JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
10 September 2025 (*)
( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Restrictions on entry into the territories of the Member States – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and subject to restrictions on entry into the territories of the Member States – Inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Error of assessment )
In Case T‑642/22,
Oleksandr Viktorovych Yanukovych, residing in Saint Petersburg (Russia), represented by B. Kennelly SC,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by A. Boggio-Tomasaz and J. Rurarz, acting as Agents, and by B. Maingain and S. Remy, lawyers,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed of R. Mastroianni (Rapporteur), acting as President, M. Brkan and S.L. Kalėda, Judges,
Registrar: M. Zwozdziak-Carbonne, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 18 September 2024,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Oleksandr Viktorovych Yanukovych, seeks annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1355 of 4 August 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 204I, p. 4), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1354 of 4 August 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 204I, p. 1; together, ‘the initial acts’), (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1; together, ‘the September 2022 maintaining acts’), (iii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1; together, ‘the March 2023 maintaining acts’), (iv) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3; together, ‘the September 2023 maintaining acts’), and (v) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2024/847), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2024/849; together, ‘the March 2024 maintaining acts’), in so far as the initial acts, the September 2022 maintaining acts, the March 2023 maintaining acts, the September 2023 maintaining acts and the March 2024 maintaining acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) concern the applicant.
Background to the dispute
2        The applicant is the son of the former President of Ukraine.
3        The present case has arisen in the context of restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
4        On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).
5        On the same date, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).
6        On 25 February 2022, in view of the seriousness of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted (i) Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1), and (ii) Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1) in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria by which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be made subject to the restrictive measures at issue.
7        Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329 (‘amended Decision 2014/145’), is worded as follows:
‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:
(a)      natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;
…
(e)      natural or legal persons, entities or bodies conducting transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine;
…
and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’
8        The detailed rules for the freezing of those funds are set out in the subsequent paragraphs of that article.
9        Article 1(1)(a) and (c) of amended Decision 2014/145 prohibits the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States of natural persons who satisfy essentially the same criteria as those set out in Article 2(1)(a) and (e) of that decision.
10      Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, requires the adoption of measures to freeze funds and lays down the detailed rules governing the freezing of those funds in terms that are, in essence, identical to those of amended Decision 2014/145. Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation essentially reproduces Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.
11      By letters of 25 February and 8 July 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to add his name to the lists annexed to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, and to amended Decision 2014/145 (‘the lists at issue’), and sent the files bearing the references WK 1272/2022 (‘the first WK file’), WK 1272/2022 ADD 1 REV 1 (‘the first WK ADD 1 file’) and WK 1272/2022 ADD 2 REV 1 (‘the first WK ADD 2 file’) (together, ‘the first WK files’).
12      On 4 August 2022, the Council adopted the initial acts.
13      The reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are as follows:
‘Oleksandr Yanukovych is a businessman and the son of former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. During the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych and thanks to the personal connection with a group of persons close to his father, he assembled an array of business interests and accumulated a great fortune. He still runs his business activities in the Donba[s] region controlled by the separatists groups, especially in the energy, coal, construction, banking and real estate sectors. In particular, thanks to close ties with the pro-Russian separatists, he acquired key economic assets in the so-called “Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics”, inter alia in the energy, coal and real-estate sectors. The separatist OPLOT battalion (listed since February 2015) protected his real-estate development projects in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.
Therefore, Oleksandr Yanukovych is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and he conducted transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine.
Furthermore, he is associated with his father Viktor Yanukovych, who is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the state’s stability and security.’
14      On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the September 2022 maintaining acts, which extended the measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2023 without making any changes to the reasons for including his name on the lists at issue as compared with those set out in the initial acts.
Events subsequent to the bringing of the present action
15      By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures against him for the same reasons as those in the initial acts and sent him the file bearing the reference WK 17598/2022 REV I (‘the second WK file’).
16      By letter of 11 January 2023, the applicant submitted his observations.
17      By the March 2023 maintaining acts, the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 September 2023. By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.
18      By letters of 19 June and 18 August 2023, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures against him and sent the files bearing the references WK 7868/2023 and WK 10556/2023 (‘the third WK files’).
19      By letters of 30 June and 23 August 2023, the applicant submitted his observations.
20      By the September 2023 maintaining acts, the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 March 2024. By letter of 15 September 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.
21      The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:
‘Oleksandr Yanukovych is a businessman and the son of former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. During the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych and thanks to the personal connection with a group of persons close to his father, he assembled an array of business interests and accumulated a great fortune. He still runs his business activities in the Donba[s] region controlled by the separatists groups, especially in the energy, coal, construction, banking and real estate sectors. In particular, thanks to close ties with the pro-Russian separatists, he acquired key economic assets in the so-called “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics”, inter alia in the energy, coal and real-estate sectors. The separatist OPLOT battalion (listed since February 2015) protected his real-estate development projects in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.
Oleksandr Yanukovych’s MAKO Holding company was officially transferred to Russian jurisdiction and is now registered in Donetsk. Prior to the transition to Russian jurisdiction, the MAKO group of companies was de jure under Ukrainian jurisdiction.
Therefore, Oleksandr Yanukovych is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and he conducted transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine.
Furthermore, he is associated with his father Viktor Yanukovych, who is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the state’s stability and security.’
22      By letters of 21 December 2023 and 8 February 2024, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures against him for the same reasons as those set out in the September 2023 maintaining acts and sent the files bearing the reference WK 16833/2023 and WK 5142/2023 ADD 2 (‘the fourth WK files’).
23      By letters of 10, 15 and 29 February 2024, the applicant submitted his observations.
24      By the March 2024 maintaining acts, the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 September 2024. By letter of 13 March 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.
Forms of order sought
25      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested acts in so far as they concern him;
–        order the Council to pay the costs.
26      The Council contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
Annexes B.1 to B.13
27      The applicant submits that documents B.1 to B.13 annexed to the Council’s defence were in no way part of the Council’s decision-making process, are irrelevant and must be rejected as inadmissible.
28      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
29      In that regard, it must be noted that the review of substantive legality which is incumbent on the General Court must be carried out, in particular as regards disputes concerning restrictive measures, in the light not only of the material set out in the statements of reasons of the acts at issue, but also in the light of the material provided by the Council, in the event of challenge, to the General Court in order to establish that the facts alleged in those statements are made out (judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 64).
30      In its review of the merits of acts imposing restrictive measures, the Court may take into account additional evidence that was not contained in the evidence file and which is produced in order to confirm that the facts alleged in the grounds for listing are made out where (i) that evidence supports material that the Council had at its disposal and (ii) that evidence relates to events prior to the adoption of the contested acts in question.
31      In the present case, it should be noted that the Council lodged press articles, namely Annexes B.1 to B.13 to the defence, as contextual material.
32      It must be noted that the annexes to the defence predate the adoption of the initial acts and that the Council produced Annexes B.1 to B.13 to the defence in order to support evidence set out in the first WK files.
33      Accordingly, Annexes B.1 to B.13 can be taken into account by the Court in order to review the merits of the contested acts.
The substance
34      The applicant relies on a single plea in law in support of his action. He submits that, in the contested acts, the Council made a manifest error of assessment in concluding that the conditions laid down in the designation criteria were met.
35      The applicant claims that the reasons for his inclusion on the lists at issue are materially incorrect and that the Council does not have a sufficiently solid basis to justify the adoption of those acts. In his view, the elements on which the Council based its decision are unverified historical statements, allegations and opinions from media outlets, the reliability of which he disputes.
36      The Council disputes the merits of that plea.
Preliminary observations
37      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the present plea must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment, not a manifest error of assessment. While it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all European Union acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
38      Next, it must be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, inter alia, that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128).
39      Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in its context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
40      It is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57).
41      Furthermore, it should be noted that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67).
42      In order to justify retaining a person’s name on the list in question, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on that list, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 9 June 2021, Borborudi v Council, T‑580/19, EU:T:2021:330, paragraph 60 (not published) and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78).
43      The present plea must be examined in the light of those considerations.
The evidence produced by the Council
44      In the present case, as stated in paragraph 11 above, in order to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council provided the documents contained in the first WK file, which include the following material:
–        a press article published in May 2019 on the website of Narodna Pravda (Evidence No 1);
–        a press article published in May 2019 on the website of Fakty ta Komentari (Evidence No 2);
–        a press article published in March 2015 on the website of NV Biznes (Evidence No 3);
–        a press article published in July 2015 on the website of Gordon (Evidence No 4);
–        an undated extract from the website Yanukovich.info (Evidence No 5);
–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website of NV (Evidence No 6);
–        a press article published in February 2018 on the website of Rosbalt (Evidence No 7);
–        a press article published in October 2016 on the website of Ekonomicheskaya Pravda (Evidence No 8);
–        a press article published in January 2020 on the website of Radio Svoboda (Evidence No 9).
45      As regards the first WK ADD 1 file, it contains the following material:
–        a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Fortune (Evidence No 1);
–        a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Firstpost (Evidence No 2);
–        a press article published in March 2022 on the website of ABTC (Evidence No 3);
–        another press article published in March 2022 on the website of ABTC (Evidence No 4);
–        a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Asia ABC (Evidence No 5).
46      As regards the first WK ADD 2 file, it contains the following material:
–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website of Reuters (Evidence No 1);
–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website Argumentua.com (Evidence No 2);
–        another press article published in December 2014 on the website Argumentua.com (Evidence No 3);
–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website Radiosvoboda.org (Evidence No 4);
–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP.org) (Evidence No 5);
–        a press article published in December 2014 on the website Ukrrudprom.com (Evidence No 6);
–        an extract of December 2014 from the website Genshtab.info (Evidence No 7).
47      In order to justify the adoption of the September 2022 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that set out in the first WK files.
48      As regards the March 2023 maintaining acts, the Council produced the second WK file, consisting of a press article of April 2022 from the website of Politeka and a journalist’s tweet from April 2020.
49      As regards the September 2023 maintaining acts, the Council took account of the third WK files, consisting of a press article published in February 2023 on the website of RIA and a note from the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) of July 2023.
50      As regards the March 2024 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the fourth WK files, consisting of a press article published in April 2023 on the website kommersant.ru, an extract of November 2023 from the Spark Interfax database, showing that the applicant is the co-owner of the company MAKO HOLDING LLC (‘MAKO’), and a file containing 26 documents relating to the business environment and the economy of the Russian Federation.
The reliability and credibility of the evidence
51      The applicant calls into question, in essence, the reliability and relevance of the sources used by the Council to justify the inclusion and retention of his name on the lists at issue.
52      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
53      In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In order to assess the probative value of a document, regard must be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited).
54      In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59).
55      Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information being provided (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116).
56      In the present case, the applicant cannot dispute the reliability and credibility of the documents which make up the WK files by merely submitting, in an abstract manner, that they consist mainly of press articles. In view of the situation referred to in paragraph 55 above, the Council cannot be criticised for relying mainly on press articles.
57      As regards the arguments raised by the applicant in respect of the items of information contained in certain documents in the WK files on the ground that they are, in his view, irrelevant or incorrect, it should be noted that those arguments are not capable of calling into question the probative value of those documents. Such arguments fall within the scope of the examination of whether the Council’s factual basis is sufficient to justify the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
58      In the light of the foregoing, in view of the context of the war and in the absence of investigative powers of the Council in third countries (see paragraph 54 above), and in the absence of other arguments raised by the applicant capable of calling into question the reliability and credibility of the sources used by the Council, those sources must be regarded as sound and reliable, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 53 above.
The error of assessment
59      In the absence of an express reference, in the contested acts, to the legal provisions which served as the basis for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, it is necessary to infer, from the content of the reasons for his inclusion, the listing criterion or criteria used by the Council, as set out in paragraph 7 above.
60      It is apparent from the reasons for the initial acts and the maintaining acts that, as the applicant and the Council state in their pleadings, the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue on the basis of the following three criteria: in the first place, under the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of amended Decision 2014/145, in so far as the Council considered that he was responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (‘criterion (a)’); in the second place, under the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(e) of amended Decision 2014/145, in so far as the Council considered that he had conducted transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine and, in the third place, pursuant to the end of Article 2(1) of amended Decision 2014/145, in so far as the Council stated that he was associated with his father, Mr Viktor Yanukovych.
61      It is appropriate to examine, first of all, the applicant’s arguments concerning criterion (a).
62      As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the Council considers, as it confirmed at the hearing, that the reasons for including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, on the basis of criterion (a), are linked, in particular, to his support for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine.
63      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that criterion (a) requires that a direct or indirect link be established between the activities or actions of the person or entity concerned and the situation in Ukraine, giving rise to the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue. In other words, those persons must, through their conduct, have been responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or for supporting those actions or policies.
–       The initial acts
64      The applicant submits, in essence, that the evidence on which the Council relies is not capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard that the conditions laid down by criterion (a) are satisfied.
65      It is therefore necessary to examine whether the Council had a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent set of indicia to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (a). In that regard, it should be noted that, in essence, the grounds on which the applicant’s name was included on those lists under that criterion are linked, in the first place, to the fact that he manages economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups and, in the second place, to the fact that he acquired and manages those economic assets by virtue of his close links with those separatist groups.
66      In the first place, as regards the economic activities which, according to the Council, the applicant manages in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups, the applicant submits that the financial assets and companies which he owned in the Donbas region dated back to a period well before 2014 and have been frozen since then. The financial statements, tax returns and statistical reports of the companies in which he held shares prove, in his view, that he no longer carries out any activities in the region. Moreover, the applicant insists that he does not own, and has never owned, or had any interest in energy sector assets in the ‘Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics’. The applicant states that the documents on which the Council relied merely refer to unsubstantiated opinions and ‘rumours’ which are not capable of supporting the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue.
67      In that regard, first of all, it should be noted that, as regards the applicant’s argument that the financial assets and companies which he owned in the Donbas region have been frozen since 2014, those circumstances do not demonstrate that the applicant no longer carries out any activities in the Donbas region. Even if the applicant’s assets are subject to the restrictive measures imposed by the Ukrainian authorities, the fact that it is impossible for those authorities to ensure that those measures are applied in the Donbas region renders those fund-freezing measures ineffective. Consequently, the applicant remained capable of carrying out an economic activity in that region.
68      Next, it must be held that certain documents confirm that the applicant continued to carry out economic activities in the Donbas region after the events at the beginning of 2014.
69      It is appropriate, in particular, to refer, first, to Evidence No 1 of the first WK ADD 2 file, namely an article of December 2014 from the international press agency Reuters, which states that the Ukrainian Minister for the Interior considered that the applicant was a powerful force behind an entrepreneur, accused of having taken control of several major metallurgical, chemical and energy plants in the Donbas areas held by the separatists, with the support of the pro-Russian separatists, that it was the applicant who had taken all the decisions, and that that entrepreneur and the applicant operated as a single group.
70      As regards, in particular, the testimony of the Ukrainian Minister for the Interior, set out in Evidence No 1 of the first WK ADD 2 file, it must be noted, as the Council has submitted, that the fact that the person concerned is an opponent of the applicant’s father does not necessarily mean that his statements are not credible. Furthermore, the information which he provided to Reuters concerning the close links between the applicant and the abovementioned entrepreneur is corroborated by other sources. By way of example, in 2013, the Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw, Poland) stated that Vetek, a company owned by that entrepreneur, was, in all likelihood, a representative of the interests of the ‘family’, an informal oligarchic group associated with the applicant (see Annex B.1 to the defence). In addition, in an article of March 2014, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) stated that, according to prosecutors, the applicant was the real owner of certain assets of the Vetek conglomerate (see Annex B.2 to the defence).
71      Second, Evidence Nos 2 and 3 from the first WK ADD 2 file, namely two press articles of December 2014 from the website Argumentua.com, confirm the applicant’s interest in the gas industry in the Donbas region and indicate that he had received licences through agreements between his father and the owner of the Zasyadko coal mine in Donetsk, outside legal public procurement procedures.
72      Third, Evidence No 5 from the first WK ADD 2 file, namely a press article of December 2014 from the website of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP.org), mentions the applicant’s attempts to establish links with Donetsk officials and to increase his influence in the region by offering them high-level positions in his company MAKO.
73      Fourth, Evidence No 6 from the first WK file, which is a press article of December 2014, states that the applicant’s company, MAKO, continues to implement real estate projects in Donetsk and that those construction projects are generally guarded by militants of the illegal armed formation OPLOT, which is controlled by the ‘Prime minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.
74      Fifth, Evidence No 4 in the first WK file, namely a press article published in July 2015 on the website of Gordon, refers to an interview with the Governor of Donetsk in which he confirms that the applicant owns, directly or indirectly, assets in the coal sector in that region.
75      Sixth, Evidence No 2 in the first WK file, namely a press article published in May 2019 on the website of Fakty ta Komentari, states that the applicant ‘was handed over’ part of the energy sector companies in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. That related to, in particular, the Zuiv thermal power plant, Enerhiya Donbassa.
76      In those circumstances, it must be noted that, contrary to what the applicant claims, several sources confirm that he continued to carry out activities in the Donbas region after the events at the beginning of 2014.
77      In the second place, as regards the finding that the applicant, in essence, acquired and managed his economic assets through his close links with the separatist groups, the applicant submits that it is incorrect and called into question by the fact that, in June 2015, separatist militants carried out attacks on the National Development Bank which he owns, and that the delivery of humanitarian aid to Donbas residents by his charitable foundation was, moreover, blocked by separatist groups.  The applicants states, with regard to the acquisition of assets, that the complete lack of detail in that statement means that it is practically impossible to determine the evidence on which the Council relied. It is, in his view, difficult to know which ‘key economic assets’ he purportedly acquired and when. The applicant adds that all the allegations suggesting that he was able to acquire or operate assets in the ‘Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics’, whether directly or indirectly, are based merely on suppositions and rumours, some of which come from unidentified sources, and that the majority of the press articles date back several years.
78      In that regard, it must be noted, first, that the applicant’s assertion that separatist groups blocked the delivery, by his charitable foundation, of humanitarian aid to Donbas residents is in no way substantiated and cannot therefore succeed.
79      Second, as regards the attack carried out by separatist militants on the National Development Bank in June 2015, it must be noted that the applicant has produced, as an annex to the reply (Annex C.4), an article from the Ukrainian online publication Obozrevatel which confirms that separatist militants carried out a robbery of the applicant’s bank. In those circumstances, the Council cannot maintain that there are no documents corroborating the fact that the perpetrators of the robbery of the National Development Bank were separatist activists. However, it must be noted that that robbery does not necessarily demonstrate that the applicant does not have close links with the pro-Russian separatists. The same article produced by the applicant states that even though that robbery had been carried out with the backing of certain employees of the Ministry of State of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, it had been carried out for the personal interests of some of them. Consequently, it must be held that the fact that separatist militants carried out attacks on the National Development Bank owned by the applicant is not sufficient to refute the assertion that he has close links with the pro-Russian separatists.
80      Third, as regards the finding that the separatist OPLOT battalion protected his real estate development projects in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, the applicant claims that the press article from which the information originates contains only an oral allegation lacking any evidence.
81      In that regard, it should be noted that Evidence No 6 in the first WK file, namely a press article of December 2014 from the website of NV, states that, according to the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, the construction sites of the company MAKO in Donetsk were guarded by militants of the OPLOT battalion.
82      It must be observed, as the Council has submitted, that the applicant has not explained why the statements by the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine should be regarded as not credible. In addition, the link between the applicant and the OPLOT group is supported by another press article published in December 2014 on the website censor.net, produced by the Council as Annex B.12, according to which the OPLOT group was financed by the applicant.
83      The applicant submits, in that regard, in the reply, that he brought legal proceedings against the Security Service of Ukraine, and was successful, in connection with statements falsely alleging that he had financed and/or provided instructions to a separatist organisation. However, it must be noted that the decision of the Kyiv Court of Appeal, produced by the applicant as Annex C.9, is not relevant in the present case. That decision, which states that the Ukrainian security services publicly communicated incorrect information regarding the applicant, concerns revelations relating to the link between the applicant and an organisation called ‘Young Regionalists’. Furthermore, the decision in question does not refer to the separatist group OPLOT and relates to information provided by the Ukrainian security services, and not by the media Censor.net, which revealed the link between the applicant and the OPLOT group.
84      In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the finding that the separatist battalion OPLOT protected his real estate development projects in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ cannot succeed either.
85      Lastly, as regards other evidence demonstrating the applicant’s close links with the separatist groups and his acquisition of economic assets in the Donbas region through those links, reference should be made, inter alia, to Evidence No 7 of the first WK file, namely an article of February 2018 from the website of Rosbalt, which states that the applicant financed separatists in Donbas. In that article, a former Member of the Russian State Duma states that ‘the initial phase of what was happening in Donbas with the formation of the DPR [“Donetsk People’s Republic”] and the LPR [“Lugansk People’s Republic”] was financed by Oleksandr Yanukovych’.
86      It is also appropriate to refer to Evidence Nos 1 and 2 in the first WK file which attest to the meeting, in May 2019, between the applicant and two politicians, presented respectively as the ‘Prime Minister’ and the ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ supported by the Russian Government. In that regard, it should be noted, as the Council has submitted, that, although it is true that the taking control of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ is described as a likely reason for the applicant’s visit to Donetsk, the fact that the applicant met those two politicians is presented as certain by both Narodna Pravda (Evidence No 1 in the first WK file) and Fakty ta Komentari (Evidence No 2 in the first WK file). In addition, as Evidence No 2 in the first WK file indicates, another channel, Donetsk Aborigen, also referred to the applicant’s visit to Donetsk. It should also be noted that that Evidence No 2 states that, in the context of that visit, the applicant ‘was handed over’ part of the energy sector companies in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. That related to, in particular, the Zuiv thermal power plant, Enerhiya Donbassa.
87      In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be held that the Council did not err in finding, in essence, that the applicant manages economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups and acquired and manages those economic assets through his close links with those separatist groups.
88      Accordingly, the elements referred to above constitute a set of specific, precise and consistent indicia to establish, under criterion (a), that the applicant is supporting actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
89      That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Council included his name on the lists at issue on the basis of historical allegations.
90      It must be noted, in that regard, that the Council may take into account, in order to assess whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as criterion (a), information or evidence relating to circumstances prior to the date of adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence supports the reasons for that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and in view of all the relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 June 2019, K.P., C‑458/15, EU:C:2019:522, paragraph 57). In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, that there is continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation.
91      In the present case, it should be noted that it is true that the evidence to justify the adoption of the initial acts concerning the applicant’s economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups and his close links with those groups relates to circumstances prior to the date of adoption of those initial acts, namely the period between 2014 and 2019. However, it should be noted that one of the items of evidence which the Council provided to justify the March 2023 maintaining acts, in this case a press article of April 2022 from the website of Politeka, indicates that the applicant’s undertaking received, through other individuals, the Chaikino mine in ORDLO. That evidence, which was published before the initial acts were adopted, therefore supports the information contained in several items of evidence in the first WK files, thus demonstrating continuity between the applicant’s previous situation and his situation at the time when his name was included on the lists at issue. The applicant has not demonstrated that he has ceased all economic activity in the Donbas region and, above all, that he has severed all close ties with the separatist groups controlling that region. In those circumstances, that argument of the applicant cannot succeed.
92      In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that, on the basis of the elements examined in paragraphs 65 to 91 above, the Council was entitled, without making an error of assessment, to include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under criterion (a).
93      According to the case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
94      It follows that the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the other findings of fact set out in the statement of reasons are ineffective, in that the Council’s findings that have been examined in paragraphs 65 to 91 above are sufficient to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under criterion (a).
–       The maintaining acts
95      As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the reasons underlying the September 2022 and March 2023 maintaining acts remained the same as those underlying the initial acts. By contrast, a paragraph was added to the reasons set out in the September 2023 maintaining acts, relating to the transfer of the applicant’s holding company MAKO to Russian jurisdiction.
96      It must be added that, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by adopting the September 2022 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that set out in the first WK files (see paragraph 14 above). As regards the March 2023 maintaining acts, the Council also relied on the second WK file. In order to adopt the September 2023 maintaining acts, the Council also took into account the information set out in the third WK files. In order to justify the adoption of the March 2024 maintaining acts, the Council produced the fourth WK files.
97      It is necessary, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above, to ascertain whether the context, the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures and the applicant’s individual situation made it possible to maintain the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (a).
98      The applicant bases, in essence, his first request for modification, on two arguments. First, he reiterates the line of argument that the grounds for listing are both incorrect and unsubstantiated. In particular, he considers that the Council wrongly relied on information from the media without having verified its origin, veracity and reliability. Second, he claims that the Council relied on largely historic evidence and that it did not carry out an updated assessment of the situation, contrary to the case-law of the General Court.
99      As regards the second request for modification, concerning the March 2023 acts, the applicant maintains his plea in law, arguments and evidence, as set out in the application, in the reply and in the first statement of modification. As regards the additional evidence presented by the Council in order to support maintaining the restrictive measures against him and, in particular, to support the allegation that he ‘still runs his business activities in the Donba[s] region’, the applicant considers that the two articles submitted by the Council are not capable of supporting any decision to include his name on the lists at issue.
100    As regards the third request for modification, concerning the September 2023 acts, the applicant maintains his plea in law, arguments and evidence, as set out in the application, in the reply and in the first and second statements of modification. The applicant maintains that the Council made an error of assessment in considering that the criteria for including his name on the lists at issue had been met. As regards the amended statement of reasons set out in the September 2023 acts and the additional evidence supporting it, the applicant denies having participated in any transfer, to Russian jurisdiction, of PJSC MAKO or of any other company, and considers that the additional evidence provided by the Council is not capable of supporting any decision to include his name on the list.
101    As regards, lastly, the fourth request for modification, the applicant reiterates, in essence, the same complaints as those already raised previously. In particular, he submits that the Council made errors of assessment in finding that the listing criteria were met. He also alleges that the statement of reasons is incorrect and not supported by the evidence relied on by the Council.
102    As regards the additional evidence provided by the Council in support of the March 2024 maintaining acts, the applicant considers that that evidence cannot support any decision to include his name on the lists at issue. In particular, he argues that the Council incorrectly described an article on which it had relied as being ‘fairly recent’, whereas it was dated 9 April 2013, and that the Council wrongly asserted that that article referred to MAKO.
103    In addition, the applicant claims that he was not involved in the change of jurisdiction of MAKO. First, he argues that a decision of the State Committee of Defence of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ demonstrates that all real estate owned by MAKO was seized, and that the person presented as being the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ was appointed as a ‘temporary administrator’. Second, he produces a document indicating that the legal entities within the territories of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ were automatically entered into the Russian register. In addition, he claims that that evidence demonstrates that he was unaware of the fact that MAKO had been entered into the Russian register. Moreover, the applicant argues that the fact that MAKO was entered into the Russian register of legal entities is irrelevant.
104    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
105    It follows from Article 6 of Decision 2014/145 that the latter is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met. Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides that the list in the annex to that regulation is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.
106    It is therefore necessary, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above, to ascertain whether the context, the objectives of the restrictive measures and the applicant’s individual situation made it possible to maintain his name on the lists at issue.
107    As regards the general context linked to the situation in Ukraine, it must be stated that, at the time when the September 2022 maintaining acts, the March 2023 maintaining acts, the September 2023 maintaining acts and the March 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, that context in terms of the threats to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of that State had remained unchanged since the adoption of the initial acts.
108    Similarly, at the time when the September 2022 maintaining acts, the March 2023 maintaining acts, the September 2023 maintaining acts and the March 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, the restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and end the military aggression towards that country, and to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
109    In respect of the applicant’s individual situation, it must be held that he has not demonstrated that his individual situation had changed by the time the September 2022 maintaining acts were adopted; those acts were adopted only one month after the initial acts, based on the same listing grounds as those underlying the initial acts and based on the same evidence as that set out in the first WK files. It should be recalled that the Council did not make an error of assessment in including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under criterion (a) (see paragraph 97 above). Consequently, the applicant’s arguments raised in the first statement of modification, which are, in essence, similar to those set out in his statements challenging the legality of the initial acts, must be rejected.
110    As regards the arguments raised by the applicant in the second statement of modification, it should be recalled that the Council, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name by way of the March 2023 maintaining acts, also relied on two additional documents, consisting of a press article of April 2022 from the website of Politeka, and a journalist’s tweet from April 2020.
111    In that regard, it should be noted that, contrary to what the applicant submits, the additional evidence referred to above confirms that he is still engaged in economic activities in the Donbas region. In particular, the press article of April 2022 from the website of Politeka states, in essence, that the applicant’s undertaking received, through other individuals, the Chaikino mine in ORDLO with coal reserves of 100 million tonnes. In that regard, it must be noted that it is true that, as the applicant submits, that information is not substantiated by other sources. However, it is consistent with the information contained in several items of evidence in the first WK files, which indicate that the applicant took control of several large metallurgical, chemical and energy plants in the Donbas areas held by the separatists, with the support of pro-Russian separatists (see, for example, Evidence Nos 1 to 3 of the first WK ADD 2 file).
112    As regards the applicant’s argument alleging that the Council wrongly relied on media reports without verifying their origin, veracity and reliability, it is sufficient to recall that, according to the case-law, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgment of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council, T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608, paragraph 59). In that regard, it would be excessive and disproportionate to require the Council itself to investigate, on the ground, the accuracy of facts which are relayed by numerous media (judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59). That argument cannot therefore succeed.
113    It follows from the foregoing that the Council did not make any error of assessment when adopting the March 2023 maintaining acts.
114    As regards the arguments raised by the applicant in the third statement of modification, it should be noted that the Council added, in the listing grounds in the September 2023 maintaining acts, the following paragraph:
‘Oleksandr Yanukovych’s MAKO Holding company was officially transferred to Russian jurisdiction and is now registered in Donetsk. Prior to the transition to Russian jurisdiction, the MAKO group of companies was de jure under Ukrainian jurisdiction.’
115    In addition, the Council produced a press article of February 2023 from the website of RIA Novosti, and a note of July 2023 from the SBU.
116    In that regard, it should be noted, as the Council has submitted, that the additional evidence on which the Council relied confirms that the applicant is engaged in economic activities in the Donbas region controlled by the separatist groups.
117    That evidence shows that, on 17 January 2023, MAKO submitted a request to enter information into the Russian register of legal persons; that request was accepted by what is presented as being the Federal Tax Office of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. That fact is confirmed by evidence from the SBU. Those pieces of evidence therefore demonstrate that the applicant was still engaged in economic activities in the Donbas region.
118    As regards the applicant’s criticisms of the quality and veracity of the additional evidence produced by the Council, it must be noted, in addition to the considerations already set out in paragraphs 53 to 58 above, that the information relating to the transfer of the company MAKO to Russian jurisdiction, first, comes from RIA Novosti, a press agency established in Russia and, second, is confirmed by a note from the SBU. In those circumstances, the applicant cannot argue that that information lacks credibility.
119    The other arguments put forward by the applicant cannot succeed either. In the first place, it should be noted that the applicant is the sole shareholder of the MAKO companies named ‘Capital Building Corporation’ and ‘Fin Asset’, registered under Ukrainian law in Kramatorsk (Ukraine), and that companies of the same name under Russian law were registered in Donetsk. It must be noted that the applicant has not established that they are different entities.
120    In the second place, as regards an alleged seizure of the applicant’s companies, the applicant has not stated the reasons which led the Russian authorities to seize his companies; nor has he produced, in his third statement of modification, any evidence of any seizure.
121    In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument that he does not have the status of director of his companies and that he therefore does not have the power to submit applications on their behalf under Ukrainian law, it is sufficient to note that, since the applicant is the sole shareholder of his companies, he has not established that that circumstance was such as to constitute an obstacle to the registration of those companies by the Russian authorities.
122    Lastly, it should be noted that, in the context of the war and in view of the fact that the applicant claims that his Ukrainian companies have not been active for a long time, the fact that he has submitted a record of a registration carried out under Ukrainian law is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that there has been a new registration in Russia.
123    It follows from the foregoing that the Council did not make an error of assessment when adopting the September 2023 maintaining acts.
124    As regards the arguments raised by the applicant in the fourth statement of modification, it should be noted, first of all, as regards the additional evidence consisting of a press article of 9 April 2023 from the website kommersant.ru, that the date of that article is incorrect since it is an article from 2013, not from 2023. That article states that the applicant, as the owner of MAKO, appointed a new managing director of the company; however, that article states that that appointment was made on 8 April 2013. That article is therefore not evidence justifying the maintenance of the applicant’s name in the March 2024 acts.
125    As regards the inclusion of MAKO in the Russian register of legal persons, it should be noted that the elements produced by the applicant indicate that all the real estate owned by MAKO was seized, that the person presented as being the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ was appointed as a ‘temporary administrator’ and that the legal entities within the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ were automatically entered into the Russian register. However, it should also be noted that the evidence provided by the Council, in the context of the third modification of the form of order sought, indicates, by contrast, that MAKO lodged an application on 17 January 2023 to enter information into the Russian register of legal persons; that application was accepted by what is presented as being the Federal Tax Office of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. That information, provided by RIA Novosti, which is a press agency based in Russia, is confirmed by a note from the SBU. Furthermore, as stated by the Council at the hearing, the Russian Federation’s legislation providing for the re-registration of Ukrainian companies in the Russian Trade and Companies Register (produced as Annex J.13) expressly provides that, in order to be included in that register, legal entities must ensure that the instruments of incorporation of the company in question comply with Russian law, and those entities must actively make a request to the competent authorities to be registered.
126    In those circumstances, the evidence submitted by the Council is sufficient to conclude that the applicant requested and obtained the transfer of the head office of his company to the jurisdiction of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Accordingly, the Council did not make an error of assessment when adopting the March 2024 maintaining acts.
127    Consequently, in view of the seriousness of the continuing situation in Ukraine and the additional evidence provided by the Council concerning the applicant’s individual situation, the Council did not make an error of assessment in maintaining the restrictive measures at issue.
128    In the light of all the foregoing, it must be held that the reason for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, which is based on support for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, corresponding to criterion (a) of amended Decision 2014/145, is sufficiently substantiated, with the result that, in the light of that criterion, the inclusion and maintenance of his name on the lists at issue, resulting from the initial acts and from the maintaining acts, are well founded.
129    According to the case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
130    Therefore, without there being any need to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call into question the Council’s assessment in the light of criterion (e), which relates to the transactions which the applicant allegedly conducted with the separatist groups in the Donbas region in Ukraine, and in the light of the criterion of association, which relates to the applicant being associated with his father Mr Viktor Yanukovych, the action, as regards both the initial acts and the maintaining acts, must be dismissed as unfounded.
Costs
131    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
132    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders Mr Oleksandr Viktorovych Yanukovych to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.
Mastroianni
Brkan
Kalėda
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 September 2025.
V. Di Bucci
R. Mastroianni
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.