ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Single Judge)
7 May 2026 (*)
( Civil service – Staff of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union – Recruitment – Vacancy notice CDT-AD5-2025/03 – Rejection of application – Duty to state reasons – Failure to communicate the applicant’s scores )
In Case T‑790/25,
NX,
represented by A. Pappas and by D.-A. Pappa, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT),
represented by M. Garnier and V. Cirlig, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Single Judge),
Judge: C. Mac Eochaidh,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the decision of the General Court (Fourth Chamber), pursuant to Article 14(3) and Article 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, to assign the case to C. Mac Eochaidh, sitting as a single Judge,
makes the following
Order
1        By her action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, NX, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Selection Committee of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT) (‘the Selection Committee’) of 8 August 2025, taken in the context of selection procedure ‘CDT-AD5-2025/03 – Assistant to the Director’, not to invite her to the selection stage (‘the contested decision’) and, if necessary, annulment of the response of 11 August 2025 of the Chair of the Selection Committee to her request for information (‘the letter of 11 August 2025’).
Background to the dispute
2        On 20 May 2025, the CdT published vacancy notice CDT-AD5-2025/03 for the position of Assistant to the Director (‘the vacancy notice’).
3        Point 4 of the vacancy notice described a two-part pre-selection procedure in the following terms:
‘(a)      Pre-selection stage:
The pre-selection stage will take place in two parts:
–        The first part will be based on the abovementioned “eligibility criteria” … and aims to establish whether the applicant meets all the mandatory eligibility criteria and all the formal requirements laid down in the application procedure. Applicants who do not meet these requirements will be rejected.
–        The second part will take account of professional experience and other aspects mentioned in point 3, “Selection Criteria”. It will be marked on a scale from 0 to 20 (pass mark: 12).
The selection committee will invite the applicants who have passed the pre-selection stage and achieved the highest scores to sit a written test and attend an interview [at the selection stage].
(b)      Selection stage:
…’
4        At the relevant time the applicant was employed by an agency of the European Union other than the CdT. For inter-agency applicants, the vacancy notice indicated that the eligibility criteria included the following:
‘On the closing date for applications and on the day of filling the vacant post, be engaged as temporary staff under Article 2(f) of [the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (“the CEOS”)] within their agency in a grade and function group corresponding to grade bracket AD 5 to AD 7;
Have worked for at least two years at their agency before moving;
Have successfully completed the probationary period as provided for in Article 14 of the CEOS in the relevant function group.’
5        On 19 June 2025, the applicant submitted her application in response to the vacancy notice.
6        On 8 August 2025, the CdT informed the applicant of the decision not to invite her to the selection stage.
7        On the same day, the applicant requested further information on the evaluation process and on the assessment of her application from the Chair of the Selection Committee.
8        The Chair of the Selection Committee replied to her request by letter of 11 August 2025.
Forms of order sought
9        The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        annul, if necessary, the letter of 11 August 2025;
–        order the CdT to pay the costs.
10      The CdT contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action as inadmissible;
–        in the alternative, dismiss the action as unfounded;
–        decide on costs as it deems appropriate.
Law
Subject matter of the action
11      By her action before the Court, the applicant seeks the annulment of the contested decision and, if necessary, the letter of 11 August 2025.
12      According to the case-law, a measure of a purely informative nature can neither affect the interests of the addressee nor change his or her legal position compared with the situation prior to receipt of that measure (see judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council, T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
13      In the present case, it is apparent from the file submitted to the Court that the letter of 11 August 2025 was purely informative in nature. The Chair of the Selection Committee provided information in response to each question put by the applicant (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). Indeed, the parties agree that the letter of 11 August 2025 does not have content independent of the contested decision and that it ought not be regarded as a challengeable act.
14      Therefore, the claim for annulment must be regarded as being directed solely against the contested decision.
Admissibility of the action
15      The CdT disputes the admissibility of the present action. It contends that before an action could be brought before the Court, the contested decision should have been the subject of a complaint, under Article 90(2) and Article 91 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’). The defendant argues that the failure of the applicant to make a pre-litigation complaint is fatal to her action.
16      Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations provides that an appeal to the EU Courts by an official is admissible only if that official has previously submitted a complaint to the appointing authority in accordance with Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, order of 26 September 2019, Barata v Parliament, C‑71/19 P, not published, EU:C:2019:793, paragraph 80). Article 46 of the CEOS provides that Title VII of the Staff Regulations, which includes Articles 90 and 91 thereof, applies by analogy.
17      However, a complaint to an administrative body against a decision of a selection board or committee would be pointless, where that body has no authority to annul or amend the impugned decision. The only legal remedy open to those concerned by such a decision normally lies in a direct application to the EU Courts. In such a situation, the lodging of a complaint by the person concerned prior to bringing the matter before the EU Courts is merely optional (see, to that effect, order of 26 September 2019, Barata v Parliament, C‑71/19 P, not published, EU:C:2019:793 paragraph 81 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2015, Cuallado Martorell v Commission, T‑506/12 P, EU:T:2015:931, paragraphs 54 and 55 and the case-law cited).
18      Point 6 of the vacancy notice states that applicants may lodge a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, addressed to ‘the Authority Empowered to Conclude Contracts of Employment’, but expressly adds that the said body ‘does not have the power to amend the decisions of a selection committee’.
19      Since any complaint lodged with the Authority Empowered to Conclude Contracts of Employment would appear to be pointless, the applicant was entitled to bring her action directly to the Court without needing to lodge a preliminary administrative complaint.
20      It follows from the foregoing that the applicant’s action for annulment is admissible.
Substance
21      Under Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where the Court of Justice or the General Court has already ruled on one or more questions of law identical to those raised by the pleas in law of the action and the General Court finds that the facts have been established, it may, after the written part of the procedure has been closed, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the parties, decide by reasoned order in which reference is made to the relevant case-law to declare the action manifestly well founded.
22      In her reply to a measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court on 23 March 2026 under Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant submits that the conditions for applying Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure in the instant case are fulfilled. In its reply to that measure, the CdT states that those conditions are not fulfilled.
23      In the present case, the Court considers that the conditions for applying Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure have been met and has decided to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings. The Court finds that all relevant facts are established and that the legal questions raised have been previously determined by a clear line of case-law.
24      In support of the action, the applicant raises five pleas in law, alleging (i) infringement of the obligation to state reasons; (ii) infringement of point 6 of the vacancy notice; (iii) infringement of the principles of equal treatment, consistent scoring and objectivity of the assessment, and misuse of discretion; (iv) manifest error of assessment; and (v) infringement of the principles of transparency and equal treatment, and non-respect of the binding force of the vacancy notice.
25      The first plea raises a point of law identical to that on which the Court of Justice ruled in its judgments of 11 June 2020, Commission v Di Bernardo (C‑114/19 P, EU:C:2020:457), and of 29 January 2026, PB v SRB (Decision not to reclassify) (C‑727/23 P, EU:C:2026:58). The General Court also ruled on that point in its judgment of 18 December 2024, TB v ENISA (T‑560/21, EU:T:2024:914).
26      The applicant argues that the contested decision neither enables her to understand the rejection of her application, nor permits the Court to exercise its review. Consequently, the CdT has infringed the obligation to state reasons.
27      The CdT disputes that argument. It submits that the information provided to the applicant was sufficient to enable her to understand the reasons for not inviting her to the selection stage.
28      The requirement to state reasons obliges the EU institution or body which is the author of the act to make its reasoning clear and unequivocal so as to enable the persons affected to know the reasons for the measure taken and for the competent court to exercise its review. That requirement must be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the act, the nature of the grounds relied on and the interest which the addressees of the act or other persons directly and individually concerned by it may have in receiving explanations. It is in the light of the purpose of that requirement and of all the abovementioned factors that the statement of reasons of a decision may be considered either absent or inadequate (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 June 2020, Commission v Di Bernardo, C‑114/19 P, EU:C:2020:457, paragraph 54 and of 29 January 2026, PB v SRB (Decision not to reclassify), C‑727/23 P, EU:C:2026:58, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
29      In the present case, the contested decision informed the applicant merely that ‘the Selection Committee has carefully analysed your application, and we regret to inform you that you have not been selected to participate in the tests [at the selection stage]’. Prima facie, no reason is expressed for the rejection of the job application.
30      As noted by the applicant, the contested decision does not reveal at which of the two parts of the pre-selection stage of the procedure her application was rejected. That is to say, the said decision does not state whether her application was rejected at the first part, on the basis of the eligibility criteria, or at the second part, on the basis of the selection criteria (see paragraph 3 above). This lack of information is not cured by the letter of 11 August 2025, since that letter does not contain any individual assessment of the applicant’s application and merely paraphrases the vacancy notice.
31      The Selection Committee was required to indicate in which part of the pre-selection stage the applicant’s application had been rejected, since, as specified in the vacancy notice and as the letter of 11 August 2025 recalls, only eligible applications were to be scored from 0 to 20 in the second part of that stage. The second part presupposes that the application was eligible. In that regard, the vacancy notice states that ‘applicants who do not meet these requirements [inter alia ‘all mandatory eligibility criteria’] will be rejected’. The letter of 11 August 2025 confirms that ‘the pre-selection was based on a comparative assessment of all eligible applications’.
32      However, the CdT has stated in paragraph 20 of its defence that ‘the decision not to invite [the applicant] to the next stage resulted from a comparative assessment of all eligible applications’ and that she was so informed.
33      That indication that the applicant’s application was assessed as an eligible application (which does not appear in the contested decision or in the letter of 11 August 2025, contrary to what is pleaded in paragraph 20 of the defence) must be understood to mean that the CdT decided that the applicant had met ‘all the mandatory eligibility criteria’ (see paragraph 3 above) and had therefore succeeded in the first part of the pre-selection stage. Her application must therefore have been evaluated and rejected in the second part of the pre-selection stage. As can be seen from the vacancy notice, this second part involves awarding scores from 0 to 20 to each eligible applicant. As the Court found in paragraphs 28 and 30 above, the contested decision does not express any reason for the rejection of the applicant’s application, and the letter of 11 August 2025 merely paraphrases the vacancy notice.
34      According to settled case-law, a statement of reasons so incomplete that it does not in any way enable the addressee, in the context of its adoption, to understand its author’s reasoning amounts to a failure to state reasons. Furthermore, such a failure cannot be remedied by producing that statement of reasons before the EU Courts (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 June 2020, Commission v Di Bernardo, C‑114/19 P, EU:C:2020:457, paragraphs 52, 55 and 60 and the case-law cited, and of 29 January 2026, PB v SRB (Decision not to reclassify), C‑727/23 P, EU:C:2026:58, paragraphs 30, 31 and 34).
35      Manifestly, the contested decision falls within the category of decision described by the case-law in the preceding paragraph. Consequently, the contested decision is found to be vitiated by a failure to state reasons, which the CdT cannot remedy by seeking to add reasons in the defence.
36      For the sake of completeness and assuming that the CdT had indeed analysed the applicant’s application in the second part of the pre-selection stage, the CdT was not entitled to refuse to disclose her score.
37      It is true that, as argued by the CdT, with regard to decisions taken by a selection committee created to fill a position, the duty to state reasons must be reconciled with observance of the secrecy surrounding the proceedings of selection boards by virtue of Article 6 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2019, Stamatopoulos v ENISA, T‑99/18, not published, EU:T:2019:305, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
38      However, the case-law referred to in paragraph 37 above does not preclude the disclosure of scores to candidates. Indeed, it has already been held that communication of the scores obtained in the various tests constitutes an adequate statement of the reasons on which the selection board’s decisions are based and, therefore, that the candidate must be informed of the scores obtained at the same time as the decision rejecting his or her application (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 May 2019, Stamatopoulos v ENISA, T‑99/18, not published, EU:T:2019:305, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and of 18 December 2024, TB v ENISA, T‑560/21, EU:T:2024:914, paragraphs 87 and 88 and the case-law cited).
39      Thus, the Court finds that the contested decision does not contain any statement of reasons for the rejection of the applicant’s application for the position in question.
40      Consequently, the first plea in law is upheld, the action is declared manifestly well founded in accordance with Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure and the contested decision must be annulled, without it being necessary to examine the other pleas in law put forward by the applicant.
Costs
41      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
42      In the present case, since the CdT has been unsuccessful, it is ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Single Judge)
hereby orders:
1.      The decision of the Selection Committee of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT) of 8 August 2025, taken in the context of selection procedure ‘CDT-AD5-2025/03 – Assistant to the Director’, not to invite NX to the selection stage is annulled.
2.      The CdT shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by NX.
Luxembourg, 7 May 2026.
V. Di Bucci
C. Mac Eochaidh
Registrar
Judge
*      Language of the case: English.