db-d2/primevul-codebert-embeddings huggingface dataset:
Commit message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind

usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.

Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.

Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2016-3951
CWE: CWE-703
Vulnerability description: Double free vulnerability in drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inserting a USB device with an invalid USB descriptor.

Project: linux
File: cdc_ncm.c

 static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
 {
	int ret;
 	/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
 	if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
 		return -ENODEV;

	/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed, so we hard-coded it.
 	 * Additionally, generic NCM devices are assumed to accept arbitrarily
 	 * placed NDP.
 	 */
	ret = cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM, 0);
	/*
	 * We should get an event when network connection is "connected" or
	 * "disconnected". Set network connection in "disconnected" state
	 * (carrier is OFF) during attach, so the IP network stack does not
	 * start IPv6 negotiation and more.
	 */
	usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
	return ret;
 }
Commit message: KVM: MTRR: remove MSR 0x2f8

MSR 0x2f8 accessed the 124th Variable Range MTRR ever since MTRR support
was introduced by 9ba075a664df ("KVM: MTRR support").

0x2f8 became harmful when 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the
size of variable MTRRs") shrinked the array of VR MTRRs from 256 to 8,
which made access to index 124 out of bounds.  The surrounding code only
WARNs in this situation, thus the guest gained a limited read/write
access to struct kvm_arch_vcpu.

0x2f8 is not a valid VR MTRR MSR, because KVM has/advertises only 16 VR
MTRR MSRs, 0x200-0x20f.  Every VR MTRR is set up using two MSRs, 0x2f8
was treated as a PHYSBASE and 0x2f9 would be its PHYSMASK, but 0x2f9 was
not implemented in KVM, therefore 0x2f8 could never do anything useful
and getting rid of it is safe.

This fixes CVE-2016-3713.

Fixes: 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the size of variable MTRRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2016-3713
CWE: CWE-284
Vulnerability description: The msr_mtrr_valid function in arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6.1 supports MSR 0x2f8, which allows guest OS users to read or write to the kvm_arch_vcpu data structure, and consequently obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service (system crash), via a crafted ioctl call.

Project: linux
File: mtrr.c

static bool msr_mtrr_valid(unsigned msr)
{
	switch (msr) {
	case 0x200 ... 0x200 + 2 * KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR - 1:
	case MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_C8000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_D0000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_D8000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_E0000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_E8000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_F0000:
	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000:
 	case MSR_MTRRdefType:
 	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
 		return true;
	case 0x2f8:
		return true;
 	}
 	return false;
 }
Commit message: x86/mm/32: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32

Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only
the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files
(libraries, vDSO, etc.). This patch enables randomization for the
libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode.

By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries,
vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA.

This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or
4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR.

The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not
only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases
the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these
non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are
more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of
these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a
very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been
allowed for too long.

Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE
personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid
applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant
flags.

This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the
possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited".

Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Acked-by: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457639460-5242-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CVE: CVE-2016-3672
CWE: CWE-254
Vulnerability description: The arch_pick_mmap_layout function in arch/x86/mm/mmap.c in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not properly randomize the legacy base address, which makes it easier for local users to defeat the intended restrictions on the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE flag, and bypass the ASLR protection mechanism for a setuid or setgid program, by disabling stack-consumption resource limits.

Project: linux

void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
	unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;

 	if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
 		random_factor = arch_mmap_rnd();
 
	mm->mmap_legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base(random_factor);
 
 	if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
 		mm->mmap_base = mm->mmap_legacy_base;
		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
	} else {
		mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor);
		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
	}
}
Commit message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports

The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.

See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CVE: CVE-2016-3140
CWE: CWE-703
Vulnerability description: The digi_port_init function in drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.

Project: linux
File: digi_acceleport.c

 static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
 {
 	struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
 	int ret;
 
 	serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!serial_priv)
		return -ENOMEM;

	spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
	serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
	serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];

	ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
						serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
	if (ret) {
		kfree(serial_priv);
		return ret;
	}

	usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);

	return 0;
}
Commit message: USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe

An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This
patch checks for the existence of a second port.

CVE-2016-3136

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
[johan: add error message ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CVE: CVE-2016-3136
CWE: CWE-703
Vulnerability description: The mct_u232_msr_to_state function in drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted USB device without two interrupt-in endpoint descriptors.

Project: linux
File: mct_u232.c

 static int mct_u232_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 {
 	struct mct_u232_private *priv;
 
 	priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!priv)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Use second interrupt-in endpoint for reading. */
	priv->read_urb = port->serial->port[1]->interrupt_in_urb;
 	priv->read_urb->context = port;
 
 	spin_lock_init(&priv->lock);

	usb_set_serial_port_data(port, priv);

	return 0;
}
Commit message: netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow

Ben Hawkes says:
 integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can
 lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap
 corruption.

Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CVE: CVE-2016-3135
CWE: CWE-189
Vulnerability description: Integer overflow in the xt_alloc_table_info function in net/netfilter/x_tables.c in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 on 32-bit platforms allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.

Project: linux
File: x_tables.c

struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size)
{
 	struct xt_table_info *info = NULL;
 	size_t sz = sizeof(*info) + size;
 
 	/* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */
 	if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages)
 		return NULL;

	if (sz <= (PAGE_SIZE << PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER))
		info = kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY);
	if (!info) {
		info = vmalloc(sz);
		if (!info)
			return NULL;
	}
	memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
	info->size = size;
	return info;
}
Commit message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CVE: CVE-2016-3132
CWE: CWE-415
Vulnerability description: Double free vulnerability in the SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet function in ext/spl/spl_dllist.c in PHP 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted index.

Project: php-src

SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, offsetSet)
{
	zval                  *zindex, *value;
	spl_dllist_object     *intern;

	if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "zz", &zindex, &value) == FAILURE) {
		return;
	}

	intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());

	if (Z_TYPE_P(zindex) == IS_NULL) {
		/* $obj[] = ... */
		spl_ptr_llist_push(intern->llist, value);
	} else {
		/* $obj[$foo] = ... */
		zend_long                   index;
		spl_ptr_llist_element *element;

 		index = spl_offset_convert_to_long(zindex);
 
 		if (index < 0 || index >= intern->llist->count) {
			zval_ptr_dtor(value);
 			zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid or out of range", 0);
 			return;
 		}

		element = spl_ptr_llist_offset(intern->llist, index, intern->flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_LIFO);

		if (element != NULL) {
			/* call dtor on the old element as in spl_ptr_llist_pop */
			if (intern->llist->dtor) {
				intern->llist->dtor(element);
			}

			/* the element is replaced, delref the old one as in
			 * SplDoublyLinkedList::pop() */
			zval_ptr_dtor(&element->data);
			ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&element->data, value);

			/* new element, call ctor as in spl_ptr_llist_push */
			if (intern->llist->ctor) {
				intern->llist->ctor(element);
			}
		} else {
			zval_ptr_dtor(value);
			zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid", 0);
			return;
		}
	}
} /* }}} */

/* {{{ proto void SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetUnset(mixed index)
Commit message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)

Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.

Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information.  Made for easy test case writing :).
CVE: CVE-2016-3074
CWE: CWE-189
Vulnerability description: Integer signedness error in GD Graphics Library 2.1.1 (aka libgd or libgd2) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or potentially execute arbitrary code via crafted compressed gd2 data, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.

Project: libgd

_gd2GetHeader (gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy,
               int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy,
               t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
	int i;
	int ch;
	char id[5];
	t_chunk_info *cidx;
	int sidx;
	int nc;

	GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading gd2 header info\n"));

	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
		ch = gdGetC (in);
		if (ch == EOF) {
			goto fail1;
		};
		id[i] = ch;
	};
	id[4] = 0;

	GD2_DBG (printf ("Got file code: %s\n", id));

	/* Equiv. of 'magick'.  */
	if (strcmp (id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
		GD2_DBG (printf ("Not a valid gd2 file\n"));
		goto fail1;
	};

	/* Version */
	if (gdGetWord (vers, in) != 1) {
		goto fail1;
	};
	GD2_DBG (printf ("Version: %d\n", *vers));

	if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
		GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad version: %d\n", *vers));
		goto fail1;
	};

	/* Image Size */
	if (!gdGetWord (sx, in)) {
		GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get x-size\n"));
		goto fail1;
	}
	if (!gdGetWord (sy, in)) {
		GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get y-size\n"));
		goto fail1;
	}
	GD2_DBG (printf ("Image is %dx%d\n", *sx, *sy));

	/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
	if (gdGetWord (cs, in) != 1) {
		goto fail1;
	};
	GD2_DBG (printf ("ChunkSize: %d\n", *cs));

	if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
		GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad chunk size: %d\n", *cs));
		goto fail1;
	};

	/* Data Format */
	if (gdGetWord (fmt, in) != 1) {
		goto fail1;
	};
	GD2_DBG (printf ("Format: %d\n", *fmt));

	if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) &&
	        (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) &&
	        (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
		GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad data format: %d\n", *fmt));
		goto fail1;
	};


	/* # of chunks wide */
	if (gdGetWord (ncx, in) != 1) {
		goto fail1;
	};
	GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks Wide\n", *ncx));

	/* # of chunks high */
	if (gdGetWord (ncy, in) != 1) {
		goto fail1;
	};
	GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks vertically\n", *ncy));

	if (gd2_compressed (*fmt)) {
		nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
		GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading %d chunk index entries\n", nc));
		sidx = sizeof (t_chunk_info) * nc;
		cidx = gdCalloc (sidx, 1);
		if (!cidx) {
			goto fail1;
		}
		for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
			if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
				goto fail2;
			};
 			if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
 				goto fail2;
 			};
 		};
 		*chunkIdx = cidx;
 	};

	GD2_DBG (printf ("gd2 header complete\n"));

	return 1;
fail2:
	gdFree(cidx);
fail1:
	return 0;
}
Commit message: USB: visor: fix null-deref at probe

Fix null-pointer dereference at probe should a (malicious) Treo device
lack the expected endpoints.

Specifically, the Treo port-setup hack was dereferencing the bulk-in and
interrupt-in urbs without first making sure they had been allocated by
core.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CVE: CVE-2016-2782
CWE: CWE-703
Vulnerability description: The treo_attach function in drivers/usb/serial/visor.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inserting a USB device that lacks a (1) bulk-in or (2) interrupt-in endpoint.

Project: linux
File: visor.c

static int treo_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
	struct usb_serial_port *swap_port;

	/* Only do this endpoint hack for the Handspring devices with
	 * interrupt in endpoints, which for now are the Treo devices. */
	if (!((le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor)
						== HANDSPRING_VENDOR_ID) ||
		(le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor)
						== KYOCERA_VENDOR_ID)) ||
 		(serial->num_interrupt_in == 0))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
 	* It appears that Treos and Kyoceras want to use the
 	* 1st bulk in endpoint to communicate with the 2nd bulk out endpoint,
	* so let's swap the 1st and 2nd bulk in and interrupt endpoints.
	* Note that swapping the bulk out endpoints would break lots of
	* apps that want to communicate on the second port.
	*/
#define COPY_PORT(dest, src)						\
	do { \
		int i;							\
									\
		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(src->read_urbs); ++i) {	\
			dest->read_urbs[i] = src->read_urbs[i];		\
			dest->read_urbs[i]->context = dest;		\
			dest->bulk_in_buffers[i] = src->bulk_in_buffers[i]; \
		}							\
		dest->read_urb = src->read_urb;				\
		dest->bulk_in_endpointAddress = src->bulk_in_endpointAddress;\
		dest->bulk_in_buffer = src->bulk_in_buffer;		\
		dest->bulk_in_size = src->bulk_in_size;			\
		dest->interrupt_in_urb = src->interrupt_in_urb;		\
		dest->interrupt_in_urb->context = dest;			\
		dest->interrupt_in_endpointAddress = \
					src->interrupt_in_endpointAddress;\
		dest->interrupt_in_buffer = src->interrupt_in_buffer;	\
	} while (0);

	swap_port = kmalloc(sizeof(*swap_port), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!swap_port)
		return -ENOMEM;
	COPY_PORT(swap_port, serial->port[0]);
	COPY_PORT(serial->port[0], serial->port[1]);
	COPY_PORT(serial->port[1], swap_port);
	kfree(swap_port);

	return 0;
}
Commit message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close

ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client.  This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.

This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CVE: CVE-2016-2544
CWE: CWE-362
Vulnerability description: Race condition in the queue_delete function in sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) by making an ioctl call at a certain time.

Project: linux
File: seq_queue.c

 static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
 {
 	/* stop and release the timer */
 	snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
 	snd_seq_timer_close(q);
 	/* wait until access free */
 	snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
 	/* release resources... */
	snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->tickq);
	snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->timeq);
	snd_seq_timer_delete(&q->timer);

	kfree(q);
}
Commit message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl

snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference.  The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CVE: CVE-2016-2543
CWE: CWE-703
Vulnerability description: The snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events function in sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 does not verify FIFO assignment before proceeding with FIFO clearing, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) via a crafted ioctl call.

Project: linux

static int snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events(struct snd_seq_client *client,
				       void __user *arg)
{
	struct snd_seq_remove_events info;

	if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
		return -EFAULT;

	/*
	 * Input mostly not implemented XXX.
	 */
	if (info.remove_mode & SNDRV_SEQ_REMOVE_INPUT) {
		/*
 		 * No restrictions so for a user client we can clear
 		 * the whole fifo
 		 */
		if (client->type == USER_CLIENT)
 			snd_seq_fifo_clear(client->data.user.fifo);
 	}
 
	if (info.remove_mode & SNDRV_SEQ_REMOVE_OUTPUT)
		snd_seq_queue_remove_cells(client->number, &info);

	return 0;
}
Commit message: prefer memcpy to strcpy

When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).

This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CVE: CVE-2016-2315
CWE: CWE-119
Vulnerability description: revision.c in git before 2.7.4 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.

Project: git
File: revision.c

char *path_name(const struct name_path *path, const char *name)
{
	const struct name_path *p;
	char *n, *m;
	int nlen = strlen(name);
	int len = nlen + 1;

	for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
		if (p->elem_len)
			len += p->elem_len + 1;
 	}
 	n = xmalloc(len);
 	m = n + len - (nlen + 1);
	strcpy(m, name);
 	for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
 		if (p->elem_len) {
 			m -= p->elem_len + 1;
			memcpy(m, p->elem, p->elem_len);
			m[p->elem_len] = '/';
		}
	}
	return n;
}
Commit message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor

The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.

The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90

Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CVE: CVE-2016-2185
CWE: CWE-703
Vulnerability description: The ati_remote2_probe function in drivers/input/misc/ati_remote2.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.

Project: linux
File: ati_remote2.c

static int ati_remote2_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
	struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
	struct usb_host_interface *alt = interface->cur_altsetting;
	struct ati_remote2 *ar2;
	int r;

	if (alt->desc.bInterfaceNumber)
		return -ENODEV;

	ar2 = kzalloc(sizeof (struct ati_remote2), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!ar2)
		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ar2->udev = udev;
 
 	ar2->intf[0] = interface;
 	ar2->ep[0] = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
 
 	ar2->intf[1] = usb_ifnum_to_if(udev, 1);
 	r = usb_driver_claim_interface(&ati_remote2_driver, ar2->intf[1], ar2);
 	if (r)
 		goto fail1;
 	alt = ar2->intf[1]->cur_altsetting;
 	ar2->ep[1] = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
 
 	r = ati_remote2_urb_init(ar2);
 	if (r)
		goto fail2;
 
 	ar2->channel_mask = channel_mask;
 	ar2->mode_mask = mode_mask;
 
 	r = ati_remote2_setup(ar2, ar2->channel_mask);
 	if (r)
		goto fail2;
 
 	usb_make_path(udev, ar2->phys, sizeof(ar2->phys));
 	strlcat(ar2->phys, "/input0", sizeof(ar2->phys));

	strlcat(ar2->name, "ATI Remote Wonder II", sizeof(ar2->name));
 
 	r = sysfs_create_group(&udev->dev.kobj, &ati_remote2_attr_group);
 	if (r)
		goto fail2;
 
 	r = ati_remote2_input_init(ar2);
 	if (r)
		goto fail3;
 
 	usb_set_intfdata(interface, ar2);
 
 	interface->needs_remote_wakeup = 1;
 
 	return 0;
 
 fail3:
 	sysfs_remove_group(&udev->dev.kobj, &ati_remote2_attr_group);
 fail2:
 	ati_remote2_urb_cleanup(ar2);
 	usb_driver_release_interface(&ati_remote2_driver, ar2->intf[1]);
  fail1:
 	kfree(ar2);

	return r;
}