JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
3 September 2025 (1)
Environment – Regulation (EU) 2019/631 – Carbon dioxide emission performance standards – New passenger cars – Commission Decision specifying the values relating to the performance of manufacturers and pools of manufacturers of new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles for 2021 – Scope – Special purpose vehicle – Wheelchair accessible vehicle – Equal treatment – Proportionality – Legitimate expectations – Obligation to state reasons – Plea of illegality )
In Case T‑1024/23,
London EV Co. Ltd, established in Coventry (United Kingdom), represented by M. Struys, V. Ciudin and C. Verney, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Commission, represented by J. Flett and B. Cullen, acting as Agents,
defendant,
supported by
European Parliament,
represented by W. Kuzmienko and L. Taïeb, acting as Agents,
and by
Council of the European Union,
represented by A. Maceroni and N. Brzezinski, acting as Agents,
interveners,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),
composed of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl, President, I. Nõmm and R. Meyer (Rapporteur), judges,
Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 10 March 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, London EV Co. Ltd, seeks the annulment of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1623 of 3 August 2023 specifying the values relating to the performance of manufacturers and pools of manufacturers of new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles for the calendar year 2021 and the values to be used for the calculation of the specific emission targets from 2025 onwards, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council and correcting Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2087 (OJ 2023 L 200, p. 5; ‘the contested decision’), in so far as it concerns the applicant.
Background to the dispute
2        The contested decision was adopted pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and for new light commercial vehicles, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 443/2009 and (EU) No 510/2011 (OJ 2019 L 111, p. 13).
3        Under Regulation 2019/631, the European Commission is required to determine, each year, the average specific emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the specific emissions target for each manufacturer or pool of manufacturers of new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles. Pursuant to Article 4 of that regulation, a manufacturer meets its specific emissions target when its average specific emissions of CO2 do not exceed that target. Manufacturers may meet their targets either individually or in the form of a pool. For manufacturers that are members of a pool, whether the target is met is assessed at pool level, in accordance with Article 6 of that regulation.
4        The calculation of the average specific emissions of CO2 and of specific emissions targets for the calendar year 2021 relies on the precise data of the reporting authorities concerning registrations of new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles during that calendar year.
5        All the reporting authorities transmitted their 2021 data to the Commission.
6        The applicant is a United Kingdom electric vehicle manufacturer, represented in the European Union by China-Euro Vehicle Technology, established in Sweden. It manufactures, inter alia, a zero-emissions electric taxi with full wheelchair accessibility. In December 2020, the applicant joined a pool formed with other manufacturers in order to meet its CO2 emissions target pursuant to Regulation 2019/631.
7        On 25 January 2023, the Commission notified to the applicant the provisional calculation of its average specific emissions of CO2 and also its specific emissions targets for 2021, in accordance with Article 7(4) of Regulation 2019/631.
8        Article 7(5) of Regulation 2019/631 provides that manufacturers may, within three months of being notified of the provisional calculation, notify the Commission of any errors in the data. In accordance with that article, the applicant notified the Commission of a number of errors in the provisional data transmitted.
9        After checking those errors, the Commission informed the applicant, by email of 2 February 2023, that, of the nine vehicles referred to in the set of provisional data, only one vehicle could be considered to be within the scope of Regulation 2019/631 and that those findings would be incorporated in the set of final data.
10      On 3 August 2023, the Commission adopted the contested decision, which determines, in Annex I, the values relating to the performance regarding emissions of CO2 of manufacturers and pools of manufacturers of new passenger cars and light commercial vehicles for the calendar year 2021 and, in Annex II, the 2025 and 2030 EU fleet-wide targets.
11      The contested decision indicates, for the applicant, an average specific emissions value of 19 g of CO2/km and a specific emissions target of 104.838 g of CO2/km. Those values applicable to the applicant were determined on the basis of the total number of new passenger cars registered in the European Union, Iceland and Norway during the 2021 calendar year produced by the applicant and considered to be within the scope of Regulation 2019/631, namely, in this instance, a single vehicle.
Forms of order sought
12      The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns the applicant;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs.
13      The Commission, supported by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, contends, in essence, that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
14      In support of its action, the applicant puts forward, in essence, four pleas in law.
15      The first plea alleges, primarily, that the interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 favoured by the Commission is contrary to the objectives of that regulation and of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, adopted in December 2015 by the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed on 22 April 2016 (‘the Paris Agreement’), and also to a number of fundamental principles of EU law. In the alternative, the first plea alleges that that provision is unlawful. The second plea alleges, in essence, that the contested decision is unlawful and contrary to a number of fundamental principles of EU law, in that it deprives the applicant of the possibility of fully participating in the carbon pooling mechanism. The third plea alleges, in essence, that Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 is contrary to the principle of equal treatment in that it systematically excludes from the scope of that regulation vehicles whose certificate of conformity contains the reference ‘wheelchair accessible vehicle’. The fourth plea alleges, in essence, that the Commission has breached the obligation to state reasons and the applicant’s right to the sound administration of justice.
16      By those pleas, the applicant maintains, in essence, that the contested decision is unlawful and must be annulled, in that the Commission wrongly considered, on the basis of an incorrect interpretation and application of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631, that, out of all the new vehicles which the applicant had registered during the calendar year 2021, only one came within the scope of that regulation. That incorrect interpretation and application of Regulation 2019/631 thus deprived the applicant of the possibility of taking full advantage of the pooling mechanism, provided for in Article 6 of that regulation. In the applicant’s submission, by not taking into account all the vehicles which it had registered during the year in question for the purposes of determining its specific CO2 target emissions, the Commission reduced the CO2 emissions rights that could be granted to it and which it would then have been able to sell within the pool in question, since its vehicles had very low specific emissions of CO2.
17      It is appropriate, as a preliminary step, to set out the legal framework of which the contested decision forms part and the objectives of Regulation 2019/631.
Preliminary observations relating to Regulation 2019/631 and the objectives which it pursues
18      It must be borne in mind that Regulation 2019/631 forms part of the legislative framework put in place by the Parliament and the Council to ensure that the policies of the European Union are consistent with the climate targets which it has set itself, while ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market. In accordance with Article 1, that regulation establishes CO2 emissions performance requirements for new passenger cars and for new light commercial vehicles. It defines EU-wide CO2 target emissions and allocates the emissions reduction effort between vehicle manufacturers. Manufacturers of vehicles included in the scope of Regulation 2019/631 are thus required, pursuant to Article 4, to ensure that their average specific emissions of CO2 do not exceed the specific emissions targets assigned to them. If a manufacturer’s average specific emissions of CO2 exceed its target fixed for the same calendar year, the Commission is to impose payment of the excess emissions premium provided for in Article 8 of Regulation 2019/631.
19      Article 6(1) of Regulation 2019/631 provides that manufacturers, other than manufacturers which have been granted a derogation under Article 10 of that regulation, may form a pool for the purposes of meeting their obligations under Article 4 of that regulation. Article 6(7) of that regulation provides that manufacturers in a pool are to be regarded as one manufacturer for the purposes of meeting specific emissions targets.
20      Regulation 2019/631 therefore relies in part on an economic logic that encourages manufacturers, in particular those producing a limited range of vehicles, to emit average quantities of specific emissions of CO2 that are less than the target emissions assigned to them, in order to sell the surplus, within the framework of a pool, to another manufacturer whose emissions are higher than its target. Emissions targets therefore have commercial value (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 July 2023, Arctic Paper Grycksbo v Commission, T‑269/21, EU:T:2023:429, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
21      It should also be made clear that Article 2(1) of Regulation 2019/631 provides, in essence, that that regulation is to apply, inter alia, to Category M1 motor vehicles as defined in Annex II to Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (OJ 2007 L 263, p. 1). Conversely, it follows from Article 2(3) of that regulation that the regulation is not to apply to special purpose vehicles as defined in point 5 of Part A of Annex II to Directive 2007/46.
22      In that regard, Annex II to Directive 2007/46 defines ‘Category M1’ vehicles as vehicles designed and constructed for the carriage of passengers and comprising no more than eight seats in addition to the driver’s seat. ‘Special purpose vehicles’ are defined as vehicles intended to perform a function which requires special body arrangements or equipment. That category is to include wheelchair accessible vehicles.
23      That directive was repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU) 2018/858 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the approval and market surveillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2007 and (EC) No 595/2009 and repealing Directive 2007/46/EC (OJ 2018 L 151, p. 1), with effect from 1 September 2020. However, as the Commission observed at the hearing, without being challenged by the applicant, Directive 2007/46 remains applicable in the present case, in view of the date of the approval of the vehicles, which was in 2019. In any event, as the parties also emphasised at the hearing, the relevant provisions of Directive 2007/46 are expressed in identical terms in Regulation 2018/858.
24      It should be borne in mind, last, that the objective of Regulation 2019/631 is not only the protection of the environment and the reduction of the CO2 emissions of new passenger cars, but also a socially acceptable and just transition towards zero-emission mobility and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, by setting competitively neutral, socially equitable and sustainable emissions reduction targets which take account of the diversity of European automobile manufacturers and avoid any unjustified distortion of competition between them. In that context, it is apparent from the drafting history of Regulation 2019/631 that that regulation seeks in particular not to increase the burden on manufacturers of wheelchair accessible vehicles, thus implementing the principle of the integration of persons with disabilities set out in Article 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and the obligations set out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, concluded in New York on 13 December 2006 and approved on behalf of the EU by Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 (OJ 2010 L 23, p. 35).
The first plea, alleging, primarily, that the interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 favoured by the Commission is contrary to the objectives of that regulation and of the Paris Agreement and also to a number of fundamental principles of EU law
25      This plea consists of three parts.
26      The first part concerns the objectives and the effectiveness of Regulation 2019/631 and the Paris Agreement. The second part concerns the breach of the principles that must influence the interpretation of provisions that are prima facie contradictory. The third part concerns the breach of the principles of equal treatment, necessity and proportionality.
The first part, concerning breach of the objectives and the effectiveness of Regulation 2019/631 and of the Paris Agreement
27      The applicant maintains, in essence, that Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631, as such or as interpreted and applied by the Commission in the contested decision, breaches the fundamental objective pursued by that regulation, as expressed in the preamble thereto, and undermines the effectiveness of that regulation, and more generally the policy and international commitments of the European Union on the reduction of CO2 emissions. Excluding from the scope of Regulation 2019/631 special purpose vehicles that meet the M1 specifications and perform well in terms of CO2 emissions undermines the effectiveness of that regulation and its main objective of reducing the CO2 emissions of Category M1 vehicles in the European Union. The exclusion of those vehicles also has the consequence of depriving manufacturers of those vehicles of the possibility of benefiting from the pooling mechanism provided for in Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631.
28      The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
29      The applicant maintains, in essence, that the contested decision is based on an overly restrictive interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 that is contrary to the spirit and the purpose of that regulation.
30      In that regard, it should be borne in mind, by way of a preliminary point, that, in accordance with settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. The origins of a provision of EU law may also provide information relevant to its interpretation (see judgment of 13 January 2022, Germany – Ville de Paris and Others v Commission, C‑177/19 P to C‑179/19 P, EU:C:2022:10, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited).
31      In the present case, it should be noted that the wording of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 is clear and unambiguous. It states expressly that that regulation is not to apply to special purpose vehicles as defined in point 5 of Part A of Annex II to Directive 2007/46. Recital 31 of that regulation explains, in that sense, that, in view of the specific requirements to which special purpose vehicles are subject for the purposes of type approval, they should be excluded from the scope of that regulation.
32      That conclusion is confirmed by Article 2(1) of Regulation 2019/631, the wording of which is also unambiguous, according to which that regulation is to apply only to motor vehicles in categories M1 and N1, as defined in Annex II to Directive 2007/46.
33      Consequently, the Commission’s interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 in the contested decision is in keeping with its wording.
34      That interpretation is also consistent with the aim pursued by Regulation 2019/631, the objectives of which are set out in paragraph 24 above.
35      In particular, as is apparent from the drafting history of Regulation 2019/631, that regulation is intended, in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter, and with the obligations set out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, not to increase the burden on manufacturers of wheelchair accessible vehicles by imposing additional requirements on them, since, as stated in point 5 of Part A of Annex II to Directive 2007/46, those manufacturers are already subjected to special requirements. Thus, their exclusion from the scope of Regulation 2019/631 has the effect of exempting them from the obligations relating to specific emissions of CO2 laid down in that regulation.
36      In addition, the applicant claims that the Commission’s interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 is contrary to the Paris Agreement. However, it does not specify how, or to which provision of that agreement, the interpretation is contrary. It merely asserts, without more, that, by that interpretation, the Commission has infringed the Paris Agreement.
37      According to Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, any application initiating proceedings is to contain the subject matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and the arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law. The information given must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his or her defence and the Court to decide the case, if necessary without further supporting information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, if an action is to be admissible under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, for the essential facts and points of law on which the action is based to be apparent, even if only stated briefly, from the application itself (see judgment of 16 November 2022, Sciessent v Commission, T‑122/20 and T‑123/20, EU:T:2022:712, paragraph 117 (not published and the case-law cited)). In those circumstances, the applicant’s assertion must be rejected as inadmissible.
38      It follows from all of the foregoing that special purpose vehicles, and thus the applicant’s vehicles, do not fall within the scope of Regulation 2019/631. The applicant cannot therefore properly take issue with the Commission for having based the contested decision on an overly restrictive interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 that is contrary to the spirit and the purpose of that regulation and the Paris Agreement, by excluding special purpose vehicles from its scope. Moreover, as is apparent from all of the foregoing considerations, the interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 proposed by the applicant does not follow from either its wording or the aim pursued by that regulation.
39      Last, in so far as the applicant raises a plea of illegality within the meaning of Article 277 TFEU against Regulation 2019/631, on the grounds, in essence, first, that Article 1 thereof is incompatible with Article 2(3) and, second, that Article 2(3) infringes the Paris Agreement, it is sufficient to state that such a plea of illegality must be rejected for reasons similar to those set out in paragraphs 34 to 37 above.
40      The present part of the plea must therefore be rejected.
The second part, concerning the breach of the principles that must guide the interpretation of provisions that are prima facie contradictory
41      The applicant claims, in essence, that there is a contradiction between Article 1, Article 2(3) and Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631. Article 1 of Regulation 2019/631, read in the light of recital 4 of that regulation, pursues clear collective objectives with respect to CO2 emissions, which concern the entire EU fleet, with a view to the transition of the entire transport sector to a zero emissions level. Expanding on that article, Article 6 of that regulation allows vehicle manufacturers, including the applicant, to participate in the pooling mechanism. Article 2(3) of that regulation, on the other hand, excludes special purpose vehicles from the scope of that regulation. In those circumstances, the only way of reconciling those provisions, in the applicant’s submission, is to consider, in the present case, that if its vehicles are not required to meet the carbon emissions obligations, it may legitimately participate in carbon pooling agreements, which aim to reduce collectively the carbon emissions of other vehicle manufacturers which market their goods in the European Union, since only manufacturers which benefit from a derogation under Article 10 of Regulation 2019/631 are excluded from the scope of Article 6 of that regulation.
42      The Commission, supported by the Parliament and by the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
43      The applicant maintains, in essence, that the contested decision is based on an incorrect interpretation of Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, since only manufacturers which have been granted a derogation under Article 10 of that regulation are excluded from the scope of that article and therefore from the possibility of forming a pool.
44      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 1, which defines its subject matter and objectives, Regulation 2019/631 was adopted by the Parliament and the Council in order to contribute to the achievement of the Union’s target of reducing the CO2 emissions of new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles.
45      Under Article 4(1) of Regulation 2019/631, each manufacturer is to ensure that the average specific emissions of CO2 of its fleet of vehicles newly registered in a given year do not exceed its annual specific emissions target.
46      Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, entitled ‘Pooling’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof that manufacturers, other than manufacturers which have been granted a derogation under Article 10 of that regulation, may form a pool for the purposes of meeting their specific emissions obligations. Then, for manufacturers which are members of a pool, compliance with the objective laid down in Article 4 of Regulation 2019/631 is assessed at the ‘pool’ level.
47      It necessarily follows that a vehicle manufacturer which does not come within the scope of Regulation 2019/631 cannot participate in a pool.
48      That conclusion is supported by the fact that manufacturers which have been granted a derogation from their specific emissions obligations, under Article 10 of that regulation, are excluded from forming a pool for the purposes of meeting their specific emissions obligations, provided for in Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631.
49      The exclusion of those manufacturers shows, in fact, that the logic of Regulation 2019/631 consists in precluding the possibility of participating in a pool for vehicle manufacturers which, by reason of a derogation, are no longer required to meet the CO2 emissions requirements provided for in Regulation 2019/631. It necessarily follows that the impossibility of participating in a pool applies, a fortiori, to vehicle manufacturers which do not come within the scope of that regulation.
50      It follows from the examination of the first part of the present plea that Regulation 2019/631, in accordance with Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631, does not apply to special purpose vehicles.
51      In that regard, and since it is common ground that the applicant’s vehicles at issue have been registered as special purpose vehicles, the applicant cannot properly take issue with the Commission for having deprived it, in the contested decision, of the benefit of Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631.
52      It follows that the alleged contradictions between Article 1, Article 2(3) and Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631 are not made out.
53      The present part of the plea must therefore be rejected.
The third part, concerning the breach of the principles of equal treatment, necessity and proportionality
54      The applicant maintains, in essence, that the Commission’s overly formalistic interpretation and application of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 in the contested decision, according to which manufacturers of vehicles that are both wheelchair accessible and low carbon emission vehicles are excluded from the scope of that regulation, fails to have regard to the principle of equal treatment and is neither necessary nor proportionate to the objective of encouraging the construction of vehicles for persons with disabilities.
55      The Commission, supported by the Parliament and by the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
56      The applicant maintains, in essence, that an interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 consistent with the principles of equal treatment, necessity and proportionality would have entailed the exclusion from the scope of that regulation, more specifically from the scope of Article 6 thereof, of only manufacturers of special purpose vehicles that do not meet the CO2 emissions requirements defined by that regulation. That approach would have allowed manufacturers of special purpose vehicles which have made investments in order to reduce their CO2 emissions, in accordance with the preamble to, and Article 1 of, Regulation 2019/631, to benefit from their efforts to produce environmentally friendly vehicles.
57      In that regard, according to settled case-law, a conforming interpretation of secondary EU law cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of that law contra legem (see order of 17 July 2015, EEB v Commission, T‑685/14, not published, EU:T:2015:560, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
58      It must be held that, for the reasons stated in answer to the first two parts of the present plea, Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 has a clear meaning. For that reason, this part of the first plea must be rejected at the outset.
59      In any event, it must be pointed out that the approach proposed by the applicant, which ultimately consists in treating different situations in the same way and identical situations differently, does not ensure respect for the principle of equal treatment, which, as a general principle of EU law, requires that comparable situations are not to be treated differently and that different situations are not to be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 15 September 2021, Daimler v Commission, T‑359/19, EU:T:2021:568, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
60      In fact, first, the applicant’s approach amounts to affording different treatment to manufacturers of special purpose vehicles, which, however, so far as Regulation 2019/631 is concerned, are in a comparable situation. If that approach were followed, the consequence would be that certain manufacturers of such vehicles would be allowed to form a pool, on the basis of Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, whereas, as was established in the examination of the first two parts of this plea, none of them is subjected to that regulation, irrespective of whether their vehicles have low CO2 emissions.
61      Second, that approach amounts to treating in the same way manufacturers of Categories M1 and N1 vehicles and certain manufacturers of special purpose vehicles, which, however, so far as Regulation 2019/631 is concerned, are in different situations. If that approach were followed, the consequence would be that certain manufacturers of special purpose vehicles would be allowed to form pools, on the same basis as manufacturers of Categories M1 and N1 vehicles, whereas, unlike the latter manufacturers, they are not subjected to the specific emissions targets of Regulation 2019/631.
62      The approach proposed by the applicant cannot therefore be justified on the basis of the principle of equal treatment.
63      Nor can that approach be justified on the basis of the principles of necessity and proportionality. The principle of proportionality, which forms part of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the aim pursued by the legislation at issue; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the inconvenience caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2020, PlasticsEurope v ECHA, T‑207/18, EU:T:2020:623, paragraph 264 (not published and the case-law cited)).
64      In this instance, in spite of the adverse financial consequences which it has for the applicant, the fact that the interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 employed by the Commission in the contested decision results in the exclusion of wheelchair accessible vehicles from the scope of Regulation 2019/631, and more specifically from Article 6 thereof, is an effect inherent in any mechanism having, as in the present case, a defined scope, which cannot be avoided.
65      In addition, the exclusion of wheelchair accessible vehicles from the scope of Regulation 2019/631, which has the effect of exempting manufacturers of those vehicles from the CO2 emissions requirements and, accordingly, of not increasing their burdens by imposing additional requirements on them, is consistent with the objective of that regulation, set out in paragraph 24 above, namely that the effort of reducing emissions of CO2 must be allocated in a neutral and equitable manner.
66      Consequently, the applicant cannot validly maintain that the exclusion of its vehicles from the benefit of the pooling mechanism, provided for in Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, fails to have regard to the principles of necessity and proportionality.
67      The present part of the plea must therefore be rejected, as must the plea in its entirety.
The first plea, alleging, in the alternative, that the Commission’s interpretation of Directive 2007/46 as applied in the context of Regulation 2019/631 is incorrect and encroaches on the legislature’s prerogatives
68      In the event that the Court does not uphold the first plea, the applicant submits, on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, that Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631, as interpreted and applied by the Commission in the contested decision, is unlawful. According to the applicant, in considering, in essence, that a vehicle that meets the requirements of both Annex IV and Annex XI to Directive 2007/46 could be approved only as a special purpose vehicle, the Commission not only revised an essential element of Directive 2007/46, but also adopted an interpretation that is contrary to that directive, read either on its own or in conjunction with Regulation 2019/631. That interpretation runs counter to the definition of special purpose vehicle and to the definition of wheelchair accessible vehicle, since ‘wheelchair accessible vehicles’ essentially form part of Category M1 vehicles and are (i) Category M1 vehicles and (ii) vehicles originally built or subsequently altered in order to be able to accommodate one or more wheelchairs. In the applicant’s submission, Category M1 precedes the function to which the vehicle will be put, which tends to suggest that, if a Category M1 vehicle also meets the ‘wheelchair accessible vehicle’ criteria, it is the manufacturer, which is ultimately responsible for classifying its vehicles, that should decide on the category of the vehicle.
69      The Commission, supported by the Parliament and by the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
70      As a preliminary point, it follows from the examination of the first plea that the Commission’s interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 in the contested decision does not breach either the provisions and the objectives of Regulation 2019/631 or the principles of equal treatment, necessity and proportionality.
71      The applicant maintains, however, in the context of this plea, that, if that is the case, the Commission’s interpretation of Directive 2007/46 is unlawful, which led it to an application and an interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 that breach a number of principles of EU law.
72      The applicant asserts, in essence, that the Commission considers, incorrectly, that vehicles, including wheelchair accessible vehicles, that meet the technical requirements of Annexes IV and XI to Directive 2007/46 and which may therefore be approved on the basis of those annexes can be registered only on the basis of Annex XI to that directive as special purpose vehicles.
73      It claims to base that assertion on the discussions that took place at the meetings of the Type-Approval Authorities Expert Group (‘the TAAEG’) and the Type-Approval Authorities Meeting (‘the TAAM’). In particular, it refers to the meeting of 28 and 29 June 2018, as regards the TAAM, and the meeting of February 2018, as regards the TAAEG.
74      Thus, the act which is alleged to be unlawful consists, in essence, of the position adopted by the Commission within the TAAEG and the TAAM. That position implies an obligation to approve and to register as a special purpose vehicle any vehicle which conforms both to the specifications of ‘M1 vehicles’ and to the specifications of ‘special purpose vehicles’.
75      Without there being any need to consider whether such a position might constitute an ‘act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the Union’, within the meaning of Article 277 TFEU, it is sufficient to state that the present plea is factually incorrect.
76      First, as regards the TAAM meeting on 28 and 29 June 2018, during which the participants concluded, first, that a vehicle that meets the requirements of Annexes IV and XI to Directive 2007/46 can be approved under only one of those two annexes and, second, that the certificate of conformity of a wheelchair accessible vehicle that meets the requirements of those annexes must refer only to ‘special purpose vehicle’, it should be observed that the Commission was not among the participants in that meeting, as is apparent from Annex A3 to the application and from the list of participants set out in that annex. In those circumstances, and as the Commission correctly contends, those conclusions cannot be attributed to it.
77      Second, as regards the TAAEG meeting held in February 2018, while the Commission does not deny having taken part in that meeting, or likewise in the discussions that took place there concerning the classification of vehicles that meet the requirements of Annexes IV and XI to Directive 2007/46, it does, on the other hand, dispute the conclusions which the applicant draws from that meeting, following an email exchanged with a member of the Netherlands approval authority who was present at the meeting.
78      It should be observed, as the Commission submits, that it cannot be inferred from that email that the Commission would consider and require manufacturers whose vehicles met the technical requirements of Annexes IV and XI to Directive 2007/46 to register them under Annex XI to that directive as special purpose vehicles. On the one hand, it is not disputable that that email did not originate from the Commission; and, on the other hand, it is not apparent from that email that the opinion expressed therein is attributable to the Commission.
79      On that last point, it is apparent from the complete minutes of the February 2018 TAAEG meeting, attached to Annex B1 to the defence, that the Commission stated, in answer to a question from the Netherlands authority about the possibility of approving a wheelchair accessible vehicle under Annex IV and Annex XI to Directive 2007/46, that it considered that, under that directive, a vehicle could be approved, in accordance with Annex XI or Annex IV to that directive, only once. It also indicated that there was nothing to prevent a vehicle from being approved under Annex XI to Directive 2007/46 when it met the requirements of Annex IV to that directive. That detail could also be mentioned on the certificate of conformity. It concluded its answer by stating that the manufacturer must choose between approval under Annex IV or Annex XI to Directive 2007/46.
80      Accordingly, although it might have been desirable for the full minutes of the February 2018 TAAEG meeting to be made public on the register of groups of experts, in accordance with Article 26 of Commission Decision C(2016) 3301 final of 30 May 2016 establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of Commission expert groups, the premiss alleged by the applicant and set out in paragraph 72 above does not follow from the discussions that took place at that meeting. It is apparent from those discussions, on the contrary, that, for the Commission, where a vehicle meets the requirements of Annexes IV and XI to Directive 2007/46, the manufacturer is free to choose to have its vehicle registered under either of those two annexes. The only restriction is that the manufacturer cannot have its vehicle approved and registered under both of those annexes.
81      It was observed, moreover, in the examination of the first two parts of the first plea that Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 has a clear meaning. The applicant therefore did not need to wait until it knew the Commission’s position in order to be aware that if its vehicles were approved and registered as special purpose vehicles, those vehicles would be excluded from the scope of Regulation 2019/631.
82      In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s premiss set out in paragraph 72 above is incorrect.
83      The applicant also seems to claim, more generally, that the Commission, in essence, required manufacturers whose vehicles met the technical requirements of Annexes IV and XI to Directive 2007/46 to register them under Annex XI to that directive as special purpose vehicles.
84      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the provisions of Directive 2007/46, and in particular of Article 3(5) and (36), Article 4(1) to (3), Article 5(1), Article 6(2) and (3) and Article 18(1) thereof, it is for the manufacturer, first, to indicate, in the folder accompanying its application for approval, the vehicle type on the basis of which the application is submitted and, second, to issue a certificate of conformity showing the technical and regulatory requirements which the vehicle meets. Furthermore, as regards the approval procedure, it is conducted under the supervision of an approval authority, which is an authority of a Member State.
85      It should also be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation 2019/631, it is the Member States that, for each calendar year, record information for each new passenger car registered in their territory, which, in accordance with point 2 of Part A of Annexes II and III to that regulation, is taken from the certificates of conformity, and which transmits that information to the Commission, so that it may determine, for each manufacturer, its average specific emissions of CO2 and its specific emissions target.
86      It follows that the Commission does not intervene either for the purposes of type approval or for the purposes of drawing up the certificate of conformity, with a view to the registration and sale or putting into service of a vehicle. It intervenes only for the determination of the manufacturers’ average specific emissions of CO2 and of their specific emissions target, on the basis of the information supplied by the Member States.
87      In those circumstances, and in so far as the Commission does not intervene in the context of those procedures, the applicant’s assertion that the Commission requires manufacturers whose vehicles meet the technical requirements of Annexes IV and XI to Directive 2007/46 to register them under Annex XI to that directive as special purpose vehicles is in any event unfounded.
88      For the same reasons, the same conclusion must be drawn with respect to the applicant’s assertion that the Commission misinterprets Directive 2007/46 in so far as it considers that a vehicle that comes within the scope of Annex IV to that directive could not also come within the scope of Annex XI to that directive.
89      In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the applicant’s premiss set out in paragraph 83 above is incorrect.
90      Consequently, in so far as the applicant’s arguments in support of its plea of illegality are based on incorrect premisses, they cannot in any event succeed in demonstrating the illegality which it pleads.
91      In any event, it must be noted that the applicant no longer claims in the reply that the Commission required it to register its vehicles as special purpose vehicles. It now agrees that the Commission did not have the power to do so, since issuing certificates of conformity is no longer among its powers. The applicant claims, on the contrary, that, in view of the constraints linked with the national legislation of the Member States in which it markets its vehicles, it is required to have its vehicles registered as special purpose vehicles in order to be able to pursue its activities on the EU market. It explains in that regard that, in view of their specific features, the vehicles which it produces are essentially used by taxi companies. However, in accordance with the national legislation on taxis in a number of Member States in which the applicant markets its vehicles, only vehicles approved as wheelchair accessible vehicles could obtain taxi licences.
92      In the light of all of the foregoing, the plea of illegality raised by the applicant must be rejected, without there being any need to rule on its admissibility, raised by the Parliament in application of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.
The second plea, alleging that the contested decision is illegal and contrary to a number of fundamental principles of EU law, in that it deprives the applicant of the full benefit of its participation in the carbon pooling mechanism
93      The present plea consists of three parts.
94      The first part concerns the fact that the Commission had no legal basis on which to deprive the applicant of its participation in the pooling mechanism. The second part concerns, in essence, the Commission’s breach of the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business. The third part concerns the Commission’s breach of the principle of the protection of the applicant’s legitimate expectations.
The first part, relating to the lack of a legal basis for depriving the applicant of the full benefit of its participation in the pooling mechanism
95      The applicant maintains, in essence, that the contested decision has no legal basis or is based on an ineffective and blindly formalistic interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631, which had the effect of not allowing the applicant to benefit from the pooling mechanism and thus deprived it of a source of revenues that it deserves, under Article 6 of that regulation, in spite of its efforts to comply with the Paris Agreement and the emissions targets set by Regulation 2019/631.
96      The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
97      In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that the applicant’s arguments are based on the incorrect premiss that the contested decision has no legal basis or is based on an ineffective and incorrect interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631.
98      First of all, it was found in the examination of the first part of the first plea that the contested decision did not rely on an interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 that is contrary to the spirit and the purpose of that regulation. On the contrary, it was found that the Commission’s interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 was consistent with the wording of and the aim pursued by that regulation.
99      Next, it was observed in the examination of the second part of the first plea that Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631 applied only to manufacturers of vehicles subjected to the specific emissions requirements of that regulation, as defined in Article 4. It was concluded that, since it was common ground that the other eight vehicles manufactured by the applicant had been registered as special purpose vehicles, they did not come within the scope of Regulation 2019/631, in accordance with Article 2(3), and that the applicant could not therefore include those vehicles in the framework of the pooling mechanism.
100    Last, it was concluded in the examination of the third part of the first plea that the contested decision did not breach the principles of equal treatment, necessity and proportionality.
101    It follows from all of the foregoing that, contrary to the applicant’s contention, the contested decision does have a legal basis, namely Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631, and that the Commission’s interpretation of that provision in the contested decision is consistent with its wording and does not infringe Articles 1 and 6 of that regulation.
102    Furthermore, in so far as the applicant cannot rely on the application of Regulation 2019/631, and more specifically of Article 6 thereof, with regard to special purpose vehicles, it is immaterial whether the contested decision had the effect of depriving it of a source of revenue which it deserved or of the result of its efforts to reduce the CO2 emissions of its vehicles. The applicant’s arguments alleging financial or economic damage are therefore ineffective.
103    The present part of the plea must therefore be rejected.
The second part, relating to the breach of the freedom to conduct a business
104    The applicant maintains, in essence, that by excluding its vehicles registered as special purpose vehicles from the scope of Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631 when they also met the requirements of Category M1 vehicles and recorded good CO2 emissions performances, the contested decision interferes with its freedom to conduct a business on grounds that cannot be justified and limits the effectiveness  of that article.
105    The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
106    As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 16 of the Charter, freedom to conduct a business is recognised in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices. The protection afforded by Article 16 of the Charter covers the freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity, the freedom of contract and free competition, as is apparent from the explanations relating to that article, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter (see judgment of 15 April 2021, Federazione nazionale delle imprese elettrotecniche ed elettroniche (Anie) and Others, C‑798/18 and C‑799/18, EU:C:2021:280, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
107    In the present case, it must be stated that, in order to be able to find that the Commission infringed the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business by excluding its vehicles registered as special purpose vehicles from the scope of Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, it would have first of all been necessary for those vehicles to come within the scope of that regulation and also for the Commission to have a discretion on that point.
108    As is apparent from the examination of the first plea, Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631 expressly states that that regulation is not to apply to special purpose vehicles, such as wheelchair accessible vehicles.
109    It follows that, according to the applicable legal provisions, first, special purpose vehicles did not come within the scope of Regulation 2019/631, so that the regulation did not allow the Commission to authorise manufacturers of those vehicles to form pools, and, second, the Commission had no discretion on that point, given the clear and unequivocal wording of those provisions.
110    Consequently, the applicant cannot properly maintain that the Commission interfered with its freedom to conduct a business by excluding its vehicles from the pooling mechanism provided for in Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, irrespective of whether those vehicles have low CO2 emissions.
111    Furthermore, it follows from paragraphs 84 to 86 above, first, that manufacturers’ average specific emissions of CO2, and their specific emissions targets, or more generally whether they are subjected to Regulation 2019/631, are determined by the Commission on the basis of information taken from the certificates of conformity. Second, it is the manufacturer that is responsible for drawing up and issuing the certificates of conformity. Third, the Commission does not intervene for the purposes of drawing up and issuing those certificates.
112    In those circumstances, and in so far as it is common ground that the certificates of conformity of the vehicles in question all bore the reference ‘Wheelchair accessible vehicle’ and that those vehicles had been registered by the applicant as special purpose vehicles for the purposes of its activities, as stated in paragraph 91 above, the applicant cannot properly take issue with the Commission for having infringed, in the contested decision, its freedom to conduct a business.
113    Last, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 59 to 61 above, the applicant’s argument that the Commission would have been able to allow it to participate in pools, given its vehicles’ good CO2 emissions performances, even though it was not required to meet the requirements of Regulation 2019/631, cannot be followed.
114    The present part of the plea must therefore be rejected.
The third part, relating to the breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations
115    The applicant maintains, in essence, that, having regard, first, to the objective set by Article 1 of Regulation 2019/631; second, to the fact that its vehicles are environmentally friendly Category M1 vehicles; and, third, to the wording and the objective of Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, it could legitimately expect that all of its vehicles would benefit from the pooling arrangements, in spite of having a certificate of conformity bearing the reference ‘Special purpose vehicle’. Last, the applicant submits that there is no overriding public interest that would justify the breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
116    The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
117    As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any individual in a situation in which the EU authorities have caused him or her to entertain justified hopes. In whatever form it is given, information which is precise, unconditional and consistent and comes from authorised and reliable sources constitutes assurances capable of giving rise to such hopes. By contrast, a person may not plead breach of the principle unless he or she has been given precise assurances by the authorities. Similarly, if a prudent and alert economic operator can foresee that the adoption of an EU measure is likely to affect his or her interests, he or she cannot plead that principle if that measure is adopted (see judgment of 26 July 2023, Arctic Paper Grycksbo v Commission, T‑269/21, EU:T:2023:429, paragraph 155 and the case-law cited).
118    In the present case, first of all, the applicant does not demonstrate that the Commission gave it assurances, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 117 above, that it would be able to include its vehicles registered as special purpose vehicles in the pooling mechanism, in accordance with Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631. It merely makes assertions, beginning with the assumption that, having regard, first, to the objective set by Article 1 of Regulation 2019/631; second, to the fact that its vehicles are environmentally friendly Category M1 vehicles; and, third, to the wording and the objective of Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, it could legitimately expect that all of its vehicles would benefit from the pooling arrangements.
119    Next, it is not apparent from the file that the Commission gave the applicant assurances that those special purpose vehicles would be eligible for the pooling mechanism. On the contrary, it is apparent from the file and, more specifically, from Annex 6 to the application and Annexes B3 and B5 to the defence, the contents of which correspond to emails exchanged between the Commission or the European Environmental Agency (EEA) and the applicant, that the applicant had been informed several months before the contested decision was adopted that its vehicles, apart from just one, did not fall within the scope of Regulation 2019/631, and therefore of Article 6 of that regulation, because the reference ‘Special purpose vehicle’ appeared on their certificates of conformity.
120    Last, in view of the clear and precise wording of Article 2(3) and Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631, as established in the examination of the first plea, the applicant was clearly in a position to foresee the sense of the contested decision.
121    In those circumstances, the applicant cannot properly take issue with the Commission for having breached, by the contested decision, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
122    The present part of the plea must therefore be rejected, as must the plea in its entirety.
The third plea, alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment
123    The applicant maintains, in essence, that in the contested decision the Commission treated manufacturers of vehicles that met the same requirements, namely the Category M1 vehicles requirements and special purpose vehicles requirements, differently. There is no doubt that, from a technical standpoint and from a legal standpoint, the applicant’s vehicles were in a situation comparable to, or even identical with, vehicles whose certificates of conformity bear the reference ‘M1’. That difference in treatment constitutes a disadvantage for manufacturers, like the applicant, of Category M1 vehicles whose certificates bear the reference ‘Wheelchair accessible vehicle’ and which record good performances in terms of the reduction of CO2 emissions, since it does not allow them to derive the full benefit from the pooling arrangements and to monetise their emissions surplus.
124    The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
125    It should be observed at the outset that the argument which the applicant develops in the context of the present plea is similar, in its premiss, to the argument developed in the third part of the first plea. The applicant again maintains that its vehicles are comparable to, or even identical with, Category M1 vehicles and may be distinguished from other wheelchair accessible vehicles, since its vehicles are environmentally friendly. Therefore, by excluding the applicant’s vehicles from the scope of Regulation 2019/631, and more precisely from Article 6 thereof, the contested decision breached the principle of equal treatment.
126    As is apparent from the examination of the first part of the first plea, Regulation 2019/631 does not apply to special purpose vehicles, such as the applicant’s wheelchair accessible vehicles, regardless of whether they are environmentally friendly. The regulation applies only to motor vehicles in Categories M1 and N1.
127    In those circumstances, and in so far as its vehicles do not come within the scope of Regulation 2019/631 and are therefore not subjected to the CO2 emissions requirements laid down in that regulation, the applicant cannot validly maintain that its vehicles are in a situation comparable to, or even identical with, that of the vehicles of Category M1 manufacturers. In that regard, it is also immaterial whether the applicant’s vehicles meet the same technical requirements as the vehicles of Category M1 manufacturers.
128    The same applies as regards the alleged discrimination by comparison with manufacturers of wheelchair accessible vehicles that are not environmentally friendly. Regulation 2019/631 does not make such a distinction for the purposes of determining the vehicles that fall within its scope. Therefore, even on the assumption that the applicant’s vehicles are indeed environmentally friendly, that characteristic does not bring them within the scope of Regulation 2019/631. In those circumstances, the applicant’s vehicles are not, from the aspect of Regulation 2019/631, in a different situation from those of other wheelchair accessible vehicles. The alleged discrimination is therefore not made out.
129    It follows from all of the foregoing that the Commission did not breach the principle of equal treatment by not allowing the applicant to include its vehicles registered as special purpose vehicles in the pooling mechanism, in accordance with Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631.
130    The present plea must therefore be rejected.
The fourth plea, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons and of the principle of good administration
131    The applicant submits, in essence, that the Commission did not meet, in the present case, its obligations to state reasons and to provide good administration. It maintains that the Commission relied precipitously and incorrectly on Regulation 2019/631, thus disregarding Regulation 2018/858 and the applicable principles of EU law. Furthermore, the applicant was required to guess what the Commission’s reasoning might be.
132    The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, disputes the applicant’s arguments.
133    In the first place, as regards the alleged breach of the obligation to state reasons, in accordance with settled case-law, the statement of reasons must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Court to exercise its power of review (see judgment of 16 June 2021, Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza Chłodnictwa i Klimatyzacji v Commission, T‑126/19, EU:T:2021:360, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited).
134    That requirement to state reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the case. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all of the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 16 June 2021, Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza Chłodnictwa i Klimatyzacji v Commission, T‑126/19, EU:T:2021:360, paragraph 149 and the case-law cited).
135    It also follows from the case-law that an implementing act satisfies the obligation to state reasons where it contains an express reference to the provisions of the regulation on which it is based, so that the criteria leading to its adoption can be understood (see judgment of 24 June 2015, GHC v Commission, T‑847/14, EU:T:2015:428, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
136    In this instance, first, it should be observed, first of all, that the contested decision is an implementing decision, which is based on Regulation 2019/631 and which refers, as is clear, inter alia, from its second citation, to Article 9(1) of Regulation 2019/631, which provides that, by 31 October of each year, the Commission is to publish, by means of implementing acts, for each manufacturer, its average specific emissions of CO2 and the specific emissions target that is not to be exceeded.
137    Next, recital 2 of the contested decision states that the reference values are to be calculated on the basis of detailed data transmitted by the reporting authorities regarding the registrations of new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles during the 2021 calendar year.
138    Last, Article 1(1) of the contested decision provides that the reference values for each manufacturer for the 2021 calendar year are to be those specified in Annex I to that decision. Annex I specifies, in particular, for each manufacturer, the total number of new passenger cars registered in the European Union, Iceland and Norway during that calendar year, the average specific emissions of CO2, the manufacturer’s specific emissions target and the difference between the average specific emissions of CO2 and the specific emissions target.
139    Second, it must be borne in mind, as stated in paragraph 119 above, that the contested decision forms part of a dialogue between the applicant and the Commission, and that the applicant therefore knew, several months before the decision was adopted, the factual and procedural context of the decision.
140    Third, it should be noted that, in any event and as the examination of the pleas in the application demonstrates, the reasons on which the contested decision was based allowed the applicant to understand the reasons that justified its adoption and to formulate its objections and the Court to exercise its power of review.
141    Having regard to the foregoing, the alleged breach must be rejected as unfounded.
142    In the second place, as regards the alleged breach of the principle of sound administration, it should be borne in mind, as a preliminary point, that the guarantees afforded by EU law in administrative proceedings include, in particular, the principle of sound administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, which entails the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see judgment of 20 September 2019, PlasticsEurope v ECHA, T‑636/17, EU:T:2019:639, paragraph 129 and the case-law cited).
143    In this instance, as is apparent from the examination of the various pleas put forward in the action, the applicant has not shown that the Commission had interpreted and applied the provisions of Regulation 2019/631 incorrectly in the contested decision. In particular, it has not shown that, by excluding the applicant’s vehicles from the scope of the regulation and, more specifically, from Article 6 thereof, the Commission had breached the objectives and the effectiveness of that regulation and breached the principles of equal treatment, necessity and proportionality. The applicant thus cannot property take issue with the Commission for not having examined, carefully and impartially, all the relevant aspects of the present case.
144    Having regard to the foregoing, the alleged breach must be rejected, as must the plea in its entirety.
145    It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
146    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
147    As the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.
148    Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Parliament and the Council shall therefore bear their own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders EV Co. Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;
3.      Orders the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to bear their own costs.
Škvařilová-Pelzl
Nõmm
Meyer
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 September 2025.
V. Di Bucci
O. Porchia
Registrar
President
1      Language of the case: English.