61983CJ0224_EN
Parties
Subject of the case
Grounds
Decision on costs
Operative part
Parties
IN CASE 224/83
FERRIERA VITTORIA SRL, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT 22 A VIA BRESCIA, ODOLO, ITALY, REPRESENTED BY ITS SOLE DIRECTOR, VINCENZO BOTTAZZI, ASSISTED BY GINO ALBERTO BERGMANN, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF ANDRE ELVINGER, 15 COTE D ' EICH,
APPLICANT,
V
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPRESENTED BY ORESTE MONTALTO, A MEMBER OF ITS LEGAL DEPARTMENT, ACTING AS AGENT, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF MANFRED BESCHEL, JEAN MONNET BUILDING, KIRCHBERG,
DEFENDANT,
Subject of the case
APPLICATION FOR A DECLARATION THAT INDIVIDUAL DECISION NO C(83 ) 1022/5 OF THE COMMISSION OF 14 JULY 1983 IMPOSING A FINE ON THE APPLICANT IS VOID,
Grounds
1 BY APPLICATION LODGED AT THE COURT REGISTRY ON 6 OCTOBER 1983, FERRIERA VITTORIA SRL, WHOSE REGISTERED OFFICE IS IN ODOLO, ITALY, BROUGHT AN ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE ECSC TREATY, REQUESTING THE COURT TO DECLARE VOID COMMISSION DECISION NO C(83 ) 1022/5 OF 14 JULY 1983 WHEREBY IT WAS FINED LIT 70 200 900 FOR INFRINGING ARTICLE 60 OF THE ECSC TREATY BY GRANTING DISCOUNTS ON THE PRICES FIXED BY THE COMMISSION FOR CONCRETE-REINFORCING BARS . IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE APPLICANT REQUESTS THE COURT TO REDUCE THE FINE TO A PURELY NOMINAL AMOUNT, AND, IN THE FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT A LONG EXTENSION, FREE OF INTEREST, FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE FINE .
2 THE CONTESTED DECISION WAS ADDRESSED TO THE APPLICANT BY REGISTERED LETTER DATED 19 JULY 1983 AND THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ITS RECEIPT WAS SIGNED ON 21 JULY 1983 AT THE APPLICANT ' S REGISTERED OFFICE IN ODOLO .
3 THE COMMISSION, BY A SEPARATE DOCUMENT RAISING A PROCEDURAL ISSUE, HAS OBJECTED THAT THE APPLICATION IS INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT IS OUT OF TIME . THE APPLICANT DID NOT IN FACT LODGE ITS APPLICATION UNTIL 6 OCTOBER 1983, WHEREAS THE CONTESTED DECISION WAS NOTIFIED TO IT ON 21 JULY 1983 . ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 39 OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ECSC, READ TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 33 OF THE ECSC TREATY, THE ACTION OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN BROUGHT WITHIN ONE MONTH OF THE LATTER DATE, PROLONGED BY A PERIOD OF TEN DAYS ON ACCOUNT OF DISTANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 81 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT AND ARTICLE 1 OF ANNEX II THERETO . ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION, THE PERIOD FOR BRINGING THIS ACTION THEREFORE EXPIRED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1983 .
4 THE APPLICANT, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAINTAINS THAT THE APPLICATION IS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT DID NOT ACQUIRE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMMISSION ' S DECISION UNTIL THE END OF AUGUST . IN PARTICULAR, IT SUBMITS THAT THE COMPANY AND ITS OFFICES HAD BEEN CLOSED DOWN SINCE 6 JUNE ON ACCOUNT OF THE STEEL CRISIS AND THAT FROM THAT DATE ITS STAFF HAD RECEIVED BENEFITS FROM THE CASSA INTEGRAZIONE STRAORDINARIA . FURTHERMORE, THE COMPANY ' S SOLE DIRECTOR HAD BEEN ABSENT FROM 19 JULY TO 26 AUGUST 1983 AND WAS THEREFORE UNABLE TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE DECISION UNTIL HE RETURNED AT THE END OF AUGUST . AS PROOF OF THOSE ASSERTIONS, IT HAS PRODUCED A SWORN STATEMENT BY ITS SOLE DIRECTOR,
AUTHENTICATED BY A SERGEANT AT THE LOCAL POLICE STATION VESTED WITH AUTHORITY FOR THAT PURPOSE, WHO HAS CERTIFIED ' ' THAT THE STATEMENTS ( OF THE DIRECTOR ) CORRESPOND TO THE TRUTH ' ' .
5 THE APPLICANT FURTHER ARGUES THAT THERE IS NO PROVISION OF LAW WHICH CREATES A PRESUMPTION THAT, ONCE A REGISTERED LETTER ARRIVES IN THE ADDRESSEE ' S LETTERBOX, HE IS AUTOMATICALLY AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS .
6 IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT UNDER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 33 AND ARTICLE 36 OF THE ECSC TREATY, READ TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 39 OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ECSC, THE PERIOD FOR BRINGING AN ACTION TO HAVE A COMMISSION DECISION BASED ON ARTICLE 64 OF THE ECSC TREATY DECLARED VOID IS ONE MONTH FROM THE NOTIFICATION OF THAT DECISION .
7 THAT PERIOD, WHICH, AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT IN CASE 284/82 ( BUSSENI, ( 1984 ) ECR 557 ), MUST BE STRICTLY OBSERVED, CANNOT BE EXTENDED SAVE ON GROUNDS OF DISTANCE AS PROVIDED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ECSC . IN THIS CASE, THE EXTENSION ON ACCOUNT OF DISTANCE WHICH IS GRANTED TO ITALIAN NATIONALS IS 10 DAYS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX II TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT .
8 ACCORDING TO THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 33 OF THE ECSC TREATY, THE PERIOD FOR INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS BEGINS TO RUN FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE CONTESTED MEASURE WAS NOTIFIED . ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 81 ( 1 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT, THAT PERIOD BEGINS TO RUN ' ' FROM THE DAY FOLLOWING THE RECEIPT BY THE PERSON CONCERNED OF NOTIFICATION OF THE MEASURE . . . ' ' .
9 IN THIS CASE, THE MEASURE IN QUESTION WAS NOTIFIED BY REGISTERED LETTER WITH AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT SIGNED ON 21 JULY 1983 . THAT IS A METHOD WHICH ENABLES THE DATE FROM WHICH TIME BEGINS TO RUN TO BE DETERMINED WITH CERTAINTY, AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY STATED IN ITS JUDGMENT IN JOINED CASES 32 AND 33/58 ( SNUPAT V HIGH AUTHORITY, ( 1959 ) ECR 127 AT P . 136 ).
10 HOWEVER, THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS THAT THE PERIOD COULD BEGIN TO RUN ONLY FROM THE DAY ON WHICH ITS SOLE DIRECTOR ACQUIRED ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE MEASURE NOTIFIED, WHICH WAS NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL AFTER 26 AUGUST 1983 .
11 THAT ARGUMENT MUST BE REJECTED AS UNFOUNDED . IT FOLLOWS FROM THE PROVISIONS CITED ABOVE THAT THE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOLE DIRECTOR OF THE APPLICANT COMPANY OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTIFIED MEASURE CANNOT AFFECT THE DATE ON WHICH THE PERIOD FOR COMMENCING PROCEEDINGS BEGINS TO RUN .
12 HOWEVER, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE FACTS RELIED UPON BY THE APPLICANT CONSTITUTE UNFORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES OR FORCE MAJEURE, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ECSC, WHICH PREVENTED IT FROM LODGING ITS APPLICATION IN TIME .
13 AS FAR AS THAT POINT IS CONCERNED, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT, LEAVING ASIDE THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH IT IS USED, THAT THE CONCEPT OF FORCE MAJEURE ESSENTIALLY COVERS UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE RELEVANT ACTION TO BE CARRIED OUT . EVEN THOUGH IT DOES NOT PRESUPPOSE ABSOLUTE IMPOSSIBILITY, IT NEVERTHELESS REQUIRES ABNORMAL DIFFICULTIES, INDEPENDENT OF THE WILL OF THE PERSON CONCERNED AND APPARENTLY INEVITABLE, EVEN IF ALL DUE CARE IS TAKEN ( JUDGMENT IN CASE 284/82, BUSSENI, ( 1984 ) ECR 557 ).
14 IN THIS CASE IT IS CLEAR FROM THE DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE COURT THAT THE APPLICANT UNDERTAKING WAS CLOSED, THAT ITS STAFF WERE RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM THE CASSA INTEGRAZIONE STRAORDINARIA AND THAT ITS SOLE DIRECTOR WAS ABSENT FOR PERSONAL REASONS . THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT EXCUSE THE SOLE DIRECTOR FROM TAKING THE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES DURING HIS ABSENCE . CONSEQUENTLY, THE DELAY IN BRINGING THE ACTION CANNOT BE REGARDED AS ATTRIBUTABLE TO UNFORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES OR FORCE MAJEURE .
15 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE APPLICATION WAS LODGED OUT OF TIME AND MUST BE DISMISSED AS INADMISSIBLE .
Decision on costs
COSTS
16 UNDER ARTICLE 69 ( 2 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY IS TO BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS . AS THE APPLICANT HAS FAILED IN ITS SUBMISSIONS, IT MUST BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS .
Operative part
ON THOSE GROUNDS,
THE COURT ( THIRD CHAMBER )
HEREBY :
1 . DISMISSES THE APPLICATION AS INADMISSIBLE ;
2 . ORDERS THE APPLICANT TO PAY THE COSTS .