ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
16 January 2026 (*)
( Interim relief – Environment – Fluorinated greenhouse gases – Regulation (EU) 2024/573 – Decision imposing a penalty on an undertaking that exceeded the quota allocated to it – Quota reduction – Application for interim measures – No urgency )
In Case T‑694/25 R,
Chemours Netherlands BV, established in Dordrecht (Netherlands), represented by N. Konings and C. Mereu, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Commission, represented by A. Azéma and G. Wils, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
having regard to the order of 20 October 2025, Chemours Netherlands v Commission (T‑694/25 R, not published),
makes the following
Order
1        By its application on the basis of Articles 278 and 279
TFEU, the applicant, Chemours Netherlands BV, seeks,
inter alia,
the suspension of operation of the letter of the European Commission of 1 August 2025, by which a quota reduction penalty was imposed on the applicant for non-compliance with Article 16(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/573 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 February 2024 on fluorinated greenhouse gases, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 (OJ L, 2024/573) (‘the contested decision’),
and also the grant of any other or further relief that the President of the General Court considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
Background to the dispute and forms of order sought
2        The applicant is a company incorporated under Netherlands law which is active in the hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) sector.
3        HFCs are a category of fluorinated greenhouse gas used, in particular, in refrigeration and air-conditioning systems, aerosols and the manufacture of insulating foam.
4        In the fight against greenhouse gas emissions, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation 2024/573.
5        According to recital 6 of Regulation 2024/573, it is important that that regulation ensures that the European Union comply with its international obligations in the long term,
in particular, with regard to the reduction of consumption and production of HFCs, and to reporting and licensing requirements, in particular by introducing a phase-down for production and adding reduction steps for the placing on the market of HFCs after 2030.
6        Undertakings that have exceeded their quota for placing HFCs on the market that was allocated or transferred to them may, under Article 31(5) of Regulation 2024/573, only be allocated a reduced quota for the allocation period after the excess has been detected,
with that reduction being calculated as
200% of the amount by which the quota was exceeded.
7        On 27 June 2025, the Commission addressed a letter to the applicant
which stated that, based on the outcome of an investigation by the Dutch competent authorities into the applicant’s operations at its site at Dordrecht (Netherlands), on meetings with the applicant concerning the import of trifluoromethane for use in its production process at the Dordrecht site, on a letter sent by the Commission to the Dutch competent authorities on 11 December 2024, and on data reported by the applicant to the Commission in accordance with Article 26 of Regulation 2024/573, it appeared that the applicant had infringed Article 16(1) of that regulation by exceeding its annual quota. The letter listed the years in which the quota appeared to have been exceeded (2016 to 2019 and 2021 to 2024) and quantified the exceedance in tonnes of CO2 equivalent. The letter requested that the applicant confirm, within four weeks, whether the information contained
therein was accurate, and was informed that, in the absence of such confirmation, the Commission would consider that information to be correct.
8        On 24 July 2025, the applicant sent its reply to the Commission’s letter of 27 June
2025.
9        On 1 August 2025, the Commission addressed the contested decision to the applicant, by which it found that the applicant had exceeded its available quota for the years 2016 to 2019, 2021, 2023 and 2024, and that, pursuant to Article 31(5) of Regulation 2024/573, its quota had been reduced, with the reduction being set at 200% of the amount by which the quoted had been exceeded, namely 964 724 tonnes of CO2 equivalent. The decision also stated that the quota exceedance for 2022 had not yet been detected since a further assessment was required, and, accordingly, that year had not been taken into account in the amount of quota reduction.
10      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 9 October 2025, the applicant brought an action
seeking, in essence, annulment of the contested decision.
11      By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 17 October 2025, the applicant brought the present application for interim measures, in which it claims that the President of the General Court should:
–        suspend the operation of the contested decision, in so far as it imposes a quota reduction penalty of 964 724 tonnes of CO2 equivalent under Article 31(5) of Regulation 2024/573, pending final determination of the action for annulment;
–        order that the suspension is to take effect immediately and, in any event, before 20 October 2025 at 23:59, the deadline for payments under the Commission’s quota allocation process for 2026;
–        order that, for the purpose of calculating the quota allocated for 2026 and the following years during the main proceedings, the quota reduction penalty imposed by the contested decision is not to be applied and that the quota not be deducted from the amount
allocated, until judgment on the merits;
–        order the Commission to take all the measures necessary to ensure that the quota allocation for 2026 is calculated without application of the contested quota reduction penalty;
–        grant any other or further relief that the President of the General Court considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case, even if that is, if necessary, before the observations of the opposite party have been submitted;
–        reserve the costs of the present application for interim measures.
12      In its observations on the application for interim measures, lodged at the Court Registry on 3 November 2025, the Commission contends that the President of the General Court should:
–        dismiss the application for interim measures;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
General considerations
13      It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, pursuant to Article 156
of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (order of 19 July
2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12).
14      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.
15      The judge hearing an application for interim measures may thus order suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim measures is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March
2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P‑R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21
and the case-law cited).
16      In the context of that overall examination, the court hearing the application for interim measures enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July
2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23
and the case-law cited).
17      Having regard to the documents in the case file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information necessary to rule on the present application for interim measures without any need to hear oral argument from the parties beforehand.
18      In order to assess whether the cumulative conditions that are required for the granting of interim measures are met in the present case, it is appropriate to examine first whether the condition relating to urgency is satisfied.
The condition relating to urgency
19      In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the EU Courts. To attain that objective, urgency must, generally, be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see order of 14 January
2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P‑R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27
and the case-law cited).
20      In addition, under the second sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure, applications for interim measures ‘shall contain all the evidence and offers of evidence available to justify the grant of interim measures’.
21      It is in the light of those criteria that it is necessary to examine whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency.
22      In that regard, the applicant raises six heads of argument, which are all contested by the Commission and will be examined below.
23      In the first place, the applicant argues in the present case that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may take into account the particular characteristics of a specific market and, in the light of those specific
factors, may refrain from requiring proof of irreparable harm. It argues that that conclusion has been drawn
in cases where the structure of the market itself implied that demonstrating such harm could only be achieved with excessive difficulty, due to systemic reasons. In such circumstances, in accordance with the order of 4 December 2014, Vanbreda Risk & Benefits v Commission (T‑199/14 R, EU:T:2014:1024), the requiring of such proof would result in an excessive and unjustified infringement of the effective judicial protection to which the applicant is entitled under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
24      It submits that the market for fluorinated gases is a specific market in that it is regulated and does not operate under the normal rules of competition. According to the applicant, access to that market is controlled, and its customer base is narrowly defined and evolves very little,
owing to regulatory requirements relating to competence and certification. The market for fluorinated gases is also limited in time since it is due to be phased out by 2030. Furthermore, the market for fluorinated gases is particularly volatile, which makes any form of projection extremely difficult. Given those characteristics, the requirement to demonstrate irreparable harm is devoid of meaning since such proof is excessively difficult to establish given the market’s specificities.
25      In that regard, it must be observed that the judge hearing an application for interim measures has indeed accepted a certain easing of the conditions applicable to assessing whether there is urgency, in particular, taking into account the requirements which follow from the effective provisional judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (see, to that effect, order of 23 April 2015, Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275, paragraphs 30 and 57). However, without it being necessary to consider whether such an easing could be applied in the context of proceedings other than in public procurement matters (see, to that effect, order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraphs 37 to 42 and the case-law cited), it must be stated that it cannot, in any event, be interpreted as allowing the judge hearing an application for interim measures to set aside all the conditions establishing the urgency of an interim measure (see, to that effect, order of 22 March 2018, Wall Street Systems UK v ECB, C‑576/17 P(R), not published, EU:C:2018:208, paragraphs 24 to 27).
26      Furthermore, the development of the case-law referred to in paragraph 25 above is explained not by the specific economic characteristics of certain
business
sectors, but by the nature of the administrative acts at issue, whose possible irregularities may present the individual with a fait accompli.
27      In the second place, the applicant claims that,
if applied in full in 2026, the penalty will reduce the quota allocated to it in a manner that would in particular disrupt its business operations and the ability to satisfy its customers. To that end, it refers to several factors connected with fulfilling its business commitments, maintaining its position on the market as a supplier of refrigerants with ultra-low global warming potential
(‘GWP’), with the need to continue its business operations at current levels and to continue its manufacturing operations for the production of HCFC‑22 and TFE (tetrafluoroethylene), as well as with its ability to compete effectively with other quota holders on the EU market and with the fact that the decrease in its quota in 2026 will
negatively impact its reference values for the allocation of quota in the future.
28      The applicant states that the damage
that would be caused by those factors would be irreparable since lost customers could not be fully recovered, business relationships would be severed, its reputation would be permanently damaged and financial losses could not be compensated for.
29      In that regard, first, it must be observed that the factors referred to by the applicant in order to illustrate the imminency and irreparability of the damage lack precision and are difficult to assess.
30      First of all, the information submitted by the applicant does not explain why the 964 724 tonnes of CO2 equivalent are necessary for the continuation of its economic operations.
31      In that context, it must be stated, as the Commission has done, that it is apparent from Annex R15 to the application for interim measures that the applicant’s sales volumes in 2024 amounted to more than 5 000 000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent, while its quota use for that year was approximately 116 000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent. For 2026, the applicant forecasts sales of approximately 3 500 000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent, in the absence of a reduction in quota. The quota allocated in 2026, taking account of the quota reduction, would be some 400 000 tonnes
of CO2 equivalent. Consequently, there is no reason to assume that the applicant will not be able to carry out production as normal. Furthermore, as is apparent from Annex S.11 to the observations on the application for interim measures, the applicant has for several years transferred quota to a related company established in Switzerland, including in 2024.
32      Further, even if it were indeed to need the missing quota, the applicant fails to provide any specific information as to the possibility to find commercial or technical alternatives to the quota lack of 964 724 tonnes of CO2 equivalent. As the Commission observes, there is nothing to prevent the applicant from purchasing the quantities of HFC
it needs from other companies which have available quota and which place HFCs
on the EU market, and from maintaining its own sales at the same level. Taking account of the foregoing, the quota reduction would have only a limited effect on the applicant’s sales.
33      In fact, the allocation of quota is not the sole means available to an undertaking to place HFCs
on the market. Article 21 of Regulation 2024/573 allows importers and producers to receive transfers of quota from another undertaking which has received a quota on the basis of a reference value. The applicant could therefore receive a transfer and use the transferred quota to place HFCs on the market or purchase the gas it requires from another quota holder
on the EU market.
34      Furthermore, it must be stated, as does the Commission, that the applicant could also maintain its business operations
by purchasing reclaimed gas on the market, namely gas that is recovered from equipment and reclaimed for use, an activity that is not subject to quota, as is apparent
from Article 16(1) and Article 3(6) of Regulation 2024/573, which provide that, as regards imports, quota is
required when products are placed on the market for the first time.
35      Lastly, assuming that the missing quota is necessary and the applicant would not be able to find alternative sources of supply, it fails to provide any indication of the significance of HFC sales within its turnover or in that of the group to which it belongs. The applicant, even though it claims
that it faces the likelihood of financial losses, has not produced an accurate overall picture of its financial situation.
36      However, it is settled case-law that, in order to determine whether the damage claimed is serious and irreparable and thus justifies, on an exceptional basis, suspending the operation of the measure at issue, the judge hearing the application for interim measures must at all times have specific and precise information, supported by detailed and certified documentary evidence, which shows the situation in which the party seeking the interim measures finds itself and enables the probable consequences, should the measures sought not be granted, to be assessed. It follows that that party, in particular when it relies on the occurrence of financial damage, must, in principle, produce, with supporting documentation, an accurate overall picture of its financial situation (see, to that effect, order of 10 July
2018, Synergy Hellas v Commission, T‑244/18 R, not published, EU:T:2018:422, paragraph 27
and the case-law cited).
37      In the present case, it is therefore not possible to ascertain whether the contested decision causes the applicant
serious financial damage. It should be observed
in that context that, in accordance with Regulation 2024/573, the trade in HFCs in the European Union is in any event due to come to an end over time.
38      Second, as regards whether the damage is irreparable, it must be found, first of all, that even if the applicant were not able to supply some of its clients and the latter had to turn to other suppliers, it fails to adduce any evidence of a likelihood of that situation becoming permanent.
39      However, in accordance with well-established case-law, there is urgency only if the serious and irreparable damage feared by the party seeking the interim measures is so imminent that its occurrence can be foreseen with a sufficient degree of probability. That party remains, in any event, required to prove the facts that form the basis of its claim that such damage is likely, it being clear that purely hypothetical damage, based on future and uncertain events, cannot justify the granting of interim measures (see order of 22 June
2018, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v Commission, T‑476/17 R, EU:T:2018:407, paragraph 24
and the case-law cited).
40      In addition, the applicant has failed to adduce any evidence to support its claim that the contested decision will harm its reputation. It merely asserts that its reputation as a reliable supplier will be permanently damaged.
41      In that regard, it must be found that, in accordance with settled case-law, suspending the operation of a decision would not make good the damage to that reputation (see order of 17 February
2017, Janssen‑Cases v Commission, T‑688/16 R, not published, EU:T:2017:107, paragraph 20
and the case-law cited).
42      Furthermore, it must be stated that the purpose of proceedings for interim relief is not to ensure reparation for damage which has already occurred (see, to that effect, order of 16 June
2015, Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, T‑274/15 R, not published, EU:T:2015:389, paragraph 16), since such damage can no longer be avoided by the grant of the interim measures applied for.
43      Should the applicant’s reputation indeed be indirectly compromised by the contested decision, it is well-established case-law that annulment of that decision on conclusion of the main proceedings would provide sufficient reparation for the alleged non-material harm (see, to that effect, orders of 25 March
1999, Willeme v Commission, C‑65/99 P(R), EU:C:1999:176, paragraphs 14 et 61; of 22 July
2010, H v Council and Others, T‑271/10 R, not published, EU:T:2010:315, paragraph 36; and of 18 November 2011, EMA v Commission, T‑116/11 R, not published, EU:T:2011:681, paragraph 21).
44      In the third place, the applicant argues that the contested decision will have detrimental effects not only on its business, but also on its customers and on the broader transition to refrigerants with low GWP, which Regulation 2024/573 is intended to facilitate, since equipment manufacturers and end-users who depend on ultra-low GWP refrigerants supplied by the applicant’s customers will face supply constraints, which could force them to use alternatives with a higher GWP or delay the transition of their equipment.
45      On that issue, it is necessary to point out that the applicant is not relying on a
personal interest of its own, but on the general interests of the European Union. However, according to settled case-law, the party seeking interim measures may not, in order to establish urgency, rely on damage caused to the rights of third parties or to the general interest (see order of 26 September 2017, António Conde & Companhia v Commission, T‑443/17 R, not published, EU:T:2017:671, paragraph 35
and the case-law cited).
46      In accordance with well-established case-law, in order to prove that the condition of urgency is met, an applicant is required to show that suspension of the operation of a measure or other interim measures sought are necessary in order to protect his or her own interests. However, in order to establish urgency, an applicant cannot plead damage to an interest which is not personal to him or her, such as for example to an aspect of public interest or to the rights of third parties, be they individuals or a State. Such interests may be taken into consideration only when the Court comes to balance the interests at stake (see order of 10 November 2004, Wam v Commission, T‑316/04 R, EU:T:2004:333, paragraph 28
and the case-law cited).
47      In the fourth place, the applicant submits that the impossibility of a retrospective correction means that the harm is, by definition, irreparable. If the applicant were to succeed in the main action, that would not remedy the harm suffered in 2026. The quota and related supply lost in 2026 could not be fully added to the quota that will be allocated to it in 2027 since Regulation 2024/573 aims at reducing the quantities of fluorinated gas placed on the market until they are fully phased out in 2030. The same applies to its loss of market position and its historical commercial relationships.
48      In that regard, it should be observed that, in accordance with Article 35(6) of Regulation 2024/573, it is 2050 that has been set in Annex VII
to that regulation for completion of the phase-out of HFC quota.
49      In the fifth place, the applicant argues that financial compensation would not suffice to remedy its non-financial harm and the damage done to the environment. In addition, lost profits are difficult to quantify. Furthermore, it claims that even if damages were theoretically available, there is nothing to guarantee that it
would be able to obtain adequate compensation from the Commission.
50      In
that regard, it should be observed that, in accordance with the case-law, harm of a financial nature may be considered to be serious and irreparable if the harm, even when it occurs, cannot be quantified (see order of 28 November 2013, EMA v InterMune UK and Others, C‑390/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:795, paragraph 49
and the case-law cited).
51      It is true that the uncertainty of obtaining compensation for pecuniary damage if an action for damages is brought cannot in itself be regarded as a factor capable of establishing that such damage is irreparable within the meaning of the case-law. At the interlocutory stage, the possibility of subsequently obtaining compensation for pecuniary damage if an action for damages is brought following annulment of the contested measure is necessarily uncertain. Interlocutory proceedings are not intended to act as a substitute for an action for damages in order to remove that uncertainty, since their purpose is only to guarantee the full effectiveness of the final future decision that will be made in the main action (in this case an action for annulment), to which the interlocutory proceedings are an adjunct (see order of 22 June 2018, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v Commission, T‑476/17 R, EU:T:2018:407, paragraph 93
and the case-law cited).
52      However, the situation is different where it is already clear, when the assessment is carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures, that, in view of its nature and the manner in which it will foreseeably occur, the harm alleged, should it occur, may not be adequately identified or quantified and that, in practice, it will not therefore be possible to make good that harm by bringing an action for damages (see order of 22 June 2018, Arysta LifeScience Netherlands v Commission, T‑476/17 R, EU:T:2018:407, paragraph 94
and the case-law cited).
53      In the present case, the applicant claims that the losses at issue are not quantifiable, that they arise owing to lost market share, to damage to its relationships with its customers and to a long-term competitive disadvantage. In addition, market prices are volatile and unpredictable and would need financial quantification. Furthermore, the harm to its reputation and its market position could not be compensated for by damages. Lastly, increased greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the use by customers of replacement solutions with higher GWP could not be undone or compensated for. The applicant thus claims that financial compensation would not be able adequately to remedy the harm that would
result from the reduced 2026 quota allocation.
54      In that regard, it should be stated that, according to the Commission, the applicant has itself already presented an estimate of the potential costs arising from the alleged harm. Indeed, at a presentation made during a meeting with the Commission
on 8 October 2025, the applicant was able, albeit provisionally, to quantify its damage. Furthermore, as observed by the Commission, a reasonable calculation of the harm may be made retrospectively on the basis of the Commission’s quarterly price monitoring.
55      It follows that it is possible to quantify the purported risks related to the alleged damage, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 50 above.
56      In the sixth place, the applicant claims that, if the contested decision was
not suspended before 20 October 2025, irreversible
consequences would occur. That would create a situation of immediate serious and irreparable harm which could not be remedied by a favourable judgment in the main action. The lost quota could not be retrieved subsequently owing to regulatory barriers.
57      In that regard, it should be found that since the applicant has not succeeded in establishing that it will suffer serious and irreparable damage, it is not necessary to assess whether the alleged damage is so imminent that its occurrence can be foreseen with a sufficient degree of probability.
58      It follows from all of the foregoing that the application for interim measures must be dismissed since the applicant has failed to established urgency, it not being necessary to rule on the existence of a prima facie case or to carry out a weighing of the interests.
59      Furthermore, it is necessary to reject as inadmissible the head of claim in which the applicant requests the granting of any other interim measure considered appropriate, in accordance with settled case-law to the effect that asking the judge hearing the application for interim measures to adopt any other interim relief measures, without specifying in what those measures might consist, amounts to asking the judge himself or herself to draw up the form of order which he or she is subsequently supposed to assess (see order of 15 July 2019, 3V Sigma v ECHA, T‑176/19 R, not published, EU:T:2019:547, paragraph 37
and the case-law cited).
60      Since the present
order brings the interim proceedings to an end, it is appropriate to cancel the order of 20 October 2025, Chemours Netherlands v Commission (T‑694/25 R, not published), adopted on the basis of Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure, by which the Commission was ordered to suspend the operation of the contested decision until the date of the order closing the present interim proceedings.
61      Pursuant to Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs should be reserved.
On those grounds,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
hereby orders:
1.      The application for interim measures is dismissed.
2.      The order of 20 October 2025, Chemours Netherlands v Commission (T‑694/25), is cancelled.
3.      The costs are reserved.
Luxembourg, 16 January 2026.
V. Di Bucci
M. van der Woude
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.