Commit message: ASN.1: Fix non-match detection failure on data overrun

If the ASN.1 decoder is asked to parse a sequence of objects, non-optional
matches get skipped if there's no more data to be had rather than a
data-overrun error being reported.

This is due to the code segment that decides whether to skip optional
matches (ie. matches that could get ignored because an element is marked
OPTIONAL in the grammar) due to a lack of data also skips non-optional
elements if the data pointer has reached the end of the buffer.

This can be tested with the data decoder for the new RSA akcipher algorithm
that takes three non-optional integers.  Currently, it skips the last
integer if there is insufficient data.

Without the fix, #defining DEBUG in asn1_decoder.c will show something
like:

	next_op: pc=0/13 dp=0/270 C=0 J=0
	- match? 30 30 00
	- TAG: 30 266 CONS
	next_op: pc=2/13 dp=4/270 C=1 J=0
	- match? 02 02 00
	- TAG: 02 257
	- LEAF: 257
	next_op: pc=5/13 dp=265/270 C=1 J=0
	- match? 02 02 00
	- TAG: 02 3
	- LEAF: 3
	next_op: pc=8/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0
	next_op: pc=11/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0
	- end cons t=4 dp=270 l=270/270

The next_op line for pc=8/13 should be followed by a match line.

This is not exploitable for X.509 certificates by means of shortening the
message and fixing up the ASN.1 CONS tags because:

 (1) The relevant records being built up are cleared before use.

 (2) If the message is shortened sufficiently to remove the public key, the
     ASN.1 parse of the RSA key will fail quickly due to a lack of data.

 (3) Extracted signature data is either turned into MPIs (which cope with a
     0 length) or is simpler integers specifying algoritms and suchlike
     (which can validly be 0); and

 (4) The AKID and SKID extensions are optional and their removal is handled
     without risking passing a NULL to asymmetric_key_generate_id().

 (5) If the certificate is truncated sufficiently to remove the subject,
     issuer or serialNumber then the ASN.1 decoder will fail with a 'Cons
     stack underflow' return.

This is not exploitable for PKCS#7 messages by means of removal of elements
from such a message from the tail end of a sequence:

 (1) Any shortened X.509 certs embedded in the PKCS#7 message are survivable
     as detailed above.

 (2) The message digest content isn't used if it shows a NULL pointer,
     similarly, the authattrs aren't used if that shows a NULL pointer.

 (3) A missing signature results in a NULL MPI - which the MPI routines deal
     with.

 (4) If data is NULL, it is expected that the message has detached content and
     that is handled appropriately.

 (5) If the serialNumber is excised, the unconditional action associated
     with it will pick up the containing SEQUENCE instead, so no NULL
     pointer will be seen here.

     If both the issuer and the serialNumber are excised, the ASN.1 decode
     will fail with an 'Unexpected tag' return.

     In either case, there's no way to get to asymmetric_key_generate_id()
     with a NULL pointer.

 (6) Other fields are decoded to simple integers.  Shortening the message
     to omit an algorithm ID field will cause checks on this to fail early
     in the verification process.


This can also be tested by snipping objects off of the end of the ASN.1 stream
such that mandatory tags are removed - or even from the end of internal
SEQUENCEs.  If any mandatory tag is missing, the error EBADMSG *should* be
produced.  Without this patch ERANGE or ENOPKG might be produced or the parse
may apparently succeed, perhaps with ENOKEY or EKEYREJECTED being produced
later, depending on what gets snipped.

Just snipping off the final BIT_STRING or OCTET_STRING from either sample
should be a start since both are mandatory and neither will cause an EBADMSG
without the patches

Reported-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
CVE: CVE-2016-2053
CWE: CWE-310
Vulnerability description: The asn1_ber_decoder function in lib/asn1_decoder.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via an ASN.1 BER file that lacks a public key, leading to mishandling by the public_key_verify_signature function in crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c.

Project: linux
File: asn1_decoder.c

int asn1_ber_decoder(const struct asn1_decoder *decoder,
		     void *context,
		     const unsigned char *data,
		     size_t datalen)
{
	const unsigned char *machine = decoder->machine;
	const asn1_action_t *actions = decoder->actions;
	size_t machlen = decoder->machlen;
	enum asn1_opcode op;
	unsigned char tag = 0, csp = 0, jsp = 0, optag = 0, hdr = 0;
	const char *errmsg;
	size_t pc = 0, dp = 0, tdp = 0, len = 0;
	int ret;

	unsigned char flags = 0;
#define FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH	0x01
#define FLAG_MATCHED		0x02
#define FLAG_LAST_MATCHED	0x04 /* Last tag matched */
#define FLAG_CONS		0x20 /* Corresponds to CONS bit in the opcode tag
				      * - ie. whether or not we are going to parse
				      *   a compound type.
				      */

#define NR_CONS_STACK 10
	unsigned short cons_dp_stack[NR_CONS_STACK];
	unsigned short cons_datalen_stack[NR_CONS_STACK];
	unsigned char cons_hdrlen_stack[NR_CONS_STACK];
#define NR_JUMP_STACK 10
	unsigned char jump_stack[NR_JUMP_STACK];

	if (datalen > 65535)
		return -EMSGSIZE;

next_op:
	pr_debug("next_op: pc=\e[32m%zu\e[m/%zu dp=\e[33m%zu\e[m/%zu C=%d J=%d\n",
		 pc, machlen, dp, datalen, csp, jsp);
	if (unlikely(pc >= machlen))
		goto machine_overrun_error;
	op = machine[pc];
	if (unlikely(pc + asn1_op_lengths[op] > machlen))
		goto machine_overrun_error;

	/* If this command is meant to match a tag, then do that before
	 * evaluating the command.
	 */
	if (op <= ASN1_OP__MATCHES_TAG) {
 		unsigned char tmp;
 
 		/* Skip conditional matches if possible */
		if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND && flags & FLAG_MATCHED) ||
		    (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__SKIP && dp == datalen)) {
 			flags &= ~FLAG_LAST_MATCHED;
 			pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
 			goto next_op;
		}

		flags = 0;
		hdr = 2;

		/* Extract a tag from the data */
		if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - 1))
			goto data_overrun_error;
		tag = data[dp++];
		if (unlikely((tag & 0x1f) == ASN1_LONG_TAG))
			goto long_tag_not_supported;

		if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ANY) {
			pr_debug("- any %02x\n", tag);
		} else {
			/* Extract the tag from the machine
			 * - Either CONS or PRIM are permitted in the data if
			 *   CONS is not set in the op stream, otherwise CONS
			 *   is mandatory.
			 */
			optag = machine[pc + 1];
			flags |= optag & FLAG_CONS;

			/* Determine whether the tag matched */
			tmp = optag ^ tag;
			tmp &= ~(optag & ASN1_CONS_BIT);
			pr_debug("- match? %02x %02x %02x\n", tag, optag, tmp);
			if (tmp != 0) {
				/* All odd-numbered tags are MATCH_OR_SKIP. */
				if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__SKIP) {
					pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
					dp--;
					goto next_op;
				}
				goto tag_mismatch;
			}
		}
		flags |= FLAG_MATCHED;

		len = data[dp++];
		if (len > 0x7f) {
			if (unlikely(len == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
				/* Indefinite length */
				if (unlikely(!(tag & ASN1_CONS_BIT)))
					goto indefinite_len_primitive;
				flags |= FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH;
				if (unlikely(2 > datalen - dp))
					goto data_overrun_error;
			} else {
				int n = len - 0x80;
				if (unlikely(n > 2))
					goto length_too_long;
				if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - n))
					goto data_overrun_error;
				hdr += n;
				for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
					len <<= 8;
					len |= data[dp++];
				}
				if (unlikely(len > datalen - dp))
					goto data_overrun_error;
			}
		}

		if (flags & FLAG_CONS) {
			/* For expected compound forms, we stack the positions
			 * of the start and end of the data.
			 */
			if (unlikely(csp >= NR_CONS_STACK))
				goto cons_stack_overflow;
			cons_dp_stack[csp] = dp;
			cons_hdrlen_stack[csp] = hdr;
			if (!(flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
				cons_datalen_stack[csp] = datalen;
				datalen = dp + len;
			} else {
				cons_datalen_stack[csp] = 0;
			}
			csp++;
		}

		pr_debug("- TAG: %02x %zu%s\n",
			 tag, len, flags & FLAG_CONS ? " CONS" : "");
		tdp = dp;
	}

	/* Decide how to handle the operation */
	switch (op) {
	case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
	case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
		ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
		if (ret < 0)
			return ret;
		goto skip_data;

	case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT:
	case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
	case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
		ret = actions[machine[pc + 2]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
		if (ret < 0)
			return ret;
		goto skip_data;

	case ASN1_OP_MATCH:
	case ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
	case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY:
	case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
	case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY:
	skip_data:
		if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) {
			if (flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
				ret = asn1_find_indefinite_length(
					data, datalen, &dp, &len, &errmsg);
				if (ret < 0)
					goto error;
			} else {
				dp += len;
			}
			pr_debug("- LEAF: %zu\n", len);
		}
		pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
		goto next_op;

	case ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP:
	case ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP:
	case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP:
		pr_debug("- MATCH_JUMP\n");
		if (unlikely(jsp == NR_JUMP_STACK))
			goto jump_stack_overflow;
		jump_stack[jsp++] = pc + asn1_op_lengths[op];
		pc = machine[pc + 2];
		goto next_op;

	case ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL:
		if (unlikely(!(flags & FLAG_MATCHED)))
			goto tag_mismatch;
		pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
		goto next_op;

	case ASN1_OP_COMPLETE:
		if (unlikely(jsp != 0 || csp != 0)) {
			pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Stacks not empty at completion (%u, %u)\n",
			       jsp, csp);
			return -EBADMSG;
		}
		return 0;

	case ASN1_OP_END_SET:
	case ASN1_OP_END_SET_ACT:
		if (unlikely(!(flags & FLAG_MATCHED)))
			goto tag_mismatch;
	case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ:
	case ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF:
	case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF:
	case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_ACT:
	case ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF_ACT:
	case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF_ACT:
		if (unlikely(csp <= 0))
			goto cons_stack_underflow;
		csp--;
		tdp = cons_dp_stack[csp];
		hdr = cons_hdrlen_stack[csp];
		len = datalen;
		datalen = cons_datalen_stack[csp];
		pr_debug("- end cons t=%zu dp=%zu l=%zu/%zu\n",
			 tdp, dp, len, datalen);
		if (datalen == 0) {
			/* Indefinite length - check for the EOC. */
			datalen = len;
			if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2))
				goto data_overrun_error;
			if (data[dp++] != 0) {
				if (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF) {
					dp--;
					csp++;
					pc = machine[pc + 1];
					pr_debug("- continue\n");
					goto next_op;
				}
				goto missing_eoc;
			}
			if (data[dp++] != 0)
				goto invalid_eoc;
			len = dp - tdp - 2;
		} else {
			if (dp < len && (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF)) {
				datalen = len;
				csp++;
				pc = machine[pc + 1];
				pr_debug("- continue\n");
				goto next_op;
			}
			if (dp != len)
				goto cons_length_error;
			len -= tdp;
			pr_debug("- cons len l=%zu d=%zu\n", len, dp - tdp);
		}

		if (op & ASN1_OP_END__ACT) {
			unsigned char act;
			if (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF)
				act = machine[pc + 2];
			else
				act = machine[pc + 1];
			ret = actions[act](context, hdr, 0, data + tdp, len);
		}
		pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
		goto next_op;

	case ASN1_OP_MAYBE_ACT:
		if (!(flags & FLAG_LAST_MATCHED)) {
			pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
			goto next_op;
		}
	case ASN1_OP_ACT:
		ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + tdp, len);
		if (ret < 0)
			return ret;
		pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
		goto next_op;

	case ASN1_OP_RETURN:
		if (unlikely(jsp <= 0))
			goto jump_stack_underflow;
		pc = jump_stack[--jsp];
		flags |= FLAG_MATCHED | FLAG_LAST_MATCHED;
		goto next_op;

	default:
		break;
	}

	/* Shouldn't reach here */
	pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Found reserved opcode (%u) pc=%zu\n",
	       op, pc);
	return -EBADMSG;

data_overrun_error:
	errmsg = "Data overrun error";
	goto error;
machine_overrun_error:
	errmsg = "Machine overrun error";
	goto error;
jump_stack_underflow:
	errmsg = "Jump stack underflow";
	goto error;
jump_stack_overflow:
	errmsg = "Jump stack overflow";
	goto error;
cons_stack_underflow:
	errmsg = "Cons stack underflow";
	goto error;
cons_stack_overflow:
	errmsg = "Cons stack overflow";
	goto error;
cons_length_error:
	errmsg = "Cons length error";
	goto error;
missing_eoc:
	errmsg = "Missing EOC in indefinite len cons";
	goto error;
invalid_eoc:
	errmsg = "Invalid length EOC";
	goto error;
length_too_long:
	errmsg = "Unsupported length";
	goto error;
indefinite_len_primitive:
	errmsg = "Indefinite len primitive not permitted";
	goto error;
tag_mismatch:
	errmsg = "Unexpected tag";
	goto error;
long_tag_not_supported:
	errmsg = "Long tag not supported";
error:
	pr_debug("\nASN1: %s [m=%zu d=%zu ot=%02x t=%02x l=%zu]\n",
		 errmsg, pc, dp, optag, tag, len);
	return -EBADMSG;
}