Commit message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data

We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):

skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>]  [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8  EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS:  00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
 ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
 ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
 ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
 [<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
 [<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
 [<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
 [<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
 [<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
 [<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
 [<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
 [<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
 [<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
 [<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP  [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
 RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>

This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.

This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.

(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)

Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2013-4162
CWE: CWE-399
Vulnerability description: The udp_v6_push_pending_frames function in net/ipv6/udp.c in the IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 makes an incorrect function call for pending data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call.

Project: linux
File: udp.c

int __udp4_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
		   int proto)
{
	struct sock *sk;
	struct udphdr *uh;
	unsigned short ulen;
	struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
	__be32 saddr, daddr;
	struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);

	/*
	 *  Validate the packet.
	 */
	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
		goto drop;		/* No space for header. */

	uh   = udp_hdr(skb);
	ulen = ntohs(uh->len);
	saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
	daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;

	if (ulen > skb->len)
		goto short_packet;

	if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP) {
		/* UDP validates ulen. */
		if (ulen < sizeof(*uh) || pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, ulen))
			goto short_packet;
		uh = udp_hdr(skb);
	}

	if (udp4_csum_init(skb, uh, proto))
		goto csum_error;

	if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST|RTCF_MULTICAST))
		return __udp4_lib_mcast_deliver(net, skb, uh,
				saddr, daddr, udptable);

	sk = __udp4_lib_lookup_skb(skb, uh->source, uh->dest, udptable);

	if (sk != NULL) {
		int ret;

		sk_mark_ll(sk, skb);
		ret = udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
		sock_put(sk);

		/* a return value > 0 means to resubmit the input, but
		 * it wants the return to be -protocol, or 0
		 */
		if (ret > 0)
			return -ret;
		return 0;
	}

	if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
		goto drop;
	nf_reset(skb);

	/* No socket. Drop packet silently, if checksum is wrong */
	if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
		goto csum_error;

	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
	icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);

	/*
	 * Hmm.  We got an UDP packet to a port to which we
	 * don't wanna listen.  Ignore it.
	 */
	kfree_skb(skb);
	return 0;

short_packet:
	LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "UDP%s: short packet: From %pI4:%u %d/%d to %pI4:%u\n",
		       proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE ? "Lite" : "",
		       &saddr, ntohs(uh->source),
		       ulen, skb->len,
		       &daddr, ntohs(uh->dest));
	goto drop;

csum_error:
	/*
	 * RFC1122: OK.  Discards the bad packet silently (as far as
	 * the network is concerned, anyway) as per 4.1.3.4 (MUST).
	 */
	LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "UDP%s: bad checksum. From %pI4:%u to %pI4:%u ulen %d\n",
		       proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE ? "Lite" : "",
		       &saddr, ntohs(uh->source), &daddr, ntohs(uh->dest),
		       ulen);
	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
drop:
	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_INERRORS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
	kfree_skb(skb);
	return 0;
}

Project: linux
File: udp.c

static int __udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	int rc;

	if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr)
		sock_rps_save_rxhash(sk, skb);

	rc = sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
	if (rc < 0) {
		int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);

		/* Note that an ENOMEM error is charged twice */
		if (rc == -ENOMEM)
			UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_RCVBUFERRORS,
					 is_udplite);
		UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
		kfree_skb(skb);
		trace_udp_fail_queue_rcv_skb(rc, sk);
		return -1;
	}

	return 0;

}

Project: linux
File: udp.c

static int udp_lib_lport_inuse(struct net *net, __u16 num,
			       const struct udp_hslot *hslot,
			       unsigned long *bitmap,
			       struct sock *sk,
			       int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
						 const struct sock *sk2),
			       unsigned int log)
{
	struct sock *sk2;
	struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
	kuid_t uid = sock_i_uid(sk);

	sk_nulls_for_each(sk2, node, &hslot->head)
		if (net_eq(sock_net(sk2), net) &&
		    sk2 != sk &&
		    (bitmap || udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash == num) &&
		    (!sk2->sk_reuse || !sk->sk_reuse) &&
		    (!sk2->sk_bound_dev_if || !sk->sk_bound_dev_if ||
		     sk2->sk_bound_dev_if == sk->sk_bound_dev_if) &&
		    (!sk2->sk_reuseport || !sk->sk_reuseport ||
		      !uid_eq(uid, sock_i_uid(sk2))) &&
		    (*saddr_comp)(sk, sk2)) {
			if (bitmap)
				__set_bit(udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash >> log,
					  bitmap);
			else
				return 1;
		}
	return 0;
}

Project: linux
File: udp.c

void udp_proc_unregister(struct net *net, struct udp_seq_afinfo *afinfo)
{
	remove_proc_entry(afinfo->name, net->proc_net);
}

Project: linux
File: udp.c

int udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
	int rc;
	int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);

	/*
	 *	Charge it to the socket, dropping if the queue is full.
	 */
	if (!xfrm4_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
		goto drop;
	nf_reset(skb);

	if (static_key_false(&udp_encap_needed) && up->encap_type) {
		int (*encap_rcv)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);

		/*
		 * This is an encapsulation socket so pass the skb to
		 * the socket's udp_encap_rcv() hook. Otherwise, just
		 * fall through and pass this up the UDP socket.
		 * up->encap_rcv() returns the following value:
		 * =0 if skb was successfully passed to the encap
		 *    handler or was discarded by it.
		 * >0 if skb should be passed on to UDP.
		 * <0 if skb should be resubmitted as proto -N
		 */

		/* if we're overly short, let UDP handle it */
		encap_rcv = ACCESS_ONCE(up->encap_rcv);
		if (skb->len > sizeof(struct udphdr) && encap_rcv != NULL) {
			int ret;

			ret = encap_rcv(sk, skb);
			if (ret <= 0) {
				UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
						 UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS,
						 is_udplite);
				return -ret;
			}
		}

		/* FALLTHROUGH -- it's a UDP Packet */
	}

	/*
	 * 	UDP-Lite specific tests, ignored on UDP sockets
	 */
	if ((is_udplite & UDPLITE_RECV_CC)  &&  UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {

		/*
		 * MIB statistics other than incrementing the error count are
		 * disabled for the following two types of errors: these depend
		 * on the application settings, not on the functioning of the
		 * protocol stack as such.
		 *
		 * RFC 3828 here recommends (sec 3.3): "There should also be a
		 * way ... to ... at least let the receiving application block
		 * delivery of packets with coverage values less than a value
		 * provided by the application."
		 */
		if (up->pcrlen == 0) {          /* full coverage was set  */
			LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING "UDPLite: partial coverage %d while full coverage %d requested\n",
				       UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov, skb->len);
			goto drop;
		}
		/* The next case involves violating the min. coverage requested
		 * by the receiver. This is subtle: if receiver wants x and x is
		 * greater than the buffersize/MTU then receiver will complain
		 * that it wants x while sender emits packets of smaller size y.
		 * Therefore the above ...()->partial_cov statement is essential.
		 */
		if (UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov  <  up->pcrlen) {
			LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING "UDPLite: coverage %d too small, need min %d\n",
				       UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov, up->pcrlen);
			goto drop;
		}
	}

	if (rcu_access_pointer(sk->sk_filter) &&
	    udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
		goto csum_error;


	if (sk_rcvqueues_full(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
		goto drop;

	rc = 0;

	ipv4_pktinfo_prepare(skb);
	bh_lock_sock(sk);
	if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
		rc = __udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
	else if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf)) {
		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
		goto drop;
	}
	bh_unlock_sock(sk);

	return rc;

csum_error:
	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
drop:
	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
	atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
	kfree_skb(skb);
	return -1;
}

Project: linux
File: udp.c

void udpv6_encap_enable(void)
{
	if (!static_key_enabled(&udpv6_encap_needed))
		static_key_slow_inc(&udpv6_encap_needed);
}