Commit message: net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions

When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as
already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit
auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally
still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to
have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ...

[  533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[  533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230
[  533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0
[  533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...]
[  534.939704] Call Trace:
[  534.951833]  [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[  534.984213]  [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[  535.015025]  [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170
[  535.045661]  [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0
[  535.074593]  [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50
[  535.105239]  [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp]
[  535.138606]  [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0
[  535.166848]  [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

... or depending on the the application, for example this one:

[ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0
[ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0
[ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...]
[ 1370.963431] Call Trace:
[ 1370.974632]  [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.000863]  [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.027154]  [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170
[ 1371.054679]  [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[ 1371.080183]  [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten:

[  669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G        W     ): Poison overwritten
[  669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
[  669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494
[  669.826424]  __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566
[  669.826433]  __kmalloc+0x280/0x310
[  669.826453]  sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
[  669.826471]  sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp]
[  669.826488]  sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp]
[  669.826505]  sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...]
[  669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494
[  669.826635]  __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8
[  669.826643]  kfree+0x1d6/0x230
[  669.826650]  kzfree+0x31/0x40
[  669.826666]  sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp]
[  669.826681]  sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp]
[  669.826695]  sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp]

Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at
heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice
when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again
from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on
the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation
of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected
at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation).

Reference counting of auth keys revisited:

Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations
in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being
added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached
and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds
a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which
keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc
or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and
the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped.

User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct
sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or
adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes
with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old
sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt()
on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either
endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places)
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key().

sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's
and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key
directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops
the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we
eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with
intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in
sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to
set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().

To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret
material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track
of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76
("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of
this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures
being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly
on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are
being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount
of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is
to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics.

Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2015-1421
CWE: CWE-703
Vulnerability description: Use-after-free vulnerability in the sctp_assoc_update function in net/sctp/associola.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18.8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering an INIT collision that leads to improper handling of shared-key data.

Project: linux
File: associola.c

void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc,
		       struct sctp_association *new)
{
	struct sctp_transport *trans;
	struct list_head *pos, *temp;

	/* Copy in new parameters of peer. */
	asoc->c = new->c;
	asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd;
	asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed;
	asoc->peer.auth_capable = new->peer.auth_capable;
	asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i;
	sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
			 asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC);

	/* Remove any peer addresses not present in the new association. */
	list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
		trans = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
		if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(new, &trans->ipaddr)) {
			sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, trans);
			continue;
		}

		if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED)
			sctp_transport_reset(trans);
	}

	/* If the case is A (association restart), use
	 * initial_tsn as next_tsn. If the case is B, use
	 * current next_tsn in case data sent to peer
	 * has been discarded and needs retransmission.
	 */
	if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
		asoc->next_tsn = new->next_tsn;
		asoc->ctsn_ack_point = new->ctsn_ack_point;
		asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = new->adv_peer_ack_point;

		/* Reinitialize SSN for both local streams
		 * and peer's streams.
		 */
		sctp_ssnmap_clear(asoc->ssnmap);

		/* Flush the ULP reassembly and ordered queue.
		 * Any data there will now be stale and will
		 * cause problems.
		 */
		sctp_ulpq_flush(&asoc->ulpq);

		/* reset the overall association error count so
		 * that the restarted association doesn't get torn
		 * down on the next retransmission timer.
		 */
		asoc->overall_error_count = 0;

	} else {
		/* Add any peer addresses from the new association. */
		list_for_each_entry(trans, &new->peer.transport_addr_list,
				transports) {
			if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &trans->ipaddr))
				sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &trans->ipaddr,
						    GFP_ATOMIC, trans->state);
		}

		asoc->ctsn_ack_point = asoc->next_tsn - 1;
		asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = asoc->ctsn_ack_point;
		if (!asoc->ssnmap) {
			/* Move the ssnmap. */
			asoc->ssnmap = new->ssnmap;
			new->ssnmap = NULL;
		}

		if (!asoc->assoc_id) {
			/* get a new association id since we don't have one
			 * yet.
			 */
			sctp_assoc_set_id(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
		}
	}

	/* SCTP-AUTH: Save the peer parameters from the new associations
	 * and also move the association shared keys over
	 */
	kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
	asoc->peer.peer_random = new->peer.peer_random;
	new->peer.peer_random = NULL;

	kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
	asoc->peer.peer_chunks = new->peer.peer_chunks;
	new->peer.peer_chunks = NULL;

	kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
 	asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = new->peer.peer_hmacs;
 	new->peer.peer_hmacs = NULL;
 
	sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key);
 	sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }