Profile 1a: via a hand aimed or temporary roadside mounted and aimed 
Remote Early Detection Communication Reader  
4.1.3 Profile 1b: via a vehicle mounted and directed Remote Early Detection 
Communication Reader (REDCR)  
4.2 Security/Integrity  
5. REMOTE COMMUNICATION DESIGN AND PROTOCOLS  
5.1 Design  
5.2 Workflow  
5.2.1 Operations  
5.2.2 Interpretation of the Data received via the DSRC communication  
5.3 DSRC Physical interface parameters for remote communication  
5.3.1 Location constraints  
5.3.2 Downlink and uplink parameters  
5.3.3 Antenna design  
5.4 DSRC Protocol requirements for RTM  
5.4.1 Overview  
5.4.2 Commands  
5.4.3 Interrogation command sequence  
5.4.4 Data structures  
5.4.5 Elements of RtmData, actions performed and definitions  
5.4.6 Data transfer mechanism  
5.4.7 Detailed DSRC transaction description  
5.4.8 DSRC Test transaction description  
▼M1 
5.5 Support for Directive (EU) 2015/719  
▼B 
5.5.1 Overview  
5.5.2 Commands  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 485  
5.5.3 Interrogation command sequence  
5.5.4 Data structures  
5.5.5 ASN.1 module for the OWS DSRC transaction  
5.5.6 Elements of OwsData, actions performed and definitions  
5.5.7 Data transfer mechanisms  
5.6 Data transfer between the DSRC-VU and VU  
5.6.1 Physical Connection and interfaces  
5.6.2 Application Protocol  
5.7 Error handling  
5.7.1 Recording and communication of the Data in the DSRC-VU  
5.7.2 Wireless Communication errors  
6. COMMISSIONING AND PERIODIC INSPECTION TESTS FOR THE 
REMOTE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION  
6.1 General  
6.2 ECHO  
6.3 Tests to validate the secure data content  
1. INTRODUCTION  
This Appendix specifies the design and the procedures to follow in order 
to perform the remote communication function (the Communication) as 
required in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 (the Regulation).  
DSC_1 Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 determines that the tachograph 
shall be equipped with a remote communication functionality 
that shall enable agents of the competent control authorities to 
read tachograph information from passing vehicles by using 
remote interrogation equipment (the Remote early detection 
communication reader [REDCR]), specifically, interrogation 
equipment connecting wirelessly using CEN 5.8 GHz 
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) interfaces.  
It is important to comprehend that this functionality is intended 
to serve only as a pre-filter in order to select vehicles for 
closer inspection, and it does not replace the formal inspection 
process as determined in the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 
165/2014. See recital 9 in the preamble of this regulation, 
stating that remote communication between the tachograph 
and control authorities for roadside control purposes facilitates 
targeted roadside checks.  
DSC_2  The Data  shall be exchanged using  the Communication  which 
shall be a wireless intercourse using 5.8 GHz DSRC wireless 
communications consistent with this Appendix and tested 
against the appropriate parameters of EN 300 674-1, {Elec ­
tromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); 
Road Transport and Traffic Telematics (RTTT); Dedicated 
Short Range Communication (DSRC) transmission equipment  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 486  
(500 kbit/s / 250 kbit/s) operating in the 5,8 GHz Industrial, 
Scientific and Medical (ISM) band; Part 1: General characte ­
ristics and test methods for Road Side Units (RSU) and On 
-Board Units (OBU)}.  
DSC_3  The Communication  shall be established with the communi ­
cations equipment only when so requested by the equipment of 
the competent control authority using compliant radio- 
communication means ( the Remote early detection communi ­
cation reader (REDCR) ). 
DSC_4  The Data  shall be secured to ensure integrity.  
DSC_5 Access to  the Data  communicated shall be restricted to 
competent control authorities authorised to check 
infringements of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 and of Regu ­
lation (EU) No 165/2014 and to workshops in so far as it is 
necessary to verify the correct functioning of the tachograph.  
DSC_6  The Data  exchanged during  the Communication  shall be 
limited to the data necessary for the purpose of targeting 
roadside checks of vehicles with a potentially manipulated or 
misused tachograph.  
DSC_7 Data integrity and security shall be obtained by securing  the 
Data  within the Vehicle Unit (VU) and by passing only the 
secured payload data and security related data (see 5.4.4) 
across the wireless 5.8 GHz DSRC remote communication 
medium, meaning that only authorised persons of competent 
control authorities have the means to understand the data 
passed across  the Communication  and to verify its authenticity. 
See Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms.  
DSC_8  The Data  shall contain a timestamp for the time of its last 
update.  
DSC_9 The content of the security data shall be known only to and 
within the control of the competent control authorities, and 
those parties with whom they share this information and is 
outwith the provisions of  the Communication  that is the 
subject of this Appendix, save that  the Communication  
makes provision to transfer a packet of security data with 
every packet of payload data.  
DSC_10 The same architecture and equipment shall be capable be used 
to acquire other data concepts (such as weigh–on-board) using 
the architecture specified herein.  
DSC_11 For clarification, in accordance with the provisions of Regu ­
lation (EU) No 165/2014 (Article 7), data concerning the 
identity of the driver shall not be communicated across  the 
Communication . 
2. SCOPE  
The scope of this Appendix is to specify how agents of the competent 
control authorities use a specified 5.8 GHz DSRC wireless communi ­
cation to remotely obtain data ( the Data ) from a targeted vehicle that 
identifies that the targeted vehicle is in potential violation of Regulation  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 487  
(EU) No 165/2014 and should be targeted for consideration to be 
stopped for further investigation.  
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 requires that the Data collected shall be 
limited to data or pertaining to data that identifies a potential 
infringement, as defined in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.  
▼M1 
In this scenario, the time available for communication is limited, because  
the Communication  is targeted and of a short- range design. Further, the 
same communication means for remote tachograph monitoring (RTM) 
may also be used by the competent control authorities for other appli ­
cations (such as the maximal weights and dimensions for heavy goods 
vehicles defined in Directive (EU) 2015/719) and such operations may 
be separate or sequential at the discretion of the competent control 
authorities.  
▼B 
This Appendix specifies:  
— The communications equipment, procedures and protocols to be used 
for the Communication  
— The Standards and Regulations to which the radio equipment shall 
comply  
— The presentation of  the Data  to the Communication  equipment  
— The enquiry and download procedures and sequence of operations  
— The Data  to be transferred  
— Potential interpretation of  the Data  transferred across  the Communi ­
cation  
— The provisions for security data relating to  the Communication  
— The availability of  the Data  to the competent control authorities  
— How the  Remote early detection communication reader  can request 
different freight and fleet data concepts  
For clarification, this Appendix does  not specify:  
— the collection of  the Data  operation and management within the VU 
(which shall be a function of product design unless specified 
elsewhere within Regulation (EU) No 165/2014)  
— the form of presentation of collected data to the agent of the 
competent control authorities, nor the criteria which shall be used 
by the competent control authorities to decide which vehicles to stop 
(which shall be a function of product design unless specified 
elsewhere within Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 or a policy 
decision of the competent control authorities). For clarification:  the 
Communication  only makes  the Data  available to the competent 
control authorities in order that  they may make informed decisions  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 488  
— Data security provisions (such as encryption) concerning the content 
of the Data  (which shall be specified within Appendix 11 Common 
Security Mechanisms).  
— detail of any data concepts other than RTM which may be obtained 
using the same architecture and equipment  
— detail of the behaviour and management between VU's and the 
DSRC-VU, nor the behaviour within the DSRC-VU (other than to 
provide  the Data  when so requested by an REDCR).  
3. ACRONYMS, DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS  
The following acronyms and definitions specific to this Appendix are 
used in this appendix:  
the Antenna  electrical device which converts 
electric power into radio waves, and 
vice versa used in combination with 
a radio transmitter or radio receiver. 
In operation, a radio transmitter 
supplies an electric current oscillating 
at radio frequency to the antenna's 
terminals, and the antenna radiates 
the energy from the current as elec ­
tromagnetic waves (radio waves). In 
reception, an antenna intercepts some 
of the power of an electromagnetic 
wave in order to produce a tiny 
voltage at its terminals, that is 
applied to a receiver to be amplified  
the Communication  exchange of information/data 
between a DSRC-REDCR and a 
DSRC-VU according to section 5 in 
a master-slave relationship to obtain 
the Data.  
the Data  secured data of defined format (see 
5.4.4) requested by the  DSRC- 
REDCR  and provided to the  DSRC- 
REDCR  by the  DSRC-VU  across a 
5.8 GHz DSRC link as defined in 5 
below  
Regulation (EC) No 165/2014  Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 February 2014 on 
tachographs in road transport, 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC)  ▼B
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No 3821/85 on recording equipment 
in road transport and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of 
the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the harmonisation of 
certain social legislation relating to 
road transport  
AID Application Identifier  
BLE  Bluetooth Low Energy  
BST  Beacon Service Table  
CIWD  Card insertion while driving  
CRC  cyclic redundancy check  
DSC (n)  identifier of a requirement for a 
specific DSRC appendix  
DSRC  Dedicated Short Range Communi ­
cation  
DSRC-REDCR  DSRC — Remote Early Detection 
Communication Reader.  
DSRC-VU  DSRC — Vehicle Unit. This is the 
‘remote early detection facility’ 
defined in Annex 1C.  
DWVC  Driving without valid card  
EID Element Identifier  
LLC  Logical Link Control  
LPDU  LLC Protocol Data Unit  
OWS  Onboard Weighing System  
PDU  Protocol Data Unit  
REDCR  Remote early detection communi ­
cation reader. This is the ‘remote 
early detection communication 
reader equipment’ defined in Annex 
1C. 
RTM  Remote Tachograph Monitoring  
SM-REDCR  Security Module-Remote early 
detection communication reader  
TARV  Telematics Applications for 
Regulated Vehicles (ISO 15638 
series of Standards)  ▼B
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VU Vehicle Unit  
VUPM  Vehicle Unit Payload Memory  
VUSM  Vehicle Unit Security Module  
VST  Vehicle Service Table  
WIM  Weigh in motion  
WOB  Weigh on board  
The specification defined in this Appendix refers to and depends upon 
all or parts of the following regulations and standards. Within the 
clauses of this Appendix the relevant standards, or relevant clauses of 
standards, are specified. In the event of any contradiction the clauses of 
this Appendix shall take precedence. In the event of any contradiction 
where no specification is clearly determined in this Appendix, operating 
within ERC 70-03 (and tested against the appropriate parameters of EN 
300 674-1) shall take precedence, followed in descending order of pref ­
erence by EN 12795, EN 12253 EN 12834 and EN 13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 
and 7.1.  
Regulations and standards referenced in this Appendix are:  
[1] Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording 
equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 
561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport.  
[2] Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain 
social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council 
Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (Text with EEA 
relevance).  
[3] ERC 70-03 CEPT: ECC Recommendation 70-03: Relating to the 
Use of Short Range Devices (SRD)  
[4] ISO 15638 Intelligent transport systems — Framework for 
cooperative telematics applications for regulated commercial 
freight vehicles (TARV).  
[5] EN 300 674-1 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum 
Matters (ERM); Road Transport and Traffic Telematics (RTTT); 
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) transmission 
equipment (500 kbit/s / 250 kbit/s) operating in the 5,8 GHz Indus ­
trial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band; Part 1: General characte ­
ristics and test methods for Road Side Units (RSU) and On-Board 
Units (OBU).  
[6] EN 12253 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated short- 
range communication — Physical layer using microwave at 5.8 
GHz.  ▼B
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[7] EN 12795 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated short- 
range communication — Data link layer: medium access and 
logical link control.  
[8] EN 12834 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated short- 
range communication — Application layer.  
[9] EN 13372 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated short- 
range communication — Profiles for RTTT applications  
[10] ISO 14906 Electronic fee collection — Application interface defi ­
nition for dedicated short- range communication  
4. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS  
4.1 Overview  
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 provides specific and controlled scenarios 
within which  the Communication  is to be used.  
The scenarios supported are:  
‘Communication Profile 1: Roadside inspection using a short range 
wireless communication Remote Early Detection Communication 
Reader instigating a physical roadside inspection (master-:-slave)  
Reader Profile 1a: via a hand aimed or temporary roadside mounted 
and aimed Remote Early Detection Communication  
Reader Profile 1b: via a vehicle mounted and directed Remote Early 
Detection Communication Reader’.  
4.1.1  Preconditions to data transfer via 5,8 GHz DSRC interface  
NOTE: In order to understand the context of the preconditions the reader 
is referred to Figure 14.3 below.  
4.1.1.1 Data held in VU  
DSC_12 The VU shall be responsible to keep updated every 60 seconds 
and maintain the data to be stored in the VU, without any 
involvement of the DSRC communication function. The 
means by which this is achieved is internal to the VU, 
specified in Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, Annex 1 C, 
section 3.19 ‘ Remote communication for targeted roadside 
checks ’ and is not specified in this Appendix.  
4.1.1.2 Data provided to DSRC-VU Facility  
DSC_13 The VU shall be responsible to update the DSRC tachograph 
data ( the Data ) whenever the data stored in the VU is updated 
at the interval determined in 4.1.1.1 (DSC_12), without any 
involvement of the DSRC communication function.  
DSC_14 The VU data shall be used as a basis to populate and update  
the Data , the means by which this is achieved, is specified in 
Annex 1.C, section 3.19 ‘ Remote communication for targeted 
roadside checks ’ or if there is no such specification it is a 
function of product design and is not specified in this 
Appendix. For the design of the connection between DSRC- 
VU facility and the VU, please refer to section 5.6.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 492  
4.1.1.3 Content of the Data  
DSC_15 The content and format of  the Data  shall be such that, once 
decrypted, it shall be structured and made available in the form 
and format specified in 5.4.4 of this Appendix (Data struc ­
tures).  
4.1.1.4 Data presentation  
DSC_16  The Data , having been kept frequently updated in accordance 
with the procedures determined in 4.1.1.1, shall be secured 
prior to presentation to the  DSRC-VU , and presented as a 
secured data concept value, for temporary storage in the  
DSRC-VU  as the current version of  the Data . This data is 
transferred from the  VUSM  to the DSRC function  VUPM . 
The VUSM  and  VUPM  are functions and not necessarily 
physical entities. The form of physical instantiation to 
perform these functions shall be a matter of product design 
unless specified elsewhere in Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.  
4.1.1.5 Security data  
DSC_17 Security data ( securityData ), comprising the data required by 
the REDCR  to complete its ability to decrypt  the Data  shall be 
supplied as defined in Appendix 11 Common Security Mech ­
anisms and presented as a data concept value, for temporary 
storage in the  DSRC-VU  as the current version of  secur­
ityData , in the form defined in this Appendix section 5.4.4.  
4.1.1.6 VUPM data available for transfer across the DSRC interface  
DSC_18 The data concept which shall always be available in the DSRC 
function VUPM for immediate transfer upon request by the  
REDCR  is defined in section 5.4.4 for full ASN.1 Module 
specifications.  
General overview of communication Profile 1  
This profile covers the use case where an agent of the competent control 
authorities, uses a short range remote communication Remote Early 
Detection Communication Reader (5.8 GHz DSRC interfaces operating 
within ERC 70-03, and tested against the appropriate parameters of EN 
300 674-1 as described in section 5) ( the REDCR ) to remotely identify a 
vehicle which is potentially in violation of Regulation (EU) No 
165/2014. Once identified, the agent of the competent control authorities 
who is controlling the interrogation decides whether the vehicle should 
be stopped.  
4.1.2  Profile 1a: via a hand aimed or temporary roadside mounted and aimed 
Remote Early Detection Communication Reader  
In this use case the agent of the competent control authorities is situated 
at the roadside, and aims a hand held, tripod mounted, or similar 
portable,  REDCR  from the roadside towards the centre of the windshield 
of the targeted vehicle. The interrogation is made using 5.8 GHz DSRC 
interfaces operating within ERC 70-03, and tested against the appro ­
priate parameters of EN 300 674-1 as described in section 5. See 
Figure 14.1 (Use Case 1).  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 493  
Figure 14.1  
Roadside interrogation using 5,8 GHz DSRC
  
4.1.3  Profile 1b: via a vehicle mounted and directed Remote Early Detection 
Communication Reader (REDCR)  
In this use case the agent of the competent control authorities is situated 
within a moving vehicle, and either aims a hand held, portable  REDCR  
from the vehicle towards the centre of the windshield of the targeted 
vehicle, or  the REDCR  is mounted within or on the vehicle so as to 
point towards the centre of the windshield of the targeted vehicle when 
the Remote Early Detection Communication Reader's vehicle is in a 
particular position relevant to the targeted vehicle (for example 
directly ahead in a stream of traffic). The interrogation is made using 
5.8 GHz DSRC interfaces operating within ERC 70-03, and tested 
against the appropriate parameters of EN 300 674-1 as described in 
section 5. See Figure 14.2. (Use Case 2).  
Figure 14.2  
Vehicle based interrogation using 5,8 GHz DSRC
  
4.2 Security/Integrity  
To give the possibility to verify the authenticity and integrity of down ­
loaded data through the remote communication, the secured  Data  is 
verified and decrypted in accordance with Appendix 11 Common 
Security Mechanisms.  
5. REMOTE COMMUNICATION DESIGN AND PROTOCOLS  
5.1 Design  
The design of the remote communication function in the Smart 
Tachograph is shown as described in Figure 14.3.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 494  
Figure 14.3  
Design of the remote communication function
  
DSC_19 The following functions are located in the VU:  
— Security Module ( VUSM ). This function present in the VU 
is responsible for securing  the Data  which is to be trans ­
mitted from the  DSRC-VU  to the agent of the competent 
control authorities via remote communication.  
— The secured data is stored in the VUSM memory. At 
intervals determined in 4.1.1.1 (DSC_12), the VU 
encrypts and replenishes the RTMdata concept (which 
comprises payload data and security data concept values 
determined below in this Appendix) held in the memory of 
the DSRC-VU. The operation of the security module is 
defined in Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms 
and outwith the scope of this Appendix, save that it shall 
be required to provide updates to the VU Communication 
facility each time the VUSM data changes.  
— The communication between the VU and the DSRC-VU 
may be a wired communication or a Bluetooth Low 
Energy (BLE) communication, and the physical location 
of the DSRC-VU may be integral with the antenna on 
the windshield of the vehicle, may be internal to the VU, 
or located somewhere between.  
— The DSRC-VU shall have a reliable source of power 
available at all times. The means by which it is provided 
with its power is a design decision.  
— The memory of the DSRC-VU shall be non-volatile in 
order to maintain the Data in the DSRC-VU even when 
the vehicle ignition is switched off.  
— If the communication between the VU and the DSRC-VU 
is made via BLE and the power source is a non-recharging 
battery, the power source of the DSRC-VU shall be 
replaced at every Periodic Inspection, and the manufacturer  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 495  
of the DSRC-VU equipment shall be responsible to ensure 
that the power supply is adequate to last from one Periodic 
Inspection to the next Periodic Inspection, maintaining 
normal access to the data by an REDCR throughout the 
period without failure or interruption.  
— VU RTM ‘payload memory’ facility ( VUPM ). This 
function present in the VU is responsible for providing 
and updating  the Data . The content of  The Data . (‘Tacho ­
graphPayload’) is defined in 5.4.4/5.4.5 below and is 
updated at the interval determined in 4.1.1.1 (DSC_12).  
— DSRC-VU. This is the function, within or connected to the 
antenna and in communication with the VU through a 
wired or wireless (BLE) connection, which holds the 
current data ( VUPM-data ) and manages the response to 
an interrogation across the 5.8 GHz DSRC medium. 
Disconnection of the DSRC facility or interference 
during normal vehicle operation with the functioning of 
the DSRC facility shall be construed as a violation of 
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.  
— Security module (REDCR) ( SM-REDCR ) is the function 
used to decrypt and check integrity of the data originating 
from the VU. The means by which this is achieved is 
determined in Appendix 11 Common Security Mech ­
anisms, and is not defined in this Appendix.  
— The DSRC facility (REDCR) ( DSRC-REDCR ) function 
comprises a 5.8 GHz transceiver and associated firmware 
and software which manages  the Communication  with the  
DSRC-VU  according to this Appendix.  
— The  DSRC-REDCR  interrogates the  DSRC-VU  of the 
targeted vehicle and obtains  the Data  (the targeted 
vehicle's current  VUPM-data ) via the DSRC link and 
processes and stores the received data in its  SM-REDCR . 
▼M1 
— The DSRC-VU antenna shall be positioned at a location 
where it optimizes the DSRC communication between the 
vehicle and the roadside reader antenna, when the reader is 
installed 15 meters distance in front of the vehicle and 2 
meters height, targeting the horizontal and vertical centre 
of the windscreen. For light vehicles an installation 
corresponding to the upper part of the windscreen is 
suitable. For all the other vehicles the DSRC antenna 
shall be installed either near the lower or near the upper 
part of the windscreen.  
▼B 
DSC_20 The Antenna and The Communication shall operate within 
ERC 70-03, tested against the appropriate parameters of EN 
300 674-1 as described in section 5. The Antenna and the 
Communication can implement mitigation techniques against 
the risk of wireless interference as described in ECC report 
228 using e.g., filters in the CEN DSRC 5.8 GHz communi ­
cation.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 496  
DSC_21 The DSRC antenna shall be connected to the DSRC-VU 
facility either directly within the module mounted to or close 
to the windshield, or through a dedicated cable constructed in 
a manner to make illegal disconnection difficult. Discon ­
nection of or interference with the functioning of Antenna 
shall be a violation of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014. 
Deliberate masking or otherwise detrimentally affecting the 
operational performance of the Antenna shall be construed as 
a violation of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.  
DSC_22  ►M1 The form factor of the antenna is not defined and shall 
be a commercial decision, so long as the fitted DSRC-VU 
meets the conformance requirements defined in section 5 
below. The antenna shall be positioned as determined in 
DSC_19 and efficiently support the use cases described in in 
4.1.2 and 4.1.3. ◄ 
Figure 14.4  
Example of positioning of the 5,8 GHz DSRC antenna in the 
windshield of regulated vehicles
  
The form factor of  the REDCR  and its antenna may vary according to 
the circumstances of the reader (tripod mounted, hand held, vehicle 
mounted, etc.) and the modus operandi employed by the agent of the 
competent control authorities.  
A display and/or notification function is used to present the results of the 
remote communication function to the agent of the competent control 
authorities. A display may be provided on a screen, as a printed output, 
an audio signal, or a combination of such notifications. The form of such 
display and/or notification is a matter of the requirements of the agents 
of the competent control authorities and equipment design and is not 
specified within this Appendix.  
DSC_23 The design and form factor of the  REDCR  shall be a function 
of commercial design, operating within ERC 70-03, and the 
design and performance specifications defined in this 
Appendix, (section 5.3.2), thus providing the marketplace  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 497  
maximum flexibility to design and provide equipment to cover 
the specific interrogation scenarios of any particular competent 
control authority.  
DSC_24 The design and form factor of the  DSRC-VU  and its posi ­
tioning inside or outside the VU shall be a function of 
commercial design, operating within ERC 70-03 and the 
design and performance specifications defined in this 
Appendix (section 5.3.2) and within this Clause (5.1).  
DSC_25 However, the  DSRC-VU  shall be reasonably capable to accept 
data concept values from other intelligent vehicle equipment 
by means of an open industry standard connection and 
protocols. (For example from weigh on board equipment), so 
long as such data concepts are identified by unique and known 
application identifiers/file names, and the instructions to 
operate such protocols shall be made available to the 
European Commission, and available without charge to manu ­
facturers of relevant equipment.  
5.2 Workflow  
5.2.1  Operations  
The workflow of operations is represented in Figure 14.5.  
Figure 14.5  
Workflow for remote communication function
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 498  
The steps are described below:  
a. Whenever the vehicle is in operation (ignition ON) the tachograph is 
providing data to the VU function. The VU function prepares  the 
Data  for the remote communication function (encrypted) and updates 
the VUPM  held in the memory of the  DSRC-VU  (as defined in 
4.1.1.1 — 4.1.1.2).  The Data  collected shall be formatted as 
determined in 5.4.4 — 5.4.5 below.  
b. On every occasion that  the Data  is updated, the timestamp defined in 
the security data concept shall be updated.  
c. The  VUSM  function secures the data in accordance with the 
procedures determined in Appendix 11.  
d. On every occasion that  the Data  is updated (see 4.1.1.1 — 4.1.1.2),  
the Data  shall be transferred to the  DSRC-VU , where it replaces any 
previous data, in order that updated current data ( the Data ) shall 
always be available to be provided in the event of an interrogation 
by an  REDCR.  When supplied by the VU to the DSRC-VU  the Data  
shall be identifiable by the filename  RTMData or  by ApplicationID 
and Attribute identifiers.  
e. If an agent of the competent control authorities wishes to target a 
vehicle and collect  the Data  from the targeted vehicle, the agent of 
the competent control authorities shall first insert his/her smartcard in  
the REDCR  to enable  the Communication  and to allow the  SM- 
REDCR  to verify its authenticity and decrypt the data.  
f. The agent of the competent control authority then targets a vehicle 
and requests the data through remote communication.  The REDCR  
opens a 5.8 GHz DSRC interface session with the  DSRC-VU  of the 
targeted vehicle, and requests  the Data . The Data  is transferred to  the 
REDCR  through the wireless communication system as a DSRC 
Attribute using the Application service GET as defined in 5.4. The 
Attribute contains the encrypted payload data values and the DSRC 
security data.  
g. The data is analyzed by the  REDCR  equipment and provided to the 
agent of the competent control authority.  
h. The agent of the competent control authority uses the data to assist in 
a decision of whether or not to stop for a detailed inspection, or ask 
another agent of the competent control authority to stop the vehicle.  
5.2.2  Interpretation of the Data received via the DSRC communication  
DSC_26 Data received across the 5.8 GHz interface shall carry the 
meaning and import defined in 5.4.4 and 5.4.5 below and 
only that meaning and import, and shall be understood 
within the objectives defined therein. In accordance with the 
provisions of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014,  the Data  shall 
be used only to provide relevant information to a competent  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 499  
control authority to assist them to determine which vehicle 
should be stopped for physical inspection, and shall be 
subsequently destroyed in accordance with Article 9 of Regu ­
lation (EU) No 165/2014.  
5.3 DSRC Physical interface parameters for remote communication  
5.3.1  Location constraints  
DSC_27 The remote interrogation of vehicles using a 5.8GHz DSRC 
interface should not be used within 200 metres of an opera ­
tional 5.8 GHz DSRC gantry.  
5.3.2  Downlink and uplink parameters  
DSC_28 The equipment used for remote tachograph monitoring shall 
conform to and operate within ERC70-03 and the parameters 
defined in Tables 14.1 and 14.2 below.  
DSC_29 Further, to ensure compatibility with the operational 
parameters of other standardised 5.8 GHz DSRC systems, 
the equipment used for remote tachograph monitoring shall 
conform to parameters from EN 12253 and EN 13372.  
Namely:  
Table 14.1  
Downlink parameters  
Item No  Parameter  Value(s)  Remark  
D1 Downlink Carrier 
Frequencies  There are four alternatives 
which may be used by an 
REDCR: 
5,7975 GHz 
5,8025 GHz 
5,8075 GHz 
5,8125 GHz  Within ERC 70-03. 
Carrier Frequencies may be 
selected by the implementer of the 
roadside system and need not be 
known in the DSRC-VU 
(Consistent with EN 12253, EN 
13372)  
D1a (*) Tolerance of Carrier 
Frequencies  within ± 5 ppm  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D2 (*) RSU (REDCR) Transmitter 
Spectrum Mask  Within ERC 70-03. 
REDCR shall be according 
to Class B,C as defined in 
EN 12253. 
No other specific 
requirement within this 
Annex  Parameter used for controlling 
interference between interrogators 
in proximity (as defined in EN 
12253 and EN 13372).  
D3 OBU(DSRC-VU) Minimum 
Frequency Range  5,795 — 5,815 GHz  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D4 (*) Maximum E.I.R.P.  Within ERC 70-03 
(unlicensed) and within 
National Regulation 
Maximum + 33 dBm  (Consistent with EN 12253)  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 500  
Item No  Parameter  Value(s)  Remark  
D4a Angular E.I.R.P. mask  According to declared and 
published specification of 
interrogator designer  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D5 Polarisation  Left hand circular  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D5a Cross-Polarisation  XPD: 
In bore sight: (REDCR) 
RSU t ≥ 15 dB 
(DSRC-VU) OBU r ≥ 10 
dB 
At -3 dB area: (REDCR) 
RSU t ≥ 10 dB 
(DSRC-VU) OBU r ≥ 6 dB  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D6 (*) Modulation  Two level amplitude modu ­
lation.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D6a (*) Modulation Index  0,5 ... 0,9  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D6b Eye Pattern  ≥ 90 % (time) / ≥ 85 % 
(amplitude)  
D7 (*) Data Coding  FM0 
‘1’ bit has transitions only 
at the beginning and end 
of the bit interval. ‘0’ bit 
has an additional transition 
in the middle of the bit 
interval compared to the 
‘1’ bit.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D8 (*) Bit rate  500 kBit/s  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D8a Tolerance of Bit Clock  better than ± 100 ppm  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D9 (*) Bit Error Rate (B.E.R.) for 
communication  ≤ 10  – 6 when incident po- 
wer at OBU (DSRC-VU) is 
in the range given by [D11a 
to D11b].  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D10 Wake-up trigger for OBU 
(DSRC-VU)  OBU (DSRC-VU) shall 
wake up on receiving any 
frame with 11 or more 
octets (including preamble)  No special wake-up pattern is 
necessary. 
DSRC-VU may wake up on 
receiving a frame with less than 
11 octets 
(Consistent with EN 12253)  
D10a  Maximum Start Time  ≤ 5 ms  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D11 Communication zone  Spatial region within which 
a B.E.R. according to D9a 
is achieved  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D11a  (*) Power Limit for communi ­
cation (upper).  – 24dBm  (Consistent with EN 12253)  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 501  
Item No  Parameter  Value(s)  Remark  
D11b  (*) Power Limit for communi ­
cation (lower).  Incident power: 
– 43 dBm (boresight) 
– 41 dBm (within – 45° ± 
45°Corresponding to the 
plane parallel to the road 
surface when the DSRC- 
VU later is installed in the 
vehicle (Azimuth))  (Consistent with EN 12253) 
Extended requirement for hori ­
zontal angles up to ±45°, due to 
the use cases defined in this annex.  
D12 (*) Cut-off power level of 
(DSRC-VU)  – 60 dBm  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D13 Preamble  Preamble is mandatory.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D13a  Preamble Length and 
Pattern  16 bits ± 1 bit of FM0 
coded ‘1’ bits  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D13b  Preamble Wave form  An alternating sequence of 
low level and high level 
with pulse duration of 2 μs. 
The tolerance is given 
byD8a  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
D13c  Trailing Bits  The RSU (REDCR) is 
permitted to transmit a 
maximum of 8 bits after 
the end flag. An OBU 
(DSRC-VU) is not required 
to take these additional bits 
into account.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
(*) – Downlink parameters subject to conformance testing in accordance with relevant parameter test from EN 300 674-1.  
Table 14.2  
Uplink parameters  
Item No.  Parameter  Value(s)  Remark  
U1 (*) Sub-carrier Frequencies  A OBU (DSRC-VU) shall 
support 1,5 MHz and 2,0 
MHz 
An RSU (REDCR) shall 
support 1,5 MHz or 2,0 
MHz or both. U1-0: 1,5 
MHz U1-1: 2,0 MHz  Selection of sub-carrier frequency 
(1,5 MHz or 2,0 MHz) depends on 
the EN 13372 profile selected.  
U1a (*) Tolerance of Sub- carrier 
Frequencies  within ± 0,1 %  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U1b Use of Side Bands  Same data on both sides  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U2 (*) OBU (DSRC-VU) Trans ­
mitter Spectrum Mask  According to EN12253 
1) Out band power: 
see ETSI EN 300674-1  (Consistent with EN 12253)  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 502  
Item No.  Parameter  Value(s)  Remark  
2) In band power: 
[U4a] dBm in 500 kHz 
3) Emission in any other 
uplink channel: 
U2(3)-1 = – 35 dBm in 
500 kHz  
U4a (*) Maximum Single Side Band 
E.I.R.P. (boresight)  Two options: 
U4a-0: – 14 dBm 
U4a-1: – 21 dBm  According to declared and 
published specification of 
equipment designer  
U4b (*) Maximum Single Side Band 
E.I.R.P. (35°)  Two options: 
— Not applicable 
— – 17dBm  According to declared and 
published specification of 
equipment designer  
U5 Polarisation  Left hand circular  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U5a Cross Polarisation  XPD: 
In bore sight: (REDCR) 
RSU r ≥ 15 dB 
(DSRC-VU) OBU t ≥ 10 
dB 
At – 3 dB: (REDCR) RSU 
r ≥ 10 dB 
(DSRC-VU) OBU t ≥ 6 dB  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U6 Sub-Carrier Modulation  2-PSK 
Encoded data synchronised 
with sub-carrier: Transitions 
of encoded data coincide 
with transitions of sub- 
carrier.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U6b Duty Cycle  Duty Cycle: 
50 % ± α, α ≤ 5 %  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U6c Modulation on Carrier  Multiplication of modulated 
sub- carrier with carrier.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U7 (*) Data Coding  NRZI (No transition at 
beginning of ‘1’ bit, tran ­
sition at beginning of ‘0’ 
bit, no transition within bit)  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U8 (*) Bit Rate  250 kbit/s  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U8a Tolerance of Bit Clock  Within ± 1 000 ppm  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U9 Bit Error Rate (B.E.R.) for 
communication  ≤10 – 6 (Consistent with EN 12253)  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 503  
Item No.  Parameter  Value(s)  Remark  
U11 Communication Zone  The spatial region within 
which the DSRC-VU is 
situated such that its trans ­
missions are received by the 
REDCR with a B.E.R. of 
less than that given by U9a.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U12a  (*) Conversion Gain (lower 
limit)  1 dB for each side band 
Range of angle: Circularly 
symmetric between bore 
sight and ± 35° 
and 
within – 45° ± 45° 
Corresponding to the plane 
parallel to the road surface 
when the DSRC-VU later is 
installed in the vehicle (Azi ­
muth)  Greater that the specified value 
range for horizontal angles up to 
± 45°, due to the use cases 
defined in this annex.  
U12b  (*) Conversion Gain (upper 
limit)  10 dB for each side band  Less than the specified value range 
for each side band within a circular 
cone around boresight of ± 45° 
opening angle  
U13 Preamble  Preamble is mandatory.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U13a  Preamble 
Length and Pattern  32 to 36 μs modulated with 
sub- carrier only, then 8 bits 
of NRZI coded ‘0’ bits.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
U13b  Trailing Bits  The DSRC-VU is permitted 
to transmit a maximum of 8 
bits after the end flag. A 
RSU (REDCR) is not 
required to take these ad ­
ditional bits into account.  (Consistent with EN 12253)  
(*) – Uplink parameters subject to conformance testing in accord ance with relevant parameter test from EN 300 674-1  
5.3.3  Antenna design  
5.3.3.1 REDCR antenna  
DSC_30 The design of the  REDCR  antenna shall be a function of 
commercial design, operating within the limits defined in 
5.3.2 which is adapted to optimise the reading performance 
of the  DSRC-REDCR  for the specific purpose and read 
circumstances in which the  REDCR  has been designed to 
operate.  
5.3.3.2 VU antenna  
DSC_31 The design of the  DSRC-VU  antenna shall be a function of 
commercial design, operating within the limits defined in 
5.3.2 which is adapted to optimise the reading performance 
of the  DSRC-REDCR  for the specific purpose and read 
circumstances in which the  REDCR  has been designed to 
operate.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 504  
DSC_32 The VU antenna shall be fixed to, or close to, the front wind ­
shield of the vehicle as specified in 5.1 above.  
DSC_33 In the test environment in a workshop (see section 6.3), a 
DSRC-VU antenna, affixed according to 5.1 above, shall 
successfully connect with a standard test communication 
and successfully provide an RTM transaction as defined 
within this Appendix, at a distance between 2 and 10 
meters, better than 99 % of the time, averaged over 1 000 
read interrogations.  
5.4 DSRC Protocol requirements for RTM  
5.4.1  Overview  
DSC_34 The transaction protocol to download  the Data  across the 5.8 
GHz DSRC interface link shall be according to the following 
steps. This section describes a transaction flow under ideal 
conditions without retransmissions or communication inter ­
rupts.  
NOTE The purpose of the initialisation phase (Step 1) is to 
set up the communication between the  REDCR  and DSRC- 
VUs that have entered the 5.8 GHz DSRC (master-slave) 
transaction zone but have not yet established communication 
with the  REDCR , and to notify the application processes.  
— Step 1  Initialisation. The  REDCR  sends a frame 
containing a ‘beacon service table’ (BST) that includes 
the application identifiers (AIDs) in the service list that it 
supports. In the RTM application this will simply be the 
service with the AID value = 2 (Freight&Fleet). The  
DSRC-VU  evaluates the received BST, and shall 
respond (see below) with the list of the supported appli ­
cations within the Freight&Fleet domain, or shall not 
respond if none are supported. If the  REDCR  does not 
offer AID=2, the DSRC-VU shall not answer to the 
REDCR.  
— Step 2  The  DSRC-VU  sends a frame containing a request 
for a private window allocation.  
— Step 3  The  REDCR  sends a frame containing a private 
window allocation.  
— Step 4  The  DSRC-VU  uses the allocated private window 
to send a frame containing its vehicle service table (VST). 
This VST includes a list of all the different application 
instantiations that this  DSRC-VU  supports in the 
framework of AID=2. The different instantiations shall 
be identified by means of uniquely generated EIDs, 
each associated with an Application Context Mark 
parameter value indicating the application and standard 
supported.  
— Step 5  Next the  REDCR  analyses the offered VST, and 
either terminates the connection (RELEASE) since it is 
not interested in anything the VST has to offer (i.e. it is 
receiving a VST from a  DSRC-VU  that is not supporting 
the RTM transaction), or, if it receives an appropriate 
VST it starts an app instantiation.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 505  
— Step 6  To bring this about, the REDCR shall send a 
frame containing a command to retrieve the RTM data, 
identifying the RTM application instantiation by spec ­
ifying the identifier corresponding to the RTM application 
instantiation (as specified by the DSRC-VU in the VST), 
and shall allocate a private window.  
— Step 7  The  DSRC-VU  uses the newly allocated private 
window to send a frame that contains the addressed 
identifier corresponding to the RTM application 
instantiation as provided in the VST, followed by the 
attribute  RtmData  (payload element + security element).  
— Step 8  If there are multiple services requested, the value 
‘n’ is changed to the next service reference number and 
the process repeated.  
— Step 9  The  REDCR  confirms receipt of the data by 
sending a frame containing a RELEASE command to 
the DSRC-VU  to terminate the session OR if it has 
failed to validate a successful receipt of the LDPU goes 
back to step 6.  
See Figure 14.6 for a pictorial description of the transaction 
protocol.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 506  
Figure 14.6  
RTM over 5,8 GHz DSRC process flow
  
5.4.2  Commands  
DSC_35 The following commands are the only functions used in an 
RTM transaction phase  
— INITIALISATION.request : A command, issued from 
the REDCR in the form of a broadcast with definition 
of applications that the REDCR supports.  
— INITIALISATION.response : An answer from the 
DSRC-VU confirming the connection and containing a 
list of supported application instances with characteristics 
and information how to address them (EID).  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 507  
— GET.request : A command, issued from  the REDCR  to 
the DSRC-VU , that specifies the application instantiation 
to be addressed by means of a defined EID, as received in 
the VST, instructing the  DSRC-VU  to send the selected 
attribute(s) with  the Data . The objective of the GET 
command is for  the REDCR  to obtain  the Data  from 
the DSRC-VU . 
— GET.response : An answer from the DSRC-VU that 
contains  the Data  requested.  
— ACTION.request ECHO : A command, instructing the  
DSRC-VU  to send back data from the  DSRC-VU  to the 
REDCR . The objective of the ECHO command is to 
enable workshops or type approval test facilities to test 
that the DSRC link is working without needing access to 
security credentials.  
— ACTION .response ECHO: An answer from the DSRC 
VU on the ECHO command.  
— EVENT_REPORT.request  RELEASE: A command, 
instructing the  DSRC-VU  that the transaction is ended. 
The objective of the RELEASE command is to end the 
session with the  DSRC-VU . On receipt of the RELEASE 
the DSRC-VU  shall not respond to any further inter ­
rogations under the current connection. Note that 
according to EN 12834 a DSRC-VU will not connect 
twice to the same interrogator unless it has been out of 
the communication zone for 255 seconds or if the Beacon 
ID of the interrogator is changed.  
5.4.3  Interrogation command sequence  
DSC_36 From the perspective of the command and response sequence, 
the transaction is described as follows:  
Sequence  Sender  Receiver  Description  Action  
1 REDCR  >  DSRC-VU  Initialisation of the 
communication link — 
Request  REDCR broadcasts BST  
2 DSRC-VU  >  REDCR  Initialisation of the 
communication link — 
Response  If BST supports AID=2 then 
DSRC-VU Requests a private 
window  
3 REDCR  >  DSRC-VU  Grants a private window  Sends Frame containing 
private window allocation  
4 DSRC-VU  >  REDCR  Sends VST  Sends Frame comprising VST  
5 REDCR  >  DSRC-VU  Sends GET.request for 
data in Attribute for 
specific EID  
6 DSRC-VU  >  REDCR  Sends GET.response 
with requested Attribute 
for specific EID  Sends Attribute (RTMData, 
OWSData….) with data for 
specific EID  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 508  
Sequence  Sender  Receiver  Description  Action  
▼M1 
7 REDCR  >  DSRC-VU  Sends GET.request for 
data of other Attribute 
(if appropriate)  
▼B 
8 DSRC-VU  >  REDCR  Sends GET.response 
with requested Attribute  Sends Attribute with data for 
specific EID  
9 REDCR  >  DSRC-VU  Acknowledges 
successful receipt of 
data Sends RELEASE command 
which closes transaction  
10 DSRC-VU  Closes transaction  
An example of the transaction sequence and contents of the 
exchanged frames is defined in clauses 5.4.7 and 5.4.8  
5.4.4  Data structures  
DSC_37 The semantic structure of  the Data  when passed across the 
5.8 GHz DSRC interface shall be consistent with what 
described in this Appendix. The way these data are structured 
is specified in this clause.  
DSC_38 The payload (RTM data) consists of the concatenation of  
1. EncryptedTachographPayload data, which is the encryption 
of the TachographPayload defined in ASN.1 in section 
5.4.5. The method of encryption is described in 
Appendix 11  
2. DSRCSecurityData, specified in Appendix 11.  
DSC_39 The RTM Data is being addressed as RTM Attribute=1 and is 
transferred in the RTM container = 10.  
DSC_40 The RTM Context Mark shall identify the supported standard 
part in the TARV series of standards (RTM corresponds to 
Part 9)  
The ASN.1 module definition for the DSRC data within the 
RTM application is defined as follows:  ▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 509
  
► (1) (2) (3) (4)  M1 ▼B
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5.4.5  Elements of RtmData, actions performed and definitions  
DSC_41 The data values to be calculated by the VU and used to 
update the secured data in the DSRC-VU shall be calculated 
according to the rules defined in Table 14.3:  
Table 14.3  
Elements of RtmData, actions performed and definitions  
(1) RTM Data 
Element  (2) Action performed by the VU  (3)  ASN.1 definition of data  
RTM1 
Vehicle 
Registration 
Plate  The VU shall set the value of the  tp15638Ve ­
hicleRegistrationPlate  data element RTM1 
from the recorded value of the data type  Vehi­
cleRegistrationIdentification  as defined in 
Appendix 1  VehicleRegistrationIdentification  Vehicle Regis ­
tration Plate 
expressed as a 
string of char ­
acters
  
RTM2 
Speeding 
Event  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM2 tp15638SpeedingEvent. 
The tp15638SpeedingEvent value shall be 
calculated by the VU from the number of 
Over Speeding Events recorded in the VU in 
the last 10 days of occurrence, as defined in 
Annex 1C.  1 (TRUE) — 
Indicates irregu ­
larities in speed 
within last 10 
days of occur ­
rence
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 511  
(1) RTM Data 
Element  (2) Action performed by the VU  (3)  ASN.1 definition of data  
If there is at least one tp15638SpeedingEvent 
in the last 10 days of occurrence, the 
tp15638SpeedingEvent value shall be set to 
TRUE. 
ELSE if there are no events in the last 10 days 
of occurrence, the tp15638SpeedingEvent shall 
be set to FALSE.  
RTM3 
Driving 
Without 
Valid Card  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM3 tp15638DrivingWithout ­
ValidCard. 
The VU shall assign a value of True to the 
tp15638DrivingWithoutValidCard variable if 
the VU data has recorded at least one event 
in the last 10 days of occurrence of type 
‘Driving without an appropriate card’ event 
as defined in Annex 1C. 
ELSE if there are no events in the last 10 days 
of occurrence, the tp15638DrivingWithout ­
ValidCard variable shall be set to FALSE.  1 (TRUE) = 
Indicates invalid 
card usage
  
RTM4 
Valid Driver 
Card  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM4 
tp15638DriverCard on the basis of the data 
stored in the VU and defined in Appendix 1. 
If no valid driver card is present the VU shall 
set the variable to TRUE 
ELSE if a valid driver card is present the VU 
shall set the variable to FALSE  0 (FALSE) = 
Indicates a valid 
driver card
  
RTM5 
Card 
Insertion 
while Driving  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM5. 
The VU shall assign a value of TRUE to the 
tp15638CardInsertion variable if the VU data 
has recorded in the last 10 days of occurrence 
at least one event of type ‘Card insertion while 
driving.’ as defined in Annex 1C. 
ELSE if there are no such events in the last 10 
days of occurrence, the tp15638CardInsertion 
variable shall be set to FALSE.  1 (TRUE) = 
Indicates card 
insertion while 
driving within 
last 10 days of 
occurrence
  
RTM6 
Motion Data 
Error  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM6. 
The VU shall assign a value of TRUE to the 
tp15638MotionDataError variable if the VU 
data has in the last 10 days of occurrence 
recorded at least one event of type ‘Motion 
data error’ as defined in Annex 1C. 
ELSE if there are no such events in the last 10 
days of occurrence, the tp15638MotionDa ­
taError variable shall be set to FALSE.  1 (TRUE) = 
Indicates motion 
data error within 
last 10 days of 
occurrence
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 512  
(1) RTM Data 
Element  (2) Action performed by the VU  (3)  ASN.1 definition of data  
RTM7 
Vehicle 
Motion 
Conflict  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM7. 
The VU shall assign a value of TRUE to the 
tp15638vehicleMotionConflict variable if the 
VU data has in the last 10 days recorded at 
least one event of type Vehicle Motion 
Conflict (value ‘0A’H ). 
ELSE if there are no events in the last 10 days 
of occurrence, the tp15638vehicleMotion ­
Conflict variable shall be set to FALSE.  1 (TRUE) = 
Indicates motion 
conflict within 
last 10 days of 
occurrence
  
RTM8 
2nd Driver 
Card  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM8 on the basis of Annex 1C 
(‘Driver Activity Data’ CREW and CO- 
DRIVER). 
If a 2nd valid driver card is present the VU 
shall set the variable to TRUE 
ELSE if a 2nd valid driver card is not present 
the VU shall set the variable to FALSE  1 (TRUE) = 
Indicates a 
second driver 
card inserted
  
RTM9 
Current 
Activity  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM9. 
If the current activity is recorded in the VU as 
any activity other than ‘DRIVING’ as defined 
in Annex 1C the VU shall set the variable to 
TRUE 
ELSE if the current activity is recorded in the 
VU as ‘DRIVING’ the VU shall set the 
variable to FALSE  1 (TRUE) = 
other activity 
selected; 
0 (FALSE) = 
driving selected
  
RTM10 
Last Session 
Closed  The VU shall generate a boolean value for data 
element RTM10. 
If the last card session was not properly closed 
as defined in Annex 1C the VU shall set the 
variable to TRUE. 
ELSE if the last card session was properly 
closed the VU shall set the variable to FALSE  1 (TRUE) = 
improperly 
closed 
0 (FALSE) = 
properly closed
  
RTM11 
Power Supply 
Interruption  The VU shall generate an integer value for data 
element RTM11. 
The VU shall assign a value for the 
tp15638PowerSupplyInterruption variable 
equal to the longest power supply interruption 
according to Article 9, Reg (EU) 165/2014 of 
type ‘Power supply interruption’ as defined in 
Annex 1C.  — Number of 
power 
supply inter ­
ruptions in 
last 10 days 
of occur­
rence
  ▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 513  
(1) RTM Data 
Element  (2) Action performed by the VU  (3)  ASN .1 definition of data  
ELSE if in the last 10 days of occurrence there 
are have been no Power supply interruption 
events the value of the integer shall be set to 0.  
▼M1 
RTM12 
Sensor Fault  The VU shall generate an integer value for data 
element RTM12. 
The VU shall assign to the variable sensorFault 
a value of: 
— 1 if an event of type ‘35H’ Sensor fault 
has been recorded in the last 10 days, 
— 2 if an event of type GNSS receiver fault 
(either internal or external with enum 
values ‘36’H or ‘37’ H) has been 
recorded in the last 10 days. 
— 3 if an event of type ‘0E’H Communi ­
cation error with the external GNSS 
facility event has been recorded in the 
last 10 days. 
— 4 If both Sensor Fault and GNSS receiver 
faults have been recorded in the last 10 
days 
— 5 If both Sensor Fault and Communication 
error with the external GNSS facility event 
have been recorded in the last 10 days 
— 6 If both GNSS receiver fault and 
Communication error with the external 
GNSS facility event have been recorded 
in the last 10 days 
— 7 If all three sensor faults, have been 
recorded in the last 10 days ELSE it 
shall assign a value of 0 if no events 
have been recorded in the last 10 days  – sensor fault one 
octet as per 
data dictionary
  
▼B 
RTM13 
Time 
Adjustment  The VU shall generate an integer value 
(timeReal from Appendix 1) for data element 
RTM13 on the basis of the presence of Time 
Adjustment data as defined in Annex 1C. 
The VU shall assign the value of time at which 
the last time adjustment data event has 
occurred. 
ELSE if no ‘Time Adjustment’ event. as 
defined in Annex 1C is present in the VU 
data it shall set a value of 0  Time of the last 
time adjustment
  
RTM14 
Security 
Breach 
Attempt  The VU shall generate an integer value 
(timeReal from Appendix 1) for data element 
RTM14 on the basis of the presence of a 
Security breach attempt event as defined in 
Annex 1C.  Time of last 
breach attempt 
— Default value 
=0x00FF
  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 514  
(1) RTM Data 
Element  (2) Action performed by the VU  (3)  ASN.1 definition of data  
The VU shall set the value of the time of the 
latest security breach attempt event recorded by 
the VU. 
ELSE if no ‘security breach attempt’ event as 
defined in Annex 1C is present in the VU data 
it shall set a value of 0x00FF.  
RTM15 
Last Cali ­
bration  The VU shall generate an integer value 
(timeReal from Appendix 1) for data element 
RTM15 on the basis of the presence of Last 
Calibration data as defined in Annex 1C. 
The VU shall set the value of time of the latest 
two calibrations (RTM15 and RTM16), which 
are set in VuCalibrationData defined in 
Appendix 1. 
The VU shall set the value for RTM15 to the 
timeReal of the latest calibration record.  Time of last cali ­
bration data
  
RTM16 
Previous 
Calibration  The VU shall generate an integer value 
(timeReal from Appendix 1) for data element 
RTM16 of the calibration record preceding that 
of the last calibration 
ELSE if there has been no previous calibration 
the VU shall set the value of RTM16 to 0.  Time of previous 
calibration data
  
RTM17 
Date 
Tachograph 
Connected  For data element RTM17 the VU shall 
generate an integer value (timeReal from 
Appendix 1). 
The VU shall set the value of the time of the 
initial installation of the VU. 
The VU shall extract this data from the 
VuCalibrationData (Appendix 1) from the 
vuCalibrationRecords with CalibrationPurpose 
equal to: ‘03’H  Date tachograph 
connected
  
RTM18 
Current 
Speed  The VU shall generate an integer value for data 
element RTM18. 
The VU shall set the value for RTM16 to the 
last current recorded speed at the time of the 
latest update of the RtmData.  Last current 
recorded speed
  
RTM19 
Timestamp  For data element RTM19 the VU shall 
generate an integer value (timeReal from 
Appendix 1). 
The VU shall set the value for RTM19 to the 
time of the latest update of the RtmData.  Timestamp of 
current 
Tachograph ­
Payload record
  
5.4.6  Data transfer mechanism  
DSC_42 Payload data defined previously are requested by the REDCR 
after initialisation phase, and consequently transmitted by the  
DSRC-VU  in the allocated window. The command GET is 
used by the REDCR to retrieve data.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 515  
DSC_43 For all DSRC exchanges, data shall be encoded using PER 
(Packed Encoding Rules) UNALIGNED, apart from
  
and
 , which shall 
be encoded using OER (Octet Encoding Rules) defined in 
ISO/IEC 8825-7, Rec. ITU-T X.696.  
▼B 
5.4.7  Detailed DSRC transaction description  
DSC_44 Initialisation is performed according to DSC_44 — DSC_48 
and Tables 14.4 — 14.9. In the initialisation phase, the 
REDCR starts sending a frame containing a BST (Beacon 
Service Table) according to EN 12834 and EN 13372, 6.2, 
6.3, 6.4 and 7.1 with settings as specified in the following 
Table 14.4.  
Table 14.4  
Initialisation — BST frame settings  
Field  Settings  
Link Identifier  Broadcast address  
BeaconId  As per EN 12834  
Time  As per EN 12834  
Profile  No extension, 0 or 1 to be used  
MandApplications  No extension, EID not present, 
Parameter not present, AID= 2 
Freight&Fleet  
NonMandApplications  Not present  
ProfileList  No extension, number of profiles in 
list = 0  
Fragmentation header  No fragmentation  
Layer 2 settings  Command PDU, UI command  
A practical example of the settings specified in Table 14.4, 
with an indication of bit encodings, is given in the following 
Table 14.5.  
Table 14.5  
Initialisation — BST frame contents example
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Broadcast ID
  Broadcast address  
3 MAC Control Field
  Command PDU  
4 LLC Control field
  UI command  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 516
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
5 Fragmentation header
  No fragmentation  
6 BST
  Initialisation request  
SEQUENCE {  
OPTION indicator 
BeaconID SEQUENCE { 
ManufacturerId INTEGER 
(0..65535)
  NonMand applications not 
present
  
Manufacturer Identifier  
7
 
8
 
IndividualID INTEGER (0..134217727) 
}
 27 bit ID available for 
manufacturer  
9
 
10
 
11
 
12 Time INTEGER (0..4294967295)
  32 bit UNIX real time  
13
 
14
 
15
 
16 Profile INTEGER (0..127,...)
  No extension. Example 
profile 0  
17 MandApplications SEQUENCE 
(SIZE(0..127,...)) 
OF {
  No extension, Number of 
mandApplications = 1  
18 SEQUENCE {  
OPTION indicator
  EID not present  
OPTION indicator
  Parameter not present  
AID DSRCApplicationEntityID } }
  No extension. AID= 2 
Freight&Fleet  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 517
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
19 ProfileList SEQUENCE (0..127,...) OF 
Profile }
  No extension, number of 
profiles in list = 0  
20 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
21
 
22 Flag
  End Flag  
DSC_45 A  DSRC-VU , when receiving a BST, requires the allocation 
of a private window, as specified by EN 12795 and EN 
13372, 7.1.1, with no specific RTM settings. Table 14.6 
provides an example of bit encoding.  
Table 14.6  
Initialisation — Private window allocation request frame contents
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Private LID
  Link address of specific 
DSRC-VU  
3
 
4
 
5
 
6 MAC Control field
  Private window request  
7 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
8
 
9 Flag
  End Flag  
DSC_46 The REDCR then answers by allocating a private window, as 
specified by EN 12795 and EN 13372, 7.1.1 with no specific 
RTM settings.  
Table 14.7 provides an example of bit encoding.  
Table 14.7  
Initialisation — Private window allocation frame contents
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Private LID
  Link address of the 
specific DSRC-VU  
3
 ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 518
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
4
 
5
 
6 MAC Control field
  Private window allocation  
7 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
8
 
9 Flag
  End Flag  
DSC_47 The  DSRC-VU , when receiving the private window allocation, 
sends its VST (Vehicle Service Table) as defined in EN 
12834 and EN 13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 7.1 with settings as 
specified Table 14.8, using the allocated transmission 
window.  
Table 14.8  
Initialisation — VST frame settings  
Field  Settings  
Private LID  As per EN 12834  
VST parameters  Fill=0, then for each supported appli ­
cation: EID present, parameter 
present, AID=2, EID as generated by 
the OBU  
Parameter  No extension, Contains the RTM 
Context Mark  
ObeConfiguration  The optional ObeStatus field may be 
present, but shall not be used by the 
REDCR  
Fragmentation header  No fragmentation  
Layer 2 settings  Command PDU, UI command  
DSC_48 The  DSRC-VU  shall support the ‘Freight and Fleet’ appli ­
cation, identified by the Application Identifier ‘2’. Other 
Application Identifiers may be supported, but shall not be 
present in this VST, as the BST only requires AID=2. The 
‘Applications’ field contains a list of the supported application 
instances in the  DSRC-VU . For each supported application 
instantiation, a reference to the appropriate standard is 
given, made of an Rtm Context mark, which is composed 
of an OBJECT IDENTIFIER representing the related 
standard, its part (9 for RTM) and possibly its version, plus 
an EID that is generated by the DSRC-VU, and associated to 
that application instance.  
A practical example of the settings specified in Table 14.8, 
with an indication of bit encodings, is given in Table 14.9.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 519  
Table 14.9  
Initialisation — VST frame contents example
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Private LID
  Link address of the 
specific DSRC-VU  
3
 
4
 
5
 
6 MAC Control field
  Command PDU  
7 LLC Control field
  UI command  
8 Fragmentation header
  No fragmentation  
9 VST 
SEQUENCE {
  Initialisation response  
Fill BIT STRING (SIZE(4))
  Unused and set to 0  
10 Profile INTEGER (0..127,...) 
Applications SEQUENCE OF {
  No extension. Example 
profile 0  
11
 No extension, 1 appli ­
cation  
12 SEQUENCE {  
OPTION indicator
  EID present  
OPTION indicator
  Parameter present  
AID DSRCApplicationEntityID
  No extension. AID= 2 
Freight&Fleet  
13 EID Dsrc-EID
  Defined within the OBU 
and identifying the appli ­
cation instance.  
14 Parameter Container {
  No extension, Container 
Choice = 02, Octet string  
15
 No extension, Rtm Context 
Mark length = 8  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 520
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
16 Rtm-ContextMark::= SEQUENCE 
{ 
StandardIdentifier 
standardIdentifier
  ►M1 Object Identifier of 
the supported standard, 
part, and version. 
Example: ISO (1) 
Standard (0) TARV 
(15638) part9 (9) 
Version1 (1). 
First octet is 06H, which 
is the Object Identifier. 
Second octet is 06H, 
which is its length. 
Subsequent 6 octets 
encode the example 
Object Identifier. ◄ 17
 
18
 
19
 
20
 
21
 
22
 
23
 
24 ObeConfiguration Sequence {  
OPTION indicator
  ObeStatus not present  
EquipmentClass INTEGER (0..32767)
  
25
 
26 ManufacturerId INTEGER (0..65535)
  Manufacturer identifier 
for the DSRC-VU as 
described in ISO 14816 
Register  27
 
28 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
29
 
30 Flag
  End Flag  
DCS_49 The REDCR then reads the data by issuing a GET command, 
conforming to the GET command defined in EN 13372, 6.2, 
6.3, 6.4 and EN 12834, with settings as specified in Table 
14.10.  
Table 14.10  
Presentation — GET request frame settings  
Field  Settings  
Invoker Identifier (IID)  Not present  
Link Identifier (LID)  Link address of the specific DSRC-VU  
Chaining  No  
Element Identifier (EID)  As specified in the VST. No extension  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 521  
Field  Settings  
Access Credentials  No  
AttributeIdList  No extension, 1 attribute, AttributeID = 1 
(RtmData)  
Fragmentation  No  
Layer2 settings  Command PDU, Polled ACn command  
Table 14.11 shows an example of reading the RTM data.  
Table 14.11  
Presentation — Get Request frame example
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Private LID
  Link address of the 
specific DSRC-VU  
3
 
4
 
5
 
6 MAC Control field
  Command PDU  
7 LLC Control field
  Polled ACn command, n 
bit 
8 Fragmentation header
  No fragmentation  
9 Get.request 
SEQUENCE {
  Get request  
OPTION indicator
  Access Credentials not 
present  
OPTION indicator
  IID not present  
OPTION indicator
  AttributeIdList present  
Fill BIT STRING(SIZE(1))
  Set to 0.  
10 EID INTEGER(0..127,…)
  The EID of the RTM 
application instance, as 
specified in the VST. No 
extension  
11 AttributeIdList SEQUENCE OF { 
AttributeId }}
  No extension, number of 
attributes = 1  
12
 AttributeId=1, RtmData. 
No extension  
13 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
14
 
15 Flag
  End Flag  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 522  
DSC_50 The  DSRC-VU , when receiving the GET request, sends a 
GET response with the requested data conforming to the 
GET response defined in EN 13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and EN 
12834, with settings as specified in Table 14.12.  
Table 14.12  
Presentation — GET response frame settings  
Field  Settings  
Invoker Identifier (IID)  Not present  
Link Identifier (LID)  As per EN 12834  
Chaining  No  
Element Identifier (EID)  As specified in the VST.  
Access Credentials  No  
Fragmentation  No  
Layer2 settings  Response PDU, Response 
available and command 
accepted, ACn command  
Table 14.13 shows an example of reading the RTM data.  
Table 14.13  
Presentation — Response frame contents example
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Private LID
  Link address of the 
specific DSRC-VU  
3
 
4
 
5
 
6 MAC Control field
  Response PDU  
7 LLC Control field
  Response available, ACn 
command n bit  
8 LLC Status field
  Response available and 
command accepted  
9 Fragmentation header
  No fragmentation  
10 Get.response 
SEQUENCE {
  Get response  ▼B
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 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
OPTION indicator
  IID not present  
OPTION indicator
  Attribute List present  
OPTION indicator
  Return status not present  
Fill BIT STRING(SIZE(1))
  Not used  
11 EID INTEGER(0..127,…)
  Responding from the 
RTM application 
Instance. No extension,  
12 AttributeList SEQUENCE OF {
  No extension, number of 
attributes = 1  
13 Attributes SEQUENCE { 
AttributeId
  No extension, Attribu ­
teId=1 (RtmData)  
14 AttributeValue CONTAINER {
  No extension, Container 
Choice = 10  10 . 
15
 RtmData  
16
 
17
 
… …  
n }}}}
  
n+1 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
n+2
 
n+3 Flag
  End Flag  
DSC_51 The REDCR then closes the connection by issuing a 
EVENT_REPORT, RELEASE command conforming to EN 
13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and EN 12834,7.3.8, with no specific 
RTM settings. Table 14.14 shows a bit encoding example 
of the RELEASE command.  
Table 14.14  
Termination. EVENT_REPORT Release frame contents
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Private LID
  Link address of the 
specific DSRC-VU  
3
 
4
 ▼B
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 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
5
 
6 MAC Control field
  The frame contains a 
command LPDU  
7 LLC Control field
  UI command  
8 Fragmentation header
  No fragmentation  
9 EVENT_REPORT.request 
SEQUENCE {
  EVENT_REPORT 
(Release)  
OPTION indicator
  Access Credentials not 
present  
OPTION indicator
  Event parameter not 
present  
OPTION indicator
  IID not present  
Mode BOOLEAN
  No response expected  
10 EID INTEGER (0..127,…)
  No extension, EID = 0 
(System)  
11 EventType INTEGER (0..127,…) }
  Event type 0 = Release  
12 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
13
 
14 Flag
  End Flag  
DSC_52 The  DSRC-VU  is not expected to answer to the Release 
command. The communication is then closed.  
5.4.8  DSRC Test transaction description  
DSC_53 Full tests that include securing the data, need to be carried out 
as defined in Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms, by 
authorised persons with access to security procedures, using 
the normal GET command as defined above.  
DSC_54 Commissioning and periodic inspection tests that require 
decrypting and comprehension of the decrypted data content 
shall be undertaken as specified in Appendix 11 Common 
Security Mechanisms and Appendix 9, Type Approval List 
of Minimum required tests.  
However, the basic DSRC communication can be tested by 
the command ECHO. Such tests may be required on commis ­
sioning, at periodic inspection, or otherwise to the 
requirement of the competent control authority or Regulation 
(EU) No 165/2014 (See 6 below)  ▼B
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DSC_55 In order to effect this basic communication test, the ECHO 
command is issued by the REDCR during a session, i.e., after 
an initialisation phase has been completed successfully. The 
sequence of interactions is thus similar to that of an inter ­
rogation:  
— Step 1  The REDCR  sends a ‘beacon service table’ (BST) 
that includes the application identifiers (AIDs) in the 
service list that it supports. In the RTM applications 
this will simply be the service with the AID value = 2.  
The DSRC-VU  evaluates the received BST, and where it 
identifies that the BST is requesting Freight&Fleet (AID 
= 2), the  DSRC-VU  shall respond. If  the REDCR  does not 
offer AID=2, the  DSRC-VU  shall shut down its trans ­
action with  the REDCR . 
— Step 2  The DSRC-VU  sends a request for a private 
window allocation.  
— Step 3 The REDCR sends a private window allocation.  
— Step 4 The  DSRC-VU  uses the allocated private window 
to send its vehicle service table (VST). This VST includes 
a list of all the different application instantiations that this  
DSRC-VU  supports in the framework of AID=2. The 
different instantiations shall be identified by means of 
uniquely EIDs, each associated with a parameter value 
indicating the instance of the application that is 
supported.  
— Step 5 Next  the REDCR  analyses the offered VST, and 
either terminates the connection (RELEASE) since it is 
not interested in anything the VST has to offer (i.e., it is 
receiving a VST from a  DSRC-VU  that is not an RTM 
VU, or, if it receives an appropriate VST it starts an app 
instantiation.  
— Step 6 The  REDCR  shall issue a command (ECHO) to 
the specific  DSRC-VU , and allocates a private window.  
— Step 7 The  DSRC-VU  uses the newly allocated private 
window to send an ECHO response frame.  
The following tables give a practical example of an ECHO exchange 
session.  
DSC_56 Initialisation is performed according to 5.4.7 (DSC_44 — 
DSC_48) and Tables 14.4 — 14.9  
DSC_57 The REDCR then issues an ACTION, ECHO command 
conforming to ISO 14906, containing 100 octets of data 
and with no specific settings for RTM. Table 14.15 shows 
the contents of the frame sent by the REDCR.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 526  
Table 14.15  
ACTION, ECHO request frame example
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Private LID
  Link address of the 
specific DSRC-VU  
3
 
4
 
5
 
6 MAC Control field
  Command PDU  
7 LLC Control field
  Polled ACn command, n 
bit 
8 Fragmentation header
  No fragmentation  
9 ACTION.request 
SEQUENCE {
  Action request (ECHO)  
OPTION indicator
  Access Credentials not 
present  
OPTION indicator
  Action parameter present  
OPTION indicator
  IID not present  
Mode BOOLEAN
  Response expected  
10 EID INTEGER (0..127,…)
  No extension, EID = 0 
(System)  
11 ActionType INTEGER (0..127,…)
  No extension, Action type 
ECHO request  
12 ActionParameter CONTAINER {
  No extension, Container 
Choice = 2  
13
 No extension. String 
length = 100 octets  
14
 Data to be echoed  
… …  
113 }}
  
114 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
115
 
116 Flag
  End Flag  ▼B
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DSC_58 The  DSRC-VU , when receiving the ECHO request, sends an 
ECHO response of 100 octets of data by reflecting the 
received command, according to ISO 14906, with no 
specific settings for RTM. Table 14.16 shows a bit level 
encoding example.  
Table 14.16  
ACTION, ECHO response frame example
 Octet # 
Attribute/Field  Bits in octet  Description  
1 FLAG
  Start flag  
2 Private LID
  Link address of the 
specific VU  
3
 
4
 
5
 
6 MAC Control field
  Response PDU  
7 LLC Control field
  ACn command n bit  
8 LLC status field
  Response available  
9 Fragmentation header
  No fragmentation  
10 ACTION.response 
SEQUENCE {
  ACTION response 
(ECHO)  
OPTION indicator
  IID not present  
OPTION indicator
  Response parameter 
present  
OPTION indicator
  Return status not present  
Fill BIT STRING (SIZE (1))
  Not used  
11 EID INTEGER (0..127,…)
  No extension, EID = 0 
(System)  
12 ResponseParameter CONTAINER {
  No extension, Container 
Choice = 2  
13
 No extension. String 
length = 100 octets  
14
 Echoed data  
… …  
113 }}
  
114 FCS
  Frame check sequence  
115
 
116 Flag
  End Flag  ▼B
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5.5 Support for Directive (EU) 2015/719  
5.5.1  Overview  
DSC_59 To support the Directive (EU) 2015/719 on the maximal 
weights and dimensions for heavy goods vehicles, the trans ­
action protocol to download OWS data across the 5,8 GHz 
DSRC interface link will be the same as that used for the 
RTM data (see 5.4.1), the only difference being that the 
Object Identifier that relates to the TARV standard will be 
addressing the ISO 15638 standard (TARV) Part 20 related to 
WOB/OWS.  
▼B 
5.5.2  Commands  
DSC_60 The commands used for an OWS transaction will be the same 
as those used for an RTM transaction.  
5.5.3  Interrogation command sequence  
DSC_61 The interrogation command sequence for OWS data will be 
the same as for RTM data.  
5.5.4  Data structures  
DSC_62 The payload (OWS data) consists of the concatenation of  
1. EncryptedOwsPayload data, which is the encryption of the 
OwsPayload defined in ASN.1 in section 5.5.5. The 
method of encryption shall be the same adopted for the 
RtmData, which is specified in Appendix 11  
2. DSRCSecurityData, calculated with the same algorithms 
adopted for the RtmData, which is specified in 
Appendix 11.  ▼M1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 529  
5.5.5  ASN.1 module for the OWS DSRC transaction  
DSC_63. The ASN.1 module definition for the DSRC data within the 
RTM application is defined as follows:
  ▼B
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5.5.6  Elements of OwsData, actions performed and definitions  
The elements of OwsData are defined to support Directive 2015/719/EC 
on the maximal weights and dimensions for heavy goods vehicles. Their 
meaning is:  
— recordedWeight represents the total measured weight of the heavy 
goods vehicle with a resolution of 10 Kg as defined in EN ISO 
14906. For example, a value of 2500, represent a weight of 25 tons.  
— axlesConfiguration represents the configuration of the heavy goods 
vehicle as number of axles. The configuration is defined with the bit 
mask of 20 bits (extended from EN ISO 14906).  
A bit mask of 2 bits represents the configuration of an axle with the 
following format:  
— Value 00B means that value is ‘non available’ because the 
vehicle does not have equipment to collect the weight on the 
axle.  
— Value 01B means that the axle is not present.  
— Value 10B means that the axle is present and the weight has 
been calculated and collected and it is provided in the axlesRe ­
cordedWeight field.  
— Value 11B is reserved for future uses.  
The last 4 bits are reserved for future uses.  
Number of Axles  
Number of axles on tractor unit  Number of axles on trailer  
00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  00/01/ 
10/11  RFU 
(4 bits)  
— axlesRecordedWeight represent the specific weight recorded for each 
axle with a resolution of 10 Kg. Two octets are used for each axle. 
For example, a value of 150, represent a weight of 1 500 Kgs.  
The other data types are defined in 5.4.5.  
5.5.7  Data transfer mechanisms  
DSC_64 The Data transfer mechanism for OWS data between the 
Interrogator and the DSRC facility in the vehicle shall be 
the same as for RTM data (see 5.4.6).  
DSC_65 The Data transfer between the platform collecting the 
maximal weights data and the DSRC facility in the vehicle 
shall be based on the physical connection and interfaces and 
protocol defined in section 5.6.  
5.6 Data transfer between the DSRC-VU and VU  
5.6.1  Physical Connection and interfaces  
DSC_66 The connection between the  VU and the  DSRC-VU  can be 
either by physical cable or short range wireless communi ­
cation based on Bluetooth v4.0 BLE.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 531  
DSC_67 Regardless of the choice of the physical connection and 
interface, the following requirements shall be satisfied:  
DSC_68  ►M1 a) In order that different suppliers may be contracted 
to supply the VU and the DSRC-VU, and indeed 
different batches of DSRC-VU, the connection 
between the VU and the DSRC-VU not internal 
to the VU shall be an open standard connection. 
The VU shall connect with the DSRC-VU 
either ◄ 
i) using fixed cable of at least 2 meters, using a 
Straight DIN 41612 H11 Connector — 11 pin 
approved male connector from the DSRC-VU 
to match a similar DIN/ISO approved female 
connector from the VU device,  
ii) using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)  
iii) using a standard ISO 11898 or SAE J1939 
connection  
DSC_69 b) the definition of the interfaces and connection between the 
VU and DSRC-VU must support the application protocol 
commands defined in 5.6.2. and  
DSC_70 c) the VU and DSRC-VU must support the operation of the 
data transfer via the connection in regard to performance 
and power supply.  
5.6.2  Application Protocol  
DSC_71 The application protocol between the VU Remote Communi ­
cation facility and DSRC-VU is responsible for periodically 
transferring the remote communication data from the VU to 
the DSRC.  
DSC_72 The following main commands are identified:  
1. Initialisation of the communication link — Request  
2. Initialisation of the communication link — Response  
3. Send Data with Identifier of the RTM application and 
Payload defined by RTM Data  
4. Acknowledgment of the data  
5. Termination of the communication link — Request  
6. Termination of the communication link — Response  
DSC_73 In ASN1.0, the previous commands may be defined as:  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 532
  
DSC_74 The description of the commands and parameters is 
following:  
—
 
is used to initialize the communication link. The 
command is sent by the VU to the DSRC-VU. The LinkI ­
dentifier is set by the VU and communicated to the 
DSRC-VU to track a specific communication link.  
(Note:  this is to support future links and other application/ 
modules like Weighing on board).  
—
 
is used by the DSRC-VU to provide the response of the 
request to initialize the communication link. The 
command is sent by the DSRC-VU to the VU. The 
command provides the result of the initialisation as 
answer = 1 (Success) or =0 (Failure).  
DSC_75 The initialization of the communication link shall be done 
only after installation, calibration, and start of the 
engine/VU is switched on.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 533  
—
 is used to by the VU to send the 
signed RCDTData (i.e.,  the remote communication 
Data ) to the DSRC-VU. The data will be sent every 60 
seconds. The DataTransactionId parameter identifies the 
specific transmission of data. The LinkIdentifier is also 
used to ensure that the appropriate link is correct.  
—
 is sent by the DSRC- 
VU to provide the feedback to the VU on the reception of 
the data from a
  command identified 
by the DataTransactionId parameter. The Answer 
parameter is 1 (Success) or =0 (Failure). If a VU 
receives more than three answers equal to 0 or if the 
VU does not receive a RCDT Data Acknowledgment 
for a specific previously sent RCDT- Send Data with a 
specific DataTransactionId, the VU will generate and 
record an event.  
—
 
is sent by the VU to DSRC-VU to terminate a link for a 
specific LinkIdentifier.  
DSC_76 At the restart of the DSRC-VU or a VU, all the existing 
Communication Links should be removed as there could be 
‘dangling’ Links due to the sudden shutdown of a VU.  
—
 
is sent by the DSRC-VU to the VU to confirm the request 
of termination of the link by the VU for the specific 
LinkIdentifier.  
5.7 Error handling  
5.7.1  Recording and communication of the Data in the DSRC-VU  
▼M1 
DSC_77  The Data  shall be provided, already secured , by the  VUSM  
function to the  DSRC-VU . The  VUSM  shall verify that data 
recorded in the  DSRC-VU  has been recorded correctly. The 
recording and reporting of any errors in the transfer of data 
from the  VU  to the memory of the  DSRC-VU  shall be 
recorded with type EventFaultType and enum value set to 
‘0C’H Communication error with the remote communication 
facility event together with the timestamp.  
▼B 
DSC_78 The  VU shall maintain a file identified by a unique name that 
is easily identifiable by inspectors for the purpose of 
recording ‘VU internal communication failures’.  
DSC_79 If the VUPM attempts to obtain VU data from the security 
module (to pass to the VU-DSRC), but fails to do so, it shall 
record that failure with type EventFaultType and enum value  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 534  
set to  ‘62’H Remote Communication Facility ' com- 
munication fault together with the timestamp. The failure 
of the communication is detected when a
  
message is not received 
for the related (i.e., with the same DataTransactionId
  
messages)
  
for more than three consecutive times.  
5.7.2  Wireless Communication errors  
DSC_80 Communication error handling shall be consistent with the 
related DSRC standards, namely EN 300 674-1, EN 12253, 
EN 12795, EN 12834 and the appropriate parameters of EN 
13372.  
5.7.2.1  Encryption and signature errors  
DSC_81 Encryption and signature errors shall be handled as defined in 
Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms and are not 
present in any error messages associated with the DSRC 
transfer of data.  
5.7.2.2  Recording of errors  
The DSRC medium is a dynamic wireless communication in an envi ­
ronment of uncertain atmospheric and interference conditions, particu ­
larly in the ‘portable REDCR’ and ‘moving vehicle’ combinations 
involved in this application. It is therefore necessary to ascertain the 
difference between a ‘read failure’ and an ‘error’ condition. In a trans ­
action across a wireless interface, read failure is common and the 
consequence is usually to retry, i.e. rebroadcast the BST and reattempt 
the sequence, which will in most circumstances lead to a successful 
communication connection and transfer of data, unless the target 
vehicle moves out of range during the time required to retransmit. (A 
‘successful’ instance of a ‘read’ may have involved several attempts and 
retries).  
Read failure may be because the antennas were not paired properly 
(failure of ‘aiming’); because one of the antennas is shielded — this 
may be deliberate, but also can be caused by the physical presence of 
another vehicle; radio interference, especially from circa 5.8 GHz WIFI 
or other public access wireless communications, or may be caused by 
radar interference, or difficult atmospheric conditions (e.g. during a 
thunderstorm); or simply by moving out of the range of the DSRC 
communication. Individual instances of read failures, by their nature, 
cannot be recorded, simply because the communication simply did not 
occur.  
However, if the agent of the competent control authority targets a 
vehicle and attempts to interrogate its  DSRC-VU , but no successful 
transfer of data ensues, this failure could have occurred because of 
deliberate tampering, and therefore the agent of the competent control 
authority needs a means to log the failure, and alert colleagues down ­
stream that there may be a violation. The colleagues can then stop the 
vehicle and carry out a physical inspection. However, as no successful 
communication has taken place, the DSRC-VU cannot provide data 
concerning the failure. Such reporting shall therefore be a function of 
REDCR equipment design.  
‘Failure to read’ is technically different to an ‘error’. In this context an 
‘error’ is the acquisition of a wrong value.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 535  
Data transferred to the  DSRC-VU  is supplied already secured, therefore 
must be verified by the supplier of the data (see 5.4).  
Data subsequently transferred across the air interface is checked by 
cyclic redundancy checks at the communications level. If the CRC 
validates, then the data is correct. If the CRC does not validate, the 
data is retransmitted. The probability that data could successfully pass 
through a CRC incorrectly is statistically so highly improbable that it 
may be discounted.  
If the CRC does not validate and there is no time to retransmit and 
receive the correct data, then the result will not be an error, but an 
instantiation of a specific type of read failure.  
The only meaningful ‘failure’ data that can be recorded is that of the 
number of successful initiations of transactions that occur, that do not 
result in a successful transfer of data to the REDCR.  
DSC_82 The  REDCR  shall therefore record, time-stamped, the number 
of occasions where the ‘initialisation’ phase of a DSRC inter ­
rogation is successful, but the transaction terminated before  
the Data  was successfully retrieved by the REDCR. This data 
shall be available to agent of the competent control authority 
and shall be stored in the memory of the REDCR equipment. 
The means by which this is achieved shall be a matter of 
product design or the specification of a competent control 
authority.  
The only meaningful ‘error’ data that can be recorded is the 
number of occasions where the REDCR fails to decrypt  the 
Data  received. However, it should be noted that this will only 
relate to the efficiency of the REDCR software. Data may be 
technically decrypted, but make no semantic sense.  
DSC_83 The  REDCR  shall therefore record, time-stamped, the number 
of occasions where it has attempted but failed to decipher data 
received across the DSRC interface.  
6. COMMISSIONING AND PERIODIC INSPECTION TESTS FOR THE 
REMOTE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION  
6.1 General  
DSC_84 Two type of tests are foreseen for the remote communication 
function:  
1) An ECHO test to validate the  DSRC-REDCR  >>-:-< DSRC- 
VU wireless  communication channel.  
2) A End-to-end security test to ensure that a workshop card 
is able to access the encrypted and signed data content 
created by the VU and transmitted over the wireless 
communication channel.  
6.2 ECHO  
This clause contains provisions specifically made to test only that the  
DSRC-REDCR  >>-:-< DSRC-VU  is functionally active.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 536  
The objective of the ECHO command is to enable workshops or type 
approval test facilities to test that the DSRC link is working without 
needing access to security credentials. The tester's equipment therefore 
only needs to be able to initialise a DSRC communication (sending a 
BST with AID=2) and then send the ECHO command, and, assuming 
the DSRC is working, will receive the ECHO response. See 5.4.8 for 
details. Assuming it receives this response correctly, the DSRC link 
(DSRC-REDCR  >>-:-< DSRC-VU ) may be validated as functioning 
correctly.  
6.3 Tests to validate the secure data content  
DSC_85 This test is execute to validate the end-to-end security flow of 
data. A DSRC test reader is needed for such test. The DSRC 
test reader performs the same functionality and it is im ­
plemented with the same specifications of the reader used 
by the law enforcers, with the difference that a workshop 
card shall be used to authenticate the user of the DSRC test 
reader rather than a control card. The test can be executed 
after the initial activation of a Smart Tachograph or at the end 
of the calibration procedure. After the activation, the vehicle 
unit shall generate and communicate to the DSRC-VU the 
secured early detection data.  
DSC_86 The workshop personnel must position the DSRC test reader 
at a distance between 2 and 10 metres in front of the vehicle.  
DSC_87 Then the workshop personnel will insert a workshop card in 
the DSRC test reader to request the interrogation of the early 
detection data to the vehicle unit. After a successful inter ­
rogation, the workshop personnel will access the received 
data to ensure that it has been successfully validated for 
integrity and decrypted.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 537  
Appendix 15  
MIGRATION: MANAGING THE CO-EXISTENCE OF EQUIPMENT 
GENERATIONS  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
1. DEFINITIONS  
2. GENERAL PROVISIONS  
2.1. Overview of the transition  
2.2. Interoperability between vu and cards  
2.3. Interoperability between VU and MS  
2.4. Interoperability between vehicle units, tachograph cards and equipment 
for data download  
2.4.1 Direct card download by IDE  
2.4.2 Card download through a vehicle unit  
2.4.3 Vehicle unit download  
2.5. Interoperability between VU and calibration equipment  
3. MAIN STEPS DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE THE INTRO ­
DUCTION DATE  
4. PROVISIONS FOR THE PERIOD AFTER THE INTRODUCTION 
DATE  
1. DEFINITIONS  
For the purposes of this Appendix, the following definitions are used.  
smart tachograph system  as defined by this Annex (chapter 1: defi ­
nition bbb);  
first generation tachograph system  as defined by this Regulation 
(article 2: definition 1);  
second generation tachograph system  as defined by this Regulation 
(article 2: definition 7);  
introduction date  as defined by this Annex (chapter 1: definition ccc);  
Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE)  equipment used to perform 
data downloading, as defined in Appendix 7 of this Annex.  
2. GENERAL PROVISIONS  
2.1. Overview of the transition  
The preamble of this Annex provides an overview of the transition 
between the first and the second generation tachograph systems.  
In addition to the provisions of this preamble:  
— first generation motion sensors will not be interoperable with second 
generation vehicle units.  
— second generation motion sensors will start to be installed in vehicles 
at the same time as second generation vehicle units.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 538  
— data download and calibration equipment will need to evolve, in 
order to support use of both generation of recording equipment 
and tachograph cards.  
2.2. Interoperability between VU and cards  
▼M1 
It is understood that first generation tachograph cards are interoperable 
with first generation vehicle units in compliance with Annex IB to 
Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85, while second generation tachograph 
cards are interoperable with second generation vehicle units in 
compliance with Annex IC to this Regulation. In addition, the 
requirements below shall apply.  
▼B 
MIG_001 Except as provided for in requirement MIG_004 and 
MIG_005, first generation tachograph cards may continue 
to be used in second generation vehicle units until their 
end of validity date. Their holders may however ask for 
their replacement by second generation tachograph cards as 
soon as they are available.  
MIG_002 Second generation vehicle units shall be able to use any valid 
first generation driver, control and company card inserted.  
MIG_003 This capability may be suppressed once and forever in such 
vehicle units by workshops, so that first generation 
tachograph cards cannot be accepted anymore. This may 
only be done after the European Commission has launched 
a procedure aiming to request workshops to do so, for 
example during each periodic inspection of tachograph.  
MIG_004 Second generation vehicle units shall only be able to use 
second generation workshop cards.  
MIG_005 For determining the mode of operation, second generation 
vehicle units shall only consider the types of the valid 
cards inserted, regardless of their generations.  
MIG_006 Any valid second generation tachograph card shall be able to 
be used in first generation vehicle units exactly the same 
manner as a first generation tachograph card of the same 
type.  
2.3. Interoperability between VU and MS  
It is understood that first generation motion sensors are interoperable 
with first generation vehicle units, while second generation motion 
sensors are interoperable with second generation vehicle units. In 
addition, the requirements below shall apply.  
MIG_007 Second generation vehicle units will not be able to be paired 
and used with first generation motion sensors.  
MIG_008 Second generation motion sensors may be paired and used 
with second generation vehicle units only, or with both 
generations of vehicle units.  
2.4. Interoperability between vehicle units, tachograph cards and 
equipment for data download  
MIG_009 Equipment for data download may be used with one 
generation only of vehicle units and tachograph cards, or 
with both.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 539  
2.4.1  Direct card download by IDE  
MIG_010 Data shall be downloaded by IDE from tachograph cards of 
one generation inserted in their card readers, using the 
security mechanisms and the data download protocol of 
this generation, and downloaded data shall have the format 
defined for this generation.  
MIG_011 To allow drivers' control by non EU control authorities, it 
shall also be possible to download second generation driver 
(and workshop) cards exactly the same manner as 1st 
generation drivers (and workshop) cards. Such download 
shall include:  
▼M1 
— non signed EFs IC and ICC (optional),  
▼B 
— non signed EFs (1st generation)
  
and
 ,  
▼M1 
— the other application data EFs (within DF Tachograph) 
requested by the first generation card download protocol. 
This information shall be secured with a digital signature, 
according to the first generation security mechanisms.  
Such download shall not include application data EFs only 
present in second generation driver (and workshop) cards 
(application data EFs within DF Tachograph_G2).  
▼B 
2.4.2  Card download through a vehicle unit  
MIG_012 Data shall be downloaded from a second generation card 
inserted in a first generation vehicle unit using the first 
generation data download protocol. The card shall answer 
to the vehicle unit commands exactly the same manner as 
a first generation card and downloaded data shall have the 
same format as data downloaded from a first generation card.  
MIG_013 Data shall be downloaded from a first generation card 
inserted in a second generation vehicle unit using the data 
download protocol defined in Appendix 7 of this Annex. The 
vehicle unit shall send commands to the card exactly the 
same manner as a first generation vehicle unit, and down ­
loaded data shall respect the format defined for first 
generation cards.  
2.4.3  Vehicle unit download  
▼M1 
MIG_014 Outside the frame of drivers' control by non EU control 
authorities, data shall be downloaded from second generation 
vehicle units using the second generation security mech ­
anisms, and the data download protocol specified in 
Appendix 7 of this Annex.  
MIG_015 To allow drivers' control by non EU control authorities, it 
may optionally also be possible to download data from 
second generation vehicle units using the first generation 
security mechanisms. Downloaded data shall then have the 
same format as data downloaded from a first generation 
vehicle unit. This capability may be selected through 
commands in the menu.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 540  
2.5. Interoperability between VU and calibration equipment  
MIG_016 Calibration equipment shall be able to perform calibration of 
each generation of tachograph, using the calibration protocol 
of this generation. Calibration equipment may be used with 
one generation only of tachograph, or with both.  
3. MAIN STEPS DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE THE INTRO ­
DUCTION DATE  
MIG_017 Test keys and certificates shall be available to manufacturers 
at the latest  30 months  before the introduction date.  
MIG_018 Interoperability tests shall be ready to start if requested by 
manufacturers at the latest  15 months  before the introduction 
date.  
MIG_019 Official keys and certificates shall be available to manufac ­
turers at the latest  12 months  before the introduction date.  
MIG_020 Member states shall be able to issue second generation 
workshop cards at the latest  3 months  before the intro ­
duction date.  
MIG_021 Member States shall be able to issue all types of second 
generation tachograph cards at the latest  1 month before 
the introduction date . 
4. PROVISIONS FOR THE PERIOD AFTER THE INTRODUCTION 
DATE  
MIG_022 After the introduction date, Member States shall only issue 
second generation tachograph cards.  
MIG_023 Vehicle units/motion sensors manufacturers shall be allowed 
to produce first generation vehicle units/motion sensors as 
long as they are used in the field, so that malfunctioning 
components can be replaced.  
MIG_024 Vehicle units/motion sensors manufacturers shall be allowed 
to request and obtain type approval maintenance of first 
generation vehicle units/motion sensors types already type 
approved.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 541  
Appendix 16  
ADAPTOR FOR M1 AND N1 CATEGORY VEHICLES  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
1. ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS  
1.1. Abbreviations  
1.2. Reference standards  
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE 
ADAPTOR  
2.1. Adaptor general description  
2.2. Functions  
2.3. Security  
3. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN 
ADAPTOR IS INSTALLED  
4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
ADAPTOR  
4.1. Interfacing and adapting incoming speed pulses  
4.2. Inducing the incoming pulses to the embedded motion sensor  
4.3. Embedded motion sensor  
4.4. Security requirements  
4.5. Performance characteristics  
4.6. Materials  
4.7. Markings  
5. INSTALLATION OF THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN 
ADAPTOR IS USED  
5.1. Installation  
5.2. Sealing  
6. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS  
6.1. Periodic inspections  
7. TYPE APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN 
ADAPTOR IS USED  
7.1. General points  
7.2. Functional certificate  
1. ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS  
1.1. Abbreviations  
TBD  To Be Defined  
VU Vehicle Unit  
1.2. Reference standards  
ISO16844-3 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 3: Motion 
sensor interface  
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE 
ADAPTOR  
2.1. Adaptor general description  
ADA_001 The adaptor shall provide a connected VU with secured motion 
data permanently representative of vehicle speed and distance 
travelled.  
The adaptor is only intended for those vehicles that are 
required to be equipped with recording equipment in 
compliance with this Regulation.  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 542  
It shall be installed and used only in those types of vehicle 
defined in definition yy) ‘adaptor’ of Annex IC where it is not 
mechanically possible to install any other type of existing 
motion sensor which is otherwise compliant with the 
provisions of this Annex and its Appendixes 1 to 16.  
The adaptor shall not be mechanically interfaced to a moving 
part of the vehicle, but connected to the speed/distance 
impulses which are generated by integrated sensors or alter ­
native interfaces.  
ADA_002 A type approved motion sensor (according to the provisions of 
this Annex IC, section 8, Type approval of recording 
equipment and tachograph cards) shall be fitted into the 
adaptor housing, which shall also include a pulse converter 
device inducing the incoming pulses to the embedded motion 
sensor. The embedded motion sensor itself shall be connected 
to the VU, so that the interface between the VU and the 
adaptor shall be compliant with the requirements set out in 
ISO16844-3.  
2.2. Functions  
ADA_003 The adaptor shall include the following functions:  
— interfacing and adapting the incoming speed pulses,  
— inducing the incoming pulses to the embedded motion 
sensor,  
— all functions of the embedded motion sensor, providing 
secured motion data to the VU.  
2.3. Security  
ADA_004 The adaptor shall not be security certified according to the 
motion sensor generic security target defined in Appendix 10 
of this Annex. Security related requirements specified in 
section 4.4 of this Appendix shall apply instead.  
3. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN 
ADAPTOR IS INSTALLED  
The requirements in the following Chapters indicate how the requirements 
of this Annex shall be understood when an adaptor is used. The related 
requirement numbers of Annex IC are provided between brackets.  
ADA_005 The recording equipment of any vehicle fitted with an adaptor 
must comply with all the provisions of this Annex, except 
otherwise specified in this Appendix.  
ADA_006 When an adaptor is installed, the recording equipment includes 
cables, the adaptor (including a motion sensor), and a VU [01].  
ADA_007 The detection of events and/or faults function of the recording 
equipment is modified as follows:  
— the ‘power supply interruption’ event shall be triggered by 
the VU, while not in calibration mode, in case of any 
interruption exceeding 200 milliseconds of the power 
supply of the embedded motion sensor [79]  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 543  
— the ‘motion data error’ event shall be triggered by the VU 
in case of interruption of the normal data flow between the 
embedded motion sensor and the VU and/or in case of data 
integrity or data authentication error during data exchange 
between the embedded motion sensor and the VU [83]  
— the ‘security breach attempt’ event shall be triggered by the 
VU for any other event affecting the security of the 
embedded motion sensor, while not in calibration mode 
[85] 
— the ‘recording equipment’ fault shall be triggered by the 
VU, while not in calibration mode, for any fault of the 
embedded motion sensor [88]  
ADA_008 The adaptor faults detectable by the recording equipment shall 
be those related with the embedded motion sensor [88].  
ADA_009 The VU calibration function shall allow to automatically pair 
the embedded motion sensor with the VU [202, 204].  
4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
ADAPTOR  
4.1. Interfacing and adapting incoming speed pulses  
ADA_011 The adaptor input interface shall accept frequency pulses rep ­
resentative of the vehicle speed and distance travelled. Elec ­
trical characteristics of the incoming pulses are:  TBD by the 
manufacturer . Adjustments accessible to only the adaptor 
manufacturer, and to the approved workshop performing the 
adaptor installation shall allow the correct interfacing of the 
adaptor input to the vehicle, if applicable.  
ADA_012 The adaptor input interface shall be able, if applicable, to 
multiply or divide the frequency pulses of the incoming 
speed pulses by a fixed factor, to adapt the signal to the k 
factor range defined by this Annex (4 000 to 25 000 
pulses/km). This fixed factor may only be programmed by 
the adaptor manufacturer, and the approved workshop 
performing the adaptor installation.  
4.2. Inducing the incoming pulses to the embedded motion sensor  
ADA_013 The incoming pulses, possibly adapted as specified above, shall 
be induced to the embedded motion sensor, so that each 
incoming pulse shall be detected by the motion sensor.  
4.3. Embedded motion sensor  
ADA_014 The embedded motion sensor shall be stimulated by the 
induced pulses, thus allowing it to generate motion data 
accurately representing the vehicle movement, as if it was 
mechanically interfaced to a moving part of the vehicle.  
ADA_015 The identification data of the embedded motion sensor shall be 
used by the VU to identify the adaptor [95].  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 544  
ADA_016 The installation data stored in the embedded motion sensor 
shall be considered to represent the adaptor installation data 
[122].  
4.4. Security requirements  
ADA_017 The adaptor housing shall be designed so that it cannot be 
opened. It shall be sealed, so that physical tampering 
attempts can be easily detected (e.g. through visual inspection, 
see ADA_035). Seals shall follow the same requirements of 
motion sensor seals [398 to 406]  
ADA_018 It shall not be possible to remove the embedded motion sensor 
from the adaptor without breaking the seal(s) of the adaptor 
housing, or breaking the seal between the sensor and the 
adaptor housing (see ADA_034).  
ADA_019 The adaptor shall ensure that motion data may only been 
processed and derived from the adaptor input.  
4.5. Performance characteristics  
ADA_020 The adaptor shall be fully operational in the temperature range 
defined by the manufacturer.  
ADA_021 The adaptor shall be fully operational in the humidity range 
10 % to 90 % [214].  
ADA_022 The adaptor shall be protected against over-voltage, inversion 
of its power supply polarity, and short circuits [216].  
ADA_023 The adaptor shall either:  
— react to a magnetic field disturbing vehicle motion 
detection. In such circumstances, the vehicle unit will 
record and store a sensor fault [88] or,  
— have a sensing element that is protected from, or immune 
to, magnetic fields [217].  
ADA_024 The adaptor shall conform to international regulation UN ECE 
R10, related to electromagnetic compatibility, and shall be 
protected against electrostatic discharges and transients [218].  
4.6. Materials  
ADA_025 The adaptor shall meet the protection grade ( TBD by the manu ­
facturer, depending on the installation position ) [220, 221].  
ADA_026 The colour of the adaptor housing shall be yellow.  
4.7. Markings  
ADA_027 A descriptive plaque shall be affixed to the adaptor and shall 
show the following details:  
— name and address of the manufacturer of the adaptor,  
— manufacturer's part number and year of manufacture of the 
adaptor,  
— approval mark of the adaptor type or of the recording 
equipment type including the adaptor,  
— the date on which the adaptor has been installed,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 545  
— the vehicle identification number of the vehicle on which it 
has been installed.  
ADA_028 The descriptive plaque shall also show the following details (if 
not directly readable from the outside on the embedded motion 
sensor):  
— name of the manufacturer of the embedded motion sensor,  
— manufacturer's part number and year of manufacture of the 
embedded motion sensor,  
— approval mark for the embedded motion sensor.  
5. INSTALLATION OF THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN 
ADAPTOR IS USED  
5.1. Installation  
ADA_029 Adaptors to be installed in vehicles shall only be installed by 
vehicle manufacturers, or by approved workshops, authorised 
to install, activate and calibrate digital and smart tachographs.  
ADA_030 Such approved workshop installing the adaptor shall adjust the 
input interface and select the division ratio of the input signal 
(if applicable).  
ADA_031 Such approved workshop installing the adaptor shall seal the 
adaptor housing.  
ADA_032 The adaptor shall be fitted as close as possible to that part of 
the vehicle which provides its incoming pulses.  
ADA_033 The cables for providing the adaptor power supply shall be red 
(positive supply) and black (ground).  
5.2. Sealing  
ADA_034 The following sealing requirements shall apply:  
— the adaptor housing shall be sealed (see ADA_017),  
— the housing of the embedded sensor shall be sealed to the 
adaptor housing, unless it is not possible to remove the 
sensor from the adaptor housing without breaking the 
seal(s) of the adaptor housing (see ADA_018),  
— the adaptor housing shall be sealed to the vehicle,  
— the connection between the adaptor and the equipment 
which provides its incoming pulses shall be sealed on 
both ends (to the extent of what is reasonably possible).  
6. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS  
6.1. Periodic inspections  
ADA_035 When an adaptor is used, each periodic inspection (periodic 
inspections means in compliance with Requirement [409] 
through to Requirement [413] of Annex 1C) of the recording 
equipment shall include the following checks:  
— that the adaptor carries the appropriate type approval 
markings,  
— that the seals on the adaptor and its connections are intact,  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 546  
— that the adaptor is installed as indicated on the installation 
plaque,  
— that the adaptor is installed as specified by the adapter 
and/or vehicle manufacturer,  
— that mounting an adaptor is authorised for the inspected 
vehicle.  
ADA_036 These inspections shall include a calibration and a replacement 
of all seals, whatever their state.  
7. TYPE APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN 
ADAPTOR IS USED  
7.1. General points  
ADA_037 Recording equipment shall be submitted for type approval 
complete, with the adaptor [425].  
ADA_038 Any adaptor may be submitted for its own type approval, or 
for type approval as a component of a recording equipment.  
ADA_039 Such type approval shall include functional tests involving the 
adaptor. Positive results to each of these tests are stated by an 
appropriate certificate [426].  
7.2. Functional certificate  
ADA_040 A functional certificate of an adaptor or of recording equipment 
including an adaptor shall be delivered to the adaptor manu ­
facturer only after all the following minimum functional tests 
have been successfully passed.  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
1. Administrative examination  
1.1 Documentation  Correctness of docu ­
mentation of the 
adaptor  
2. Visual inspection  
2.1. Compliance of the adaptor with documentation  
2.2. Identification / markings of the adaptor  ADA_027, 
ADA_028  
2.3 Materials of the adaptor  [219] to [223] 
ADA_026  
2.4. Sealing  ADA_017, 
ADA_018, 
ADA_034  
3. Functional tests  
3.1 Inducing the speed pulses to the embedded motion 
sensor  ADA_013  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 547  
No Test  Description  Related requirements  
3.2 Interfacing and adapting incoming speed pulses  ADA_011, 
ADA_012  
3.3 Motion measurement accuracy  [30] to [35], [217]  
4. Environmental tests  
4.1 Manufacturer test results  Results of manu ­
facturer environment 
tests.  ADA_020, 
ADA_021, 
ADA_022, 
ADA_024  
5. EMC  
5.1 radiated emissions and 
susceptibility  Verify compliance 
with Directive 2006/ 
28/EC  ADA_024  
5.2 Manufacturer test results  Results of manu ­
facturer environment 
tests.  ADA_024  ▼B
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 548  
ANNEX II  
APPROVAL MARK AND CERTIFICATE  
I. APPROVAL MARK  
1. The approval mark shall be made up of:  
(a) a rectangle, within which shall be placed the letter ‘e’ followed by a 
distinguishing number or letter for the country which has issued the 
approval in accordance with the following conventional signs: 
Belgium  6,  
Bulgaria  34,  
Czech Republic  8,  
Denmark  18,  
Germany  1,  
Estonia  29,  
Ireland  24,  
Greece  23,  
Spain  9,  
France  2,  
Croatia  25,  
Italy 3,  
Cyprus  CY,  
Latvia  32,  
Lithuania  36,  
Luxembourg  13,  
Hungary  7,  
Malta  MT,  
Netherlands  4,  
Austria  12,  
Poland  20,  
Portugal  21,  
Romania  19,  
Slovenia  26,  
Slovakia  27,  
Finland  17,  
Sweden  5,  
United Kingdom  11,  
and 
▼M1 
(b) an approval number corresponding to the number of the approval certifi ­
cate drawn up for the prototype of the recording equipment or the record 
sheet or the tachograph card, placed at any point within the immediate 
proximity of that rectangle.  ▼C1
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 549  
2. The approval mark shall be shown on the descriptive plaque of each set of 
equipment and on each record sheet and on each tachograph card. It must be 
indelible and must always remain clearly legible.  
3. The dimensions of the approval mark drawn below (  1 ) are expressed in milli ­
metres, these dimensions being minima. The ratios between the dimensions 
must be maintained.
  ▼C1 
( 1 ) These figures are shown for guidance only.
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 550  
II. APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR ANALOGUE TACHOGRAPHS  
A Member State which has granted approval shall issue the applicant with an 
approval certificate, the model of which is given below. When informing other 
Member States of approvals issued or, if the occasion should arise, withdrawn, a 
Member State shall use copies of that certificate.  
APPROVAL CERTIFICATE  
Name of competent administration  
Notification concerning (  1 ): 
— approval of a type of recording equipment  
— withdrawal of approval of a type of recording equipment  
— approval of a model record sheet  
— withdrawal of approval of a model record sheet  
Approval No:  
...................................  
1. Trade mark or name  
2. Name of type or model  
3. Name of manufacturer  
4. Address of manufacturer  
5. Submitted for approval on  
6. Tested at  
7. Date and number of the test(s)  
8. Date of approval  
9. Date of withdrawal of approval  
10. Type or types of recording equipment in which sheet is designed to be used  
11. Place  
12. Date  
13. Descriptive documents annexed  
14. Remarks (including the position of seals if applicable)  
(Signature)  ▼C1 
( 1 ) Delete items not applicable.
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 551  
III. APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR DIGITAL TACHOGRAPHS  
A Member State which has granted approval shall issue the applicant with an 
approval certificate, the model of which is given below. When informing other 
Member States of approvals issued or, if the occasion should arise, withdrawn, a 
Member State shall use copies of that certificate.  
APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR DIGITAL TACHOGRAPHS  
Name of competent administration  
Notification concerning (  1 ): 
□ approval of:  □ withdrawal of approval of:  
□ recording equipment model  
□ recording equipment component (  2 ) 
□ a driver's card  
□ a workshop card  
□ a company card  
□ a controller's card  
Approval No:  
1. Manufacturing brand or trademark  
2. Name of model  
3. Name of manufacturer  
4. Address of manufacturer  
▼M1 
5. Submitted for approval on  
▼C1 
6. Laboratory(-ies)  
7. Date and number of test report  
8. Date of approval  
9. Date of withdrawal of approval  
10. Model of recording equipment(s) with which the component is designed to 
be used  
11. Place  
12. Date  
13. Descriptive documents annexed  
14. Remarks (including the position of seals if applicable)  
(Signature)  ▼C1 
( 1 ) Tick the relevant boxes. 
( 2 ) Specify the component dealt with in the notification.
 02016R0799 — EN — 17.04.2018 — 001.001 — 552  
IV. APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR SMART TACHOGRAPHS  
A Member State which has granted approval shall issue the applicant with an 
approval certificate, the model of which is given below. When informing other 
Member States of approvals issued or, if the occasion should arise, withdrawn, a 
Member State shall use copies of that certificate.  
APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR SMART TACHOGRAPHS  
Name of competent administration  
Notification concerning (  1 ): 
□ approval of:  □ withdrawal of approval of:  
□ recording equipment model  
□ recording equipment component (  2 ) 
□ a driver's card  
□ a workshop card  
□ a company card  
□ a controller's card  
Approval No:  
1. Manufacturing brand or trademark  
2. Name of model  
3. Name of manufacturer  
4. Address of manufacturer  
▼M1 
5. Submitted for approval on  
▼C1 
6. (a) Test laboratory for functional certification  
(b) Test laboratory for security certification  
(c) Test laboratory for interoperability certification  
7. (a) Date and number of functional certificate  
(b) Date and number of security certificate  
(c) Date and number of interoperability certificate  
8. Date of approval  
9. Date of withdrawal of approval  
10. Model of recording equipment(s) with which the component is designed to 
be used  
11. Place  
12. Date  
13. Descriptive documents annexed  
14. Remarks (including the position of seals if applicable)  
(Signature)  ▼C1 
( 1 ) Tick the relevant boxes. 
( 2 ) Specify the component dealt with in the notification.