JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
15 April 2026 (*)
( Civil service – Members of the contract staff – Change of place of employment – Conduct of the administration – Failure to comply with formal requirements – Partial inadmissibility – Liability )
In Case T‑594/23,
PS, represented by S. Rodrigues and A. Champetier, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European External Action Service (EEAS), represented by S. Falek and R. Coesme, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of L. Truchot, President, H. Kanninen (Rapporteur) and M. Sampol Pucurull, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the measure of organisation of procedure of 23 October 2024 and the replies of the EEAS and the applicant lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 5 and 7 November 2024, respectively,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By his action based on Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, PS, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the European External Action Service (EEAS) of 14 June 2023 rejecting his complaint of 23 December 2022 (‘the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022’) and, second, compensation for the professional and psychological damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of the EEAS’ unlawful conduct.
I.      Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action
2        The applicant is a former member of the contract staff of the EEAS. Before being recruited by the EEAS, the applicant was employed at the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (EASME) under a contract of indefinite duration, pursuant to Article 3a of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’), in function group IV.
3        In August 2019, the applicant applied to position AC GF IV No 321139 of Infrastructure Officer in the European Union Delegation in Washington DC (United States) (‘the delegation’), offered by the EEAS for a fixed period of one year.
4        On 17 October 2019, the applicant was informed by the EEAS that his application had been successful and that the position would be reserved for his recruitment on 1 January 2020.
5        On 23 October 2019, the applicant informed the EEAS division ‘HR.2 – Contract Agents Team’ (‘the HR.2 Division’) that he accepted the offer of employment and confirmed his availability for a start date of 1 January 2020.
6        On 24 October 2019, the HR.2 Division informed the applicant that he could not be recruited under a fixed-term contract of one year, since he was employed as a member of the contract staff with a contract of indefinite duration with EASME.
7        By email of 4 November 2019, the HR.2 Division confirmed to the applicant that he could be offered a one-year contract only if he resigned from his current post, which was not recommended to him, and that a gap between those two contracts was necessary.
8        On 23 December 2019, the HR.2 Division stated to the applicant that the purpose of the post in question was to carry out an infrastructure project budgeted for one year. Thus, although the applicant’s contract had to be concluded for an indefinite duration, the EEAS reserved the right to terminate the contract in the interest of the service.
9        On 27 January 2020, the applicant informed Unit B.1 of the Directorate-General for Human Resources of the European Commission (‘DG HR Unit B.1’), responsible for recruiting contract staff for the EEAS, that his objective was to be recruited under a contract of indefinite duration with the EEAS. Therefore, if his application to EASME for leave on personal grounds prevented a contract of indefinite duration from being concluded, he would withdraw that request. Should that not be the case, he would maintain the application to EASME for leave on personal grounds for the period from 16 February to 15 September 2020.
10      On 28 January 2020, DG HR Unit B.1 replied to the applicant that he could either resign from EASME on 15 February 2020 and be offered a contract of indefinite duration with the EEAS without a probationary period from 16 February 2020, or take leave on personal grounds from EASME and be offered a one-year contract with the EEAS including a probationary period.
11      On 31 January 2020, the applicant replied to DG HR Unit B.1, informing it that he would resign from his post at EASME on 15 February 2020.
12      By email of 10 February 2020, the Head of Administration of the delegation stated that the delegation had not foreseen a mission budget to carry out a pre-posting seminar and that, consequently, the Head of Delegation was not in a position, at that stage, to give his agreement for the applicant to attend such a seminar. He added that if it was a mandatory seminar, the applicant could choose to postpone his entry into service until the end of that seminar.
13      On 16 February 2020, the applicant entered the service of the EEAS as a member of the contract staff for an indefinite period, in accordance with Article 3a of the CEOS. Under the second paragraph of Article 2 of the applicant’s contract of employment, his place of assignment was Washington DC. Under the third paragraph of that article, the EEAS reserved the right to reassign the applicant to ‘another place’, solely in the interests of the service. According to the same paragraph, the applicant was required to act on such a reassignment.
14      On 28 July 2020, the EEAS sent an email to the applicant stating that, in view of the limited temporal scope of his term in Washington DC, a lease going beyond February or March 2021 would not be approved.
15      On 13 October 2020, the EEAS sent a note to the applicant informing him that, for budgetary reasons, the post he held would be abolished and that it intended to terminate his contract with effect from 16 February 2021 on the basis of Article 47(b)(ii) of the CEOS, applicable to the applicant by virtue of Article 119 of the CEOS; it also invited him to submit observations.
16      On 26 October 2020, the applicant requested that the HR.2 Division provide clarifications regarding the note referred to in paragraph 15 above. He also sent an email to the Head of Division ‘Rights and Obligations’ of the EEAS, in which he asserted that he had not been authorised to take leave on personal grounds from EASME and that he had been asked to resign from his post with EASME in order to be able to sign a contract for an indefinite duration with the EEAS.
17      On 24 November 2020, the EEAS replied to that request, confirming that the post would be abolished in the interests of the service and that the applicant’s contract would be terminated. It added that it had provided the applicant with sufficient information to take an informed decision.
18      On 25 November 2020, the EEAS decided to terminate the applicant’s contract with effect from 16 February 2021.
19      On 23 March 2021, the Head of the HR.2 Division sent the applicant an email informing him of the decision to transfer him to the vacant architect post No 339626 within the ‘Field Operations’ team of the ‘BA.SI.4’ Division at the EEAS headquarters in Brussels (Belgium), with effect from 27 April 2021. According to that email, the decision of 25 November 2020 to terminate the applicant’s contract was withdrawn.
20      On 30 March 2021, the applicant informed the HR.2 Division that, in principle, the applicant would accept the post to which he was to be reassigned, but he asked that he be given until the end of August 2021 to be able to organise his move to Brussels.
21      On 23 July 2021, the applicant signed an amendment to his contract of employment. According to that amendment, the applicant’s place of assignment was to be in Brussels, with effect from 1 September 2021.
22      On 20 October 2021, the applicant lodged, first, a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) against the amendment of 23 July 2021, and second, a claim for compensation under Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations.
23      By decision of 22 February 2022, the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (‘the AECE’) rejected the applicant’s complaint against the amendment of 23 July 2021 as inadmissible. By the same decision, the AECE also rejected the claim for compensation of 20 October 2021.
24      On 20 May 2022, the applicant lodged, first, a complaint against the decision of 22 February 2022 in so far as it related to the claim for compensation of 20 October 2021 and, second, a new claim for compensation.
25      The amendment of 23 July 2021 and the decision of 22 February 2022, by which the AECE rejected his complaint against that amendment, were the subject of an action for annulment brought by the applicant, registered at the Court Registry on 31 May 2022 under case number T‑327/22.
26      By a decision of 30 September 2022, the AECE rejected the complaint of 20 May 2022 as manifestly inadmissible.
27      On the same day, by separate decision, the AECE rejected the new request for compensation, submitted on 20 May 2022, as inadmissible in part and unfounded in part (‘the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation’).
28      On 23 December 2022, the applicant submitted a complaint against the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation.
29      The decisions of the EEAS of 22 February 2022 rejecting the applicant’s claim for compensation of 20 October 2021 and of 30 September 2022 rejecting the complaint of 20 May 2022 were the subject of an action brought by the applicant, registered at the Court Registry on 6 January 2023 under case number T‑4/23. In the same action, the applicant sought compensation for the material and non-material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of the EEAS’ decision to reassign him to Brussels.
30      On 14 June 2023, the AECE rejected the complaint of 23 December 2022 as inadmissible in part and unfounded in part.
31      By order of 19 June 2023, PS v EEAS (T‑327/22, not published, EU:T:2023:354), the Court dismissed the action for annulment of 31 May 2022 as inadmissible.
32      On 19 December 2023, the AECE decided to terminate the applicant’s service from 31 December 2023 on the ground of permanent incapacity and to grant him an invalidity allowance with effect from 1 January 2024.
33      By order of 23 January 2024, PS v EEAS (T‑4/23, not published, EU:T:2024:43), the Court dismissed the action as inadmissible, in so far as there was a close link between the claim for compensation made in that action and the claim for annulment of the amendment of 23 July 2021, which the Court had rejected as inadmissible in its order of 19 June 2023, PS v EEAS (T‑327/22, not published, EU:T:2023:354).
II.    Forms of order sought
34      The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:
–        annul the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022;
–        order the EEAS to pay him the amounts of EUR 135 000 as compensation for the professional damage suffered and EUR 25 000 as compensation for the non-material damage suffered;
–        order the EEAS to pay the costs.
35      The EEAS contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action as inadmissible in part and unfounded in part;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
III. Law
A.      Subject matter of the action
36      By his first head of claim, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022.
37      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to case-law, an administrative complaint such as that referred to in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations and its rejection, whether express or implied, constitute an integral part of a complex procedure and are no more than a precondition for bringing the matter before the Court. In those circumstances, the action, even if formally directed against the rejection of the complaint, has the effect of bringing before the court the act adversely affecting the applicant against which the complaint was lodged, except where the rejection of the complaint has a different scope from that of the measure against which the complaint was lodged (see judgment of 8 July 2020, WH v EUIPO, T‑138/19, not published, EU:T:2020:316, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
38      Any decision rejecting a complaint, whether express or implied, if it is straightforward, merely confirms the act or failure to act complained of and, when taken in isolation, does not constitute a challengeable act, so that the claims made against that decision which has no autonomous content in relation to the initial decision must be regarded as being directed against the initial act (see judgments of 12 September 2019, XI v Commission, T‑528/18, not published, EU:T:2019:594, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and of 8 July 2020, WH v EUIPO, T‑138/19, not published, EU:T:2020:316, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). In such a situation, it is the legality of the act adversely affecting the applicant that must be examined, taking into consideration the reasons set out in the decision rejecting the complaint, as that reasoning is deemed to coincide with that act. By the decision rejecting the complaint, the competent authority supplements the statement of reasons for the decision which is the subject of the complaint, in particular by responding to the grievances put forward in the complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 September 2018, Villeneuve v Commission, T‑671/16, EU:T:2018:519, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
39      Moreover, a decision rejecting a complaint may, in the light of its content, not be confirmatory of the contested measure. That is the case where the decision rejecting the complaint contains a re-examination of the situation of the person concerned in the light of new elements of law or of fact, or where it changes or adds to the original decision. In such circumstances, the rejection of the complaint constitutes a measure subject to review by the judicature, which will take it into consideration when assessing the legality of the contested measure or will even regard it as an act adversely affecting the applicant replacing the contested measure (see judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
40      Moreover, according to settled case-law in civil service matters, a decision of an institution rejecting a request for compensation is an integral part of the preliminary administrative procedure which precedes an action to establish liability before the Court. The measure setting out the position adopted by the institution during the pre-litigation stage has the sole effect of allowing the party who claims to have suffered damage to apply to the Court for compensation, and consequently, claims for annulment of such a decision cannot be assessed in isolation from the claims relating to liability (see judgment of 3 October 2019, DQ and Others v Parliament, T‑730/18, EU:T:2019:725, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
41      In the present case, first, in the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the request for compensation, the AECE found that that request related to alleged instances of misconduct on the part of the administrative authorities other than those covered by the complaint of 20 May 2022. That complaint concerned the claim for compensation brought on 20 October 2021, which had been rejected by the decision of 22 February 2022. The complaint of 20 May 2022 was rejected in turn by another decision of 30 September 2022. As referred to in paragraph 33 above, the action for damages brought following the latter decision was declared inadmissible by the order of 23 January 2024, PS v EEAS (T‑4/23, not published, EU:T:2024:43).
42      Second, in the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation, the AECE found that some of the alleged instances of misconduct resulted from acts adversely affecting the applicant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations (‘the first set of instances of alleged misconduct’), whereas others were the result of the conduct of the administration which was not in the nature of a decision (‘the second set of instances of alleged misconduct’). In its decision, the AECE examined those two sets of instances of alleged misconduct separately.
43      As regards the first set of instances of alleged misconduct, the AECE found that the applicant had not lodged a complaint within the three-month period against the decision to ‘deny’ him the right to attend a seminar, or against the decision not to approve a lease ‘for more than five months’. The AECE concluded that the claim for compensation had to be declared inadmissible in respect of that first set of instances of alleged misconduct.
44      As regards the second set of instances of alleged misconduct, the AECE considered that the claim for compensation was based on three grounds, namely, first, ‘[various] actions and decisions taken by EEAS … during the [applicant’s] recruitment and [entry into service]’, secondly, ‘maladministration and mismanagement on the attribution of responsibilities, downgrading of [the applicant’s] actual responsibilities and duties’ and, thirdly, a breach of the duty of care. The AECE examined those alleged instances of misconduct on the merits and determined that there was no misconduct. In that regard, the AECE stated that it had not found any illegality, which was sufficient to reject the claim.
45      In the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, first of all, the AECE confirmed the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation as regards the first set of instances of alleged misconduct. In that regard, it added a line of reasoning in order to respond to an argument put forward by the applicant in the complaint.
46      Next, as regards the second set of instances of alleged misconduct, the AECE found that the applicant repeated his claim for compensation relating to the first two of the three grounds set out in paragraph 44 above. The AECE examined them on the merits and concluded, as in the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation, that no illegality had been committed by the administration.
47      Lastly, in paragraph 110 of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, in the context of the examination of the second set of instances of alleged misconduct, the AECE found that the applicant had not challenged by a complaint within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations the decision that his ‘first weeks of teleworking in Brussels [would be regarded] as Annual leave, despite [the fact that he had been authorised] by the [Head of Administration of the delegation to telework]’ (‘the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022’).
48      In that regard, it should be noted that, in the claim for compensation of 20 May 2022, the applicant stated that he had lodged a complaint concerning his request for teleworking from Brussels, which he claimed had been rejected. In the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation, the AECE addressed the question of teleworking in Brussels, but only in the context of the applicant’s arguments that the EEAS had not provided him with the necessary tools to work from his home. It was therefore in the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022 that the AECE claimed, for the first time, that the applicant had not challenged the decision relating to teleworking by means of a complaint within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.
49      The Court therefore considers that, in the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, the AECE confirmed the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation in so far as it relates to the first and second sets of instances of alleged misconduct. In addition, in the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, the AECE considered that the claim for compensation relating to teleworking in Brussels was inadmissible.
50      Accordingly, in so far as the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022 confirms the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation, there is no need to rule independently on the applicant’s first head of claim, since the present action has no purpose other than to obtain compensation for the damage which the applicant claims to have suffered as a result of unlawful acts which it imputes to the EEAS.
51      As regards the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, the Court considers that it is a part of that decision the scope of which differs from that of the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation.
52      In the light of all the foregoing, in the first place, it is necessary to examine the applicant’s claim for annulment in so far as it concerns the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022. In the second place, it is necessary to rule on the applicant’s claim for compensation.
B.      Admissibility of the claim for annulment in so far as it relates to the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022
53      As regards the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, it should be noted that, in the complaint of 20 May 2022 against the decision of 22 February 2022 rejecting the request for compensation of 20 October 2021, the applicant mentioned the issue of teleworking in Brussels under the heading ‘breach of the duty of care’. He claimed, first, that, even though he had ultimately been authorised to telework from Brussels by the Head of Administration of the Delegation, the first two weeks had been regarded as annual leave and, second, that he had lodged a complaint in that regard, but that that complaint had been rejected.
54      As recalled in paragraphs 26 and 27 above, on 30 September 2022, the EEAS rejected separately the complaint of 20 May 2022 and the new claim for compensation, also submitted on 20 May 2022.
55      In that regard, the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the complaint of 20 May 2022 does not mention the period of teleworking in Brussels. In the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation, as noted in paragraph 48 above, the AECE mentioned the period of teleworking in Brussels without, however, ruling on the conversion of those two weeks of teleworking into leave.
56      As stated in paragraph 104 of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, the applicant stated in the complaint of 23 December 2022 against the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation that the first weeks of teleworking in Brussels had been considered to be annual leave, even though that period of teleworking in Brussels had been authorised by the Head of Administration of the delegation and, in so doing, the EEAS had not assisted him in the practical aspects of teleworking. In the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, the EEAS considered that the applicant had not challenged the decision relating to teleworking by means of a complaint within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, as recalled in paragraph 47 above.
57      In the application, the applicant merely makes a very brief reference to the issue of teleworking in Brussels without citing paragraph 110 of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022. In the context of the unlawful conduct which, in his view, is not in the nature of a decision and constitutes maladministration, the applicant claims that the first weeks of teleworking in Brussels were considered to be annual leave, although he was authorised by the Head of Administration of the delegation to work remotely from Brussels and that that question was discussed with a member of the human resources department of the EEAS.
58      In the defence, the EEAS recalls that the applicant did not challenge the decision by which the EEAS considered the first weeks of teleworking in Brussels to be annual leave, despite the fact that he claims to have received an authorisation from the Head of Administration of the delegation, by lodging a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.
59      The Court issued a measure of organisation of procedure in order to hear the parties as to whether the applicant had, in his application, challenged the consideration set out in the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022.
60      In his reply to the measure of organisation of procedure, the applicant states that he submitted reasoned submissions in that regard and refers to the considerations in the application, set out in paragraph 57 above. The applicant also submits, in his reply, that the EEAS’ argument is not relevant in the context of an action for damages.
61      For its part, the EEAS states, in its reply to the measure of organisation of procedure, that the applicant does not put forward any arguments regarding the statement of reasons set out in the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022.
62      In that connection, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain, inter alia, the subject matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law relied upon. It is clear from the case-law that that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his or her defence and for the Court to exercise its power of review. It follows that the essential elements of fact and law on which an action is based must be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. The application must, accordingly, specify the nature of the grounds on which the action is based, with the result that a mere abstract statement of the grounds does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure (see judgment of 14 February 2012, Italy v Commission, T‑267/06, not published, EU:T:2012:69, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
63      In the present case, the Court considers, first, that the applicant did not clearly put forward any ground in the application directed against the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022 and, secondly, that the arguments raised by the applicant in the context of the various procedures, set out in paragraphs 53 and 56 above, do not provide any clarification in that connection. In those circumstances, the claim for annulment directed against the autonomous part of the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022 must be rejected as inadmissible.
C.      The claim for compensation
1.      Admissibility of the claim for compensation, in so far as it concerns the damage resulting from the first set of instances of alleged misconduct
64      As regards the claim for damages relating to the damage resulting from the first set of instances of alleged misconduct, which the EEAS classified as acts adversely affecting the applicant, namely, first, the decision by which the EEAS refused to grant the applicant leave to attend a pre-posting seminar and, second, the decision by which the applicant was refused authorisation to sign a residential lease in Washington DC, the EEAS found in the decision of 30 September 2022 rejecting the claim for compensation that the claim was inadmissible, in view of the fact that the applicant had not challenged those two refusal decisions within a three-month period, in accordance with Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. In the decision of 14 June 2023 rejecting the complaint of 23 December 2022, the EEAS confirmed that finding and that reason.
65      The parties were invited, by way of a measure of organisation of procedure, to submit their observations on the nature of those two decisions in the light of the case-law relating to the classification of acts adversely affecting a person, the judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ (C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 44) in particular; the parties changed their positions as compared with those contained in their written pleadings before the Court. They identify two emails as being the decisions at issue and agree that those two emails are not acts adversely affecting the applicant. Since the Court raised of its own motion the classification of the two emails referred to above and heard the parties in that regard, it is necessary to determine whether those emails constitute acts open to challenge.
66      According to settled case-law, the admissibility of an action for damages brought before the Court under Article 270 TFEU and Article 91 of the Staff Regulations depends upon the pre-litigation procedure being conducted in the proper manner and upon the prescribed time limits for that procedure being complied with (see judgment of 10 September 2019, DK v EEAS, T‑217/18, not published, EU:T:2019:571, paragraph 171 and the case-law cited).
67      That procedure differs according to whether the harm in respect of which reparation is sought results from an act adversely affecting the applicant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations or from conduct on the part of the administration which is not in the nature of a decision. In the first case, it is for the person concerned to submit to the AECE, within the prescribed time limits, a complaint directed against the act in question, it being open to that person to submit the claim for damages either in that complaint or for the first time in the application, whereas, in the second case, the administrative procedure must commence with the submission of a request, within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations, for compensation, and be continued, if necessary, by a complaint directed against the decision dismissing the request (see judgment of 12 March 2019, TK v Parliament, T‑446/17, not published, EU:T:2019:151, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).
68      It is settled case-law that an applicant is adversely affected, for the purposes of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, only by measures which produce binding legal effects such as to affect his or her interests by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position (see judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
69      In order to determine whether an act produces such effects, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the act (see judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission, C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).
70      Thus, the ability of an act to affect directly the legal position of a natural or legal person cannot be assessed solely by reference to the fact that that act takes the form of an email, since that would amount to giving precedence to the form of the act which is the subject of the action over the actual substance of that act (see judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission, C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).
71      It is therefore necessary, in line with the case-law referred to in paragraph 69 above, to examine the content of the emails in question, taking into account the context in which those emails were sent and the powers of their authors.
72      As regards the first email, the parties refer to an email of 10 February 2020 by which, in essence, the Head of Administration of the delegation informed the applicant that no mission budget had been foreseen by the delegation for a pre-posting seminar and that, consequently, the Head of Delegation was not in a position to agree, at that stage, for the applicant to attend such a seminar.
73      As regards the second email, the parties refer to an email of 28 July 2020 by which, in essence, a staff member of the Administration section of the delegation informed the applicant that the Deputy Head of Delegation had reported an issue concerning the duration of his lease and that that Deputy Head would not approve a lease going beyond February or March of the following year. In the same email, the staff member asked the applicant to confirm, in the light of the information provided, his intention concerning his lease.
74      The Court observes that those emails do not entail any change in the material rights conferred on the applicant by the Staff Regulations. They merely contain information that was communicated by the Head of Administration of the delegation and by a member of the Administration section of the delegation, respectively, as to the action which the competent authorities might take in response to the applicant’s requests.
75      The Court therefore considers that those emails are not capable of forming the subject matter of an application for annulment by means of a complaint. Since those emails do not produce binding legal effects capable of directly and immediately affecting the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position, they cannot be classified as acts adversely affecting him but must be regarded as conduct on the part of the administration which is not in the nature of a decision, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 67 above.
76      Thus, in view of the fact that the applicant complied with the pre-litigation stage with regard to that conduct by submitting, as a first step, a request and, as a second step, a complaint, it is necessary to rule on the substance of the claim for compensation in so far as it concerns the damage resulting from the first set of instances of alleged misconduct.
2.      The merits of the claim for damages
77      As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in the field of the civil service, in order for liability to arise on the part of an EU institution, body, office or agency, a number of conditions must be satisfied. Thus, the conduct of which the institution, body, office or agency is accused must be unlawful, actual damage must have been suffered, and there must be a causal link between the alleged conduct and the damage pleaded, those three conditions being cumulative (see judgment of 8 November 2018, QB v ECB, T‑827/16, EU:T:2018:756, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited).
78      It is also apparent from the case-law that it is for the applicant, in an action for damages, to establish that the conditions under which the European Union incurs non-contractual liability are satisfied (see judgment of 19 March 2003, Innova Privat-Akademie v Commission, T‑273/01, EU:T:2003:78, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited; judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraph 182).
79      It is therefore necessary to examine whether the three cumulative conditions required for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability are satisfied in the present case, beginning with the examination of whether the conduct on the part of the EEAS was unlawful.
80      Thus, since both the first set of instances of alleged misconduct and the second set of instances of alleged misconduct may be classified as conduct which is not in the nature of a decision, it will be necessary to examine, first, any illegality resulting from the first set of instances of alleged misconduct; secondly, any illegality resulting from the EEAS’s actions and decisions at the time of the applicant’s recruitment and taking up his duties and, thirdly, any illegality resulting from maladministration and mismanagement in the attribution of responsibilities.
(a)    The alleged unlawfulness resulting from the first set of instances of alleged misconduct
81      First, with regard to the pre-posting seminar which the applicant was allegedly refused leave to attend, he states, first of all, that it was compulsory. Next, he claims that he was adversely affected by the fact that he was unable to attend the seminar in so far as he had to acquire all the knowledge himself and he was not given access to information which should have been available to him. Moreover, the justification given for refusing to grant him leave to attend is vitiated by an error. Beyond the lack of budget, the applicant submits that the EEAS refused to grant him leave to attend the seminar on the ground that he had not yet completed his probationary period, which, in his view, was clearly an invalid justification since he was not required to complete a probationary period.
82      Second, regarding the refusal to sign the lease in Washington DC, the applicant argues that it was based on the assertion that he was only under a contract for one year. That reason given is inaccurate, since the applicant had a contract of indefinite duration, the termination of which was decided only later.
83      According to the applicant, those two refusals show a significant breach of the duty of care, ‘maladministration’ and a lack of organisation, management and planning on the part of the EEAS. Furthermore, in the reply, the applicant also alleges a breach of the duty of care.
84      Before the General Court, the EEAS contends that the applicant’s claim for compensation in respect of the claims under consideration is unfounded.
85      It should be borne in mind that, according to case-law, the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations in the relationship between a public authority and public servants. That balance implies in particular that when the authority takes a decision concerning the position of an official, it should take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and that when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also, in particular, those of the official concerned. The latter obligation is also imposed on the administration by the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see judgment of 14 April 2021, RQ v Commission, T‑29/17 RENV, not published, EU:T:2021:188, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
86      It must also be borne in mind that the duty to act diligently which is also inherent in the principle of sound administration and applies generally to the actions of the EU administration in its relations with the public requires that that administration act with care and caution (judgment of 4 April 2017, Ombudsman v Staelen, C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, paragraph 34).
87      As regards the pre-posting seminar, the Court observes that the applicant does not dispute the lack of budget relied on by the EEAS and, a fortiori, does not establish that that claim is incorrect. The applicant in fact alleges an error as regards the justification provided by the EEAS, namely that he had not yet completed his probationary period. No such justification is apparent from the email of 10 February 2020, referred to in paragraph 72 above. Indeed, reference is made to the fact that participation in that seminar may be ‘compulsory’, but it does not follow from that email that the Head of Administration of the delegation informed the applicant that completion of a probationary period would be the stated reason for refusing to grant him leave to attend the seminar.
88      Consequently, the claim made by the applicant has no factual basis.
89      Regarding the lease in Washington DC, it is apparent from the email of 28 July 2020 that the information that the applicant’s lease could not be approved was based on the fact that the applicant’s assignment in Washington DC was limited, not on the fact that the length of the applicant’s contract was for one year. That email stated clearly that the applicant holds a contract of indefinite duration.
90      Thus, that claim made by the applicant also has no factual basis.
91      Since the two allegations raised by the applicant are based on matters that have no factual basis, the Court considers, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the plea alleging breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, that the applicant has not succeeded in showing that the EEAS acted unlawfully by infringing its duty to have regard for the welfare of officials or its duty of diligence, or by ‘maladministration’.
(b)    The alleged unlawfulness resulting from the actions and decisions of the EEAS at the time of the applicant’s recruitment and taking up his duties
92      The applicant claims that the EEAS asked him to resign from his post at EASME in order to be able to conclude a contract of indefinite duration with him. The applicant claims that he did not receive an informed opinion from the EEAS as to the options open to him and, more specifically, as regards his right to take leave on personal grounds from EASME.
93      In the reply, the applicant claims that the option proposed by DG HR Unit B.1 to take leave on personal grounds of one year from EASME in order to be able to sign a one-year contract with the EEAS, including a probationary period, disregards Article 1(3) of Annex III to the general provisions for implementing Article 79(2) of the CEOS, governing the conditions of employment of contract staff employed by the Commission under Articles 3a and 3b thereof, applicable to the EEAS by virtue of Decision HR ADMIN (2018)4 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the GIPs’). Since he had already been confirmed in his post at the end of the probationary period provided for in Article 84 of the CEOS, the applicant should have been exempted from the obligation to complete a new probationary period in all cases. The applicant claims that he was forced to resign from EASME because he was not allowed to request one year’s leave on personal grounds and, at the same time, to sign a contract of indefinite duration, although such a possibility is provided for in Article 1(3) and (4) of the GIPs.
94      The EEAS disputes the applicant’s arguments.
95      The Court considers that the applicant complains, in essence, that the EEAS gave him inaccurate information concerning the possibilities of him being recruited by the EEAS under a contract of indefinite duration while retaining his contract of indefinite duration, under Article 3a of the CEOS, in function group IV, which linked him to EASME. He claims, inter alia, that he was entitled to conclude a contract of indefinite duration with the EEAS.
96      It is necessary to examine the information which the EEAS communicated to the applicant in that connection.
97      As a preliminary point, the Court observes that it is apparent from Article 1(4) of Annex III to the GIPs that where a person who was already under a contract of indefinite duration with another institution under Article 3a of the CEOS then immediately concludes a contract with the Commission under Article 3a of the CEOS in the same function group, he or she must be engaged for an indefinite period.
98      As is apparent from paragraphs 3 and 6 above, the applicant submitted his application in August 2019 for the post of Infrastructure Officer in the European Union Delegation in Washington DC. According to the vacancy notice, the person recruited would have a contract as a member of the contract staff provided for under Article 3a of the CEOS, in Function Group IV, for a fixed-term duration of one year. On 24 October 2019, the EEAS informed the applicant that he could not be recruited under a fixed-term contract of one year, since he was employed as a member of the contract staff with a contract of indefinite duration with EASME. Referring to Article 1(4) of Annex III to the GIPs, the EEAS observed that, since the applicant was bound by a contract of indefinite duration with EASME, he should be recruited under a contract of indefinite duration. However, the EEAS stated that the contract for the post in Washington DC was for one year.
99      On 4 November 2019, the EEAS informed the applicant that the only way to offer him a one-year contract was for him to resign from his current position at EASME. EEAS, however, did not recommend that he avail himself of that option.
100    By a note of 23 December 2019, the EEAS reminded the applicant that the applicable provisions required the applicant’s contract to be of indefinite duration. In the same note, the EEAS reminded him that, since the Washington DC position was only budgeted for one year, it reserved the right to terminate the contract in the interest of the service on the basis of Article 47(c) of the Staff Regulations.
101    After the applicant informed the EEAS of his decision to conclude a contract of indefinite duration, the EEAS replied on 28 January 2020 that he could either resign from EASME on 15 February 2020 and be offered a contract of indefinite duration with the EEAS without a probationary period from 16 February 2020, or take leave on personal grounds from EASME and be offered a one-year contract including a probationary period with the EEAS.
102    It is clear that the information provided by the EEAS to the applicant changed. However, the applicant’s complaint alleges more specifically that the EEAS provided him with incorrect information.
103    In that regard, the applicant claims that the second option referred to in paragraph 101 above is contrary to Article 1(3) and (4) of Annex III to the GIPs and Article 84 of the CEOS.
104    According to the applicant, it follows from Article 1(3) and (4) of Annex III to the GIPs that he should have been able to take one year’s leave on personal grounds from EASME and to sign a contract of indefinite duration.
105    In that regard, it should be noted that it follows from Article 10 of the GIPs and Article 1 of Annex III thereto that those provisions apply to successive contracts, namely cases in which the Commission employs a person under a contract concluded under Article 3a or Article 3b of the CEOS immediately after a previous contract of the same type which that person had concluded with another institution. Thus, the applicant’s line of argument relates to the situation in which he would have maintained his contract under Article 3a of the CEOS, whereas the provisions on which he relies do not cover such a situation. Thus, the applicant is not justified in relying on those provisions in support of his argument.
106    As regards the applicant’s assertion that the second option is contrary to the ‘applicable rules’ in that, in order to be able to request leave on personal grounds of one year from EASME, the contract with the EEAS should have been a one-year fixed-term contract with a probationary period, it should be noted that the applicant does not specify what those ‘applicable rules’ are. Assuming that the applicant is referring to Article 1(3) and (4) of Annex III to the GIPs, it is sufficient to note that that option does not fall within the scope of Article 10 of and Annex III to the GIPs, since those provisions concern the situation of successive contracts, as has already been stated in paragraph 105 above.
107    Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s complaint that, after the note of 23 December 2019, the EEAS did not recommend that he not resign from his contract with EASME, it is sufficient to note that it was for the applicant to assess the options which had been presented to him, in particular, in the information that he had received from the EEAS on 28 January 2020. The Court adds that the applicant had indeed been informed by the EEAS of the temporary nature of the post in Washington DC and that it is apparent from the email of 4 November 2019 that the EEAS had recommended that he not resign from EASME at that stage.
108    It follows from the foregoing that the complaint alleging unlawful conduct resulting from the information communicated to the applicant by the EEAS at the time of his recruitment and taking up his duties must be rejected.
(c)    The alleged illegality resulting from maladministration and mismanagement in the attribution of responsibilities
109    In this complaint, the applicant criticises, in essence, five instances of conduct on the part of the EEAS. First, the applicant claims that the delegation received incorrect information from the EEAS. Secondly, he criticises the fact that he was placed under the supervision of a local agent. Thirdly, he states that the EEAS did not assign him the tasks which corresponded to the vacancy notice. Fourthly, he criticises the EEAS for having employed a new contract and procurement manager. Fifthly, he highlights several circumstances that arose during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic.
(1)    The transmission of incorrect information to the delegation
110    The applicant complains, in essence, that the EEAS lacked coordination. In his view, the EEAS failed to transmit the correct information to the delegation, first of all, as to the type of contract offered to him, next, as to the duration of that contract and, lastly, as to the date of entry into service. The uncertainty as to the actual date of entry into service, moreover, caused the applicant considerable stress and anxiety. The applicant claims that he felt pressured to waive the rights conferred on him by his new contract of indefinite duration and to sign a one-year contract.
111    The EEAS disputes the applicant’s arguments.
112    First, as regards the information relating to the type of contract offered to the applicant, it must be noted that he provides an email from the Head of Administration of the delegation of 3 March 2020 sent to several EEAS persons, in which he refers to the applicant’s post as a post as a member of the contract staff in function group III (AC III).
113    Since the applicant was recruited as a member of the contract staff in function group IV, it must be held that this is in fact an error. Similarly to the EEAS, the Court considers, however, that it cannot be ruled out that this is a mere clerical error. In any event, the error in question cannot be classified as unlawful conduct capable of rendering the European Union liable.
114    Secondly, as regards the duration of the applicant’s contract, first of all, it must be pointed out that he provides three emails. In the email of 3 March 2020, referred to in paragraph 112 above, the Head of Administration of the delegation mentions that the ‘AC III’ post was only budgeted for one year. The applicant also produces an email from the Head of Administration of the delegation of 21 February 2020, in which that person describes the tasks entrusted to the applicant from 18 February 2020 to 30 March 2021. In addition, the applicant produces an email of 20 August 2020 by which the new Deputy Head of Administration of the delegation states that the information provided ‘always referred to one year in Washington’.
115    Next, the applicant produces two documents. The first contains photocopies of residence permit application forms by which the EEAS communicates the arrival of the applicant and his spouse to the US Department of State. That document states that their date of departure from Washington DC was scheduled to be 15 February 2021. The second document is a document signed by the Head of Administration of the delegation regarding the applicant’s arrival in Washington DC on 17 February 2020 and stating that his date of departure was scheduled to be 15 February 2021.
116    Next, in support of his arguments, the applicant also relies on various meetings and conversations he claims to have had with staff members of the delegation, in which they alluded to the fact that he had a one-year contract. The applicant refers, in particular, to a meeting with the Deputy Head of the delegation, during which he announced to the applicant that the year ahead would be an intense year for him, and to a meeting with the Deputy Head of Administration of the delegation during which he stated to the applicant that he would be able to attend the pre-posting seminar in Brussels only in June 2020, once he had completed his probationary period as required under his one-year contract. Moreover, the applicant argues that, in conversations with the head of the ‘Infrastructure’ cluster of the delegation (‘the local agent heading the cluster’) and with the secretaries, reference was made to the fact that his contract was for one year and 15 February 2021 was the scheduled date of departure.
117    The Court notes that the documents on which the applicant relies refer to the length of his assignment in Washington DC. None of these documents calls into question the indefinite nature of the applicant’s contract with the EEAS. The indefinite nature of the applicant’s contract cannot be confused with the duration of his assignment to Washington DC, as the applicant himself acknowledges. At the time of his engagement, the EEAS stated to the applicant that the purpose of the position in Washington DC was to carry out an infrastructure project budgeted for one year. Thus, although the applicant’s contract would be concluded for an indefinite duration, the EEAS reserved the right to terminate the contract in the interest of the service. In those circumstances, the EEAS cannot be criticised for having sent imprecise information to the delegation. Regarding the meetings and conversations referred to above, the applicant asserts that there was a ‘belief’ on the part of the staff members of the delegation that his contract was only for one year. However, the Court considers that this is a subjective assessment on the applicant’s part, which cannot be regarded as constituting unlawful conduct capable of rendering the European Union liable.
118    Thirdly, as regards the date on which the applicant entered into service, he alleges a lack of coordination by the EEAS, in so far as that date was amended several times. He claims that this was a source of stress and anxiety for him.
119    As is apparent from paragraphs 4 and 5 above, it is common ground that the applicant was scheduled to be recruited on 1 January 2020. However, as has been stated in paragraphs 6 to 13 above, on account of the discussions between the applicant and the EEAS on the type of the applicant’s contract, the entry into service did not take place on that date. The applicant’s contract was signed on 12 February 2020, stating that it would take effect on 16 February 2020. Thus, the applicant entered into service on that date.
120    In that regard, it should be noted that, in the application, the applicant claims that the EEAS administration asked him to bring forward his resignation from EASME and his entry into service to 1 February 2020. Moreover, according to the applicant, on 12 February 2020, the Head of Administration of the delegation asked him to postpone his entry into service until after 16 February 2020. In the reply, the applicant submits that it was never foreseen that he would enter into service on 1 February 2020 but that, on the contrary, he always informed the EEAS that he would be present at the delegation on 16 February 2020.
121    It is apparent from the applicant’s submissions that he criticises the EEAS for having asked him, first, to bring forward his entry into service to 1 February 2020 and, second, to delay it until after 16 February 2020. As has already been pointed out, it was the intention of the EEAS that the applicant should be able to enter into service on 1 January 2020, but his recruitment was delayed because of discussions on the type of contract. In addition, it should be noted that on 10 February 2020, that is to say, two days before the signature of his contract, in an email to the applicant, the Head of Administration of the delegation stated that, from an administrative point of view, a February date of entry into service did not seem realistic to him.
122    While it is true that, as the applicant maintains, there was some uncertainty as to the date of actual entry into service, that uncertainty arises from the particular circumstances of his recruitment as described above. Moreover, the applicant does not specify what illegality the EEAS allegedly committed in that regard. Consequently, the Court finds that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of unlawful conduct on the part of the EEAS.
(2)    Placement of the applicant under the supervision of a local agent
123    The applicant recalls that, according to his contract, he should have been placed under the supervision of the Head of Administration and Deputy Head of Administration of the delegation. Following the departure of those two persons approximately one month after his entry into service, he was placed under the supervision of a local agent, namely the local agent heading the cluster, whose grade was below his grade, until August 2020, the date on which the new Head of Administration of the delegation was appointed. Furthermore, the applicant claims that the ‘INFRA and Procurement’ cluster, led by the local agent heading the cluster, of which he was a member, consisted only of local staff in a category lower than his own. He was therefore required to share his office with a local staff member in a lower category than his own, with only the local agent heading the cluster having an individual office in that team. In addition, that local agent assumed all the responsibilities, duties and tasks for which the applicant had been recruited and censured the applicant’s work repeatedly. Even though he brought those circumstances to the attention of several persons within the EEAS, no action was taken to remedy them. Thus, the applicant claims that the EEAS acted contrary to the description of the post, the vacancy notice and the applicable legal rules and provisions.
124    The applicant claims, in the reply, that he suffered treatment ‘that he did not consider normal’ by the local agent heading the cluster. In addition, the applicant is of the view that he has shown to the requisite legal standard that she encroached upon his powers or prevented him from performing the tasks that should normally fall to him. He claims that, as a technical expert and Infrastructure Officer, he was not authorised to participate in meetings and was not consulted on operations relating to buildings.
125    The EEAS disputes the applicant’s arguments.
126    The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints relate, in essence, to the fact that he was placed under the supervision of the local agent heading the cluster and to the consequences arising from that circumstance, the conduct of that person in particular.
127    It is apparent from the vacancy notice that the jobholder was to be placed under the supervision of the Head of Administration and the Deputy Head of Administration of the delegation. It is common ground between the parties that the persons under whose supervision the applicant was to be placed, namely the Head of Administration and the Deputy Head of Administration of the delegation, left the delegation shortly after the applicant entered into service. In an email from the Head of Administration of the delegation sent to the delegation on 23 March 2020, he stated that he would be absent from that day and that the new Head of Administration of the delegation would arrive a few weeks later. He added that, in the meantime, the imprest account holder and the local agent heading the cluster would coordinate the administration.
128    In addition, by an email of 25 March 2020, the Head of Administration of the delegation reminded the applicant that he had asked the local agent heading the cluster to coordinate the work of the ‘Infrastructure’ cluster throughout the teleworking period. It is apparent from that email that he asked the applicant to attend the weekly meetings of the ‘Infrastructure’ cluster and that he had to follow the work priorities and instructions that he had previously given to him.
129    The new Head of Administration of the delegation did not take up his duties until August 2020. According to the EEAS, that delay was due to the travel restrictions in force during the COVID-19 pandemic. That argument of the EEAS is not disputed by the applicant.
130    As the applicant submits, without it being disputed by the EEAS, the fact that the applicant was placed under the supervision of the local agent heading the cluster was not in line with the vacancy notice and the description of the post in question, as is apparent from paragraph 127 above.
131    In view of the unavailability of the applicant’s two hierarchical superiors, the EEAS had to appoint from among the staff of the delegation in Washington DC a person capable of performing the duties of a hierarchical superior vis-à-vis the applicant, who had just arrived at the delegation, and the other members of the ‘Infrastructure’ cluster. In the present case, the designated person was the local agent heading the cluster.
132    In that regard, it should be noted that that situation was a temporary one, in exceptional circumstances. The applicant was placed under the supervision of the local agent heading the cluster for four months because of the situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which delayed the arrival of the new Head of Administration of the delegation.
133    While the applicant claims that his placement under the supervision of the local agent heading the cluster is contrary to the ‘rules and legal provisions’, he does not specify which rules of law have been infringed. Similarly, he does not put forward any legal argument as to the possible unlawful nature of the measures taken by the EEAS.
134    It should be added that, in view of the broad discretion enjoyed by the institutions in the organisation of their services and the exceptional circumstances of the present case, the fact that the applicant was placed under the supervision of the local agent heading the cluster on a temporary basis, contrary to what was stated in the vacancy notice and in the description of the post in question, does not constitute unlawful conduct capable of rendering the European Union liable.
135    Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s criticisms of the local agent heading the cluster, it should be noted that the existence of confrontational relationships between officials is not sufficient, in itself, to demonstrate the existence of unlawful conduct on the part of the institution concerned. Only inaction on the part of that institution in the event of a difficult situation is capable of constituting such a fault (judgment of 6 February 2015, BQ v Court of Auditors, T‑7/14 P, EU:T:2015:79, paragraph 37).
136    It should be borne in mind that criticism by a hierarchical superior of work or a task carried out by a subordinate is not in itself inappropriate behaviour since, were that the case, the management of a service would be almost impossible (see judgment of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).
137    In that regard, although the applicant expressed to a number of EEAS persons his disagreement with his situation, he does not put forward any evidence to support a finding that the local agent heading the cluster went beyond the usual framework of a hierarchical relationship or that her attitude towards him had an impact on his health or on the functioning of the service such as to render the administration liable. The fact that the local agent heading the cluster criticised the applicant’s work and ‘bypassed’ his decisions cannot be described as a service-related fault. In any event, the applicant does not provide any evidence in support of his claims. The email exchanges on which he relies refer solely to the performance by the local agent heading the cluster of the coordination and managerial functions of the unit to which he belonged.
138    Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s placement in an office area in which there were only local staff or the fact that he did not have an individual office and a professional telephone, these are EEAS administrative measures on questions concerning the organisation of departments. Thus, it must be held that, in the light of the discretion enjoyed by the administrative authorities in organising their services, those facts do not constitute unlawful conduct, even if they were difficult to accept for the applicant.
(3)    Failure to allocate tasks in accordance with the vacancy notice
139    The applicant is of the view that he was not assigned any of the responsibilities for which he had initially been engaged, as described in the vacancy notice, save for drafting the property management contract, and that those responsibilities were assumed, first, by the local agent heading the cluster and, secondly, by the new procurement manager.
140    The applicant produces two tables dated 11 and 20 March 2020 showing a division of tasks between members of the ‘Infrastructure’ cluster, including those which he was to carry out in the context of his duties as infrastructure officer. He also cites examples of tasks which were not entrusted to him even though, in his view, they should have been entrusted to him.
141    The EEAS disputes the applicant’s arguments.
142    First of all, it should be noted that it is not apparent from the vacancy notice that the successful candidate necessarily had to perform all the duties described in that notice and that no one else could perform them. In addition, it should be noted that, of the tasks which the applicant had to carry out within the delegation, particular importance had been attached to the drafting of a property management contract, a task which, moreover, he retained.
143    Next, the tables and examples provided do not enable the Court to identify precisely the tasks which should have been attributed to the applicant, but which were taken over by the local agent heading the cluster. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that it is not for the Court to supplement the arguments put forward by the applicant in the application, by searching for and identifying, in the annexes thereto, evidence capable of supporting the applicant’s arguments where it is not expressly relied on by the applicant himself or herself (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2025, Commission and Others v Carpatair, C‑244/23 P to C‑246/23 P, EU:C:2025:87, paragraph 77).
144    Furthermore, the applicant’s mere subjective assessment of the tasks which should have been assigned to him is not such as to call into question the actions of the administration, which take account of the interests of the service.
145    Lastly, it should be noted that the applicant does not specify the rule of law allegedly infringed by the EEAS.
146    Consequently, it must be held that the applicant has not established the existence of any unlawful conduct on the part of the EEAS.
(4)    The employment of a new contract and procurement manager
147    The applicant criticises the appointment of a new infrastructure officer in November 2020 to the post of contract and procurement manager. He submits that that officer actually took on the tasks corresponding to those of the applicant, in accordance with the description of the post and the vacancy notice. The applicant claims that the irregular situation which existed with the local agent heading the cluster with regard to his tasks continued after the appointment of a new infrastructure officer, even though he could have taken on the duties of that new member of staff. This led to unnecessary duplication of work and the inefficient use of public resources, and ultimately led to the abolition of the applicant’s post. The applicant claims that he raised that issue with several persons within the EEAS, but that no action was taken.
148    In the reply, the applicant claims that the new Head of Administration of the delegation stated that he did not have the requisite skills in contract management and public procurement even though, in the vacancy notice, such skills were required and he was recruited. According to the applicant, his assignment in Washington DC could have been extended if the EEAS had provided him with the necessary tools and opportunities.
149    The EEAS disputes the applicant’s arguments.
150    It is settled case-law that the institutions have a wide discretion to organise their departments to suit the tasks entrusted to them and to assign the staff available to them in the light of such tasks on condition, however, that the staff are assigned in the interest of the service (see judgment of 7 May 2019, WP v EUIPO, T‑407/18, not published, EU:T:2019:290, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
151    In that regard, it should be recalled that an institution alone has the power to organise and operate a department, and that the hierarchical authority has sole responsibility for how departments are organised. It is for that authority alone to assess the needs of the service and to assign the staff available to it accordingly (see judgment of 11 July 1997, Cesaratto v Parliament, T‑108/96, EU:T:1997:115, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
152    The institutions and bodies of the European Union are free to organise their administrative units taking account of a whole range of factors, such as the nature and scope of the tasks which are assigned to them and the budgetary possibilities. That freedom involves both the freedom to abolish posts and to change the allocation of tasks in the interest of more efficient work organisation or in response to budgetary requirements to abolish posts imposed by the political authorities of the European Union, and the power to reassign tasks previously carried out by the holder of the post abolished, without the abolition of that post necessarily being subject to the condition that all the tasks imposed must be performed by fewer people than before the reorganisation. Furthermore, the abolition of a post does not have to mean that the tasks it involved lapse (see judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).
153    Similarly, the administration has a broad discretion with regard to contract renewal and, in that context, the Court’s review is confined to the question whether, having regard to the various considerations which have influenced the administration in making its assessment, the latter has remained within reasonable bounds and has not used its power in a manifestly incorrect way (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2018, Wahlström v Frontex, T‑591/16, not published, EU:T:2018:938, paragraphs 47 and 95 and the case-law cited).
154    At the outset, the applicant criticises the hiring of a new contract and procurement manager, to whom duties very close to his own were assigned. He also argues that it was that hiring which led to the abolition of his post and the termination of his contract.
155    As regards that last circumstance, it should be noted that the decision of the EEAS of 25 November 2020 to terminate the applicant’s contract was the subject, on 25 January 2021, of a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. By email of 23 March 2021, the EEAS sent the applicant a decision that his contract of employment was maintained and that the decision to terminate his contract was withdrawn. As regards the decision to abolish his post, no complaint was lodged within the prescribed period. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, in the vacancy notice for the post occupied by the applicant, it was already stated that the post was only budgeted for one year.
156    Furthermore, it should be noted that the applicant merely sets out facts and criticises the conduct of the EEAS, without putting forward any legal arguments. The Court nevertheless understands that, according to the applicant, the EEAS acted in a manner detrimental to him, against the interests of the service and without taking into account the operational needs of the delegation, by hiring a new contract and procurement manager.
157    The EEAS explains that the new contract and procurement manager was to occupy the post of the local agent heading the cluster, who now held the post of Deputy Head of Administration of the delegation. The EEAS claims that it took account of the delegation’s operational needs when it took the position that a technical profile such as that of the applicant was not suitable for the post in question and that the recruitment of a new member of staff was more appropriate.
158    In that regard, it is apparent from an email of 3 March 2020 from the Head of Administration of the delegation that, as a technical expert, the applicant was responsible for examining the architectural state of the buildings and for determining whether an update of the plans was necessary, and for drafting the technical specifications of the future property management contract.
159    As regards the applicant’s claim that he was sufficiently qualified to be trained in the particular fields required for that new post, that is a purely subjective assessment on his part.
160    In those circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant has not shown that, by hiring a new contract and procurement manager, the EEAS had acted unlawfully.
(5)    The period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of suitable work equipment for the performance of his duties
161    The applicant states that he did not have the necessary tools to work when he arrived in Washington DC. He also claims that he did not have the appropriate material, resources or documents to carry out his work remotely from Brussels during the COVID-19 pandemic.
162    The applicant adds that, since the EEAS knew that he was going to join the delegation and knew the date of his arrival, good administration would have required the EEAS to take the necessary measures in advance in order to anticipate what he would need or to ask him in that connection. As regards the documents which the applicant needed to telework from Brussels, he relies on the emergency situation and concern at the beginning of the health crisis. As a result, he could not have foreseen that he would need those documents when he left Washington DC.
163    The EEAS begins by explaining that, before the applicant was recruited, the delegation did not have an architect on its premises, so that it was not in a position to obtain the necessary equipment and software from the time of the applicant’s arrival in Washington DC. In any event, the delegation sought solutions to obtain the software that the applicant needed. Secondly, the EEAS explains that the documents requested by the applicant could not be sent to him by diplomatic pouch because of the COVID-19 pandemic and that it is therefore a case of force majeure. In any event, according to the EEAS, the applicant could have taken the documents with him when he left for Brussels. Thus, according to the EEAS, no unlawful act was committed.
164    It is apparent from the description of the facts set out by the applicant and by the EEAS that, when the applicant arrived in Washington DC and, subsequently, in the context of the teleworking imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, the applicant had to deal with certain IT and logistical issues. However, the applicant does not rely, in support of his argument, on an infringement of a rule of law capable of establishing the existence of an unlawful act committed by the EEAS.
165    In the reply, it is true that the applicant refers to ‘good administration’. Assuming that the applicant relies on an infringement of the principle of sound administration, it should be recalled, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of that plea, that, according to the case-law, the principle of sound administration, where it constitutes the expression of a specific right such as the right to have one’s affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time, as provided for in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be regarded as a rule of EU law whose purpose is to confer rights on individuals (see judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 200 and the case-law cited).
166    Consequently, the assessment of whether the EEAS’ conduct was unlawful may be carried out only by reference to a specific right expressing the principle of sound administration. Since the applicant has not succeeded in doing so, observance of the right to good administration cannot serve as a basis for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability.
167    Consequently, the claim must be rejected.
(d)    Form of order sought regarding the alleged unlawful conduct of the EEAS
168    Since the three conditions for liability to be incurred are cumulative, it is sufficient that any one of those conditions is not satisfied for the action for damages to have to be dismissed in its entirety without there being any need for examination of the other conditions for such liability (see order of 13 December 2018, Bowles v ECB, T‑447/17, not published, EU:T:2018:993, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).
169    Since no unlawful conduct has been established by the applicant, it must be concluded, without there being any need to examine the other two conditions, that the EEAS cannot incur liability.
170    It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed as inadmissible in part and unfounded in part.
IV.    Costs
171    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
172    In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the EEAS.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders PS to pay the costs.
Truchot
Kanninen
Sampol Pucurull
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 15 April 2026.
V. Di Bucci
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.