db-d2/primevul-codebert-embeddings huggingface dataset:
Commit message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_state()

The memory reserved to dump the xfrm state includes the padding bytes of
struct xfrm_usersa_info added by the compiler for alignment (7 for
amd64, 3 for i386). Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the buffer
to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2012-6537
CWE: CWE-200
Vulnerability description: net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.

Project: linux
File: xfrm_user.c

 static void copy_to_user_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_usersa_info *p)
 {
 	memcpy(&p->id, &x->id, sizeof(p->id));
 	memcpy(&p->sel, &x->sel, sizeof(p->sel));
 	memcpy(&p->lft, &x->lft, sizeof(p->lft));
	memcpy(&p->curlft, &x->curlft, sizeof(p->curlft));
	memcpy(&p->stats, &x->stats, sizeof(p->stats));
	memcpy(&p->saddr, &x->props.saddr, sizeof(p->saddr));
	p->mode = x->props.mode;
	p->replay_window = x->props.replay_window;
	p->reqid = x->props.reqid;
	p->family = x->props.family;
	p->flags = x->props.flags;
	p->seq = x->km.seq;
}
Commit message: batman-adv: Only write requested number of byte to user buffer

Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
CVE: CVE-2011-4604
CWE: CWE-119
Vulnerability description: The bat_socket_read function in net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted batman-adv ICMP packet.

Project: linux
File: icmp_socket.c

static ssize_t bat_socket_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
	struct socket_client *socket_client = file->private_data;
	struct socket_packet *socket_packet;
	size_t packet_len;
	int error;

	if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && (socket_client->queue_len == 0))
		return -EAGAIN;

	if ((!buf) || (count < sizeof(struct icmp_packet)))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))
		return -EFAULT;

	error = wait_event_interruptible(socket_client->queue_wait,
					 socket_client->queue_len);

	if (error)
		return error;

	spin_lock_bh(&socket_client->lock);

	socket_packet = list_first_entry(&socket_client->queue_list,
					 struct socket_packet, list);
	list_del(&socket_packet->list);
	socket_client->queue_len--;
 
 	spin_unlock_bh(&socket_client->lock);
 
	error = copy_to_user(buf, &socket_packet->icmp_packet,
			     socket_packet->icmp_len);
 
	packet_len = socket_packet->icmp_len;
 	kfree(socket_packet);
 
 	if (error)
		return -EFAULT;

	return packet_len;
}
Commit message: None
CVE: CVE-2011-4347
CWE: CWE-264
Vulnerability description: The kvm_vm_ioctl_assign_device function in virt/kvm/assigned-dev.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1.10 does not verify permission to access PCI configuration space and BAR resources, which allows host OS users to assign PCI devices and cause a denial of service (host OS crash) via a KVM_ASSIGN_PCI_DEVICE operation.

Project: linux

 static int kvm_vm_ioctl_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
 				      struct kvm_assigned_pci_dev *assigned_dev)
 {
 	int r = 0, idx;
 	struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *match;
 	struct pci_dev *dev;
 
 	if (!(assigned_dev->flags & KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU))
 		return -EINVAL;

	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);

	match = kvm_find_assigned_dev(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head,
				      assigned_dev->assigned_dev_id);
	if (match) {
		/* device already assigned */
		r = -EEXIST;
		goto out;
	}

	match = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (match == NULL) {
		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Couldn't allocate memory\n",
		       __func__);
		r = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}
	dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(assigned_dev->segnr,
				   assigned_dev->busnr,
				   assigned_dev->devfn);
	if (!dev) {
		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: host device not found\n", __func__);
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (pci_enable_device(dev)) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Could not enable PCI device\n", __func__);
 		r = -EBUSY;
		goto out_put;
	}
	r = pci_request_regions(dev, "kvm_assigned_device");
	if (r) {
		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Could not get access to device regions\n",
		       __func__);
		goto out_disable;
	}

	pci_reset_function(dev);
	pci_save_state(dev);
	match->pci_saved_state = pci_store_saved_state(dev);
	if (!match->pci_saved_state)
		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Couldn't store %s saved state\n",
		       __func__, dev_name(&dev->dev));
	match->assigned_dev_id = assigned_dev->assigned_dev_id;
	match->host_segnr = assigned_dev->segnr;
	match->host_busnr = assigned_dev->busnr;
	match->host_devfn = assigned_dev->devfn;
	match->flags = assigned_dev->flags;
	match->dev = dev;
	spin_lock_init(&match->intx_lock);
	match->irq_source_id = -1;
	match->kvm = kvm;
	match->ack_notifier.irq_acked = kvm_assigned_dev_ack_irq;

	list_add(&match->list, &kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head);

	if (!kvm->arch.iommu_domain) {
		r = kvm_iommu_map_guest(kvm);
		if (r)
			goto out_list_del;
	}
	r = kvm_assign_device(kvm, match);
	if (r)
		goto out_list_del;

out:
	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
	return r;
out_list_del:
	if (pci_load_and_free_saved_state(dev, &match->pci_saved_state))
		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Couldn't reload %s saved state\n",
		       __func__, dev_name(&dev->dev));
	list_del(&match->list);
	pci_release_regions(dev);
out_disable:
	pci_disable_device(dev);
out_put:
	pci_dev_put(dev);
out_free:
	kfree(match);
	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
	return r;
}
Commit message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options

Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()

Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.

Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2011-4087
CWE: CWE-399
Vulnerability description: The br_parse_ip_options function in net/bridge/br_netfilter.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly initialize a certain data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service by leveraging connectivity to a network interface that uses an Ethernet bridge device.

Project: linux
File: br_netfilter.c

static int br_parse_ip_options(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct ip_options *opt;
	struct iphdr *iph;
	struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
	u32 len;

	iph = ip_hdr(skb);
	opt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);

	/* Basic sanity checks */
	if (iph->ihl < 5 || iph->version != 4)
		goto inhdr_error;

	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, iph->ihl*4))
		goto inhdr_error;

	iph = ip_hdr(skb);
	if (unlikely(ip_fast_csum((u8 *)iph, iph->ihl)))
		goto inhdr_error;

	len = ntohs(iph->tot_len);
	if (skb->len < len) {
		IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INTRUNCATEDPKTS);
		goto drop;
	} else if (len < (iph->ihl*4))
		goto inhdr_error;

	if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, len)) {
		IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
 		goto drop;
 	}
 
	/* Zero out the CB buffer if no options present */
	if (iph->ihl == 5) {
		memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
 		return 0;
	}
 
 	opt->optlen = iph->ihl*4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
 	if (ip_options_compile(dev_net(dev), opt, skb))
		goto inhdr_error;

	/* Check correct handling of SRR option */
	if (unlikely(opt->srr)) {
		struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
		if (in_dev && !IN_DEV_SOURCE_ROUTE(in_dev))
			goto drop;

		if (ip_options_rcv_srr(skb))
			goto drop;
	}

	return 0;

inhdr_error:
	IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
drop:
	return -1;
}
Commit message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr

When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.

Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CVE: CVE-2011-3619
CWE: CWE-20
Vulnerability description: The apparmor_setprocattr function in security/apparmor/lsm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 does not properly handle invalid parameters, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) or possibly have unspecified other impact by writing to a /proc/#####/attr/current file.

Project: linux
File: lsm.c

static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
				void *value, size_t size)
{
	char *command, *args = value;
	size_t arg_size;
	int error;

	if (size == 0)
		return -EINVAL;
	/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
	 * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
	 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
	 */
	if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
		if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
			return -EINVAL;
		args[size] = '\0';
	}

	/* task can only write its own attributes */
	if (current != task)
		return -EACCES;

	args = value;
	args = strim(args);
	command = strsep(&args, " ");
	if (!args)
		return -EINVAL;
	args = skip_spaces(args);
	if (!*args)
		return -EINVAL;

	arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
		if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
			error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
							 !AA_DO_TEST);
		} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
			error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
							 AA_DO_TEST);
		} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
			error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
							     !AA_DO_TEST);
		} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
			error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
							     AA_DO_TEST);
		} else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
			error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
		} else {
			struct common_audit_data sa;
			COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
 			sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
 			sa.aad.info = name;
 			sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
			return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
 					&sa, NULL);
 		}
 	} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
		error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
						     !AA_DO_TEST);
	} else {
		/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
		return -EINVAL;
	}
	if (!error)
		error = size;
	return error;
}
Commit message: perf tools: do not look at ./config for configuration

In addition to /etc/perfconfig and $HOME/.perfconfig, perf looks for
configuration in the file ./config, imitating git which looks at
$GIT_DIR/config.  If ./config is not a perf configuration file, it
fails, or worse, treats it as a configuration file and changes behavior
in some unexpected way.

"config" is not an unusual name for a file to be lying around and perf
does not have a private directory dedicated for its own use, so let's
just stop looking for configuration in the cwd.  Callers needing
context-sensitive configuration can use the PERF_CONFIG environment
variable.

Requested-by: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: 632923@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110805165838.GA7237@elie.gateway.2wire.net
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2011-2905
CWE: CWE-94
Vulnerability description: Untrusted search path vulnerability in the perf_config function in tools/perf/util/config.c in perf, as distributed in the Linux kernel before 3.1, allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted config file in the current working directory.

Project: linux
File: config.c

 int perf_config(config_fn_t fn, void *data)
 {
 	int ret = 0, found = 0;
	char *repo_config = NULL;
 	const char *home = NULL;
 
 	/* Setting $PERF_CONFIG makes perf read _only_ the given config file. */
	if (config_exclusive_filename)
		return perf_config_from_file(fn, config_exclusive_filename, data);
	if (perf_config_system() && !access(perf_etc_perfconfig(), R_OK)) {
		ret += perf_config_from_file(fn, perf_etc_perfconfig(),
					    data);
		found += 1;
	}

	home = getenv("HOME");
	if (perf_config_global() && home) {
		char *user_config = strdup(mkpath("%s/.perfconfig", home));
		if (!access(user_config, R_OK)) {
			ret += perf_config_from_file(fn, user_config, data);
			found += 1;
		}
 		free(user_config);
 	}
 
	repo_config = perf_pathdup("config");
	if (!access(repo_config, R_OK)) {
		ret += perf_config_from_file(fn, repo_config, data);
		found += 1;
	}
	free(repo_config);
 	if (found == 0)
 		return -1;
 	return ret;
}
Commit message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)

This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.

Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.

Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.

Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CVE: CVE-2011-1585
CWE: CWE-264
Vulnerability description: The cifs_find_smb_ses function in fs/cifs/connect.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.36 does not properly determine the associations between users and sessions, which allows local users to bypass CIFS share authentication by leveraging a mount of a share by a different user.

Project: linux
File: connect.c

cifs_find_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *username)
 {
	struct list_head *tmp;
 	struct cifsSesInfo *ses;
 
 	write_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
	list_for_each(tmp, &server->smb_ses_list) {
		ses = list_entry(tmp, struct cifsSesInfo, smb_ses_list);
		if (strncmp(ses->userName, username, MAX_USERNAME_SIZE))
			continue;
 		++ses->ses_count;
 		write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
 		return ses;
	}
	write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
	return NULL;
}
Commit message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths

Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes.  Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2011-1180
CWE: CWE-119
Vulnerability description: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication function in net/irda/iriap.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging connectivity to an IrDA infrared network and sending a large integer value for a (1) name length or (2) attribute length.

Project: linux
File: iriap.c

static void iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication(struct iriap_cb *self,
					     struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct ias_object *obj;
	struct ias_attrib *attrib;
	int name_len;
	int attr_len;
	char name[IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1];	/* 60 bytes */
	char attr[IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1];	/* 60 bytes */
	__u8 *fp;
	int n;

	IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s()\n", __func__);

	IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, return;);
	IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, return;);
	IRDA_ASSERT(skb != NULL, return;);

	fp = skb->data;
 	n = 1;
 
 	name_len = fp[n++];
 	memcpy(name, fp+n, name_len); n+=name_len;
 	name[name_len] = '\0';
 
 	attr_len = fp[n++];
 	memcpy(attr, fp+n, attr_len); n+=attr_len;
 	attr[attr_len] = '\0';
 
	IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: Looking up %s: %s\n", name, attr);
	obj = irias_find_object(name);

	if (obj == NULL) {
		IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Object %s not found\n", name);
		iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, 0x1235, IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN,
					       &irias_missing);
		return;
	}
	IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: found %s, id=%d\n", obj->name, obj->id);

	attrib = irias_find_attrib(obj, attr);
	if (attrib == NULL) {
		IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Attribute %s not found\n", attr);
		iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id,
					       IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN,
					       &irias_missing);
		return;
	}

	/* We have a match; send the value.  */
	iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id, IAS_SUCCESS,
				       attrib->value);
}
Commit message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules

Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/.  This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**.  However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.

This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases.  This fixes CVE-2011-1019.

Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".

Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.

    root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
    root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
    CapInh:	0000000000000000
    CapPrm:	fffffff800001000
    CapEff:	fffffff800001000
    CapBnd:	fffffff800001000
    root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
    FATAL: Error inserting xfs
    (/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
    xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
    sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
    sit0      Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
	      NOARP  MTU:1480  Metric:1

    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
    sit                    10457  0
    tunnel4                 2957  1 sit

For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:

    root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
    CapInh:	0000000000000000
    CapPrm:	ffffffffffffffff
    CapEff:	ffffffffffffffff
    CapBnd:	ffffffffffffffff
    root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
    xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
    root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
    xfs                   745319  0

Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CVE: CVE-2011-1019
CWE: CWE-264
Vulnerability description: The dev_load function in net/core/dev.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38 allows local users to bypass an intended CAP_SYS_MODULE capability requirement and load arbitrary modules by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.

Project: linux
File: dev.c

 void dev_load(struct net *net, const char *name)
 {
 	struct net_device *dev;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(net, name);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
	if (!dev && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
		request_module("%s", name);
 }
Commit message: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries

Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.

Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.

Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CVE: CVE-2014-9420
CWE: CWE-399
Vulnerability description: The rock_continue function in fs/isofs/rock.c in the Linux kernel through 3.18.1 does not restrict the number of Rock Ridge continuation entries, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop, and system crash or hang) via a crafted iso9660 image.

Project: linux
File: rock.c

static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
{
	int ret = 1;
	int blocksize = 1 << rs->inode->i_blkbits;
	const int min_de_size = offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u);

	kfree(rs->buffer);
	rs->buffer = NULL;

	if ((unsigned)rs->cont_offset > blocksize - min_de_size ||
	    (unsigned)rs->cont_size > blocksize ||
	    (unsigned)(rs->cont_offset + rs->cont_size) > blocksize) {
		printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: corrupted directory entry. "
			"extent=%d, offset=%d, size=%d\n",
			rs->cont_extent, rs->cont_offset, rs->cont_size);
		ret = -EIO;
		goto out;
	}

	if (rs->cont_extent) {
		struct buffer_head *bh;

		rs->buffer = kmalloc(rs->cont_size, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!rs->buffer) {
			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out;
 		}
 		ret = -EIO;
 		bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
 		if (bh) {
 			memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
					rs->cont_size);
			put_bh(bh);
			rs->chr = rs->buffer;
			rs->len = rs->cont_size;
			rs->cont_extent = 0;
			rs->cont_size = 0;
			rs->cont_offset = 0;
			return 0;
		}
		printk("Unable to read rock-ridge attributes\n");
	}
out:
	kfree(rs->buffer);
	rs->buffer = NULL;
	return ret;
}