62022CC0747
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
EMILIOU
delivered on 30 October 2025 (
1
)
Case C‑747/22
KH
v
Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Bergamo (District Court, Bergamo, Italy))
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Beneficiaries of international protection – Directive 2011/95/EU – Articles 26 and 29 – Access to employment – Social welfare – Citizenship income – Residency condition of 10 years, the final 2 years of which must be consecutive – Indirect discrimination – Justification – Core benefits)
I. Introduction
1.
In CU and ND (Social assistance – Indirect discrimination), (
2
) the Court was asked to review the compatibility with EU law of national measures providing for certain forms of financial assistance to persons residing in the territory of the Member State in question aiming to combat poverty, inequality and social exclusion. In particular, an Italian court sought to clarify whether a specific aspect of the Italian legislation establishing a ‘reddito di cittadinanza’ (citizenship income) – namely, the requirement for the beneficiaries to have resided in Italy for at least 10 years, the final 2 years of which must be consecutive (‘the 10-year residency requirement’) – was consistent with a number of provisions of EU law.
2.
In its judgment, the Court – sitting in Grand Chamber – ruled that such a requirement was precluded by Article 11(1)(d) of Directive 2003/109/EC, (
3
) read in the light of Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). (
4
) In essence, the Court found that such a requirement (i) constituted indirect discrimination towards third-country nationals who are long-term residents, and (ii) could not be justified, since it had the effect of extending unilaterally the required period of residence for long-term residents to enjoy the right guaranteed by Article 11(1)(d) of Directive 2003/109. (
5
)
3.
The present case concerns the compatibility with EU law of the same aspect of that national legislation concerning the 10-year residency requirement, albeit from a different angle. In essence, the referring court asks the Court whether that requirement, when applied to beneficiaries of international protection, is consistent with Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU, often referred to as ‘the Qualification Directive’. (
6
) Those two provisions impose an obligation on Member States to ensure that activities designed to facilitate access to employment, as well as certain forms of social assistance, are granted to beneficiaries of international protection under conditions equivalent to those applicable to nationals.
II. Legal framework
A.
European Union law
4.
Recitals 41, 42 and 45 of Directive 2011/95 read:
‘(41)
In order to enhance the effective exercise of the rights and benefits laid down in this Directive by beneficiaries of international protection, it is necessary to take into account their specific needs and the particular integration challenges with which they are confronted. …
(42)
… efforts should be made in particular to address the problems which prevent beneficiaries of international protection from having effective access to employment-related educational opportunities and vocational training, inter alia, relating to financial constraints.
…
(45)
… With regard to social assistance, the modalities and detail of the provision of core benefits to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status should be determined by national law. The possibility of limiting such assistance to core benefits is to be understood as covering at least minimum income support, assistance in the case of illness, or pregnancy, and parental assistance, in so far as those benefits are granted to nationals under national law.’
5.
Article 26(2) and (3) of Directive 2011/95, concerning ‘access to employment’, provides:
‘2.   Member States shall ensure that activities such as employment-related education opportunities for adults, vocational training, including training courses for upgrading skills, practical workplace experience and counselling services afforded by employment offices, are offered to beneficiaries of international protection, under equivalent conditions as nationals.
3.   Member States shall endeavour to facilitate full access for beneficiaries of international protection to the activities referred to in paragraph 2.’
6.
Article 29 of Directive 2011/95, entitled ‘Social welfare’, states:
‘1.   Member States shall ensure that beneficiaries of international protection receive, in the Member State that has granted such protection, the necessary social assistance as provided to nationals of that Member State.
2.   By way of derogation from the general rule laid down in paragraph 1, Member States may limit social assistance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status to core benefits which will then be provided at the same level and under the same eligibility conditions as nationals.’
B.
National law
7.
Article 1(1) of decreto-legge n. 4 ‘Disposizioni urgenti in materia di reddito di cittadinanza e di pensioni’ (Decree-Law No 4 containing urgent provisions on citizenship income and pensions) of 28 January 2019, (
7
) converted into law by legge n. 26 (Law No 26) of 28 March 2019 (
8
) (‘the Decree-Law’), provides:
‘From April 2019, citizenship income … shall be established as a fundamental measure of active employment policy to guarantee the right to work, to combat poverty, inequality and social exclusion, and to promote the right to information, education, training and culture by means of policies for the economic support and social inclusion of persons at risk of exclusion from society and from the world of work. [Citizenship income] constitutes an essential benefit within the limits of available resources.’
8.
Article 2 of the Decree-Law, entitled ‘Beneficiaries’, defines the conditions for accessing citizenship income. Those conditions relate, first, to the nationality, permanent residence or residence of the applicant and, second, more specifically, to the income, assets and durable goods of the applicant’s household. Regarding the first set of conditions, Article 2(1)(a)(2) requires the beneficiary to, inter alia, ‘have been resident in Italy for at least 10 years, the final 2 years of which, at the time the application is made and throughout the period for which the benefit is paid, must be consecutive’.
9.
Article 3(1) of that decree-law provides that the economic benefit conferred by the citizenship income is comprised of two components: one intended to supplement household income, and the other intended to supplement the income of households living in rented accommodation. Article 3(6) of the same decree-law states that citizenship income is granted for a continuous period not exceeding 18 months. It may be renewed, subject to suspension of payment for a period of one month prior to each renewal.
10.
Article 4(1) of the Decree-Law, concerning ‘employment pact and social inclusion pact’, states:
‘The provision of the benefit is conditional upon the declaration of immediate availability for work by the adult members of the household, in accordance with the procedures set out in this article, as well as participation in a personalised programme of support for employment and social inclusion, which includes community service, professional retraining, completion of studies, and other commitments identified by the relevant services aimed at integration into the labour market and social inclusion.’
III. Facts, procedure and the questions referred
11.
The applicant, KH, arrived in Italy in 2011 and has a residence permit for persons granted subsidiary protection. He has been living in Italy ever since where, in 2019, he got married and, in 2020, his daughters were born.
12.
He initially received citizenship income because he had incorrectly claimed that he met the 10-year residency requirement. After carrying out some checks, the Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) (National Social Security Institute, Italy) revoked, by letter of 13 October 2021, the applicant’s citizenship income on the grounds that he did not meet the requirement of a total of 10 years of residence in Italy at the moment of his application.
13.
The applicant brought a special appeal before the Tribunale ordinario di Bergamo (District Court, Bergamo, Italy) against the INPS, claiming discrimination and seeking, specifically, that the act of revoking his citizenship income be declared discriminatory and that his right to receive that benefit be re-established.
14.
Before that court, the applicant argued that the 10-year residency requirement to receive citizenship income is incompatible with Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95, which provide that equal treatment between beneficiaries of international protection and national citizens is to be afforded in matters relating to the access to employment and social welfare. According to the INPS, however, citizenship income does not come within the scope of those provisions.
15.
The Tribunale ordinario di Bergamo (District Court, Bergamo), harbouring doubts as to the proper interpretation of those provisions, decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Are Articles 29 and 26 [of] Directive 2011/95 to be interpreted as precluding a national provision such as that contained in Article 2(1)(a)[(2)] [of the Decree-Law], which provides for a requirement of 10 years’ residency in Italy, in addition to the condition of 2 years of continuous residency prior to application, in order to access an anti-poverty benefit supporting access to employment and social integration, such as the “[citizenship] income”?’
16.
Written observations have been submitted by the applicant in the main proceedings, the INPS, the Italian Government and the European Commission. Those parties also presented oral argument at the hearing on 17 June 2025.
17.
In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Italian Government requested that the present case be heard by the Grand Chamber.
IV. Analysis
18.
By its question, the referring court essentially seeks to ascertain whether Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95 preclude a national measure that makes entitlement to an anti-poverty benefit – intended to facilitate access to employment and social integration for persons enjoying international protection – conditional upon 10 years of residence in the Member State concerned, the final 2 of which must be consecutive.
19.
Before examining the substantive issues raised by the question referred (B), two issues of procedural nature must first be addressed: the Court’s jurisdiction in the present case and the need to reply to the question referred (A).
A.
Jurisdiction of the Court and the need to reply to the question referred
20.
The Italian Government contends that the Court has no jurisdiction to answer the question referred, since the national provisions applicable in the main proceedings relate to a benefit that does not fall within the scope of Directive 2011/95.
21.
In that regard, it suffices to note that the question referred by the Tribunale ordinario di Bergamo (District Court, Bergamo) concerns the interpretation of two provisions of EU law, namely Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95, which is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Court. (
9
) In fact, the question whether a measure such as citizenship income falls within the scope of those provisions is an issue that pertains to the merits of the query of the referring court, and cannot cast doubt on either the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of the reference. (
10
)
22.
Furthermore, at the hearing, the Italian Government explained that (i) the national legislation referred to in the request for a preliminary ruling remained in force until 31 December 2023, having been repealed by legge n. 197, ‘Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 2023 e bilancio pluriennale per il triennio 2023-2025’ (Law No 197 on the State budget for the 2023 financial year and multiyear budget for the three-year period 2023-2025) of 29 December 2022; (
11
) and (ii) by its judgment No 31/2025 of 20 March 2025, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy) declared the 10-year residency requirement for EU citizens to be incompatible with the Italian Constitution. That court found that the national legislation should have required 5 years of residence rather than 10.
23.
In the light of that, the question could arise as to whether there is still a need for the Court of Justice to reply to the question referred. The conditions for the admissibility of a reference for a preliminary ruling – set out in Article 267 TFEU and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – must be satisfied not only at the moment when the Court is seised, but also throughout the proceedings. When, in the course of the proceedings, those conditions are no longer fulfilled, the Court is to terminate the proceedings, declaring that there is no need to reply. That may be the case, for example, when the main proceedings have become devoid of purpose due to subsequent decisions of the referring court (or another national court) in the very same proceedings, or in some related proceedings, or when the relevant provisions of national law have been amended or repealed. (
12
)
24.
However, that is not the case in the present proceedings. Both the applicant in the main proceedings and the Italian Government stated at the hearing that an answer from the Court to the question referred is still necessary for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings. As I understand it, the national legislation at issue remains applicable ratione temporis to the dispute, and the judgment of the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) referred to above did not concern the situation of persons enjoying international protection.
25.
Finally, it is worth mentioning in passing that Directive 2011/95 has recently been repealed by Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted, amending Directive 2003/109 and repealing Directive 2011/95. (
13
) Pursuant to Articles 41 and 42 of that regulation, Directive 2011/95 will be repealed with effect from 12 June 2026 and the regulation will apply from 1 July 2026.
26.
Accordingly, the present proceedings have not become devoid of purpose.
B.
Substance
27.
In essence, Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95 require Member States to ensure that certain activities promoting access to employment and certain forms of social assistance are accessible to beneficiaries of international protection, on the same terms as nationals.
28.
There are two main issues that arise in the present case. First, does a national measure such as citizenship income fall within the scope of Article 26 and/or Article 29 of Directive 2011/95? And, second, if it does, is such a measure compatible with those provisions?
29.
In that regard, the Italian Government and the INPS take the view that a measure such as citizenship income does not come within the ambit of Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95. They argue that citizenship income is not merely a social assistance benefit intended to remedy a state of financial need, but it is a broader personalised measure which forms part of a wider framework comprising both support for households in poverty and commitments made by those households to achieve specific objectives, with a view to helping them become self-sufficient. Those parties state, in particular, that this benefit is conditional upon a declaration of immediate availability for work by the adult members of the household as well as the signing of an ‘employment pact’ with an employment office. Accordingly, the measure is – they contend – mainly a tool for professional re-integration and social inclusion. The mixed nature of that measure has allegedly been confirmed by the case-law of the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court).
30.
The applicant in the main proceedings and the Commission disagree. They take the view that the mixed nature of a national measure does not in itself preclude it from falling within the scope of Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95. In their view, the citizenship income established by the Italian legislature possesses the characteristics necessary to bring it within the scope of those provisions. Accordingly, beneficiaries of international protection must not be subject to any form of discrimination concerning access to the benefits conferred therein.
31.
I agree with the applicant in the main proceedings and the Commission. I will explain below why I take the view that a measure such as citizenship income falls within the scope of those two provisions (1, 2 and 3) and appears to be incompatible with them (4 and 5), with a small caveat as regards Article 29 of the directive (6).
1. Access to employment
32.
Article 26(2) of Directive 2011/95 requires ‘Member States [to] ensure that activities such as employment-related education opportunities for adults, vocational training, including training courses for upgrading skills, practical workplace experience and counselling services afforded by employment offices, are offered to beneficiaries of international protection, under equivalent conditions as nationals.’ Article 26(3) of that directive also requires ‘Member States [to] endeavour to facilitate full access for beneficiaries of international protection to the activities referred to in paragraph 2.’ (
14
)
33.
In my opinion, a measure such as citizenship income comes within the scope of those provisions. As both the INPS and the Italian Government state, a key component of that measure is the declaration of immediate availability for work by the adult members of the household and the signing of an ‘employment pact’ with an employment office. That pact is – as stated in Article 4(1) of the Decree-Law – ‘a personalised programme of support for employment and social inclusion, which includes community service, professional retraining, completion of studies, and other commitments identified by the relevant services aimed at integration into the labour market and social inclusion’.
34.
The very wording of the two legal provisions in question (Article 26(2) of Directive 2011/95 and Article 4(1) of the Decree-Law) makes it rather clear that the activities listed therein largely coincide. It is hard to dispute the view that the activities which Italian employment offices are to offer to beneficiaries of citizenship income should be regarded as ‘vocational training’ and ‘counselling services’ in the sense of Article 26(2) of Directive 2011/95.
35.
In fact, both provisions share the same objective. The obligations set out in Article 26(2) and (3) of Directive 2011/95 are clearly instrumental in ensuring the effectiveness of the principle enounced in Article 26(1): ‘Member States shall authorise beneficiaries of international protection to engage in employed or self-employed activities subject to rules generally applicable to the profession and to the public service, immediately after protection has been granted.’ (
15
)
36.
The aim of the measures provided for in Article 4(1) of the Decree-Law is the same: to facilitate entry into the labour market. Both the preamble to, and Article 1(1) of, that decree-law refer to a measure intended to guarantee the right to work by means of policies for the economic support and social integration of persons at risk of exclusion from society and from the world of work.
37.
I would add, ad abundantiam, that a number of elements confirm the broad scope of the obligation set out in Article 26 of Directive 2011/95, and its significance within the scheme of that directive.
38.
First, the terminology employed in that article indicates the comprehensive nature of the provision: ‘activities such as’ (non-exhaustive list), ‘employment-related education opportunities’ (broad and purpose-related term) and ‘full access’ (emphatic expression). (
16
)
39.
Second, not only must Member States ensure that the activities in question are offered to beneficiaries of international protection (paragraph 2 of Article 26), they must also facilitate access to them (paragraph 3 thereof). As explained in the preamble to Directive 2011/95, the EU legislature considered that beneficiaries of international protection have specific needs and are confronted with particular integration challenges (recital 41) and, consequently, ‘efforts should be made in particular to address the problems which prevent beneficiaries of international protection from having effective access to employment-related educational opportunities and vocational training, inter alia, relating to financial constraints’ (recital 42).
40.
In essence, it is not enough that the activities set out in Article 26(2) of Directive 2011/95 are accessible to beneficiaries of international protection; national authorities must also, under Article 26(3) of that directive, take initiatives aimed at removing the obstacles which may hinder such access. This obligation to be proactive shows, quite clearly, the emphasis that the EU legislature placed on beneficiaries of international protection having access to assistance, in the form of training and counselling, so that they can be integrated more easily in the job market. The fact that recital 42 of Directive 2011/95 refers to ‘financial constraints’ shows that, mutatis mutandis, the directive and the Decree-Law reflect the same concern: it may be necessary to provide some form of financial assistance to the persons in question, since they might otherwise be unable to participate in the training and counselling activities being offered.
41.
In conclusion, I take the view that activities such as those set out in Article 4(1) of the Decree-Law fall, largely, within the scope of Article 26 of Directive 2011/95.
2. Social welfare
42.
Article 29(1) of Directive 2011/95 requires Member States to ‘ensure that beneficiaries of international protection receive … the necessary social assistance as provided to nationals of that Member State’. It should, thus, be examined whether a national measure such as citizenship income constitutes ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of that provision.
(a) An autonomous concept of EU law
43.
It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that, where a provision of EU law contains no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope, its terms must, as a rule, be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union. (
17
)
44.
Although Directive 2011/95 does not include a definition of the term ‘social assistance’, Article 29 thereof does not contain any reference to the law of the Member States as regards the meaning of that term, either. It follows that the term ‘social assistance’ included in that article must be regarded, for the purposes of applying that directive, as an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the Member States. (
18
)
45.
The Italian Government, however, disagrees. In its view, the Court has held that, notwithstanding the absence of a reference to national law, it is still for the national authorities to define what constitutes ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article 29 of Directive 2011/95.
46.
I am not convinced by that argument. It seems to me that the Italian Government misreads the judgment of the Court in ASGI and Others. (
19
) In that judgment, the Court defined the concept of ‘social assistance’ as encompassing ‘all assistance schemes established by the public authorities, whether at national, regional or local level, to which recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources sufficient to meet his or her own basic needs and those of his or her family’. (
20
) In my view, the Court is simply giving a broad definition of the concept, making clear that it covers all assistance schemes set up by all the public authorities (regardless of whether they are central or peripheral). The Court is by no means implying that it is for the national authorities to decide autonomously which measures constitute social assistance and which do not.
47.
Nor is it of any relevance that, in that judgment, the Court finally left it to the referring court to verify whether the national measure at issue in the main proceedings ‘constitute[d] social assistance for the purposes of Article 29 of Directive 2011/95’. Indeed, the referring court was required to make that assessment not on the basis of national law, but ‘in the light of th[e] definition’ set out above. (
21
)
(b) Application of the concept (I): the economic benefits as a form of social assistance
48.
As mentioned in point 46 above, the Court has adopted a rather broad and to some extent open-ended interpretation of the concept of ‘social assistance’ for the purposes of Directive 2011/95. Social assistance clearly encompasses – but is certainly not limited to – ‘minimum income support, assistance in the case of illness, or pregnancy, and parental assistance’ (recital 45 of that directive). That recital identifies that support and that assistance as ‘core benefits’.
49.
The Court’s definition includes four main elements, which concern the structure (‘scheme’), the origin (‘public authorities’), the beneficiaries (‘individual[s] who [do] not have resources sufficient to …’) and the function (to meet the beneficiary’s ‘own basic needs and those of his or her family’) of the assistance in question. Although there is no single definition of the term ‘social assistance’ that is universally accepted, it seems to me that the Court’s interpretation of the concept is coherent with the general understanding of the term. (
22
)
50.
Against that background, I am of the view that a measure such as citizenship income falls within the scope of Article 29 of Directive 2011/95.
51.
To begin with, that measure fulfils all the criteria set out in point 49 above: first, it is a general mechanism of assistance; second, it has been established by the authorities; third, the beneficiaries are households in need; and fourth, one of its essential aims is to ‘combat poverty’.
52.
More generally, citizenship income displays several characteristics that, in the Court’s case-law, have typically been associated with measures of social assistance. (
23
) In particular, the national measure at issue provides a cash benefit that is: (i) non-contributory, being funded by the public purse; (ii) means-tested and, at least to some extent, takes into account the household’s specific situation and needs; and (iii) aimed at providing individuals with a minimum level of subsistence.
53.
The last element is, in my view, of particular significance. Indeed, the need to ensure ‘a minimum level of subsistence’ is explicitly referred to in the preamble to the Decree-Law as one of the objectives of the measure at issue. In addition, the fact that the two components of the economic benefit granted are meant to, respectively, (a) ‘supplement household income’ and (b) ‘supplement the income of households living in rented accommodation’ is clearly indicative of the nature of the measure.
54.
In addition, the preamble to the Decree-Law expressly refers to the ‘extraordinary necessity and urgency of providing for the simplification of the social assistance system in order to make it certain and essential, with the aim of redefining the model of collective welfare’. (
24
) The textual correspondence between that preamble and Article 29 of Directive 2011/95 is, thus, undeniable.
55.
A number of specific features of the economic benefit set out in Article 3 of the Decree-Law confirm the idea that such a benefit is destined to satisfy the basic needs of a household. In particular, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that provision, the amount of the benefit that has not been spent or withdrawn in the month following the payment is, at least in part, deducted from the successive monthly payment. In addition, pursuant to Article 5 of the Decree-Law, as implemented by means of an administrative decree, the benefit was paid through a card, which could not be used to purchase certain products and services (such as, for instance, jewellery and other luxury items, artworks, gambling services, insurance services) or in certain transactions (purchases abroad, online or through direct marketing services).
(c) Application of the concept (II): the objections of the Italian Government and the INPS
56.
The above finding concerning the nature of the measure at issue cannot be called into question by the fact that the cash benefits are, under Article 4(1) of the Decree-Law, conditional‘upon the declaration of immediate availability for work by the adult members of the household … as well as participation in a personalised programme of support for employment and social inclusion, which includes community service, professional retraining, completion of studies, and other commitments identified by the relevant services’.
57.
Although schemes of social assistance are often accessible to low-income or vulnerable individuals and families, without requiring them to meet specific conditions (beyond proving their status), the opposite is also not uncommon. Both in the European Union and beyond there exist social welfare programmes that provide financial assistance to individuals in need, contingent upon them fulfilling specific behavioural requirements. Those may concern, for example, seeking employment, undertaking training or participating in activities of common interest. Such programmes are meant to reduce both current and future poverty by promoting the development of the individuals concerned, in particular through investment in education and professional training. The financial assistance provided is, therefore, an incentive to comply with the obligations set out in the legislation. It is, thus, also logical that – in such programmes – a failure to comply with those obligations may lead to a suspension or reduction of the financial assistance (and/or of the other benefits provided). (
25
)
58.
Accordingly, what matters in this context is not whether an economic benefit is granted conditionally or unconditionally; it is more important to verify whether the conditions, if any, promote the ultimate objective of tackling poverty by providing assistance to individuals in need. In the present case, the conditions are consistent with the aim of combating future poverty by increasing the probability that the beneficiaries of the scheme might, in the short- to medium-term, find employment.
59.
Moreover, I observe that the Decree-Law includes, in Article 4(2) and (3) thereof, various categories of persons (inter alia, persons of an age of 65 or above, persons with disabilities, and persons attending educational courses) who are relieved from the obligations laid down in Article 4(1) of that decree-law. In those cases, the economic benefit is granted unconditionally.
60.
I also do not consider to be particularly relevant, in this context, the fact – stressed by the Italian Government and the INPS – that citizenship income is granted ‘for a continuous period not exceeding 18 months’.
61.
Social assistance is often temporary in nature because it is mainly designed as a ‘safety net’ for specific situations, and not as a permanent support system. This applies all the more so in so far as the grant of such benefits – such as, in the case of citizenship income – is made subject to the beneficiary’s compliance with certain obligations which, as previously noted, are designed to facilitate his or her subsequent access to other forms of income or support, including employment. Given the significant public resources involved, it is also reasonable that, on grounds of budget discipline, the authorities might set a pre-determined duration for such economic benefits. For the individuals in question, that works as an incentive to be proactive in their job-seeking activities.
62.
In any event, I note that, pursuant to Article 3(6) of the Decree-Law, citizenship income ‘may be renewed, subject to suspension of payment for a period of one month prior to each renewal’, and that ‘the suspension does not apply in the case of [individuals over the age of 65].’
63.
In fact, the Italian Government and the INPS acknowledge that citizenship income displays characteristics of social assistance. However, they argue that it cannot be considered to be only – or at least not mainly – that. They emphasise that citizenship income is a complex measure of mixed nature and refer, in that respect, to two judgments of the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court), an issue to which I will come back shortly.
64.
In my view, the complex structure of the measure and its mixed nature do not exclude the fact that the measure may fall within the scope of Article 29 of Directive 2011/95.
65.
It is rather common for national legislation to pursue, with the establishment of novel instruments, different objectives at the same time. Depending on the nature of those objectives, the legislature may pursue them to varying degrees or, where they are conflicting, try to strike a fair balance between them. Naturally, national legislation can introduce mechanisms with a complex structure including different components. In terms of their application, those components may be self-standing and separable or, conversely, form a coherent and indivisible whole.
66.
That is often the case of measures adopted in fields such as social assistance, social security and social integration. For example, as early as 1974, the Court found that ‘one cannot exclude the possibility that by reason of the persons covered, its objectives and its method of application, a legislation can come close to both [social security and social assistance], thus preventing any comprehensive classification’. (
26
) In such cases, the interpreter of the law must identify the predominant function (or functions) of the measure, where that might entail certain consequences under EU law. (
27
)
67.
However, in the present case, the measure has, as a matter of fact, different components. Having regard to the wording of the preamble to the Decree-Law, its operative provisions and its stated objectives and scope of application, it appears evident – particularly from the perspective of EU law – that the national measure at issue is structured around two pillars of equal significance: the provision of economic support (Article 3 of the Decree-Law) and the implementation of the employment and social inclusion pacts (Article 4 thereof). In the majority of cases – though not invariably – citizenship income operates as a do ut des mechanism: financial assistance is granted in return for a commitment to personal and professional development.
68.
My findings are, I believe, consistent with those of the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court), from a national law perspective. In its judgments of 2022 and 2025, that court found, in essence, that the legislation on citizenship income could not be regarded as merely being concerned with a form of social assistance; according to those judgments, the social assistance component, which is indeed present in the measure, is part of a broader legal framework which pursues a variety of objectives, in particular those of integration into the labour market and social inclusion. (
28
)
69.
While I fully agree with those findings, I do not think that they can be read as a justification for considering the social assistance function as merely ancillary or secondary to the other function.
70.
The economic benefits provided to those in need constitute, as explained in points 48 to 55 above, a crucial part of the overall framework set up by the Decree-Law. Furthermore, as pointed out in point 59 above, for some categories of beneficiaries (many of whom are individuals temporarily or definitively unable to work), it is the only component of the measure that is applicable, since those individuals are relieved of the obligations set out in Article 4 of the Decree-Law. In those cases, citizenship income is mainly, if not only, a measure of social assistance. This element militates against the classification of citizenship income as a benefit designed solely, or even predominantly, to facilitate access to the labour market. (
29
) In this context, I would also note, in passing, that legislation on citizenship income has generally been presented to the press and to citizens, by the government that adopted it, as a measure that ‘defeated poverty’ (not one which ‘defeated unemployment’).
71.
Finally, I would add that the great significance of the elements discussed above, within the scheme of the Decree-Law, has also been stressed by both the referring court in the present case and the referring court in the CU and ND case. (
30
) I wish to clarify this in the following points.
72.
In its observations, the Italian Government emphasises that, in its judgment in CU and ND, the Court did not make any assessment with regard to whether citizenship income constituted a ‘social benefit’, and merely relied on what the referring court had stated in its request for a preliminary ruling. (
31
) I have the impression that the Italian Government suggests that the referring court’s position in that respect was incorrect.
73.
However, that would in any event be immaterial in the present case. Indeed, in CU and ND, the Court was asked to consider the national measure at issue under the lens of Article 11(1)(d) of Directive 2003/109. That provision stipulates that ‘long-term residents shall enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards … social security, social assistance and social protection as defined by national law’. (
32
) By contrast, as explained in points 43 to 47 above, the concept of ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article 29 of Directive 2011/95 is an autonomous concept of EU law that must be interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the European Union. Consequently, the classification of the measure at issue under national law is not decisive in the present case. (
33
)
74.
Finally, even if one were to consider (quod non, in my view) that the provision of an economic benefit is merely ancillary and instrumental to the principal objective of job integration of the individuals concerned, those benefits would not fall outside the scope of Directive 2011/95. Indeed, as explained above, (i) the activities set out in Article 4 of the Decree-Law fall within the scope of Article 26(2) of the directive; (ii) Article 26(3) of the directive requires Member States to ‘facilitate full access’ to activities set out in paragraph 2 of that article; and (iii) recital 42 of the directive provides that Member States should make efforts to, inter alia, address the financial constraints which may prevent access to such activities by beneficiaries of international protection.
75.
That means, in essence, that if one were to exclude the economic benefit in question from the scope of Article 29 of Directive 2011/95, it would likely fall within the scope of Article 26(3) of the same directive. It seems to me to be rather intuitive that excluding beneficiaries of international protection from an economic benefit, which is granted to any other individual in need in order to enable them to participate in activities relating to access to employment, flies in the face of the logic underpinning Article 26(3) and recital 42 of Directive 2011/95.
76.
For all of the above reasons, an anti-poverty economic benefit such as that set out in Article 3 of the Decree-Law falls within the scope of Article 29 of Directive 2011/95.
3. Interim conclusions on the scope of Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95
77.
In conclusion, the structural complexity and multifaceted character of a national measure that provides assistance to individuals in need – such as citizenship income introduced by the Decree-Law – cannot absolve the interpreter from the duty to give due consideration to its essential components. To hold otherwise would risk enabling Member States to circumvent the application of Directive 2011/95 by means of what may be described as legislative superfetation: the deliberate layering of distinct legal mechanisms within a single legislative act, or the establishment of a composite and polyfunctional normative framework.
78.
In my view, the two main components of the national legislation establishing citizenship income are not only of comparable importance, but are also inextricably linked and complementary.
79.
In that regard, I must admit that, at certain moments during the hearing, I had the impression that the Italian Government was contradicting itself, whereby it attempted to refute the social character of the national measure by pointing to its elements connected to access to employment, and then refuted that characteristic by pointing to its elements of a social nature. Metaphorically speaking, I had the feeling that that government was arguing that 1 + 1 = 0, whereas, as in arithmetic, also in the present case 1 + 1 = 2.
80.
In fact, for the reasons explained above, those two components fall within the scope of Directive 2011/95: (i) the activities provided for in Article 4 of the Decree-Law in so far as they are activities relating to ‘access to employment’ for the purpose of Article 26 of that directive; and (ii) the economic benefits provided for in Article 3 of the Decree-Law in so far as ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article 29 of the directive.
4. Indirect discrimination
81.
The wording of Article 26 (‘under equivalent conditions as nationals’) and Article 29 (‘as provided to nationals of that Member State’) of Directive 2011/95 makes it clear that both provisions constitute an expression of the principle of equal treatment.
82.
According to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment, set out in Article 20 of the Charter, is a general principle of EU law which requires that comparable situations are not to be treated differently and that different situations are not to be treated in the same manner, unless such treatment is objectively justified. (
34
) That principle prohibits not only overt discrimination, but also all covert forms thereof which, while relying on ostensibly neutral distinguishing criteria, ultimately produce the same discriminatory effects. (
35
)
83.
In its judgment in CU
and
ND, the Court determined that a residency requirement such as that under examination constitutes indirect discrimination against third-country nationals possessing long-term residence status, in comparison with nationals of the Member State concerned. (
36
) The same conclusion must, quite evidently, be reached in the present case with regard to the beneficiaries of international protection.
84.
Paraphrasing what the Court stated in paragraph 50 of its judgment in CU and ND, the residency requirement ‘affects primarily non-nationals, which includes [beneficiaries of international protection]’.
85.
Indeed, although the national legislation is, on its face, neutral with regard to nationality, the 10-year residency requirement renders its application unequal. The vast majority of Italian nationals meet that requirement and the vast majority of beneficiaries of international protection do not, even if their needs in terms of access to the labour market and social assistance are comparable.
86.
A national measure such as citizenship income is, therefore, indirectly discriminatory vis-à-vis beneficiaries of international protection.
5. Justification
87.
As the Court has consistently held, indirect discrimination on the grounds of nationality is, in principle, prohibited unless it can be objectively justified. To be deemed justified, such discrimination must be suitable for securing the attainment of a legitimate objective and must not exceed what is necessary to achieve that objective. (
37
)
88.
In that regard, the Italian Government argues that a measure such as that at issue entails a significant investment of economic resources. It goes beyond the mere financial allocation given to households in need, since it is accompanied by additional costs, in particular those of setting up an appropriate organisational structure to ensure the effectiveness of the pacts concluded by beneficiaries with the employment offices, and the costs resulting from tax and social contribution exemptions granted to undertakings hiring beneficiaries.
89.
The Italian Government contends that, under the circumstances, it is reasonable for the national legislature to restrict the application of this complex instrument exclusively to individuals who are firmly established within the national community and may be regarded as its permanent members. The extended residence requirement imposed on beneficiaries of citizenship income is intrinsically linked to the necessity of establishing a genuine connection between those beneficiaries and the legal order of the Member State concerned.
90.
I find those arguments unconvincing.
91.
To begin with, it is quite natural that the organisation of activities promoting access to employment and the provision of social assistance are costly in terms of both financial and administrative resources. (
38
) This is an element that cannot have escaped the EU legislature when it adopted Directive 2011/95, and yet it decided that beneficiaries of international protection should be treated on an equal basis with nationals. The reference to the need, for Member States, to make efforts to, inter alia, address the financial constraints which may prevent access to such activities by beneficiaries of international protection demonstrates that the EU legislature was well aware that the implementation of Directive 2011/95 entailed certain costs for the public purse.
92.
Accepting the Italian Government’s arguments based on the costs of the measure would, de facto, mean introducing an unwritten derogation to the rules set out in Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95. A derogation of – I would add – a rather vague scope which would undermine the directive’s objective to ‘ensure that a minimum level of benefits is available for those persons in all Member States’. (
39
)
93.
As the Court has stated in its judgment in Ayubi, the rights conferred by Chapter VII of Directive 2011/95 (which includes Articles 26 and 29 thereof) ‘may be limited only in accordance with the conditions set by Chapter VII of that directive, since Member States are not entitled to add restrictions not already listed there’. (
40
) Neither Article 26 nor Article 29 of Directive 2011/95 make the rights in question subject to the length of the claimants’ residence in the Member State concerned. (
41
)
94.
Moreover, it is settled case-law that a Member State cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations under EU law. (
42
) Thus, the mere fact that ensuring full compliance with EU rules might entail the adoption or modification of complex and/or costly measures is no valid justification to elude the application of those rules. (
43
)
95.
The Court’s case-law on so-called social tourism – to which the Italian Government made numerous references in its submissions – is also irrelevant in the present case.
96.
In that respect, it should be recalled that EU citizens have, in principle, the right to move and reside in other Member States. However, EU law does not grant unrestricted access to national social welfare systems to economically inactive individuals. The right of free movement of EU citizens that are not workers is, accordingly, subject to the condition that they have sufficient resources and a comprehensive health insurance, so as not to become a burden on the host Member State’s system of social assistance. (
44
)
97.
In line with those principles, the Court has held, in particular, that Member States may exclude from entitlement to social assistance citizens of other Member States who are economically inactive and who have exercised their freedom of movement with the sole aim of receiving social assistance from another Member State, and who have no right of residence in the host Member State based on EU provisions. (
45
)
98.
A different solution would create an intolerable burden for the finances of the Member States that have a more generous policy on social allocations. That would, in turn, risk encouraging Member States to enter into a ‘race to the bottom’ as regards access to social welfare. (
46
)
99.
The situation in the present case is, however, profoundly different from that examined by the Court in the cases on social tourism, and the rationale behind its case-law is inapplicable with respect to beneficiaries of international protection.
100.
Beneficiaries of international protection do not enjoy unrestricted freedom of movement within the European Union. In fact, their movement is largely restricted to the Member State that has granted them international protection. (
47
)
101.
Moreover, the fact that the individuals concerned have been granted international protection signifies that their entry into the territory of the Member State in question was not motivated by an intention to exploit its welfare system, but rather by a well-founded fear of persecution or a genuine risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. (
48
) The status of beneficiaries of international protection is not permanent; in fact, when an individual ceases to be a refugee or eligible for subsidiary protection, the Member State in question is to revoke, end or refuse to renew his or her status. (
49
) That may entail the revocation of the residence permit and the return of the individual in question to his or her country of origin, even against his or her will (provided the principle of non-refoulement is respected). (
50
)
102.
It follows that imposing on beneficiaries of international protection a requirement to demonstrate that they are firmly established within the Member State concerned, or to prove the existence of a genuine and sufficiently close link with the legal order of that Member State, as a condition for the application of Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95, is manifestly unreasonable and inconsistent with the objectives and spirit of the directive.
103.
For the reasons articulated above, I find that the purported justifications advanced by the Italian Government in support of the national measure at issue lack sufficient merit and fail to satisfy the requirements of legal justification under applicable EU law. Accordingly, those arguments must be rejected.
6. A caveat concerning ‘core benefits’
104.
Finally, the Italian Government argues that, if the Court were to find citizenship income to be a social welfare scheme falling within the scope of Article 29 of Directive 2011/95, then it should not be considered a ‘core benefit’ within the meaning of Article 29(2) and recital 45 thereof.
105.
Article 29(2) of Directive 2011/95 provides that, by way of derogation from the general rule of non-discrimination, laid down in paragraph 1 of that provision, ‘Member States may limit social assistance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status to core benefits which will then be provided at the same level and under the same eligibility conditions as nationals’. In turn, recital 45 of Directive 2011/95 states that ‘with regard to social assistance, the modalities and detail of the provision of core benefits to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status should be determined by national law. The possibility of limiting such assistance to core benefits is to be understood as covering at least minimum income support, assistance in the case of illness, or pregnancy, and parental assistance, in so far as those benefits are granted to nationals under national law.’
106.
It follows from the above that, first, the equal treatment rule may be derogated from with respect to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (but not with respect to refugees). In such cases, Member States may decide that only certain forms of social assistance benefits granted to nationals can also be granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Member States enjoy, therefore, a degree of discretion in that respect. However, that discretion is not unfettered, since they must in any event grant such beneficiaries ‘core benefits’. That concept covers, at least, minimum income support, assistance in the case of illness or pregnancy, and parental assistance. More generally, the Court has held that the term ‘core benefits’ should be understood as referring to ‘benefits which enable individuals to meet their basic needs such as food, accommodation and health’. (
51
)
107.
The wording of the preamble to the Decree-Law (referring to the need to provide for a minimum level of subsistence) and of Article 1(1) thereof (stating that citizenship income ‘constitutes an essential level of benefits within the limits of available resources’) seems consistent with the idea that the measure at issue concerns core benefits. Moreover, the relatively low thresholds for the maximum annual household income required to qualify for the measure further support this conclusion. (
52
)
108.
At the same time, however, if other national measures exist which provide beneficiaries of subsidiary protection with core benefits of a level that ensures respect for human dignity, (
53
) then the Italian authorities could lawfully exclude those individuals (including the applicant in the main proceedings) from the economic benefits of citizenship income.
109.
At the hearing, the Italian Government was asked to indicate what measures are in place to fulfil that requirement. The answer it gave was rather vague and failed to refer to any specific measure. It merely stated that there existed a variety of measures, adopted at regional and local level, which were sufficient to provide beneficiaries of subsidiary protection with the core benefits set out in Directive 2011/95.
110.
In those circumstances, I believe that it is impossible for the Court to rule on this matter. If the Court agrees, then it will thus be for the referring court to verify whether a measure such as citizenship income falls outside the concept of ‘core benefits’ provided for in Article 29(2) of Directive 2011/95 and, as such, could lawfully be denied to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.
111.
Finally, I would only add that, in order to determine whether Article 29(2) of Directive 2011/95 is applicable in the main proceedings, the fact – emphasised at the hearing by the Commission – that the Italian Government has not previously declared that it intended to rely on the derogation set out therein is not decisive. Directive 2011/95 does not lay down any such requirement. I am naturally aware that the Court has, in its case-law on similar legal instruments, given a certain weight to that element. (
54
) However, absent a legal provision which makes it a conditio sine qua non for the application of the derogation, I do not think the referring court should place an unduly significant importance on that element.
V. Conclusion
112.
In conclusion, I propose that the Court answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale ordinario di Bergamo (District Court, Bergamo, Italy) as follows:
Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted
must be interpreted as:
–
precluding legislation of a Member State which makes access, for beneficiaries of international protection, to activities intended to facilitate access to employment, on the one hand, and to certain forms of social assistance, on the other hand, conditional upon having resided in the territory of that Member State for at least 10 years, the final 2 of which must be consecutive; and
–
not precluding legislation which does not grant access, for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, to forms of social assistance that do not constitute core benefits.
(
1
)	Original language: English.
(
2
)	Judgment of 29 July 2024 (C‑112/22 and C‑223/22, ‘the judgment in CU and ND’, EU:C:2024:636).
(
3
)	Council Directive of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44). Article 11 thereof requires Member States to ensure that long-term residents enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards, inter alia, ‘social security, social assistance and social protection as defined by national law’.
(
4
)	Article 34 of the Charter concerns ‘social security and social assistance’.
(
5
)	See paragraphs 33 to 59 of the judgment in CU and ND.
(
6
)	Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).
(
7
)	GURI No 23 of 28 January 2019.
(
8
)	GURI No 75 of 29 March 2019.
(
9
)	See, to that effect, the judgment in CU and ND, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited.
(
10
)	Ibid., paragraph 27 and the case-law cited.
(
11
)	GURI No 303 of 29 December 2022.
(
12
)	See, for example, judgment of 27 February 2014, Pohotovosť (C‑470/12, EU:C:2014:101, paragraph 33), and order of 3 March 2016, Euro Bank (C‑537/15, not published, EU:C:2016:143, paragraphs 34 and 35).
(
13
)	OJ L, 2024/1347.
(
14
)	Emphasis added.
(
15
)	Emphasis added.
(
16
)	Emphasis added.
(
17
)	See, inter alia, judgment of 7 September 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Nature of the right of residence under Article 20 TFEU) (C‑624/20, EU:C:2022:639, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
(
18
)	See, by analogy, ibid., paragraphs 20 and 21.
(
19
)	Judgment of 28 October 2021 (C‑462/20, EU:C:2021:894).
(
20
)	Ibid., paragraph 34.
(
21
)	Ibid., paragraph 35.
(
22
)	See, for example, International Labour Organization, ‘Universal social protection for climate action and a just transition’, World Social Protection Report 2024-26, pp. 15 and 165. See also, with ample references, Vonk, G. and Olivier, M., ‘The fundamental right of social assistance: A global, a regional (Europe and Africa) and a national perspective (Germany, the Netherlands and South Africa)’, European Journal of Social Security, Vol. 21(3), 2019, pp. 219 to 240.
(
23
)	See, inter alia, judgments of 14 June 2016, Commission v United Kingdom (C‑308/14, EU:C:2016:436, paragraphs 55 and 60), and of 15 July 2021, The Department for Communities in Northern Ireland (C‑709/20, EU:C:2021:602, paragraphs 70 and 71). See also Opinions of Advocate General Rantos in Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Effects of an expulsion decision) (C‑719/19, EU:C:2021:104, point 101), and of Advocate General Szpunar in S (C‑411/20, EU:C:2021:1017, point 52).
(
24
)	Emphasis added.
(
25
)	See, for example, European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Medgyesi, M., Conditional cash transfers and their impact on children – Synthesis Report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2016; UNICEF, ‘Conditionality in cash transfers: UNICEF’s approach’, Social Inclusion Summaries, 2016; Rinaldi, F.M. and Leone, L., ‘Conditional cash transfers in OECD countries: a realist synthesis’, Frontiers in Sociology, Vol. 8, 2023 (all available online).
(
26
)	Judgment of 9 October 1974, Biason (24/74, EU:C:1974:99, paragraph 9).
(
27
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 15 September 2015, Alimanovic (C‑67/14, EU:C:2015:597, paragraph 45).
(
28
)	Judgments No 19 of 25 January 2022 (‘in law’, point 3 point 3.2 of the Conclusions on points of law), and No 31 of 20 March 2025 (point 7 of the Conclusions on points of law).
(
29
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2009, Vatsouras and Koupatantze (C‑22/08 and C‑23/08, EU:C:2009:344, paragraphs 43 and 45).
(
30
)	See paragraphs 17 and 18.
(
31
)	Ibid., paragraphs 39 to 41.
(
32
)	Emphasis added.
(
33
)	See, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 1992, Hughes (C‑78/91, EU:C:1992:331, paragraph 14).
(
34
)	See, for example, judgment of 8 March 2022, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld (Direct effect) (C‑205/20, EU:C:2022:168, paragraph 54).
(
35
)	See, inter alia, the judgment in CU and ND, paragraph 48.
(
36
)	Paragraphs 49 to 52 of that judgment.
(
37
)	See, inter alia, the judgment in CU and ND, paragraph 53.
(
38
)	See, similarly, judgment of 21 November 2018, Ayubi (C‑713/17, EU:C:2018:929, paragraph 34).
(
39
)	See recital 12 of Directive 2011/95.
(
40
)	Judgment of 21 November 2018 (C‑713/17, EU:C:2018:929, paragraph 27).
(
41
)	See, to that effect, ibid., paragraph 28.
(
42
)	See, for example, judgment of 12 November 2019, Commission v Ireland (Derrybrien Wind Farm) (C‑261/18, EU:C:2019:955, paragraph 89).
(
43
)	See, to that effect, judgments of 8 February 1973, Commission v Italy (30/72, EU:C:1973:16, paragraphs 10 and 11); of 4 June 2002, Commission v Portugal (C‑367/98, EU:C:2002:326, paragraph 52); and of 19 December 2012, Commission v Ireland (C‑374/11, EU:C:2012:827, paragraph 39).
(
44
)	See, in particular, Article 21(1) TFEU and Article 45(1) of the Charter.
(
45
)	See, in particular, judgments of 11 November 2014, Dano (C‑333/13, EU:C:2014:2358), and of 15 September 2015, Alimanovic (C‑67/14, EU:C:2015:597).
(
46
)	See, mutatis mutandis, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in van der Helder and Farrington (C‑321/12, EU:C:2013:406, points 46 to 49).
(
47
)	See, in particular, Article 33 of Directive 2011/95 and Article 21 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19).
(
48
)	See, in particular, Article 2(d) and (f) of Directive 2011/95.
(
49
)	See Articles 11, 14, 16 and 19 of Directive 2011/95.
(
50
)	See, inter alia, ECtHR, judgments of 25 April 2017, Krasniqi v. Austria (CE:ECHR:2017:0425JUD004169712), and of 15 April 2021, K.I. v. France (CE:ECHR:2021:0415JUD000556019). See also Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Joined Cases Salahadin Abdulla (C‑175/08, C‑176/08, C‑178/08 and C‑179/08, EU:C:2009:551, point 45).
(
51
)	See, inter alia, the judgment in CU and ND, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited.
(
52
)	See Article 2(1) and (4) of the Decree-Law: in a nutshell, depending on the circumstances, EUR 6.000, EUR 7.560 or EUR 9.360 – amounts to be adjusted on the basis of the number and status of the persons composing the household.
(
53
)	A principle whose importance is emphasised in recital 16 of Directive 2011/95. See also Article 34(3) of the Charter, recognising ‘the right to social … assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices’ (emphasis added).
(
54
)	See, for example, judgment of 25 November 2020, Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (Family benefits for long-term residents) (C‑303/19, EU:C:2020:958, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited), and the judgment in CU and ND, paragraph 42.