ORDER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT
30 October 2025 (*)
( Appeal – Interim relief – Actions for damages – Request for the initiation of infringement proceedings against the Kingdom of Sweden – Decision of the European Commission rejecting that request – Damage allegedly suffered by the appellant – Manifest inadmissibility )
In Case C‑590/25 P(R),
APPEAL under second paragraph of Article 57 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 26 August 2025,
Alireza Malekzadeh Arasteh, residing in Partille (Sweden), represented by himself,
appellant,
the other party to the proceedings being:
European Commission,
defendant at first instance,
THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT,
after hearing the Advocate General, M. Szpunar,
makes the following
Order
1        By his appeal, Mr Alireza Malekzadeh Arasteh seeks to have set aside the order of the President of the General Court of the European Union of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25 R, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2025:799), by which the latter dismissed his application requesting that the European Commission be ordered to adopt provisional steps toward initiating infringement proceedings against the Kingdom of Sweden or, in the alternative, formally to reconsider his complaint under Article 258 TFEU within a set time limit.
The proceedings before the General Court and the order under appeal
2        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 2 July 2025, the appellant brought an action based, in essence, on Article 268 and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, seeking compensation for the damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of the Commission’s failure to initiate infringement proceedings against the Kingdom of Sweden.
3        By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 29 July 2025, the appellant brought an application for interim relief based on Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, requesting that the President of the General Court order the Commission to adopt provisional steps toward initiating infringement proceedings against the Kingdom of Sweden or, in the alternative, formally to reconsider his complaint under Article 258 TFEU within a set time limit.
4        By its order of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25, EU:T:2025:800), the General Court dismissed the main action brought on 2 July 2025, on the ground that it had been brought by the appellant under his signature alone and, therefore, without him being represented by a lawyer, contrary to the requirements of the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. For the sake of completeness, the General Court stated that, when examining whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law, the Commission has a discretion which excludes the right for individuals to require it to adopt a specific position. The General Court recalled that, since the Commission is under no obligation to initiate infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, its decision not to initiate such proceedings is not in any event unlawful, so that it cannot give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union.
5        On those grounds, the General Court held, pursuant to Article 126 of its Rules of Procedure, that the appellant’s action for damages was manifestly inadmissible.
6        By the order under appeal, the President of the General Court also dismissed the application for interim relief. After recalling, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order under appeal, that the main action was dismissed by the order of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25, EU:T:2025:800), and that the proceedings for interim relief are ancillary in relation to the proceedings in the main case, the President of the General Court concluded that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for interim relief.
The forms of order sought by the appellant and the proceedings before the Vice-President of the Court of Justice
7        By his appeal, which is directed simultaneously against the order of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25, EU:T:2025:800), and the order under appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of Justice should, in the context of the proceedings for interim relief:
–        set aside the order under appeal;
–        refer the case back to the General Court for it to examine the application for interim relief;
–        in the alternative, rule itself on the interim relief;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings for interim relief.
8        By decision of 10 September 2025, the Vice-President of the Court decided that there was no need to serve the appeal on the Commission.
The appeal
9        As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the appellant brought the present appeal, like the action at first instance, under his signature alone and without being represented by a lawyer.
10      The third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union lay down two separate and cumulative conditions as regards the representation before the Courts of the European Union of parties not covered by the first and second paragraphs of Article 19, known as ‘non-privileged’ parties. Under the first condition, laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19, those parties must be ‘represented by a lawyer’. Under the second condition, laid down in the fourth paragraph of that article, only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3) may represent or assist a party before the Courts of the European Union (judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 49).
11      In that regard, the Court has held, inter alia, that a ‘party’, within the meaning of those provisions, whatever that party’s standing, is not authorised to act on its own behalf before a Court of the European Union, but must use the services of a third party, who can only be a ‘lawyer’ (judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
12      In the present case, although it is apparent from the appeal that the appellant challenges the requirement of being represented by a lawyer, relying in particular on Articles 16, 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the fact remains that the appellant is still required, under the provisions referred to in paragraph 10 of the present order, to comply with that requirement in the present appeal, failing which the appeal will be manifestly inadmissible.
13      In addition, it should be noted for the sake of completeness that, in support of his appeal, the appellant relies on nine grounds of appeal, of which only the fourth, alleging failure to examine the substance of the application for interim relief, concerns the order under appeal. By that fourth ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that the President of the General Court erred in law in finding that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for interim relief on account of the main action being dismissed.
14      It follows that the first to third and fifth to ninth grounds of appeal are, in any event, manifestly inadmissible in so far as they do not concern the order under appeal.
15      As regards the fourth ground of appeal, it must be noted that it is unfounded, since it is apparent from Article 156(1) and (2) and Article 158(3) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court that any application for interim relief made in accordance with Articles 278 and 279 TFEU is ancillary in relation to the main action. In the present case, the President of the General Court therefore did not err in law in holding that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for interim relief, given that the main action had been dismissed.
16      In those circumstances, the appeal is, in so far as it relates to the order under appeal, manifestly inadmissible.
Costs
17      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which is applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.
18      In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other party to the proceedings and, therefore, before that party could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear his own costs.
On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court hereby orders:
1.      The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible, in so far as it relates to the order of the President of the General Court of the European Union of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25 R, EU:T:2025:799).
2.      Mr Alireza Malekzadeh Arasteh shall bear his own costs.
Luxembourg, 30 October 2025.
A. Calot Escobar
T. von Danwitz
Registrar
Vice-President
*      Language of the case: English.