2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 1
This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents
►B COUNCIL DECISION
of 19 March 2001
adopting the Council's security regulations
(2001/264/EC)
(OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1)
Amended by:
Official Journal
No page date
►M1 Council Decision 2004/194/EC of 10 February 2004 L 63 48 28.2.2004
▼B
COUNCIL DECISION
of 19 March 2001
adopting the Council's security regulations
(2001/264/EC)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community and
in particular Article 207(3) thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision 2000/396/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 5
June 2000 adopting the Councils Rules of Procedure (1), and in parti-
cular Article 24 thereof,
Whereas:
(1) In order to develop Council activities in areas which require a
degree of confidentiality, it is appropriate to establish a compre-hensive security system covering the Council, its GeneralSecretariat and the Member States.
(2) Such system should combine in a single text the subject mattercovered by all previous decisions and provisions in the samefield.
(3) In practice, the major part of EU information classified CONFI-
DENTIEL UE and above will concern the Common Security and
Defence Policy.
(4) In order to safeguard the effectiveness of the security systemthus established, Member States should be associated with itsfunctioning by taking national measures necessary to respect the
provisions of this Decision where their competent authorities and
servants handle EU classified information.
(5) The Council welcomes the intention of the Commission to intro-duce, by the date of application of this Decision, a
comprehensive system that is in line with the Annexes thereto,
with a view to ensuring a smooth functioning of the decision-making process of the Union.
(6) The Council underlines the importance of associating, where
appropriate, the European Parliament and the Commission with
the rules and standards of confidentiality which are necessary inorder to protect the interests of the Union and its Member States.
(7) This Decision is taken without prejudice to Article 255 of the
Treaty and to instruments implementing it.
(8) This Decision is taken without prejudice to existing practices in
Member States with regard to informing their national Parlia-ments on the activities of the Union,
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
The Council's security regulations contained in the Annex are hereby
approved.
Article 2
1. The Secretary-General/High Representative shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that, when handling EU classified information, theregulations referred to in Article 1 are respected within the GeneralSecretariat of the Council (hereinafter referred to as ‘GSC’) by GSCofficials and other servants, by GSC external contractors, and by2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 2
(1) OJ L 149, 23.6.2000, p. 21.
▼B
personnel seconded to the GSC, as well as within Council premises and
EU decentralised agencies (1).
2. Members States shall take appropriate measures, in accordance
with national arrangements, to ensure that, when EU classified infor-
mation is handled, the regulations referred to in Article 1 arerespected, within their services and premises by:
(a) members of Member States' permanent representations to the
European Union as well as by members of national delegationsattending meetings of the Council or of its bodies, or participatingin other Council activities;
(b) other members of the Member States' national administrations
handling EU classified information, whether they serve in the terri-tory of the Member States or abroad; and
(c) Member States' external contractors and seconded personnel, hand-
ling EU classified information.
Member States shall forthwith inform the GSC of the measures taken.3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be taken
before 30 November 2001.
Article 3
In keeping with the basic principles and minimum standards of security
contained in part I of the Annex, the Secretary-General/High Represen-tative may take measures in accordance with part II, Section I(1) and(2), of the Annex.
Article 4
As from the day of its application, this Decision shall replace:
(a) Council Decision 98/319/EC of 27 April 1998 relating to the proce-
dures whereby officials and employees of the General Secretariat
of the Council may be allowed access to classified information
held by the Council (
2);
(b) Decision of the Secretary-General/High Representative of 27 July
2000 on measures for the protection of classified information
applicable to the General Secretariat of the Council (3);
(c) Decision 433/97 of the Secretary-General of the Council of 22 May
1997 on the Security Clearance procedure of the officials respon-sible for the functioning of the Cortesy network.
Article 5
1. This Decision shall take effect on the day of its publication.2. It shall apply from 1 December 2001.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 3
(1) See Council Conclusions of 10 November 2000.
(2) OJ L 140, 12.5.1998, p. 12.
(3) OJ C 239, 23.8.2000, p. 1.
▼B
ANNEX
SECURITY REGULATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 4
▼B
CONTENTS
PART I
Basic principles and minimum standards of security ......................................
P A R T I I...............................................................
SECTION I
The organisation of security in the Council of the European Union ............................
SECTION II
Classifications and markings . . ..........................................................
SECTION IIIClassification management . . . ..........................................................
SECTION IV
Physical security . .....................................................................
SECTION V
General rules on the need-to-know principle and security clearance ............................
SECTION VISecurity clearance procedure for GSC officials and other servants .............................
SECTION VII
Preparation, distribution, transmission, storage and destruction of EU classified material . . . ........
SECTION VIII
Très secret UE/EU top secret registries ...................................................
SECTION IXSecurity measures to be applied at the time of specific meetings held outside the Council premises and
involving high sensitivity issues .........................................................
SECTION XBreaches of security and compromise of EU classified information ............................
SECTION XI
Protection of information handled in information technology and communication systems . . ........
SECTION XII
Release of EU classified information to third States or international organisations . . . .............
AppendicesAppendix 1
List of national security authorities . . . ....................................................
Appendix 2Comparison of national security classifications .............................................
Appendix 3
Practical classification guide . . ..........................................................
Appendix 4
Guidelines for release of EU classified information to third States or international organisations . . . .
— Level 1 cooperationAppendix 5 ..........................................................................
Guidelines for release of EU classified information to third States or international organisations
— Level 2 cooperation . ...............................................................
Appendix 6
Guidelines for release of EU classified information to third States or international organisations . . . .
— Level 3 cooperation2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 5
▼B
PART I
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
1. These provisions lay down the basic principles and minimum standards of
security to be respected in an appropriate manner by the Council, by the
General Secretariat of the Council (hereinafter called ‘GSC’), by the
Member States and by the decentralised agencies of the European Union
(hereinafter called ‘EU decentralised agencies’), so that security is safe-
guarded and each may be assured that a common standard of protection is
established.
2. The term ‘EU classified information’ means any information and material,
an unauthorised disclosure of which could cause varying degrees of preju-
dice to the EU interests, or to one or more of its Member States, whether
such information originates within the EU or is received from Member
States, third States or international organisations.
3. Throughout these regulations:
(a) by ‘document’ is meant any letter, note, minute, report, memorandum,
signal/message, sketch, photograph, slide, film, map, chart, plan, note-
book, stencil, carbon, typewriter or printer ribbon, tape, cassette,
computer disk, CD ROM, or other physical medium on which informa-
tion has been recorded;
(b) by ‘material’ is meant ‘document’ as defined in (a) above and also any
item of equipment or weapons, either manufactured or in the process of
manufacture.
4. Security has the following principal objectives:
(a) to safeguard EU classified information from espionage, compromise or
unauthorised disclosure;
(b) to safeguard EU information handled in communications and informa-
tion systems and networks, against threats to its integrity and
availability;
(c) to safeguard installations housing EU information from sabotage and
malicious wilful damage;
(d) in the event of failure, to assess the damage caused, limit its conse-
quences and adopt the necessary remedial measures.
5. The foundations of sound security are:
(a) within each Member State, a national security organisation responsible
for:
(i) the collection and recording of intelligence on espionage, sabotage,
terrorism and other subversive activities, and
(ii) information and advice to its government, and through it, to the
Council, on the nature of the threats to security and the means of
protection against them;
(b) within each Member State, and within the GSC, a technical INFOSEC
authority responsible for working with the security authority concerned
to provide information and advice on technical threats to security and
the means for protection against them;
(c) regular collaboration among government departments, agencies and the
appropriate GSC services, in order to establish, and recommend, as
appropriate:
(i) what information, resources and installations need to be protected,
and
(ii) common standards of protection.
6. Where confidentiality is concerned, care and experience are needed in the
selection of information and material to be protected and the assessment of
the degree of protection it requires. It is fundamental that the degree of
protection should correspond with the security criticality of the individual
piece of information and material to be protected. In order to ensure the
smooth flow of information, steps shall be taken in order to avoid over clas-
sification. The classification system is the instrument for giving effect to
these principles; a similar system of classification should be followed in
planning and organising ways to counter espionage, sabotage, terrorism
and other threats so that the greatest measure of protection is given to the
most important premises housing classified information and to the most
sensitive points within them.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 6
▼B
BASIC PRINCIPLES
7.The security measures shall:
(a) extend to all persons having access to classified information, classified
information-carrying media, all premises containing such information
and important installations;
(b) be designed to detect persons whose position might endanger the
security of classified information and important installations housing
classified information and provide for their exclusion or removal;
(c) prevent any unauthorised person from having access to classified infor-
mation or to installations which contain it;
(d) ensure that classified information is disseminated solely on the basis of
the need-to-know principle which is fundamental to all aspects of
security;
(e) ensure the integrity (i.e. prevention of corruption or unauthorised altera-
tion or unauthorised deletion) and the availability (i.e. access is not
denied to those needing and authorised to have access) of all informa-
tion, either classified or not classified, and especially of such
information stored, processed or transmitted in electromagnetic form.
ORGANISATION OF SECURITY
Common minimum standards
8. The Council and each Member State shall ensure that common minimum
standards of security are observed in all administrative and/or government
departments, other EU institutions, agencies and contractors so that EU clas-
sified information can be passed in the confidence that it will be handled
with equal care. Such minimum standards shall include criteria for the
clearance of personnel, and procedures for the protection of EU classified
information.
SECURITY OF PERSONNEL
Clearance of personnel
9. All persons who require access to information classified CONFIDENTIEL
UE or above shall be appropriately cleared before such access is authorised.
Similar clearance shall be required in the case of persons whose duties
involve the technical operation or maintenance of communication and infor-
mation systems containing classified information. This clearance shall be
designed to determine whether such individuals:
(a) are of unquestioned loyalty;
(b) are of such character and discretion as to cast no doubt upon their integ-
rity in the handling of classified information; or
(c) may be vulnerable to pressure from foreign or other sources, e.g. due to
former residence or past associations which might constitute a risk to
security.
Particularly close scrutiny in the clearance procedures shall be given to
persons:
(d) to be granted access to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET informa-
tion;
(e) occupying positions involving regular access to a considerable volume
of SECRET UE information;
(f) whose duties give them special access to mission-critical communica-
tion or information systems and thus the opportunity to gain
unauthorised access to large amounts of EU classified information or
to inflict serious damage upon the mission through acts of technical
sabotage.
In the circumstances outlined in subparagraphs (d), (e) and (f), the fullest
practicable use shall be made of the technique of background investigation.
10. When persons not having an established ‘need to know’ are to be employed
in circumstances in which they may have access to EU classified informa-
tion (e.g. messengers, security agents, maintenance personnel and cleaners,
etc.), they shall first be appropriately security-cleared.
Records of personnel clearances
11. All services, bodies or establishments handling EU classified information or
housing mission-critical communication or information systems shall main-
tain a record of the clearances granted to the personnel assigned thereto.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 7
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Each clearance shall be verified as the occasion demands to ensure that it is
adequate for that person's current assignment; it shall be re-examined as a
matter of priority whenever new information is received indicating that
continued assignment on classified work is no longer consistent with the
interests of security. The record of clearances shall be held by the head of
security for the service, body or establishment concerned.
Security instruction of personnel
12. All personnel employed in positions where they could have access to classi-
fied information shall be thoroughly instructed on taking up assignment and
at regular intervals in the need for security and the procedures for accom-
plishing it. It is a useful procedure to require that all such personnel should
certify in writing that they fully understand the security regulations relevant
to their assignment.
Management responsibilities
13. Managers shall have the duty of knowing those of their staff who are
engaged in classified work or who have access to mission-critical commu-
nication or information systems and of recording and reporting any
incidents or apparent vulnerabilities, likely to have a bearing on security.
Security status of personnel
14. Procedures shall be established to ensure that, when adverse information
becomes known concerning an individual, it is determined whether the indi-
vidual is employed on classified work or has access to mission-critical
communication or information systems, and the authority concerned
informed. If it is established that such an individual constitutes a security
risk, he or she shall be barred or removed from assignments where he or
she might endanger security.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
Need for protection
15. The degree of physical security measures to be applied to ensure the protec-
tion of EU classified information shall be proportional to the classification,
volume of and threat to the information and material held. Therefore care
shall be taken to avoid both over- and under-classification, and classifica-
tion shall be subject to regular review. All holders of EU classified
information shall follow uniform practices regarding classification of that
information and meet common standards of protection regarding custody,
transmission and disposal of information and material requiring protection.
Checking
16. Before leaving areas containing EU classified information unattended,
persons having custody thereof shall ensure that it is securely stored and
that all security devices have been activated (locks, alarms, etc.). Further
independent checks shall be carried out after working hours.
Security of buildings
17. Buildings housing EU classified information or mission-critical communica-
tion and information systems shall be protected against unauthorised access.
The nature of the protection afforded to EU classified information, e.g.
barring of windows, locks for doors, guards at entrances, automated access
control systems, security checks and patrols, alarm systems, intrusion detec-
tion systems and guard dogs, shall depend on:
(a) the classification, volume and location within the building of the infor-
mation and material to be protected;
(b) the quality of the security containers for this information and material;
(c) the physical nature and location of the building.
18. The nature of the protection afforded to communication and information
systems shall similarly depend upon an assessment of the value of the assets
at stake and of the potential damage if security were compromised, upon the
physical nature and location of the building in which the system is housed,
and upon the location of the system within the building.
Contingency plans
19. Detailed plans shall be prepared in advance for the protection of classified
information during a local or national emergency.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 8
▼B
SECURITY OF INFORMATION (INFOSEC)
20. INFOSEC relates to the identification and application of security measures
to protect information processed, stored or transmitted in communication,
information and other electronic systems against loss of confidentiality,
integrity or availability, whether accidental or intentional. Adequate coun-
termeasures shall be taken in order to prevent access to EU information by
unauthorised users, to prevent the denial of access to EU information to
authorised users, and to prevent corruption or unauthorised modification or
deletion of EU information.
COUNTER-SABOTAGE AND OTHER FORMS OF MALICIOUS WILFUL
DAMAGE
21. Physical precautions for the protection of important installations housing
classified information are the best protective security safeguards against
sabotage and malicious wilful damage, and clearance of personnel alone is
not an effective substitute. The competent national body shall collect intelli-
gence regarding espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive
activities.
RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THIRD STATES OR
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
22. The decision to release EU classified information originating in the Council
to a third State or international organisation shall be taken by the Council. If
the originator of the information for which release is desired is not the
Council, the Council shall first seek the originator's consent to release. If
the originator cannot be established, the Council will assume the former's
responsibility.
23. If the Council receives classified information from third States, from inter-
national organisations or from other third parties, that information shall be
given protection appropriate to its classification and equivalent to the stan-
dards established in these regulations for EU classified information, or such
higher standards as may be required by the third party releasing the infor-
mation. Mutual checks may be arranged.
24. The above principles shall be implemented in accordance with the detailed
provisions set out in part II.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 9
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PART II
SECTION I
THE ORGANISATION OF SECURITY IN THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The Secretary-General/High Representative
1. The Secretary-General/High Representative shall:
(a) implement the Council's security policy;
(b) consider security problems referred to him by the Council or its compe-
tent bodies;
(c) examine questions involving changes in the Council security policy, in
close liaison with the National Security (or other appropriate) Authori-
ties of the Member States (hereinafter ‘NSA’). Appendix 1 contains a
list of those authorities.
2. In particular, the Secretary-General/High Representative shall be responsible
for:
(a) coordinating all matters of security relating to Council activities;
(b) requesting that each Member State set up a central TRÈS SECRET UE/
EU TOP SECRET registry and requiring such a registry to be set up inthe EU decentralised agencies, where appropriate;
(c) addressing to the designated authorities of the Member States requests
for the NSA to provide security clearances for personnel employed in
the GSC in accordance with Section VI;
(d) investigating or ordering an investigation into any leakage of EU classi-
fied information which, on prima facie evidence, has occurred in the
GSC or any of the EU decentralised agencies;
(e) requesting the appropriate security authorities to initiate investigations
when a leakage of EU classified information appears to have occurred
outside the GSC or the EU decentralised agencies, and coordinating the
enquiries when more than one security authority is involved;
(f) carrying out jointly and in agreement with the NSA concerned, periodic
examinations of the security arrangements for the protection of EU clas-
sified information in the Member States;
(g) maintaining close liaison with all security authorities concerned in order
to achieve overall coordination of security;
(h) keeping the Council security policy and procedures constantly under
review and, as required, preparing appropriate recommendations. In
this regard, he shall present to the Council the annual inspection plan
prepared by the GSC Security Office.
The Security Committee of the Council
3. A Security Committee shall be set up. It shall consist of representatives of
the NSA of each Member State. It shall be chaired by the Secretary-
General/High Representative or by his/her delegate. Representatives of EU
decentralised agencies may also be invited to attend when questions
concerning them are discussed.
4. The Security Committee shall meet as instructed by the Council, at the
request of the Secretary-General/High Representative or of an NSA. The
Committee shall have the power to examine and assess all issues of security
relating to the proceedings of the Council, and to present recommendations
to the Council as appropriate. As regards the activity of the GSC, the
Committee shall have the power to make recommendations on security
issues to the Secretary-General/High Representative.
The Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council
5. In order to fulfil the responsibilities mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2, the
Secretary-General/High Representative shall have the GSC Security Office
at his disposal for coordinating, supervising and implementing security
measures.
6. The Head of the GSC Security Office shall be the principal adviser to the
Secretary-General/High Representative on security matters and shall act assecretary to the Security Committee. In this regard he shall direct the
updating of the security regulations and coordinate security measures with
the competent authorities of the Member States and, as appropriate, with
international organisations linked to the Council by security agreements.
To that effect, he/she shall act as a liaison officer.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 10
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7. The Head of the GSC Security Office shall be responsible for the accredita-
tion of IT systems and networks within the GSC. The Head of the GSC
Security Office and the relevant NSA shall jointly decide, where appro-
priate, on the accreditation of IT systems and networks involving the GSC,
the Member States, EU decentralised agencies and/or third parties (States or
international organisations).
EU decentralised agencies
8. Each director of an EU decentralised agency shall be responsible for the
implementation of security within his or her establishment. He or she will
normally nominate a member of his or her staff as being responsible to
him or her in this field. This staff member is designated as a security offi-
cial.
Member States
9. Each Member State should designate an NSA responsible for the security of
EU classified information (1).
10. In the framework of each Member State administration, the corresponding
NSA should be responsible for:
(a) the maintenance of the security of EU classified information held by
any national department, body or agency, public or private, at home or
abroad;
(b) authorising the establishment of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
registries (this authority may be delegated to the TRÈS SECRET UE/
EU TOP SECRET Control Officer of a Central Registry);
(c) the periodic inspection of the security arrangements for the protection of
EU classified information;
(d) ensuring that all nationals as well as foreigners employed within a
national department, body or agency who may have access to EU infor-
mation classified TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, SECRET UE
and CONFIDENTIEL UE have been security cleared;
(e) devising such security plans as are considered necessary to prevent EU
classified information from falling into unauthorised hands.
Mutual security inspections
11. Periodic inspections of the security arrangements for the protection of EU
classified information in the GSC and in the Permanent Representations of
the Member States to the European Union, as well as to the Member States
premises in the Council buildings shall be carried out by the GSC Security
Office and by the NSA concerned, jointly and in mutual agreement (2).
12. Periodic inspections of the security arrangements for the protection of EU
classified information in the EU decentralised agencies, shall be carried
out by the GSC Security Office or, at the Secretary-General's request, by
the NSA of the host Member State.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 11
(1) For a list of NSAs responsible for the security of EU classified information, see
Appendix 1.
(2) Without prejudice to the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic relations.
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SECTION II
CLASSIFICATIONS AND MARKINGS
LEVELS OF CLASSIFICATION (1)
Information is classified at the following levels:1. TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET: this classification shall be applied
only to information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could
cause exceptionally grave prejudice to the essential interests of the European
Union or of one or more of its Member States.
2. SECRET UE: this classification shall be applied only to information and
material the unauthorised disclosure of which could seriously harm the essen-
tial interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States.
3. CONFIDENTIEL UE: this classification shall be applied to information and
material the unauthorised disclosure of which could harm the essential inter-
ests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States.
4. RESTREINT UE: this classification shall be applied to information and
material the unauthorised disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to
the interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States.
MARKINGS5. A caveat marking may be used for specifying the field covered by the docu-
ment or a particular distribution on a need-to-know basis.
6. The ESDP/PESD marking shall be applied to documents and copies thereof
concerning the security and defence of the Union or of one or more of its
Member States, or concerning military or non-military crisis management.
7. Certain documents, namely related to Information Technology (IT) Systems
may bear an additional marking entailing supplementary security measures
as defined in the appropriate regulations.
AFFIXING OF CLASSIFICATION AND MARKINGS8. Classification and markings shall be applied as follows:
(a) on RESTREINT UE documents, by mechanical or electronic means,
(b) on CONFIDENTIEL UE documents, by mechanical means and by hand
or by printing on pre-stamped, registered paper,
(c) on SECRET UE and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents,
by mechanical means and by hand.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 12
(1) A comparative table of EU, NATO, WEU and Member States' security gradings may
be found in Appendix 2.
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SECTION III
CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT
1. Information shall be classified only when necessary. The classification shall
be clearly and correctly indicated, and shall be maintained only as long as
the information requires protection.
2. The responsibility for classifying information and for any subsequent down-
grading or declassification (1) rests solely with the originator.
Officials and other servants of the GSC shall classify, downgrade or declas-
sify information on instruction from or with the agreement of their Director-
General.
3. The detailed procedures for the treatment of classified documents have been
so framed as to ensure that they are subject to protection appropriate to the
information they contain.
4. The number of persons authorised to originate TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET documents shall be kept to a minimum, and their names kept on a
list drawn up by the GSC, each Member State, and, where appropriate, by
each EU decentralised agency.
APPLICATION OF CLASSIFICATIONS
5. The classification of a document shall be determined by the level of sensi-
tivity of its contents in accordance with the definition at Section II,
paragraphs 1 to 4. It is important that classification is correctly and spar-
ingly used. This applies especially to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET classification.
6. The originator of a document which is to be given a classification shall bear
in mind the regulations set out above and curb any tendency to over- or
under-classify.
Although a high classification may, at first sight, appear to guarantee more
protection to a document, routine over-classification can result in a loss of
confidence in the validity of the classification system.
On the other hand, documents shall not be underclassified with a view to
avoiding the constraints connected with protection.
A practical guide for the classification is contained in Appendix 3.
7. Individual pages, paragraphs, sections, annexes, appendices, attachments
and enclosures of a given document may require different classifications
and shall be marked accordingly. The classification of the document as a
whole shall be that of its most highly classified part.
8. The classification of a letter or note covering enclosures shall be as high as
the highest classification of its enclosures. The originator should indicate
clearly at which level it should be classified when detached from its enclo-
sures.
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
9. EU classified documents may be downgraded or declassified only with the
permission of the originator, and, if necessary, after discussion with other
interested parties. Downgrading or declassification shall be confirmed in
writing. The originating Institution, Member State, office, successor organi-
sation or higher authority shall be responsible for informing its addressees
of the change, and they in turn shall be responsible for informing any subse-
quent addressees, to whom they have sent or copied the document, of the
change.
10. If possible, originators shall specify on classified documents a date or
period when the contents may be downgraded or declassified. Otherwise,
they shall keep the documents under review every five years, at the latest,
in order to ensure that the original classification is necessary.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 13
(1) Downgrading (déclassement) means a reduction in the level of classification; declassi-
fication (déclassification) means the removal of any classification.
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SECTION IV
PHYSICAL SECURITY
GENERAL
1. The main objective of physical security measures is to prevent an
unauthorised person from gaining access to EU classified information and/
or material.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
2. All premises, areas, buildings, offices, rooms, communication and informa-
tion systems, etc. in which EU classified information and material is stored
and/or handled shall be protected by appropriate physical security measures.
3. In deciding what degree of physical security protection is necessary,
account shall be taken of all relevant factors such as:
(a) the classification of information and/or material;
(b) the amount and form (for example hard copy, computer storage media)
of the information held;
(c) the locally assessed threat from intelligence services which target the
EU, the Member States, and/or other institutions or third parties holding
EU classified information from, namely, sabotage, terrorism and other
subversive and/or criminal activities.
4. The physical security measures applied shall be designed to:
(a) deny surreptitious or forced entry by an intruder;
(b) deter, impede and detect actions by disloyal personnel (the spy within);
(c) prevent those officials and other servants of the GSC, of government
departments of the Member States and/or other institutions or third
parties who do not have a need to know from having access to EU clas-
sified information.
PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES
Security areas
5. Areas where information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE or higher is
handled and stored shall be so organised and structured as to correspond to
one of the following:
(a) Class I security area: an area where CONFIDENTIEL UE or above is
handled and stored in such a way that entry into the area constitutes,
for all practical purposes, access to classified information. Such an
area requires:
(i) a clearly defined and protected perimeter through which all entry
and exit is controlled;
(ii) an entry control system, which admits only those duly cleared and
specially authorised to enter the area;
(iii) specification of the classification of the information normally held
in the area, i.e. the information to which entry gives access.
(b) Class II security area: an area where CONFIDENTIEL UE or above is
handled and stored in such a way that it can be protected from access
by unauthorised persons by means of internally established controls, e.g.
premises containing offices in which CONFIDENTIEL UE or above is
regularly handled and stored. Such an area requires:
(i) a clearly defined and protected perimeter through which all entry
and exit is controlled;
(ii) an entry control system which admits unescorted only those duly
cleared and specially authorised to enter the area. For all other
persons, provision shall be made for escorts or equivalent controls,
to prevent unauthorised access to EU classified information and
uncontrolled entry to areas subject to technical security inspections.
Those areas not occupied by duty personnel on a 24-hour basis shall be
inspected immediately after normal working hours to ensure that EU classi-
fied information is properly secured.
Administrative area
6. Around or leading up to Class I or Class II security areas, an administrative
area of lesser security may be established. Such an area requires a visibly
defined perimeter allowing personnel and vehicles to be checked. Only2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 14
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RESTREINT UE information shall be handled and stored in administrative
areas.
Entry and exit controls
7. Entry into Class I and Class II security areas shall be controlled by a pass or
personal recognition system applicable to the permanent staff. A system of
visitor checks designed to deny unauthorised access to EU classified infor-
mation shall also be established. Pass systems may be supported by
automated identification, which shall be regarded as a supplement to, but
not a total replacement for guards. A change in the threat assessment may
entail a strengthening of the entry and exit control measures, for example
during the visit of prominent persons.
Guard patrols
8. Patrols of Class I and Class II security areas are to take place outside
normal working hours to protect EU assets against compromise, damage or
loss. The frequency of patrols will be determined by local circumstances
but, as a guide, are to be conducted once every two hours.
Security containers and strong rooms
9. Three classes of containers shall be used for the storage of EU classified
information:
— Class A: containers nationally approved for storage of TRÈS
SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET information within a Class I or a Class
II security area;
— Class B: containers nationally approved for storage of SECRET UE
and CONFIDENTIEL UE information within a Class I or a Class II
security area;
— Class C: office furniture suitable for storage of RESTREINT UE
information only.
10. For strong rooms constructed within a Class I or a Class II security area,
and for all Class I security areas where information classified CONFIDEN-
TIEL UE and higher is stored on open shelves or displayed on charts, maps,
etc., the walls, floors and ceilings, door(s) with lock(s) shall be certified by
an NSA as offering equivalent protection to the class of security container
approved for the storage of information of the same classification.
Locks
11. Locks used with security containers and strong rooms in which EU classi-
fied information is stored shall meet the following standards:
— Group A: nationally approved for Class A containers;
— Group B: nationally approved for Class B containers;— Group C: suitable for Class C office furniture only.
Control of keys and combinations
12. Keys of security containers shall not be taken out of the office building.
Combination settings of security containers shall be committed to memory
by persons needing to know them. For use in an emergency, the Security
Officer of the establishment concerned shall be responsible for holding
spare keys and a written record of each combination setting; the latter shall
be held in separate sealed opaque envelopes. Working keys, spare security
keys and combination settings shall be kept in separate security containers.
These keys and combination settings should be given security protection no
less stringent than the material to which they give access.
13. Knowledge of the combination settings of security containers shall be
restricted to as few people as practicable. Combinations shall be reset:
(a) on receipt of a new container;
(b) whenever a change of personnel occurs;
(c) whenever a compromise has occurred or is suspected;
(d) at intervals of preferably six months and at least every 12 months.
Intrusion detection devices
14. When alarm systems, closed circuit television and other electrical devices
are used to protect EU classified information, an emergency electrical
supply shall be available to ensure the continuous operation of the system
if the main power supply is interrupted. Another basic requirement is that
a malfunction in or tampering with such systems shall result in an alarm
or other reliable warning to the surveillance personnel.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 15
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Approved equipment
15. NSAs shall maintain, from their own or from bilateral resources, up-to-date
lists by type and model of the security equipment which they have approved
for the direct or indirect protection of classified information under various
specified circumstances and conditions. The GSC Security Office shall
maintain a similar list, based, inter alia, on information from NSAs. EU
decentralised agencies shall consult with the GSC Security Office and, as
appropriate, with the NSA of their host Member State before purchasing
such equipment.
Physical protection of copying and telefax machines
16. Copying and telefax machines shall be physically protected to the extent
necessary to ensure that only authorised persons can use them and that all
classified products are subject to proper controls.
PROTECTION AGAINST OVERLOOKING AND EAVESDROPPING
Overlooking
17. All appropriate measures shall be taken by day and by night to ensure that
EU classified information is not seen, even accidentally, by any
unauthorised person.
Eavesdropping
18. Offices or areas in which information classified SECRET UE and above is
regularly discussed shall be protected against passive and active eavesdrop-
ping attacks where the risk demands it. The assessment of the risk of such
attacks shall be the responsibility of the competent security authority after
consultation, as necessary, with NSAs.
19. To determine the protective measures to be taken in premises sensitive to
passive eavesdropping (e.g. insulation of walls, doors, floors and ceilings,
measurement of compromising emanations) and to active eavesdropping
(e.g. search for microphones), the GSC Security Office may request assis-
tance from experts from NSAs. Security officers of EU decentralised
agencies may request technical inspections to be carried out by the GSC
Security Office and/or the assistance from experts from NSAs.
20. Likewise, when circumstances require, the telecommunications equipment
and the electrical or electronic office equipment of any kind used during
meetings at SECRET UE level and above may be checked by technical
security specialists of NSAs at the request of the competent Security
Officer.
TECHNICALLY SECURE AREAS
21. Certain areas may be designated as technically secure areas. A special entry
check shall be carried out. Such areas shall be kept locked by an approved
method when not occupied and all keys treated as security keys. Such areas
shall be subject to regular physical inspections, which will also be under-
taken following any unauthorised entry or suspicion of such an entry.
22. A detailed inventory of equipment and furniture shall be kept in order to
monitor their movements. No item of furniture or equipment shall be
brought into such an area until it has undergone a careful inspection by
specially trained security personnel, designed to detect any listening
devices. As a general rule, the installation of communication lines in tech-
nically secure areas should be avoided.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 16
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SECTION V
GENERAL RULES ON THE NEED-TO-KNOW PRINCIPLE AND
SECURITY CLEARANCE
1. Access to EU classified information will be authorised only for persons
having a ‘need-to-know’ for carrying out their duties or missions. Access
to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, SECRET UE and CONFIDEN-
TIEL UE information will be authorised only for persons in possession of
the appropriate security clearance.
2. The responsibility for determining ‘need-to-know’ will rest within the GSC,
the EU decentralised agencies and with the Member State's service or
department in which the person concerned is to be employed, according to
the requirements of the task.
3. The clearance of personnel will be the responsibility of the official's
employer based on relevant applicable procedures. As regards GSC officials
and other servants, the security clearance procedure is provided for in
Section VI.
This will result in the issue of a ‘security certificate’ showing the level of
classified information to which the cleared person may have access and the
date of expiry.
A security certificate for a given classification may give the holder access
to information with a lower classification.
4. Persons other than officials or other servants of the GSC or of Member
States, for example members, officials or servants of EU institutions, with
whom it may be necessary to discuss, or to whom it may be necessary to
show, EU classified information, must have a security clearance as regards
EU classified information and be briefed as to their responsibility for
security. The same rule shall apply, in similar circumstances, to external
contractors, experts or consultants.
SPECIFIC RULES ON ACCESS TO TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
INFORMATION
5. All persons who are to have access to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET information shall first be screened for access to such information.
6. All persons who are required to have access to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET information shall be designated by the Head of their department
and their names kept in the appropriate TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET registry.
7. Before having access to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET information,
all persons shall sign a certificate to the effect that they have been briefed
on Council security procedures and that they fully understand their special
responsibility for safeguarding TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET infor-
mation, and the consequences which the EU rules and national law or
administrative rules provide when classified information passes into
unauthorised hands, either by intent or through negligence.
8. In the case of persons having access to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET information at meetings, etc., the competent Control Officer of
the service or body in which that person is employed shall notify the body
organising the meeting that the persons concerned have such authorisation.
9. The names of all persons ceasing to be employed on duties requiring access
to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET information shall be removed
from the TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET list. In addition, the atten-
tion of all such persons shall be drawn again to their special responsibility
for the safeguarding of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET information.
They shall also sign a declaration stating that they will neither use nor pass
on TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET information in their possession.
SPECIFIC RULES ON ACCESS TO SECRET UE AND CONFIDENTIEL UE
INFORMATION
10. All persons who are to have access to SECRET UE or CONFIDENTIEL
UE information shall first be screened to the appropriate grading.
11. All persons who are to have access to SECRET UE or CONFIDENTIEL
UE information shall be acquainted with the appropriate security regulations
and shall be aware of the consequences of negligence.
12. In the case of persons having access to SECRET UE or CONFIDENTIEL
UE information at meetings, etc., the Security Officer of the body in which
that person is employed shall notify the body organising the meeting that
the persons concerned have such authorisation.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 17
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SPECIFIC RULES ON ACCESS TO RESTREINT UE INFORMATION
13. Persons with access to RESTREINT UE information will be made aware of
these security regulations and of the consequences of negligence.
TRANSFERS
14. When a member of staff is transferred from a post which involves the hand-
ling of EU classified material, the Registry will oversee the proper transfer
of that material from the outgoing to the incoming official.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS15. Persons who are required to handle EU classified information should, on
first taking up their duties and periodically thereafter, be made aware of:
(a) the dangers to security arising from indiscreet conversation;
(b) precautions to take in their relations with the press;
(c) the threat presented by the activities of intelligence services which
target the EU and Member States as regards EU classified information
and activities;
(d) the obligation to report immediately to the appropriate security authori-
ties any approach or manoeuvre giving rise to suspicions of espionage
activity or any unusual circumstances relating to security.
16. All persons normally exposed to frequent contact with representatives of
countries whose intelligence services target the EU and Member States as
regards EU classified information and activities shall be given a briefing
on the techniques known to be employed by various intelligence services.
17. There are no Council security regulations concerning private travel to any
destination by personnel cleared for access to EU classified information.
The competent security authorities will, however, acquaint the officials and
other servants falling within their responsibility with travel regulations to
which they may be subject. It will be the responsibility of the security offi-
cers to arrange refresher meetings for staff members on these special
instructions.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 18
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SECTION VI
SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCEDURE FOR GSC OFFICIALS AND
OTHER SERVANTS
1. Only officials and other servants of the GSC or persons working within the
GSC who, by reason of their duties and for the requirements of the service,
need to have knowledge of, or to use, classified information held by the
Council, shall have access to such information.
2. In order to have access to information classified as ‘TRÈS SECRET UE/EU
TOP SECRET’, ‘SECRET UE’ and ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’, the persons
referred to in paragraph 1 must have been authorised, in accordance with
the procedure referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5.
3. Authorisation shall be granted only to persons who have undergone security
screening by the competent national authorities of the Member States (NSA)
in accordance with the procedure referred to in paragraphs 6 to 10.
4. The appointing authority within the meaning of Article 2, first subparagraph
of the Staff Regulations shall be responsible for granting the authorisations
referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.
The appointing authority shall grant authorisation after obtaining the
opinion of the competent national authorities of the Member States on the
basis of security screening carried out in accordance with paragraphs 6 to
12.
5. Authorisation, which shall be valid for a period of five years, may not
exceed the duration of the tasks on the basis of which it was granted. It
may be renewed by the appointing authority in accordance with the proce-
dure referred to in paragraph 4.
Authorisation shall be withdrawn by the appointing authority where it
considers there are justifiable grounds for doing so. Any decision to with-
draw authorisation shall be notified to the person concerned, who may ask
to be heard by the appointing authority, and to the competent national
authority.
6. The aim of security screening shall be to establish that there are no objec-
tions to allowing the person to have access to classified information held by
the Council.
7. Security screening shall be carried out with the assistance of the person
concerned and at the request of the appointing authority by the competent
national authorities of the Member State of which the person subject to
authorisation is a national. Should the person concerned reside in the terri-
tory of another Member State, the national authorities concerned may secure
the cooperation of the authorities of the State of residence.
8. As part of the screening procedure, the person concerned shall be required
to complete a personal information form.
9. The appointing authority shall specify in its request the type and level of
classified information to be made available to the person concerned, so
that the competent national authorities can carry out the screening process
and give their opinion as to the level of authorisation it would be appro-
priate to grant to that person.
10. The whole security-screening process together with the results obtained
shall be subject to the relevant rules and regulations in force in the Member
State concerned, including those concerning appeals.
11. Where the competent national authorities of the Member State give a posi-
tive opinion, the appointing authority may grant the person concerned
authorisation.
12. A negative opinion by the competent national authorities shall be notified to
the person concerned, who may ask to be heard by the appointing authority.
Should it consider it necessary, the appointing authority may ask the compe-
tent national authorities for any further clarification they can provide. If the
negative opinion is confirmed, authorisation shall not be granted.
13. All persons granted authorisation within the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 5
shall, at the time the authorisation is granted and at regular intervals there-
after, receive any necessary instructions concerning the protection of
classified information and the means of ensuring such protection. Such
persons shall sign a declaration acknowledging receipt of the instructions
and give an undertaking to obey them.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 19
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14. The appointing authority shall take any measure necessary in order to
implement this section, in particular as regards the rules governing access
to the list of authorised persons.
15. Exceptionally, if required by the service, the appointing authority may, after
giving the national competent authorities notification and provided there is
no reaction from them within a month, grant temporary authorisation for a
period not exceeding six months, pending the outcome of the screening
referred to in paragraph 7.
16. The provisional and temporary authorisations thus granted shall not give
access to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET information; such access
shall be limited to officials who have effectively undergone a screening
with positive results, in accordance with paragraph 7. Pending the outcome
of the screening, the officials requested to be cleared at TRÈS SECRET
UE/EU TOP SECRET level, may be authorised temporarily and provision-
ally, to access information classified up to, and including SECRET UE.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 20
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SECTION VII
PREPARATION, DISTRIBUTION, TRANSMISSION, STORAGE AND
DESTRUCTION OF EU CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
Contents
General provisions
Chapter I Preparation and distribution of EU classified documents ......................
Chapter II Transmission of EU classified documents . .................................
Chapter III Electrical and other means of technical transmission . . . ......................
Chapter IV Extra copies and translations of, and extracts from, EU classified documents .....
Chapter V Musters and checks, storage and destruction of EU classified documents . . . ......
Chapter VI Specific rules applicable to documents intended for the Council ................2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 21
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General provisions
This section details measures for the preparation, distribution, transmission,
storage and destruction of EU classified documents as defined in paragraph
3(a) of the Basic Principles and Minimum Standards of Security set out in part
I of this Annex. It shall be used as a reference for the adaptation of those
measures for other EU classified material, according to its type and on a case-
by-case basis.
Chapter I
Preparation and distribution of EU classified documents
PREPARATION
1. The EU classifications and markings shall be applied as established in
Section II and appear at the top and bottom centre of each page, and each
page shall be numbered. Each EU classified document shall bear a reference
number and a date. In the case of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
and SECRET UE documents, this reference number shall appear on each
page. If they are to be distributed in several copies, each one shall bear a
copy number, which will appear on the first page, together with the total
number of pages. All annexes and enclosures shall be listed on the first
page of a document classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and above.
2. Documents classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and above shall be typed, trans-
lated, stored, photocopied, reproduced magnetically or microfilmed only by
persons who have been cleared for access to EU classified information up to
at least the appropriate security classification of the document in question,
except in the special case described in paragraph 27 of this section.
The provisions regulating the computerised production of classified docu-
ments are set out in Section XI.
DISTRIBUTION
3. EU classified information shall be distributed only to persons with a need to
know and having the appropriate security clearance. The initial distribution
shall be specified by the originator.
4. TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents shall be circulated
through TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registries (see Section
VIII). In the case of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET messages, the
competent registry may authorise the Head of the communications centre to
produce the number of copies specified in the list of addressees.
5. Documents classified SECRET UE and below may be redistributed by the
original addressee to other addressees based on a need to know. The origi-
nating authorities shall, however, clearly state any caveats they wish to
impose. Whenever such caveats are imposed, the addressees may redistri-
bute the documents only with the originating authorities' authorisation.
6. Every document classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and above shall, on
arriving at or leaving an establishment, be recorded by the establishment's
registry. The particulars to be entered (references, date and where applicable
the copy number) shall be such as to identify the documents and be entered
into a logbook or in special protected computer media.
Chapter II
Transmission of EU classified documents
PACKAGING
7. Documents classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and above shall be transmitted
in heavy duty, opaque double envelopes. The inner envelope shall be
marked with the appropriate EU security classification as well as, if
possible, full particulars of the recipient's job title and address.
8. Only a Registry Control Officer, or his substitute, may open the inner
envelope and acknowledge receipt of the documents enclosed, unless that
envelope is addressed to an individual. In such a case, the appropriate
Registry shall log the arrival of the envelope, and only the individual to
whom it is addressed may open the inner envelope and acknowledge receipt
of the documents it contains.
9. A receipt form shall be placed in the inner envelope. The receipt, which
will not be classified, should quote the reference number, date and copy
number of the document, but never its subject.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 22
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10. The inner envelope shall be enclosed in an outer envelope bearing a
package number for receipting purposes. Under no circumstances shall the
security classification appear on the outer envelope.
11. For documents classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and above, couriers and
messengers shall obtain receipts against the package numbers.
TRANSMISSION WITHIN A BUILDING OR GROUP OF BUILDINGS12. Within a given building or group of buildings, classified documents may be
carried in a sealed envelope bearing only the addressee's name, on condition
that it is carried by a person cleared to the level of classification of the
documents.
TRANSMISSION OF EU DOCUMENTS WITHIN A COUNTRY13. Within a country, TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents should
be sent only by means of official messenger service or by persons
authorised to have access to TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET infor-
mation.
14. Whenever a messenger service is used for the transmission of a TRÈS
SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET document outside the confines of a
building or group of buildings, the packaging and receipting provisions
contained in this Chapter shall be complied with. Delivery services shall
be so staffed as to ensure that packages containing TRÈS SECRET UE/EU
TOP SECRET documents remain under the direct supervision of a respon-
sible official at all times.
15. Exceptionally, TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents may be
taken by officials, other than messengers, outside the confines of a building
or group of buildings for local use at meetings and discussions, provided
that:
(a) the bearer is authorised to have access to those TRÈS SECRET UE/EU
TOP SECRET documents;
(b) the mode of transportation complies with national rules governing the
transmission of national TOP SECRET documents;
(c) under no circumstances does the official leave the TRÈS SECRET UE/
EU TOP SECRET documents unattended;
(d) arrangements are made for the list of documents so carried to be held in
the TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET Registry holding the docu-
ments and recorded in a log, and checked against this record on their
return.
16. Within a given country, SECRET UE and CONFIDENTIEL UE documents
may be sent either by post, if such transmission is permitted under national
regulations and is in accordance with the provisions of those regulations, or
by messenger service or by persons cleared for access to EU classified
information.
17. Each Member State or, EU decentralised agency, should prepare instruc-
tions on the personal carrying of EU classified documents based on these
regulations. The bearer should be required to read and sign these instruc-
tions. In particular, the instructions should make it clear that, under no
circumstances, may documents:
(a) leave the bearer's possession unless they are in safe custody in accor-
dance with the provisions contained in Section IV;
(b) be left unattended in public transport or private vehicles, or in places
such as restaurants or hotels. They may not be stored in hotel safes or
left unattended in hotel rooms;
(c) be read in public places such as aircraft or trains.
TRANSMISSION FROM ONE MEMBER STATE TO ANOTHER
18. Material classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and above should be conveyed
from one Member State to another by diplomatic or military courier
services.
19. However, the personal carriage of material classified SECRET UE and
CONFIDENTIEL UE may be permitted if provisions for the carriage are
such as to ensure that they cannot fall into any unauthorised person's hands.
20. NSAs may authorise personal carriage when diplomatic and military cour-
iers are not available or the use of such couriers would result in a delay
that would be detrimental to EU operations and the material is urgently
required by the intended recipient. Each Member State should prepare
instructions covering the personal carriage of material classified up to and2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 23
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including SECRET UE internationally by persons other than diplomatic and
military couriers. The instructions should require that:
(a) the bearer has the appropriate security clearance granted by Member
States;
(b) a record is held in the appropriate office or registry of all material so
carried;
(c) packages or bags containing EU material bear an official seal to prevent
or discourage inspection by customs, and labels with identification and
instructions to the finder;
(d) the bearer carries a courier certificate and/or mission order recognised
by all EU States authorising him to carry the package as identified;
(e) no EU non-Member State or its frontier is crossed when travelling over-
land unless the shipping State has a specific guarantee from that State;
(f) the bearer's travel arrangements with regard to destinations, routes to be
taken and means of transportation to be used will be in accordance with
EU Regulations or — if national regulations with respect to such
matters are more stringent — in accordance with such regulations;
(g) the material must not leave the possession of the bearer unless it is
housed in accordance with the provisions for safe custody contained in
Section IV;
(h) the material must not be left unattended in public or private vehicles, or
in places such as restaurants or hotels. It must not be stored in hotel
safes or left unattended in hotel rooms;
(i) if the material being carried contains documents, these must not be read
in public places (for example in aircraft, trains, etc.).
The person designated to carry the classified material must read and sign a
security briefing that contains, as a minimum, the instructions listed above
and procedures to be followed in an emergency or in case the package
containing the classified material is challenged by customs or airport
security officials.
TRANSMISSION OF RESTREINT UE DOCUMENTS
21. No special provisions are laid down for the conveyance of RESTREINT UE
documents, except that they should be such as to ensure that they cannot
fall into any unauthorised person's hands.
COURIER PERSONNEL SECURITY
22. All couriers and messengers employed to carry SECRET UE and CONFI-
DENTIEL UE documents shall be appropriately security cleared.
Chapter III
Electrical and other means of technical transmission
23. Communications security measures are designed to ensure the secure trans-
mission of EU classified information. The detailed rules applicable to the
transmission of such EU classified information are dealt with in Section XI.
24. Only accredited communications centres and networks and/or terminals and
systems may transmit information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and
SECRET UE.
Chapter IV
Extra copies and translations of and extracts from EU classified documents
25. Only the originator may authorise the copy or translation of TRÈS SECRET
UE/EU TOP SECRET documents.
26. If persons without TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET clearance require
information which, although contained in a TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET document, does not have that classification, the Head of the
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET Registry may be authorised to
produce the necessary number of extracts from that document. He/she shall,
at the same time, take the necessary steps to ensure that these extracts are
given the appropriate security classification.
27. Documents classified SECRET UE and lower may be reproduced and trans-
lated by the addressee, within the framework of the national security
regulations and on condition that it complies strictly with the need-to-know
principle. The security measures applicable to the original document shall
also be applicable to reproductions and/or translations thereof. EU decentra-
lised agencies shall follow these security regulations.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 24
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Chapter V
Musters and checks, storage and destruction of EU classified documents
MUSTERS AND CHECKS
28. Every year, each TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET Registry as
referred to in Section VIII shall carry out an itemised muster of TRÈS
SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents in accordance with the regula-
tions set out in Section VIII, (9) to (11). EU classified documents below the
level of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET shall be subject to internal
checks in accordance with national guidelines, and, in the case of the GSC
or EU decentralised agencies, according to instructions from the Secretary
General/High Representative.
These operations shall afford the opportunity to secure holders' views as to:
(a) the possibility of downgrading or declassifying certain documents;
(b) documents to be destroyed.
ARCHIVE STORAGE OF EU CLASSIFIED INFORMATION29. To minimise storage problems, the control officers of all registries shall be
authorised to have TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, SECRET UE
and CONFIDENTIEL UE documents microfilmed or otherwise stored in
magnetic or optical media for archive purposes, providing that:
(a) the microfilming/storage process is undertaken by personnel with
current clearance for the corresponding appropriate classification level;
(b) the microfilm/storage medium is afforded the same security as the
original documents;
(c) the microfilming/storing of any TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
document is reported to the originator;
(d) rolls of film, or other type of support, contain only documents of the
same TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, SECRET UE or CONFI-
DENTIEL UE classification;
(e) the microfilming/storing of a TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET or
SECRET UE document is clearly indicated in the record used for the
annual inventory;
(f) original documents which have been microfilmed or otherwise stored
are destroyed, in accordance with the regulations set out in paragraphs
31 to 36.
30. These rules also apply to any other form of storage authorised by the NSA,
such as electromagnetic media and optical disk.
ROUTINE DESTRUCTION OF EU CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
31. To prevent the unnecessary accumulation of EU classified documents, those
regarded by the Head of the establishment holding them as out of date and
surplus in number shall be destroyed as soon as practicable, in the following
manner:
(a) TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents shall be destroyed
only by the Central Registry responsible for them. Each document
destroyed shall be listed in a destruction certificate, signed by the
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET control officer and by the
officer witnessing the destruction, who shall be TRÈS SECRET UE/
EU TOP SECRET cleared. A note to this effect shall be made in the
logbook;
(b) the registry shall keep the destruction certificates, together with the
distribution sheets, for a period of ten years. Copies shall be forwarded
to the originator or to the appropriate central registry only when expli-
citly requested;
(c) TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents, including all classi-
fied waste resulting from the preparation of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU
TOP SECRET documents such as spoiled copies, working drafts, typed
notes and carbon paper, shall be destroyed, under the supervision of a
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET officer, by burning, pulping,
shredding or otherwise reducing into an unrecognisable and non-recon-
stitutable form.
32. SECRET UE documents shall be destroyed by the registry responsible for
those documents, under the supervision of a security cleared person, using
one of the processes indicated in paragraph 31(c). SECRET UE documents
that are destroyed shall be listed on signed destruction certificates to be
retained by the Registry, together with the distribution forms, for at least
three years.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 25
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33. CONFIDENTIEL UE documents shall be destroyed by the registry respon-
sible for those documents, under the supervision of a security cleared
person, by one of the processes indicated in paragraph 31(c). Their destruc-
tion shall be recorded in accordance with national regulations and, in the
case of GSC or EU decentralised agencies, according to instructions from
the Secretary-General/High Representative.
34. RESTREINT UE documents shall be destroyed by the registry responsible
for those documents or by the user, in accordance with national regulations
and, in the case of GSC or EU decentralised agencies, according to instruc-
tions from the Secretary-General/High Representative.
DESTRUCTION IN EMERGENCIES35. The GSC, the Member States and the EU decentralised agencies shall
prepare plans based on local conditions for the safeguarding of EU classi-
fied material in a crisis including if necessary emergency destruction and
evacuation plans; they shall promulgate, within their respective organisa-
tions, instructions deemed necessary to prevent EU classified information
from falling into unauthorised hands.
36. The arrangements for the safeguarding and/or destruction of SECRET UE
and CONFIDENTIEL UE material in a crisis shall under no circumstances
adversely affect the safeguarding or destruction of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU
TOP SECRET material, including the enciphering equipment, whose treat-
ment shall take priority over all other tasks. The measures to be adopted for
the safeguarding and destruction of enciphering equipment in an emergency
shall be covered by ad hoc instructions.
CHAPTER VI
Specific rules applicable to documents intended for the Council
37. Within the GSC, a ‘Classified Information Office’ shall monitor information
classified as SECRET UE or CONFIDENTIEL UE contained in documents
for the Council.
Under the authority of the Director-General for Personnel and Administra-
tion it shall:
(a) manage operations relating to the registration, reproduction, translation,
transmission dispatch and destruction of such information;
(b) update the list of particulars on classified information;
(c) periodically question issues on the need to maintain the classification of
information;
(d) lay down, in collaboration with the Security Office, the practical
arrangements for classifying and declassifying information.
38. The Classified Information Office shall keep a register of the following
particulars:
(a) the date of preparation of the classified information;
(b) the level of classification;
(c) the expiry date of the classification;
(d) the name and department of the issuer;
(e) the recipient or recipients, with serial number;
(f) the subject;
(g) the number;(h) the number of copies circulated;
(i) the preparation of inventories of the classified information submitted to
the Council;
(j) the register of declassification and downgrading of classified informa-
tion.
39. The general rules provided for in Chapters I to V of this Section shall apply
to the Classified Information Office of the GSC, unless modified by the
specific rules laid down in this Chapter.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 26
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SECTION VIII
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET REGISTRIES
1. The purpose of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registries is to
ensure the recording, handling and distribution of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU
TOP SECRET documents in accordance with security regulations. The
head of the TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registry, respectively in
each Member State, in the GSC and, as appropriate in EU decentralised
agencies, will be the TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET control officer.
2. Central registries will act as the main receiving and despatching authority in
Member States, in the GSC and EU decentralised agencies, in which such
registries have been set up, as well as, if appropriate, in other EU institu-
tions, international organisations and third States with which the Council
has agreements on security procedures for the exchange of classified infor-
mation.
3. When necessary, subregistries shall be established, to be responsible for the
internal management of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents;
they shall keep up-to-date records of the circulation of each document held
on the Subregistry's charge.
4. TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET sub-registries shall be set up as
specified in Section I in response to long term needs and shall be attached
to a central TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registry. If there is a
need to consult TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents only
temporarily and occasionally, these documents may be released without
setting up a TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET subregistry provided
rules are laid down to ensure that they remain under the control of the
appropriate TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registry and that all
physical and personnel security measures are observed.
5. Subregistries may not transmit TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET docu-
ments direct to other subregistries of the same central TRÈS SECRET UE/
EU TOP SECRET registry without express approval by the latter.
6. All exchanges of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents
between subregistries not attached to the same central registry shall be
routed through the central TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registries.
CENTRAL TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET REGISTRIES
7. As the control officer, the head of a central TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET registry shall be responsible for:
(a) the transmission of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents
in accordance with the regulations defined in Section VII;
(b) maintaining a list of all its dependent TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET sub-registries together with names and signatures of the
appointed control officers and their authorised deputies;
(c) holding receipts from registries for all TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET documents distributed by the central registry;
(d) maintaining a record of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET docu-
ments held and distributed;
(e) maintaining an up-to-date list of all central TRÈS SECRET UE/EU
TOP SECRET registries with which he/she normally corresponds,
together with the names and signatures of their appointed control offi-
cers and their authorised deputies;
(f) the physical safeguarding of all TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
documents held within the registry in accordance with regulations
contained in Section IV.
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET SUBREGISTRIES
8. As the control officer, the head of a TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
subregistry shall be responsible for:
(a) the transmission of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents
in accordance with regulations contained in Section VII and paragraphs
5 and 6 of Section VIII;
(b) maintaining an up-to-date list of all persons authorised to have access to
the TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET information under his
control;
(c) the distribution of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET documents in
accordance with the instructions of the originator or on a need-to-know2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 27
▼B
basis, having first checked that the addressee has the requisite security
clearance;
(d) maintaining an up-to-date record of all TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET documents held or circulating under his control or which
have been passed to other TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET regis-
tries and holding all corresponding receipts;
(e) maintaining an up-to-date list of TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
registries with whom he is authorised to exchange TRÈS SECRET UE/
EU TOP SECRET documents, together with the names and signatures
of their control officers and authorised deputies;
(f) the physical safeguarding of all TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
documents held within the subregistry in accordance with the regula-
tions laid down in Section IV.
INVENTORIES
9. Every twelve months, each TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registry
shall carry out an itemised inventory of all TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET documents for which it is accountable. A document is deemed to
have been accounted for if the registry physically musters the document, or
holds a receipt from the TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET registry to
which the document has been transferred, a destruction certificate for the
document or an instruction to downgrade or declassify that document.
10. Subregistries shall forward the findings of their annual inventory to the
central registry to which they are answerable, on a date specified by the
latter.
11. NSAs, as well as those EU institutions, international organisations and EU
decentralised agencies in which a central TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET registry has been set up, shall forward the findings of the annual
inventories conducted in central TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
registries to the Secretary-General/High Representative, by 1 April each
year at the latest.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 28
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SECTION IX
SECURITY MEASURES TO BE APPLIED AT THE TIME OF SPECIFIC
MEETINGS HELD OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL PREMISES AND INVOL-
VING HIGH SENSITIVITY ISSUES
GENERAL
1. When European Council, Council, Ministerial or other important meetings
are held outside the Council premises in Brussels and Luxembourg, and
where justified by the particular security requirements relating to the high
sensitivity of the issues or information dealt with, the security measures
described below should be taken. These measures concern only the protec-
tion of EU classified information; other security measures may have to be
planned.
RESPONSIBILITIES
Host Member States
2. The Member State on whose territory the meeting is being held (the host
Member State) should be responsible, in cooperation with the GSC security
office, for the security of the European Council, Council, Ministerial or
other important meetings and for the physical security of the principal dele-
gates and their staff.
As regards the protection of security, it should specifically ensure that:
(a) plans are drawn up to deal with security threats and security-related
incidents, the measures in question covering in particular the safe
custody of EU classified documents in offices;
(b) measures are taken to provide possible access to Council's communica-
tions system for the receipt and transmission of EU classified messages.
The host Member State will also provide access if required to secure
telephone systems.
Member States
3. The Member States' authorities should take the necessary steps to ensure
that:
(a) appropriate security clearance certification is provided for their national
delegates, if necessary by signal or fax, either directly to the meeting
security officer or via the GSC Security Office;
(b) any specific threat is made known to the host Member State's authori-
ties and, as appropriate, to the GSC Security Office so that appropriate
action can be taken.
Meeting Security Officer
4. A security officer should be appointed and be responsible for the general
preparation and control of general internal security measures and for coordi-
nation with the other security authorities concerned. The measures taken by
him/her should in general relate to:
(a) (i) protective measures at the meeting place to ensure that the meeting
is conducted without any incident that might compromise the
security of any EU classified information that may be used there;
(ii) checking the personnel whose access to the place of the meeting,
delegations' areas and conference rooms is permitted, and checking
any equipment;
(iii) constant coordination with the competent authorities of the host
Member State and with the GSC Security Office.
(b) the inclusion of security instructions in the meeting dossier with due
regard for the requirements set out in these security regulations and
any other security instructions considered necessary.
GSC Security Office
5. The GSC Security Office should act as an adviser on security for the
preparation of the meeting; it should be represented there to help and advise
the meeting security officer and delegations as necessary.
6. Each delegation to a meeting should designate a security officer, who will
be responsible for dealing with security matters within his/her delegation
and for maintaining liaison with the meeting security officer, as well as
with the GSC Security Office representative as required.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 29
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SECURITY MEASURES
Security areas
7. The following security areas should be established:
(a) a Class II security area, consisting of a drafting room, the GSC offices
and reprographic equipment, as well as delegations' offices as appro-
priate;
(b) a Class I security area, consisting of the conference room and inter-
preters' and sound engineers' booths;
(c) administrative areas, consisting of the press area and those parts of the
meeting place that are used for administration, catering and accommo-
dation, as well as the area immediately adjacent to the Press Centre and
the meeting place.
Passes
8. The meeting security officer should issue appropriate badges as requested
by the delegations, according to their needs. Where required, a distinction
may be made as regards access to different security areas.
9. The security instructions for the meeting should require all persons
concerned to wear and display their badges prominently at all times within
the place of the meeting, so that they can be checked as needed by security
personnel.
10. Apart from badge-holding participants, as few people as possible should be
admitted to the meeting place. National delegations wishing to receive visi-
tors during the meeting should notify the meeting security officer. Visitors
should be given a visitor's badge. A visitor's pass form bearing his/her name
and the name of the person being visited should be filled in. Visitors should
be accompanied at all times by a security guard or by the person being
visited. The visitor's pass form should be carried by the accompanying
person, who shall return it, together with the visitor's badge, to the security
personnel when the visitor leaves the meeting place.
Control of photographic and audio equipment
11. No camera or recording equipment may be brought into a Class I security
area, with the exception of equipment brought by photographers and by
sound engineers duly authorised by the meeting security officer.
Checking of briefcases, portable computers and packages
12. Pass-holders allowed access to a security area may normally bring in their
briefcases and portable computers (with own power supply only) without a
check being made. In the case of packages for delegations, delegations may
take delivery of the packages, which will either be inspected by the delega-
tion security officer, screened by special equipment or opened by security
personnel for inspection. If the meeting security officer considers it neces-
sary, more stringent measures for the inspection of briefcases and packages
may be laid down.
Technical security
13. The meeting room may be made technically secure by a technical security
team, which may also conduct electronic surveillance during the meeting.
Delegations' documents
14. Delegations should be responsible for taking EU classified documents to
and from meetings. They should also be responsible for the verification
and security of those documents during their use in the premises assigned
to them. The host Member States' help may be requested for the transporta-
tion of classified documents to and from the place of the meeting.
Safe custody of documents
15. If the GSC, the Commission or delegations are unable to store their classi-
fied documents in accordance with approved standards, they may lodge
those documents in a sealed envelope with the meeting security officer,
against receipt, so that the latter can store the documents in accordance
with approved standards.
Inspection of offices
16. The meeting security officer should arrange for the GSC and delegations'
offices to be inspected at the end of each working day to ensure that all
EU classified documents are being kept in a safe place; if not, he should
take the requisite measures.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 30
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Disposal of EU classified waste
17. All waste should be treated as EU classified, and waste-paper baskets or
bags should be given to the GSC and delegations for its disposal. Before
leaving the premises they have been assigned, the GSC and delegations
should take their waste to the meeting security officer, who should arrange
for its destruction according to the regulations.
18. At the end of the meeting, all documents held but no longer wanted by the
GSC or delegations should be treated as waste. A thorough search of GSC
and delegations' premises should be made before the security measures
adopted for the meeting are lifted. Documents for which a receipt was
signed should, as far as applicable, be destroyed as prescribed in Section
VII.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 31
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SECTION X
BREACHES OF SECURITY AND COMPROMISE OF EU CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
1. A breach of security occurs as the result of an act or omission contrary to a
Council or national security regulation which might endanger or compro-
mise EU classified information.
2. Compromise of EU classified information occurs when it has wholly or in
part fallen into the hands of unauthorised persons, i.e. who do not haveeither the appropriate security clearance or the necessary need-to-know or
if there is the likelihood of such an event having occurred.
3. EU classified information may be compromised as a result of carelessness,
negligence or indiscretion as well as by the activities of services which
target the EU or its Member States, as regards EU classified information
and activities, or by subversive organisations.
4. It is important that all persons who are required to handle EU classified
information are thoroughly briefed on security procedures, the dangers of
indiscreet conversation and their relationships with the press. They should
be aware of the importance of reporting any breach of security which may
come to their notice at once to the security authority of the Member State,
Institution or Agency in which they are employed.
5. When a security authority discovers or is informed of a breach of security
relating to EU classified information or of the loss or disappearance of EU
classified material, it shall take timely action in order to:
(a) establish the facts;
(b) assess and minimise the damage done;
(c) prevent a recurrence;
(d) notify the appropriate authorities of the effects of the breach of security.
In this context, the following information shall be provided:
(i) a description of the information involved, including its classification,
reference and copy number, date, originator, subject and scope;
(ii) a brief description of the circumstances of the breach of security,
including the date and the period during which the information was
exposed to compromise;
(iii) a statement of whether the originator has been informed.
6. It shall be the duty of each security authority, as soon as it is notified that
such a breach of security may have occurred, to report the fact immediately,
using the following procedure: the EU TOP SECRET sub-registry shall
report the matter to the GSC Security Office via its central EU TOP
SECRET registry; in the event of a compromise of EU classified informa-
tion occurring within the jurisdiction of a Member State, it shall be reported
to the GSC Security Office as specified in paragraph 5, through the NSA
responsible.
7. Cases involving RESTREINT UE information need to be reported only
when they present unusual features.
8. On being informed that a breach of security has occurred, the Secretary-
General/High Representative shall:
(a) notify the authority that originated the classified information in ques-
tion;
(b) ask the appropriate security authorities to initiate investigations;
(c) coordinate enquiries where more than one security authority is affected;
(d) obtain a report on the circumstances of the breach, the date or period
during which it may have occurred and was discovered, with a detailed
description of the content and classification of the material involved.
Damage done to the interests of the EU or of one or more of its
Member States and action taken to prevent a recurrence should also be
reported.
9. The originating authority shall inform the addressees and shall give appro-
priate instructions.
10. Any individual who is responsible for compromising EU classified informa-
tion shall be liable to disciplinary action according to the relevant rules and
regulations. Such action shall be without prejudice to any legal action.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 32
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SECTION XI
PROTECTION OF INFORMATION HANDLED IN INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Contents
Chapter I Introduction . . . ........................................................
Chapter II Definitions . . . ........................................................
Chapter III Security responsibilities .................................................
Chapter IV Non-technical security measures . . . .......................................
Chapter V Technical security measures .............................................
Chapter VI Security during handling . . . .............................................
Chapter VII Procurement . . ........................................................
Chapter VIII Temporary or occasional use .............................................2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 33
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Chapter I
Introduction
GENERAL ASPECTS
1. The security policy and requirements in this section shall apply to all
communications and information systems and networks (hereinafter
SYSTEMS) handling information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and
above.
2. SYSTEMS handling RESTREINT UE information also require security
measures to protect the confidentiality of that information. All SYSTEMS
require security measures to protect the integrity and availability of those
systems and of the information they contain. The security measures to be
applied to those systems will be determined by the designated Security
Accreditation Authority (SAA) and will be commensurate with the assessed
risk and consistent with the policy stated in these security regulations.
3. Protection of sensor systems containing embedded IT SYSTEMS shall be
determined and specified in the general context of the systems to which
they belong using applicable provisions of this section to the extent
possible.
THREATS TO, AND VULNERABILITIES OF SYSTEMS
4. In general terms, a threat can be defined as a potential for the accidental or
deliberate compromise of security. In the case of SYSTEMS, such a
compromise involves loss of one or more of the properties of confidenti-
ality, of integrity and of availability. A vulnerability can be defined as a
weakness or lack of controls that would facilitate or allow a threat actuation
against a specific asset or target. A vulnerability may be an omission or it
may relate to a deficiency in a control's strength, completeness or consis-
tency; it may be technical, procedural or operational in nature.
5. EU classified and unclassified information handled in SYSTEMS in a
concentrated form designed for rapid retrieval, communication and use is
vulnerable to many risks. These include access to the information by
unauthorised users or, conversely, denial of access to authorised users.
There are also the risks of the unauthorised disclosure, corruption, modifica-
tion or deletion of the information. Furthermore, the complex and
sometimes fragile equipment is expensive and often difficult to repair or
replace rapidly. These SYSTEMS are therefore attractive targets for intelli-
gence gathering operations and sabotage, especially if security measures are
thought to be ineffective.
SECURITY MEASURES
6. The main purpose of the security measures stated in this section is to
provide protection against unauthorised disclosure of information (the loss
of confidentiality) and against the loss of integrity and availability of infor-
mation. To achieve adequate security protection of a SYSTEM handling EU
classified information, the appropriate standards of conventional security
shall be specified, along with appropriate special security procedures and
techniques particularly designed for each SYSTEM.
7. A balanced set of security measures shall be identified and implemented to
create a secure environment in which a SYSTEM operates. The fields of
application of those measures concern physical elements, personnel, non-
technical procedures, computer and communications operating procedures.
8. Computer security measures (hardware and software security features) shall
be required to implement the need-to-know principle, and to prevent or
detect the unauthorised disclosure of information. The extent to which
computer security measures are to be relied upon shall be determined during
the process of establishing the security requirement. The process of accred-
itation shall determine that an adequate level of assurance is present to
support this reliance on computer security measures.
SYSTEM-SPECIFIC SECURITY REQUIREMENT STATEMENT (SSRS)
9. For all SYSTEMS handling information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE
and above, a SYSTEM-Specific Security Requirement Statement (SSRS)
shall be required to be produced by the IT System Operational Authority
(ITSOA) in cooperation with input and assistance as required from the
project staff and INFOSEC Authority, and approved by the SAA. An
SSRS shall also be required where the availability and integrity of the
RESTREINT UE or unclassified information is deemed critical by the SAA.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 34
▼B
10. The SSRS shall be formulated at the earliest stage of a project's inception
and shall be developed and enhanced as the project develops, fulfilling
different roles at different stages in the project and SYSTEM's life cycle.
11. The SSRS shall form the binding agreement between the IT System Opera-
tional Authority and the SAA against which the SYSTEM is to be
accredited.
12. The SSRS is a complete and explicit statement of the security principles to
be observed and of the detailed security requirements to be met. It is based
on Council security policy and risk assessment, or imposed by parameters
covering the operational environment, the lowest level of personnel security
clearance, the highest classification of information handled, the security
mode of operation or user requirements. The SSRS is an integral part of
project documentation submitted to the appropriate authorities for technical,
budgetary and security approval purposes. In its final form, the SSRS
constitutes a complete statement of what it means for the SYSTEM to be
secure.
SECURITY MODES OF OPERATION
13. All SYSTEMS handling information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and
above shall be accredited to operate in one, or where warranted by require-
ments during different time periods, more than one, of the following
security modes of operation, or their national equivalent:
(a) dedicated;
(b) system high; and
(c) multi-level.
Chapter II
Definitions
ADDITIONAL MARKINGS
14. Additional markings such as CRYPTO or any other EU-recognised special
handling designator, shall apply where there is a need for limited distribu-
tion and special handling in addition to that designated by the security
classification.
15. ‘DEDICATED’ SECURITY MODE OF OPERATION shall mean: a mode
of operation in which ALL individuals with access to the SYSTEM are
cleared to the highest classification level of information handled within the
SYSTEM, and with a common need-to-know for ALL of the information
handled within the SYSTEM.
Notes:(1) The common need-to-know indicates there is no mandatory requirement
for computer security features to provide separation of information
within the SYSTEM.
(2) Other security features (for example, physical, personnel and proce-
dural) shall conform to the requirements for the highest classification
level and all category designations of the information handled within
the SYSTEM.
16. ‘SYSTEM HIGH’ SECURITY MODE OF OPERATION shall mean: a
mode of operation in which ALL individuals with access to the SYSTEM
are cleared to the highest classification level of information handled within
the SYSTEM, but NOT ALL individuals with access to the SYSTEM have
a common need-to-know for the information handled within the SYSTEM.
Notes:(1) The lack of common need-to-know indicates that there is a requirement
for computer security features to provide selective access to, and
separation of, information within the SYSTEM.
(2) Other security features (for example, physical, personnel and proce-
dural) shall conform to the requirements for the highest classification
level and all category designations of the information handled within
the SYSTEM.
(3) All information handled or being available to a SYSTEM under this
mode of operation, together with output generated, shall be protected
as potentially of the information category designation and of the highest
classification level being handled until determined otherwise, unless
there is an acceptable level of trust that can be placed in any labelling
functionality present.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 35
▼B
17. ‘MULTI-LEVEL’ SECURITY MODE OF OPERATION shall mean: a
mode of operation in which NOT ALL individuals with access to the
SYSTEM are cleared to the highest classification level of information
handled within the SYSTEM, and NOT ALL individuals with access to
the SYSTEM have a common need-to-know for the information handled
within the SYSTEM.
Notes:(1) This mode of operation permits, currently, the handling of information
of different classification levels and of mixed information category
designations.
(2) The fact that not all individuals are cleared to the highest levels, asso-
ciated with a lack of common need-to-know, indicates that there is a
requirement for computer security features to provide elective access
to, and separation of, information within the SYSTEM.
18. INFOSEC shall mean: the application of security measures to protect infor-
mation processed, stored or transmitted in communication, information and
other electronic systems against loss of confidentiality, integrity or avail-
ability, whether accidental or intentional, and to prevent loss of integrity
and availability of the systems themselves. INFOSEC measures include
those of computer, transmission, emission and cryptographic security, and
the detection, documentation and countering of threats to information and
to the SYSTEMS.
19. COMPUTER SECURITY (COMPUSEC) shall mean: the application of
hardware, firmware and software security features to a computer system in
order to protect against, or prevent, the unauthorised disclosure, manipula-
tion, modification/deletion of information or denial of service.
20. COMPUTER SECURITY PRODUCT shall mean: a generic computer
security item which is intended for incorporation into an IT system for use
in enhancing, or providing for, confidentiality, integrity or availability of
information handled.
21. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) shall mean: the application
of security measures to telecommunications in order to deny unauthorised
persons information of value which might be derived from the possession
and study of such telecommunications or to ensure the authenticity of such
telecommunications.
Note:Such measures include cryptographic, transmission and emission security;
and also include procedural, physical, personnel, document and computer
security.
22. EVALUATION shall mean: the detailed technical examination, by an
appropriate authority, of the security aspects of a SYSTEM or of a crypto-
graphic or a computer security product.
Notes:(1) The evaluation investigates the presence of required security function-
ality and the absence of compromising side-effects from such
functionality and assesses the incorruptibility of such functionality.
(2) The evaluation determines the extent to which the security requirements
of a SYSTEM, or the security claims of a computer security product,
are satisfied and establishes the assurance level of the SYSTEM or of
the cryptographic, or the computer security product's trusted function.
23. CERTIFICATION shall mean: the issue of a formal statement, supported by
an independent review of the conduct and results of an evaluation, of the
extent to which a SYSTEM meets the security requirement, or a computer
security product meets pre-defined security claims.
24. ACCREDITATION shall mean: the authorisation and approval granted to a
SYSTEM to process EU classified information in its operational environ-
ment.
Note:Such accreditation should be made after all appropriate security procedures
have been implemented and a sufficient level of protection of the system
resources has been achieved. Accreditation should normally be made on
the basis of the SSRS, including the following:
(a) a statement of the objective of accreditation for the system; in parti-
cular, what classification level(s) of information are to be handled and
what system or network security mode(s) of operation is being
proposed;2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 36
▼B
(b) production of a risk management review to identify the threats and
vulnerabilities and measures to counter them;
(c) the Security Operating Procedures (SecOPs) with a detailed description
of the proposed operations (e.g., modes, services, to be provided) and
including a description of the SYSTEM security features which shall
form the basis of accreditation;
(d) the plan for the implementation and maintenance of the security
features;
(e) the plan for initial and follow-on system security or network security
test, evaluation and certification; and
(f) certification, where required, together with other elements of accredita-
tion.
25. IT SYSTEM shall mean: assembly of equipment, methods and procedures,
and if necessary, personnel, organised to accomplish information processing
functions.
Notes:
(1) This is taken to mean an assembly of facilities, configured for handling
information within the system.
(2) Such systems may be in support of consultation, command, control,
communications, scientific or administrative applications including
word processing;
(3) The boundaries of a system will generally be determined as being the
elements under the control of a single ITSOA.
(4) An IT system may contain subsystems some of which are themselves IT
systems.
26. IT SYSTEM SECURITY FEATURES comprise all hardware/firmware/soft-
ware functions, characteristics, and features; operating procedures,
accountability procedures, and access controls, the IT area, remote term-
inal/workstation area, and the management constraints, physical structure
and devices, personnel and communications controls needed to provide an
acceptable level of protection for classified information to be handled in
an IT system.
27. IT NETWORK shall mean: organisation, geographically disseminated, of IT
systems interconnected to exchange data, and comprising the components of
the interconnected IT systems and their interface with the supporting data or
communications networks.
Notes:
(1) An IT network can use the services of one or several communications
networks interconnected to exchange data; several IT networks can use
the services of a common communications network.
(2) An IT network is called ‘local’ if it links several computers together in
the same site.
28. IT NETWORK SECURITY FEATURES include the IT system security
features of individual IT systems comprising the network together with
those additional components and features associated with the network as
such (for example, network communications, security identification and
labelling mechanisms and procedures, access controls, programs and audit
trails) needed to provide an acceptable level of protection for classified
information.
29. IT AREA shall mean: an area which contains one or more computers, their
local peripheral and storage units, control units and dedicated network and
communications equipment.
Note:
This does not include a separate area in which remote peripheral devices or
terminals/workstations are located even though those devices are connected
to equipment in the IT area.
30. REMOTE TERMINAL/WORKSTATION AREA shall mean: an area
containing some computer equipment, its local peripheral devices or term-
inals/workstations and any associated communications equipment, separate
from an IT area.
31. TEMPEST countermeasures: security measures intended to protect equip-
ment and communication infrastructures against the compromise of
classified information through unintentional electromagnetic emissions.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 37
▼B
Chapter III
Security responsibilities
GENERALITIES
32. The responsibilities of the Security Committee, defined in Section I, para-
graph 4 include INFOSEC issues. The Security Committee shall organise
its activities in such a way that it can provide expert advice on the above
issues.
33. In case of problems regarding security (incidents, breaches, etc.), immediate
action shall be taken by the responsible National Authority and/or the GSC
Security Office. All problems shall be referred to the GSC Security Office
34. The Secretary-General/High Representative or, where appropriate, the Head
of an EU decentralised agency, shall establish an INFOSEC Office to
provide guidance to the security authority on the implementation and
control of special security features designed as part of SYSTEMS.
SECURITY ACCREDITATION AUTHORITY (SAA)
35. The SAA shall be either:
— an NSA,
— the Authority designated by the Secretary-General/High Representative,
— the security authority of a EU decentralised agency, or— their delegated/nominated representatives, depending on the SYSTEM to
be accredited.
36. The SAA shall be responsible for ensuring the compliance of SYSTEMS
with the Council's security policy. One of its tasks shall be to grant the
approval of a SYSTEM to handle EU classified information to a defined
level of classification in its operational environment. As regards the GSC
and, as appropriate EU decentralised agencies, the SAA shall exercise
responsibility for security on behalf of the Secretary-General/High Repre-
sentative or of the Heads of decentralised agencies.
The jurisdiction of the GSC SAA shall cover all the SYSTEMS that are in
operation within the premises of the GSC. SYSTEMS and components of
SYSTEMS in operation within a Member State shall remain under the juris-
diction of that Member State. When different components of a SYSTEM
come under the jurisdiction of the GSC SAA and others SAAs, all the
parties will appoint a joint accreditation board under the coordination of
the GSC SAA.
INFOSEC AUTHORITY (IA)
37. The INFOSEC Authority is responsible for the INFOSEC office activities.
As regards the GSC and, as appropriate, EU decentralised agencies, the
INFOSEC Authority is responsible for:
— providing technical advice and assistance to the SAA,
— assisting in the development of the SSRS,
— reviewing the SSRS to ensure consistency with these security regula-
tions and the INFOSEC policies and architecture documents,
— participating in the accreditation panels/boards as required and providing
INFOSEC recommendation on accreditation to the SAA,
— providing support to the INFOSEC training and education activities,
— providing technical advice in investigation of INFOSEC related inci-
dents,
— establishing technical policy guidance to ensure that only authorised
software is used.
IT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY (ITSOA)
38. The INFOSEC Authority shall delegate at the earliest stage possible the
responsibility for the implementation and operation of controls and special
security features of the SYSTEM to the ITSOA. This responsibility shall
extend throughout the life cycle of the SYSTEM from the project concept
stage to final disposal.
39. The ITSOA shall be responsible for all security measures designed as part
of the overall SYSTEM. This responsibility includes the preparation of the
SecOPs. The ITSOA shall specify the security standards and practices to be
met by the supplier of the SYSTEM.
40. The ITSOA may delegate a part of its responsibilities where appropriate to,
for instance the INFOSEC security officer and the INFOSEC site security2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 38
▼B
officer. The various INFOSEC functions may be performed by a single
person.
USERS
41. All users shall be responsible for ensuring that their actions do not
adversely affect the security of the SYSTEM that they are using.
INFOSEC TRAINING
42. INFOSEC education and training shall be available at various levels, and
for various personnel, as appropriate, within the GSC, EU decentralised
Agencies or Member State government departments.
Chapter IV
Non-technical security measures
PERSONNEL SECURITY
43. Users of the SYSTEM shall be cleared and have a need-to-know, as appro-
priate for the classification and content of the information handled within
their particular SYSTEM. Access to certain equipment or information
specific to security of SYSTEMS will call for special clearance issued
according to Council procedures.
44. The SAA shall designate all sensitive positions and specify the level of
clearance and supervision required by all personnel occupying them.
45. SYSTEMS shall be specified and designed in a way that facilitates the allo-
cation of duties and responsibilities to personnel so as to prevent one person
having complete knowledge or control of the system security keys points.
The aim should be that collusion between two or more individuals would
be necessary for alteration or intentional degradation of the system or
network to take place.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
46. IT and remote terminal/workstation areas (as defined in paragraphs 29 and
30) in which information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and above is
handled by IT means, or where potential access to such information is
possible, shall be established as EU Class I or Class II security areas or
national equivalent, as appropriate.
47. IT and remote terminal/workstation areas in which the security of the
SYSTEM can be modified shall not be occupied by only one authorised
official/other servant.
CONTROL OF ACCESS TO A SYSTEM
48. All information and material which allow access control to a SYSTEM shall
be protected under arrangements commensurate with the highest classifica-
tion and the category designation of the information to which it may give
access.
49. When no longer used for this purpose, the access control information and
material shall be destroyed pursuant to paragraphs 61 to 63.
Chapter V
Technical security measures
SECURITY OF INFORMATION
50. It shall be incumbent upon the originator of the information to identify and
classify all information-bearing documents, whether they be in the form of
hard-copy output or computer storage media. Each page of hard-copy output
shall be marked, at the top and bottom, with the classification. Output,
whether it is the form of hard-copy or computer storage media shall have
the same classification as the highest classification of the information used
for its production. The way in which a SYSTEM is operated may also
impact on the classification of outputs of that system.
51. It shall be incumbent upon an organisation and its information holders to
consider the problems of aggregation of individual elements of information,
and the inferences that can be gained from the related elements, and deter-
mine whether or not a higher classification is appropriate to the totality of
the information.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 39
▼B
52. The fact that the information may be a brevity code, transmission code or in
any form of binary representation does not provide any security protection
and should not, therefore, influence the classification of the information.
53. When information is transferred from one SYSTEM to another the informa-
tion shall be protected during transfer and in the receiving SYSTEM in the
manner commensurate with the original classification and category of the
information.
54. All computer storage media shall be handled in a manner commensurate
with the highest classification of the stored information or the media label,
and at all times shall be appropriately protected.
55. Reusable computer storage media used for recording EU classified informa-
tion shall retain the highest classification for which they have ever been
used until that information has been properly downgraded or declassified
and the media reclassified accordingly, or the media declassified or
destroyed by an approved GSC or national procedure (see paragraphs 61 to
63).
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF INFORMATION
56. Automatic (audit trails) or manual logs shall be kept as a record of access to
information classified SECRET UE and above. These records shall be
retained in accordance with these security regulations.
57. EU classified outputs held within the IT area may be handled as one classi-
fied item and need not be registered, provided the material is identified,
marked with its classification and controlled in an appropriate manner.
58. Where output is generated from a SYSTEM handling EU classified infor-
mation, and transmitted to a remote terminal/workstation area from an IT
area, procedures, agreed by the SAA shall be established for controlling
the remote output. For SECRET UE and above, such procedures shall
include specific instructions for accountability of the information.
HANDLING AND CONTROL OF REMOVABLE COMPUTER STORAGE
MEDIA
59. All removable computer storage media classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and
above shall be handled as material and general rules will apply. Appropriate
identification and classification markings need to be adapted to the specific
physical appearances of the media, to enable it to be clearly recognised.
60. Users shall take the responsibility for ensuring that EU classified informa-
tion is stored on media with the appropriate classification marking and
protection. Procedures shall be established to ensure that, for all levels of
EU information, the storage of information on computer storage media is
being carried out in accordance with these security regulations.
DECLASSIFICATION AND DESTRUCTION OF COMPUTER STORAGE
MEDIA
61. Computer storage media used for recording EU classified information may
be downgraded or declassified if approved GSC or national procedures are
applied.
62. Computer storage media which has held TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET or special category information shall not be declassified and
reused.
63. If computer storage media cannot be declassified or is not reusable, it shall
be destroyed by an approved GSC or national procedure.
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
64. When EU classified information is transmitted electromagnetically, special
measures shall be implemented to protect the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of such transmissions. The SAA shall determine the require-
ments for protecting transmissions from detection and interception. The
information being transmitted in a communication system shall be protected
based upon the requirements for confidentiality, integrity and availability.
65. When cryptographic methods are required to provide confidentiality, integ-
rity and availability protection such methods or associated products shall be
specifically approved for the purpose by the SAA.
66. During transmission, the confidentiality of information classified SECRET
UE and above shall be protected by cryptographic methods or products
approved by the Council upon recommendation of the Council Security
Committee. During transmission, the confidentiality of information classi-2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 40
▼B
fied CONFIDENTIEL UE or RESTREINT UE shall be protected by crypto-
graphic methods or products approved either by the SG/HR upon
recommendation of the Council Security Committee or by a Member State.
67. Detailed rules applicable to the transmission of EU classified information
shall be set out in specific security instructions approved by the Council
upon recommendation of the Council Security Committee.
68. Under exceptional operational circumstances, information classified
RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE and SECRET UE may be trans-
mitted in clear text provided each occasion is explicitly authorised. Such
exceptional circumstances are as follows:
(a) during impending or actual crisis, conflict, or war situations; and
(b) when speed of delivery is of paramount importance, and means of
encryption are not available, and it is assessed that the transmitted infor-
mation cannot be exploited in time to adversely influence operations.
69. A SYSTEM shall have the capability of positively denying access to EU
classified information at any or all of its remote workstations or terminals,
when required either by physical disconnection or by special software
features approved by the SAA.
INSTALLATION AND RADIATION SECURITY
70. Initial installation of SYSTEMS and any major change thereto shall be so
specified that installation is carried out by security cleared installers under
constant supervision by technically qualified personnel who are cleared for
access to EU classified information to the level equivalent to the highest
classification which the SYSTEM is expected to store and handle.
71. All equipment shall be installed in accordance with current Council's
security policy.
72. SYSTEMS handling information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and above
shall be protected in such a way that their security cannot be threatened bycompromising emanations, the study and control of which is referred to as
‘TEMPEST’.
73. TEMPEST countermeasures for GSC and EU decentralised agencies instal-
lations shall be reviewed and approved by a TEMPEST authority designated
by the GSC Security authority. For national installations which handle EU
classified information, the approval authority shall be the recognised
national TEMPEST approval authority.
Chapter VI
Security during handling
SECURITY OPERATING PROCEDURES
74. SecOPs define the principles to be adopted on security matters, the oper-
ating procedures to be followed, and personnel responsibilities. The
SecOPs shall be prepared under the responsibility of the ITSOA.
SOFTWARE PROTECTION/CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
75. Security protection of applications programs shall be determined on the
basis of an assessment of the security classification of the program itself
rather than of the classification of the information it is to process. The soft-
ware versions in use should be verified at regular intervals to ensure their
integrity and correct functioning.
76. New or modified versions of software should not be used for the handling
of EU classified information until verified by the ITSOA.
CHECKING FOR THE PRESENCE OF MALICIOUS SOFTWARE/
COMPUTER VIRUSES
77. Checking for the presence of malicious software/computer viruses shall be
periodically carried out in accordance with the requirements of the SAA.
78. All computer storage media arriving in the GSC or EU decentralised agen-
cies or in the Member States should be checked for the presence of any
malicious software or computer viruses, before being introduced to any
SYSTEM.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 41
▼B
MAINTENANCE
79. Contracts and procedures for scheduled and on-call maintenance of
SYSTEMS for which a SSRS has been produced shall specify requirements
and arrangements for maintenance personnel and their associated equipment
entering to an IT area.
80. The requirements shall be clearly stated in the SSRS and the procedures
shall be clearly stated in the SecOPs. Contractor maintenance requiring
remote access diagnostic procedures shall be permitted only in exceptional
circumstances, under stringent security control, and only with the approval
of the SAA.
Chapter VII
Procurement
81. Any security product to be used with the SYSTEM to be procured should
either have been evaluated and certified, or currently be under evaluation
and certification by an appropriate Evaluation or Certification body against
internationally acknowledged criteria (such as the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, see ISO 15 408).
82. In deciding whether equipment, particularly computer storage media, should
be leased rather than purchased, it should be borne in mind that such equip-
ment, once used for handling EU classified information, cannot be released
outside an appropriately secure environment without first being declassified
to the approval of the SAA and that such approval may not always be
possible.
ACCREDITATION
83. All SYSTEMS for which a SSRS has to be produced, prior to handling EU
classified information, shall be accredited, based upon information provided
in the SSRS, SecOPs and any other relevant documentation, by the SAA.
Subsystems and remote terminals/workstations shall be accredited as part
of all the SYSTEMS to which they are connected. Where a SYSTEM
supports both Council and other organisations, the GSC and relevant
Security Authorities shall mutually agree on the accreditation.
84. The accreditation process may be carried out in accordance with an accred-
itation strategy appropriate to the particular SYSTEM and defined by the
SAA.
EVALUATION AND CERTIFICATION
85. Prior to accreditation, in certain instances, the hardware, firmware and soft-
ware security features of a SYSTEM shall be evaluated and certified as
being capable of safeguarding information at the intended level of classifi-
cation.
86. The requirements for evaluation and certification shall be included in
system planning, and clearly stated in the SSRS.
87. The evaluation and certification processes shall be carried out in accordance
with approved guidelines and by technically qualified and appropriately
cleared personnel acting on behalf of the ITSOA.
88. The teams may be provided from a nominated Member State's evaluation or
certification authority or its nominated representatives, for example a
competent and cleared contractor.
89. The degree of evaluation and certification processes involved may be
lessened (for example, only involving integration aspects) where SYSTEMS
are based on existing nationally evaluated and certified computer security
products.
ROUTINE CHECKING OF SECURITY FEATURES FOR CONTINUED
ACCREDITATION
90. The ITSOA shall establish routine control procedures which shall ensure
that all security features of the SYSTEM are still valid.
91. The types of change that would give rise to re-accreditation, or that require
the prior approval of the SAA, shall be clearly identified and stated in the
SSRS. After any modification, repair or failure which could have affected
the security features of the SYSTEM, the ITSOA shall ensure that a check
is made to ensure the correct operation of the security features. Continued
accreditation of the SYSTEM shall normally depend on the satisfactory
completion of the checks.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 42
▼B
92. All SYSTEMS where security features have been implemented shall be
inspected or reviewed on a periodic basis by the SAA. In respect of
SYSTEMS handling TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET or additional
markings information the inspections shall be carried out not less than
once annually.
Chapter VIII
Temporary or occasional use
SECURITY OF MICROCOMPUTERS/PERSONAL COMPUTERS
93. Microcomputers/Personal Computers (PCs) with fixed disks (or other non-
volatile storage media), operating either in stand-alone mode or as
networked configurations, and portable computing devices (for example,
portable PCs and electronic ‘notebooks’) with fixed hard disks, shall be
considered as information storage media in the same sense as floppy disk-
ettes or other removable computer storage media.
94. These equipment shall be afforded the level of protection, in terms of
access, handling, storage and transportation, commensurate with the highest
classification level of information ever stored or processed (until down-
graded or declassified in accordance with approved procedures).
USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED IT EQUIPMENT FOR OFFICIAL COUNCIL
WORK
95. The use of privately-owned removable computer storage media, software
and IT hardware (for example, PCs and portable computing devices) with
storage capability shall be prohibited for handling EU classified informa-
tion.
96. Privately-owned hardware, software and media shall not be brought into any
Class I or Class II area where EU classified information is handled without
the permission of the Head of the Security Office of the GSC or of a
Member State's Department or of the respective EU decentralised agency.
USE OF THE CONTRACTOR-OWNED OR NATIONALLY-SUPPLIED IT
EQUIPMENT FOR OFFICIAL COUNCIL WORK
97. The use of contractor-owned IT equipment and software in organisations in
support of official Council work may be permitted by the Head of the
Security Office of the GSC or of a Member State's Department or of the
respective EU decentralised agency. The use of nationally-provided IT
equipment and software by employees in the GSC or a EU decentralised
agency may also be permitted; in this case, the IT equipment shall be
brought under the control of the appropriate GSC's inventory. In either
case, if the IT equipment is to be used for handling EU classified informa-
tion, then the appropriate SAA shall be consulted in order that the elements
of INFOSEC that are applicable to the use of that equipment are properly
considered and implemented.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 43
▼B
SECTION XII
RELEASE OF EU CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THIRD STATES
OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
PRINCIPLES REGULATING THE RELEASE OF EU CLASSIFIED INFOR-
MATION
1. The release of EU classified information to third States or international
organisations will be decided by the Council on the basis of:
— the nature and content of such information,
— the recipients' need to know,
— the measure of advantages to EU.
The Member State originator of the EU classified information to be released
will be asked for its agreement.
2. These decisions will be taken on a case-by-case basis, depending on:
— the desired degree of cooperation with the third States or international
organisations concerned,
— the confidence that may be placed in them, which ensues from the level
of security that would be applied to the EU classified information
entrusted to those States or organisations and from the consistency
between the security rules applicable there and those applied in EU;
the Council Security Committee will give the Council its technical
opinion on this point.
3. The acceptance of EU classified information by third States or international
organisations will imply an assurance that the information will be used for
no purposes other than those motivating the release or exchange of informa-
tion, and that they will provide the protection required by the Council.
LEVELS
4. Once the Council has decided that classified information may be released to
or exchanged with a given State or international organisation, it will decide
on the level of cooperation that is possible. This will depend in particular on
the security policy and regulations applied by that State or organisation.
5. There are three levels of cooperation:
Level 1
Cooperation with third States or with international organisations whose
security policy and regulations are very close to EU's.
Level 2
Cooperation with third States or with international organisations whose
security policy and regulations are markedly different from EU's.
Level 3
Occasional cooperation with third States or with international organisations
whose policy and security regulations cannot be assessed.
6. Each level of cooperation will determine the security regulations, reworded
in individual cases in the light of the Council Security Committee's tech-
nical opinion, that the beneficiaries will be asked to apply to the protection
of the classified information released to them. These procedures and
security regulations are detailed in Appendices 4, 5 and 6.
THE AGREEMENTS
7. Once the Council has decided that there is a permanent or long-term need
for the exchange of classified information between the EU and third States
or other international organisations, it will draw up ‘agreements on security
procedures for the exchange of classified information’ with them, defining
the purpose of cooperation and the reciprocal rules on the protection of the
information exchanged.
8. In the case of Level 3 occasional cooperation, which by definition is limited
in time and purpose, a simple memorandum of understanding defining the
nature of the classified information to be exchanged and the reciprocal obli-
gations regarding that information may take the place of the ‘agreement on
procedures for the exchange of classified information’ on condition that it is
classified no higher than RESTREINT UE.
9. Draft agreements on security procedures or memoranda of understanding,
will be approved by the Security Committee before they are presented to
the Council for a decision.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 44
▼B
10. NSAs will provide the Secretary-General/High Representative with all
necessary assistance to ensure that the information to be released is used
and protected in accordance with the provisions of the agreements on
security procedures or memoranda of understanding.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 45
▼B
Appendix 1
List of national security authorities
BELGIUM
Service public fédéral des affaires étrangères, du commerce extérieur et de la
coopération au développement
Autorité nationale de sécurité (ANS)Direction du protocole et de la sécuritéService de la sécurité P & S 6Rue des Petits Carmes 15B-1000 Bruxelles
Federale Overheidsdienst Buitenlandse Zaken, Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwik-
kelingssamenwerking
Nationale Veiligheidsoverheid (NVO)
Directie Protocol en Veiligheid P&S 6
Karmelietenstraat 15B-1000 BrusselTéléphone du secrétariat: (32-2) 519 05 74Téléphone de la présidence: (32-2) 501 82 20; (32-2) 501 87 10Télécopieur: (32-2) 519 05 96
CZECH REPUBLIC
National Security Authority
Na Popelce 2/16
CZ-150 06 Praha 56
Telefon: (420) 257 28 33 35Fax: (420) 257 28 31 10
DENMARK
Politiets Efterretningstjeneste
Klausdalsbrovej 1DK-2860 SøborgTelefon (45) 33 14 88 88Fax (45) 33 43 01 90
GERMANY
Bundesministerium des Innern
Referat IS 2Alt-Moabit 101 D
D-11014 Berlin
Telefon: 49-18 88–681-15 26Fax: 49-18 88-681-558 06
ESTONIA
Ministry of Defence, Republic of Estonia, Department of Security
Sakala 1EE-15094 TallinnTelefon: (372) 717 00 30Fax: (372) 717 00 01
GREECE
Γενικό Επιτελείο Εθνικής Άµυνας (ΓΕΕΘΑ)
Υπηρεσία Στρατιωτικών Πληροφοριών (ΥΣΠ —Β Κλάδος)
Τµήµα Ασφαλείας και Αντιπληροφοριών
ΣΤΓ 1020-Χολαργός (Αθήνα)
ΕλλάδαΤηλέφωνα: (30) 210 657 20 09 (ώρες γραφείου), (30) 210 657 20 10 (ώρες
γραφείου)
Φαξ: (30) 210 642 64 32, (30) 210 657 21 81
Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS)
Military Intelligence Service (MIS-Bi Branch)Security Counterintelligence SectionGR-STG 1020 Holargos — Athens
Telephone: (30) 210 657 20 09, (30) 210 657 20 10
Fax: (30) 210 642 64 32, (30) 210 657 21 812001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 46
▼M1
▼M1
SPAIN
Autoridad Nacional de Seguridad
Oficina Nacional de Seguridad
Avenida Padre Huidobro s/nCarretera Nacional Radial VI, km 8,5
E-28023 Madrid
Teléfono: (34-91) 372 57 07, (34-91) 372 50 27Fax: (34-91) 372 58 08
FRANCE
Secrétariat général de la défense nationale
Service de sécurité et de défense (SGDN/SSD)
51 boulevard de la Tour-Maubourg
F-75700 Paris 07 SP
Téléphone: (33-1) 71 75 81 77Télécopieur: (33-1) 71 75 82 00
IRELAND
National Security Authority
Department of Foreign Affairs
80 St. Stephens GreenDublin 2
Ireland
Telephone: (353-1) 478 08 22
Fax: (353-1) 478 14 84
ITALY
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
Autorità Nazionale per la SicurezzaUfficio Centrale per la Sicurezza
Via della Pineta Sacchetti, 216
I-00168 RomaTel.: (39) 066 27 47 75
Fax: (39) 066 14 33 97
CYPRUS
Υπουργείο Άµυνας
Στρατιωτικό επιτελείο του υπουργού
Εθνική Αρχή Ασφάλειας (ΕΑΑ)
Υπουργείο ΆµυναςΛεωφόρος Εµµανουήλ Ροΐδη 4
1432Λευκωσία ,Κύπρος
Τηλέφωνα: (357) 22 80 75 69, (357) 22 80 75 19, (357) 22 80 77 64Φαξ: (357) 22 30 23 51
Ministry of Defence
Minister's Military Staff
National Security Authority (NSA)
4 Emanuel Roidi streetCY-1432 Nicosia
Telephone: (357) 22 80 75 69; (357) 22 80 75 19; (357) 22 80 77 64
Fax: (357) 22 30 23 51
LATVIA
Constitution Protection Bureau of the Republic of Latvia
Miera Iela 85/A
LV-1001 RigaTelefon: (371) 702 54 18
Fax: (371) 702 54 06
LITHUANIA
National Security Authority of the Republic of Lithuania
Gedimino 40/2
LT-2600 Vilnius
Telefon: (370-5) 266 32 05Fax: (370-5) 266 32 00
LUXEMBOURG
Autorité nationale de sécurité
Ministère d'État2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 47
▼M1
Boîte Postale 23 79
L-1023 Luxembourg
Téléphone: (352) 478 22 10 (central), (352) 478 22 35 (ligne directe)
Télécopieur: (352) 478 22 43; (352) 478 22 71
HUNGARY
National Security Authority Republic of Hungary
Pf. 2
HU-1352 Budapest
Telefon: (361) 346 96 52
Fax: (361) 346 96 58
MALTA
Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs
P.O. Box 146
MT-VallettaTelefon: (356) 21 24 98 44
Fax: (356) 21 23 53 00
NETHERLANDS
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken
Postbus 200102500 EA Den Haag
NederlandTel.: (31-70) 320 44 00
Fax: (31-70) 320 07 33
Ministerie van Defensie
Militaire Inlichtingendienst (MID)
Postbus 207012500 ES Den HaagNederland
Tel.: (31-70) 318 70 60
Fax: (31-70) 318 79 51
AUSTRIA
Informationssicherheitskommission
Bundeskanzleramt
Ballhausplatz 2
A-1014 WienTelefon: 431-531 15 23 96
Fax: 431-531 15 25 08
POLAND
Military Information Services
National Security Authority — Military Sphere
PL-00-909 Warszawa 60Telefon: (48-22) 684 61 19
Fax: (48-22) 684 61 72
Internal Security Agency
Department for the Protection of Classified Information
2A Rakowiecka St.PL-00-993 Warszawa
Telefon: (48-22) 585 73 60
Fax: (48-22) 585 85 09
PORTUGAL
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros
Autoridade Nacional de Segurança
Avenida Ilha da Madeira
P-1400-204 LisboaTel.: (351-21) 301 17 10
Fax: (351-21) 303 17 11
SLOVENIA
Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia
For the Protection of Classified Information — NSA
Slovenska cesta 5SVN-1000 Ljubljana
Telefon: (386-1) 426 91 20
Fax: (386-1) 426 91 912001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 48
▼M1
SLOVAKIA
National Security Authority
Budatínska 30
SK-851 05 Bratislava
Telefon: (421-2) 68 69 95 09
Fax: (421-2) 63 82 40 05
FINLAND
Ulkoasiainministeriö/Utrikesministeriet
Alivaltiosihteeri (Hallinto)/Understatssekreteraren (Administration)
Laivastokatu/Maringatan 22
PL/PB 176
FI-00161 Helsinki/Helsingfors
P. (358-9) 16 05 53 38
F. (358-9) 16 05 53 03
SWEDEN
Utrikesdepartementet
SSSB
S-103 39 Stockholm
Telefon (46-8) 405 54 44
Fax (46-8) 723 11 76
UNITED KINGDOM
National Security Authority
The Secretary for T3P/1
PO Box 56 56
London EC1A 1AH
United Kingdom
Telephone: (44) 20 72 70 87 51
Fax: (44) 20 76 30 14 282001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 49
Appendix 2
Comparison of security classifications
EU classification Très Secret UE/EU Top Secret Secret UE Confidentiel UE Restreint UE
Belgium Très Secret
Zeer GeheimSecret
GeheimConfidentiel
VertrouwelijkDiffusion restreinte
Beperkte verspreiding
Czech Republic P řísnětajné Tajné D ůvěrné Vyhrazené
Denmark Yderst hemmeligt Hemmeligt Fortroligt Til tjenestebrug
Germany Streng geheim Geheim VS (2) — Vertraulich VS — Nur für den Dienstgebrauch
Estonia Täiesti salajane Salajane Konfidentsiaalne PiiratudGreece Άκρως απόρρητο
Abk:ΑΑΠΑπόρρητο
Abk: (ΑΠ)Εµπιστευτικό ΕΕ
Αbk: (ΕΜ)Περιορισµένης χρήσης
Abk: (ΠΧ)
Spain Secreto Reservado Confidencial Difusión limitadaFrance Très Secret Défense (
1) Secret Défense Confidentiel Défense Diffusion restreinte
Ireland Top Secret Secret Confidential RestrictedItaly Segretissimo Segreto Riservatissimo Riservato
Cyprus Άκρως απόρρητο Απόρρητο Εµπιστευτικό ΕΕ Περιορισµένης χρήσης
Latvia Seviš ķi slepeni Slepeni Konfidenci āli Dienesta vajadz ībām
Lithuania Visiškai slaptai Slaptai Konfidencialiai Riboto naudojimoLuxembourg Très Secret Secret Confidentiel Diffusion restreinte
Hungary Szigorúan titkos! Titkos! Bizalmas! Korlátozott terjesztés ű!
Malta L-Og ħla Segretezza Sigriet Kunfidenzjali Ristrett▼B2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 50▼M1
EU classification Très Secret UE/EU Top Secret Secret UE Confidentiel UE Restreint UE
Netherlands STG Zeer Geheim STG Geheim STG Confidentieel —
Austria Streng geheim Geheim Vertraulich EingeschränktPoland Ściśle tajne Tajne Poufne Zastrze żone
Portugal Muito Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Slovenia Strogo tajno Tajno Zaupno SVN InternoSlovakia Prísne tajné Tajné Dôverné VyhradenéFinland Erittäin salainen Erittäin salainen Salainen Luottamuksellinen
Sweden Kvalificerat hemlig Hemlig Hemlig Hemlig
United Kingdom Top Secret Secret Confidential RestrictedNATO Classification Cosmic Top Secret NATO Secret NATO Confidential NATO RestrictedWEU Classification Focal Top Secret WEU Secret WEU Confidential WEU Restricted
(1) France: the classification ‘Très Secret Défense’, which covers governmental priority issues, may be changed only with the Prime Minister's author isation.
(2) Germany: VS = Verschlusssache.▼M12001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 51
Appendix 3
Practical classification guide
This guide is indicative and may not be construed as modifying the substantial provisions laid down in Sections II and III.
Classification When Who MarkingsDowngrading/Declassification/Destruction
Who When
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET:
This classification shall be
applied only to information
and material the unauthorised
disclosure of which could cause
exceptionally grave prejudice to
the essential interests of the
European Union or of one or
more of its Member States
[SII(1)].The compromise of assets
marked TRÈS SECRET UE/
EU TOP SECRET would be
likely to:
— threaten directly the
internal stability of the
EU or one of its Member
States or friendly coun-
tries
— cause exceptionally grave
damage to relations with
friendly governments
— lead directly to wide-
spread loss of life
— cause exceptionally grave
damage to the operational
effectiveness or security
of Member States or other
contributors' forces, or to
the continuing effective-
ness of extremely valu-
able security or
intelligence operations
— cause severe long-term
damage to the EU or
Member States economy.Member States:
duly authorised persons
(originators) [SIII(4)];
GSC:
duly authorised persons
(originators) [SIII(4)], SG/HR
and DSG.
Originators shall specify a
date or period when the
contents may be downgraded
or declassified. Otherwise
they shall keep the documents
under review every five years
at the latest, in order to
ensure that the original classi-
fication is necessary
[SIII(10)].The classification TRÈS
SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET shall be applied to
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET documents, and
where applicable introduce
the defence marking ESDP,
by mechanical means and by
hand [SII(8)].
The EU classifications shall
appear at the top and bottom
centre of each page, and
each page shall be numbered.
Each document shall bear a
reference number and a date;
this reference number shall
appear on each page.
If they are to be distributed in
several copies, each one shall
bear a copy number, which
will appear on the first page,
together with the total
number of pages. All annexes
and enclosures shall be listedon the first page [SVII(1)].Declassification or down
grading rests solely with the
originator, or the SG/HR or
DSG, who shall inform of
the change any subsequent
addressees to whom they
have sent or copied the docu-
ment [SVIII(9)].
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET documents shall be
destroyed by the Central
Registry or subregistry
responsible for them. Each
document destroyed shall be
listed in a destruction certifi-
cate, signed by the TRÈS
SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET control officer and
by the officer witnessing the
destruction, who shall be
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET cleared. A note to
this effect shall be made in
the logbook. The registry
shall keep the destruction
certificates, together with the
distribution sheet, for a period
of ten years [SVII(31)].Surplus copies and documents
no longer needed must be
destroyed [SVII(31)].
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET documents, including
all classified waste resulting
from the preparation of TRÈS
SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET documents such as
spoiled copies, working drafts,
typed notes and carbon paper,
shall be destroyed, under the
supervision of a TRÈS
SECRET UE/EU TOP
SECRET officer, by burning,
pulping, shredding or otherwise
reducing into an unrecognisable
and non-reconstitutable form
[SVII(31)].
SECRET:
This classification shall be
applied only to information
and material the unauthorisedThe compromise of assets
marked SECRET UE would
be likely to:
— raise internationalMember States:
authorised persons (origina-
tors) [SIII(2)];The classification SECRET
UE shall be applied to
SECRET UE documents, and
where applicable introduceDeclassification and down-
grading rests solely with the
originator, or the SG/HR or
DSG, who shall inform ofSurplus copies and documents
no longer needed must be
destroyed [SVII(31)].
SECRET UE documents,▼B2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 52
Classification When Who MarkingsDowngrading/Declassification/Destruction
Who When
disclosure of which could
seriously harm the essential
interests of the European Union
or of one or more of its
Member States [SII(2)].tensions
— seriously damage relations
with friendly governments
— threaten life directly or
seriously prejudice public
order or individual
security or liberty
— cause serious damage to
the operational effective-
ness or security of
Member States or other
contributors' forces, or to
the continuing effective-
ness of highly valuable
security or intelligence
operations
— cause substantial material
damage to EU or one of
its Member States finan-
cial, monetary, economic
and commercial interests.GSC and EU decentralised
agencies:
authorised persons (origina-
tors) [SIII(2)], Directors
General, SG/HR and DSG.
Originators shall specify a
date or period when the
contents may be downgraded
or declassified. Otherwise
they shall keep the documents
under review every five years
at the latest, in order to
ensure that the original classi-
fication is necessary
[SVII(1)].the defence marking —
ESDP, by mechanical means
and by hand [SIII(8)].
The EU classifications shall
appear at the top and bottom
centre of each page, and
each page shall be numbered.
Each document shall bear a
reference number and a date;
this reference number shall
appear on each page.
If they are to be distributed in
several copies, each one shall
bear a copy number, which
will appear on the first page,
together with the total
number of pages. All annexes
and enclosures shall be listed
on the first page [SVII(1)].the change any subsequent
addressees to whom they
have sent or copied the docu-
ment [SVII(9)].
SECRET UE documents shall
be destroyed by the registry
responsible for those docu-
ments, under the supervision
of a security cleared person.
SECRET UE documents that
are destroyed shall be listed
on signed destruction certifi-
cates to be retained by the
Registry, together with the
destruction forms, for at least
three years [SVII(32)].including all classified waste
resulting from the preparation
of SECRET UE documents
such as spoiled copies, working
drafts, typed notes and carbon
paper, shall be destroyed by
burning, pulping, shredding or
otherwise reducing into anunrecognisable and non-recon-
stitutable form [SVII(31),(32)].
CONFIDENTIEL UE:
This classification shall be
applied to information and
material the unauthorised
disclosure of would harm the
essential interests of the
European Union or of one or
more of its Member [SII(3)].The compromise of assets
marked CONFIDENTIEL UE
would be likely to:
— materially damage diplo-
matic relations, that is,
cause formal protest or
other sanctions
— prejudice individual
security or liberty
— cause damage to the
operational effectiveness
or security of Member
States or other contribu-
tors' forces, or to the
effectiveness of valuable
security or intelligence
operations
— substantially undermine
the financial viability ofMember States:
authorised persons (origina-
tors) [SIII(2)];
GSC and EU decentralised
agencies:
authorised persons (origina-
tors) [SIII(2)], Directors
General, SG/HR and DSG.
Originators shall specify a
date or period when the
contents may be downgraded
or declassified. Otherwise
they shall keep the documents
under review every five years
at the latest, in order to
ensure that the original classi-
fication is necessaryThe classification CONFI-
DENTIEL UE shall be
applied to CONFIDENTIEL
UE documents, and where
applicable introduce the
defence-marking — ESDP,
by mechanical means and by
hand or by printing on pre-
stamped, registered paper
[SII(8)].
The EU classifications shall
appear at the top and bottom
centre on each page, and
each page shall be numbered.
Each document shall bear a
reference number and a date.
All annexes and enclosures
shall be listed on the first
page [SVII(1)].Declassification and down-
grading rests solely with the
originator or the SG/HR or
DSG, who shall inform of
the change any subsequent
addressees to whom they
have sent or copied the docu-
ment [SVII(31)].
CONFIDENTIEL UE docu-
ments shall be destroyed by
the registry respon-sible for
those documents, under the
supervision of a cleared
person. Their destruction
shall be recorded in accor-
dance with national regula-
tions and, in the case of GSC
or EU decentralised agencies,
according to instructions fromSurplus copies and documents
no longer needed must be
destroyed [SVII(31)].
CONFIDENTIEL UE docu-
ments, including all classified
waste resulting from the
preparation of CONFIDEN-
TIEL UE documents such as
spoiled copies, working drafts,
typed notes and carbon paper,
shall be destroyed by burning,
pulping, shredding or otherwise
reducing into an unrecognisable
and non-reconstitutable form
[SVII(31),(33)].▼B2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 53
Classification When Who MarkingsDowngrading/Declassification/Destruction
Who When
major organisations
— impede the investigation
or facilitate the commis-
sion of serious crime
— work substantially against
EU or Member States
financial, monetary,
economic and commercial
interests
— seriously impede the
development or operation
of major EU policies
— shut down or otherwise
substantially disrupt
significant EU activities.[SIII(10)]. the SG/HR or DSG
[SVII(33)].
RESTREINT UE:
This classification shall be
applied to information and
material the unauthorised
disclosure of which could be
disadvantageous to the interests
of the EU or of one or more of
its Member States [SII(4)].The compromise of assets
marked RESTREINT UE
would be likely to:
— adversely affect diplo-
matic relations
— cause substantial distress
to individuals
— make it more difficult to
maintain the operational
effectiveness or security
of Member States or other
contributors' forces
— cause financial loss or
facilitate improper gain
or advantage for indivi-
duals or companies
— breach proper undertak-
ings to maintain the confi-
dence of information
provided by third parties
— breach statutory restric-
tions on disclosure of
information
— prejudice the investigationMember States:
authorised persons (origina-
tors) [SIII(2)];
GSC and EU decentralised
agencies:
authorised persons (origina-
tors) [SIII(2)], Directors
General, SG/HR and DSG.
Originators shall specify a
date or period when the
contents may be downgraded
or declassified. Otherwise
they shall keep the documents
under review every five years
at the latest, in order to
ensure that the original classi-
fication is necessary
[SIII(10)].The classification
RESTREINT UE shall be
applied to RESTREINT UE
documents, and where applic-
able introduce the defence
marking — ESDP, by
mechanical or electronic
means [SII(8)].
The EU classifications shall
appear at the top and bottom
centre on each page, and
each page shall be numbered.
Each document shall bear a
reference number and a date
[SVII(1)].Declassification and down-
grading rests solely with the
originator, or the SG/HR or
DSG, who shall inform of
the change any subsequent
addressees to whom they
have sent or copied the docu-
ment [SIII(9)].
RESTREINT UE documents
shall be destroyed by the
registry responsible for those
documents, in accordance
with national regulations and,
in the case of GSC or EU
decentralised agencies,
according to instructions
from the SG/HR or DSG
[SVII(34)].Surplus copies and documents
no longer needed must be
destroyed [SVII(31)].▼B2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 54
Classification When Who MarkingsDowngrading/Declassification/Destruction
Who When
or facilitate the commis-
sion of crime
— disadvantage EU or
Member States in
commercial or policy
negotiations with others
— impede the effective
development or operation
of EU policies
— undermine the proper
management of the EU
and its operations.▼B2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 55
▼B
Appendix 4
Guidelines for release of EU classified information to third States or inter-
national organisations
Level 1 Cooperation
PROCEDURES
1. The authority to release EU classified information to countries that are not
signatories of the Treaty on European Union or to other international orga-
nisations whose security policy and regulations are comparable to EU's lies
with the Council.
2. The Council may delegate the decision to release classified information. Its
delegation will state the nature of the information that may be released and
its level of classification, which will normally be no higher than CONFI-
DENTIEL UE.
3. Subject to the conclusion of a security agreement, requests for the release of
EU classified information will be made to the Secretary-General/High
Representative by the security bodies of the States or international organisa-
tions concerned, which shall state the purposes for which this release is
intended and the nature of the classified information to be released.
Requests may also be made by a Member State or EU decentralised agency,
that regard the release of EU classified information as desirable; they will
state the aims and the benefit to EU of such a release, specifying the nature
and classification of the information to be released.
4. The request will be considered by the GSC, which:
— shall seek the opinions of the Member State or, as appropriate, the
decentralised EU agency originating the information to be released,
— shall establish the necessary contacts with the security bodies of the
beneficiary countries or international organisations to verify whether
their security policy and regulations are such as to guarantee that the
classified information released will be protected in accordance with
these security regulations,
— shall seek the technical opinions of the Member States' National
Security Authorities as to the confidence that can be placed in the bene-
ficiary States or international bodies.
5. The GSC will forward the request and the Security Office's recommendation
to the Council for a decision.
SECURITY REGULATIONS TO BE APPLIED BY BENEFICIARIES
6. The Secretary-General/High Representative will notify the beneficiary
States or international organisations of the Council's decision to authorise
the release of EU classified information, forwarding as many copies of these
security regulations as are considered necessary. If the request was made by
a Member State, this State will notify the beneficiary of the authorised
release.
The decision to release will come into force only when the beneficiaries
give a written assurance that they will:
— use the information for no other than the agreed purposes,
— protect the information in accordance with these security regulations and
in particular the special provisions set out below.
7.Personnel
(a) The number of officials having access to the EU classified information
will be strictly limited, based on the need-to-know principle, to those
persons whose duties require such access.
(b) All officials or nationals authorised to have access to information clas-
sified CONFIDENTIEL UE or above shall hold either a security
certificate at the appropriate level or the equivalent security clearance,
either one being issued by their own State's government.
8.Transmission of documents
(a) The practical procedures for the transmission of documents will be
decided by agreement on the basis of the provisions of Section VII of
the Council Security Regulations. They will in particular specify the
registries to which EU classified information is to be forwarded.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 56
▼B
(b) If the classified information whose release is authorised by the Council
includes TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, the beneficiary State
or international organisation shall set up a central EU registry and, if
necessary, EU subregistries. These registries will be governed by the
provisions of Section VIII of these security regulations.
9.Registration
As soon as a registry receives a EU document classified CONFIDENTIEL
UE or above, it will list the document in a special register held by the orga-
nisation, with columns for the date received, particulars of the document
(date, reference and copy number), its classification, title, the recipient's
name or title, the date of return of the receipt and the date the document is
returned to the EU originator or is destroyed.
10. Destruction
(a) EU classified documents will be destroyed in accordance with the
instructions set out in Section VI of these security regulations. Copies
of the destruction certificates for SECRET UE and TRÈS SECRET
UE/EU TOP SECRET documents will be sent to the EU registry that
has forwarded the documents.
(b) EU classified documents will be included in emergency destruction
plans for the beneficiary bodies own classified documents.
11. Protection of documents
Every step will be taken to prevent unauthorised persons from having access
to EU classified information.
12. Copies, translations and extracts
No photocopies or translation may be made of a document classified
CONFIDENTIEL UE or SECRET UE, or extracts taken, without the
authorisation of the Head of the security organisation concerned, who will
register and check those copies, translations or extracts and stamp them as
necessary.
The reproduction or translation of a TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
document may be authorised only by the originating authority, which will
specify the number of copies authorised; if the originating authority cannot
be determined, the request will be referred to the GSC Security Office.
13. Breaches of security
When a breach of security involving a EU classified document has taken
place or is suspected, the following action should be taken immediately,
subject to the conclusion of a security agreement:
(a) carry out an investigation to establish the circumstances of the breach of
security;
(b) notify the GSC Security Office, the National Security Authority and the
originating authority, or clearly state that the latter has not been notified
if this has not been done;
(c) take action to minimise the effects of the breach of security;
(d) reconsider and implement measures to prevent any recurrence;
(e) implement any measures recommended by the GSC Security Office to
prevent a recurrence.
14. Inspections
The GSC Security Office will be permitted, by agreement with the States or
international organisations concerned, to carry out an assessment of the
effectiveness of measures for the protection of the EU classified information
released.
15. Reporting
Subject to the conclusion of a security agreement, as long as the State or
international organisation holds EU classified information, it should submit
a yearly report, by a date specified when the authorisation to release the
information is given, confirming that these security regulations have been
complied with.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 57
▼B
Appendix 5
Guidelines for release of EU classified information to third States or inter-
national organisations
Level 2 Cooperation
PROCEDURES
1. The authority to release EU classified information to third States or interna-
tional organisations whose security policy and regulations are markedly
different from EU's lies with the Council. In principle, it is restricted to
information classified up to and including SECRET UE; it excludes national
information specifically reserved to Member States and categories of EU
classified information protected by special markings.
2. The Council may delegate the decision: in delegating it will, within the
constraints defined in paragraph 1, state the nature of the information that
may be released and its level of classification, which will be no higher
than RESTREINT UE.
3. Subject to the conclusion of a security agreement, requests for the release of
EU classified information will be made to the Secretary-General/High
Representative by the security bodies of the States or international organisa-
tions concerned, which will state the purposes for which this release is
intended and the nature and classification of the information to be released.
Requests may also be made by a Member State or EU decentralised agency
that regard the release of EU classified information as desirable; they will
state the aims and the benefit to EU of such a release, specifying the nature
and classification of the information to be released.
4. The request will be considered by the GSC, which:
— shall seek the opinions of the Member State or, as appropriate, the EU
decentralised agency originating the information to be released,
— shall establish preliminary contacts with the security bodies of the bene-
ficiary States or international organisations to find out information on
their security policy and regulations, and in particular to draw up a table
comparing the classifications applicable in the EU and in the State or
organisation concerned,
— shall arrange for a meeting of the Council Security Committee or, under
a silent procedure if necessary, enquire from the Member States'
National Security Authorities with a view to obtaining the Security
Committee's technical opinion.
5. The Council Security Committee's technical opinion will be on the
following:
— the confidence that can be placed in the beneficiary States or interna-
tional organisations with a view to assessing the security risks incurred
by the EU or its Member States,
— an assessment of the beneficiaries' ability to protect classified informa-
tion released by EU,
— proposals as to practical procedures for the handling of the EU classified
information (for example providing expurgated versions of a text) and
documents transmitted (retaining or deleting EU classification headings,
specific markings, etc.),
— downgrading or declassification by the originating authority before the
information is released to the beneficiary countries or international orga-
nisations (1).
6. The Secretary-General/High Representative will forward to the Council for
a decision, the request and the Council Security Committee's technical
opinion obtained by the GSC Security Office.
SECURITY REGULATIONS TO BE APPLIED BY BENEFICIARIES
7. The Council's decision to authorise the release of EU classified information
will be brought to the attention of the beneficiary countries or international
organisations by the Secretary-General/High Representative, together with a
table comparing the classifications applicable within the EU and the States2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 58
(1) This entails the originating authority's application of the procedure defined in paragraph
9, Section III, in the case of all copies circulated within EU.
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or organisations concerned. If the request was made by a Member State, this
State will notify the beneficiary of the authorised release.
The decision to release will come into force only when the beneficiaries
give a written assurance that they will:
— use the information for no other than the agreed purposes,
— protect the information in accordance with the regulations laid down by
the Council.
8. The following rules of protection will be established unless the Council,
having obtained the Council Security Committee's technical opinion,
decides on a particular procedure for the handling of EU classified docu-
ments (deleting mention of the EU classification, specific marking, etc.).
The rules will be adapted in that case.
9.Personnel
(a) The number of officials having access to EU classified information
must be strictly limited, based on the need-to-know principle, to those
persons whose duties require such access.
(b) All officials or nationals authorised to have access to the classified
information released by EU shall have a national security clearance or
authorisation for access, in the case of national classified information, to
an appropriate level equivalent to that of the EU, as defined in the
comparative table.
(c) These national security clearances or authorisations will be forwarded to
the Secretary-General/High Representative for information.
10. Transmission of documents
(a) The practical procedures for the transmission of documents will be
agreed between the GSC Security Office and the security bodies of the
recipient States or international organisations based on its rules set out
in Section VII of these Regulations. They will in particular specify the
precise addresses to which the documents must be forwarded as well as
the courier or mail services used for the transmission of the EU classi-
fied information.
(b) Documents classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and higher will be trans-
mitted under double cover. The inner envelope will be marked ‘UE’
together with the security classification. A receipt form will be enclosed
for each classified document. The receipt form, which will not itself be
classified, will quote only the particulars of the document (its reference,
date, copy number) and its language, not the title.
(c) The inner envelope will then be placed in the outer envelope, which
will carry a package number for receipting purposes. The outer
envelope will not bear a security classification.
(d) A receipt showing the package number will always be given to the
couriers.
11. Registration on arrival
The addressee State's NSA or its equivalent in the State receiving on behalf
of its government the classified information forwarded by the EU, or the
security bureau of the recipient international organisation, will open a
special register to record EU classified information on its receipt. The
Register will contain columns indicating the date received, particulars of
the document (date, reference and copy number), its classification, title,
the addressee's name or title, the date of return of the receipt and the date
of return of the document to EU or its destruction.
12. Return of documents
When the recipient returns a classified document to the Council, or the
Member State which released it, it will proceed as indicated in paragraph
10.
13. Protection
(a) When the documents are not in use, they will be stored in a security
container which is approved for the storage of nationally-classified
material of the same classification. The container will bear no indication
of its contents, which will be accessible only to persons authorised to
handle EU classified information. Where combination locks are used,
the combination will be known only to those officials in the State or
organisation having authorised access to the EU classified information
stored in the container and will be changed every six months, or sooner
on the transfer of an official, on withdrawal of the security clearance of2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 59
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one of the officials knowing the combination or if there is a risk of
compromise.
(b) EU classified documents will be removed from the security container
only by those officials cleared for access to the EU classified docu-
ments and having need to know. They will remain responsible for the
safe custody of those documents as long as they are in their possession
and, in particular, for ensuring that no unauthorised person has access to
the documents. They will also ensure that the documents are stored in a
security container when they have finished consulting them and outside
working hours.
(c) No photocopies may be made of a document classified CONFIDEN-
TIEL UE or above, nor extracts taken, without the authorisation of the
GSC Security office.
(d) The procedure for the rapid and total destruction of the documents in an
emergency should be defined and confirmed with the GSC Security
office.
14. Physical security
(a) When not in use, security containers used for storage of EU classified
documents shall be kept locked at all times.
(b) When it is necessary for maintenance or cleaning staff to enter or work
in a room which houses such security containers, they shall be escorted
at all times by a member of the State's or organisation's security service
or by the official more specifically responsible for supervising the
security of the room.
(c) Outside normal working hours (at night, at weekends and on public
holidays) the security containers containing EU classified documents
shall be protected either by a guard or by an automatic alarm system.
15. Breaches of security
When a breach of security involving a EU classified document has taken
place or is suspected, the following action should be taken immediately:
(a) forward a report immediately to the GSC Security Office or the NSA of
the Member State that has taken the initiative in forwarding documents(with a copy to the GSC Security Office);
(b) conduct an enquiry, on completion of which a full report will be
submitted to the security body (see (a) above). The requisite measures
to remedy the situation should then be adopted.
16. Inspections
The GSC Security Office will be permitted, by agreement with the States or
international organisations concerned, to carry out an assessment of the
effectiveness of measures for the protection of the EU classified information
released.
17. Reporting
As long as the State or organisation holds EU classified information, it shall
submit a yearly report, by a date specified when the authorisation to release
the information is given, confirming that these security regulations havebeen complied with.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 60
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Appendix 6
Guidelines for release of EU classified information to third States or inter-
national organisations
Level 3 Cooperation
PROCEDURES
1. From time to time, the Council may wish to cooperate in certain special
circumstances with States or organisations that cannot give the assurances
required by these security regulations, but that cooperation may call for the
release of EU classified information. Such release will be exclusive of
national information specifically reserved to Member States.
2. In such special circumstances, requests for cooperation with EU, whether
from third States or international organisations or whether proposed by the
Member States or, where applicable, EU decentralised agencies, will first be
considered as to substance by the Council, which will, where necessary,
seek the opinions of the Member State or decentralised agency originating
the information. The Council will consider the wisdom of releasing classi-
fied information, assess the beneficiaries' need to know and decide on the
nature of the classified information that may be communicated.
3. If the Council is in favour, it will be the responsibility of the Secretary-
General/High Representative to convene the Council Security Committee
or to enquire from the National Security Authorities of Member States, if
appropriate under a silence procedure, in order to obtain the Security
Committee's technical opinion.
4. The Council Security Committee's technical opinion will be on the
following:
(a) an evaluation of the security risks incurred by EU or its Member States;
(b) classification of the information that may be released, where appro-
priate, in view of its nature;
(c) the downgrading or declassification of the information by the origi-
nating authority before it is released to the countries or international
organisations concerned (1);
(d) procedures for handling the documents to be released (see paragraph 5
below);
(e) the possible methods of transmission (use of public postal services,
public or secure telecommunications systems, diplomatic bag, cleared
couriers, etc.).
5. The documents released to the States or organisations covered in this
Appendix will, in principle, be prepared without reference to the source or
a EU classification. The Council Security Committee may recommend:
— the use of a specific marking or codename,
— the use of a specific system of classification linking the sensitivity of the
information to the control measures required of the beneficiary methods
of transmission of the documents (see examples in paragraph 14).
6. The GSC Security Office will submit the Security Committee's technical
opinion to the Council, where necessary attaching the proposed delegations
of authority required for the performance of the task, particularly in urgent
circumstances.
7. Once the Council has approved the release of EU classified information and
the practical implementing procedures, the GSC Security Office will estab-
lish the necessary contact with the security body of the State or organisation
concerned to facilitate the application of the security measures envisaged.
8. As a reference, the GSC Security Office will circulate a table to all the
Member States and where appropriate, EU decentralised agencies concerned
summarising the nature and classification of the information and listing the
organisations and countries to which it may be released, as decided by the
Council.
9. The NSA of the Member State making the release, or the GSC Security
Office, will take all the necessary measures to facilitate any consequent
damage assessment and review of procedures.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 61
(1) This entails the originating authority's application of the procedure defined in paragraph
9, Section III, to all copies circulated within EU.
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10. Further reference will be made to the Council whenever the conditions of
cooperation are altered.
SECURITY REGULATIONS TO BE APPLIED BY BENEFICIARIES
11. The Council's decision to authorise the release of EU classified information
will be brought to the attention of the beneficiary States or internationalorganisations by the Secretary-General/High Representative, together with
the detailed rules of protection proposed by the Council Security Committee
and approved by the Council. If the request was made by a Member State,
this State will notify the beneficiary of the authorised release.
The decision will come into force only when the beneficiaries give a written
assurance that they will:
— use the information for no other purpose than the cooperation decided
by the Council,
— offer the information the protection required by the Council.
12. Transmission of documents
(a) The practical procedures for the transmission of documents will be
agreed between the GSC Security Office and the security bodies of the
recipient States or international organisations. They will in particular
specify the precise addresses to which the documents must be
forwarded.
(b) Documents classified CONFIDENTIEL UE and higher will be trans-
mitted under double cover. The inner envelope will bear the specific
stamp or codename decided upon and a mention of the special classifi-
cation approved for the document. A receipt form will be enclosed for
each classified document. The receipt form, which will not itself be
classified, will quote only the particulars of the document (its reference,
date, copy number) and its language, not the title.
(c) The inner envelope will then be placed in the outer envelope, which
will carry a package number for receipting purposes. The outer
envelope will not bear a security classification.
(d) A receipt showing the package number will always be given to the
couriers.
13. Registration on arrival
The addressee State's NSA or its equivalent in the State receiving the clas-
sified information forwarded by EU on behalf of its government, or the
security bureau of the recipient international organisation, will open a
special register to record EU classified information on its receipt. The
Register will contain columns indicating the date received, particulars of
the document (date, reference and copy number), its classification, title,
the addressee's name or title, the date of return of the receipt and the date
of return of the receipt to EU and the date of destruction of the document.
14. Use and protection of the classified information exchanged
(a) Information at the level of SECRET UE will be handled by specifically
designated officials authorised to have access to information with this
classification. It will be stored in good quality security cabinets that
can be opened only by the persons authorised to have access to the
information they contain. The areas in which those cabinets are located
will be permanently guarded and a system of verification will be set up
to ensure that only duly authorised persons are allowed to enter.
SECRET UE-level information will be forwarded by diplomatic bag,
secure mail services and secure telecommunications. A SECRET UE
document may be copied only with the originating authority's written
agreement. All copies will be registered and monitored. Receipts will
be issued for all operations relating to SECRET UE documents.
(b) CONFIDENTIEL UE-level information will be handled by duly desig-
nated officials authorised to be informed on the subject. Documents will
be stored in locked security cabinets in controlled areas.
CONFIDENTIEL UE-level information will be forwarded by diplo-
matic bag, military mail services and secure telecommunications.
Copies may be made by the recipient body, their number and distribu-
tion being recorded in special registers.
(c) RESTREINT UE-level information will be handled in premises that are
not accessible to unauthorised personnel and stored in locked
containers. Documents may be forwarded by public postal services as
registered mail in a double envelope and, in emergency situations
during operations, by the unprotected public telecommunications
systems. The recipients may make copies.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 62
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(d) Unclassified information will not call for special protection measures
and may be forwarded by mail and public telecommunications systems.
The addressees may make copies.
15. Destruction
Documents no longer needed must be destroyed. In the case of
RESTREINT UE and CONFIDENTIEL UE-level documents, an appropriate
note will be entered in the special registers. In the case of SECRET UE-
level documents, destruction certificates will be issued and signed by two
persons witnessing their destruction.
16. Breaches of security
If CONFIDENTIEL UE- or SECRET UE-level information is compromised
or there is a suspicion of compromise, the NSA of the State or the head of
security in the organisation will conduct an enquiry into the circumstances
of the compromise. If the enquiry yields positive results, the originating
authority will be notified. The necessary steps will be taken to remedy
inadequate procedures or storage methods if they have given rise to the
compromise. The Council Secretary-General/High Representative or the
NSA of the Member State that released the compromised information may
ask the beneficiary for details on the enquiry.2001D0264 — EN — 28.02.2004 — 001.001 — 63