ORDER OF THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed)
19 January 2026 (*)
( Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed )
In Case C‑597/25 P,
APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 10 September 2025,
Kurt Hesse, residing in Nuremberg (Germany), represented by M. Krogmann, Rechtsanwalt,
appellant,
the other parties to the proceedings being:
Ferrari SpA, established in Modena (Italy),
applicant at first instance,
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),
defendant at first instance,
THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed),
composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, N. Jääskinen and R. Frendo (Judge-Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, D. Spielmann,
makes the following
Order
1        By his appeal, Mr Kurt Hesse asks the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 2 July 2025, Ferrari v EUIPO – Hesse (TESTAROSSA) (T‑1103/23, ‘the contested judgment’, EU:T:2025:659), by which the General Court annulled the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 29 August 2023 (Joined Cases R 334/2017-5 and
R 343/2017-5), as corrected on 28 September 2023, concerning revocation proceedings between Ferrari SpA and Mr Hesse.
The request that the appeal be allowed to proceed
2        Under the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so.
3        In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
4        Under Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court of Justice to rule on that request.
5        In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court is to rule as soon as possible on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, in the form of a reasoned order.
Arguments of the appellant
6        In support of his request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant submits that the five grounds of his appeal raise issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, which have not yet been addressed by the Court.
7        By his first, fourth and fifth grounds of appeal, the appellant argues, in essence, that the General Court, in paragraphs 44, 45, 91 and 93 of the contested judgment, did not meet the requirements for the unequivocal proof of the trade mark proprietor’s consent to use of that trade mark by third parties for establishing genuine use of the trade mark in the context of the sale of used motor vehicles and also of spare parts and accessories, within the meaning of Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ
2017 L 154, p. 1), as those requirements emerge from the case-law of the Court.
8        The appellant submits, in that regard, that the sale of the goods at issue by a dealer or distributor authorised by the proprietor of that trade mark is merely an indication and is not, in itself, sufficient to provide unequivocal proof of consent by the proprietor of that trade mark.
9        The appellant further criticises the General Court for having blatantly misinterpreted the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning the question of whether the use of a trade mark for spare parts and accessories can be regarded as genuine use of the trade mark for the main product, in the present case, ‘automobiles’.
He also criticises the General Court for having wrongly held that the Board of Appeal had failed to examine whether spare parts and accessories can be an independent subcategory
of ‘automobiles’.
10      By his second ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in finding, contrary to Article 18(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, that genuine use of the contested trade mark in relation to motor vehicles was apparent from the existence of certification services by which the proprietor of that trade mark issues third parties with certificates of authenticity for vehicles or spare parts sold.
11      According to the appellant, such an assessment is contrary to the case-law of the Court in the judgment of 22 October 2020, Ferrari (C‑720/18 and C‑721/18, EU:C:2020:854, paragraph 63), and that of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Higher Regional Court, Düsseldorf, Germany) concerning those certificates.
12      By his third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court was wrong to find, in paragraphs 69 and 76 of the contested judgment, that the decision of the Board of Appeal of EUIPO to reject the evidence of genuine use of the contested trade mark in relation to spare parts and accessories on the ground that that evidence was submitted out of time was vitiated by a failure to state reasons and by contradictory reasoning.
13      The appellant concludes therefrom that, in so doing, the General Court incorrectly found that the Board of Appeal had disregarded the conditions for exercising its discretion under Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001.
Findings of the Court
14      As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by his appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 20, and of 28 October 2025, eBilet Polska v EUIPO, C‑305/25 P, EU:C:2025:855, paragraph 10).
15      Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to specify, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of that statute whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 21, and of 28 October 2025, eBilet Polska v EUIPO, C‑305/25 P, EU:C:2025:855, paragraph 11).
16      Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the contested judgment or order, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the contested judgment or order. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the contested judgment or order which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 22, and of 28 October 2025, eBilet Polska v EUIPO, C‑305/25 P, EU:C:2025:855, paragraph 12).
17      A request that an appeal be allowed to proceed which does not contain the information mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present order cannot be capable of demonstrating that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that justifies the appeal being allowed to proceed (orders of 24 October 2019, Porsche v EUIPO, C‑613/19 P, EU:C:2019:905, paragraph 16, and of 28 October 2025, eBilet Polska v EUIPO, C‑305/25 P, EU:C:2025:855, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).
18      In the present case, it is apparent from the arguments summarised in paragraphs 7 to 13 of the present order that the appellant, whilst purporting to argue an alleged infringement of the criteria for the application of Article 18(1) and (2) of Regulation 2017/1001 and an incorrect interpretation of the discretion provided for in Article 95(2) of that regulation, seeks, in reality, to elicit from the Court a new appraisal of the General Court’s assessment of the facts and evidence. In any event, such a line of argument, in itself, cannot be regarded as raising an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (see, to that effect, order of 25 June 2025, Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists v EUIPO, C‑6/25 P, EU:C:2025:494, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
19      Furthermore, as regards the appellant’s line of argument referred to in paragraphs 9 and 11 of the present order, alleging that the contested judgment infringed the Court’s case-law, it should be noted that such an allegation is not, in itself, sufficient to establish, in accordance with the burden of proof which lies with the party requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, that that appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. To that end, it is for the party making the request to show, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the contested judgment or order as well as those of the rulings of the Court of Justice alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the specific reasons why that contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (see, to that effect, order of 30 September 2020, Giorgio Armani v EUIPO, C‑239/20 P, EU:C:2020:762, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). Although the appellant does identify the contested paragraphs of the contested judgment and those of the Court’s case-law which is allegedly infringed, he does not set out the specific reasons why that alleged infringement raises an issue which is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. In any event, the alleged disregard by the General Court of national case-law is not capable of establishing the existence of such an issue (see, to that effect, order of 15 June 2023, Zielonogórski Klub Żużlowy Sportowa v EUIPO, C‑199/23 P, EU:C:2023:560, paragraph 15).
20      Lastly, as regards the line of argument referred to in paragraph 6 of the present order, to the effect that the issues raised have not yet been addressed by the Court, it should be borne in mind that the fact that
an issue of law has not yet been examined by the Court is not, in itself, sufficient to consider it significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
The party requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed remains bound to demonstrate such significance by providing detailed information not only on the novelty of that issue, but also on the reasons why that issue is particularly significant in that regard (see, to that effect, order of 29 April 2025, Jopp-Pol Eksport-Import Ryszard Jopp-Krzysztof Jopp v EUIPO, C‑871/24 P, EU:C:2025:316, paragraph 17). However, the appellant does not set out the specific reasons why that lack of examination raises an issue which is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
21      The appellant has accordingly failed to satisfy all the requirements referred to in paragraphs 14 to 17 of the present order.
22      In those circumstances, the request submitted by the appellant is not such as to establish that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
23      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.
Costs
24      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.
25      Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties to the proceedings and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear his own costs.
On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders:
1.      The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
2.      Mr Kurt Hesse shall bear his own costs.
Luxembourg, 19 January 2026.
A. Calot Escobar
T. von Danwitz
Registrar
President of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed
*      Language of the case: English.