ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
25 November 2025 (*)
( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark G CORE – Earlier EU word mark CORE – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law )
In Case T‑660/24,
G-Core Innovations Sàrl, established in Contern (Luxembourg), represented by L. Karnøe Søndergaard, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by E. Nicolás Gómez, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Coretransform GmbH, established in Berlin (Germany), represented by U. Hildebrandt, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),
composed, at the time of deliberations, of A. Marcoulli, President, W. Valasidis and L. Spangsberg Grønfeldt (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
makes the following
Order
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, G-Core Innovations Sàrl, seeks annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 24 October 2024 (Case R 2364/2023-1) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2        On 17 December 2021, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:
3        The mark applied for covered goods and services in, inter alia, Classes 9 and 42 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 9: ‘Computer software; computer software for use in accessing, updating, managing, modifying, organising, storing, backing up, synchronising, transmitting and sharing data, documents, files, information and multimedia content via a global computer network; downloadable and non-downloadable (cloud) application software for providing a social networking system including music streaming, movie streaming, video streaming, management of domain name system (DNS) services, cyber security software for computers; downloadable and non-downloadable software for cyber security and software testing’;
–        Class 42: ‘Computer consultation services; computer programming services; consulting in the field of cloud computing networks and applications; computer software design and development services; hosting of computer software and software applications for others; cloud computing; cloud storage services for electronic data and files; private and public cloud hosting provider service; scientific and technological services and research and design relating thereto; design and development of computer hardware, software cloud computing services; application service provider (ASP) services; application service provider (ASP) services featuring software for use in domain name system (DNS) and domain name management; provision of software and computer services for use in DNS; maintaining database; computer security services [design and development of hardware, software and systems, all in relation to cybersecurity services]; cybersecurity software advisory services; cybersecurity consultancy, electronic storage of files and documents’.
4        On 29 June 2021, the intervener, Coretransform GmbH, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of all of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5        The opposition was based, inter alia, on the earlier EU word mark CORE, registered on 29 November 2010 under number 9 232 406 and renewed until 8 July 2030, covering services in Classes 41 and 42 and corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 41: ‘Educational instruction; training’;
–        Class 42: ‘Design and development of computer hardware and software; information technology consulting’.
6        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
7        On 11 October 2023, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 in respect of all of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.
8        On 4 December 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that, given the overall degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the identity or similarity of the goods and services at issue, there was a likelihood of confusion for the relevant public within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
Forms of order sought
10      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        allow the mark applied for to be registered in respect of all the refused goods and services;
–        order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the Court.
11      EUIPO contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
12      The intervener contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
13      Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where an action is manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the General Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
14      In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings, notwithstanding that one of the parties has requested a hearing.
15      In particular, the judgment of 28 September 2022, G-Core Innovations v EUIPO – Coretransform (G CORELABS) (T‑454/21, not published, EU:T:2022:591), which gave rise, on appeal, to the order of 23 March 2023, G-Core Innovations v EUIPO (C‑732/22 P, not published, EU:C:2023:253), between the same parties and concerning issues similar to those which are again discussed before the General Court (see, inter alia, paragraph 39 below), must be taken into consideration in the present case.
16      In support of its action, the applicant raises, in essence, a single plea in law alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. In that regard, it submits, first, that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue and, secondly, that it incorrectly assessed the likelihood of confusion.
17      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
18      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
19      The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services at issue come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services at issue and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).
20      For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
21      Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods or services at issue in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, in order for registration of a trade mark to be refused, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
22      As regards the determination of the relevant public, first of all, the Board of Appeal noted that, in the light of the fact that the marks at issue were EU trade marks, the relevant territory was that of the European Union. The Board of Appeal also confirmed the Opposition Division’s findings that, first, the relevant public comprised both the public at large and business customers and, secondly, the level of attention of that relevant public varied from average to high, depending on the price, the specialised nature or the terms and conditions of the goods and services purchased.
23      As regards the comparison of the goods and services at issue, the Board of Appeal confirmed the Opposition Division’s findings that the goods and services covered by the mark applied for, in Classes 9 and 42, were in part identical and in part similar to the services covered by the earlier mark in Classes 41 and 42. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found that those findings had not been challenged before it by the applicant.
24      Since those assessments have not been challenged by the parties, there is no need to call them in question.
The comparison of the signs
25      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services at issue plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
26      Furthermore, assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks at issue as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).
27      Furthermore, it should be noted that the greater or lesser degree of distinctiveness of the elements common to the mark applied for and an earlier mark is one of the relevant factors in assessing the similarity of the signs at issue (see judgment of 26 March 2015, Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club v OHIM – Lifestyle Equities (Royal County of Berkshire POLO CLUB), T‑581/13, not published, EU:T:2015:192, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). The descriptive, non-distinctive or weakly distinctive elements of a complex trade mark generally have less weight in the analysis of the similarity between the signs than the elements of greater distinctiveness, which are also more able to dominate the overall impression created by the mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson, C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
28      In the present case, before addressing the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, the assessment carried out by the Board of Appeal of the distinctive and dominant elements of those signs must be examined.
The distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue
29      In the first place, the Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark was composed of the word element ‘core’, an English word which had a common general meaning in that language and a specialised meaning, specific to computing.
30      As regards the general meaning, the Board of Appeal specified, first, that the English word ‘core’, which referred in that language to ‘the central, innermost, or most essential part of something’, was not part of the basic English vocabulary and that the applicant had not established that that word had close equivalents in other ‘European language[s]’. Consequently, the Board of Appeal found that, for the non-English-speaking part of the relevant public at large, that word was regarded as invented and that the word element ‘core’ was, therefore, distinctive to an average degree.
31      The Board of Appeal found, secondly, that a very large proportion of European consumers and professionals had an elementary knowledge of English and that certain English terms in technical fields were understood by the relevant professionals throughout the European Union. From that, the Board of Appeal concluded that the general meaning of the English word ‘core’ would be understood not only by the English-speaking part of the public at large but also by the specialised public. For that part of the relevant public, the Board of Appeal found that the word ‘core’ had no direct or specific relation with the services designated by the earlier mark and that its distinctiveness was, therefore, also average.
32      As regards the specialised meaning of the English word ‘core’ in computing, which referred to ‘one of several processing units working in parallel to a computer’, the Board of Appeal found that that meaning exceeded the mere knowledge of the English language and was not likely to be grasped by the relevant public at large or by a non-negligible part of the relevant specialised public. The Board of Appeal also stated that the relevant English-speaking part of the individuals or professionals at which the services of the earlier mark were directed were not necessarily familiarised with the jargon of the IT field. It is, therefore, only for the part of the specialised public that would grasp the abovementioned meaning relating to the IT field that the term would be allusive of the designated services and, consequently, its distinctiveness would be of a below-average degree.
33      In the second place, the Board of Appeal noted that the mark applied for consisted of two elements. As regards the figurative element representing the letter ‘g’, the Board of Appeal stated that it would be noticed by the general public because of its position, its size and the contrast created by the colour combination used. That element also has no meaning in relation to the relevant goods and services. In that context, the Board of Appeal found that the figurative element had an average degree of distinctiveness. As regards the word element ‘core’, the Board of Appeal found that it would be equally eye-catching in the contested mark due to its size, its black bold font and its legibility. The Board of Appeal also noted that, when encountering a sign, the public tended to look for words. Therefore, the Board of Appeal found that neither of the elements of the mark applied for is visually more dominant. Moreover, the Board of Appeal specified that the explanations on the distinctiveness of the word ‘core’ mentioned for the earlier mark were applicable to the mark applied for.
34      The applicant submits that the meaning of the word element ‘core’ was not assessed correctly. That term has a variety of meanings, reflecting the idea of centrality, essentiality or foundational aspects. The term ‘core’ is thus descriptive of the services covered by the earlier mark and the Board of Appeal should have found that its distinctiveness was close to non-existent.
35      EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.
36      In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant’s line of argument relies on the idea that the entirety of the relevant public is able to perceive the meanings of the term ‘core’ mentioned in its arguments (see paragraph 34 above) and thus considers that that term is descriptive of the services covered by the earlier mark.
37      Nevertheless, as the Board of Appeal correctly notes in the contested decision, although the term ‘core’ is an English word that, as such, has several meanings, those meanings will not all be perceived by the various parts of the relevant public defined in the contested decision. In general, it is commonly considered that the English word ‘core’ corresponds to ‘the central, innermost, or most essential part of something’. That definition includes the various meanings derived from the physical sciences, the field of education, philosophy or business which are mentioned by the applicant. That definition also applies to the metaphorical meaning of the word to which the applicant makes reference in its arguments.
38      Nonetheless, contrary to what the applicant claims, it clearly cannot be considered that the entirety of the relevant public perceives the meaning referred to in paragraph 37 above.
39      Given that the element ‘core’ lacks specific meaning for the non-English-speaking part of the public at large, which is not contested by the applicant, the Board of Appeal correctly stated that that element had an average degree of distinctiveness for that part of the relevant public (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2022, G CORELABS, T‑454/21, not published, EU:T:2022:591, paragraphs 39 and 40).
40      Accordingly, inasmuch as – as EUIPO notes – a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion for a non-negligible part of the relevant public is sufficient to uphold an opposition brought against an application for registration of a mark (see judgment of 20 November 2017, Stada Arzneimittel v EUIPO – Urgo recherche innovation et développement (Immunostad), T‑403/16, not published, EU:T:2017:824, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited), the applicant’s line of argument proves clearly ineffective as regards the assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements carried out by the Board of Appeal concerning the non-English-speaking part of the public at large, which represents a non-negligible part of the relevant public.
41      Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, for the English-speaking part of the public at large and for the specialised public which possessed an elementary knowledge of English, the Board of Appeal considered that, although that part of the relevant public would perceive the general meaning commonly given to the English word ‘core’, that meaning had no direct or specific relation with the services covered by the earlier mark and that the distinctiveness of the word element ‘core’ was, therefore, also average.
42      In that regard, it clearly cannot be claimed, as the applicant maintains, that the general meaning given to the English word ‘core’ demonstrates that that word is descriptive of the services covered by the earlier mark.
43      In order to support its line of argument, the applicant does not claim that the mere reference to the term ‘core’ and to its general meaning is sufficient to describe the services covered by the earlier mark, but uses other terms to provide the context required in order to arrive at such an association. Thus, in order to maintain that the term ‘core’ describes training services, the applicant submits that the training concerns imparting essential competencies, often referred to as ‘core skills’ or ‘core knowledge’. Similarly, in order to argue that the term ‘core’ refers to the creation or development of computer hardware or IT consulting, the applicant states that, in those fields, that term ‘represents the central functionality or fundamental components of technology’, is ‘used to describe the primary processing units, frameworks, or algorithms that drive the technology’s performance’, or ‘signifies the foundational strategies and infrastructure solutions that support organisational goals’.
44      Yet such a line of argument cannot suffice to establish that the general meaning commonly given to the English word ‘core’, by the part of the relevant public that perceives it, makes it possible to describe directly and without effort the various services covered by the earlier mark. In the present case, that term remains too vague to be considered as descriptive or allusive to the extent necessary that it would diminish its distinctiveness for that part of the relevant public.
45      For that reason, there is clearly no need to call in question the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the word element ‘core’ had an average degree of distinctiveness for the English-speaking part of the public at large, and for the specialised public that possessed an elementary knowledge of English.
46      Moreover, it should also be noted that the applicant does not challenge the Board of Appeal’s assessment that, for the professional public that perceived the specialised meaning of the English word ‘core’ in the IT field, that term would allude to the services designated and, therefore, its distinctiveness would only be below average, and not close to non-existent.
47      It follows that the Board of Appeal clearly did not make an error of assessment in finding that the word element common to the earlier mark and the mark applied for had an average degree of distinctiveness for the non-English-speaking part of the public at large, on the one hand, and for the English-speaking part of the public at large and for the specialised public that possessed an elementary knowledge of English, on the other hand. Similarly, the Board of Appeal clearly did not make an error of assessment in finding that the distinctiveness of that word element was of only a below-average degree for the part of the specialised public that understood the specialised meaning of the English word ‘core’ in the IT field.
The visual similarity of the signs
48      The Board of Appeal noted that while the signs at issue differed in the presence of the figurative element ‘g’ in the mark applied for, they coincided in the word element ‘core’, the sole element of the earlier mark. From that, the Board of Appeal concluded that those signs were similar to an average degree, except as regards the public that understood the ‘IT connotation’ of the element ‘core’ for which, taking into account the allusiveness of that element, the similarity of the signs was below average.
49      The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment because ‘the highly visual and distinctive element in the [mark applied for] was not given enough emphasis when keeping the very low/non-exist[ent] distinctiveness of the word “core” in mind’.
50      EUIPO disputes that line of argument.
51      In the present case, it should be borne in mind that the Board of Appeal was correct to consider that the common element ‘core’ had an average degree of distinctiveness for the public at large and for a non-negligible part of the professional public and a distinctiveness of only a below-average degree – not a low or very low degree – for the part of the professional public that perceived the specialised meaning of the term ‘core’ in the IT field (see paragraphs 29 to 33 above). Accordingly, the Board of Appeal correctly stated that, contrary to what the applicant submitted before it, the element ‘g’ of the mark applied for, despite its distinctiveness and the fact that it was visually striking, was not such as to completely eclipse the other element ‘core’ of that mark, which remained identifiable.
52      Since the applicant has merely repeated, before the Court, the line of argument previously rejected by the Board of Appeal, without calling in question the merits of that assessment or the merits of other assessments in the contested decision, it must clearly, therefore, be held that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in stating, at the end of an overall assessment of all the various elements of the marks at issue that coincided and differed, that those marks were visually similar to an average or below-average degree depending on the different degrees of distinctiveness of the term ‘core’ mentioned in paragraph 54 above.
The phonetic similarity of the signs
53      The Board of Appeal found that the marks at issue had an identical phonetic element, namely the word ‘core’ which would be pronounced by the relevant public as one or two syllables depending on the language used, and that the fact that the earlier mark is included in full in the mark applied for created a phonetic similarity. The Board of Appeal also noted that the pronunciation of those marks was differentiated by the presence of the additional element ‘g’ in the mark applied for, which, if pronounced – which might not be the case – was just one syllable. Consequently, the Board of Appeal found that the marks had an average degree of phonetic similarity or were phonetically identical depending on whether or not the element ‘g’ was pronounced.
54      The applicant submits that, when pronouncing the earlier mark and the mark applied for, no matter in which language, the consumer will emphasise the first syllable differently, ‘core’ as compared to ‘g’ respectively, and will pronounce each element of the mark applied for. The mark applied for is, therefore, phonetically significantly longer than the earlier mark.
55      EUIPO disputes that line of argument.
56      In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant’s line of argument fails to take into account the result of the assessment of the phonetic similarity of the signs at issue set out in the contested decision. The Board of Appeal adjudicated, in that regard, not only having regard to the fact that there was a difference between the scenario where the figurative element ‘g’ of the mark applied for were pronounced and the scenario where that element were not pronounced, but it also specified that, while it was necessary to take into consideration the intonation and the different length of the marks at issue in the event that that element were pronounced, it was also necessary to take into consideration the fact that the word element ‘core’ of the earlier mark was included in full in the mark applied for.
57      Thus, the particular circumstances identified by the applicant must be analysed with regard to the other elements taken into account by the Board of Appeal, which are not referred to or, therefore, contested by the applicant.
58      Consequently, there is clearly no reason to call in question the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the marks at issue are phonetically identical or phonetically similar to an average degree depending on the scenarios taken into consideration.
The conceptual similarity of the signs
59      The Board of Appeal found that, conceptually, the marks at issue were similar to an average degree or non-comparable. First, the Board of Appeal stated that those marks had an average degree of similarity for the part of the relevant public that understood any of the meanings of the term ‘core’, with the figurative element and the word element ‘g’ of the mark applied for not conveying any meaning. Secondly, the Board of Appeal noted that, for the non-English-speaking part of the public at large that did not understand the meaning of the word element ‘core’, the conceptual comparison was not possible.
60      The applicant submits that the mark applied for is conceptually different from the earlier mark, because it conveys a specific concept, possibly tied to a geometric, graphical, or network-related context, whereas the word ‘core’ alone generally signifies a central or foundational part of something, without necessarily referring to a graphical or network-related context. Moreover, given the descriptive nature of the term ‘core’, it would not reasonably lead consumers to believe that the mark applied for is merely a sub-brand or an updated version of the earlier mark. Instead, they would consider that the mark applied for could stand as a distinct brand with its own conceptual and functional identity, differentiating itself from the generic and foundational implications of ‘core’.
61      EUIPO disputes that line of argument.
62      In the present case, it should, first, be noted, as EUIPO observes, that the applicant’s assertion that the mark applied for conveyed a specific concept possibly tied to a geometric, graphical, or network-related context, is not accompanied by any evidence capable of substantiating that assertion. On the contrary, it should instead be considered that the additional element ‘g’ in the mark applied for conveys no particular concept (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2022, G CORELABS, T‑454/21, not published, EU:T:2022:591, paragraph 58). Secondly, it must be borne in mind that, contrary to what the applicant submits, the common word element ‘core’ is not descriptive, but instead has an average or below-average degree of distinctiveness depending on the parts of the relevant public taken into consideration.
63      Consequently, there is clearly no reason to call in question the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the marks at issue have an average degree of conceptual similarity for the part of the relevant public that understands any of the meanings of the term ‘core’ or cannot be compared in that respect for the non-English-speaking part of the public at large that does not understand the meaning of the word element ‘core’.
The overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion
64      In order to find that there was a likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal noted, inter alia, that the relevant public consisted of the public at large and business customers, the degree of attention of which varied from average to high, and that the goods and services under comparison were either identical or similar. The Board of Appeal also noted that the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark was in the main average and only below average for the part of the specialised public that also understood the specific connotation of the term ‘core’ as ‘processing unit working in parallel in a computer’. In that respect, the Board of Appeal rejected the applicant’s argument that the earlier mark was descriptive of the services at issue. On that point, it referred to the judgment of 28 September 2022, G CORELABS (T‑454/21, not published, EU:T:2022:591, paragraph 55), in which it was held that the term ‘core’ was merely allusive and not descriptive in respect of services of the same type. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal specified that the marks at issue had an average or below-average degree of visual similarity and were phonetically identical or had an average degree of phonetic similarity. Moreover, conceptually, it found that those marks had an average degree of similarity or were not comparable. The Board of Appeal also stated that, inasmuch as the sole element making up the earlier mark was included in its entirety within the mark applied for, the signs at issue were partially identical in such a manner as to create a certain impression of similarity in the mind of the relevant public. The differing figurative element ‘g’ in the mark applied for cannot be sufficient to rule out a likelihood of confusion or association amongst the relevant public.
65      In essence, the applicant submits that the marks at issue contain more differences than they do shared elements. Taking into account the low level of visual similarity, the below-average phonetic similarity and the neutral conceptual comparison, those marks are, in its view, not sufficiently similar to be perceived as confusingly similar.
66      EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument.
67      A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
68      In the present case, in the first place, it should be borne in mind, as noted in paragraphs 22 to 24 above, that the Board of Appeal considered, without being disproved in that regard by the applicant, first, that the relevant public was composed of the public at large and business customers, the degree of attention of which varied from average to high, and, secondly, that the services covered by the earlier mark were either identical or similar to the goods and services covered by the mark applied for.
69      In the second place, it follows from the foregoing that the applicant’s criticisms of the Board of Appeal’s assessments in respect of the distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue or in respect of the marks’ visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. In particular, it is established that, contrary to the applicant’s contentions, the word element ‘core’ of the earlier mark is not descriptive or weakly distinctive. The Board of Appeal was correct in finding, in that regard, that the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark was in the main average and only below-average for the part of the specialised public that also understood the specialised meaning of the term ‘core’ in the IT field.
70      Accordingly, it must be found that, having regard to the above and in the context of an overall assessment of the circumstances of the case, the Board of Appeal was clearly entitled to find, for the reasons that it set out in the contested decision, that there was a likelihood of confusion.
71      In the light of all of the foregoing, the single plea in law in the action, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
72      Consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim requesting the Court to allow registration of the mark applied for.
Costs
73      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
74      Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.
75      By contrast, as EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is held, EUIPO must be ordered to bear its own costs since no hearing has been held.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.      The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
2.      G-Core Innovations Sàrl, in addition to bearing its own costs, shall pay those incurred by Coretransform GmbH.
3.      The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs.
Luxembourg, 25 November 2025.
V. Di Bucci
A. Marcoulli
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.