Commit message: net: fix for a race condition in the inet frag code

I stumbled upon this very serious bug while hunting for another one,
it's a very subtle race condition between inet_frag_evictor,
inet_frag_intern and the IPv4/6 frag_queue and expire functions
(basically the users of inet_frag_kill/inet_frag_put).

What happens is that after a fragment has been added to the hash chain
but before it's been added to the lru_list (inet_frag_lru_add) in
inet_frag_intern, it may get deleted (either by an expired timer if
the system load is high or the timer sufficiently low, or by the
fraq_queue function for different reasons) before it's added to the
lru_list, then after it gets added it's a matter of time for the
evictor to get to a piece of memory which has been freed leading to a
number of different bugs depending on what's left there.

I've been able to trigger this on both IPv4 and IPv6 (which is normal
as the frag code is the same), but it's been much more difficult to
trigger on IPv4 due to the protocol differences about how fragments
are treated.

The setup I used to reproduce this is: 2 machines with 4 x 10G bonded
in a RR bond, so the same flow can be seen on multiple cards at the
same time. Then I used multiple instances of ping/ping6 to generate
fragmented packets and flood the machines with them while running
other processes to load the attacked machine.

*It is very important to have the _same flow_ coming in on multiple CPUs
concurrently. Usually the attacked machine would die in less than 30
minutes, if configured properly to have many evictor calls and timeouts
it could happen in 10 minutes or so.

An important point to make is that any caller (frag_queue or timer) of
inet_frag_kill will remove both the timer refcount and the
original/guarding refcount thus removing everything that's keeping the
frag from being freed at the next inet_frag_put.  All of this could
happen before the frag was ever added to the LRU list, then it gets
added and the evictor uses a freed fragment.

An example for IPv6 would be if a fragment is being added and is at
the stage of being inserted in the hash after the hash lock is
released, but before inet_frag_lru_add executes (or is able to obtain
the lru lock) another overlapping fragment for the same flow arrives
at a different CPU which finds it in the hash, but since it's
overlapping it drops it invoking inet_frag_kill and thus removing all
guarding refcounts, and afterwards freeing it by invoking
inet_frag_put which removes the last refcount added previously by
inet_frag_find, then inet_frag_lru_add gets executed by
inet_frag_intern and we have a freed fragment in the lru_list.

The fix is simple, just move the lru_add under the hash chain locked
region so when a removing function is called it'll have to wait for
the fragment to be added to the lru_list, and then it'll remove it (it
works because the hash chain removal is done before the lru_list one
and there's no window between the two list adds when the frag can get
dropped). With this fix applied I couldn't kill the same machine in 24
hours with the same setup.

Fixes: 3ef0eb0db4bf ("net: frag, move LRU list maintenance outside of
rwlock")

CC: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
CC: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE: CVE-2014-0100
CWE: CWE-362
Vulnerability description: Race condition in the inet_frag_intern function in net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c in the Linux kernel through 3.13.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free error) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large series of fragmented ICMP Echo Request packets to a system with a heavy CPU load.

Project: linux
File: inet_fragment.c

static struct inet_frag_queue *inet_frag_intern(struct netns_frags *nf,
		struct inet_frag_queue *qp_in, struct inet_frags *f,
		void *arg)
{
	struct inet_frag_bucket *hb;
	struct inet_frag_queue *qp;
	unsigned int hash;

	read_lock(&f->lock); /* Protects against hash rebuild */
	/*
	 * While we stayed w/o the lock other CPU could update
	 * the rnd seed, so we need to re-calculate the hash
	 * chain. Fortunatelly the qp_in can be used to get one.
	 */
	hash = f->hashfn(qp_in);
	hb = &f->hash[hash];
	spin_lock(&hb->chain_lock);

#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
	/* With SMP race we have to recheck hash table, because
	 * such entry could be created on other cpu, while we
	 * released the hash bucket lock.
	 */
	hlist_for_each_entry(qp, &hb->chain, list) {
		if (qp->net == nf && f->match(qp, arg)) {
			atomic_inc(&qp->refcnt);
			spin_unlock(&hb->chain_lock);
			read_unlock(&f->lock);
			qp_in->last_in |= INET_FRAG_COMPLETE;
			inet_frag_put(qp_in, f);
			return qp;
		}
	}
#endif
	qp = qp_in;
	if (!mod_timer(&qp->timer, jiffies + nf->timeout))
		atomic_inc(&qp->refcnt);

	atomic_inc(&qp->refcnt);
	hlist_add_head(&qp->list, &hb->chain);
	spin_unlock(&hb->chain_lock);
	read_unlock(&f->lock);
	inet_frag_lru_add(nf, qp);
	return qp;
}