Commit message: rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map

This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.

Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.

Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
FS:  00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
 rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
 rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
 ? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
 ? __fdget+0x13/0x20
 SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021

Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08

The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
__rds_rdma_map().

Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2018-7492
CWE: CWE-476
Vulnerability description: A NULL pointer dereference was found in the net/rds/rdma.c __rds_rdma_map() function in the Linux kernel before 4.14.7 allowing local attackers to cause a system panic and a denial-of-service, related to RDS_GET_MR and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST.

Project: linux
File: rdma.c

static int __rds_rdma_map(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_get_mr_args *args,
				u64 *cookie_ret, struct rds_mr **mr_ret)
{
	struct rds_mr *mr = NULL, *found;
	unsigned int nr_pages;
	struct page **pages = NULL;
	struct scatterlist *sg;
	void *trans_private;
	unsigned long flags;
	rds_rdma_cookie_t cookie;
	unsigned int nents;
 	long i;
 	int ret;
 
	if (rs->rs_bound_addr == 0) {
 		ret = -ENOTCONN; /* XXX not a great errno */
 		goto out;
 	}

	if (!rs->rs_transport->get_mr) {
		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
		goto out;
	}

	nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&args->vec);
	if (nr_pages == 0) {
		ret = -EINVAL;
		goto out;
	}

	/* Restrict the size of mr irrespective of underlying transport
	 * To account for unaligned mr regions, subtract one from nr_pages
	 */
	if ((nr_pages - 1) > (RDS_MAX_MSG_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
		ret = -EMSGSIZE;
		goto out;
	}

	rdsdebug("RDS: get_mr addr %llx len %llu nr_pages %u\n",
		args->vec.addr, args->vec.bytes, nr_pages);

	/* XXX clamp nr_pages to limit the size of this alloc? */
	pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!pages) {
		ret = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}

	mr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rds_mr), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!mr) {
		ret = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}

	refcount_set(&mr->r_refcount, 1);
	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mr->r_rb_node);
	mr->r_trans = rs->rs_transport;
	mr->r_sock = rs;

	if (args->flags & RDS_RDMA_USE_ONCE)
		mr->r_use_once = 1;
	if (args->flags & RDS_RDMA_INVALIDATE)
		mr->r_invalidate = 1;
	if (args->flags & RDS_RDMA_READWRITE)
		mr->r_write = 1;

	/*
	 * Pin the pages that make up the user buffer and transfer the page
	 * pointers to the mr's sg array.  We check to see if we've mapped
	 * the whole region after transferring the partial page references
	 * to the sg array so that we can have one page ref cleanup path.
	 *
	 * For now we have no flag that tells us whether the mapping is
	 * r/o or r/w. We need to assume r/w, or we'll do a lot of RDMA to
	 * the zero page.
	 */
	ret = rds_pin_pages(args->vec.addr, nr_pages, pages, 1);
	if (ret < 0)
		goto out;

	nents = ret;
	sg = kcalloc(nents, sizeof(*sg), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!sg) {
		ret = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}
	WARN_ON(!nents);
	sg_init_table(sg, nents);

	/* Stick all pages into the scatterlist */
	for (i = 0 ; i < nents; i++)
		sg_set_page(&sg[i], pages[i], PAGE_SIZE, 0);

	rdsdebug("RDS: trans_private nents is %u\n", nents);

	/* Obtain a transport specific MR. If this succeeds, the
	 * s/g list is now owned by the MR.
	 * Note that dma_map() implies that pending writes are
	 * flushed to RAM, so no dma_sync is needed here. */
	trans_private = rs->rs_transport->get_mr(sg, nents, rs,
						 &mr->r_key);

	if (IS_ERR(trans_private)) {
		for (i = 0 ; i < nents; i++)
			put_page(sg_page(&sg[i]));
		kfree(sg);
		ret = PTR_ERR(trans_private);
		goto out;
	}

	mr->r_trans_private = trans_private;

	rdsdebug("RDS: get_mr put_user key is %x cookie_addr %p\n",
	       mr->r_key, (void *)(unsigned long) args->cookie_addr);

	/* The user may pass us an unaligned address, but we can only
	 * map page aligned regions. So we keep the offset, and build
	 * a 64bit cookie containing <R_Key, offset> and pass that
	 * around. */
	cookie = rds_rdma_make_cookie(mr->r_key, args->vec.addr & ~PAGE_MASK);
	if (cookie_ret)
		*cookie_ret = cookie;

	if (args->cookie_addr && put_user(cookie, (u64 __user *)(unsigned long) args->cookie_addr)) {
		ret = -EFAULT;
		goto out;
	}

	/* Inserting the new MR into the rbtree bumps its
	 * reference count. */
	spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
	found = rds_mr_tree_walk(&rs->rs_rdma_keys, mr->r_key, mr);
	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);

	BUG_ON(found && found != mr);

	rdsdebug("RDS: get_mr key is %x\n", mr->r_key);
	if (mr_ret) {
		refcount_inc(&mr->r_refcount);
		*mr_ret = mr;
	}

	ret = 0;
out:
	kfree(pages);
	if (mr)
		rds_mr_put(mr);
	return ret;
}