62023CJ0544_RES
Case C‑544/23
T.T. and BAJI Trans, s.r. o.
v
Národný inšpektorát práce
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší správny súd Slovenskej republiky)
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 August 2025
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EU) No 165/2014 – Obligation periodically to inspect tachographs – Exemption – Last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 51(1) thereof – Principle lex posterior mitius – Administrative penalties of a criminal nature – Appeal in cassation – New law having entered into force after the ruling which is the subject of that appeal – Concept of ‘final conviction’)
Fundamental rights – Charter of Fundamental Rights – Scope – Implementation of EU law – National legislation having a connection with EU law – Legislation penalising infringement of provisions of EU law – Imposition of an administrative penalty as a result of that infringement – Adoption of measures in connection with a margin of discretion forming part of the regime established by an act of EU law – Acts concerned constituting an implementation of EU law
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1); European Parliament and Council Regulations No 561/2006, Art. 13(1), No 165/2014 and 2020/1054; Council Regulation No 3821/85)
(see paragraphs 50-58, operative part 1)
Fundamental rights – Charter of Fundamental Rights – Principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law – Scope – Criteria for assessing the criminal nature of the penalty – Legal classification of the offence under national law, nature of the offence and degree of severity of the penalty incurred – Proceedings or penalties not classified as criminal under national law but having to be regarded as such on the basis of the other two criteria – Included – Assessing the punitive purpose of the measure – Measure also pursuing a deterrent purpose – Irrelevant – Degree of severity of the penalty incurred – Assessment having regard to the maximum penalty
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 49(1))
(see paragraphs 63-79)
Fundamental rights – Charter of Fundamental Rights – Principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law – Principle of retroactive application of the lighter penalty – Application to an administrative penalty of a criminal nature – Penalty concerned imposed on the basis of a rule amended after the imposition of the penalty in a way which is more favourable to the person concerned by that penalty – Whether permissible – Conditions
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 49(1))
(see paragraphs 81-94, operative part 2)
Fundamental rights – Charter of Fundamental Rights – Principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law – Principle of retroactive application of the lighter penalty – Judicial decision dismissing the action against an administrative fine of a criminal nature and falling within the scope of EU law – Appeal in cassation – National legislation which is more favourable to the convicted person and which entered into force after the delivery of the decision which is the subject of the appeal in cassation – Mandatory application by the court hearing the appeal in cassation – Decision which is the subject of the appeal in cassation regarded as final under national law – Irrelevant
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 49(1); European Parliament and Council Regulation 2020/1054)
(see paragraphs 96-114, operative part 3)
Résumé
Hearing a request for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší správny súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic), the Court of Justice, sitting as the Grand Chamber, specifies the scope of the principle lex posterior mitius (lex mitior), enshrined in the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), in the context of the review by a court of an administrative penalty, at the stage of the appeal in cassation.
By an administrative decision adopted in December 2016, T.T. was found guilty of an offence consisting in having driven a vehicle, owned by BAJI Trans, intended for the carriage of concrete and with a tachograph (
1
) which had not undergone a valid periodic inspection. On that basis, T.T. was ordered to pay a fine of EUR 200.
The administrative appeal brought by T.T. against that decision having been dismissed by the National Labour Inspectorate, T.T. and BAJI Trans brought an action against those decisions before the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava, Slovakia).
That court dismissed their action, holding, inter alia, that the obligation to use tachographs in all road transport vehicles was laid down by Regulation No 3821/85 (
2
) and by national legislation, without prejudice to the exceptions listed by Regulation No 561/2006. (
3
) However, those exceptions did not include vehicles intended for the carriage of concrete.
The parties then brought an appeal in cassation against that decision, emphasising that Regulation No 561/2006 had been amended by Regulation 2020/1054. (
4
) They argued that that amendment, made after the lodging of their appeal in cassation, meant that the acts committed by T.T. were no longer unlawful, as the Slovak Republic had implemented the possibility, derived from that amendment, of exempting vehicles intended for the carriage of concrete from the obligation to be equipped with tachographs.
Hearing that appeal in cassation, the referring court has decided to ask the Court, primarily, whether the principle lex mitior is to be applied by the court hearing an appeal in cassation, ruling in connection with a dispute concerning an administrative penalty, where the more lenient law entered into force subsequent to the decision given by the lower administrative court ruling on the substance, which has become final under national law and against which the appeal in cassation has been lodged.
Findings of the Court
In the first place, the Court finds that a Member State is implementing Union law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, and that the Charter is therefore applicable, when, in accordance with the regulation on recording equipment (
5
) and with Regulation No 165/2014, (
6
) it imposes an administrative penalty on the driver of a vehicle because of a failure, by that driver, to fulfil obligations laid down by those regulations. In addition, this is also the case when it subsequently avails itself of the possibility which it is recognised as having under the latter regulation (
7
) of exempting certain road transport vehicles from having to comply with such obligations.
First of all, on the date of the offence committed by T.T., both the regulation on recording equipment and the regulation on tachographs required, without the possibility of exemption, the presence of tachographs in vehicles such as the vehicle at issue in the main proceedings, as well as the periodic inspection of those devices. Furthermore, both regulations impose an obligation on Member States to penalise infringements of their provisions. (
8
) Thus, by adopting a piece of national legislation laying down an obligation to use tachographs in all road transport vehicles and by imposing an administrative fine on T.T. for failing to comply with the obligations periodically to inspect the tachograph with which his vehicle had to be equipped, the Slovak authorities were implementing Union law.
In addition, the Court notes that the dispute in the main proceedings concerns, more specifically, the possibility of imposing a penalty on T.T. for having committed the offence at issue, before the entry into force of Regulation 2020/1054, even though, as a result of the combined effect of that regulation and the national legislation referred to above, vehicles transporting ready-mixed concrete are now exempt, under Slovak law, from the obligation to be equipped with tachographs. Such an amendment to the relevant national legislation, which is a measure adopted in connection with a margin of discretion which is an integral part of the regime established by an act of EU law, also constitutes an implementation of Union law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter.
In the second place, the Court rules that the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter is capable of being applied to an administrative penalty of a criminal nature imposed on the basis of a rule which, after the imposition of the penalty, has been amended in a way which is more favourable to the person concerned by that penalty, provided that that amendment reflects a change of position regarding the criminal classification of the acts committed by that person or regarding the penalty to be applied.
In order to come to that conclusion, the Court begins by recalling that the application of that provision presupposes a succession of legal regimes over time; a succession which reflects a change of position favourable to the perpetrator of the offence. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has already held that Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (
9
) does not guarantee the retroactive application of an amendment which has been made to the legislation and which is favourable to the perpetrator of the offence where that amendment is due only to a change in factual circumstances which has taken place since the commission of that offence and where that amendment is, accordingly, unrelated to the assessment of the offence as such.
In this instance, T.T. was penalised for having driven a vehicle for the delivery of ready-mixed concrete with a tachograph that had not undergone a valid periodic inspection.
It appears that the rules of EU law relating to the obligation to equip certain vehicles with tachographs and to ensure that those tachographs are periodically inspected were amended, after the offence committed by T.T., in a way that could have been favourable to him if the Slovak authorities had decided, in accordance with Article 3(2) of the regulation on tachographs, to exempt that type of vehicle from the obligation to be equipped with a tachograph. The Slovak legislature decided to implement the possibility provided for by that provision. (
10
) Such a removal, under Slovak law, of the obligation, for vehicles intended for the carriage of ready-mixed concrete, to be equipped with tachographs, thus appears to reflect a change of position on the part of the Slovak legislature with regard to the wish to punish acts such as those of which T.T. is accused.
Lastly, as Article 49 of the Charter contains the same guarantees as those provided for in Article 7 ECHR, which must be taken into account as a minimum threshold of protection, the Court notes that the requirements to which a possible application of the principle lex posterior mitius is subject under Article 49(1) of the Charter ensure, in view of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, a level of protection of that principle which does not disregard the level of protection guaranteed in Article 7 ECHR, as interpreted by that court.
In the last place, the Court specifies that, under the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter, a court hearing an appeal in cassation against a judicial decision dismissing the action brought against an administrative fine of a criminal nature and falling within the scope of EU law is, in principle, required to apply a piece of national legislation which is more favourable to the convicted person and which entered into force after the delivery of that judicial decision, irrespective of whether such a decision is classified as final under national law.
In that regard, the Court recalls that the rule lex posterior mitius, contained in that provision, applies so long as no final conviction has been handed down. This rule means that, with effect from the date on which it was considered, in the legal system concerned, that it was no longer necessary either to punish a specific type of conduct at all or to punish that conduct as severely, such a change in assessment must be applied immediately to all criminal proceedings which have not yet been closed by means of a final conviction. That interpretation of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter does not disregard the threshold of protection provided by Article 7 ECHR.
In addition, although the rules of criminal procedure fall within the competence of the Member States in so far as the European Union has not legislated in that field, the Member States are nonetheless required, in exercising that competence, to comply with their obligations under EU law, including the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter. Accordingly, while the assessment of the ‘final’ nature of the conviction must be carried out on the basis of the law of the Member State in which that conviction was handed down, for the purpose of applying the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter, that concept must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, in so far as it determines the extent of the right guaranteed by that provision and, consequently, the extent of the obligations derived therefrom for the Member States.
Thus, the fact that a conviction is regarded as final under national law is not decisive for the purposes of the application, by the court hearing an appeal against the decision handing down that conviction, of that provision.
The Court considers that a conviction cannot be regarded as final for the purposes of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter where it may be the subject of an ordinary appeal, that is to say, any appeal which forms part of the normal course of an action and which, as such, constitutes a procedural development which any party must reasonably expect. That is the case where the convicted person or the public prosecuting authority may bring, within a time limit determined by law and without having to rely on exceptional circumstances, proceedings before a court in order to obtain annulment or variation of the conviction or the penalty imposed.
Consequently, where the possibility of bringing an appeal in cassation against a judicial decision, within a time limit determined by law and without having to rely on exceptional circumstances, is available to the convicted person or the public prosecuting authority, that decision cannot become final for the purposes of the application of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter until the parties have exhausted that legal remedy or have allowed the time limit for bringing such an appeal to have elapsed without having lodged such an appeal.
Accordingly, the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter means that a court hearing an appeal in cassation is, in principle, obliged to ensure that the perpetrator of an offence the penalising of which constitutes the implementation of Union law benefits from a piece of criminal legislation that is favourable to that perpetrator, even if that piece of legislation entered into force after the delivery of the judicial decision that is the subject of that appeal in cassation. The fact that, under national law, the decision which is the subject of the appeal may be set aside only in so far as it is vitiated by a defect of legality or in so far as the court hearing the appeal in cassation is required to give a ruling in the light of the situation existing on the date that decision was delivered is not capable of altering that conclusion. It is for every court to ensure that the perpetrator of an offence benefits from the criminal law which is more favourable to that perpetrator, so long as his or her conviction is not final.
In that last regard, where it is not possible to interpret a provision of national law in a way which is consistent with the requirements of EU law, the principle of the primacy of EU law requires that the national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of EU law is to disapply any provision of national law which is contrary to provisions of EU law having direct effect. The last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter is worded in a way that is clear and precise and is not subject to any conditions, meaning that it has direct effect. As a result, if the referring court were to find that its domestic law does not permit it to apply the guarantees derived from that provision to the dispute pending before it, that court would be required to ensure, within the framework of its competences, the protection derived, for litigants, from that provision and to guarantee the full effect of the provision by disapplying, if necessary, any provision of national legislation that is contrary thereto.
(
1
)	This device, which records speed, is used in, inter alia, motor vehicles.
(
2
)	See Article 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 of 20 December 1985 on recording equipment in road transport (OJ 1985 L 370, p. 8) (‘the regulation on recording equipment’).
(
3
)	The referring court alludes to Articles 3 and 13 of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ 2006 L 102, p. 1).
(
4
)	Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 as regards minimum requirements on maximum daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and daily and weekly rest periods and Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 as regards positioning by means of tachographs (OJ 2020 L 249, p. 1).
(
5
)	More specifically, Article 19(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 of 20 December 1985 on recording equipment in road transport (OJ 1985 L 370, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 (OJ 2006 L 102, p. 1).
(
6
)	Under Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport (OJ 2014 L 60, p. 1) (‘the regulation on tachographs’).
(
7
)	This possibility is provided for by Article 3(2) of that regulation, concerning the categories of vehicles mentioned in Article 13(1) of Regulation No 561/2006, as supplemented by Regulation (EU) 2020/1054.
(
8
)	This obligation is apparent from Article 19(1) of the regulation on recording equipment and Article 41(1) of the regulation on tachographs.
(
9
)	Convention signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘ECHR’).
(
10
)	The Slovak legislature chose to exempt, by operation of law, all the categories of vehicles listed in Article 13(1) of Regulation No 561/2006 from the obligation to be equipped with tachographs for reasons identical to those relied on by the EU legislature.