ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
22 August 2025 (*)
( Action for annulment – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Prohibition on providing access to ports and locks in the territory of the European Union to any vessel registered under the flag of Russia, including replicas of historical ships – Article 4ha(3)(a) of Decision 2014/512/CFSP – Lack of jurisdiction of the General Court – Article 3ea(3)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 – No interest in bringing proceedings – Inadmissibility )
In Case T‑446/24,
EV,
EW,
EY,
represented by H. over de Linden, lawyer,
applicants,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by V. Piessevaux and E. Nadbath, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed of R. Mastroianni (Rapporteur), President, T. Tóth and S.L. Kalėda, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the order of 25 November 2024, EV and Others v Council (T‑446/24 R, not published, EU:T:2024:862),
having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:
–        the application for leave to intervene by the European Commission, lodged at the General Court Registry on 13 November 2024,
–        the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council by separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 28 November 2024,
–        the applicants’ observations on the plea of inadmissibility lodged at the Court Registry on 10 January 2025,
makes the following
Order
1        By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, EV, EW and EY, seek the annulment of Article 4ha(3)(a) of Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13), as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1744 of 24 June 2024 (OJ L, 2024/1744; ‘the contested decision’), and of Article 3ea(3)(a) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024 (OJ L, 2024/1745; ‘the contested regulation’) (together, ‘the contested acts’), in that the words ‘including replicas of historical ships’ were added to the provisions at issue.
Background to the dispute
2        The present case arises in the context of restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
3        The applicants are the owner, captain and manager of the ship known as the [confidential], (1) which is a [confidential].
4        The applicants’ activities consist of training young sailors and participating in various international maritime festivals.
5        On 8 April 2022, the Council of the European Union adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/578 amending Decision 2014/512 (OJ 2022 L 111, p. 70), and, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, Council Regulation (EU) 2022/576 amending Regulation No 833/2014 (OJ 2022 L 111, p. 1), in order to prohibit, inter alia, access to ports in the territory of the European Union to any vessel registered under the flag of Russia.
6        On 24 June 2024, in the context of new restrictive measures concerning, inter alia, the prohibition on access to ports in the territory of the European Union to any vessel registered under the flag of Russia, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, the contested decision, and, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, the contested regulation.
7        Article 3ea of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by the contested regulation, is, in the version applicable to the present case, worded as follows:
‘1.      It shall be prohibited to provide access, after 16 April 2022, to ports and, after 29 July 2022, to locks in the territory of the Union to any vessel registered under the flag of Russia, and for such vessels to access ports and locks, with the exception of access to locks for the purpose of leaving the territory of the Union.
1a.      The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall also apply, after 8 April 2023, to any vessel certified by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping.
2.      Paragraph 1 shall apply to vessels that have changed their Russian flag or their registration, to the flag or register of any other State after 24 February 2022.
3.      For the purposes of this Article, with the exception of paragraph 1a, a “vessel” means:
(a)      a ship falling within the scope of the relevant international conventions, including replicas of historical ships;
(b)      a yacht, of 15 metres in length or more, which does not carry cargo and carrying no more than 12 passengers; or
(c)      recreational craft or personal watercraft as defined in Directive 2013/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.
4.      Paragraphs 1 and 1a shall not apply in the case of a vessel in need of assistance seeking a place of refuge, of an emergency port call for reasons of maritime safety, or for saving life at sea.
5.      By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 1a, the competent authorities may authorise a vessel to access a port or lock, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the access is necessary for:
(a)      unless prohibited under Article 3m or 3n, the purchase, import or transport into the Union of natural gas and oil, including refined petroleum products, titanium, aluminium, copper, nickel, palladium and iron ore, as well as certain chemical and iron products as listed in Annex XXIV;
(b)      the purchase, import or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers whose import, purchase and transport is allowed under this Regulation;
(c)      humanitarian purposes; or
(d)      transport of nuclear fuel and other goods strictly necessary for the functioning of civil nuclear capabilities.
5a.      By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the competent authorities may authorise vessels that have changed their Russian flag or their registration, to the flag or register of any other State prior to 16 April 2022, to access a port or a lock, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that:
(a)      a Russian flag or registration was required by contract; and
(b)      the access is necessary for the unloading of goods strictly necessary for the completion of renewable energy projects in the Union, provided that the import of such goods is not otherwise prohibited under this Regulation.
5b.      By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, a vessel to access a port or lock provided that it:
(a)      has flown the Russian Federation flag under a bareboat charter registration initially effected prior to 24 February 2022;
(b)      has resumed its right to fly the flag of the underlying Member State registry before 31 January 2023; and
(c)      is not owned, chartered, operated or otherwise controlled by a Russian national or any legal person, entity or body incorporated or constituted under the law of the Russian Federation.
5c.      By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the competent authorities may authorise vessels that have changed their Russian flag to the flag of any other State prior to 16 April 2022, to access a port or a lock, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the vessel:
(a)      was declared abandoned under the law of a Member State prior to 24 February 2022;
(b)      was subject to a forced sale by the competent national authorities of a Member State prior to 24 February 2022; and
(c)      was physically located in the territory of a Member State at the time of the forced sale.
6.      The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraphs 5, 5a, 5b and 5c within two weeks of the authorisation.’
8        The wording of Article 4ha of Decision 2014/512, as amended by the contested decision, is identical to that of Article 3ea of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by the contested regulation.
Forms of order sought
9        The applicants claim that the Court should:
–        annul the contested acts;
–        order the Council to pay the costs.
10      In its plea of inadmissibility raised under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the Council contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action as inadmissible;
–        order the applicants to pay the costs.
11      In their observations on the plea of inadmissibility, the applicants claim that the Court should reject the two pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Council or, in the alternative, reject a single plea of inadmissibility and declare the action admissible in part.
Law
12      Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure, on application by the defendant, the Court may decide on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case. In the present case, since the Council has requested a ruling on the inadmissibility of the action, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file, has decided to rule on that application without taking further steps in the proceedings.
13      The Council contends that the present action is inadmissible on the ground that, first, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the application for annulment of Article 4ha(3)(a) of Decision 2014/512 as amended by the contested decision and, second, the applicants have no interest in bringing an action for annulment of Article 3ea(3)(a) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by the contested regulation.
14      More specifically, the Council submits, first, that the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the application for annulment of Article 4ha(3)(a) of Decision 2014/512 as amended by the contested decision because that provision is a provision of general application relating to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), not a measure of an individual nature covered by the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. In that regard, the Council refers, by analogy, to the judgment of 20 December 2023, Islentyeva v Council (T‑233/22, EU:T:2023:828).
15      Second, the Council submits that the applicants have no interest in bringing an action for annulment against Article 3ea(3)(a) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by the contested regulation. More specifically, it is of the view that the historical ship [confidential] was already covered by the prohibition laid down in Article 3ea(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 before the contested regulation was adopted.
16      In their observations on the plea of inadmissibility, the applicants dispute the Council’s arguments.
17      First, they argue that the restrictive measures applicable to replicas of historical ships do not constitute measures of general application, but mean that the addressee can, in the present case, be identified individually. According to the applicants, the measures adopted must be compared to a measure of an individual nature adopted against the historical ship [confidential] for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU.
18      The applicants submit that, in the specific case of the historical ship [confidential], the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Article 4ha(3)(a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by the contested decision. In that regard, the applicants submit that the Council cannot rely on the judgment of 20 December 2023, Islentyeva v Council (T‑233/22, EU:T:2023:828).
19      Second, the applicants submit that the words ‘replicas of historical ships’ were added by a new CFSP decision, namely the contested decision, which means that it is an amendment, not a clarification, since the scope of the provision in question is extended. The applicants’ position is that the concept of ‘replicas of historical ships’ was added in order to target their ship individually. Moreover, the applicants claim that their vessel does not fall within the definition of ‘vessel’ in any of the international conventions cited by the Council.
20      It is appropriate to examine, as a first step, whether the claim for annulment of the contested decision has been brought before a court having jurisdiction to rule on it and then, as a second step, whether the applicants have an interest in bringing an action for annulment of Article 3ea(3)(a) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by the contested regulation.
The Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the application for annulment of Article 4ha(3)(a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by the contested decision
21      The Council claims that the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the legality of the contested decision. It submits that, under Article 275 TFEU, the Courts of the European Union do not have jurisdiction to rule on actions for annulment of restrictive measures imposed by a decision falling within the CFSP which constitute measures of general application. In the present case, it submits that Article 4ha(3)(a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by the contested decision, is a general measure whose scope is determined by reference to objective criteria, in particular any vessel as defined in Article 4ha(3) of Decision 2014/512 and that it does not target identified natural or legal persons.
22      The applicants dispute the Council’s arguments.
23      In that regard, it should be noted that the contested decision was adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, which is a provision relating to the CFSP.
24      While, pursuant to the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, the Court of Justice does not, as a general rule, have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the CFSP and the acts adopted on the basis of those provisions, it must however be recalled that the Treaties explicitly establish two exceptions to that rule. First, both the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU provide that the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU. Second, the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU confers on the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisdiction to review the legality of certain decisions referred to in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. The latter provision confers on the Court of Justice jurisdiction to give rulings on actions, brought subject to the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, concerning the review of the legality of Council decisions, adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP, which provide for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
25      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that restrictive measures resemble both measures of general application, in that they require a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner to implement prohibitions regarding the activities of certain entities listed in their annexes, and also individual decisions affecting those entities (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).
26      Thus, as regards measures adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP, it is the individual nature of those measures which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, permits access to the Courts of the European Union (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).
27      It follows from case-law that a decision providing for restrictive measures may be considered to be an individual measure if the person concerned is identified in the body of the decision or in a list annexed thereto, in other words, if that person is referred to by name in that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 May 2024, Russian Direct Investment Fund v Council, T‑235/22, not published, EU:T:2024:311, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
28      In the present case, it should be noted, first of all, that the applicants’ ship is not referred to either in the body of Decision 2014/512, as amended by the contested decision, or in the annexes thereto, circumstances which, moreover, are not disputed by the applicants.
29      In addition, it should be noted that Article 4ha(1)(a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended, prohibits ‘any vessel registered under the flag of Russia’ from accessing ports and locks in the territory of the European Union. Paragraph 3(a) of that article, as amended by the contested decision, states that ‘vessel’ means ‘a ship falling within the scope of the relevant international conventions, including replicas of historical ships’.
30      Accordingly, it must be held that the scope of the measures at issue is determined by reference to objective criteria, namely categories of vessels. The measures at issue concern vessels, including replicas of historical ships, falling within the scope of the relevant international conventions and registered under the flag of Russia. Accordingly, the restrictive measures at issue do not target identified natural or legal persons, but apply to all vessels that meet the criteria set out above (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 20 December 2023, Islentyeva v Council, T‑233/22, EU:T:2023:828, paragraph 26).
31      In those circumstances, it must be observed that the measures imposed by Article 4ha(3)(a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by the contested decision, do not constitute restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, but measures of general application.
32      That finding cannot be called into question by the applicants’ argument that their vessel is the only replica of a historical ship present in the territorial waters of the European Union since the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that that argument is in no way substantiated. In any event, even if that circumstance were confirmed, the fact remains that, as stated in paragraphs 28 to 31 above, the scope of the measures at issue is determined by reference to objective criteria and they do not target identified natural or legal persons.
33      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to review the validity of Article 4ha(3)(a) of Decision 2014/512, as amended by the contested decision. Consequently, in so far as it seeks the annulment of the contested decision, the action must be dismissed as having been brought before a court that has no jurisdiction to rule on it.
34      However, it should be noted that the jurisdiction of the Court is in no way restricted with respect to the contested regulation, which, having been adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, gives effect to the contested decision, adopted in the context of the CFSP. Such regulations constitute European Union acts, adopted on the basis of the FEU Treaty, and the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the Treaties, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the legality of those acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 106).
The applicants’ interest in bringing an action for annulment of Article 3ea(3)(a) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by the contested regulation
35      The Council submits that the applicants do not have an interest in bringing an action for annulment against Article 3ea(3)(a) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by the contested regulation. More specifically, it is of the view that the historical ship [confidential] was already covered by the prohibition laid down in Article 3ea(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 before the contested amendment was adopted.
36      In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the admissibility of an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is subject to the condition that the person concerned has an interest in having the contested act annulled. Such an interest requires that the annulment of that act must be capable, in itself, of having legal consequences and that the action may therefore, through its outcome, procure an advantage to the party which brought it (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, C‑133/12 P, EU:C:2014:105, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited, and order of 18 January 2023, Seifert v Council, T‑166/22, not published, EU:T:2023:13, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). An applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must be vested and current and may not concern a future and hypothetical situation (see judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
37      In the present case, it should be noted that, before the amendment made to paragraph 3(a) of Article 3ea of Regulation No 833/2014 by the contested regulation, the prohibition on access to EU ports and locks applied to ‘ship[s] falling within the scope of the relevant international conventions’. The amendment made to that provision by the contested regulation added the words ‘including replicas of historical ships’ to the previous text.
38      The amendment to the text made by the contested regulation uses the word ‘including’, which means that the part of the sentence which follows, that is to say, ‘replicas of historical ships’, is included in the part of the sentence which precedes those words, that is to say, ‘ship[s] falling within the scope of the relevant international conventions’.
39      It should also be noted that, according to recital 13 of the contested regulation, ‘[the contested decision] clarifies the scope of the port access ban for Russian-flagged vessels …’.
40      The Court therefore observes, similarly to the Council, that the literal wording of the amendment made by the contested regulation and recital 13 of that regulation confirm that that amendment was intended solely to specify that replicas of historical ships did in fact fall within the scope of the relevant international conventions, not to create a new prohibition.
41      As regards the applicants’ arguments that their vessel does not fall within the definition of ‘ship’ within the meaning of the international conventions cited by the Council, it must be stated that, according to the Council, the historical ship [confidential] is covered by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), concluded in London (United Kingdom) on 1 November 1974, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), signed in London on 2 November 1973, and the International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
42      In the first place, according to the Council, the historical ship [confidential] falls within the definition of ‘ship’ in the SOLAS Convention in that it is a ‘passenger ship’ and a ‘ship which carries more than twelve passengers’.
43      The applicants deny that the SOLAS Convention is applicable to their ship on the basis that, for the purposes of the SOLAS Convention, ships not propelled by mechanical means and wooden ships of primitive build are excluded. Moreover, no reference is made to historical ships in that convention.
44      In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that the applicants’ arguments are not substantiated. The applicants have in no way shown that their ship is not propelled by mechanical means or that it is a wooden ship of primitive build. On the other hand, it is apparent from the description of the ship, as set out on its website and annexed to the Council’s plea of inadmissibility, that it is a ship [confidential]. Moreover, the applicants have not adduced any evidence to show that that ship is a wooden ship of primitive build and that it therefore falls outside the scope of the SOLAS Convention. The fact that that ship is a replica of a historical wooden ship does not necessarily mean that it is a wooden ship of primitive build for the purposes of the SOLAS Convention. Finally, even though that convention does not refer to historical ships, that fact does not in any way show that that convention is not applicable to that type of ship. In those circumstances, failing any additional evidence adduced by the applicants, their arguments concerning the application of the SOLAS Convention cannot succeed.
45      In the second place, the Council submits that the MARPOL Convention also applies to the applicants’ ship, in so far as the definition of the term ‘ship’ in Article 2 of that convention refers to ‘vessel[s] of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment’.
46      The applicants emphasise that Annexes I, II, III, IV, V and VI to the guidelines of the MARPOL Convention are not applicable to their ship. Those annexes concern ships of more than 150 gross tonnage, carrying all kinds of cargo or equipment referred to therein. Annex IV to the MARPOL Convention applies to ships engaged in international voyages of 400 gross tonnage and above, but the applicants’ ship has [confidential].
47      In that regard, it should be noted that the definition of ‘ship’ in Article 2 of the MARPOL Convention is very broad in that it refers to any ‘vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment’.
48      It should also be noted that Article 3(3) of the MARPOL Convention excludes from its scope exclusively ‘any warship, naval auxiliary or other ship’ and ‘other ship[s] owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service’.
49      It is, admittedly, true that certain provisions of the MARPOL Convention concern ships with specific characteristics. Certain provisions of Annex I to that convention relate, for example, specifically to ships transporting hydrocarbons. However, in the light of the broad definition of ‘ship’ contained in that convention and failing any specific evidence to show that any part of that convention is applicable to their ship, the applicants are unable to show that the historical ship [confidential] is not included in the definition of a ship contained in the MARPOL Convention. In those circumstances, the applicants’ arguments cannot, similarly, succeed.
50      In the third place, the Council is of the view that the historical ship [confidential] falls within the scope of the STCW Convention, which applies, in accordance with the definition of ‘sea-going ship’ in Article II of that convention, to ‘ship[s] other than those which navigate exclusively in inland waters or in waters within, or closely adjacent to, sheltered waters or areas where port regulations apply’.
51      The applicants dispute that the STCW Convention is applicable to the historical ship [confidential], in that, under Article III(d) of that convention, wooden ships of primitive build are excluded from the application of that convention.
52      In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, as has already been stated in paragraph 45 above, the fact that the vessel in question is a replica of a historical wooden ship does not necessarily mean that it is a wooden ship of primitive build and that it therefore falls outside the scope of the STCW Convention. The applicants do not adduce any evidence to show that that is the case. In those circumstances, the applicants’ argument concerning the application of the STCW Convention cannot succeed, since it is not sufficiently substantiated.
53      In the light of the foregoing, even if the amendment of Article 3ea(3)(a) of Regulation No 833/2014 made by the contested regulation were to be annulled, that annulment would not procure any advantage for the applicants, given that the historical ship [confidential] would, in any event, remain covered by the prohibition on access to EU ports and locks laid down in Article 3ea(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 in force before the contested regulation was adopted, having regard to the absence of evidence adduced by the applicants showing that the historical ship [confidential] falls outside the scope of the international conventions referred to above. In those circumstances, the applicants have not established an interest in obtaining the annulment of the contested regulation.
54      Accordingly, the head of claim seeking annulment of the contested regulation must be rejected as inadmissible.
55      In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, in part as having been brought before a court which has no jurisdiction to rule on it and in part as inadmissible.
The application for leave to intervene
56      In accordance with Article 144(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where the defendant lodges a plea of inadmissibility or of lack of competence, as provided in Article 130(1) of those rules, a decision on the application to intervene is not to be given until after the plea has been rejected or the decision on the plea reserved. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 142(2) of those rules, the intervention becomes devoid of purpose, inter alia, where the application is declared inadmissible.
57      Since the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council has been upheld in the present case and the present order consequently closes the proceedings, there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene lodged by the Commission.
Costs
58      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council, including those relating to the interim proceedings, save for those relating to the application for leave to intervene.
59      Pursuant to Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission is to bear its own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.      The action is dismissed in part as having been brought before a court which has no jurisdiction to rule on it and in part as inadmissible.
2.      There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene by the European Commission.
3.      EV, EW and EY shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union, including those relating to the interim proceedings.
4.      The European Commission shall bear its own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene.
Luxembourg, 22 August 2025.
V. Di Bucci
R. Mastroianni
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.
1 Confidential information redacted.