ARCHIVES HISTORIQUES 
DE LA COMMISSION 
 
 
 
COLLECTION RELIEE DES 
DOCUMENTS "COM" 
 
 
 
 
COM (85) 567 
 
 
 
Vol. 1985/0205 
  
 
Disclaimer  
Conformém ent au règlement (CEE, Euratom) n° 354/83 du Conseil du 1er février 1983 
concernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communauté économique 
européenne et de la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15.2.1983, 
p. 1), tel que modifié par le règlement (CE, Euratom) n° 1700/2003 du 22 septembre 2003 
(JO L 243 du 27.9.2003, p. 1), ce dossier est ouvert au public. Le cas échéant, les documents 
classifiés présents dans ce dossier ont été déclassifiés conformément à l'article 5 dudit 
règlem ent. 
In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983 
concerning the opening to the public of the historical archives of the European Econom ic 
Communit y and the European Atom ic Energy Communit y (OJ L 43, 15.2.1983, p. 1), as 
amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243, 
27.9.2003, p. 1), t his file is open to the public. Where necessary, classified documents in this 
file have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation.  
In Übereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom  1. 
Februa r 1983 über die Freigabe der historischen Archive der Europäischen  
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgem einschaft (ABI. L 43 vom  15.2.1983,  
S. 1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. Septem ber 2003  
(ABI. L 243 v om 27.9.2003, S. 1), ist diese Datei der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich. Soweit  
erforderlich, wurden die Verschlusssachen in dieser Datei in Übereinstimmung mit Artikel 5  
der genannten Verordnung freigegeben.  
KOMMISSIONEN FOR DE EUROPÆISKE FÆLLESSKABER
K0MC85) 567 endelig udg.  
bru xelles, den 23. oktober 1985
MEDDELELSE TIL RÅDET F R A  KOMMISSIONEN
Fællesskabets deltagelse i UNCTAD-konferencen o m  revision af det  
kompleks af re tn in g s lin je r og re g le r, der er vedtaget på m u ltila te ra lt  
plan m ed henblik på kontrol m ed konkurrencebegrænsende handelsmetoder
K0MC85) 567 endelig udg.

Meddelelse til Ridet fra Kommissionen
Vedr.: Fællesskabets deltagelse i UNCTAD-konferencen o m  revision af det kom ­
pleks af retn in g slin jer og reg ler, der er vedtaget på m u ltila te ra lt  
plan m ed henblik på kontrol m ed konkurrencebegrænsende handelsmetoder
Indledning
D a "Kodeks fo r konkurrencebegrænsende handelsmetoder" blev vedtaget pi D e  
forenede Nationers generalforsamling (resolution 35/63 af 5.12.1980), be­
sluttede generalforsamlingen, at der i 1985 skulle afholdes en FN-konference  
i UNCTAD-regi, hvor a lle  aspekter ved denne kodeks skulle tages op t i l  fo r­
nyet overvejelse.
Denne konference finder sted i Genève den 4 .-1 4 . november 1985.
Den intern ationale ekspertgruppe (IEG ), der er kodeksens in s titu tio n e lle  
mekanisme, gennemgik på sin fjerd e samling en række forslag t i l  revision  
af kodeks samt t i l  de procedureregler, der skulle være gældende på konfe­
rencen .
Denne konference rejser to problemer;
-  m ed hvilken status skal Fællesskabet deltage i denne konference (fo r r e t­
ningsordenens a rtik e l 1  og 33)?
-  hvilke ændringer e lle r  præciseringer kan der foretages i selve kodeks?
1. Fællesskabets deltagelse i revisionskonferencen
Af a rtik e l 1  og 33 i dokument TD/RBP/C0NF/2/2 (se bilag 1) fremgår, at  
Fællesskabet ikke længere skal have status som  observatør, m en derimod  
som  d eltag er, dog uden stemmeret.

-  2 -
Denne bestemmelse svarer t i l  den, der blev d rø fte t på IEG’ s fjerd e sam­
lin g . D-gruppen tog forbehold over for dette fo rslag , 77-gruppen fandt  
det brugbart som  forhandlingsgrundlag, og B-gruppen støttede det. Der  
blev taget forbehold på Fællesskabets og dets medlemsstaters vegne (se  
bilag 2 ). I tilkn ytn in g  t i l  disse d rø ftelser tog visse medlemmer af B-  
gruppen forbehold over for en klausul, der udtrykkeligt gav Fællesskabet  
stemmeret. Der var ta le  o m  USA, Ø strig, Sverige og Schweiz.
Dette spørgsmål er allerede blevet d rø ftet i Relex-gruppen på basis af  
en meddelelse fra Kommissionen t i l  Rådet fra  8. marts 1985 (kOM(95) 91  
endelig udg.). Det drejer sig således nu o m  at nå t i l  enighed om, h v il­
ken holdning Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater skal indtage h e r til ved  
åbningen af revisionskonferencen.
D a der er ta le  o m  en revisionskonference, er Fællesskabet af den opfat­
te ls e , at de procedureregler, der gælder fo r de store kommissioner, ikke  
kan anvendes og v il derfor ikke modsætte sig, at Fællesskabet deltager  
i en sadan konference pa lige fod m ed Fællesskabets medlemsstater.
Mere p rin c ip ie lt kan m an ikke anmode Fællesskabet o m  passivt at godkende  
de grundlæggende ændringer, der måtte b live vedtaget i kodeks, uden at  
det få r lejlig h ed  t i l  -  eventuelt gennem en vetoret -  at fremsætte even­
tu e lle  indvendinger m o d  visse ændringer. Den s id e s tillin g  af regionale  
sammenslutninger m ed s ta te r, der forudses i punkt B  i i) i kodeks, v il  
føre t i l ,  at regionale sammenslutninger som  Fællesskabet er nødt t i l  at  
træ ffe de fo ran staltn in g er, der er nødvendige for at opfylde de ikke-  
bindende fo rp lig te ls e r, som  følge af deres godkendelse af kodeks. Hvis  
vi ikke fa r medhold i drøftelserne vedrørende dette punkt, bør vi derfor  
tage forbehold over for at påtage os fo rp lig te ls e r, der måske ikke er  
i overensstemmelse m ed fæ llesskabsretten.
Rådet bør derfor give Kommissionen bemyndigelse t i l  at indlede forhand­
linger m ed henblik på at opnå Fællesskabets fulde deltagelse i konferen­
cen o m  revision af kodeks. I denne forbindelse blev der i dokument  
KOMC85) 166 endelig udg., fremsat et fo rslag , der går ud på følgende:

-  3 -
1) fodnoten vedrørende a rtik e l 1, l it r a  c ), i procedurereglerne s le tte s ,  
og
2) i forretningsordenens a rtik e l 33 tilfø je s  følgende stk. 2:
"de regionale statssammenslutninger udøver pi de områder, der henhø­
rer under deres kompetence, deres stemmeret m ed et antal stemmer sva­
rende t i l  det antal af deres medlemsstater, der har godkendt kodeks.  
Disse regionale sammenslutninger udøver ikke deres stemmeret, hvis  
medlemsstaterne udøver deres, og omvendt."
2. Forslag o m  ændringer i selve kodeks
Disse forslag er indeholdt i dokument TD/RBP/CONF/2/4, hvis konklusio­
ner er gengivet i bilag 3.
Disse forslag indebærer ikke nogen ændring af selve teksten t i l  "Kodeks  
fo r konkurrencebegrænsende forretningsmetoder", når der ses bort fra den  
i denne kodeks omhandlede in s titu tio n e lle  mekanisme. Forslagene g ir ho­
vedsagelig ud pi at nå frem t i l  en fæ lles fortolkning af bestemmelser,  
der allerede findes i kodeks, og drage konsekvenserne heraf ved håndhæ­
velsen af disse bestemmelser.
a) Følgende forslag indebærer ingen ændring af kodeks:
1) at der i de enkelte lande udpeges "kontaktpersoner" i anliggender,  
der vedrører anvendelsen af kodeks. Dette kan accepteres af Fælles­
skabet, dog kun under forudsætning a f, at der findes en tilfr e d s ­
s tille n d e  løsning pi problemet vedrørende Fællesskabets deltagelse;
2) at de anmeldelsesprocedurer, der findes i de nationale lovgivnin­
ger, skærpes. Dette forslag blev a fv is t af B-gruppen pi IEG's forbe­
redende m øde i a p ril 1985, og de argumenter, der blev frem ført i  
sek retariatets p ap ir, har ikke ændret noget herved;

-  4 -
3) at de konsultationsprocedurer, der forudses i kodeks (afs n it 4 -  F)  
udbygges. Dette forslag blev forkastet af B-gruppen pi det fjerde  
m øde i IEG. Kommissionen s tille d e  sig mere Iben over for dette foi—  
slag under drøftelserne i B-gruppen. Grunden h e r til e r, at det fo re­
kommer vanskeligt at retfæ rdiggøre, at konsultationsprocedurerne
kun bringes i anvendelse i konkrete tilfæ ld e  i forbindelse m ed OECD1s  
rekommandation fra  1979, h vilket v ille  være ensbetydende m ed kun  
at anvende dem  i relationerne mellem B-gruppens lande og ikke inden  
for rammerne af UNCTAD. Det forekommer dog lid e t sandsynligt, at  
B-gruppen skulle ændre sin holdning. Forslaget støttes af 77-gruppen  
og D-gruppen;
4) at staterne opfordres t i l  at yde fin a n s ie lle  bidrag som  en form  
fo r m u ltila te ra l teknisk bistand. Dette forslag blev negativt mod­
taget af landene i B-gruppen på det forberedende møde i a p ril 1985.  
Specielt for Fællesskabets vedkommende v i l  forudsætningen for et  
sadant fin a n s ie lt bidrag være, at Fællesskabet opnår en tilfr e d s ­
s tille n d e  status, bide på revisionskonferencen og i arbejdet i den  
intern ationale ekspertgruppe;
5) at der inden for rammerne af e lle r  i tilkn ytn in g  t i l  de ordinære  
møder i IEG afholdes formelle e lle r  uformelle samrid. Dette fo r­
slag blev fremsat af B-gruppen i a p ril 1985, og det m å  accepteres,  
eftersom der er ta le  o m  samrid mellem de eksperter, der deltager
i arbejdet i IEG.
b) ændringer vedrørende den in s titu tio n e lle  mekanisme, der er hjemlet  
i kodeks:
forslaget gar ud pa at oprette en særkommission for konkurrencebegræn­
sende handelsmetoder i stedet for en ekspertgruppe for konkurrence­
begrænsende handelsmetoder. Formålet er at give dette problem større  
vægt inden for D e forenede Nationer, da en sådan særkommission v il  
fa større status i overensstemmelse m ed den rangorden for udvalg, der  
gælder i UNCTAD-systemet. B-gruppen forkastede dette forslag på mødet  
i a p ril 1985, både under henvisning t i l  de budgetmæssige virkninger

-  5 -
-  som  bestrides af UNCTAD's sekretariat -  og som  følge a f, at visse  
delegationer i B-gruppen, b l.a . USA, ønsker arbejdet i IEG begræn­
set t i l  møder mellem eksperter for derved at undgå en "p o litis erin g "  
af dette arbejde. Erfaringerne m ed IEG v is e r, at 77-gruppen ikke rå­
der over eksperter på antitrustom rådet, der kan deltage i tekniske  
d rø fte ls e r, og derfor i stedet sender medlemmer af delegationer, der  
er udstationeret i Genève, som  har tendens t i l  at p o litis e re  d rø fte l­
serne.
G eneralsekretariatet har frem fø rt, at en særkommission i henhold t i l  
UNCTAD's forretningsorden kan vedtage at undlade at følge de procedu­
rereg ler, der gælder for de store kommissioner. En særkommission v il  
således kunne vedtage, at Fællesskabet optages som  fu ld t medlem heraf.  
Dette v i ll e  fo r Fællesskabet være en god grund t i l  i B-gruppen at s tø t­
te forslaget o m  oprettelse af en sådan kommission. Hvis B-gruppen der­
e fte r godkendte en ændring af afsn it G  i)  i den nuværende kodeks, bur­
de det præciseres, at særkommissionen, der skulle være den in s titu tio ­
n elle mekanisme, ikke blot skulle bestå af de s ta te r, der har godkendt  
kodeks, m en også af regionale sammenslutninger af de lande, som  har  
godkendt den.
Fællesskabet kunne im id le rtid  også fo rts a t holde sig solidarisk m ed  
B-gruppen t i l  gengæld fo r , at denne fo rp lig te r sig t i l  at stø tte Fæl­
lesskabets fulde deltagelse i den nuværende in s titu tio n e lle  mekanisme.
Hvad angår selve kodeks, er Kommissionen således af den o p fatte lse ,  
at Fællesskabet p rin c ip ie lt kan godkende forslagene under punkt 61,  
stk. 2, l it r a  a ), f ) ,  h) og i ) .  Under forhandlingerne skulle det være  
muligt at nå t i l  enighed o m  l it r a  d ), e) og g ).

Annexe 1 \
·  · ·  v - ,  ·';·>·:' ' · '
TD/EBP/CONF.2/2:
pas® 1
DRAFT PROVISIONAL RULES OP PROCEDURE'OP THE CONFERENCE
Chapter I
REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS'  '
f
Participation . · ■ ■ ■ ·
Rule 1
Participation in the Conference shall he open tot
(a) All States, "
(b) Namibia, represented by the United Nations■Council for Namibia,
[ (c)' Regional groupings of States which have competence in the area of 
restrictive business practices and have accepted the Set of NSultilaterally Agreed  
Equitable Principles and Rules, for the Control of Restrictive Business  
Practices, and ]
(fl) Other participants referred to in operative paragraph 4 of
Generc-l Assembly resolution 5?/l5? of 20 December 1978t
Composition of delegations
Rule 2
-, i 1
Each delegation participating in the Conference' shall consist of a head of  
delegation, and not more than two other accredited representatives, and such  
alternate representatives and advisers as may be required,
s  ·
Alternates and advisers
Rule 3
The head of the delegation may.designate an alternate representative or an  
adviser to act as a representative,
\
Submission of credentials 1
Rnl e / I  · ' ■ ' · '  !
The credentials of representatives of States and the. names of alternated  
representatives and advisers shall be submitted to the Seoretary-£eneral of.  
UNCTAD, if possible not later than one week before the date fixed for the opening
_*/ Reference to regional groupings of States in this rule is based on,the  
definition contained in section B, paragraph 8, of the Set of Multilaterally  
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business  
Practices. The draft rule does not confer on such regional groupings the right  
to vote.

,  TD/RBP/CONF.2/2  
page 7,
day preceding· the meeting* The President may, however, permit the discussion
and consideration of amendments, even though these amendments have not been  
circulated, or have only been circulated the same day.
Decisions on competence ’
Rule 28 .  '
Subject to rule 1J, any motion calling for a decision on the competence of  
the Conference to consider any matter, ‘ or to adopt a proposal, or an amendment  
submitted to it, shall be put to the vote before the matter is considered or a  
.  vote is taken on the-proposal or amendment in question.
Withdrawal of proposals and motions :
3 & 3 iS u 2 9 .  ./ ·
A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor, at any time before  
voting on it .has commenced, provided that it has not been amended by decision of  
the Conference, A proposal or a motion thus, withdrawn may be reintroduced by  
any representative with its original priority, provided he does so promptly and  
it has not been substantially changed.
Consideration of programme budget- implications
Rule 30
Before the Conference takes a decision or makes a recommendation, the
implementation of which might have programme budget implications for the  
Vnited Nations, it shall receive and consider a report from the secretariat an  
such implications.
Reconsideration of nronosals . .  .
Rule 31 .  .  '  .  '
V.hen a proposal has been adopted or rejected, it may not be reconsidered  
unless the Conference, by a 'two-thirds majority of the representatives present  
and voting,, so decides. Permission to speak on the motion to reconsider shall be  
accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put  
to the vote immediately. 1
Consensus
Rule 12
1. The 'Conference shall endeavour to-ensure that all its substantive decisions  
are taken by consensus.
?.. Notwithstanding· anÿ measures that may bé taken in compliance with paragraph 1,  
a proposal before the Conference shall be voted on if a representative so requests.
Voting rights
Rule Vj
\
Each State participating in the Conference shall have one vote.
■j
j

Annexe 2
B. Provisional· agenda for the Conferenoe  
(Agenda Item 5 (b))
59· The Intergovernmental Croup of·Experts had before it' a draft- provisional  
agenda for the Conference submitted by the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/B/RBP/26),
6 o \  At th® closing meeting, on.30 April. 1985,  the Chairman introduced·a slightly  
revised proposal, which he had submitted as a result of Informal consultations  
(TD/B/RBP/30).
■  Action by the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
61. At the same meeting the Group adopted the provisional agenda for the  
Conference proposed by the Chairman (see annex III below).Ÿ  4
CÏ Provisional rules of procedure for the Conference  
(Agenda Item 5 (c )  )
62. At the closing meeting, on 30 April 1985, the Chairman drew attention to
tne draft provisional rules of. procedure for the Conference prepared by the  
.TAD secretariat ( TD/3/R3P/28 )  and to. the following changes to rules.. 1 and 4 
which had been agreed upon in informal consultations:
(a)Rule 1: The text of paragraph (c) should be plaoed in square
brackets;
(b). Rule 4: The text should be completed by adding "or by the
permanent Mission to the United Nations of the State  at Geneva,
upon the explicit authorization of the Head of State or Government 
or the Minister for Foreign Affairs".
f'" Chairman added, that with respect to rule 4> the suggested change would
ormg whe ru_e into conformity with the corresponding rule of the rules of 
procedure of the United Nations Conference on Conditions for Registration of 
onios. However, the Senior Legal Officer  of UNCTAD had been advised by the
of Legal Affairs  that this practice in UNCTAD, whereby permanent missions 
cou_;C _ssue credentials in respect of representatives to United Nations 
coherences, was not in accordance with established United Nations practice.
representative of Italy, speaking on behalf of the European Economic
reserved his position  with respect to the 
.  oecnote to rule 1 (c) and the related rule. 33 of the draft provisional rules 
o: procedure. \
_Action by the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
' T ?  ed?pted-  «  Provisional rule, of proeedur,i  .»h'w ss’gjzmr*
s X X Z S fc  JK,*? ls s u e s  w o u ;d  b e  ~ " r ·  * » '·
3/ The revised text will be issued as document TD/PBP/C0NF.2/2. *

r ci ^ e j .  j
Annexe 3
Chapter II
CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE IMPROVEMENT AND FURTHER •DEVELOPMENT OF THE SET OF
.  '  PRINCIPLES AND RULES
56. As described throughout this^-note,  the Set of Principles and Rules has not
lived up to the expectations placed on it by Governments at the time of its adoption 
in December 1980. In the last five years, restrictive business practices have 
become nn increasingly important component of international trade policy. This 
trend is the result of a serious dichotomy in government policy which, on the one 
hand, advocates free market forces in international trade while, on the other, sub­
mits to strong protectionist pressure resulting in an intricate network of market­
ing arrangements restraining trade, such os, for example, voluntary export 
restraints. All such restraints to trade inevitably involve restrictive business 
practice arrangements among enterprises in both the exporting as well as the 
importing countries. « ■
57. Full implementation by all States of their commitment to the Set of Principles 
atn! Rules would undoubtedly have averted -this negative trend. Hence the requests 
from a number^of Spates, and' in .particular from the developing countries, for a 
mandatory or legally binding Set of Principles and Rules.
53. Since the Set was unanimously adopted by .the General Assembly in the form of a 
resolution, it clearly involves n morally binding commitment and may be cited in 
national and international proceedings. Therefore, while there is no contractual 
cb 1 :.ga tion as such - as for example is the case with, an international treaty - nev- 
er'.l·.'· less the fulfilment of the commitments accepted (as in the case of an interna­
tional treaty) largely depend upon the willingness of States, and in particular the 
principal trading countries, to respect them and not to search for ways and means 
to circumvent them.
'5° It would therefore be necessary for the Conference to decide that while there 
'  is no”ifóéd'.'"at'tiffs  "time ,  "to change the provisions of the Set, it is osse^f tal,  in 
l t o  ensure trie ori equa to implementation of the Sot at both national and inter-, 
national levels, that States decide upon concrete measures to promote and enhance 
its application". ......
■6
0, An important outcome of the Conference would therefore include nn agreed dec- 
i-Va ret ion by the Conference that five years after'the adoption of the Set restrict 
business or ac. tli’ ces '  ha ve’be còme òne of the main barriers to international trade 
„ ’ .jv.1 ·sac’ l ions .  ~ P'n'r 'from"being controlled or eliminated from the Internationa, trac­
ing svste.m, restrictive business practices have been increasingly used as an 
ins t rument of protect i  onism in the face of efforts to reduce more traditional types 
of governmental restrictions to trade such ns tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
,6b Conscious of this fact, the Conference should urge all States to take concrete 
action, in line with their commitments to the Set of Principles and Rules,.to elim­
inate restrictive business practices from international trade transactions. Rr.tner 
than changing the· provisions of the Set, the Conference should endeavour to decine 
upon the following issues:
(1) To urge States to avoid entering into arrangements in restraint of trade, 
resulting in the use of restrictive business practices as a palliative to 
governmental measures as covered under the General Agreement on tariffs anc. 
Trade.
(2) To strengthen the. control of restrictive business practices at both nationa,, 
Tug'ional  and” inf p.rnational levels, by taking concrete, steps, .towards the
„iypTe'mch*fàTi.'órr;of* the"'Set'  cT~?rinciplcs~and Rules', Those steps .may include, 
„'TLP A T.t.  i cu_ln j

(a) The establishment by States of^focal points in their respective national 
or regional administrations for' contacts“with enterprises and other 
States in order to enhance and facilitate consultations, discussion and 
exchange of views between them on the application of the Set, These 
focal points should inform annually the Secretary-General of UNCTAD of 
their activities, within the existing procedure in provision 2 of sec­
tion F of the· Set. Developing countries should be assisted in estab­
lishing «uoh focal peint« through multilateral nnd bilateral taahniaal 
co-operation, -in particular through exchange of personnel at national 
or regional levels;
(b) The establishment or improvement by States, at national and regional 
levels, of notification procedures for enterprises concerning the use 
of restrictive business-practices in' import and export transactions,
Yand such information to be,made publicly available;
t ■
(c) The stfVngthening of notification procedures among States by agreeing 
that when it comes to the attention of a State that a restrictive busi­
ness practice'has,  or is likely to have, adverse effects on interna­
tional trade, particularly that of the developing countries, and the 
economic development of those countries, it should promptly notify the 
State or States concerned in order to identify the necessary action in
.  accordance with the provisions 4 - 9 of section E of the.Set to facili­
tate appropriate action.
(d) Stimulation of the use of the consultation procedure by agreeing that, 
when a State decides to undertake an investigation of a practice which 
it believes has, or is likely to have, adverse effects on international 
trace, ir.i v'r.ici has ir.p Lie.’ .tiers  for the laws, policies cr national 
interests of another State or States, it should promptly notify such 
State or States of the investigation to the extent possible and may 
enter into consultations on the matter in accordance with provision 4 of 
section F of the Set before initiating judicial or administrative 
action,
(c) An invitation to States, in particular the developed countries, to make 
voluntary financial and other contributions for the technical ass.lst- 
-· 'ance, advisory and training programmes on restrictive business prac­
tices ns called for in provisions 6 and 7 of the Set. States may also he 
invited to pursue in the Governing Council of the United Nations Devel­
opment Programme, the allocation of resources for the implementation of 
the work in this area;
(f) A request for further studies to bn prepared by the international
:  institutional machinery under provision 3 of section G of the Set, tit
particular concerning the link between restrictive business practice 
policies and governmental trade policies;
(g) The establishment of a Special Committee on Restrictive Business Prac­
tices to perform the function of the international intergovernmental 
machinery called for in section G of the Sot, in place of the Intergov­
ernmental Group of Exports,  which does not properly reflect the impor­
tance. of tlie issue of restrictive business practices and its adverse 
effects on international trade, particularly that of developing coun­
tries, and the economic development of these countries;
\
(h) The holding of intergovernmental consultations on a formal or informal 
basis, at each -'annua 1— session''of the intergovernmental machinery, for
.  the purpose of improving the implementation of provision. 4 of section C 
and provision 3(a) of section G of the Set,
(i) ,  A recommendation to the General Assembly that a Review Conference on
Restrictive Business Practices should be convened in 19,90,
\