BERETNING FRA KOMMISSIONEN TIL RÅDET OG EUROPA-PARLAMENTET OM RENTEGODTGØRELSER

INDHOLDSFORTEGNELSE

RENTEGODTGØRELSER

1. INDLEDNING: ANMODNING FRA KOMMISSIONEN TIL RÅDET

2. DEL I: RENTETILSKUD, POSITIVE OG NEGATIVE VIRKNINGER

2.1. Begrundelse for offentlig indgriben

2.2. Rentegodtgørelser: Positive virkninger

2.3. Rentegodtgørelser: negative virkninger

3. del II: indhøstede erfaringer

3.1. Aktionerne på internationalt niveau

3.1.1. Verdensbankens lån med rentegodtgørelser

3.1.2. Europarådets erfaringer

3.2. Medlemsstaterne: aktioner med rentegodtgørelser

3.3. EU-aktioner med rentegodtgørelser

3.3.1. Forsøg på en klassificering

3.3.2. EU-programmerne

4. KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER

ANNEXES: COMMISSION WORKING PAPER ON INTEREST-RATE SUBSIDIES

5. Annex I: INTEREST- RATE SUBSIDIES: COMMUNITY Programmes

5.1. Summary table of programmes

5.2. ECSC subsidised loans (Article 56: industrial conversion)

5.3. Trans-European Networks (TENs)

5.4. Interest-rate subsidies to help certain Member States to participate in the European Monetary System

5.5. Edinburgh facility (SMEs)

5.6. Subsidised loans in the ACP countries

5.7. Interest-rate subsidies linked to EIB loans in the Mediterranean

5.8. ERDF Programme

5.9. EAGGF Programme

5.10. Interest-rate subsidies in the central and eastern European countries - Phare budget

5.11. Exceptional aid for the regions of Italy devastated by the earthquake of 1980

5.12. Exceptional aid to the regions of Greece devastated by the earthquake of 1981

5.13. Exceptional aid for the reconstruction of Kalamata (Greece)

5.14. Aid for the reconstruction of Madeira after the cyclone in 1993

5.15. The Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties

5.16. Interest-rate subsidies under the Financial Mechanism of the European Economic Area

5.17. Interest-rate subsidies for projects in the western Balkans

6. ANNEX II: ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

6.1. Management and control

6.2. Visibility

6.3. Evaluation of Community programmes

6.3.1. Reconstruction programmes

6.3.2. Other programmes

6.4. Compliance with the competition rules

6.5. Final remarks

7. Annex III: INTEREST-RATE SUBSIDIES: ExpErience IN MEMBER STATES

7.1. Italy

7.2. France

7.3. Germany

7.4. Spain

7.5. Sweden

7.6. United Kingdom

8. ANNEX IV: The use of subsidies in the context of EU policies with special reference to soft loans: theoretical considerations

8.1. Introduction

8.2. On the use of subsidies in general

8.3. On the equivalence of different forms of subsidy

8.4. On the suitability of different instruments for one and the same objective

8.5. On the implementation of soft loans

8.6. Conclusion

9. ANNEX V: Macroeconomic Effects of an Interest-Rate Subsidy fOr Firms in the EU

9.1. Introduction

9.2. Assumptions

9.3. Simulation results

RENTEGODTGØRELSER

1. INDLEDNING: ANMODNING FRA KOMMISSIONEN TIL RÅDET

Efter Revisionsrettens særberetning nr. 3/99 (EFT C 217 af 29.7.1999) om "Kommissionens forvaltning og kontrol af rentegodtgørelser" rejste EU's Ministerråd (dok. nr. 6224/1/00 rev. 1) «det generelle spørgsmål om, hvorvidt det i dag stadig er rimeligt at give rentegodtgørelser, især når man tager omkostningerne ved effektive kontrolforanstaltninger og det forhold, at der findes andre finansielle instrumenter, f.eks. lånegarantier, i betragtning». På denne baggrund har Rådet anmodet Kommissionen om snarest muligt at forelægge «en fuldstændig rapport om, hvorvidt det generelt er hensigtsmæssigt at yde rentegodtgørelser set på baggrund af omkostningerne og den økonomiske effektivitet og under hensyntagen til alle relevante faktorer».

Denne beretning, som er udarbejdet efter mange kontakter med EIB, de nationale myndigheder og Kommissionens forskellige tjenestegrene, som er ansvarlige for EF-foranstaltninger, hvortil der anvendes rentesubsidier, består af to dele: i) en meddelelse fra Kommissionen og ii) et arbejdspapir fra Kommissionens tjenestegrene som bilag.

I Kommissionens meddelelse undersøges spørgsmålet ud fra et helhedssynspunkt, og der udstikkes generelle retningslinjer for den fremtidige anvendelse af rentegodtgørelser.

Anden del, eller arbejdsdokumentet fra Kommissionens tjenestegrene, er mere empirisk. Her beskrives de operationelle aspekter ved instrumentets iværksættelse og erfaringerne med rentegodtgørelsesprogrammer inden for EU, ligesom der gøres bestræbelser for at foretage en evaluering af rentegodtgørelsesprogrammer. Desuden kommer man ind på spørgsmålet om, hvordan man kan vurdere, hvilket finansielt instrument der er bedst egnet i forhold til det mål, der skal opnås.

2. DEL I: RENTETILSKUD, POSITIVE OG NEGATIVE VIRKNINGER

2.1. Begrundelse for offentlig indgriben

Rentegodtgørelser er frem for alt overførsel af midler til fysiske eller juridiske personer. Som enhver overførsel er de almindeligvis begrundet i offentlighedens interesse, dels som solidaritet (f.eks. for at støtte boligpolitikken), dels som et industri- og sektorpolitisk instrument (f.eks. for at tilskynde til investering i infrastruktur eller i forskning og udvikling, som eksportstøtte osv.), dels begge dele (f.eks. som støtte til regionalpolitikken). Det skal bemærkes, at hvis modtagerne er virksomheder, hører rentetilskuddene ind under definitionen af statsstøtte, som er underlagt traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.

Det skal nævnes, at de fordrejninger, som enhver offentlig intervention fremkalder, kan være begrundede (positive fordrejninger).

Med forbehold af reglerne om kontrol med statsstøtte kan intervention fra de offentlige myndigheders side være begrundet i følgende tilfælde:

a) Når markedet ikke er i stand til at finansiere aktiviteter eller projekter, der ikke er særlig rentable, og som de offentlige myndigheder finder nødvendige for borgernes velfærd. Eksempler: Transeuropæiske net, F&U, landbrug, miljø osv. Dette indbefatter også aktioner til fordel for mindre gunstigt stillede regioner og virksomheder i vanskeligheder.

b) Når der skal reageres på pludselige udefrakommende begivenheder; dette gælder f.eks. interventioner til fordel for lande/regioner, der rammes af naturkatastrofer osv. eller negative eksterne virkninger.

Selv om disse principper berettiger til interventioner fra de offentlige myndigheders side, siges der ikke noget om disse interventioners form: Rentesubsidier-, subventioner-, garantier-, lån-, kapitalandele-, en kombination af disse elementer- Disse instrumenter er jo forskellige af natur og ved deres virkninger; på lignende måde er de forskellige alt efter de dermed forbundne omkostninger: budgetmæssige, forvaltningsmæssige og kontrolmæssige. På grund af disse specifikke træk skal valget af instrument eller interventionsform ske på baggrund af de forfulgte målsætninger og de konkrete omstændigheder, selv om man ofte benytter flere instrumenter på en gang.

specifikke træk ved instrumenter til investeringsstøtte

* Direkte subventioner: // Formål: projekter af generel offentlig interesse

* Rentegodtgørelser: // Formål: forbedring af projekternes rentabilitet ved en reduktion af finansieringsomkostningerne.

Eksempel : infrastruktur.

* Lånegarantier: // Formål: kreditadgang for højrisikoprojekter.

Eksempel: små og mellemstore virksomheder under oprettelse eller udvikling

* Kapitalandele: // Formål: risikodeling og fleksibilitet i forrentningen af egenkapitalen

* Skattelettelser: // Formål: forbedrede overskudsperspektiver Eksempel: håndværk, små og mellemstore virksomheder, udviklingshæmmede regioner

Under alle omstændigheder er det absolut nødvendigt, at man ved iværksættelsen af disse interventioner har opfyldt visse betingelser med hensyn til kontrol, gennemsigtighed og effektivitet i forhold de opstillede mål. Dette indebærer en række forpligtelser for de offentlige myndigheder, som medfører yderligere administrative omkostninger, som der skal tages hensyn til, når beslutningen træffes. Man må nemlig vide, at opfølgningen af disse operationer er langvarig, da den varer ved i hele lånets løbetid.

2.2. Rentegodtgørelser: Positive virkninger

Ø Den direkte virkning af rentegodtgørelser er en reduktion af finansieringsomkostningerne; indirekte har de en gavnlig indvirkning på kreditefterspørgslen, investeringerne og i sidste ende beskæftigelsen. På grund af deres specifikke karakter er de "ad hoc"-instrumenter for de offentlige myndigheder, hvis målsætning er at mindske omkostningerne, gøre finansieringen mere overkommelig og følgelig råde bod på en utilstrækkelig rentabilitet. De har kun indirekte indflydelse på projektrisikoen, mens der er mere hensigtsmæssige instrumenter til at tage højde for dette aspekt, f.eks. garantier eller risikokapital.

Ø Eftersom rentegodtgørelser er forbundet med lån, er fordelen ved dem i forhold til andre interventionsformer, at der gælder de samme stramme betingelser som i forbindelse med et banklån. Set ud fra dette synspunkt er risikoen for misbrug eller uretmæssig anvendelse af offentlige midler mindre end for subventioner eller andre former for støtte.

Ø Rentegodtgørelser virker i ikke ubetydelig grad som en finansiel løftestang. for eksempel de 92,3 mio. EUR i subsidier under "SMV-faciliteten" knyttet til næsten 1 mia. EUR investeringskreditter. Fra et budgetmæssigt synspunkt drejer det sig derfor om et forholdsvis økonomisk værktøj, ikke blot fordi en begrænset indsats af midler gør det muligt at mobilisere betydelige finansieringer, men også fordi budgetforpligtelsen kan fordeles over en forholdsvis lang periode.

Ø Et af de karakteristiske træk ved instrumentet er, at subsidiegiveren allerede fra begyndelsen med sikkerhed ved, hvad interventionen vil koste ham, hvilket ikke er tilfældet for andre instrumenter som garantier eller kapitalandele.

Ø Selv om rentesubsidier er et mikroøkonomisk-politisk instrument, der er meget forskelligt fra makroøkonomiske-politiske instrumenter som "rentesatsen" (pengepolitik), følger de altid det samme mønster: Et fald i låneomkostningerne har en gunstig indvirkning på den økonomiske aktivitet, i første række på investeringerne og dernæst på beskæftigelsen.

Ø Ved hjælp af modellen «Quest», har vi kunnet vurdere indvirkningen på investeringerne og beskæftigelsen af en generel rentesubsidiepolitik rettet mod alle virksomheder (vores værktøj gjorde det ikke muligt for os at foretage dette økonometriske skøn udelukkende inden for SMV-sektoren). Resultatet (se bilag V «Forsøg på en økonometrisk simulation») er klart: Rentesubsidier i faste priser på 0,5% formindsker kapitalomkostningerne med 7% ved periodens udgang og øger industriinvesteringerne med 5%.

Ø Disse skøn er tilstrækkelige "robuste" som argument over for den kritik fra visse kredse, som bygger på, at investoren modtager subsidier, men at hans beslutning om at investere træffes uafhængigt af foranstaltningen («turbaneffekten»).

Ø Instrumentet anvendes til forskellige formål: miljøprojekter, infrastrukturprojekter, projekter på det socialpolitiske område osv. Til denne type aktioner har vi ikke kunnet foretage kvantitative skøn over deres effektivitet; men der kan ikke herske megen tvivl om, at rentegodtgørelser har en gunstig indvirkning på disse investeringer: Man behøver nemlig blot at se på omfanget af de finansielle byrder i disse projekters forretningsplaner .

2.3. Rentegodtgørelser: negative virkninger

De uønskede virkninger af dette instrument er velkendte.

Ø Som ethvert offentligt instrument kan det ud fra et makroøkonomisk synspunkt føre til en ineffektiv allokering af ressourcer i den forstand, at finansiel effektivitet defineres som en allokering af ressourcerne til investeringer med det højest forventede afkast. Dette kan på sin side have som konsekvens, at der gennemføres mindre rentable projekter eller iværksættes initiativer, som markedet ikke ville have finansieret osv.

Ø Desuden kan man af og til frygte andre mere specifikke konkurrenceforvridninger: dels på efterspørgselssiden, fordi visse foranstaltninger ikke i tilstrækkelig grad bringes til de interesserede parters kendskab, eller fordi de stillede betingelser er så komplekse, at ordningen ikke er letforståelig for modtagerne, dels på udbudssiden, fordi visse finansielle institutioner forbeholder instrumentet for deres bedste kunder, eller fordi de offentlige myndigheder overdrager instrumentet til en formidler med fortrinsstilling og dermed udelukker konkurrenterne.

Ø Fra et operationelt synspunkt er der også fælder ved dette instrument, som man genfinder ved andre lignende instrumenter, undertiden i meget mere udstrakt grad:

a) Den fulde overdragelse af rentegodtgørelsen til de endelige modtagere mangler til tider synlighed og gennemsigtighed, og der ikke altid garanti for, at den finder sted.

b) Den «offentlige» kontrol med disse subsidier, som er en ufravigelig betingelse for denne type udgifter, da det drejer sig om offentlige midler, er ikke altid let. Af og til er det endog vanskeligt at efterprøve, om alle de stillede betingelser for ydelse af subsidierne er opfyldt. Misbrug kan forekomme.

c) Desuden forøger disse kontrolforanstaltninger og forvaltningen af programmet administrationsomkostningerne i ikke ubetydeligt omfang. Man skønner f.eks., at efterfølgende dokumentkontrol med hensyn til de finansielle formidleres korrekte gennemførelse af operationerne kun kan foretages for 25/30 projekters vedkommende. For visse programmer har man kunnet skønne, at de samlede omkostninger ved forvaltningen har været på omkring 7-8% af bevillingerne til rentegodtgørelser.

Ø Der skal mindes om, at rentegodtgørelser er betydeligt mindre tiltrækkende for aktørerne efter rentefaldet i Europa. Alligevel udgør selv mindre rentesubsidier en betydelig del af rentebyrden.

Ø Det skal endelig tilføjes, at disse positive og negative virkninger af rentesubsidier ikke udelukkende er knyttet til dette instrument, men også gælder for andre instrumenter.

3. del II: indhøstede erfaringer

Instrumentet «rentegodtgørelser» anvendes løbende i både A) international sammenhæng (af de multilaterale finansielle institutioner) og B) national sammenhæng (af medlemsstaterne) samt C) EU-sammenhæng. Med henblik på denne beretning foretages der kun en summarisk og orienterende analyse af A) og B).

3.1. Aktionerne på internationalt niveau

Vi begrænser vores undersøgelse til to tilfælde: Verdensbankens og Europarådets initiativer.

3.1.1. Verdensbankens lån med rentegodtgørelser

Størstedelen af Verdensbankens lån til signatarstaterne varetages af IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) på markedsvilkår, dvs. uden rentegodtgørelse. En anden type lån fra Verdensbanken er beregnet direkte på finansiering af projekter via Den Internationale Finansieringsinstitution (IFC). Denne tilbyder kreditlinjer (uden rentesubsidier) til lokale finansielle formidlere efter en rangfølge med fem punkter: infrastruktur, SMV, styrkelse af de finansielle strukturer, informationsteknologi og sociale behov (uddannelse og sundhed).

Lån med rentesubsidier til de fattigste lande ydes inden for rammerne af IDA-programmet (Den Internationale Sammenslutning for Økonomisk Udvikling), som forvaltes af IBRD. Finansieringen sikres ved donationer fra de rigeste medlemsstater ifølge et program, der ajourføres hvert tredje år. Disse ressourcer samt tilbagebetalinger af tidligere lån gør det muligt at yde lån til de mest gældsatte lande til 0-sats (+0,75% tillæg) for en periode af 30-40 år, hvori indgår en afdragsfri periode på 10 år [1].

[1] Ved det første oliechok i 1975 åbnede Verdensbanken et "tredje vindue", der placerede sig mellem de to tidligere faciliteter, og som blev finansieret af OECD- og OPEC-landene, så der kunne ydes lån med rentegodtgørelse til medlemsstater i vanskeligheder som følge af de stigende rentesatser. Erfaringerne varede ikke længe (1976-1977) som følge af donorernes tilbageholdenhed med at indskyde nye midler.

Evaluering

I regnskabsåret 2000 (som afsluttes den 30. juni) har Verdensbanken udlånt 15,3 mia. USD, heraf 10,9 mia. USD kommercielle lån og 4,4, mia. USD lån med rentegodtgørelse (dvs. 29% af totalen). Det foregående år havde Verdensbankens aktiviteter været langt mere omfangsrige (29 mia. USD i alt) på grund af følgerne af krisen i Asien. Verdensbankens egen vurdering af sin udlånsaktivitet i de fattigste lande er en funktion af, hvor stram den finansielle forvaltning er i modtagerlandet. Ifølge Verdensbanken kan hver støttedollar i de lande, der respekterer de grundlæggende ligevægte og frihandel, tredoble sin virkning som følge af den tillid, som støtten kan give de private investorer. Man mener imidlertid, at 1 støttedollar i gennemsnit kan medføre en investering på 1,5 USD. Disse skøn gælder for samtlige støtteformer under ét fra denne institution og ikke blot rentesubsidier.

3.1.2. Europarådets erfaringer

Europarådets udlånsaktivitet er henlagt til dets socialudviklingsfond, som i henhold til vedtægterne intervenerer i to nøjere beskrevne situationer: i) støtte til vandrende arbejdstagere (boliger, sanitært udstyr og uddannelse osv.), ii) rehabilitering af katastroferamte områder. Hvad sidstnævnte tilfælde angår har fonden tidligere været involveret i initiativer svarende til Kommissionens i katastroferamte områder i Grækenland og Italien. Der er tale om en intervention af mindre omfang end Verdensbankens, i størrelsesordenen 2 mia. om året, hvilket svarer til 30-40 projekter om året.

Fondens bevilling af lån på gunstige betingelser bygger på en koncentration af initiativerne i regioner, hvor der er størst behov (for tiden landene i Central- og Østeuropa (CØE-landene)). Finansieringen sker på det internationale marked i de valutaer, der p.t. frembyder de mest gunstige vilkår (triple A), hvilket giver en betydelig renteforskel i forhold til det lokale marked, hvortil kommer en rentegodtgørelse på 1,5-3% alt efter omstændighederne.

Evaluering

Effektiviteten af denne aktion skal bedømmes på baggrund af det sociale mandat, som udviklingsfonden har fået. De medlemmer, der har undertegnet charteret, tillægger interventionerne stor betydning. De klare og let kontrollerbare målsætninger sikrer, at disse lån er politisk synlige og økonomisk attraktive. Fondens interventioner er et signal, der gør det muligt at støtte den politik, der føres i modtagerlandet, hvilket letter tilstrømningen af privat kapital fra udlandet.

3.2. Medlemsstaterne: aktioner med rentegodtgørelser

Ø Et stort antal medlemsstater anvender rentesubsidier som instrument til forskellige formål: det drejer sig undertiden om generelle ordninger til støtte for produktive investeringer for SMV'er, håndværk osv., undertiden om punktaktioner (eksportfremme, innovation, støtte til unge iværksættere osv.) eller aktioner af social art (boligpolitik).

Disse rentegodtgørelsesordninger medfinansieres undertiden af strukturfondenes (EFRU og EUGFL) programmer til fremme af den økonomiske og sociale samhørighed. De offentlige myndigheder, som er ansvarlige for at gennemføre de flerårige udviklingsprogrammer i de støtteberettigede områder, forvalter selv rentegodtgørelserne og yder støtte til de endelige modtagere, eller de overlader forvaltningen af disse foranstaltninger til finansielle institutioner på grundlag af kontrakter.

Bilag III beskriver Italiens, Frankrigs, Det Forenede Kongeriges, Spaniens, Tysklands og Sveriges aktioner (af operationelle grunde har vi måttet begrænse antallet af undersøgte tilfælde). Hvad de andre medlemsstater angår (Finland, Portugal osv.) finder man også der en ret udbredt anvendelse af rentegodtgørelser.

Til illustration af størrelsesordenen af denne aktivitet i medlemsstaterne kan man nævne nogle eksempler:

- I Italien lå antallet af rentegodtgørelser i perioden 1995-1999 på omkring 0,7 mia. EUR om året;

- i Tyskland formidlede den særlige ERP-fond (som centraliserer forvaltningen af rentegodtgørelser for staten) i 1999 et lånebeløb på 6 mia. EUR, hvilket har gjort det muligt at foretage investeringer til 15 mia. EUR i SMV'er;

- i Frankrig anvendes godtgørelsesordningen i gennemsnit på et samlet lånevolumen på 1,5 mia. EUR om året og koster staten næsten 250 mio. EUR i form af godtgørelser;

- i Spanien nåede de rentegodtgørelser, der forvaltes af ICO i forbindelse med EFRU-programmer for SMV'er i perioden 1994-1999, op på 194,6 mio. EUR og knyttede sig til et lånevolumen på 3,3 mia. EUR, hvilket har ført til investeringer i størrelsesordenen 6,1 mia. EUR;

- i Det Forenede Kongerige har SBLS (Small Business Loan Scheme), der er forbeholdt SMV'er, ydet godtgørelser for et lånevolumen på 70 mio. EUR;

- i Sverige, hvor godtgørelserne i vid udstrækning anvendes inden for boligpolitikken, nåede statens støtte i form af godtgørelser kun op på 80 mio. EUR i 1999, et markant fald som følge af en reform i 1993 og de faldende rentesatser.

Ø De vigtigste konstateringer, der kan foretages på grundlag af vores undersøgelser - som hovedsagelig vedrører virksomhedssektoren - er følgende:

a) De målsætninger, der forfølges med rentegodtgørelsespolitikken, er generelt veldefinerede (køb af udstyr, oprettelse af unge virksomheder osv.). De mindskede finansieringsomkostninger har lettet de produktive investeringer og følgelig styrket den produktive kapacitet og konkurrenceevnen, især i de regioner, der har fået støtten. Effektiviteten af de nationale aktioner og EU-aktionerne, som administreres af medlemsstaterne, betragtes generelt som tilfredsstillende.

Desuden har medlemsstaterne opstillet administrative og operationelle rammer for at sikre gennemsigtigheden. Der annonceres for disse foranstaltninger i medierne for at informere potentielle modtagere. Det skal især bemærkes, at forvaltningsmonopolet eller fordelingen af rentegodtgørelserne via særligt udvalgte finansielle formidlere gradvis erstattes af et stadig mere generelt udbudssystem.

b) Medlemsstaternes politik med hensyn til rentesubsidier varierer, da de prøver at finde den mest økonomiske vej til at nå deres politiske mål. Nogle omstrukturerer deres rentesubsidieprodukter for at tilpasse sig udviklingen inden for virksomhedssektoren (Frankrig), nogle har pakker med lånevilkår (Sverige), nogle benytter knap nok rentesubsidier (Det Forenede Kongerige), og nogle fortsætter med at benytte dem til at forfølge deres politiske mål (Tyskland, Finland, Spanien).

3.3. EU-aktioner med rentegodtgørelser

Bilag I giver en sammenfattende beskrivelse af EU's interventioner eller programmer, hvor der anvendes rentesubsidier, samt af betydningen af de iværksatte midler.

Til forskel fra medlemsstaternes aktioner, der medfinansieres af EFRU's og EUGFL's programmer, iværksættes EU's programmer direkte af Kommissionen, som ofte overlader administrationen til EIB på basis af en kontrakt.

3.3.1. Forsøg på en klassificering

Til analyseformålet kan disse interventioner klassificeres i to grupper (se også tabellen i det følgende):

a) For interventioner, hvis formål er at råde bod på markedets mangelfuldheder, kan det konkrete formål være:

i) af makroøkonomisk art, såsom «Edinburgh-faciliteten», aktion til fordel for SMV'er uden undtagelse, hvis mål er at skabe beskæftigelse;

ii) af mesoøkonomisk art. Dels drejer det sig her om aktioner til fordel for eksempelvis miljøområdet (MEDA) eller infrastrukturområdet (transeuropæiske net), hvis projekter kombinerer en oplagt offentlig interesse med udsigt til en utilstrækkelig finansiel rentabilitet. Og dels drejer det sig om interventioner inden for sektorer, der er under omstilling (EKSF) og tilbagestående regioner, hvor man finder en blanding af sociale og udviklingsmæssige målsætninger;

iii) af mikroøkonomisk art. Det drejer sig her om EU-aktioner til fordel for innovative virksomheder, nyetablerede virksomheder osv., hvor iværksætterrisikoen anses for at være for høj for investorerne.

b) interventioner, der skal tage højde for eksterne chok, som det kan være vanskelige at forudse; i denne gruppe kan man skelne mellem:

i) interventioner, hvor målsætningen er social eller solidaritetspræget. Som eksempel kan nævnes operationer til fordel for regioner, der er ramt af naturkatastrofer: Dette gælder også aktioner til fordel for Madeira, Kalamata, det sydlige Italien, som Rådet giver bemyndigelse til med beløb på henholdsvis 15,9 mio. EUR, 100 mio. EUR og 1 mia. EUR i form af lån med tilhørende rentegodtgørelse på 3%, som udbetales til EIB eller direkte til de regionale myndigheder, som det er tilfældet med Madeira;

ii) interventioner, der har en makroøkonomisk målsætning. F.eks. kan nævnes: den tidligere «facilitet under det europæiske monetære system» til fordel for lande, der står over for udefrakommende vanskeligheder, som gør det svært at forblive i EMS'en. Dette kan f.eks. skyldes en kraftig olieprisstigning eller valutaspekulationer. Denne aktionsform er kun bragt i anvendelse en gang (Italien og Irland i fællesskab), og derefter blev faciliteten afskaffet.

Alt i alt er det ikke ubetydelige budgetmidler, der er stillet til rådighed af EU i forbindelse med dette instrument: næsten 3 mia. EUR. Tages der hensyn til, at subventionssatsen ligger på omkring 3%, giver dette tal en ide om størrelsen af de lån, der ligger bag disse subsidier (løftestangseffekten). Bilag I giver tallene for disse subsidier for hvert enkelt instrument. Der skal i denne sammenfattende beskrivelse mindes om, at størstedelen af disse subsidier er overført til og administreret af EIB, som også har stillet de hertil svarende lån til rådighed.

Rentegodtgørelser i forbindelse med EU-programmer

>TABELPOSITION>

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3.3.2. EU-programmerne

Opgaven med at foretage en evaluering af dette instruments effektivitet i de forskellige programmer, der er nævnt tidligere (beskrevet i bilag I), er ikke let; beløbenes ringe størrelse, vanskeligheden ved at beregne administrations- og kontroludgifterne på troværdig måde, det forhold, at der undertiden mangler kvantificerbare målsætninger, de afledte virkninger af interventionerne osv. gør ethvert kvantitativt skøn af effektiviteten alt for usikkert.

Generelt gør analysekriterierne i første del det imidlertid muligt at fastslå, at rentesubsidier er et velegnet interventionsinstrument, eftersom:

- aktionen hovedsagelig sigter mod at råde bod på en utilstrækkelig rentabilitet i projektet og ikke at mindske risikoen

- aktionens målsætning er klart defineret, hvilket mindsker de negative virkning, der er beskrevet ovf., og effektiviteten øges

- der er mulighed og rimelig sikkerhed for efterfølgende kontrol og evaluering af programmerne, ligesom gennemsigtigheden er sikret (overførelse af det fulde beløb af rentegodtgørelserne til de endelige modtagere).

Med samme argumentation kan man konstatere følgende:

a) Hvad angår EU-interventionerne i gruppe 3.3.1 (solidaritetsaktioner) forekommer rentegodtgørelserne på sin plads, dels fordi disse aktioner på den ene side er meget målrettede og tager sigte på investeringer - især i infrastruktur - med lav rentabilitet, dels fordi de negative virkninger (diskriminering, konkurrenceforvridning osv.) er ubetydelige( [2]). I nogle tilfælde består kontrolproblemet fortsat på grund af det stigende antal intervenerende organer og det høje antal modtagere.

[2] Det skal imidlertid bemærkes, at disse EU-aktioner, som jo har et solidaritetsformål, ikke kun skal vurderes på grundlag af en ren økonomisk beregning.

Samme argumentation kan gøres gældende, når det drejer sig om lån på fordelagtige vilkår til offentlige og private iværksættere i AVS-landene, især når det drejer sig om at finansiere konkrete projekter. De fordelagtige vilkår kan ofte i dette tilfælde tage form af dels en adskilt bevilling til finansiering af specifik faglig bistand til den pågældende investering, dels et nedslag i satsen, hvilket skal bidrage til at lette afdragsbyrden. De fordelagtige vilkår, der indrømmes, er således ikke blot et spørgsmål om en automatisk nedsættelse af satsen og bidrager til at realisere udviklingsmålsætningerne.

b) Rentesubsidier til transportinfrastruktur (bortset fra telekommunikation og visse energisektorer) og miljøprojekter er særlig velegnede, især til projekter, hvor EU's interesse ligger i forlængelse af den nationale interesse (missing links). Faktisk drejer det sig på den ene side om konkrete projekter med utilstrækkelig rentabilitet, men af stor offentlig nytte, og på den anden side er kontrollen med offentlige midler forholdsvis let. Hertil kommer, at de negative konkurrenceforvridende virkninger ikke blot er meget begrænsede, men ofte er realiseringen af disse store arbejder en vigtig faktor for at gøre det muligt for de økonomiske aktører at deltage fuldt ud i det indre marked.

c) Når det drejer sig om virksomheder, der befinder i konkurrence med hinanden, er måden at administrere rentegodtgørelserne på forskellig, alt efter om virksomhederne befinder sig i regioner, der modtager støtte fra strukturfondene eller ej. Førstnævnte er behandlet under punkt 3.2. blandt de godtgørelser, der administreres af medlemsstaterne.

I de andre regioner må man skelne mellem nyetablerede SMV'er og SMV'er, der har behov for nye investeringer for at kunne udvide. Hvad angår nyetablerede virksomheder, særlig dem, der befinder inden for vækstsektorer, er problemet i mindre grad manglende rentabilitet og snarere en høj risiko for konkurs i den nystartede virksomheds første faser; ofte er deres låneadgang lukket, uanset hvilken rente de er parate til at betale [3]. Men til gengæld er rentabilitetsgraderne for dem, der når over dette punkt og befinder sig inden for vækstsektorer, ofte meget høje. Under disse omstændigheder er således oplagt, at lån med rentegodtgørelse i dette tilfælde ikke er det bedst egnede instrument, da der, samtidig med at låneafviklingen er underlagt strenge vilkår, er en stor sandsynlighed for, at disse subsidier er overflødige. I sådanne tilfælde findes der andre instrumenter, f.eks. garantier eller risikokapital, der eventuelt kan vise sig at være mere velegnede (selv om hvert af disse instrumenter også har sine egne begrænsninger) samt horisontale foranstaltninger som skattereformer og forenkling af de administrative procedurer.

[3] Nyetablerede SMV'er skal investere kraftigt i produktion, distribution og markedsføring og har ikke noget overskud i de første år. Breakeven-punktet kan ligge fem år ud i fremtiden eller endnu længere ude. Bankerne går kun modvilligt med til at forlænge finansieringen under sådanne omstændigheder.

d) Indrømmelse af rentegodtgørelser til SMV'er på bredt grundlag, f.eks. "Edinburgh-faciliteten", rejser nogle spørgsmål. Ud over at programmets målsætning (jobskabelse) er nået med meget begrænsede budgetomkostninger [4], vedrører den første bemærkning programmets dimension. Da der er afsat alt for få lånemidler, når disse interventioner kun ud til et begrænset antal virksomheder, og det efterstræbte makroøkonomiske mål (nedbringelse af arbejdsløsheden) ligger uden for instrumentets rækkevidde. Der er derfor en vis manglende overensstemmelse mellem målsætning og instrument.

[4] Det gennemsnitlige tilskud til hver ny arbejdsplads lå på kun 1716 EUR og var bestemt prisen værd. Kommissionens beretning KOM(2000) 376.

Da de finansielle kanaler, gennem hvilke den offentlige støtte passerer, nødvendigvis er meget lange, er der fra et operationelt synspunkt ikke sikret fuldstændig gennemsigtighed, men dette træk gælder også for andre programmer.

4. KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER

Ø Rentegodtgørelser er et instrument, som i vid udstrækning anvendes i EU-programmer med forskellige målsætninger:

- Politiske: naturkatastrofer i EU-landene som udtryk for solidaritet; rentegodtgørelser i CØE-landene (forberedelse til udvidelsen; Balkan-landene (stabilitet i området) eller AVS-landene (EU's tilstedeværelse)

- Økonomiske: strukturproblemer, regionale forskelle; mangelfuldheder på markedet, støtte til SMV'er, iværksættelse af infrastrukturprojekter, konjunkturudlignende instrumenter: arbejdsløshed osv.

Ø Hovedkonklusionen i denne rapport er, at man ikke med bestemthed kan fastslå, om «rentegodtgørelser» er et effektivt instrument eller ej; dette afhænger både af arten af de målsætninger, der søges nået ved aktionen, og den måde, hvorpå subsidierne administreres eller anvendes [5], og tillige af muligheden for at udøve en stram kontrol og endelig af de kanaler, igennem hvilke godtgørelserne fordeles samt kvaliteten af de finansielle formidlere.

[5] Rentegodtgørelsesordningerne er meget forskellige, f.eks. når man sammenligner de transeuropæiske net og MEDA eller andre RELEX-programmer; i førstnævnte tilfælde betales og administreres de af Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med dens egne kontrolkriterier, og i sidstnævnte tilfælde af EIB i overensstemmelse med et andet arrangement.

Den analyse, der er foretaget i beretningen, har ikke desto mindre gjort det muligt at påvise en række grundlæggende tendenser hvad angår instrumentets positive eller negative sider. Med alle de forbehold, der knytter sig til en forenkling, kan disse positive eller negative sider kort resumeres som følger:

Positive sider:

- Lave budgetomkostninger [6]

[6] Når valget af instrument ligger hos medlemsstaterne med henblik på gennemførelse af visse EU-programmer (f.eks. EUGFL), har erfaringerne vist, at valget ikke var neutralt ud fra et finansielt synspunkt, og især at dette valg ikke kunne føre til en minimering af budgetomkostningerne for EU.

- Løftestangseffekt (multiplikator)

- Additionalitet

- Bygger på et generelt og almindeligt kendt grundlag (banklån)

- Symbol på solidariteten i EU

Negative sider:

- Risiko for ineffektiv fordeling af midlerne

- Bureaukrati

- Ikke ubetydelige administrationsomkostninger

- Der er ikke altid sikkerhed for kontrol og gennemsigtighed

- Risiko for diskriminering

- Svag synlighed

Ø Administrations- og kontrolspørgsmålet er af stor betydning. Eftersom rentesubsidierne er knyttet til lån i de fleste tilfælde, varetages den overordnede kontrol af EIB inden for rammerne af en konvention, der er undertegnet med Kommissionen. I betragtning af antallet og arten af modtagere (SMV'er) er der også andre finansielle institutioner, der indgår i den kæde, der fordeler godtgørelserne, hvilket gør opfølgningen og kontrollen med programmer til en yderst vanskelig affære. Det forekommer vanskeligt at komme uden om dette problem.

Der knytter sig også nogle bemærkninger til administrationsomkostningerne. Disse omkostninger er ikke ubetydelige, når det drejer sig om rentegodtgørelsesprogrammer eller for den sags skyld andre programmer, som er møntet på tusindvis, ja titusindvis af små modtagere. Da det imidlertid drejer sig om kommercielle formidlere, og da der er konkurrence mellem pengeinstitutterne, trækker dette i retning af en reduktion af disse omkostninger. Desuden skal det beløb, som formidlerne modtager, i nogle tilfælde betragtes som utilstrækkelig i forhold til de påløbne omkostninger, især når det drejer sig om formidlere, som indretter sig på at håndtere små subsidiebeløb [7].

[7] For eksempel pådrog EIB, de nationale agenter og de finansielle formidlere sig en ikke ubetydelig administrativ byrde i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af SMV-faciliteten. I mange tilfælde skabte formidlerne nye interne procedurer for at kunne håndtere ordningen og fremstillede reklamemateriale for egen regning. Formidlerne fik gebyrer på 1% af de udbetalte subsidier (SMV-faciliteten, femte beretning).

Endelig skal problematikken omkring administrationsomkostningerne ses i sammenhæng med den fordel, der er forbundet med anvendelsen af et omfattende net af banker, som gør det muligt at iværksætte EU-initiativer inden for rimelige tidsfrister.

Ø Hvordan man kan vurdere, hvilket instrument der er mest velegnet i forhold til målsætningen, behandles mere indgående i beretningen [8]. Et resumé af denne analyse viser, at rentegodtgørelser er et egnet instrument til at råde bod på mangelfuldhederne i den finansielle sektor og til at støtte projekter med lav rentabilitet i særligt beskyttede områder (udviklingslande, støtteområder osv.). Rentegodtgørelser er også et velegnet instrument, når projektet har indirekte positive virkninger (eksternaliteter), som det ikke er muligt at afspejle i brugerprisen for den pågældende ydelse (miljø, transportforbindelser) og til at imødegå eksterne chokvirkninger (naturkatastrofer osv.).

[8] Se arbejdsdokumentet fra Kommissionens tjenestegrene, bilag IV: "Teoretiske overvejelser".

Ø Sammenligningen mellem instrumenter gør det heller ikke muligt at foretage nogen generelle og entydige konklusioner.

Rentegodtgørelser og gavebistand, der udbetales direkte som et engangsbeløb, er næsten identiske [9]. Gavebistand (aktualiseret godtgørelse, som udbetales som et diskonteret engangsbeløb ved långivningen), tager også sigte på at mindske omkostningerne ved den lånte kapital. Men til forskel fra gavebistand er modtageren af en rentegodtgørelse underkastet de overvågningsbetingelser, banken stiller i hele tilbagebetalingstiden. Denne overvågning supplerer den overvågning, som det offentlige organ, der yder subventionen, udøver. Til gengæld er gavebistand enklere at administrere og mere gennemsigtig [10], men indvirkningen på EU-budgettet er mere negativ (er koncentreret om det første år).

[9] Der er imidlertid forskellige virkninger på modtagernes "cash flow".

[10] Finansieringen af de transeuropæiske net er et eksempel, idet der inden for denne kategori af projekter også er undtagelser til fordel for rentesubsidier (se pkt. 5.3 i bilag I).

De mere garantiprægede instrumenter forekommer mere relevante end godtgørelserne, når det finansielle system er tilbageholdende som følge af den høje projektrisiko, fordi der foreligger asymmetriske oplysninger, eller når projektets begrænsede omfang ikke retfærdiggør omkostninger ved evalueringen af projektrisikoen. I disse tilfælde gør garantien det muligt for SMV'erne at få lettere låneadgang, idet der sker en spredning af risikoen mellem et stort antal debitorer. I visse tilfælde kan garantierne imidlertid komme i konflikt med principperne om korrekt forvaltning (selv om denne mulighed kan minimeres ved en grundig opfølgning og kontrol af projektet).

Risikokapital er et mere fleksibelt instrument end banklån (da der ikke er krav om faste rentebetalinger) og meget velegnet, da der sker en fordeling af risikoen i de vækstegnede virksomheders opstartfase og i de tidlige driftsfaser. De oplagte fordele ved instrumentet modvirkes af, at antallet af potentielle brugere (virksomheder) er meget begrænset, og af det forhold, at den institutionelle investor (venturekapitaludbyder) ikke kan være sikker på at kunne udtræde af projektet (lille og fragmenteret fondsmarked og regulatoriske forhindringer [11]).

[11] Se handlingsplan for kapitalinvesteringer KOM (2000) 658 endelig.

Det siger sig selv, at visse fordele og ulemper ved rentegodtgørelser også gør sig gældende for andre finansielle instrumenter.

Ø Der er visse betingelser, der skal være opfyldt, for at rentegodtgørelsesinstrumentet bevarer sin effektivitet.

- Statsstøttelovgivningen skal være opfyldt, for at man kan undgå eventuelle bivirkninger.

- Hvis der kan skabes ægte konkurrence mellem de finansielle formidlere, kan administrationsomkostningerne nedbringes. Hvis der ikke er reel konkurrence mellem formidlerne, kan det føre til fordrejninger på de finansielle markeder og skabe risiko for, at den endelige modtager ikke får rentegodtgørelsen. Hvis dette er en realistisk mulighed, bør man undgå at anvende instrumentet.

- Med hensyn til målsætninger/modtagere må man først og fremmest sørge for gå mere målrettet til værks (fordeling af rentegodtgørelser til virksomheder i almindelighed giver anledning til kritik, undtagen når det drejer sig om regioner, sektorer eller mere specifikke projekter). I øvrigt bør aktionen være af begrænset varighed.

- Programmerne bør tildeles et budget, som gør det muligt at skabe en synlig effekt og få inddækning for omkostningerne til iværksættelsen.

- Det bør udtrykkeligt gøres klart i kontrakter, at der vil blive foretaget offentlig kontrol, men man bør undgå dobbeltkontrol. Omkostningerne ved kontrol bør ikke stå i misforhold til fordelene. Hvad de finansielle formidlere angår er der ingen praktisk mulig måde, hvorpå man kan sikre sig, i hvilket omfang rentegodt gørelsen i realiteten kommer den tilsigtede endelige modtager til gode, og i hvilket omfang det er formidleren, der nyder fordelen. Dette er ikke et misbrugsspørgsmål, som kan løses ved at indføre øget kontrol; det ligger i rentegodtgørelsernes natur og skyldes den omstændighed, at vilkårene for individuelle lån ikke kan reguleres af Kommissionen.

- Rentegodtgørelserne skal ledsages af enkle og klare bestemmelser. Man bør undgå komplicerede betingelser for gennemførelse og kvantificering.

- Gennemførelsen af programmerne skal kunne øge værdien af de nationale aktioner (subsidiaritet).

- Opfølgning og evaluering bør styrkes. Alle programmer bør underkastes en forudgående evaluering, en midtvejsevaluering og en efterfølgende evaluering.

Ø Rentefaldet [12] og det forhold, at der er kommet andre finansieringstekniske instrumenter til, betyder at rentegodtgørelsernes relative betydning i dag er blevet mindre [13]. Man bør derfor fremme anvendelsen af supplerende eller alternative instrumenter. Desuden kan en kombination af flere instrumenter vise sig at være mere fordelagtig end et enkelt eksklusivt finansielt instrument. Partnerskabet (samfinansieringer osv.) mellem det offentlige og den private sektor bør også styrkes. Imidlertid skal det understreges, at rentegodtgørelsesinstrumentet benyttes i forbindelse med banklån, som har været og fortsat er den vigtigste finansieringskilde for produktive investeringer (det er en kendt sag, at de fleste SMV'er er underkapitaliserede og i vid udstrækning er afhængige af banklån).

[12] Et fald i den nominelle rentesats betyder ikke nødvendigvis et fald i samme størrelsesorden i realrentesatsen.

[13] Det er vigtigt at erkende, at rentesubsidier er ved at miste betydning som del af de samlede lånebetingelser. For iværksættere og nystartede virksomheder er det meget mere relevant at opnå langfristet finansiering (op til 20 år) og en afdragsfri periode, som beskærer kapitalomkostningerne i den tidlige fase (op til 3 år). For kommercielle banker, som kanaliserer særlige lånetilbud og kvasikapital til iværksættere, er de indbyggede elementer af risikofordeling i sådanne låneordninger en relevant faktor i begrænsningen af den risiko, bankerne løber. Adgangen til langfristet finansiering til en rimelig pris, og ikke blot rentegodtgørelser, gør i dag ordningerne attraktive for iværksættere og nystartede virksomheder i alle økonomiens sektorer.

Ø For at kunne foretage en komplet vurdering af instrumentet er det også nødvendigt at tage hensyn til alle de involveredes synspunkter, især de nationale formidlere og de endelige modtagere.

Blandt de finansielle formidlere, som er de vigtigste aktører i fordelingskæden, er vurderingen af rentegodtgørelser i langt overvejende grad positiv af følgende grunde:

* Instrumentets direkte virkning og enkelhed. Bankerne indrømmer rentegodt gørelser til virksomheder, som de har ydet lån til. Dette er mere effektivt og mere direkte end garantitilsagn, som kræver en mere kompliceret og risikabel procedure.

* Den midlertidige og genkaldelige uddelegering med efterfølgende kontrol, som gør det muligt for bankerne at påtage sig en del af fordelingsomkostningerne under optimale betingelser. Merværdien består i en større omkostningsspredning i en globalt finansielt og kommercielt forhold.

Hvad den endelige modtager angår er det almindeligt kendt, at et banklån (og således rentegodtgørelsen) foretrækkes frem for eksterne aktionærers overtagelse af kapitalandele som følge af det delvise tab af kontrollen med ledelsen af virksomheden, som optagelse af risikokapital indebærer. For en række virksomheder, som i procent udgør en meget begrænset del af totalen i EU, er der imidlertid andre finansieringstekniske instrumenter, der er lige så tiltrækkende. Som virksomhederne finder ud af hen ad vejen, så kunne SMV'erne helt opgive lånefinansiering til fordel for mere sofistikerede alternativer.

Ø Af de nævnte grunde har rentegodtgørelserne tidligere spillet en vigtig rolle. Generelt og set i et historisk perspektiv kan man konkludere, at de positive aspekter af rentegodtgørelserne har kompenseret for de negative sider. Spørgsmålet om man skal opgive dette instrument kan derfor ikke besvares med baggrund i de opnåede resultater (de mål, der er sat, er globalt set nået), men man må snarere tages udgangspunkt i, om der opstår et nyt finansielt miljø.

På denne baggrund forekommer det hensigtsmæssigt for innovative virksomheder, som er konfronteret med høje risici, og som især befinder sig i opstartfasen, i højere grad at gå efter finansielle instrumenter, der bygger på garanti- eller risikokapitalsystemer, så der i højere grad tages hensyn til markedets mangelfuldheder.

I andre tilfælde bør der foretages en nøje afvejelse, før man beslutter at opgive rentegodtgørelsesinstrumentet til fordel for andre instrumenter [14]. Dette gælder i ganske særlig grad for programmer, der skal gennemføres i områder, hvor der endnu ikke findes meget udviklede finansielle markeder (udviklingslande, CØEL), eller i ugunstigt stillede regioner i EU, eller til fordel for visse kategorier af projekter (miljø, transeuropæiske net osv.), som skaber eksternaliteter.

[14] For eksempel når tilførsel af risikokapital kun ud til et meget begrænset antal virksomheder. Der blev finansieret 3000 nyetablerede virksomheder ved hjælp af risikokapital i EU i 1999, mens der i samme periode var omkring 1,5 mio. SMV'er, der blev finansieret ved hjælp af banklån.

ANNEXES: COMMISSION WORKING PAPER ON INTEREST-RATE SUBSIDIES

5. Annex I: INTEREST- RATE SUBSIDIES: COMMUNITY Programmes

5.1. Summary table of programmes

Programme // Objective

Market failures: //

ECSC conversion (Art. 56) // Employment and access to credit for SMEs

Trans-European Networks (TENs) // Transport infrastructure

Edinburgh facility (SMEs) // Employment and access to credit

Development cooperation (ACP) // Infrastructures and access to credit for SMEs

Economic development (MEDA and Slovenia) // Environment and transport infrastructure

Economic and social cohesion (ERDF, EAGGF) // Access to credit for SMEs

Phare programme (CEECs) // Access to credit and privatisation

External shocks: //

Natural disasters (Italy, Greece, Kalamata, Madeira) // Reconstruction and restoration of productive capacity

European Monetary System // Infrastructures

Peace and reconciliation in Ireland // Access to credit for SMEs and infrastructures

Reduction in disparities (EEA) // Access to credit for SMEs and infrastructure

Reconstruction in the Balkans (FYROM and Bosnia) // Restoration of productive activity

5.2. ECSC subsidised loans (Article 56: industrial conversion)

A. Description

The purpose of subsidised conversion loans (Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty) is to assist in the economic conversion of regions affected by the decline of the coal and steel industries, by making a financial contribution to job-creating investment. The first loans were disbursed in 1961.

Amount of subsidies

Initial subsidies granted between 1993 and 1997

1993 EUR37 693 920 for 20 911 jobs created

1994 EUR26 275 492 for 13 213 jobs created

1995 EUR21 614 248 for 11 138 jobs created

1996 EUR13 732 288 for 7 249 jobs created

1997 EUR22 948 045 for 11 482 jobs created

Total : EUR122 263 993 for 63 993 jobs created

Since the ECSC Treaty will expire in July 2002, the last loan instalments were disbursed in May 1997, so that they can be repaid in May 2002, before the expiry of the Treaty.

Beneficiary industries/firms

Any firms located in an ECSC area, but particularly SMEs.

All industries are eligible, except those on a negative list, such as:

- the retail trade where the vendor does not process goods;

- hospitals;

- educational establishments;

- the steel industry, etc.

Criteria for granting interest-rate subsidies

- Investment

The amount invested must be at least twice the ECSC loan.

- Jobs

Jobs must be created not later than three years after disbursement of the loan (assessment date).

They must be maintained for at least the following two years.

B. Operational aspects

Management

The initial amount of the interest-rate subsidy is calculated on the basis of the number of jobs to be created and the loan amount requested.

The subsidy is paid in three equal instalments, on the following due dates:

1. First instalment: one year after disbursement of the loan.

2. Second instalment: three years and six months after disbursement of the loan, following verification of the business report demonstrating that the objectives of carrying through the investment and creating jobs (social clause) have been achieved.

3. Third instalment: five years after disbursement of the loan, following verification of the business report demonstrating that the jobs created have been maintained.

Control and procedures

Project control is decided on as part of the annual missions schedule laid down by DG ECFIN's Financial Operations Unit 01 (Budget and Financial Aspects).

Depending on the case, the unit member is accompanied by members of other units or institutions, such as:

- the European Court of Auditors;

- the European Commission's Financial Control Directorate-General (DG Audit);

- DG ECFIN's Evaluation and Internal Audit Unit;

- DG ECFIN's Project Management Unit.

Visits are made in the presence of an agent of the financial intermediary concerned by the projects to be checked.

Control is carried out on the basis of official documents or declarations, such as:

- monthly returns of social security contributions;

- wages book;

- annual balance sheets confirmed by the auditors' report, etc.

C. Evaluation

A report exists for the period 1981-90, and a new study is planned for the period 1991-2000. In answer to questions put to it on several occasions by the Court of Auditors and the European Parliament, the Commission has provided general replies on the effectiveness of the actions carried out.

The real impact on job creation of interest-rate subsidies paid by the Commission under Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty can be measured quantitatively as follows:

- the ECSC disbursed 15 000 loans and sub-loans in the period between 1982 and 1997, most of which were granted to small and medium-sized enterprises;

- these loans helped to create about 285 000 new jobs at a budgetary cost of ECU 490 million.

The ECSC has never claimed that these loans and interest-rate subsidies alone were responsible for creating these 285 000 new jobs; rather, they formed part of a package of measures at European, national and local level which stimulated job-creating investments.

According to information received from banks acting as the Commission's financial intermediaries and from beneficiary enterprises, the loans and interest-rate subsidies received under Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty for job creation have, in fact, played an important role in the investment decisions of the enterprises concerned.

5.3. Trans-European Networks (TENs)

A. Description

From 1995-99, legal basis: Council Regulation (EC) No 2236/95 of 18 September 1995 laying down general rules for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of trans-European networks.

From 2000, legal basis: European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1655/1999 of 19 July 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 2236/95 laying down general rules for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of trans-European networks.

Amount of interest-rate subsidies committed in the last five budget years (EURm, approximate):

1995: 25

1996: 18

1997: 37

1998: 20

1999: 71.

Ø Objectives

Interest-rate subsidies are intended to assist in the launch of transport infrastructure projects, mainly by reducing the financial burden on implementing authorities in the pre-operational phase. They reduce the interest costs, or financing costs in general, of a loan. Some large TEN projects have been funded primarily by loans from public financing bodies (e.g. EIB, National Debt Offices, etc.) or from the international banking system.

Ø Criteria for granting interest-rate subsidies

To ensure agreement on the administrative procedures to be followed in the use of interest-rate subsidies, criteria were laid down by the Commission departments responsible for transport, subjected to inter-departmental consultation and agreed by the TEN Financial Assistance Committee in 1997.

Regulation (EC) No 2236/95 stipulated in Article 4(1)(b) that Community aid for projects may take the form of subsidies of the interest on loans granted by the European Investment Bank or other public or private financial bodies. In addition, a declaration attached to the minutes of the Council meeting at which this Regulation was adopted gave some further indication of the proposed use of this form of support; the Commission declared that the amount of interest-rate subsidy from the Community budget allocated to a project in a given year should always represent a fraction of the volume of interest payments actually borne by that project during the year in question.

The rules for interest-rate support for TENs proposed by the Commission in 1997 made a distinction between different types of promoter; in particular, between single-purpose authorities, on the one hand, and multi-purpose authorities, on the other.

Single-purpose authorities:

In the case of single-purpose authorities, all expenditure is effectively aimed at meeting the objectives of the project which the Commission seeks to support. It therefore seemed unnecessary and unjustifiable to demand that each individual loan taken out by the authority should be assigned to a physical objective. In such cases, loans are generally raised to meet overall liquidity needs and not to pay for individual actions at any event. Loans are swapped in some cases according to the conditions on international currency markets.

In such cases, the following rules apply:

- interest-rate subsidies not to exceed five years, this being the general rule laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 2236/95 (although loan repayment itself may need to be monitored over a longer period, depending on circumstances), and to be below actual accumulated interest expenditure in each eligible period;

- interest-rate subsidies only for amounts of over ECU 1 million per year (for cost-effectiveness reasons);

- support can be granted to either newly negotiated or existing loans;

- interest-rate subsidies would be paid after receipt of invoices showing that interest had been paid, and progress reports showing the achievement of physical milestones, and related payments, as set out in the relevant Commission decision and application form;

- interest-rate subsidies will be paid direct to the beneficiary, where possible;

- overall support under the Regulation will be below 10% of the total expenditure on the project during the entire period of support (i.e. within the spirit of the TENs Financial Regulation limits on the financing of construction). (This may give the Commission the flexibility to pay interest-rate subsidies of over 10% of expenditure for specific years, e.g. during the launch period, when financial costs may be especially high. This form of "accelerated" payment will in a way mirror the normal advance payment of 40% for direct grants.)

Multi-purpose authorities:

In the case of multi-purpose authorities, the above individual points still apply but it cannot be said in these cases that any loan is eligible for interest-rate support. Clearly, the loan or loans supported by the Commission must be earmarked for the specific projects (i.e. track sections, equipment installations, etc.) which it wishes to support. In practice, this specific link is more likely to exist when the loan has been taken out from an institution like the EIB, which itself demands regular reports on the achievement of physical objectives.

B. Operational aspects

Ø Control

Essentially, the two key principles of control are the same as those applying for traditional direct grant projects, i.e. (i) measuring physical progress and (ii) checking the eligibility of expenditure and verifying the correctness of accounts.

For both types of project authority (see above), the Commission needs to ensure as a condition of payment that proof of loan agreements and obligations, and the actual repayment of financial costs, is accompanied by satisfactory physical and expenditure progress on launching or continuing the project (according to the stage in its evolution). Payment of initial tranches of interest-rate support and of the final tranche is contingent on progress towards and achievement of the objectives respectively. Payments to contractors should be verified and audited.

Lack of physical progress, or failure to launch, will mean that interest-rate subsidy payments should be withheld by the Commission, as would be the case with payment tranches in a direct grant scenario.

Finally, the amount paid should be flexible, although linked to physical progress, and will not exceed 95% of the amount of the interest-rate subsidy specified in the decision so as to allow for an amount to be held back pending accounting controls and assessment of the achievement of physical objectives set out in the decision.

Ø Visibility

The exact nature of this concept is hard to define. TEN projects supported by interest-rate subsidies are essentially subject to the same general rules regarding physical progress as direct grant projects and hence to associated requirements (e.g. for publicity to be given through signboards, etc. showing the role of the European Union). Part of the purpose of control is to ensure visible progress in this sense.

C. Evaluation

As part of the mid-term evaluation of the TEN-T budget interventions, which the Commission departments responsible for transport commissioned and which was delivered by outside experts in 1999, the efficiency of interest-rate subsidies ("interest rebates") as a financial instrument was discussed. An extract from the evaluator's report follows:

"The instrument of interest rebates is seen as the second best solution and generally of more value with high and volatile interest rates. Nowadays nominal interest rates are lower and in some Member States some transport operators (such as railways) can receive high grants from their governments and interest-free loans making the instrument of interest rebates even less attractive.

In addition the duration of the interest rate subsidy is not always compatible with the loans and project duration. The present limit of five years is considered as a serious constraint for the development of this instrument.

However Member States do not reject the possibility of applying for interest rate rebates in the future in the light of PPP approaches. Therefore, the Commission should better explain and spread more information on the reasons and advantages for project promoters to apply for this instrument. More information on the existing TEN-T projects benefiting from interest rebates should be provided to other Member States.

Three projects have applied for this instrument to date : the Øresund fixed link, the Belgian HST, and Malpensa Airport. In these three cases, the choice of this form of intervention was suggested by the Commission and the three projects received loans from the European Investment Bank.

* Interest rebates function well for the Øresund connection but have otherwise not been applied in Sweden. This type of support has been discussed as a possibility for the third runway at Arlanda airport. The civil aviation administration did, however, not consider them as a feasible solution as loans for the runway will have to be raised by the national civil aviation administration proper, and not by the airport, which organisationally is only a division within the administration.

* Interest rebates helped to complete the financial plan of the Belgian HST project and launch the construction phase. As the Belgian Railways had to borrow the funds needed to build the HST, the financial return of the project was highly influenced by the interest charges. This instrument appeared to be the most adequate one in this particular case and at that particular moment in time. It allowed Belgian Railways to be provided with EU aid that was not directly linked to the stretches of routes for which the Belgian requests were originally made.

* The Malpensa 2000 project is an example of a project for which this kind of support can be well suited. It was the Commission itself who suggested this solution, believing that it was the most appropriate one for this project.

Some Member States suggested that the interest rate form of aid should be allocated to the promoter as a lump sum rather than be related to a specific loan. Railway companies do not always borrow money for a specific project, but loans are arranged to finance their global investment programmes. If the interest rate subsidy form of aid is granted provided that it is linked to a specific and well-defined loan scheme, then it can perturb its financial management or impose increased auditing procedures."

There are also advantages to interest-rate subsidies for TENs : they are good for private or semi-private project authorities which have to face high financial costs in the years before their project starts to yield revenue from tolls, etc. (this was certainly the case for the Øresund fixed-link project).

5.4. Interest-rate subsidies to help certain Member States to participate in the European Monetary System

A. Description

At the end of December 1978 the Council adopted Regulation (EEC) No 3181/78 relating to the European Monetary System (EMS). Previously, the Council had recognised the need to support the less prosperous Member States in their efforts to participate in the EMS. Support was to take the form of assistance in carrying out infrastructure programmes and projects financed by the EIB and by the recently established NCI (Decision 78/870/EEC of October 1978).

The Regulation implementing this support was adopted in August 1979 (Regulation (EEC) No 1736/79); it granted a 3% interest subsidy for loans relating to Commission-approved programmes of up to one billion units of account a year for a period of five years. It was also agreed that the discounted value of the subsidies to be entered in the general budget of the Community should not exceed 200 million units of account a year for a period of five years. At the same time, the Council designated Ireland and Italy as the Member States which were eligible for these subsidies. The implicit subsidy for them was: 200 million units of account in 1979, 197 million in 1980, 193 million in 1981, 210 million in 1982 and 200 million in 1983.

In accordance with the above-mentioned Regulations, eligibility depends on the execution of major infrastructure projects in Italy and Ireland that meet EIB and NCI operational criteria and are capable of anchoring these countries' economies more firmly in the European Monetary System. By financing individual projects of undisputed public utility, the aim was therefore to pursue an overall (macroeconomic) objective in parallel with other instruments with the same purpose. It will be remembered that at the time the oil crisis had destabilised the industrialised countries' balances of payments and exchange rates and Community solidarity had been mobilised on behalf of the weakest countries, i.e. Italy and Ireland, in the form of Community borrowings (Article 108 of the Treaty). The interest-rate subsidies for infrastructure projects thus reinforced measures to restore external equilibrium.

B. Operational aspects

The subsidies were managed by the EIB, which both selected the projects and disbursed the aid.

In view of the relatively large subsidy amounts decided by the Council, the EIB kept very large-scale projects separate from those it usually managed so that they could be monitored more easily. In some cases it selected tranches of programmes which had been started before or were to be completed after the eligible period (1979-83) because of the scale of the projects and the economic importance of the tranches in question.

The subsidies were paid to the project promoters only for the five-year period laid down by the Council. Each half year, the EIB presented the Commission with a refund application calculated on the basis of the subsidised amounts, updated at the beginning of each half year. Italy thus received aid totalling ECU 669 million in respect of a loan volume of ECU 3 336 million; the subsidies for Ireland totalled ECU 331 million in respect of a loan volume of ECU 1 470 million. Control was exercised by the EIB and the Commission, in cooperation with the central banks of the two countries concerned.

C. Evaluation

During its investigations, the Court of Auditors noted delays in the execution of the projects and increases in costs as compared with the original estimates. These overspends were covered by other sources of finance such as the ERDF and state aid.

These criticisms, relatively minor by comparison with the objectives, did not prevent the Court from acknowledging that the objectives had been attained. It stated that these projects had contributed to the development of the water supply and drainage infrastructure in Ireland in the context of the expansion of industrial, agricultural, tourist and urban activity. The Court's assessment of the extension of an aqueduct in Italy was more qualified because of the delays caused by the 1980 earthquake but it did not call into question the key importance of the work for the economy of the Mezzogiorno.

5.5. Edinburgh facility (SMEs)

Council Decision 94/217/EC of 19 April 1994

A. Description

Ø Description

The purpose of this programme was to help enterprises, in particular SMEs, to create jobs. It was decided on in the early 1990s, a period of severe recession, fairly high unemployment and interest rates, and deep pessimism on the part of various economic actors.

The programme is managed by the EIB on behalf of the Commission. In each Member State the EIB dealt with a national agent that coordinated the network of financial intermediaries which selected the individual projects.

The interest subsidy related to interest on a five-year loan financing a job-creating investment project. The financial intermediaries carried out the financial analysis of the credit provided by the EIB. The subsidy was based on the number of jobs created.

The SME facility is a temporary "one shot" facility which, at the request of the Council, had to be introduced very rapidly. The operational part, which began in 1995, was completed in 1997.

Ø Amount of subsidies

- Total amount of interest subsidies granted by the Council: ECU 100 million

The subsidy was tied to EIB loans of ECU 1 000 million to SMEs in the Community. On 8 June 1998 the amount distributed in interest subsidies totalled ECU 92 321 473.

At the end of 1997 subsidies paid totalled ECU 92.3 million. This amount corresponds to a 2% per year interest-rate reduction for a maximum of five years, which is equivalent overall to 10% of the loan amount, or an average of ECU 3 000 per job created.

Ø Beneficiaries

- SMEs, in particular those with no more than 250 employees and a turnover not exceeding ECU 20 million or assets not exceeding ECU 10 million;

- virtually all sectors of activity (some countries introduced exceptions);

- all Member States;

- The loans could not be combined with other subsidised loans granted by the EIB under other agreements or with ECSC-subsidised loans.

Ø Criteria for granting interest-rate subsidies

In its application for subsidies, the SME had to state the amount of financing required from the EIB, the capital cost of the investment and the number of jobs it planned to create; only jobs created after 28 April 1994 were eligible.

In order to qualify for a definite subsidy payment, the beneficiary had to submit a sworn statement concerning the actual net increase in the number of jobs and declaring that the additional jobs had been in existence for more than six consecutive months prior to the date of the declaration. If the number of jobs actually created was smaller, the proposed subsidies were reduced accordingly.

B. Operational aspects

Ø Management

The EIB shared out the facility among the national agents and its network of intermediary banks.

- The interest subsidy is generally paid in a single instalment (lump sum). In Germany it was used to reduce the last repayment of the borrowing.

- In its report the Court of Auditors criticised the fact that the rules were less clear in some countries than in others.

Ø Control

The national agents verified each beneficiary's entitlement to its respective subsidy on the basis of the declarations made by the intermediaries and beneficiaries. As well as the usual monitoring of its global loans, the EIB also made spot checks on the documentary evidence presented in support of the requests for subsidy payments. In 1996, 1997 and 1998 the EIB monitored the procedures applied by agents in eleven countries

In its Report No 6/2000 the Court of Auditors criticised the fact that the Commission did not monitor this facility in detail, despite the cooperation agreement.

Ø Community visibility

- The financial intermediaries' documentation generally referred to Community aid, at least that of the EIB; this aspect was criticised by the Court of Auditors in its report.

Ø Accounting

- The accounting and presentation of the accounts were criticised by the Court of Auditors and the Commission has undertaken to improve them.

C. Evaluation of the action

* Four reports have already been presented to the European Parliament, the last on 2 December 1997 (COM (1997) 645 final).

* The fifth report was being drafted at the same time as this report. It contains statistical tables and is more complete than the previous ones.

5.6. Subsidised loans in the ACP countries

A. Description

Successive European Development Funds have supported the action of the EIB and of local banks by granting general interest-rate subsidies in order to reduce the very high level of interest rates and to provide access to credit for small commercial and craft firms in the countries which are signatories to the Lomé Convention. Since the pressing need for finance is, however, very extensive, subsidies have also been allocated for infrastructure and sewerage works.

During the life of the most recent Conventions, the WTO expressed reservations about this general practice and about the risk of distorting competition in relation to neighbouring countries not eligible for EDF loans. It has so far been possible to circumvent this obstacle by granting loans to public enterprises at market rates, with the State receiving the interest-rate subsidy under a contract signed with the enterprise concerned.

Nevertheless, in the spirit of openness which will guide future international conventions, it has appeared essential to review the system as a whole in order to boost direct aid while reducing indirect aid tied to a loan spread over time. The new ACP-EC Partnership Agreement signed at Cotonou on 23 June 2000, which will replace the Lomé Convention, contains a new financial mechanism - the Investment Facility (IF) - that will make it possible to finance essentially private-sector investment. Like the risk capital funds under the old Convention, this Facility will be managed by the EIB. The main changes introduced by this Facility as compared with the former risk capital funds can be summarised as follows: unlike the risk capital funds, the Facility will function as a revolving fund, thus offering ACP countries a degree of security as to the finance available for private-sector development in the short, medium and long term. In addition, the operations financed by the Facility (essentially in the form of risk capital and loans) will be financed on conditions based on those of the local financial market. However, the agreement provides that interest-rate subsidies could be granted for certain specific operations, namely for:

(1) infrastructure projects in the least-advanced countries or in countries in a post-conflict situation that are essential for private-sector development. In these cases, the interest rate will be reduced by 3 percentage points, and

(2) projects involving restructuring operations in connection with privatisation or projects entailing substantial and clearly demonstrable social or environmental advantages. In these cases, loans may carry interest-rate subsidies the amount and form of which will be decided on the basis of the special features of the project and thus on a case-by-case basis, in line with predefined criteria. For this type of operation, the interest-rate reduction will not exceed 3 percentage points and will therefore be calculated on a case-by-case basis in line with the criteria jointly laid down by the EIB, the Commission and the Member States.

In all cases, the final interest rate on the loan will be no less than 50% of the reference rate, in order to avoid situations in which the final rate would be close to 0% or even negative.

The specific criteria for granting interest-rate subsidies will form part of the Facility's policy guidelines to be laid down jointly by the EIB and the Commission and submitted to the Investment Facility Committee, which will include representatives of the Member States.

The interest-rate subsidy will be financed by the EDF's long-term development resources. The funds necessary will not exceed 5% of the total amount allocated to finance investment by the Investment Facility and by the EIB out of its own resources, i.e. some EUR200 million.

B. Operational aspects

The EIB is currently managing the equivalent of 20.7% of the budget allocations of the 8th EDF, comprising EUR1 658 million in own resources (11.34% of the resources of the Convention) and EUR1 370 million in risk capital and interest-rate subsidies (19.36% of the Fund). As regards operations, the EIB has so far signed over 660 operations in the ACP countries, 190 out of its own resources and 470 out of EDF funds.

The activity of the new Investment Facility will be more targeted than in the past as far as interest-rate subsidies are concerned, but without the automatic aspect which existed in the past; it will still be possible for concessionary loans to be granted in some cases and on the basis of predefined criteria (see above).

The financial allocation for the Facility will be EUR2.2 billion for the First Financial Protocol (2000-05), which will be used to finance investment. To this will be added a further EUR200 million or so to finance interest-rate subsidies for projects financed both by the Facility and by the EIB out of its own resources.

C. Evaluation

It is fairly difficult to make a general evaluation of the impact of subsidies in the context of operations with 72 different ACP countries. Nevertheless, the purpose of the major changes concerning the Investment Facility is to correct the shortcomings of the past and to take into account the more open direction of international trade (WTO rules).

* The new Facility will have to take care not to generate distortions on local capital markets or to undermine local financial institutions. Instead, the financial resources provided should enable these institutions to mobilise other sources of finance.

* The Facility must not disrupt or conflict with national and regional financial and monetary policies or with policies advocated by international institutions.

* Unlike the public sector in the heavily indebted ACP countries, the private sector does not seem to consider the subsidy to be a determining factor in investment decisions, unlike other criteria, viz. provision of medium- and long-term financial resources, rapid disbursement, loans in local currency, etc.

* Concessionary loans may, however, be beneficial in the cases mentioned above since they encourage economic development and support investors in situations where the political and economic risks are particularly high.

5.7. Interest-rate subsidies linked to EIB loans in the Mediterranean

A. Description

Ø Protocols

From 1978 to 1992 EIB loans formed part of the cycle of five-year financial protocols that constituted an overall legal framework for financial and technical cooperation between the European Community and each Mediterranean country and territory; each protocol fixed a financial allocation indicating the origin of credits and the nature of the finance.

The beneficiary countries were then able to use the budget funds to subsidise all EIB loans by up to two percentage points, whatever the sector (infrastructure, water, industry, etc. ). The total amount of budget commitments for these interest-rate subsidies was EUR214 million

Ø Environmental protection: from 1992

In 1992, under the Renewed Mediterranean Policy, the EIB was instructed to implement a specific financing programme for projects to protect the environment; the corresponding Financial Regulation (outside the protocol) provided for an interest subsidy of three percentage points on these projects.

Subsequently, the Barcelona Declaration, adopted on 28 November 1995 at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, established the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, a joint initiative of the 15 members of the EU and 12 Mediterranean partners. The Council Regulation of 23 July 1996 laid down the financial and technical measures (MEDA) to accompany the reform of economic and social structures of the Mediterranean partners. It provides for a 3% interest-rate subsidy on EIB loans in the field of the environment.

In accordance with these provisions, interest-rate subsidies totalling EUR255 million were granted from 1992 to 1999 to 11 Mediterranean countries and territories and mobilised for 37 different projects. These projects concerned the treatment of waste water in order to reduce pollution in coastal rivers and in the Mediterranean, the reduction of industrial pollution and the treatment of solid waste.

Ø Financial and technical cooperation with the Palestinian territories

The July 1994 Regulation laying down the provisions for this cooperation was amended in December 1998, by providing in particular for the possibility of subsidising the loans granted by the EIB to these territories at the rate of three percentage points. Two subsidies totalling EUR8.6 million were decided in 1999. These subsidies are not restricted to the environment but cover the priority economic and social areas specified in the 1994 Regulation.

B. Operational aspects

Ø Area of intervention

The areas of intervention, which were extended under the protocol system, were restricted to the environment from 1992; the environment has therefore become the main eligibility criterion for the budget grant in the form of interest-rate subsidy, with the exception of the EIB loans granted to the Palestinian territories.

Ø Management

The EIB selects and prepares projects, draws up the financing proposal and then seeks both the opinion of the "Article 14 Committee" (MEDA), consisting of the representatives of the Member States, and the Commission's opinion. On the basis of this consultation, the EIB asks the Commission to take a decision to fund the granting of an interest-rate subsidy. Following an internal consultation process, the Commission submits to the MED Committee a draft decision authorising or, where appropriate, refusing the funding. The Commission decision is forwarded to the EIB; if the decision is favourable, the EIB may grant the subsidised loan.

The EIB and the Commission jointly see to the financial management of interest-rate subsidies on the basis of a management agreement signed between them.

No problem of repayment of EIB loans by the Mediterranean partners has been indicated.

In its Report 1/98 on the management of the protocols, the Court of Auditors referred to dormant commitments or commitments in excess of the needs of the operations concerned; the Commission replied that it had introduced a regular information system and that it had reexamined the dormant commitments as part of a periodic review.

C. Evaluation

Ø MEDA evaluations carried out in 1998 and 1999

In November 1998 the evaluation by external consultants of certain aspects of EU development aid for the Mediterranean region showed that coordination between the EIB and the Commission was working well and was the subject of regular consultations but that it could be improved by incorporating the EIB activities linked to the granting of budget funds into the national indicative programmes at an earlier stage.

In February 1999 the evaluation of the MEDA provisions carried out under Article 15(6) of the MEDA Regulation recommended that the procedure for deciding interest-rate subsidies should be simplified, alone the lines of the other operations managed by the Commission.

Ø Proposal for amending the MEDA Regulation

In its recent proposal to amend the MEDA Regulation (COM (1999) 494 final), the Commission stressed the need to streamline coordination with the EIB, i.e. in the preparation of strategies and at the programming stage; as far as interest-rate subsidies specifically are concerned, the Commission has followed the recommendation made in the evaluation and has proposed lightening the decision-making procedure by providing that, as interest-rate subsidies would be covered by approved national financing plans, they would not need to be submitted separately to the MED Committee; the "Article 14 Committee" approval procedure would require no modification.

The subsidy rate applied to each payment would be equal to half the interest rate relating to the payment in question, but in no case higher than the nominal rate of 3%.

The Commission proposal maintains the area in which interest-rate subsidies would apply, i.e. the environment; given the scarcity of water resources, the growing degradation of natural resources and the dense urbanisation of the region, the environment will become an even more important issue for all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Interest-rate subsidies constitute an incentive mechanism which has effectively enabled the Mediterranean partners to embark on specific environmental action programmes; the exception for the Palestinian territories is justified by the very special situation there in the context of the peace process.

Ø Evaluation of EIB activities in connection with the financing of the Community budget

An evaluation of the financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC was launched at the beginning of this year; it covers the interest-rate subsidy and risk capital mechanisms. It will review the period 1979-99 and contain an analysis of the performance and impact of interest-rate subsidies and of the mechanisms and procedures; it will conclude by addressing recommendations to the Commission and the EIB. The results of this evaluation are expected shortly.

5.8. ERDF Programme

A. Description

Interest-rate subsidies part-financed by the Structural Funds, essentially the European Regional Development Fund, are managed not by the Commission but by the national and regional authorities in Member States charged with implementing multiannual regional development programmes within specific eligible areas.

B. Operational aspects

- SMEs in the less-developed areas of the EU face particular problems in terms of the cost of credit: although base interest rates charged by financial institutions are uniform and set nationally, a margin of additional interest is charged by banks to reflect the risks of a particular lending operation, these being higher for SMEs than for larger enterprises and often higher still for SMEs located in the less-developed regions.

- Applications for loans are vetted and granted in the normal manner by lending institutions, which agree the terms of the financing with the SME. The interest-rate subsidy is covered by a separate agreement and is paid to the SME during the term of the loan by the lending institution. The total financial cost to the SME is therefore the commercial interest rate paid to the lending institution, minus the interest-rate subsidy received from the managing authority under a regional development programme measure (such as a global grant) part-financed by the Commission.

C. Evaluation

In regional development terms, the interest cost of the finance required for an investment is reduced, enabling SMEs to invest and thereby to increase their production capacity and competitiveness. The subsidy is covered by a separate agreement from the loan agreement, thus ensuring a swift decision by the lending institution and reducing the administrative burden on the SME.

Interest-rate subsidies available under the Structural Funds are considered to be on an equal footing in terms of effectiveness with the several other forms of grant applied by the Funds. A number of lessons arising out of experience with interest-rate subsidies during the previous programming period are now being put into practice in the Commission's guidelines for the period 2000-06, in particular the need for an initial diagnosis of SME requirements, the need for prior consultation with intermediaries on the design of such schemes so as to avoid an unnecessary administrative burden on the banks and their information systems, and the fact that the targeting of interest-rate subsidies on particular SME sectors has generally enhanced their impact.

Article 29(4) [15] of the new Council Regulation laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds [16] explicitly encourages managing authorities to use forms of finance other than direct assistance, including interest-rate subsidies, by permitting an additional 10% for the maximum rate of contribution, in accordance with Article 28(3).

[15] Article 29 (4) (a) and (b) (iii).

[16] Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999.

5.9. EAGGF Programme

A. Description of the action

- Amount of subsidies (statistics for the last five years):

Since the Agriculture Directorate-General does not grant interest-rate subsidies directly but only refunds the subsidies granted by the Member States for agricultural structures (see also the answers to point B below) and since Member States often combine different forms of investment aid (capital grants, interest-rate subsidies, guarantees for loans contracted, etc.) for the same aid scheme, the EAGGF Guidance Section does not possess any analytical statistics relating to the form of aid which it has helped to finance.

Nevertheless, by way of an example to indicate an order of magnitude, France declared for 1999 alone an amount of EUR244 million in interest-rate subsidies incurred in 1998, while each year the EAGGF Guidance Section refunds Member States' expenditure at variable rates set by the rules (25% to 60%) on the basis of various parameters such as the type of aid scheme, the status of the beneficiary or its location.

- Objectives

Interest-rate subsidies have so far been granted mainly in connection with the implementation of Objective 5a of the reform of the Structural Funds, namely the granting of official aid for investments made in agricultural holdings, and setting-up aid to young farmers (Articles 7, 10 and 11 of Regulation (EC) No 950/97).

The system of interest-rate subsidies has been extended for the new programming period 2000-06 (see Article 28(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/99 or Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1257/99).

- Criteria for granting subsidies

Numerous criteria and restrictive conditions have been laid down by Council Regulation (EC) No 950/97 in connection, for instance, with the economic conditions of the agricultural holding, the status of the farmer (practising farming as his main occupation, occupational skill, etc.) or with the type of production (no aid for surplus production).

B. Operational aspects

- Management: procedures for payment of subsidies

Within the fields of intervention of the EAGGF Guidance Section, it is up to the Member States to opt for the financial instrument they deem appropriate (interest-rate subsidies, grants, etc. or a combination of these instruments) in order to implement the aid scheme provided for in a multiannual programme of assistance decided on by the Commission.

Official aid is co-financed by the EAGGF Guidance Section and the Member States. The Community rules or the programme fix the rate of Community financial intervention. Payment by the EAGGF Guidance Section is made on the basis of a system of advances, followed by refund of the annual expenditure which each Member State declares to the EAGGF and which it has already financed in advance (system in force until 1999) or in the form of down payments/intermediate payments/payment of programme balance (system in force from 2000).

When Member States are responsible for choosing the financial instrument for implementing certain Community programmes, experience has shown that this choice has not been neutral from a financial point of view and in particular that it has been unlikely to minimise budget costs for the Community.

If there was genuine competitive bidding between financial bodies, the cost of managing these aid schemes could be partially reduced, but it should be remembered that the Commission disagrees with most of the Member States on the question of applying the public procurement Directives to financial services.

- Control: who is responsible and what are the procedures-

Under Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/99 (for instance, Article 38(1)), Member States take responsibility in the first instance for the financial control of programmes. The Commission, as part of its responsibility for the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities, ensures that Member States have smoothly functioning management and control systems so that Community funds are efficiently and correctly used (Article 38(2)).

The staff of the EAGGF Guidance Section regularly carry out on-the-spot checks, including sample checks, in the Member States.

- Visibility

As stated above, it is not up to the Commission to opt for any particular financial instrument to implement its programmes within the spheres of intervention of the EAGGF Guidance Section since this is a matter for the Member States (subsidiarity principle). Consequently, the question of desirability of choosing the system of interest-rate subsidies as such does not arise when it is a matter of implementing rules laid down by the Council.

C. Evaluation

- Do evaluation reports exist-

Evaluations are obligatory under the rules, but they chiefly cover the operational content of the programmes. However, there is as yet no properly targeted evaluation in terms of the type of financial instrument (e.g. the system of interest-rate subsidies).

Nevertheless, this lack of evaluation does not mean that there is no visibility as regards the system of interest-rate subsidies in this area. On the contrary, the on-the-spot checks we have carried out in the Member States have sometimes prompted hefty criticism of the economy of such a system for the Community budget, and in particular its cost effectiveness. The risk is that the Member States, in their subsidy statement, charge part of the cost of administering the scheme to the EAGGF Guidance Section by taking advantage of the reference rates, which diverge significantly from market interest rates.

5.10. Interest-rate subsidies in the central and eastern European countries - Phare budget

A. Description

Ø Historically, Community funds have provided two types of interest-rate subsidies for the central and eastern European countries: Slovenia benefited from the continuation of EIB subsidised loans to the former Yugoslavia, and the Phare programme has provided interest-rate subsidies for loans to SMEs in the applicant countries.

Ø From September 1993 to 1997 Slovenia benefited from a financial protocol with an EIB allocation of EUR150 million accompanied by interest-rate subsidies from the Community budget of EUR20 million for transport projects in the public interest.

An amount of EUR47 million was spent on repairing the main rail network in 1993; two loans totalling EUR41 million were signed in 1994.

A loan of EUR32 million was granted in 1995 in support of the existing motorway project, with a further EUR30 million being released in 1996 for the continuation of the project.

Subsequently, Slovenia reverted to the ordinary law applicable to the applicant countries, with pre-accession EIB loans which no longer included interest-rate subsidies but some of which enjoyed the Community budget guarantee. To a very large extent, these loans were made in the telecommunications sector.

B. Management

Ø Under financing provided by the Phare programme, interest-rate subsidies have been granted for loans to SMEs. These operations were carried out mainly in the early- or mid-1990s. Since inflation was high at the time, the beneficiary countries co-financed these operations (at very low rates) with banks which were to lend at the market rate. Of the total amount of the loan, the final beneficiary thus received a loan at a very advantageous rate. Once the operation had been carried out, it repaid both its bank and the State which had obtained the Phare funds and thus had funds available for allocation elsewhere.

Micro-loans were also granted at preferential rates to small firms under the Phare programme. They were often distributed by non-bank institutions.

C. Evaluation

According to various sources, these operations do not seem to have worked to the total satisfaction of the various players involved. There were repayment defaults. This can perhaps be explained in part by the difficulties that persisted while these operations were being carried out. It was also often difficult to find partners to disburse the loans. These operations were frequently organised in parallel with grants of guarantees, e.g. in the Czech Republic and Poland; the least encouraging experience was in Bulgaria.

The conclusions which can today be drawn from the provision of interest-rate subsidies for loans to SMEs are the following:

Ø The banking environment, coupled with the level of inflation, the weak involvement of the beneficiary States and the absence of specific policy objectives, adversely affected policy implementation, with it being impossible to obtain convincing results in several countries.

Ø However, relatively satisfactory results were obtained in Hungary because of the greater maturity of the banking system, the attitude of SMEs, and support of the Finance Ministry (possibility of co-financing, existence of an agency for SMEs) and of SME associations (which were members of the agency's board of management).

Ø A satisfactory rate of disbursement through the banking system depends less on the level of subsidy to the SME and more on other factors. The most important factors would appear to be the margin that can be earned by the bank compared to alternatives (e.g. using deposits), whether the risk is shared with or borne entirely by the bank, and who is responsible for exchange-risk losses. [17]

[17] Final synthesis report of the evaluation of Phare-financed programmes in support of SMEs (February 2000; pp. 46-48)

Ø See point 5.16 above for the FYROM and for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5.11. Exceptional aid for the regions of Italy devastated by the earthquake of 1980

A. Description (Council Decision 81/19 of 20 January 1981)

The purpose of this action was to finance investments for the reconstruction of the means of production and the economic and social infrastructure in the areas affected by the earthquake of November 1980 which hit the Italian regions of Campania and Basilicata.

The Commission was empowered to contract loans in order to provide finance under the New Community Instrument (NCI). The amount of such loans could not exceed a principal equivalent to ECU 1 billion, subject to deduction of any operations of the same nature carried out by the EIB from its own resources.

Amount of the interest-rate subsidies

The budget of ECU 1 billion in loans authorised by the Council was covered up to an amount of ECU 613 million by NCI loans and up to an amount of ECU 353 million out of EIB own resources. In both cases, the loans carried an interest-rate subsidy of 3% per annum for a maximum of twelve years. The total amount in subsidies charged to the Community budget in respect of the NCI and EIB loans was ECU 240 million.

Objectives

To remedy the damage caused by the earthquake quickly and effectively by financing the investments required for the reconstruction of the means of production and the economic and social infrastructure.

Beneficiaries

Contractors of loans granted under the Council Decision on the basis of projects presented by the Italian authorities.

B. Operational aspects

Management

The Council had decided that the programme would be managed by the EIB on behalf of the Commission. An agreement was signed between the Italian Treasury, the Commission and the EIB on the procedures to be followed. Under this agreement, the loans were granted to state bodies, regional authorities, credit institutions and other bodies designated by the Italian Treasury.

Control

The agreement between the Treasury Minister, the Commission and the EIB specified that applications for subsidised loans were to be forwarded by the Italian Treasury with its favourable opinion; the loans were to be used exclusively to finance investment projects in accordance with the Council Decision.

The Court of Auditors pointed out that EIB checks were inadequate and that the Commission carried out no checks at all. In its replies, the Commission stated that the projects were eligible in accordance with the criteria laid down in the Decision and had been examined individually by the Commission in accordance with the procedure under Article 21 of the Bank's Statute.

C. Evaluation

Usefulness

The Italian authorities reported the estimated cost of the damage to be ECU 13 596 million. The Community contribution of ECU 1 billion accounted for just over 7% of that amount.

The breakdown of the loans per sector is as follows (in ECU million):

>TABELPOSITION>

Reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure and means of production was achieved by projects presented by the Italian authorities and declared eligible by the Commission in accordance with the Council Decision and the tripartite agreement.

However, in its reports, the Court of Auditors criticised:

- the time taken to complete the work, and

- the lower-than forecast number of jobs created.

Regarding the time taken to complete the work, there were various reasons for the delays: changes to the original projects, difficulties linked to expropriations, legal and administrative problems that arose in connection with the implementation of complex projects in difficult circumstances. Regarding job creation, the Commission indicated in its replies that this criterion was secondary to the main objective (reconstruction).

Cost-effectiveness analysis

No cost-effectiveness analysis was carried out. The reason for choosing interest-rate subsidies is the leverage effect: at a mode