62025TO0374
ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)
20 April 2026 (
*1
)
(Civil Service – Members of the temporary staff – Publication of a press release by a political group of the Parliament – Jurisdiction of the General Court – Liability – Material and non-material harm – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)
In Case T‑374/25,
EO, represented by L. Levi, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Parliament, represented by S. Seyr and R. Schiano, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),
composed of G. De Baere, President, J. Svenningsen (Rapporteur) and C. Mac Eochaidh, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:
–
the application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 6 June 2025,
–
the plea of inadmissibility and lack of competence (‘the preliminary objection’) raised by the Parliament lodged at the Court Registry on 15 September 2025,
–
the applicant’s observations on the preliminary objection lodged at the Court Registry on 27 October 2025,
–
the measure of organisation of procedure of 17 December 2025 and the replies of the Parliament and the applicant lodged at the Court Registry respectively on 8 January 2026 and 11 February 2026,
makes the following
Order
1
By application under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, EO, seeks annulment of the decision of 12 July 2024 (‘the first contested decision’) of the President of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (‘the S&D Group’), a political group of the European Parliament, and of the decision of 6 March 2025 of the S&D Group Bureau (‘the second contested decision’), both rejecting his claim for compensation. Under the same provision, he also seeks compensation for the material and non-material harm he allegedly suffered as a result of the publication, by the S&D Group Bureau, of a press release entitled ‘Zero tolerance for corruption’ (‘the press release’).
Background to the dispute
2
The applicant is a former member of the temporary staff, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’), of the S&D Group. His contract of employment was with the Parliament.
3
In the performance of his duties as a political adviser to the S&D Group, the applicant was involved, inter alia, in the drafting of the European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (OJ 2023 C 167, p. 99).
4
In the days following the adoption of the resolution of 24 November 2022, an accredited parliamentary assistant to a Member of the S&D Group invited the applicant to see a World Cup football match in Qatar. The gift included two tickets to attend the quarter-final match between Argentina and the Netherlands as well as travel and accommodation expenses for two people.
5
The applicant travelled to Qatar with his partner from 8 to 11 December 2022.
6
On 9 December 2022, the Belgian authorities opened an investigation into possible illicit lobbying activities by the State of Qatar (‘the Qatar investigation’). In particular, they searched the offices of the Parliament and arrested several individuals, including the accredited parliamentary assistant referred to in paragraph 4 above.
7
On 16 December 2022, the applicant informed his head of unit of his trip to Qatar. Together, they informed the Secretary General of the S&D Group.
8
On 20 December 2022, after hearing the applicant, the President of the S&D Group, in her capacity as the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (‘the AECE’), suspended him for an indefinite period and withheld his remuneration pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).
9
Following a number of administrative steps, on 15 September 2023 the Parliament terminated the applicant’s contract as a member of the temporary staff on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS. The applicant sought annulment of that decision and claimed compensation for material and non-material harm suffered. That action was dismissed by judgment of 11 June 2025, EO v Parliament (T‑368/24, under appeal, EU:T:2025:583).
10
On 20 December 2022, the same day as the President of the S&D Group suspended the applicant, the S&D Group Bureau issued the press release, making it available on the S&D Group’s website.
11
In the press release, the S&D Group Bureau stated that, following the decision the previous week to expel a vice-president of the Parliament from the group and remove other Members of the European Parliament linked to the Qatar investigation from their functions, it was committed to taking further concrete action to combat corruption and external interference. It further stated that the S&D Group Bureau was appalled by allegations of corruption and was committed to supporting a thorough investigation. It explained that it had laid down the main lines of an internal inquiry and confirmed a timeline for the election of the S&D Group candidate for the post of vice-president.
12
In the fifth of the six paragraphs of the press release, it was noted that ‘the Bureau fully supports the suspension of an S&D staff member following serious misconduct related to the ongoing judicial investigation.’
13
The applicant’s profile was subsequently removed from the organisation chart on the S&D Group’s website, although, according to the Parliament, his name remained in the Parliament’s general directory.
14
Having made inquiries, a journalist came to the conclusion that the applicant was the S&D Group staff member referred to in the press release, and on 22 December 2022, that journalist published a press article about the applicant’s suspension, naming him, in the context of the S&D Group’s internal inquiry.
15
On 14 March 2024, the applicant submitted a claim for compensation pursuant to Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations for harm suffered as a result of the press release.
16
By the first contested decision, the President of the S&D Group rejected the applicant’s claim for compensation. She took the view that the publication of the press release did not amount to a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, the duty of care, the right to sound administration or the right to protection of private life and personal data. In her view, the first of the three cumulative conditions necessary for a successful claim for compensation based on the European Union’s non-contractual liability (the condition of unlawful conduct by the institution) had not been met.
17
On 10 October 2024, the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the first contested decision. He reiterated arguments intended to show that his claim for compensation was well founded.
18
The second contested decision, signed by the President of the S&D Group ‘for the Bureau’, rejected the applicant’s complaint. It concluded that the acts of a political group can give rise to the Parliament’s non-contractual liability only when those acts can be attributed to the Parliament. The press release was an act pertaining purely to the political activities of the S&D Group and fell outside the scope of the activity of the S&D Group as an AECE. Furthermore, according to the second contested decision, the procedure laid down in Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations ‘was not open’ to the applicant since ‘a dispute between an official and his institution … can only be pursued under Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations where it originates in the relationship of employment between the person concerned and the institution’.
Forms of order sought
19
In the application and the observations on the Parliament’s preliminary objection, the applicant claims that the Court should:
–
declare the application admissible;
–
annul the first contested decision;
–
if need be, annul the second contested decision;
–
order the Parliament to pay compensation for material and non‑material harm suffered; and
–
order the Parliament to pay the costs.
20
In the preliminary objection submitted pursuant to Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Parliament contends that the Court should:
–
dismiss the application as having been brought before a court which has no jurisdiction; and
–
order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
21
Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure, on application by the defendant, the Court may decide on a preliminary objection without going to the substance of the case. Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure, where it is clear that the action is manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court may, on a proposal from the Judge‑Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
22
In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the material in the file and has decided, pursuant to Article 130(7) and Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.
Jurisdiction
23
The Parliament contends, in essence, that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the action since the decisions to issue the press release and remove the applicant’s profile from the organisation chart on the S&D Group’s website are political acts of the S&D Group Bureau, which is the body responsible for the coordination of the S&D Group’s political activities.
24
The applicant asserts that this Court has jurisdiction under Article 270 TFEU.
25
Article 270 TFEU establishes the special jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union in staff cases. That article distinguishes staff cases from other cases within that Court’s jurisdiction as disputes ‘between the Union and its servants’ and refers to the Staff Regulations as the instrument governing the limits and conditions of that special jurisdiction.
26
Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations states that the Court of Justice of the European Union is to have jurisdiction in any dispute between the European Union and ‘any person to whom [the] Staff Regulations apply’ regarding the legality of an act affecting such a person adversely, within the meaning of Article 90(2) of those regulations. In accordance with the latter provision ‘any person to whom [the] Staff Regulations apply’ may submit a complaint to the appointing authority against an act affecting him or her adversely.
27
It is not contested that the applicant was, at the material time, a member of the S&D Group’s temporary staff within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the CEOS. Article 46 of the CEOS provides that Title VII of the Staff Regulations, which includes Articles 90 and 91 thereof, applies by analogy. The applicant is therefore a person – to whom the Staff Regulations apply – who submitted a complaint to the AECE against an act affecting him adversely.
28
It follows that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the present action against the contested decisions rejecting the claim for compensation.
29
In its preliminary objection, the Parliament relies on the judgment of 22 March 1990, Le Pen (C‑201/89, EU:C:1990:133), to submit that there is no rule of EU law from which it may be inferred that the acts of a political group could be imputed to the Parliament and that the distribution, by a political group, of a publication alleged to be defamatory does not give rise to the non-contractual liability of the European Union.
30
However, contrary to what the Parliament essentially contends, the legal principle set out in the judgment of 22 March 1990, Le Pen (C‑201/89, EU:C:1990:133, paragraph 15 and paragraph 16(b)), does not limit the General Court’s special jurisdiction in staff cases established in Article 270 TFEU, but merely restricts the availability of a remedy in damages in particular situations, which it is for that Court to assess.
31
Moreover, the reliance placed on paragraphs 21 and 22 of the judgment of 22 November 1990, Mommer v Parliament (T‑162/89, EU:T:1990:72), which state that terms of employment falling outside the scope of the Staff Regulations or the CEOS fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court of the Justice of the European Union, is misplaced since those paragraphs represent obiter dicta that are not pertinent in the present case. The argument based on paragraph 20 of the order of 16 December 2019 in Kipper v Commission (T‑394/18, not published, EU:T:2019:863), similarly fails since that case involved a very different set of facts.
32
The Parliament’s preliminary objection must therefore be dismissed.
Substance
33
In the present application, the applicant argues that, in publishing the press release, the Parliament acted illegally and negligently, breaching the principle of the presumption of innocence, its duty of care and the right to sound administration, as well as the right to the protection of private life and personal data. According to the applicant, his health and reputation suffered as a direct result of the publication of the press release. He submits that all the conditions for a successful claim for compensation are therefore met.
34
Under the second and third heads of claim, the applicant seeks annulment of the first and second contested decisions.
35
In that regard, according to settled case-law a claim for annulment formally directed against the decision rejecting a complaint has the effect of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted, where that claim, as such, lacks any independent content (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 1989, Vainker v Parliament, 293/87, EU:C:1989:8, paragraph 8, and of 16 July 2025, ET v EIB, T‑417/24, not published, EU:T:2025:728, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
36
However, an express decision rejecting a complaint, in the light of its content, may not be confirmatory of the measure contested by the applicant. That is the case where the decision rejecting the complaint contains a re-examination of the applicant’s situation in the light of new elements of law or of fact, or where it changes or adds to the original decision. In such circumstances, the rejection of the complaint constitutes a measure subject to review by the judicature, which will take it into consideration when assessing the legality of the contested measure or will even regard it as an act adversely affecting the applicant replacing the contested measure (judgments of 21 May 2014, Mocová v Commission, T‑347/12 P, EU:T:2014:268, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and of 5 July 2023, SE v Commission, T‑223/21, EU:T:2023:375, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
37
In the present case, the second contested decision, rejecting the applicant’s complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, modifies the first contested decision so fundamentally as to replace it (see paragraphs 16 and 18 above).
38
It is therefore appropriate to begin with the head of claim seeking annulment of the second contested decision.
39
First, it should be noted that the applicant does not raise substantive arguments challenging the second contested decision, seeking its annulment only ‘if need be’ under the third head of claim. Indeed, the applicant merely asserts, without substantiating his assertion, that in deciding to issue the press release, the S&D Group ‘necessarily – as such or at least, also – acted as the AECE’.
40
Second, there is no rule of EU law from which it may be inferred that the acts of a political group could be imputed to the Parliament as an EU institution (judgment of 22 March 1990, Le Pen, C‑201/89, EU:C:1990:133, paragraph 14).
41
The acts of a political group are only capable of being regarded as acts of the Parliament itself if they are expressly authorised or approved by that institution, for example by a resolution of the Parliament, or by a decision of one of its representative organs, acting within its authority (see, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Le Pen, C‑201/89, EU:C:1990:63, point 19).
42
In that regard, it is clear from the very terms of the press release that it was issued by the S&D Group Bureau in the context of its policy to combat corruption and external interference, with a view to creating public awareness of its commitments in that respect against the background of the Qatar investigation (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above).
43
Third, the applicant has not established that the publication of the press release and the removal of the applicant’s profile from the organisation chart on the S&D Group’s website were in any way authorised or approved by the Parliament.
44
It is true that Article 1, Article 2(c) and Article 6 of the CEOS provide the legal basis for the attribution of the functions of an AECE to political groups. In addition, Article 4 of the decision of the Parliament’s Bureau of 13 January 2014 concerning the delegation of the powers of the appointing authority and the AECE provides for the delegation of the powers conferred on the AECE in respect of temporary staff to the authority designated by each political group. However, the acts of a political group to publish a press release and to remove a profile from an organisation chart on its website are not governed by those legal instruments.
45
It follows that the second contested decision correctly stated that the decisions to issue the press release and remove the applicant’s profile from the organisation chart on the S&D Group’s website do not give rise to the non‑contractual liability of the European Union.
46
In addition, even though the second contested decision wrongly stated that the procedure laid down in Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations ‘was not open’ to the applicant, that cannot alter the fact that that decision rightly rejected the applicant’s claim for compensation against the Parliament.
47
Therefore, the head of claim seeking annulment of the second contested decision must be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
48
As regards the head of claim seeking compensation for damage, according to settled case-law in civil-service matters, such a claim must be dismissed where it is closely associated with a claim for annulment, which has itself been dismissed either as inadmissible or as unfounded (see judgment of 19 April 2023, PP and Others v Parliament, T‑39/21, EU:T:2023:204, paragraph 130 and the case-law cited).
49
Since the head of claim seeking annulment of the second contested decision and the head of claim seeking compensation are closely associated, the latter must also be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
50
The head of claim seeking annulment of the first contested decision must also be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. In that connection, the arguments in support of that head of claim are ineffective given the replacement of the first contested decision by the second contested decision (see paragraph 37 above) and given that the head of claim seeking annulment of the second contested decision has been dismissed (see paragraph 47 above). Furthermore, and in any event, given that the publication of the press release and the removal of the applicant’s profile from the organisation chart on the S&D Group’s website cannot be attributed to the Parliament, the first of the cumulative conditions necessary for a successful claim for compensation based on the European Union’s non-contractual liability has not been met.
51
It follows that the application in its entirety must be dismissed pursuant to Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
Costs
52
Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
53
Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Parliament, to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Parliament.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.
The action is dismissed.
2.
EO shall pay the costs.
Luxembourg, 20 April 2026.
V. Di Bucci
Registrar
G. De Baere
President
(
*1
)	Language of the case: English.