EUR-Lex - 61997O0252 - EN
Avis juridique important
|
61997O0252
Order of the Court (Third Chamber) of 16 July 1998.
-
N v Commission of the European Communities.
-
Appeal - Disciplinary measures - Removal from post.
-
Case C-252/97.
European Court reports 1998 Page I-04871
Summary
Keywords
1 Appeals - Pleas in law - Erroneous assessment of the facts - Inadmissible - Erroneous assessment of evidence properly adduced - Inadmissible(EC Treaty, Art. 168a; EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51) 2 Appeals - Pleas in law - Mere repetition of the pleas in law and arguments submitted to the Court of First Instance - Inadmissible - Appeal dismissed (EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 49 and 51; Rules of Procedure of the Court, Art. 112(1)(c)) 3 European Communities - Institutions - Obligations - Observance of professional secrecy - Scope - Information provided by a third party - Anonymity of the informant preserved - Lawful nature of disciplinary proceedings initiated on the basis of such information - Conditions (EC Treaty, Art. 214) 4 Officials - Disciplinary measures - Disciplinary proceedings - Inapplicability of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 5 Officials - Disciplinary measures - Measure imposed - Discretion of the appointing authority - Review by the Court - Scope - Limits
Summary
1 Under Article 168a of the Treaty and Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of facts.Consequently, where the Court of First Instance has established the facts or appraised them, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction only to exercise review under Article 168a of the Treaty with respect to the legal characterisation of those facts and the inferences in law which the Court of First Instance has drawn from it. Similarly, the Court of Justice does not in principle have jurisdiction to examine evidence in support of those facts which the Court of First Instance has accepted.
Where that evidence has been properly obtained, and the general principles of law and rules of procedure governing the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the weight to be attributed to the evidence submitted to it. 2 It follows from the first paragraph of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, in conjunction with Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment of the Court of First Instance which it is sought to have set aside and also the legal arguments supporting the application. An appeal which simply repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments already submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on factual allegations expressly dismissed by that Court, does not meet that requirement; such an appeal amounts, in reality, to no more than a request for reconsideration of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, a matter which, by virtue of Article 49 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 3 Article 214 of the Treaty which requires the members and the servants of the institutions of the Community not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy constitutes a general principle which even applies to information supplied by natural persons, if that information is of the kind that is confidential. In the case of information supplied on a purely voluntary basis, accompanied by a request for confidentiality in order to protect the informant's anonymity, an institution which accepts such information is bound to comply with such a condition.
Furthermore, proceedings initiated on the basis of information from an undisclosed source are lawful, provided that this does not affect the opportunity for the person concerned to make known his views on the truth or implication of the facts or documents communicated or on the conclusions drawn by the Commission from them. 4 As regards disciplinary measures against officials, proceedings before the Commission are administrative, rather than judicial, with the result that the Commission cannot be characterised as a `tribunal' within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 5 Where the truth of the facts alleged against an official is established, it is for the appointing authority to choose the appropriate disciplinary measure to be imposed and that choice may be the subject of censure by the Community judicature only in the event of manifest error or misuse of powers.