Commit message: ide: Correct handling of malformed/short PRDTs

This impacts both BMDMA and AHCI HBA interfaces for IDE.
Currently, we confuse the difference between a PRDT having
"0 bytes" and a PRDT having "0 complete sectors."

When we receive an incomplete sector, inconsistent error checking
leads to an infinite loop wherein the call succeeds, but it
didn't give us enough bytes -- leading us to re-call the
DMA chain over and over again. This leads to, in the BMDMA case,
leaked memory for short PRDTs, and infinite loops and resource
usage in the AHCI case.

The .prepare_buf() callback is reworked to return the number of
bytes that it successfully prepared. 0 is a valid, non-error
answer that means the table was empty and described no bytes.
-1 indicates an error.

Our current implementation uses the io_buffer in IDEState to
ultimately describe the size of a prepared scatter-gather list.
Even though the AHCI PRDT/SGList can be as large as 256GiB, the
AHCI command header limits transactions to just 4GiB. ATA8-ACS3,
however, defines the largest transaction to be an LBA48 command
that transfers 65,536 sectors. With a 512 byte sector size, this
is just 32MiB.

Since our current state structures use the int type to describe
the size of the buffer, and this state is migrated as int32, we
are limited to describing 2GiB buffer sizes unless we change the
migration protocol.

For this reason, this patch begins to unify the assertions in the
IDE pathways that the scatter-gather list provided by either the
AHCI PRDT or the PCI BMDMA PRDs can only describe, at a maximum,
2GiB. This should be resilient enough unless we need a sector
size that exceeds 32KiB.

Further, the likelihood of any guest operating system actually
attempting to transfer this much data in a single operation is
very slim.

To this end, the IDEState variables have been updated to more
explicitly clarify our maximum supported size. Callers to the
prepare_buf callback have been reworked to understand the new
return code, and all versions of the prepare_buf callback have
been adjusted accordingly.

Lastly, the ahci_populate_sglist helper, relied upon by the
AHCI implementation of .prepare_buf() as well as the PCI
implementation of the callback have had overflow assertions
added to help make clear the reasonings behind the various
type changes.

[Added %d -> %"PRId64" fix John sent because off_pos changed from int to
int64_t.
--Stefan]

Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1414785819-26209-4-git-send-email-jsnow@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2014-9718
CWE: CWE-399
Vulnerability description: The (1) BMDMA and (2) AHCI HBA interfaces in the IDE functionality in QEMU 1.0 through 2.1.3 have multiple interpretations of a function's return value, which allows guest OS users to cause a host OS denial of service (memory consumption or infinite loop, and system crash) via a PRDT with zero complete sectors, related to the bmdma_prepare_buf and ahci_dma_prepare_buf functions.

Project: qemu

static int bmdma_prepare_buf(IDEDMA *dma, int is_write)
 {
     BMDMAState *bm = DO_UPCAST(BMDMAState, dma, dma);
     IDEState *s = bmdma_active_if(bm);
        uint32_t size;
    } prd;