62022CJ0378_RES
Case C‑378/22 P
British Airways plc
v
European Commission
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 26 February 2026
(Appeal – Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Market for airfreight – Decision of the European Commission finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and Switzerland on Air Transport – Coordination of elements of the price of air freight services (fuel surcharge, security surcharge and refusal to pay commission on surcharges) – Inbound freight services – Territorial jurisdiction of the Commission – Qualified effects – Characterisation – Single and continuous infringement – Taking into account the effects of the single and continuous infringement as a whole)
Action for annulment – Jurisdiction of the EU judicature – Scope – Power of the General Court to substitute its own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act – Not included – Power of the General Court to explain the reasons for the contested act in response to the line of argument raised before it – Included
(Art. 263 TFEU)
(see paragraphs 56-62)
Competition – EU rules – Territorial scope – Jurisdiction of the Commission – Conformity with public international law – Implementation or qualified effects of abusive practices in the EEA – Alternative methods – Criterion of the immediate, substantial and foreseeable effect – Scope
(Art. 101 TFEU; EEA Agreement, Art. 53)
(see paragraphs 67-76)
Appeal – Grounds – Need to identify precisely the points in the grounds of the judgment under appeal which are contested
(Art. 256(1), second subpara., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169(2))
(see paragraphs 77, 83)
Appeal – Grounds – Plea raised for the first time in the context of the appeal – Inadmissibility
(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170)
(see paragraphs 79-81)
Appeal – Grounds – Challenge to the contested decision before the General Court and not the judgment it delivered – Inadmissibility
(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 56, first para.)
(see paragraph 82)
Competition – EU rules – Territorial scope – Jurisdiction of the Commission – Conformity with public international law – Implementation or qualified effects of abusive practices in the EEA – Alternative methods – Criterion of the immediate, substantial and foreseeable effect – Burden of proof – Allocation between the Commission and the undertakings concerned
(Art. 101 TFEU; EEA Agreement, Art. 53)
(see paragraphs 94-98)
Appeal – Grounds – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the facts or evidence have been distorted
(Art. 256(1), second subpara., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)
(see paragraphs 99, 101, 104)
Résumé
In a series of 13 judgments, the Court of Justice dismisses almost all of the appeals brought by several airlines (
1
) involved in the ‘airfreight cartel’ against the judgments of the General Court (
2
) ruling on their actions for annulment of the decision by which the European Commission imposed fines on them for participating in that cartel. (
3
) Only the appeal brought by SAS Cargo Group is upheld in part by the Court of Justice, on account of errors made by the General Court in exercising its unlimited jurisdiction when calculating the fine imposed on that airline. (
4
)
On 7 December 2005, the Commission received an application for immunity under the 2002 Leniency Notice, lodged by Lufthansa and two of its subsidiaries. That application referred to the existence of anticompetitive contacts between a number of undertakings operating in the airfreight market (‘the carriers’), relating to the introduction of fuel and security surcharges for their airfreight services and, in essence, to the refusal to grant freight forwarders a discount on those surcharges. The evidence gathered by the Commission and its investigations led it to adopt, on 9 November 2010, an initial decision (
5
) in respect of 21 carriers.
In that decision, the Commission found that the carriers had participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 TFEU, Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’) and Article 8 of the EC-Switzerland Air Transport Agreement by coordinating their pricing behaviour in the provision of freight services. However, that decision was annulled, in whole or in part, by the General Court on account of contradictions vitiating the statement of reasons for that decision.
Following those annulment judgments, the Commission found, by the decision at issue, that there had been such a single and continuous infringement, by which 19 airlines had coordinated, over periods between 1999 and 2006, their pricing behaviour in the provision of freight services on a global basis by reaching an agreement on the introduction of fuel and security surcharges and on the refusal to pay commission. It thus imposed corrective measures and fines on them for their participation in that infringement.
Hearing several actions brought by the appellants seeking, in essence, the annulment, in whole or in part, of the decision at issue in so far as it concerns them, and the cancellation of, or a reduction in the amount of, the fine imposed, the General Court dismissed the actions brought by Martinair, KLM, Cargolux, Air France-KLM, Air France, Lufthansa and Singapore Airlines. By contrast, it annulled the decision at issue in part and reduced the fine in the light of the other appellants’ participation in the infringement.
The appellants then brought several appeals against those judgments before the Court of Justice.
Findings of the Court
In support of their respective appeals, the appellants put forward a number of grounds of appeal, which relate in particular to:
1.
the Commission’s jurisdiction to find and penalise an infringement of the competition rules in relation to freight services from airports in third countries to those in Member States of the European Union or other States party to the EEA which are not members of the European Union (‘inbound freight services’);
2.
the General Court’s examination of the merits of the decision at issue;
3.
infringement of the rights of the defence;
4.
the General Court’s exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction.
(1) The Commission’s jurisdiction to find and penalise an infringement of the competition rules in relation to inbound freight services
After clarifying that, by referring to air transport ‘between’ the European Union and third countries, Regulation No 1/2003, (
6
) as amended by Regulation No 411/2004, (
7
) applies both to air transport from the European Union to third countries and to air transport from third countries to the European Union, the Court of Justice rejects the grounds of appeal alleging a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Commission to find and penalise an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in relation to inbound freight services.
On that point, the Court of Justice recalls that the Commission may find and penalise conduct adopted outside the territory of the European Union or the EEA, provided that such conduct was implemented in that territory (‘the implementation test’) or that it was foreseeable that such conduct would have an immediate and substantial effect in that territory (‘the qualified effects test’).
Although the Commission had found, in the decision at issue, that those two tests were satisfied in the case in point, the General Court simply confirmed the Commission’s territorial jurisdiction by reference exclusively to the qualified effects test.
In that regard, the Court of Justice notes, first of all, that the General Court did not err in law in confirming the Commission’s jurisdiction by reference solely to the ‘qualified effects’ test, since that test and the implementation test are alternative.
Since a number of appellants also complained that the General Court inferred the presence of qualified effects from the classification of the cartel as a ‘restriction of competition by object’, the Court of Justice states, next, that those complaints are based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal.
The Court of Justice also rejects the complaints that the General Court substituted its own reasoning for that of the Commission as regards the application of the qualified effects test. In that regard, it notes that, where the General Court merely responds to the line of argument raised before it and explains the reasoning of the contested act, it cannot be considered that the General Court is substituting its own reasoning for that of the author of that act. Furthermore, the fact that the evidence that enabled the General Court to ascertain whether the Commission had established its extraterritorial jurisdiction in the light of the qualified effects test was taken from recitals outside the section of the decision at issue relating to the Commission’s international jurisdiction cannot establish the existence of an unlawful substitution of grounds either.
Last, the Court of Justice rejects the various complaints alleging errors of law made by the General Court in its review of the Commission’s application of the qualified effects test.
In that regard, the Court of Justice recalls that, in accordance with that test, the Commission must establish that the practices concerned have foreseeable, immediate and substantial effects in the European Union or, as in the case in point, in the EEA.
As regards the foreseeability of the practices concerned, the Court of Justice emphasises, first, that any loss the incurrence of which the cartel members ought reasonably to take into consideration on the basis of practical experience is foreseeable, unlike loss which results from an entirely extraordinary train of events.
Given that the fuel surcharge, the security surcharge and the refusal to pay commission constitute collusive horizontal price-fixing behaviour and that such behaviour is especially liable to affect trade, the Court of Justice considers that it is established that those practices lead to an increase in the total price of inbound freight services. It follows that the General Court was not required to verify specifically the effect of the surcharges on the total sale price of the freight services, nor did it have to establish whether and to what extent the freight forwarders had actually passed on that price increase to the shippers, or whether and to what extent the shippers had actually passed on that increase in transport costs to consumers.
In accordance with the general rules on the taking of evidence, the General Court also did not reverse the burden of proof by examining whether the appellants had adduced evidence capable of rebutting the finding that the effects of the conduct at issue in the EEA were foreseeable.
As regards the immediacy of the effects of the practices concerned, the Court of Justice states, second, that it is sufficient that the anticompetitive conduct in question is liable to have an immediate effect in the European Union or in the EEA in order for that requirement to be satisfied.
In that context, the Court of Justice rejects, inter alia, the complaints alleging that the effects of the appellants’ conduct on competition in the EEA were not immediate, in so far as those effects depended on the intervention of other actors in the causal chain, namely freight forwarders and shippers, since that intervention resulted objectively from the cartel at issue, in accordance with the normal functioning of the market.
As regards the substantial nature of the effects of the practices concerned, the Court of Justice rejects, third, the complaints that the General Court relied on characteristics of the cartel at issue that did not appear in the decision at issue in order to conclude that the effect on the prices of imported goods was substantial.
Furthermore, since the Commission had established that the qualified effects test was satisfied as regards coordination in relation to inbound freight services taken in isolation, it was for the sake of completeness that the General Court examined whether the qualified effects test was satisfied having regard to the effects of the single and continuous infringement taken as a whole.
(2) The examination of the merits of the decision at issue
As regards the General Court’s review of the merits of the decision at issue, some of the appellants raise complaints concerning, in particular:
(a)
the existence of a single and continuous infringement and their participation therein;
(b)
the classification of the practices concerned as a restriction by object;
(c)
the annulment only in part of the decision at issue in respect of Latam Airlines Group and Lan Cargo;
(d)
the limitation period for the Commission’s power to impose penalties in respect of conduct relating to intra-EEA routes and EU-Switzerland routes.
(a) The existence of a single and continuous infringement and the appellants’ participation therein
In the first place, as regards the geographic scope of the practices concerned, the Court of Justice notes that there is no contradiction between the operative part of the decision at issue, which classifies the scope of the anticompetitive conduct at issue as worldwide, and the grounds of that decision, which exclude certain EU-third country routes. It is necessary to distinguish the concept of ‘conduct’, which refers to a body of facts, from the concept of ‘infringement’, which refers to the legal classification given to that conduct. Furthermore, whatever the grounds on which a decision adopted by an EU institution is based, only the operative part of that decision, read in the light of the grounds which constitute the essential basis for it, is capable of producing legal effects.
In the second place, the Court of Justice recalls that, for the purpose of characterising various instances of conduct as a single and continuous infringement, it is not necessary to ascertain whether they present a link of complementarity, in the sense that each of them is intended to deal with one or more consequences of the normal pattern of competition, and, through interaction, contribute to the attainment of the set of anticompetitive effects desired by those responsible, within the framework of a global plan having a single objective. Therefore, even if the Commission had failed to establish such a link of complementarity between the agreements and practices at issue, as some of the appellants claim, that failure would not, in itself, vitiate the classification of those agreements and practices as a single and continuous infringement.
In the third place, the Court of Justice emphasises that it has only partially accepted the possibility of excluding particular anticompetitive conduct from the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, on the ground that it has been required of the undertakings by national legislation or that the legislation has eliminated any possibility of competitive conduct on their part. Thus, if a national law merely encourages or makes it easier for undertakings to engage in autonomous anticompetitive conduct, those undertakings remain subject to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Since that case-law applies both to the laws of the Member States and to those of third countries, it is for the undertakings in question to prove that the national legislation of the third countries concerned had not encouraged them but obliged them to adopt the conduct at issue.
In the fourth place, the Court of Justice rejects the arguments put forward by the appellants in order to dispute their participation in the single and continuous infringement penalised by the Commission.
In that regard, the Court of Justice recalls in particular that, where an infringement extends over several years, the fact that direct evidence of the implementation of an agreement by an undertaking has not been adduced for certain specific periods does not preclude its participation in that agreement from nevertheless being established in respect of those periods, provided that such a finding is based on objective and consistent indicia. In such a case, the General Court may base its assessment of the existence and duration of an anticompetitive practice or agreement on an overall evaluation of all the relevant evidence and indicia provided by the Commission, including in particular the effects produced by the anticompetitive conduct concerned.
The Court of Justice also rejects Air Canada’s ground of appeal alleging that the General Court erred in law by holding it liable in respect of routes on which it does not operate or on which it is not allowed to operate, namely intra-EEA routes and EU-Switzerland routes.
On that point, the Court of Justice notes that it is apparent from the findings of the General Court in the judgment under appeal that Air Canada intended, through its own conduct, to contribute to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the offending conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives. The General Court thus did not err in law in inferring therefrom that the Commission was entitled to find Air Canada liable for the single and continuous infringement in so far as it concerned intra-EEA routes and EU-Switzerland routes, irrespective of whether it was a potential competitor on those routes.
In the fifth place, the Court of Justice emphasises that, while it is for the Commission to produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support the conviction that the infringement was committed, the General Court is not required to annul a decision of the Commission simply because the Commission refers to facts that do not constitute direct evidence of the participation of the undertaking concerned in the alleged infringement. It is sufficient that the General Court ascertain, as it did in the case in point, that all the items of evidence examined were such as to support the finding that the undertaking in question participated in the single and continuous infringement. In that regard, the Court of Justice states, in addition, that evidence relating to contacts prior to the period of the infringement or relating to conduct in respect of which the Commission does not have jurisdiction can corroborate the interpretation of other evidence relating to that period, in order to provide context for that conduct or demonstrate the recurrence of certain kinds of conduct or practices.
In the sixth and last place, the Court of Justice rejects Cargolux’s ground of appeal to the effect that the General Court breached the principle of equal treatment by confirming Cargolux’s participation in the element of the infringement relating to the refusal to pay commission while ruling out British Airways’ involvement in that regard, since those two carriers were not in comparable situations as regards the evidence used against them in order to establish their participation in that element of the infringement.
Similarly, the General Court’s decision not to grant Cargolux a reduction in the fine equivalent to that granted to SAS Cargo Group cannot constitute a breach of the principle of equal treatment either, since SAS Cargo Group benefited from that reduction because the finding that it participated in the element of the infringement relating to the refusal to pay commission was annulled.
(b) The classification of the practices concerned as restrictions by object
In the first place, the Court of Justice recalls that, in order to determine whether an agreement between undertakings or a decision by an association of undertakings reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be considered a restriction of competition ‘by object’ within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, regard must be had, in accordance with settled case-law, to the content of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part. However, for collusive agreements or practices constituting particularly serious infringements of the competition rules, such as, as in the case in point, a horizontal price-fixing cartel, the Commission may limit its analysis of the economic and legal context of which the practice forms part to what is strictly necessary in order to establish the existence of a restriction of competition by object.
In the second place, the Court rejects the argument based on the fact that the collusive conduct in question concerned only part of the price of the product or service concerned, since that fact cannot in any way establish that that conduct does not fall within a form of coordination which must be regarded, by its very nature, as being harmful to the functioning of normal competition. On the contrary, such conduct leads, by its very nature, to higher prices, resulting in poor allocation of resources to the detriment, in particular, of consumers.
The argument that the refusal to pay commission constituted a legitimate response by the airlines to the allegedly unlawful conduct of the freight forwarders is also unconvincing, since it is for the public authorities and not private undertakings to ensure compliance with statutory requirements. Thus, even if it were established, that circumstance could not in any event legitimise an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, let alone a collusive practice which has been found to be sufficiently harmful to competition to be characterised as a restriction by object.
(c) The annulment only in part of the decision at issue in so far as it concerns Latam Airlines Group and Lan Cargo
By its judgment in Latam Airlines Group and Lan Cargo v Commission, the General Court annulled the decision at issue in so far as it concerned the participation of Latam Airlines Group and Lan Cargo in the elements of the single and continuous infringement relating to the security surcharge and the refusal to pay commission, on the ground that the Commission had incorrectly found that Lan Cargo was aware of those elements of the infringement.
In support of their appeal, Latam Airlines Group and Lan Cargo criticised the General Court for annulling the decision at issue only in part with regard to them, whereas the error made by the Commission should have led to the annulment of that decision in its entirety.
In that regard, the Court of Justice recalls that the finding that the Commission has failed to prove to the requisite legal standard that, when participating in one of the forms of anticompetitive conduct comprising a single and continuous infringement, an undertaking was aware of the other anticompetitive conduct adopted by the other participants in the cartel in pursuit of the same objectives, or could reasonably have foreseen that conduct and was prepared to take the risk, cannot lead that undertaking to be relieved of its liability for that part of the conduct in which it has undeniably taken part or for conduct for which it can undeniably be held liable. In that case, the EU judicature must confine itself to partial annulment of the Commission decision challenged before it.
It follows that, in so far as Lan Cargo’s participation in the exchanges relating to the fuel surcharge had not been called into question, the General Court did not err in annulling the decision at issue only in part.
Moreover, the fact that the Commission did not establish that Lan Cargo was aware of the exchanges relating to the security surcharge or of those relating to the refusal to pay commission was not such as to call into question the single and continuous nature of the infringement found, even though liability could not be attributed to that carrier in respect of that infringement in its entirety.
(d) The limitation period for the Commission’s power to impose penalties in respect of conduct relating to intra-EEA routes and EU-Switzerland routes
The Court of Justice also rejects the complaints that the General Court should have raised of its own motion that the Commission’s powers to impose penalties were time-barred in respect of the conduct relating to the intra-EEA routes and EU-Switzerland routes, in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation No 1/2003.
In that regard, the Court of Justice notes that it is apparent from the wording of Regulation No 1/2003, its context and the objectives which it pursues that the time limits laid down, inter alia, in Article 25 thereof constitute limitation periods. It is apparent from settled case-law that compliance with a limitation period may not be raised by the EU judicature of its own motion but must be raised by the party affected.
In that context, the Court of Justice also rejects the argument that the plea based on the expiry of the limitation period for the Commission’s powers to impose penalties should be treated in the same way as a plea alleging that the Commission lacked competence to impose fines on the appellants. Although Article 25 of Regulation No 1/2003 requires the Commission to impose a penalty for a particular infringement within a certain period, that provision has neither the object nor the effect of divesting the Commission of its power to impose penalties in respect of infringements other than that covered by the limitation period. Furthermore, even where the limitation period for the Commission’s powers to impose penalties has expired, the Commission remains competent to make a finding of infringement after the expiry of that period, provided that it demonstrates a legitimate interest in adopting a decision finding that the infringement was committed.
According to the Court of Justice, the appellants concerned also cannot rely on a breach of the principle of equal treatment in relation to the airlines which were successful before the General Court in claiming that the Commission’s action was partially time-barred, since that difference in treatment results exclusively from the objective circumstance that those appellants refrained from raising that plea, whereas they could have done so.
In addition, the Court of Justice emphasises that the limitation period is not comparable to procedural time limits either, since the latter are laid down with a view to ensuring due administration of justice, clarity and legal certainty. That is not the case with the limitation period, which is principally intended to protect the undertakings concerned.
Furthermore, the fact that fines imposed under Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 should be classified as ‘criminal’ within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does not in itself mean that the limitation period for the Commission’s power to impose penalties pursues an objective in the public interest going beyond the protection of the undertakings concerned.
(3) The infringement of the rights of the defence
As regards observance of the appellants’ rights of defence, the Court of Justice finds that the mere fact that the Commission did not give full and automatic access to other cartel participants’ replies to the Statement of Objections does not entail an infringement of the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned, which must adduce prima facie evidence that the documents which were not disclosed to them would be useful for their defence. It recalls, in that regard, that there is no right of full and automatic access to the file during an administrative procedure.
The Court of Justice also notes that the Commission does not infringe the rights of defence of the undertakings to which a statement of objections is addressed, and in particular their right to be heard as regards the Commission’s international jurisdiction to penalise anticompetitive conduct adopted outside the territory of the European Union or the EEA, merely because the Commission does not expressly state, in that statement, the test on which it intends to base its jurisdiction to penalise that conduct, where the Commission states, in that statement, that it intends to penalise the undertakings to which it is addressed for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement by reason of such conduct and where it sets out the essential factors which it intends to take into account for that purpose.
(4) The General Court’s exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction
As regards the General Court’s exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Court of Justice observes that, although the exercise of that jurisdiction cannot, when determining the amount of fines, result in discrimination between undertakings which have participated in an infringement of the competition rules, the General Court does not infringe the principle of equal treatment when it reduces the fine of an undertaking whose plea to that effect has been upheld, without granting a similar reduction for other undertakings that are in a comparable situation but have not raised the same plea before it.
By contrast, as regards the General Court’s calculation of the fine imposed on SAS Cargo Group, the Court of Justice finds that, by including, in the basis for calculating that fine, the turnover achieved by that undertaking on internal routes, in order to ensure equal treatment with the other incriminated carriers, the General Court made several errors of law in exercising its unlimited jurisdiction. In particular, the evidence submitted to it in no way established that all of the incriminated airlines which had challenged the decision at issue had, unlike SAS Cargo Group, had their turnover which may have been achieved on routes operated within a single EEA State included in the value of their sales which served as the basis for the calculation of their fines. The General Court therefore did not have information which would have enabled it to establish with certainty a breach of the principle of equal treatment which it was required to rectify.
Consequently, the Court of Justice sets aside in part the judgment of the General Court in SAS Cargo Group and Others and, ruling definitively on that dispute, imposes on those undertakings lower fines than those imposed in the judgment under appeal.
By contrast, in the light of all of the foregoing, the Court of Justice dismisses all the other appeals brought by the airlines involved in the ‘airfreight’ cartel.
(
1
)	Those airlines are Air Canada, Air France-KLM, Société Air France (‘Air France’), Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV (‘KLM’), British Airways plc, Cargolux Airlines International SA (‘Cargolux’), Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd, Deutsche Lufthansa AG (‘Lufthansa’), Japan Airlines International Co. Ltd (‘Japan Airlines’), Latam Airlines Group SA and Lan Cargo SA, Martinair Holland NV (‘Martinair’), SAS Cargo Group and Others (‘SAS Cargo Group’), Singapore Airlines Ltd and Singapore Airlines Cargo Pte Ltd (‘Singapore Airlines’) (together, ‘the appellants’).
(
2
)	Judgments of 30 March 2022, Martinair Holland v Commission (T‑323/17, EU:T:2022:174); Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v Commission (T‑325/17, EU:T:2022:176); Air Canada v Commission (T‑326/17, EU:T:2022:177); Cargolux Airlines v Commission (T‑334/17, EU:T:2022:178); Air France-KLM v Commission (T‑337/17, EU:T:2022:179); Air France v Commission (T‑338/17, EU:T:2022:180); Japan Airlines v Commission (T‑340/17, EU:T:2022:181); British Airways v Commission (T‑341/17, EU:T:2022:182); Deutsche Lufthansa and Others v Commission (T‑342/17, EU:T:2022:183); Cathay Pacific Airways v Commission (T‑343/17, EU:T:2022:184); Latam Airlines Group and Lan Cargo v Commission (T‑344/17, EU:T:2022:185); Singapore Airlines and Singapore Airlines Cargo v Commission (T‑350/17, EU:T:2022:186).
(
3
)	Commission Decision C(2017) 1742 final of 17 March 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 [TFEU], Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (Case AT.39258 – Airfreight) (‘the decision at issue’).
(
4
)	Judgment of 30 March 2022, SAS Cargo Group and Others v Commission (T‑324/17, EU:T:2022:175).
(
5
)	Commission Decision C(2010) 7694 final of 9 November 2010 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (Case COMP.39258 – Air Freight).
(
6
)	Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).
(
7
)	Council Regulation (EC) No 411/2004 of 26 February 2004 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3976/87 and (EC) No 1/2003, in connection with air transport between the Community and third countries (OJ 2004 L 68, p. 1).