Commit message: ipv6: fix headroom calculation in udp6_ufo_fragment

Commit 1e2bd517c108816220f262d7954b697af03b5f9c ("udp6: Fix udp
fragmentation for tunnel traffic.") changed the calculation if
there is enough space to include a fragment header in the skb from a
skb->mac_header dervived one to skb_headroom. Because we already peeled
off the skb to transport_header this is wrong. Change this back to check
if we have enough room before the mac_header.

This fixes a panic Saran Neti reported. He used the tbf scheduler which
skb_gso_segments the skb. The offsets get negative and we panic in memcpy
because the skb was erroneously not expanded at the head.

Reported-by: Saran Neti <Saran.Neti@telus.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2013-4563
CWE: CWE-189
Vulnerability description: The udp6_ufo_fragment function in net/ipv6/udp_offload.c in the Linux kernel through 3.12, when UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) is enabled, does not properly perform a certain size comparison before inserting a fragment header, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via a large IPv6 UDP packet, as demonstrated by use of the Token Bucket Filter (TBF) queueing discipline.

Project: linux
File: udp_offload.c

static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
					 netdev_features_t features)
{
	struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
	unsigned int mss;
	unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
	struct frag_hdr *fptr;
	u8 *packet_start, *prevhdr;
	u8 nexthdr;
	u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
	int offset;
	__wsum csum;
	int tnl_hlen;

	mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
	if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
		goto out;

	if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
		/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
		int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;

		if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP |
				      SKB_GSO_DODGY |
				      SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL |
				      SKB_GSO_GRE |
				      SKB_GSO_IPIP |
				      SKB_GSO_SIT |
				      SKB_GSO_MPLS) ||
			     !(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
			goto out;

		skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);

		segs = NULL;
		goto out;
	}

	if (skb->encapsulation && skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL)
		segs = skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features);
	else {
		/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
		 * do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
		 */
		offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
		csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len - offset, 0);
		offset += skb->csum_offset;
		*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
 
 		/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
 		tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
		if (skb->mac_header < (tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz)) {
 			if (gso_pskb_expand_head(skb, tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz))
 				goto out;
 		}

		/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
		 * bytes to insert fragment header.
		 */
		unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
		nexthdr = *prevhdr;
		*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
		unfrag_len = (skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb)) +
			     unfrag_ip6hlen + tnl_hlen;
		packet_start = (u8 *) skb->head + SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset;
		memmove(packet_start-frag_hdr_sz, packet_start, unfrag_len);

		SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset -= frag_hdr_sz;
		skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
		skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;

		fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
		fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
		fptr->reserved = 0;
		ipv6_select_ident(fptr, (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb));

		/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
		 * fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
		 */
		segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
	}

out:
	return segs;
}