JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
19 March 2025 (*)
( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists – Action for annulment – Time limit for bringing proceedings – Point from which time starts to run – Inadmissibility – Error of assessment )
In Case T‑281/23,
Dana Astra IOOO, established in Minsk (Belarus), represented by P. Sellar, lawyer, M. Lester and M. Birdling, Barristers-at-Law,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by T. Haas and L. Berger, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),
composed of J. Svenningsen, President, J. Laitenberger and M. Stancu (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: M. Zwozdziak-Carbonne, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 25 September 2024,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Dana Astra IOOO, seeks the annulment of:
–        Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/421 of 24 February 2023 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 41) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/419 of 24 February 2023 implementing Article 8a of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 20) (together, ‘the 2023 maintaining acts’), and
–        Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/769 of 26 February 2024 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ L 2024/769) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/768 of 26 February 2024 implementing Article 8a of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ L 2024/768) (together, ‘the 2024 maintaining acts’),
in so far as those acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) concern the applicant.
Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action
2        The applicant is a Belarusian company active in the construction and property development sectors.
3        The present case has been brought in the context of the restrictive measures taken by the European Union since 2004 in view of the situation in Belarus with regard to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and also, since 2022, in view of the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. As is apparent from the recitals of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2020/2130 of 17 December 2020 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (OJ 2020 L 426 I, p. 14) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2129 of 17 December 2020 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus (OJ 2020 L 426 I, p. 1) (together, ‘the initial acts’), and the recitals of the contested acts, this case is more specifically linked to the intensification of the persistent violation of human rights and the brutal crackdown on opponents of the regime of President Lukashenko following the presidential elections of 9 August 2020, which were found by the European Union to be inconsistent with international standards, and to the involvement of Belarus in the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, which was deemed a blatant violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of that State.
4        On 18 May 2006, the Council of the European Union, on the basis of Articles [75 and 215 TFEU], adopted Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus (OJ 2006 L 134, p. 1). On 15 October 2012, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, it adopted Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (OJ 2012 L 285, p. 1).
5        In the versions applicable on the date the contested acts were adopted, Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642 and Article 2(1) and (5) of Regulation No 765/2006, that latter provision referring to the former, provide that all funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by, inter alia, natural or legal persons, entities or bodies benefiting from or supporting the regime of President Lukashenko are to be frozen.
6        By the initial acts, the entity identified as ‘Dana Holdings/Dana Astra’ was included on the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures set out in the annex to Decision 2012/642 and Annex I to Regulation No 765/2006 (together, ‘the lists at issue’) on the following grounds:
‘Dana Holdings/Dana Astra is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus. The company received plots of land for the development of several large residential complexes and business centres.
Owners of Dana Holdings/Dana Astra maintain close relations with [President Lukashenko]. Liliya Lukashenka, daughter-in-law of the President, has a high-ranking position in the company.
As such Dana Holdings/Dana Astra is benefiting from and supporting [President Lukashenko’s] regime.’
7        On 25 February 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/353 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2021 L 68, p. 189) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/339 implementing Article 8a of Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2021 L 68, p. 29) (together, ‘the 2021 maintaining acts’), by which the inclusion of the entity identified as ‘Dana Holdings/Dana Astra’ on the lists at issue was maintained until 28 February 2022 on similar grounds as those justifying that inclusion (see paragraph 6 above).
8        On 24 February 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/307 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2022 L 46, p. 97) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/300 implementing Article 8a of Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2022 L 46, p. 3) (together, ‘the 2022 maintaining acts’), by which the restrictive measures against the applicant were maintained until 28 February 2023 on the following grounds:
‘Dana Astra, previously a subsidiary of Dana Holdings, is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus. The company received development rights for plots of land and is developing the multifunctional centre “Minsk World”, which is advertised by the company as the biggest investment of its kind in Europe.
Individuals reportedly representing Dana Astra maintain close relations with President [Lukashenko]. Liliya Lukashenka, daughter-in-law of the President, had a high-ranking position in the company.
Dana Astra is therefore benefiting from and supporting [President Lukashenko’s] regime.’
9        By letters of 26 August and 6 October 2022, the applicant informed the Council that, since 1 July 2022, it had been included on the list of Belarusian legal persons with foreign capital originating from States considered to have committed hostile acts against Belarus and the transfer of whose shares is subject to restrictions, pursuant to Resolution No 436 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, and reported the difficulties it had encountered as a result of that listing.
10      The applicant brought an action, registered as Case T‑239/21, against the 2021 and 2022 maintaining acts in so far as those acts concerned it. That action was dismissed by judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council (T‑239/21, not published, EU:T:2023:364). The applicant did not appeal against that judgment.
11      On 21 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against it and forwarded Document WK 17491/2022 INIT to it. In that letter, the Council also asked the applicant to provide it with information concerning, first, changes in its shareholding and ownership structure over the previous three years, secondly, its current involvement in the development of the Minsk World multifunctional centre (‘the Minsk World centre’) and/or any other projects in Belarus and, thirdly, the grounds on which it had been sanctioned by Belarus pursuant to Resolution No 436 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of 1 July 2022.
12      By letter of 19 January 2023, the applicant replied to the Council’s request for information and also asked the Council to reconsider its inclusion on the lists at issue.
13      On 24 February 2023, the Council adopted the 2023 maintaining acts, by which the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was maintained until 28 February 2024 on the same grounds as those justifying the adoption of the 2022 maintaining acts, referred to in paragraph 8 above.
14      By letter of 27 February 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision to maintain its name on the lists at issue and replied to the observations which the applicant had submitted in letters of 26 August, 6 October and 22 December 2022 and 6 and 19 January 2023.
15      By letter of 21 December 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against it and forwarded Document WK 16892/2023 INIT to it. The Council also gave the applicant the opportunity to submit observations by 12 January 2024.
16      By letter of 12 January 2024, the applicant submitted its observations, challenging the merits of maintaining its name on the lists at issue, and asked the Council to reconsider its decision.
17      By letter of 26 January 2024, the Council forwarded additional items of evidence, grouped together in Documents WK 735/2024 INIT and WK 735/2024 ADD 1.
18      By letter of 8 February 2024, the applicant submitted its observations.
19      On 26 February 2024, the Council adopted the 2024 maintaining acts, by which the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended to 28 February 2025. In those acts, the Council justified the extension of the restrictive measures by reference to the same grounds as those set out in paragraph 8 above.
20      By letter of 29 February 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its decision to maintain its name on the lists at issue pursuant to the 2024 maintaining acts and replied to its observations.
Forms of order sought
21      Following modification of the application under Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested acts in so far as they concern it;
–        order the Council to pay the costs.
22      The Council contends, in essence, that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action as inadmissible and, in any event, as unfounded;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs;
–        in the alternative, if the Court were to annul the contested acts in so far as they concern the applicant, order that the effects of Decision 2024/769 be maintained until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulation 2024/768 takes effect.
Law
Admissibility
23      Without formally raising a plea of inadmissibility under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Council claims that the action initially brought against the 2023 maintaining acts is inadmissible since it was brought out of time, which means that the modification of the form of order seeking to extend the action to cover the 2024 maintaining acts is also inadmissible.
24      The Council submits, as its principal argument, that the time limit for bringing an action to challenge the 2023 maintaining acts began to run on 28 February 2023, being the date on which those acts were notified to the applicant and its representatives by email and to the applicant’s representatives by registered post. The two-month period laid down in Article 263 TFEU, extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days, thus expired on 8 May 2023, that is, 15 days before the action was brought on 23 May 2023.
25      The Council submits, in the alternative, that even assuming that the time limit for bringing the action began to run on 9 March 2023, being the date on which the applicant’s representatives acknowledged receipt of the letter sent by registered post, that time limit expired on 22 May 2023, whereas the applicant did not bring its action until 23 May 2023.
26      In its rejoinder, the Council states, first, that the applicant had agreed to receive notifications by email and draws attention to the fact that email was the standard means of communication used by the parties, including in their final exchange of correspondence prior to the adoption of the 2023 maintaining acts. Secondly, several documents show that the applicant’s representatives had had the necessary authority to represent the applicant in all its correspondence with the Council since 30 November 2021 and were also authorised to accept such notifications on its behalf. Thirdly, the e-mail address of the applicant used by the Council was never questioned by the applicant and was consistently copied in by the Council in its correspondence with the applicant’s representatives.
27      In its observations on the statement of modification, the Council submits that the applicant cannot be permitted to modify its form of order and pleas in law so that they also cover the 2024 maintaining acts, since its action for annulment of the 2023 maintaining acts is inadmissible as it was brought out of time.
28      The applicant disputes those arguments.
29      Under the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, an action for annulment must be instituted within two months of the publication of the contested act, or of its notification to the applicant, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.
30      In the present case, Article 8a(2) of Regulation No 765/2006 provides that ‘the Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body [whose name it decides to include in Annex I to that regulation], either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations’. Article 6(2) of Decision 2012/642 is worded in identical terms.
31      It follows that while, admittedly, the entry into force of the contested acts is effected by their publication, the period for the bringing of an action for the annulment of those acts under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU runs, for each of those persons and entities, from the date of the communication which they must receive (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 October 2015, Oil Turbo Compressor v Council, T‑552/13, EU:T:2015:805, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
32      That situation is a consequence of the particular nature of the acts imposing restrictive measures on a person or entity, which at the same time resemble both measures of general application in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making available funds and economic resources to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes and also a series of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2013, Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
33      As regards the Council’s obligation to communicate information, it should be borne in mind that the Council is not free to choose the means of communication to the persons concerned of acts by which it subjects them to restrictive measures. Indirect communication of such acts through the publication of a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union is permissible only if it is impossible for the Council to undertake individual communication. Any other conclusion would allow the Council a convenient means of evading its obligation to effect individual communication (see, to that effect, order of 10 June 2016, Pshonka v Council, T‑381/14, EU:T:2016:361, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
34      Furthermore, the Council may not, in principle, discharge its obligation to communicate to the person concerned an act containing restrictive measures imposed on that person by sending the notification of that act to the lawyers representing the person concerned. Notification to an applicant’s representative amounts to notification to the addressee only where such a form of notification is expressly provided for by legislation, where there is an agreement to that effect between the parties or where the lawyer is duly authorised to accept such notification on behalf of his or her client (see judgment of 21 April 2021, El-Qaddafi v Council, T‑322/19, EU:T:2021:206, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
35      Lastly, in accordance with settled case-law on the burden of proof, it is for the party pleading that the application is out of time to demonstrate from which date the time limit for the filing of that application began to run (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2022, Kerstens v Commission, C‑447/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:612, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
36      It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine whether or not the present action is out of time.
37      In the instant case, it is common ground that after their adoption by the Council on 24 February 2023, the 2023 maintaining acts were, first, followed by the publication in the Official Journal of the European Union of a notice for the attention of the persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures provided for in those acts (OJ 2023 C 324, p. 3) and, secondly, communicated to the applicant and its lawyers.
38      Thus, on 28 February 2023, the Council communicated those acts to the applicant’s lawyers by registered post with a form for acknowledgement of receipt and to the applicant and its lawyers by email.
39      The applicant nevertheless argues that neither the electronic notification of the 2023 maintaining acts to it nor the postal and electronic notification of those acts to its lawyers constitutes, in the present case, a valid method of notification of those acts such as to cause the time limit for bringing proceedings laid down in Article 263 TFEU to begin to run.
40      As regards, in the first place, the electronic notification of the 2023 maintaining acts by the Council to the applicant, it is true that, contrary to what the applicant claims, email is a valid method of notification of a decision (judgments of 6 December 2012, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, T‑167/10, not published, EU:T:2012:651, paragraph 42, and of 7 December 2018, GE.CO.P. v Commission, T‑280/17, EU:T:2018:889, paragraph 50), it is also clear from the case-law that, in order for a decision to be validly notified, the addressee need not actually become aware of its content, but rather must have been given the opportunity to gain effective knowledge of it (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 August 2022, Kerstens v Commission, C‑447/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:612, paragraph 22, and order of 31 July 2020, TO v EEAS, T‑272/19, EU:T:2020:361, paragraph 42). Furthermore, the fact that the addressee of a notification need not actually become aware of its content does not relieve the Council of the burden of proving that the notification of the contested acts was actually received by the addressee and that the addressee was given the opportunity to gain knowledge of the content of those acts.
41      It has already been held that the dispatch of an email does not necessarily guarantee that it will actually be received by the addressee, with the result that, in the absence of an acknowledgement of receipt, such dispatch is not sufficient to prove that the addressee received the email. Such an email may, for technical reasons, never reach the addressee. Even where an email actually reaches the person to whom it is addressed, it may not be received on the day on which it was sent (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 November 2013, Gaumina v EIGE, T‑424/12, not published, EU:T:2013:617, paragraph 40, and of 7 December 2018, GE.CO.P. v Commission, T‑280/17, EU:T:2018:889, paragraph 50 (not published) and the case-law cited; see also, by analogy, judgment of 1 August 2022, Kerstens v Commission, C‑447/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:612, paragraph 25). Furthermore, a delivery report is not sufficient to prove receipt of an email if it comes from the sender’s IT system and if there is no evidence that the recipient’s IT system guarantees proper receipt of the email by its intended recipient (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 December 2012, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, T‑167/10, not published, EU:T:2012:651, paragraphs 48 to 51).
42      In the present case, it must be found that the Council has not adduced any evidence, such as an electronic acknowledgement of receipt, to show that the email sent to the applicant on 28 February 2023 was received by the applicant and that it was thus afforded an opportunity to acquaint itself with the content of the 2023 maintaining acts forwarded in that email.
43      It follows that the electronic communication of the 2023 maintaining acts to the applicant cannot constitute, in this case, a valid method of notifying those acts such as to cause the time limit for bringing proceedings laid down in Article 263 TFEU to begin to run, irrespective, first, of whether or not the email address used by the Council actually belonged to the applicant and, secondly, of the fact that the Council consistently copied in that email address in its correspondence with the applicant’s representatives.
44      As regards, in the second place, the postal and electronic notification of the 2023 maintaining acts by the Council to the applicant’s lawyers, it should be borne in mind that, in the field of restrictive measures, notification to an applicant’s representative amounts to notification to the addressee only where such a form of notification is expressly provided for by legislation, where there is an agreement to that effect between the parties or where the lawyer is duly authorised to accept such notification on behalf of his or her client (see paragraph 34 above).
45      In this instance, as the applicant rightly points out, the applicable legislation, namely Article 8a(2) of Regulation No 765/2006 and Article 6(2) of Decision 2012/642, makes no express reference to the possibility of notification of the contested acts taking the form of their communication to the lawyers representing the person to whom those acts apply.
46      As for whether the applicant’s lawyers could be regarded as being duly authorised to accept notification of the 2023 maintaining acts on behalf of the applicant, the following observations should be made.
47      The Court has already had occasion to hold that the notification given by the Council to the representative of a person subject to restrictive measures did not amount to direct notification of those measures to that person inasmuch as, in the absence of proof of the existence of authorisation given by the person concerned to his or her representative, the Council was not entitled to consider that person to have consented to all correspondence or information concerning him or her, and thus any official notifications, being directly addressed to that representative (judgment of 28 March 2017, El-Qaddafi v Council, T‑681/14, not published, EU:T:2017:227, paragraph 34).
48      It follows that the Council may validly send the notification of an act containing restrictive measures against an interested party to that party’s representative and that such notification causes the time limit for bringing proceedings to begin to run where the interested party has granted authorisation to his or her representative and it may be inferred from that authorisation that, in so doing, the interested party has consented to all correspondence or information concerning him or her, and thus any official notifications, being directly addressed to that representative.
49      The Court has also made clear that a power of attorney by which a person subject to restrictive measures has authorised his or her representative to receive information, to correspond and to act on his or her behalf in all matters pertaining to the imposition of sanctions on him or her by the Council and all matters pertaining to his or her inclusion on the lists at issue and/or any other subsequent act adopted by the Council is sufficient to consider that person to have consented to all correspondence or information concerning him or her, and thus any official notifications, being directly addressed to that representative  (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2021, El-Qaddafi v Council, T‑322/19, EU:T:2021:206, paragraphs 65 and 66).
50      In this instance, it is not disputed that, in the case registered under number T‑239/21, which concerned the 2021 and 2022 maintaining acts adopted in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 10 above), the Council was informed, by email of 10 November 2021, of a change in the applicant’s representatives, who were authorised, by power of attorney dated 1 November 2021, to act on its behalf in connection with the restrictive measures taken against it (‘the power of attorney of 1 November 2021’).
51      It is apparent from the wording itself of the power of attorney of 1 November 2021 that the applicant’s lawyers were authorised not only to represent it before the Courts of the European Union with a view to having the 2021 maintaining acts annulled in the context of Case T‑239/21, but also to take ‘all other actions that may be necessary or helpful in the course of the pursuing this procedure’ for annulment of the restrictive measures taken against the applicant.
52      The language in which the power of attorney of 1 November 2021 is couched permits the inference that the authorisation granted to the applicant’s lawyers was not limited exclusively to representing the applicant before the Courts of the European Union in its application for annulment of the 2021 maintaining acts, but also entitled the applicant’s lawyers to act on its behalf in connection with all matters pertaining to the restrictive measures taken against it by the Council, including any maintaining acts adopted subsequently, provided that their actions were necessary or helpful for the purposes of having the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue annulled.
53      Such an interpretation of the wording of the power of attorney of 1 November 2021 is borne out by the fact – as confirmed by the applicant at the hearing – that, in the case registered under number T‑239/21, the applicant’s lawyers lodged a statement of modification seeking to extend the action to cover the 2022 maintaining acts on the basis of the same power of attorney, even though it was concerned with maintaining acts subsequent to the 2021 maintaining acts which were not specifically mentioned in that power of attorney.
54      Furthermore, it must be stated that the wording itself of the power of attorney of 1 November 2021 refers to ‘all other actions that may be necessary or helpful in the course of the pursuing this procedure’ for annulment of the restrictive measures taken against the applicant, without drawing any distinction between the necessary or helpful actions which the applicant’s lawyers were authorised to carry out on behalf of their client for the purposes of having the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue annulled. Apart from the possibility of challenging them in court proceedings, the act of accepting the notification of maintaining acts subsequent to those of 2021, such as the 2023 maintaining acts, is undoubtedly a helpful action in proceedings seeking to have the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue annulled, inasmuch as the acceptance of such notification enabled the applicant’s lawyers to exercise the powers of representation conferred on them by the applicant, and in particular to bring, on its behalf, an action before the Court for annulment of the acts subsequently adopted by the Council.
55      It follows from those considerations that, by means of the power of attorney of 1 November 2021, the applicant consented to all correspondence or information concerning it, and thus any official notifications, being sent directly to its representatives, including in relation to maintaining acts adopted in respect of it subsequent to the 2021 maintaining acts.
56      Lastly, the Court observes that that interpretation of the wording used in the power of attorney of 1 November 2021 is supported by the context in which the contested acts were adopted and by the way in which the parties conducted themselves after the communication of that power of attorney.
57      First, the material in the file shows that, subsequent to the power of attorney of 1 November 2021, all correspondence between the applicant and the Council concerning the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue was conducted exclusively through the applicant’s lawyers, including the sending of observations on the Council’s intention to adopt the 2023 maintaining acts, even before those acts were adopted.
58      Secondly, the maintaining acts subsequent to those of 2023, namely the 2024 maintaining acts, were notified to the applicant in the same way as those of 2023, namely by registered post with a form for acknowledgement of receipt sent to its lawyers and by email sent both to the applicant and its lawyers using the same email address, an approach to which the applicant did not object. On the contrary, in the present case, in its statement of modification, the applicant took note of such notification to its lawyers, implicitly but necessarily recognising its validity.
59      The fact that the 2024 maintaining acts were notified to the applicant’s lawyers, without the applicant challenging the validity of that notification, shows that the applicant consented to its lawyers receiving, on its behalf, all correspondence or information concerning it, and thus any official notifications, including in relation to acts adopted in respect of it subsequent to the 2021 maintaining acts (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 October 2015, Chyzh and Others v Council, T‑276/12, not published, EU:T:2015:748, paragraph 85).
60      It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that, in the present case, the applicant consented to all correspondence or information concerning it, and thus any official notifications, being sent directly to its representatives, including in relation to acts adopted in respect of it subsequent to the 2021 maintaining acts. Accordingly, the postal notification of the 2023 maintaining acts to the applicant’s lawyers amounted to notification to the applicant itself.
61      In that regard, it should be noted that the registered letter with a form for acknowledgement of receipt by which the Council communicated the 2023 maintaining acts to the applicant’s lawyers was received by them on 9 March 2023. Consequently, the two-month period, extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days as provided for in Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure, must be regarded as having started to run on 9 March 2023 and thus as having expired on 19 May 2023. Therefore, since the action, in so far as it was initially directed against the 2023 maintaining acts, was brought on 23 May 2023, it must be dismissed as inadmissible on the ground that it is out of time.
62      Similarly, the action must also be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the 2024 maintaining acts, since, according to the case-law, an applicant may amend his or her pleadings in response to supervening events in the course of proceedings only if his or her application for annulment of the act previously contested was itself admissible when that application was lodged (see judgment of 24 November 2021, LTTE v Council, T‑160/19, not published, EU:T:2021:817, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).
Substance
63      Since the course of the proceedings has made it possible in this instance to examine the substance of the case and as the parties presented oral argument on that matter at the hearing, the Court considers it appropriate, for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice, also to rule on the substance of the case.
64      In support of its action, the applicant puts forward a single plea in law, by which it submits, in essence, that the grounds referred to in the contested acts, in so far as those acts concern it, are vitiated by errors of assessment and cannot therefore justify maintaining its name on the lists at issue.
65      As regards the first ground for maintaining its name on the lists at issue, the applicant states that the Council was wrong to rely on its position in the construction sector in Belarus and on its involvement in the development of the Minsk World centre to conclude that it is benefiting from or supporting the regime of President Lukashenko.
66      In the first place, the applicant reiterates that it secured the development rights for the Minsk World centre on merit and that the conditions under which it was entrusted with developing that centre were lawful under Belarusian law and consistent with projects of that kind.
67      In the second place, the applicant relies on a number of recent measures taken against it by the regime of President Lukashenko in order to demonstrate that it does not receive any preferential treatment from that regime but that, on the contrary, the regime treats it unfavourably. The applicant draws attention to the hostile environment for foreign undertakings created by the regime of President Lukashenko and to the negative impact of the measures taken by the regime in that respect on the pursuit of the applicant’s business in Belarus, in particular on the development of the Minsk World centre. The development of that centre was thus significantly delayed as a result of those measures and is now being carried out at a loss and under duress.
68      With regard to the second ground for maintaining its name on the lists at issue, the applicant claims that the Council did not establish to the requisite standard that it maintains close relations with the persons described in that ground as representing it or that those persons maintain relations with the regime of President Lukashenko.
69      As for the third ground for maintaining its name on the lists at issue, the applicant argues that the former employment of President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law, Liliya Lukashenka, is not capable of substantiating the finding that the applicant benefits from and supports that regime.
70      The Council disputes those arguments.
71      In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires inter alia that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include or to maintain the name of a person or entity on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person or entity individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).
72      It is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent European Union authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).
73      That is because it is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121).
74      If the competent European Union authority provides relevant information or evidence, the Courts of the European Union must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124).
75      Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges its burden of proof if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated (see judgment of 12 February 2020, Kanyama v Council, T‑167/18, not published, EU:T:2020:49, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).
76      As regards the reliability and probative value of evidence, including that from digital sources, it should be borne in mind that the activity of the Court of Justice and of the General Court is governed by the principle of the unfettered evaluation of evidence, and that it is only the reliability of the evidence produced which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In addition, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains, and in particular to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 224, and of 12 February 2020, Kande Mupompa v Council, T‑170/18, EU:T:2020:60, paragraph 107 (not published)).
77      In the second place, having regard to the preventive nature of the restrictive measures at issue, if, in the course of their review of the lawfulness of the contested decision, the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the grounds for listing is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such grounds cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 130).
78      In the third place, it should be borne in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 58 and 59, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).
79      It is in the light of those principles that the Court must determine whether the Council committed an error of assessment in finding that, in the present case, there was a sufficiently solid factual basis capable of justifying the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the ground that it benefits from and supports the regime of President Lukashenko.
80      As regards the first ground for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue set out in the contested acts, it should be noted that it is identical to the ground stated in the 2022 maintaining acts. Thus, the Council continues to refer to the fact that, when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant was one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus, which is developing the Minsk World centre, described by the applicant itself as the largest investment of its kind in Europe and for which it received property development rights for plots of land. The Council takes the view that, as such, the applicant is benefiting from and supporting the regime of President Lukashenko.
81      The applicant does not deny that it continues to develop the Minsk World centre. However, it submits that that fact does not substantiate the finding that it benefits from or supports the regime of President Lukashenko, since, first, it secured the development rights for the Minsk World centre on merit alone and the conditions under which it was entrusted with developing that centre are lawful and consistent with projects of that kind, and, secondly, the measures taken against it by the regime of President Lukashenko since July 2022 show that it does not receive any preferential treatment from that regime but that, on the contrary, the regime treats it unfavourably.
82      As regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the conditions under which it secured and is developing the Minsk World centre, it should be observed that the applicant adduces exactly the same evidence in support of those arguments as that adduced in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council (T‑239/21, not published, EU:T:2023:364), with the result that those arguments must be rejected for the same reasons as those set out by the Court in that judgment. In that connection, the Court held in its judgment that in order to facilitate the development of the Minsk World centre, the applicant had obtained advantages and privileges from the regime which, contrary to what it claims, are not only indicative of the closeness and good contacts that it maintains with the regime of President Lukashenko, but also demonstrate the benefit which it derives from that regime (judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council, T‑239/21, not published, EU:T:2023:364, paragraph 56). In addition, having regard to the size and prestigious nature of the Minsk World centre for the regime, confirmed by the public statements made by President Lukashenko himself, and the particular importance of that centre to the Belarus economy, the Court found that those factors demonstrate support on the applicant’s part for the regime of President Lukashenko (judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council, T‑239/21, not published, EU:T:2023:364, paragraph 77).
83      As for the applicant’s arguments alleging that the measures taken against it by the regime of President Lukashenko since July 2022 show that it does not receive any preferential treatment from that regime but that, on the contrary, the regime treats it unfavourably, it is true that, when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant was caught by several measures taken by the regime of President Lukashenko in respect of certain Belarusian undertakings with foreign capital.
84      Thus, on 1 July 2022, by means of Resolution No 436 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, the applicant was included on the list of Belarusian legal persons with foreign capital originating from States considered to have committed hostile acts against Belarus and the transfer of whose shares is subject to restrictions. Furthermore, Presidential Decree No 386 of 31 October 2022 and Law No 240-3 of 3 January 2023 respectively introduced, in relation to Belarusian legal persons with foreign capital originating from States considered to have committed hostile acts against Belarus, including the applicant, a prohibition on the reorganisation of those legal persons and a right to seize their property in favour of the regime.
85      However, the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating either how the adoption of such measures by the regime of President Lukashenko permits the inference that that regime treated it unfavourably or how, even if such unfavourable treatment were proven, it would be capable of casting doubt on the assessment that, when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant continued to benefit from and support the regime of President Lukashenko by developing the Minsk World project, considered to be the largest investment of its kind in Europe and one of particular importance to that regime.
86      First, the applicant does not claim that the measures taken against it by the regime of President Lukashenko affected the very conditions under which it had secured and continues to develop the Minsk World centre, conditions that were already held by the Court in its judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council (T‑239/21, not published, EU:T:2023:364) to be indicative of the benefit which it derives from that regime and the support provided to it (see paragraph 82 above).
87      Several items of evidence produced by the Council show, on the contrary, that when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant was still the only real estate developer for the Minsk World centre, regarded as the largest investment of its kind in Europe and a major project for that regime, that it continued to develop that centre on plots of land owned by the Belarusian State for which it had received property development rights, and that it continued to enjoy the same advantages granted by presidential decrees for the construction of that centre.
88      Thus, the article of 3 February 2023, published on the official Belarusian news agency’s website and produced as exhibit 2 in document WK 16892/2023 INIT, states that the construction of the Minsk World centre is being carried out in accordance with Presidential Decree No 456 of 22 September 2014 on the implementation of the ‘Minsk-City multifunctional centre’ investment project, under which the applicant received privileges and advantages not provided for in general legislation and the purpose of which was to facilitate the implementation of that large-scale project of particular importance for the regime (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council, T‑239/21, not published, EU:T:2023:364, paragraphs 57 and 60). Similarly, the articles of 7 October 2022, 4 November 2022 and 8 November 2022, published on the official Belarusian news agency’s website ‘belta.by’ and produced, respectively, as exhibits 5, 7 and 6 of document WK 17491/2022 INIT, describe the applicant as one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus which continues to develop the Minsk World centre on plots of land of approximately 300 hectares, for which it received property development rights from the Belarusian authorities. Articles such as these highlight the scale of the Minsk World centre, in terms of both its size and the infrastructure built on the site, which includes administrative, commercial, socio-cultural, sporting and residential facilities.
89      Secondly, the measures cited by the applicant as evidence of it having been treated unfavourably by the regime of President Lukashenko (see paragraph 84 above) were taken in respect of 190 Belarusian undertakings with foreign capital originating from States considered to have committed hostile acts against Belarus, with the result that it cannot be inferred from the adoption of those measures alone that the applicant was singled out for unfavourable treatment by the regime of President Lukashenko.
90      Thirdly, and in any event, several items of evidence produced by the Council show that, contrary to what the applicant claims, it continued its activities, in particular the development of the Minsk World centre, despite the measures taken by the regime of President Lukashenko referred to in paragraph 84 above.
91      Thus, when the 2023 maintaining acts were adopted, the articles of 4 November 2022 and 8 November 2022 published on the official Belarusian news agency’s website ‘belta.by’ and the article of 8 November 2022 published on the website ‘bir.by’, which were produced, respectively, as exhibits 7, 6 and 2 in document WK 17491/2022 INIT, describe the progress of the Minsk World centre and the applicant’s success in the development of that centre. The applicant’s success in developing the Minsk World centre is also highlighted by the applicant’s director who, in several statements referred to in those articles, welcomes the latest achievements and the progress made in relation to that centre.
92      Similarly, as regards the 2024 maintaining acts, it is apparent from the article of 30 November 2023, published on the official Belarusian news agency’s website ‘belta.by’ and produced as exhibit 3 in document WK 16892/2023 INIT, and from the article of 5 December 2023, published on the website ‘realt.onliner.by’ and produced as exhibit 5 in document WK 16892/2023 INIT, that the development of the Minsk World centre by the applicant was progressing successfully, with its completion being announced for the end of 2027. The latter article draws attention not only to the applicant’s continued development of the Minsk World centre, but also to the speed with which the development of that centre is progressing. In particular, it underlines that the applicant took only one year to build the highest tower in the country, comprising 42 floors and measuring almost 180 metres in height.
93      Such evidence, which also includes statements made by the applicant’s director himself, is credible proof that, when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant was continuing to develop the Minsk World centre successfully under the same conditions as those which, according to the Court, demonstrated that the applicant benefited from and supported the regime of President Lukashenko, despite the measures taken by that regime described in paragraph 84 above.
94      It is true that the applicant claims that, because of those measures, several of its co-contractors and partners terminated their contracts and had to be wound up, resulting in delays, penalties and difficulties in continuing to develop the Minsk World centre. In the same vein, the applicant submits that, owing to the measures taken against it by the regime of President Lukashenko, it is now the target of nationalisation by that regime and no longer has any choice but to continue its activities in Belarus, in particular the development of the Minsk World centre, since its withdrawal from the Belarusian market would allow that regime either to nationalise its assets or to collect, for the State budget, 25% of the proceeds from the sale of its subsidiaries, which would be tantamount to providing financial support to the regime.
95      However, concerning the alleged contractual terminations and windings-up, it must be stated that the applicant has not succeeded in establishing either that it was treated unfavourably by the regime of President Lukashenko or, in any event, that the contractual terminations and windings-up of its partners had specific consequences for the continued development of the Minsk World centre.
96      By those arguments, the applicant furnishes no evidence to show that a decision intended to subject it to unfavourable treatment was taken by the regime of President Lukashenko in respect of it or its partners. Thus, the applicant’s partners decided, of their own accord, to terminate their contracts with the applicant in the context of the development of the Minsk World centre. Similarly, the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating that the alleged windings-up form part of the regime’s unfavourable treatment of it or are a direct consequence of the measures taken by that regime. On the contrary, it is apparent from the evidence produced by the applicant in the annexes to the reply that, of the five partners subject to winding-up proceedings, such proceedings were active in respect of three of them prior to 1 July 2022, namely before the applicant’s inclusion on the list of Belarusian legal persons with foreign capital originating from States considered to have committed hostile acts against Belarus. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the claimed windings-up may have been caused by economic factors unrelated to the measures taken by the regime in respect of the applicant and are not therefore a direct consequence of those measures.
97      In any case, the applicant has not demonstrated, to the requisite legal standard, the impact of the contractual terminations and windings-up of its partners on the continued development of the Minsk World centre. First, as the Council rightly pointed out, it is impossible to assess the precise impact of the alleged contractual terminations of six of the applicant’s partners and the windings-up of five of them without an overview of the number of partner undertakings involved and the tasks carried out in the context of the development of that multifunctional centre, covering almost 300 hectares and comprising numerous administrative, commercial, socio-cultural, sporting and residential facilities. Secondly, the applicant’s claims concerning the difficulties in continuing with the development of the Minsk World centre as a result of the contractual terminations and windings-up of its partners are contradicted by the items of evidence set out in paragraphs 91 and 92 above, which, contrary to what the applicant submits, are credible since they originate, in part, from official sources of the regime, rely on statements made by the applicant’s director himself and post-date the adoption by the regime of President Lukashenko of the measures referred to in paragraph 84 above.
98      The same finding must be made as regards the delay alleged by the applicant in the development of the Minsk World centre and as regards the proceedings brought against it and the penalties imposed by the regime of President Lukashenko as a result of that delay.
99      The applicant has not demonstrated that the delay in the development of the Minsk World centre as well as the proceedings brought and penalties imposed are a direct consequence of the measures taken by the regime of President Lukashenko (see paragraph 84 above). As the Council rightly stated, it cannot be ruled out that the delay and slowdown in the development of the Minsk World centre may be explained by other factors, whether internal or external to the applicant. As regards the penalties imposed and proceedings brought, it is apparent from the evidence adduced by the applicant that these fall within the contractual and regulatory framework governing relations between the Belarusian State and the applicant and are the result of the applicant’s breach of its obligations, in particular concerning the scheduled deadlines for the construction and development of the Minsk World centre.
100    In any event and as has been noted in paragraphs 91 and 92 above, several items of evidence show that the development of the Minsk World centre by the applicant was progressing successfully when the contested measures were adopted, with its completion expected by the end of 2027. Such evidence also points to the speed with which the development of that centre is progressing.
101    As regards the alleged risks of nationalisation, suffice it to note that the applicant invokes only one nationalisation measure taken in respect of it by the regime of President Lukashenko as of the date of adoption of the contested acts, namely the transfer to the City of Minsk of a school as part of stage 16 of construction of the Minsk World centre.
102    In addition, it must be stated that the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating that such a transaction actually amounts to a nationalisation measure decided upon by the regime of President Lukashenko as a result of the measures adopted against it, as referred to in paragraph 84 above. In support of its arguments, the applicant merely produces, in Annex C.4 to the reply, a certificate recording the costs incurred in connection with the construction of that school and the transfer of those costs to the City of Minsk. That certificate does not contain any information or indications showing that that transfer followed on from a nationalisation measure decided upon by the regime. Furthermore, the applicant itself acknowledged that, in the context of the development of the Minsk World centre, it was required to invest almost 200 million United States dollars (USD) in State-owned infrastructure and in that regard expressly cited the example of a school. It cannot therefore be ruled out that such a transfer was a consequence of the applicant’s binding commitments as part of the development of the Minsk World centre rather than a consequence of the measures taken against it by the regime of President Lukashenko and, therefore, of the alleged unfavourable treatment to which it claims to be subject.
103    Lastly, the Court must reject the applicant’s argument that it no longer has any choice but to continue its activities in Belarus, in particular the development of the Minsk World centre, since, in the context of the measures taken by the regime of President Lukashenko, its withdrawal from the Belarusian market would allow that regime either to nationalise its assets or to collect, for the State budget, 25% of the proceeds from the sale of its subsidiaries, which would be tantamount to providing financial support to the regime.
104    That line of argument is based on circular reasoning which amounts to conceding that, if it is not to support the regime of President Lukashenko, the applicant must continue to carry on its activities under the same conditions as those which have already been held to be indicative of the benefit which it derives from that regime and the support provided to it.
105    It follows therefrom that the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating that – when the contested acts were adopted – it was the subject of unfavourable treatment by the regime of President Lukashenko, in particular in the context of the development of the Minsk World centre. Furthermore, since, when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant was continuing to develop that centre under the same conditions as those which were found by the Court in its judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council (T‑239/21, not published, EU:T:2023:364), to be indicative of the benefit which the applicant derives from the regime of President Lukashenko and the support provided to it, the applicant could be regarded, at the time of adoption of the contested acts, as a person who benefited from and supported that regime.
106    In the light of all the foregoing, the Council did not err in its assessment when it found that the applicant benefited from and supported the regime of President Lukashenko as it is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus, which is still developing the Minsk World centre – described by it as the largest investment of its kind in Europe – on plots of land for which it received development rights.
107    That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s claim that the development of the Minsk World centre does not attest to its support for the regime of President Lukashenko, since a distinction must be drawn between, on the one hand, support provided to the Belarusian economy and, on the other, support provided to the regime of President Lukashenko.
108    In that regard, it should be noted that the documents produced by the Council concerning the conditions in which economic activities are carried on in Belarus attest to the fact that, under the regime of President Lukashenko, the Belarusian economy is characterised by the control that the regime exercises over both the public and private sectors and that, having regard to the business environment and economic reality in Belarus, activities on the scale of those pursued by the applicant, in particular the development of the Minsk World centre, are not possible without the endorsement of President Lukashenko.
109    Thus, among the materials contained in document WK 735/2024 INIT, the article of 3 March 2023 published on the website ‘sceeus.se’, the article of 18 October 2023 published on the website of the media outlet ‘Deutsche Welle’ (‘dw.com’), the articles of 20 November 2023 taken from the websites ‘udf.by’ and ‘zerkalo.io’, and the article of 4 December 2023 published on the official website of the United States Department of State (‘state.gov’), produced, respectively, as exhibits 1, 5, 6, 7 and 2, illustrate the extent of the economic interventionism practised by the regime of President Lukashenko and the penalties incurred in the event of non-compliance with the regulatory measures implemented. Such articles are agreed on the fact that the pursuit of significant economic activities is possible only with the endorsement of the regime of President Lukashenko.
110    It follows from the foregoing that the first ground for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, according to which the applicant is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus, which is developing the Minsk World centre – described by it as the largest investment of its kind in Europe – on plots of land for which it received development rights, and on that basis benefits from and supports the regime of President Lukashenko, is substantiated to the requisite legal standard. Furthermore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 77 above, the finding that that ground is substantiated to the requisite legal standard is sufficient to reject the single plea in law raised by the applicant, without there being any need to examine the other arguments it has put forward and which are directed against the second and third grounds justifying the maintenance of restrictive measures against the applicant, since the fact that those grounds might be unsubstantiated cannot lead to annulment of the contested acts.
111    The action must therefore be dismissed.
Costs
112    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
113    In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful and the Council has applied for costs, the applicant must be ordered to pay the costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders Dana Astra IOOO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.
Svenningsen
Laitenberger
Stancu
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 19 March 2025.
V. Di Bucci
M. van der Woude
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.