Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Sixth Chamber)
19 June 2025 (*)
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing – Directive (EU) 2015/849 – Point 11(a) of Article 3 – Close associate of a politically exposed person – Definition – Article 45(1) and (8) – Obliged entities that are part of a group – Information sharing within the group – Application of decisions taken by another obliged entity that is part of that group – Article 14(1) and (8) – Ongoing monitoring of customers by obliged entities – Article 11(d) – Enhanced customer due diligence measures for providers of gambling services )
In Case C‑509/23,
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Administratīvā rajona tiesa (District Administrative Court, Latvia), made by decision of 7 August 2023, received at the Court on 8 August 2023, in the proceedings
‘Laimz’ SIA
v
Izložu un azartspēļu uzraudzības inspekcija,
THE COURT (Sixth Chamber),
composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, acting as President of the Sixth Chamber, A. Kumin (Rapporteur) and I. Ziemele, Judges,
Advocate General: P. Pikamäe,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the written procedure,
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
–        ‘Laimz’ SIA, by E. Jonins, zvērināta advokāta palīgs,
–        the Latvian Government, by J. Davidoviča, K. Pommere and I. Romanovska, acting as Agents,
–        the Finnish Government, by A. Laine and M. Pere, acting as Agents,
–        the European Commission, by G. Goddin, I. Naglis and G. von Rintelen, acting as Agents,
having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,
gives the following
Judgment
1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 2(1),
points 9, 11(a), 12 and 15 of Article 3, Article 8(2), Article 11(d), Article 14(5) and Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ 2015 L 141, p. 73), as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 (OJ 2018 L 156, p. 43) (‘Directive 2015/849’).
2        The request has been made in proceedings between ‘Laimz’ SIA, a provider of gambling services, and the Izložu un azartspēļu uzraudzības inspekcija (Gambling Supervision Inspectorate, Latvia) (‘the Inspection Office’) concerning a financial penalty imposed on that company for infringements of the national provisions on prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Legal context
European Union law
3        Under recitals 1, 4, 21, 22, 30 to 33 and 35 of Directive 2015/849:
‘(1)      … Money laundering, terrorism financing and organised crime remain significant problems which should be addressed at [European] Union level. In addition to further developing the criminal law approach at Union level, targeted and proportionate prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing is indispensable and can produce complementary results.
…
(4)      Money laundering and terrorist financing are frequently carried out in an international context. Measures adopted solely at national or even at Union level, without taking into account international coordination and cooperation, would have very limited effect. The measures adopted by the Union in that field should therefore be compatible with, and at least as stringent as, other actions undertaken in international fora. Union action should continue to
take particular account of the [Financial Action Task Force (FATF)] Recommendations and instruments of other international bodies active in the
fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. With a view to reinforcing the efficacy of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, the relevant Union legal acts should, where appropriate, be aligned with the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation adopted by the FATF in February 2012 (the “revised FATF Recommendations”).
…
(21)      The use of gambling sector services to launder the proceeds of criminal activity is of concern. In order to mitigate the risks relating to gambling services, this Directive should provide for an obligation for providers of gambling services posing higher risks to apply customer due diligence measures for single transactions amounting to EUR 2 000 or more. Member States should ensure that obliged entities apply the same threshold to the collection of winnings, wagering a stake, including by the purchase and exchange of gambling chips, or both. Providers of gambling services with physical premises, such as casinos and gaming houses, should ensure that customer due diligence, if it is taken at the point of entry to the premises, can be linked to the transactions conducted by the customer on those premises. However, in proven low-risk circumstances, Member States should be allowed to exempt certain gambling services from some or all of the requirements laid down in this Directive. The use of an exemption by a Member State should be considered only in strictly limited and justified circumstances, and where the risks of money laundering or terrorist financing are low. Such exemptions should be subject to a specific risk assessment which also considers the degree of vulnerability of the applicable transactions. They should be notified to the [European] Commission. In the risk assessment, Member States should indicate how they have taken into account any relevant findings in the reports issued by the Commission in the framework of the supranational risk assessment.
(22)      The risk of money laundering and terrorist financing is not the same in every case. Accordingly, a holistic, risk-based approach should be used. The risk-based approach is not an unduly permissive option for Member States and obliged entities. It involves the use of evidence-based decision-making in order to target the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing facing the Union and those operating within it more effectively.
…
(30)      Risk itself is variable in nature, and the variables, on their own or in combination, may increase or decrease the potential risk posed, thus having an impact on the appropriate level of preventative measures, such as customer due diligence measures. Therefore, there are circumstances in which enhanced due diligence should be applied and others in which simplified due diligence may be appropriate.
(31)      It should be recognised that certain situations present a greater risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Although the identity and business profile of all customers should be established, there are cases in which particularly rigorous customer identification and verification procedures are required.
(32)      This is particularly true of relationships with individuals who hold or who have held important public functions, within the Union or internationally … Such relationships may expose the financial sector in particular to significant reputational and legal risks. The international effort to combat corruption also justifies the need to pay particular attention to such persons and to apply appropriate enhanced customer due diligence measures with respect to persons who are or who have been entrusted with prominent public functions domestically or abroad and with respect to senior figures in international organisations.
(33)      The requirements relating to politically exposed persons [(“PEPs”)] are of a preventive and not criminal nature, and should not be interpreted as stigmatising politically exposed persons as being involved in criminal activity. Refusing a business relationship with a person simply on the basis of the determination that he or she is a [PEP] is contrary to the letter and spirit of this Directive and of the revised FATF Recommendations.
…
(35)      In order to avoid repeated customer identification procedures, leading to delays and inefficiency in business, it is appropriate, subject to suitable safeguards, to allow customers whose identification has been carried out elsewhere to be introduced to the obliged entities. Where an obliged entity relies on a third party, the ultimate responsibility for customer due diligence should remain with the obliged entity to which the customer is introduced. The third party, or the person that has introduced the customer, should also retain its own responsibility for compliance with this Directive, including the requirement to report suspicious transactions and maintain records, to the extent that it has a relationship with the customer that is covered by this Directive.’
4        Article 1(1) of that directive is worded as follows:
‘This Directive aims to prevent the use of the Union’s financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing.’
5        Article 2(1) of Directive 2015/849 provides:
‘This Directive shall apply to the following obliged entities:
…
(3)      the following natural or legal persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities:
…
(f)      providers of gambling services;
…’
6        Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 states:
‘For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply:
…
(9)      [“PEP”] means a natural person who is or who has been entrusted with prominent public functions and includes the following:
(a)      heads of State, heads of government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers;
(b)      members of parliament or of similar legislative bodies;
(c)      members of the governing bodies of political parties;
(d)      members of supreme courts, of constitutional courts or of other high-level judicial bodies, the decisions of which are not subject to further appeal, except in exceptional circumstances;
(e)      members of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks;
(f)      ambassadors, chargés d’affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces;
(g)      members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of State-owned enterprises;
(h)      directors, deputy directors and members of the board or equivalent function of an international organisation.
No public function referred to in points (a) to (h) shall be understood as covering middle-ranking or more junior officials;
…
(11)      “persons known to be close associates” means:
(a)      natural persons who are known to have joint beneficial ownership of legal entities or legal arrangements, or any other close business relations, with a [PEP];
(b)      natural persons who have sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal arrangement which is known to have been set up for the de facto benefit of a [PEP].
(12)      “senior management” means an officer or employee with sufficient knowledge of the institution’s money laundering and terrorist financing risk exposure and sufficient seniority to take decisions affecting its risk exposure, and need not, in all cases, be a member of the board of directors;
(13)      “business relationship” means a business, professional or commercial relationship which is connected with the professional activities of an obliged entity and which is expected, at the time when the contact is established, to have an element of duration;
(14)      “gambling services” means a service which involves wagering a stake with monetary value in games of chance, including those with an element of skill such as lotteries, casino games, poker games and betting transactions that are provided at a physical location, or by any means at a distance, by electronic means or any other technology for facilitating communication, and at the individual request of a recipient of services;
(15)      “group” means a group of undertakings which consists of a parent undertaking, its subsidiaries, and the entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries hold a participation, as well as undertakings linked to each other by a relationship within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2013/34/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ 2013 L 182, p. 19)];
…’
7        Article 8 of Directive 2015/849 provides:
‘1.      Member States shall ensure that obliged entities take appropriate steps to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, taking into account risk factors including those relating to their customers, countries or geographic areas, products, services, transactions or delivery channels. Those steps shall be proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities.
2.      The risk assessments referred to in paragraph 1 shall be documented, kept up-to-date and made available to the relevant competent authorities and self-regulatory bodies concerned. Competent authorities may decide that individual documented risk assessments are not required where the specific risks inherent in the sector are clear and understood.
3.      Member States shall ensure that obliged entities have in place policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage effectively the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing identified at the level of the Union, the Member State and the obliged entity. Those policies, controls and procedures shall be proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities.
4.      The policies, controls and procedures referred to in paragraph 3 shall include:
(a)      the development of internal policies, controls and procedures, including model risk management practices, customer due diligence, reporting, record-keeping, internal control, compliance management including, where appropriate with regard to the size and nature of the business, the appointment of a compliance officer at management level, and employee screening;
(b)      where appropriate with regard to the size and nature of the business, an independent audit function to test the internal policies, controls and procedures referred to in point (a).
5.      Member States shall require obliged entities to obtain approval from their senior management for the policies, controls and procedures that they put in place and to monitor and enhance the measures taken, where appropriate.’
8        According to Article 11 of that directive:
‘Member States shall ensure that obliged entities apply customer due diligence measures in the following circumstances:
(a)      when establishing a business relationship;
…
(d)      for providers of gambling services, upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, when carrying out transactions amounting to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked;
…
(f)      when there are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.’
9        Article 13(1), (2) and (4) of Directive 2015/849 provides:
‘1.      Customer due diligence measures shall comprise:
(a)      identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source, including, where available, electronic identification means, relevant trust services as set out in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (OJ 2014 L 257, p. 73)] or any other secure, remote or electronic identification process regulated, recognised, approved or accepted by the relevant national authorities;
(b)      identifying the beneficial owner and taking reasonable measures to verify that person’s identity so that the obliged entity is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is, including, as regards legal persons, trusts, companies, foundations and similar legal arrangements, taking reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer. …;
(c)      assessing and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship;
(d)      conducting ongoing monitoring of the business relationship including scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the obliged entity’s knowledge of the customer, the business and risk profile, including where necessary the source of funds and ensuring that the documents, data or information held are kept up-to-date.
…
2.      Member States shall ensure that obliged entities apply each of the customer due diligence requirements laid down in paragraph 1. However, obliged entities may determine the extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis.
…
4.      Member States shall ensure that obliged entities are able to demonstrate to competent authorities or self-regulatory bodies that the measures are appropriate in view of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing that have been identified.’
10      Article 14(5) of that directive is worded as follows:
‘Member States shall require that obliged entities apply the customer due diligence measures not only to all new customers but also at appropriate times to existing customers on a risk-sensitive basis, or when the relevant circumstances of a customer change, or when the obliged entity has any legal duty in the course of the relevant calendar year to contact the customer for the purpose of reviewing any relevant information relating to the beneficial owner(s), or if the obliged entity has had this duty under Council Directive 2011/16/EU [of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC (OJ 2011 L 64, p. 1)].’
11      Article 20 of Directive 2015/849 provides:
‘With respect to transactions or business relationships with [PEPs], Member States shall, in addition to the customer due diligence measures laid down in Article 13, require obliged entities to:
(a)      have in place appropriate risk management systems, including risk-based procedures, to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner of the customer is a [PEP];
(b)      apply the following measures in cases of business relationships with [PEPs]:
(i)      obtain senior management approval for establishing or continuing business relationships with such persons;
(ii)      take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds that are involved in business relationships or transactions with such persons;
(iii)      conduct enhanced, ongoing monitoring of those business relationships.’
12      Article 23 of Directive 2015/849 provides that the measures referred to in Articles 20 and 21 are also to apply to family members or ‘persons known to be close associates of [PEPs]’.
13      Article 45(1) and (8) of the directive states:
‘1.      Member States shall require obliged entities that are part of a group to implement group-wide policies and procedures, including data protection policies and policies and procedures for sharing information within the group for AML/CFT purposes. Those policies and procedures shall be implemented effectively at the level of branches and majority-owned subsidiaries in Member States and third countries.
…
8.      Member States shall ensure that the sharing of information within the group is allowed. Information on suspicions that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity or are related to terrorist financing reported to the [Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)] shall be shared within the group, unless otherwise instructed by the FIU.’
Latvian law
14      The Noziedzīgi iegūtu līdzekļu legalizācijas un terorisma un proliferācijas finansēšanas novēršanas likums (Law on the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation) of 17 July 2008 (Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2008, No 116) (‘the Law on prevention’), was amended for the purpose of transposing Directive 2015/849.
15      Article 1 of that law, in the version applicable to the facts in the main proceedings, provides as follows:
‘For the purposes of this Law:
…
(21)      “group” means a group of legal persons or arrangements;
(a)      which comprises a parent company and its subsidiary and structures in which the parent undertaking or subsidiary holds a participation,
…
(81)      “senior management” means the board of directors, if there is one, or a board member, officer or employee specifically appointed by the board of directors, with sufficient knowledge of the obliged entity’s exposure to the risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, and sufficient seniority to take decisions affecting its risk exposure;
…
(18)      [“PEP”] means a person who is or has been entrusted with prominent public functions in the Republic of Latvia, in another Member State or in a third country, including the most senior State officials, heads of State administrative units (or municipalities), heads of government, ministers (deputy ministers or assistant deputy ministers, if such a function exists in the country in question), assistant ministers or other senior officials in the government or State administrative unit (or municipality), members of parliament or of similar legislative bodies, members of the governing bodies (councils) of political parties, judges of the constitutional courts, supreme courts or other levels of jurisdiction (members of the judiciary), members of the administrative or management bodies of the higher supervisory (audit) institutions, members of the boards of central banks, ambassadors, chargés d’affaires, high-ranking officers in the armed forces, members of the administrative or management bodies of State-owned enterprises, heads (directors, deputy directors) and members of the board or equivalent function of an international organisation;
…
(182) “close associate of a politically exposed person [PEP]” means any natural person who is known to have a business relationship or any other close relationship with one of the persons referred to in point 18 of this article …’
16      Article 3 of that law, entitled ‘Scope’, states, in paragraphs 1 to 21 thereof:
‘(1)      Persons who carry on the following business or professional activities shall be regarded as obliged entities for the purposes of this Law:
…
(7)      organisers of lotteries and games of chance;
…
(2)      Obliged entities that are part of a group shall implement group-wide policies and procedures, including policies for processing the data of natural persons, as well as policies and procedures for sharing information within the group, with the aim of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. Those group-wide policies and procedures shall also be implemented effectively at the level of branches and subsidiaries in which obliged entities in Member States and third countries own a majority interest.
(21)      Obliged entities that are part of a group shall ensure, at group level, that any organisational entities which are responsible for compliance, auditing, anti-money laundering, and combating terrorist financing and proliferation, have access to the necessary information from branches and subsidiaries for the execution of those functions, including information on customers, accounts, and payments.’
17      Article 10 of that same law, entitled ‘Designation of staff responsible for compliance with the requirements of this law’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘The obliged entity, which is a legal person, shall designate one or more employees (persons responsible for compliance with requirements relating to the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation), inter alia, from senior management, who shall be authorised to take decisions and shall be directly responsible for complying with the requirements of this Law and sharing information with the competent supervisory authority …’
18      Article 11 of the Law on prevention, entitled ‘Customer due diligence requirement’, states, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘The obliged entity shall take measures relating to customer due diligence:
(1)      before the establishment of a business relationship;
…
(4)      where the obliged entity that organises lotteries and games of chance undertakes a transaction with a customer amounting to
EUR 2 000 or more, including where the customer wins, purchases means of participation in a game or lottery tickets, or exchanges foreign currency for that purpose, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked;
…’
19      Article 111 of that law, entitled ‘Customer due diligence measures and risk factors’, provides, in paragraphs 1, 2, 6 and 7 thereof:
‘(1)      Customer due diligence measures are a set of actions designed to assess risk by which the obliged entity shall:
(1)      identify the customer and verify the identification data obtained;
…
(5)      ensure that the documents, personal data and information obtained in the context of customer due diligence requirements are retained, periodically assessed and updated in accordance with the inherent risks, at least every five years.
(2)      In determining the scope and procedure for customer due diligence, as well as the frequency with which documents, personal data and information obtained in the context of customer due diligence are reviewed, the obliged entity shall take into account the money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation risks related to the customer, its country of residence (establishment), economic or personal activity of the customer, services and products used and their delivery channels, as well as the transactions made.
…
(6)      When entering into a business relationship, the obliged entity shall obtain and document, on the basis of an assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing and proliferation, information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, including the services the customer intends to use, the number and volume of transactions envisaged, the type of economic or personal activity of the customer in which the customer will use the services and, where applicable, the source of the customer’s funds and the source of the wealth contributing to the customer’s financial situation.
(7)      The obliged entity shall apply customer due diligence measures when establishing a business relationship and during that relationship (including for existing customers), taking a risk-based approach …’
20      Article 25 of the Law on prevention, entitled ‘Business relationships with [PEPs], family members of [PEPs], or close associates of [PEPs]’, provides, in paragraph 2 thereof:
‘The obliged entity’s risk-based internal control system allows it to determine whether a customer who is not a [PEP], a family member of a [PEP], or a close associate of a [PEP] at the time when a business relationship is established becomes a [PEP] after the establishment of the business relationship.’
21      Article 29 of that law, entitled ‘Recognition and acceptance of customer investigation results’, states, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘In complying with the measures set out in points 1 to 3 of Article 111(1) of this Law, credit and financial institutions may recognise and accept the results of a customer investigation conducted by credit and financial institutions of Member States or third countries, provided that all of the following conditions are satisfied: …’
The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
22      Laimz is a company established in Latvia whose commercial activity consists of organising gambling. 100% of the share capital of that company is held by ‘Optibet’ SIA, also a limited liability company established in Latvia, whose commercial activity also consists of organising gambling. Those two companies are part of the Enlabs AB group, established in Sweden. It is apparent from the order for reference that Laimz is an obliged entity within the meaning of the Law on prevention, which seeks to transpose Directive 2015/849.
23      On 2 March 2020, Optibet, which had entered into an agreement with a company to provide it with published and publicly available data concerning the assessment and management of risks with regard to the requirements of the Law on protection, concluded an agreement with Laimz under which it undertook to provide Laimz with those data, in order to ensure the most efficient use of resources and uniform compliance with the requirements of that law within the companies of that group.
24      On 23 August 2021, Laimz began to provide interactive gambling services to a customer who had previously been a customer of Optibet (‘the customer in question in the main proceedings’).
25      On 31 January 2022, Laimz took enhanced due diligence measures with regard to that customer, asking him for further information on the basis of his gaming habits, the amounts of his bets and the data provided by Optibet concerning when he was its customer. In that context, Laimz also applied a decision of 27 March 2020 taken by a member of Optibet’s senior management concerning the maintenance of relations with the customer.
26      In February and in March 2022, the Inspection Office carried out an inspection at Laimz’s premises. In the report drawn up following that inspection, the Inspection Office noted that, in 2020, in 2021 and in 2022, Laimz had not identified any business relationships with close associates of PEPs and that, as regards the customer in question in the main proceedings, it had not conducted an investigation into him after the threshold of EUR 2 000 had been reached on 26 August 2021, to ask him for information on the sources of his income, their amount and the planned game budget, or to determine his status as a close associate of a PEP and to verify the information in publicly available databases with a view to identifying additional risk factors.
27      By a decision of 15 June 2022, the Inspection Office imposed a fine of EUR 52 263.90 on Laimz, corresponding to 5% of its net turnover for the year 2020 on the ground that that company had failed to implement an effective internal control system with regard to its customers and had not conducted any investigations into them. It considered that Laimz should have carried out the assessment of the customer in question in the main proceedings autonomously and independently, and should not have relied on an assessment carried out by another company, in the present case Optibet. The Inspection Office also noted that that customer was considered to be a close associate of a PEP since, at the same time as that PEP, he held the function of member of the executive body of an association.
28      On 18 July 2022, Laimz brought an action challenging that decision before the Administratīvā rajona tiesa (District Administrative Court, Latvia), which is the referring court. In support of its action, Laimz submitted that it was entitled to use the information received from Optibet under the agreement of 2 March 2020, referred to in paragraph 23 of the present judgment, and the decisions taken by Optibet’s senior management and to apply them to its own business relationship with the customer in question in the main proceedings.
29      In addition, Laimz criticised the Inspection Office for having merely relied, in order to conclude that that customer was a close associate of a PEP, on the fact that they belonged jointly to the same association, without carrying out an individual and detailed assessment.
30      In its defence, the Inspection Office contends that the Law on prevention does not provide for the sharing of customer data with another company, which would exempt the recipient of the information concerned from having to fulfil its legal obligations. In addition, it noted that when the customer in question in the main proceedings entered into a business relationship with Laimz, he terminated his business relationship with Optibet, with the result that Laimz could no longer use the information obtained by Optibet.
31      In that context, the referring court is uncertain as to the scope of the concept of ‘persons known to be close associates’ of PEPs in point 11 of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 where the person in question belongs to the executive body of the same association as a PEP. In addition, it states that clarification is needed as regards the possibility for companies belonging to the same group to share information for the purposes of meeting their due diligence requirements, and as to whether Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with points 12 and 15 of Article 3 of that directive, allows
the use of information emanating from another company belonging to that group and the application of decisions adopted by a member of the senior management of that other company to several companies of that group. Lastly, the referring court raises the question of the obliged entity’s obligation to apply due diligence measures to existing customers in the event that no change in the relevant circumstances of their situation can be identified, unlike the situation at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 17 November 2022, Rodl & Partner, C‑562/20, EU:C:2022:883.
32      In those circumstances, the Administratīvā rajona tiesa (District Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)      Must point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 be interpreted as meaning that an individual may be regarded as being a close associate of a [PEP] solely on the ground that those persons form part of the same [association], without regard to any other circumstances?
(2)      Must [point 9 of Article 3] of Directive 2015/849 be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine whether a person is a [PEP], it is necessary to determine whether that person holds one of the positions referred to in that article and, in addition, to carry out an investigation and verify that this is a high-ranking position rather than a middle-ranking or more junior position?
(3)      Must Article 45(1) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with paragraph 8 of that same article, be interpreted as meaning that Member States must allow the obliged entities referred to in Article 2(1) of Directive 2015/849, which are regarded as companies in the same group, to share information with each other, including by concluding information sharing agreements and ensuring the reciprocal flow and mutual enforceability of information, in order to attain the objectives of Directive 2015/849?
(4)      Does Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with points 12 and 15 of Article 3 of that directive, allow such information, or decisions, to be used and enforced in several undertakings belonging to the same group, those being decisions adopted, within that group, by the senior management of an undertaking belonging to that group?
(5)      Must Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with Article 8(2) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that an obliged entity is not under an obligation to apply customer due diligence measures to existing customers if neither the time limit laid down in national law nor the time limit imposed by the internal control procedures for the application of new due diligence measures has expired, and the obliged entity is unaware of any new circumstances that might affect the risk assessment carried out in relation to the customer concerned?
(6)      Must the obligation which Article 11(d) of Directive 2015/849 imposes on obliged entities to apply customer due diligence measures where, upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, the transaction amounts in total to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked, be interpreted as meaning that such measures must be applied every time the total amount of the transaction reaches EUR 2 000, irrespective of how long it is before the sum of EUR 2 000 laid down in that provision is reached again?’
Consideration of the questions referred
The first question
33      By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as meaning that an individual may be regarded as being a close associate of a PEP solely on the basis that both persons form part of the same association.
34      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the main aim of Directive 2015/849, as is apparent from its heading and from Article 1(1) and (2) thereof, is the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (judgment of 5 December 2024, MISTRAL TRANS, C‑3/24, EU:C:2024:999, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
35      More specifically, the provisions of Directive 2015/849, which are preventive in nature, seek to establish, taking a risk-based approach, a body of preventive and dissuasive measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing effectively, in order to prevent, as is apparent from recital 1 of that directive, flows of illicit money from being able to damage the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial sector and threaten the internal market of the European Union as well as international development (judgment of 5 December 2024, MISTRAL TRANS, C‑3/24, EU:C:2024:999, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
36      It is apparent from Articles 6 to 8 of Directive 2015/849 that the risk-based approach requires an assessment of the risk undertaken, within the framework of the system established by that directive, at three levels, that is, first of all, at EU level, by the Commission, then, at Member State level and, finally, at obliged entity level. As is apparent from recital 30
of that directive, the application by those entities of appropriate due diligence measures to the customer concerned depends on that assessment. In fact, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, without such assessment, it is not possible for either the Member State concerned or, as the case may be, the said entities to decide in an individual case what measures to apply (judgment of 17 November 2022, Rodl & Partner, C‑562/20, EU:C:2022:883, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
37      In that regard, Article 20 of Directive 2015/849 lays down, with respect to transactions or business relationships with PEPs, the obligations with which reporting entities are required to comply, in addition to the customer due diligence measures which they must carry out, which are laid down in Article 13(1) of that directive. More specifically, that provision requires obliged entities to identify the customer and verify his or her identity, to identify the beneficial owner, to assess the intended business relationship and obtain information on its purpose and nature, and to conduct ongoing monitoring of that business relationship. Article 20 stipulates that Member States are to require obliged entities, inter alia, to have in place appropriate risk management systems, including risk-based procedures, to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner of the customer may be categorised as a PEP. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that recitals 31 and 32 of that directive state that certain situations present a greater risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, particularly in the case of relationships with individuals who hold or who have held important public functions.
38      In addition, under Article 23 of Directive 2015/849, obliged entities must extend those risk management systems to the identification of family members of PEPs and persons known to be close associates of PEPs.
39      In that regard, point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 defines ‘persons known to be close associates’ as ‘natural persons who are known to have joint beneficial ownership of legal entities or legal arrangements, or any other close business relations, with a [PEP]’.
40      In order to interpret a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, by reference to its usual meaning in everyday language, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 9 January 2025, Österreichische Datenschutzbehörde (Excessive requests), C‑416/23, EU:C:2025:3, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
41      As regards, in the first place, the wording of point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849, it is apparent from the order for reference that the referring court asks more specifically about the term ‘close business relations’, given that a customer participates in the executive body of the same association as a PEP.
42      In that regard, it may be noted that point 13 of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 defines the term ‘business relationship’, where it applies to an obliged entity, as a business, professional or commercial relationship which is connected with the professional activities of an obliged entity and which is expected, at the time when the contact is established, to have an element of duration. Furthermore, although that directive does not define how to assess whether a relationship is ‘close’, the inclusion of that term suggests that a business relationship alone is not enough; it must also be shown that the relationship in question is of particular importance.
43      Where the person concerned and a PEP are part of the executive body of the same association, a priori they maintain a relationship in a professional context, with the result that it cannot be ruled out that those functions may constitute ‘close business relations’ between that person and that PEP within the meaning of point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 or that they make it possible to establish one. Furthermore, in such a situation it cannot be excluded either that that person may be considered as being the beneficial owner of an entity or a legal arrangement with a PEP within the meaning of that provision. However, such findings cannot depend solely on whether those two persons belong to the executive body of the same association but must be based on an analysis of the facts at hand.
44      Under those circumstances, it may be inferred from the wording of point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 that a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which the person concerned and a PEP are members of the executive body of the same association, does not, a priori, preclude that person from being regarded as being a close associate of that PEP within the meaning of that provision.
45      That textual analysis is borne out by the context of that provision and by the objectives pursued by Directive 2015/849.
46      As recalled in paragraph 38 above, Article 23 of Directive 2015/849 provides, inter alia, that the measures laid down in Article 20 of Directive 2015/849 are to apply to persons known to be close associates of PEPs, but also to family members of PEPs. It follows that the EU legislature therefore intended to extend the scope of Directive 2015/849 to include as many individuals in close proximity to PEPs as possible.
47      However, it should also be borne in mind that, according to recital 1 of Directive 2015/849, in addition to further developing the criminal law approach at EU level, targeted and proportionate prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing is indispensable and can produce complementary results.
48      In that context, under Article 8(3) of that directive, which provides that the policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage effectively the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing must be proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities, the risk-based procedures referred to in Article 20 of Directive 2015/849 must be proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities, which gives those entities a certain margin of discretion in designing procedures that are appropriate to the risks arising from their activity. Although a risk-based approach thus allows for a degree of flexibility, it does not, however, as stated in recital 22
of that directive, constitute an unduly permissive option for Member States and obliged entities, and it involves the use of evidence-based decision-making.
49      Furthermore, it is apparent from recital 33 of Directive 2015/849 that the requirements relating to PEPs are of a preventive and not criminal nature, and should not be interpreted as stigmatising PEPs as being involved in criminal activity. According to that recital, refusing a business relationship with a person simply on the basis of the determination that he or she is a PEP is contrary to the letter and spirit of that directive and of the FATF Recommendations.
50      Consequently, the obliged entities, by using a risk-based approach, are required, when assessing the existence of a close business relationship between a person and a PEP, to take into account not only the nature of the relationship between the customer concerned and the PEP, in order to determine whether there is a risk that that relationship may be used for the purposes of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, but also the objectives pursued, so that an individual assessment of each case is required in order to meet the requirements of Directive 2015/849.
51      An interpretation to the contrary would have the consequence that the additional obligations laid down by Directive 2015/849 would have to apply to a very large number of situations in which their proportionality in relation to the objectives pursued by that directive, namely the prevention of the use of the EU financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, as provided for in Article 1(1) of Directive 2015/849, would be jeopardised and, moreover, it would raise practical problems as regards access to the data of the persons concerned.
52      In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question is that point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as meaning that an individual cannot be regarded as being a close associate of a PEP solely on the ground that both persons are members of the executive body of the same association, but that situation nevertheless constitutes a relevant circumstance to be taken into account in that assessment.
The second question
53      By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether point 9 of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine whether an individual is a PEP, it is sufficient to establish whether that individual holds one of the positions listed in points (a) to (h) of point 9 of Article 3, or whether it is also necessary to ascertain, on the basis of a factual assessment, whether the position occupied is a high-ranking one
rather than a middle-ranking or more junior position.
54      In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court has repeatedly pointed out that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between itself and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them and that the justification for a reference for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered, but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute (judgment of 7 November 2024, Adusbef (Pont Morandi), C‑683/22, EU:C:2024:936, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
55      As is apparent from the very wording of Article 267 TFEU, the preliminary ruling sought must be ‘necessary’ to enable the referring court to ‘give judgment’ in the case before it (judgment of 7 November 2024, Adusbef (Pont Morandi), C‑683/22, EU:C:2024:936, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
56      In the present case, the referring court does not provide any information on the exact nature of the professional functions carried out by the person presumed to be a PEP in the main proceedings. Furthermore, the customer in question in the main proceedings is considered by the Inspection Office to be a close associate of that PEP, and not himself a PEP.
57      Finally, it is no way apparent from the documents before the Court that the parties to the main proceedings disagree on whether the individual concerned, who may be a close associate of the customer in the main proceedings, is a PEP. The challenge raised by Laimz concerns the interpretation of the concept of ‘close associate of a [PEP]’, as given by the Inspection Office, which is the subject of the first question.
58      In those circumstances, in line with the case-law recalled in paragraphs 54 and 55 above, the second question must be declared inadmissible.
The third question
59      By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as meaning that Member States must allow the obliged entities referred to in Article 2(1) of that directive, which are part of the same group, within the meaning of point 15 of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849, to share information with each other, including by concluding information sharing agreements and ensuring the reciprocal flow of that information in order to attain the objectives of Directive 2015/849.
60      In that regard, it should be recalled that Article 45(1) of that directive stipulates that Member States are to require obliged entities that are part of a group to implement group-wide policies and procedures, including data protection policies and policies and procedures for sharing information within the group for AML/CFT purposes. According to that provision, those policies and procedures are to be implemented effectively at the level of branches and majority-owned subsidiaries in Member States and third countries. It should be added that that provision thus pursues the objective, set out in recital 35 of that directive, of avoiding repeated customer identification procedures.
61      In addition, Article 45(8) of that directive adds that Member States ‘shall ensure that the sharing of information within the group is allowed’ and specifies that information on suspicions that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity or are related to terrorist financing reported to the FIU must be shared within the group, unless otherwise instructed by the FIU.
62      In the present case, first, it is common ground that Laimz and Optibet, in so far as they are providers of gambling services within the meaning of point 3(f) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2015/849, are obliged entities. Second, Laimz and Optibet, from which Laimz obtained information, are part of a group within the meaning of point 15 of Article 3 of that directive. Consequently, the relationship between those two companies, including cooperation in order to comply with the requirements laid down by Directive 2015/849, falls within the scope of Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849.
63      Therefore, since the wording of that Article 45(1) and (8) is unambiguous, it follows that Member States are required to allow obliged entities which are part of the same group to share information in order to attain the objectives pursued by Directive 2015/849. However, that provision does not stipulate that such sharing must be the subject of an information-sharing agreement to ensure reciprocal communication within the group and accessibility to that information.
64      However, as the Commission also points out, account must be taken of the fact that the pursuit of the objectives of Directive 2015/849 requires, in principle, an individualised approach to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Accordingly, where it appears that the information shared within the group is not sufficient to enable the obliged entity to exercise vigilance over its customer, in particular because the individual services and products which it offers are different to those offered by another entity in the same group, the obliged entity concerned must carry out an individual examination. Even if the services and products at issue are identical and the information is sufficient, it is important to note that Article 45(1) and (8) of that directive does not govern the measures which obliged entities must take on the basis of information transmitted within the group and therefore does not exempt those entities from complying with the requirements under that directive relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. That interpretation is supported by Article 13(2) and (4) of Directive 2015/849, which states that those entities are to determine the extent of the due diligence measures which they apply to their customers on a risk-sensitive basis.
65      Accordingly, it should also be noted that Article 45 of Directive 2015/849 cannot be interpreted as allowing an obliged entity to use customer due diligence information automatically, without carrying out its own assessment of the risks and the due diligence measures that should be taken. However, in view of the due diligence requirements incumbent on an obliged entity under that directive, it is important that, when that entity receives information which is likely to justify, prima facie, the introduction of due diligence measures, it must carry out the necessary checks as soon as possible.
66      The answer to the third question is therefore that Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as meaning that Member States must allow the obliged entities referred to in Article 2(1) of that directive, which are part of the same group within the meaning of point 15 of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849, to share information with each other. However, such an exchange of information does not absolve the obliged entity of its responsibility to carry out customer due diligence.
The fourth question
67      By its fourth question, the referring court seeks to ascertain, in essence, whether Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with points 12 and 15 of Article 3 of that directive, must be interpreted as allowing an undertaking, which is part of a group, to apply automatically a decision taken by a person who holds a senior management position in another undertaking in the same group and concerning due diligence measures in respect of one of the customers of that undertaking, without carrying out its own assessment of the risks and due diligence measures to be taken.
68      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that Article 45(1) of that directive does not specify the kind of information which may be shared and then used by the recipient obliged entity. Given the scope of the EU legislation in question and the reference to the objectives of combating money laundering and terrorist financing, that information must be relevant in order for the requirements imposed by the same directive on obliged entities to be met.
69      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the decision in question was adopted, by an undertaking comprising part of a group, in the context of the undertaking’s due diligence obligation in respect of a particular customer. It therefore seems to be capable of falling within the scope of that Article 45(1).
70      As for the question of whether that decision can be used by another undertaking in that group, it should be recalled that, as is clear from the answer to the third question, although the sharing of information between obliged entities in a group facilitates compliance with the requirements imposed by Directive 2015/849 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, Article 45(1) and (8) of that directive does not absolve each taxable entity of its individual responsibility to comply with those requirements. Such an interpretation cannot be disregarded where the information being shared is a decision adopted by a person who holds a senior management position in another undertaking in the same group
with regard to one of its customers. That interpretation is supported by Article 8(5) of that directive, which provides that Member States are to require obliged entities to obtain approval from a member of their senior management for the policies, controls and procedures that they put in place.
71      The answer to the fourth question is therefore that Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with points 12 and 15 of Article 3 thereof, must be interpreted as precluding an obliged entity which is part of a group to apply automatically a decision taken by a person who holds a senior management position in another undertaking in the same group, in the context of its due diligence obligation concerning due diligence measures in respect of one of the customers of that undertaking, without carrying out its own assessment of the risks and due diligence measures to be taken.
The fifth question
72      By its fifth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with Article 8(2) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that an obliged entity is not under an obligation to apply due diligence measures to existing customers for as long as the time limit laid down by national legislation and the time limit imposed by the internal control procedures for the application of new due diligence measures have not expired and the obliged entity in question was unaware of any new circumstances that might affect the risk assessment carried out in relation to the customer concerned.
73      In that regard, it is apparent from the wording of Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849 that obliged entities must, on a risk-sensitive basis, apply due diligence measures not only to their new customers, but also at appropriate times to their existing customers. Article 14(5) states that one of the appropriate times conceivable is where the relevant circumstances of the customer concerned change. Moreover, that provision does not limit the obligation on obliged entities only to customers categorised as representing a high risk (judgment of 17 November 2022, Rodl & Partner, C‑562/20, EU:C:2022:883, paragraph 83).
74      Furthermore, under Article 8(2) of Directive 2015/849, obliged entities must, in particular, keep up-to-date assessments of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing to which they are exposed (judgment of 17 November 2022, Rodl & Partner, C‑562/20, EU:C:2022:883, paragraph 84).
75      In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court has already held that Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849, read together with Article 8(2) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that obliged entities are required, on the basis of an updated risk assessment, to apply due diligence measures or, where necessary, enhanced due diligence measures to an existing customer where appropriate, including where the relevant circumstances of the customer change (judgment of 17 November 2022, Rodl & Partner, C‑562/20, EU:C:2022:883, paragraph 91).
76      In addition, it should be noted that Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849 ensures the attainment of the main objective of that directive, namely the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. The application of customer due diligence measures to existing customers is therefore intended to mitigate the new or different risks associated with the customer and business relationship concerned. Therefore, if the obliged entity is unaware that the relevant circumstances of the customer concerned have changed and if the deadlines for implementing new due diligence measures have not expired, there is no obligation or grounds to apply such measures. The situation is different where the failure to identify such changes is due to deficiencies in the continuous monitoring provided for in Article 13(1)(d) of Directive 2015/849, which must be carried out by the obliged entity.
77      It follows from the foregoing that the answer to the fifth question is that
Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with Article 8(2) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that an obliged entity is not under an obligation to apply due diligence measures to existing customers for as long as the time limit laid down by national legislation and the time limit imposed by the internal control procedures for the application of new due diligence measures have not expired and as long as the obliged entity in question is not aware of other new circumstances that may have an impact on the risk assessment of the customer concerned, provided that the fact that no such new circumstances have been identified is not due to deficiencies in the continuous monitoring provided for in Article 13(1)(d) of Directive 2015/849, which that entity must carry out.
The sixth question
78      By its sixth question, the referring court seeks to ascertain, in essence, whether Article 11(d) of Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as meaning that the obligation imposed on the obliged entity, as a provider of gambling services, to apply customer due diligence measures where, upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, the transaction amounts to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked, must be applied every time the total amount of the transaction reaches EUR 2 000.
79      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that Article 11(a) of Directive 2015/849 provides that customer due diligence measures must be applied when establishing a business relationship. Business relations, within the meaning of that directive, are expected, in accordance with point 13 of Article 3 thereof, to have ‘an element of duration’.
80      Article 11(d) of Directive 2015/849, which refers to the specific case of providers of gambling services, requires them to apply customer due diligence measures where, upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, they carry out transactions amounting to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked.
81      Accordingly, the wording of that provision does not make the application of that obligation subject to the transaction having taken place within a given period as compared with a previous transaction which also fulfilled those conditions.
82      In addition, that provision must be read in the light of recital 21 of that directive, which states that the use of gambling sector services to launder the proceeds of criminal activity is of concern and that, in order to mitigate the risks relating to gambling services, Directive 2015/849 should provide for an obligation for providers of gambling services posing higher risks to apply customer due diligence measures for single transactions amounting to EUR 2 000 or more.
83      It follows that Article 11(d) of Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as meaning that the obligation imposed on the obliged entity, as a provider of gambling services, to apply customer due diligence measures where, upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, the transaction amounts to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked, must be applied every time the total amount of the transaction reaches EUR 2 000.
84      In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the sixth question is that Article 11(d) of Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as requiring obliged entities to apply customer due diligence measures each time that, upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, the transaction concerned amounts to EUR 2 000 or more, irrespective of whether that transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked.
Costs
85      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Sixth Chamber) hereby rules:
1.      Point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018,
must be interpreted as meaning that an individual cannot be regarded as being a close associate of a politically exposed person solely on the ground that both persons are members of the executive body of the same association, but that situation nevertheless constitutes a relevant circumstance to be taken into account in that assessment.
2.      Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849, as amended by Directive 2018/843,
must be interpreted as meaning that Member States must allow the obliged entities referred to in Article 2(1) of Directive 2015/849, as amended, which are part of the same group, within the meaning of point 15 of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849, as amended, to share information with each other. However, such an exchange of information does not absolve the obliged entity of its responsibility to carry out customer due diligence.
3.      Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849, as amended by Directive 2018/843, read in conjunction with points 12 and 15 of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849, as amended,
must be interpreted as precluding an obliged entity which is part of a group to apply automatically a decision taken by a person who holds a senior management position in another undertaking in the same group, in the context of its due diligence obligation concerning due diligence measures in respect of one of the customers of that undertaking, without carrying out its own assessment of the risks and due diligence measures to be taken.
4.      Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849, as amended by Directive 2018/843, read in conjunction with Article 8(2) of Directive 2015/849, as amended,
must be interpreted as meaning that an obliged entity is not under an obligation to apply due diligence measures to existing customers for as long as the time limit laid down by national legislation and the time limit imposed by the internal control procedures for the application of new due diligence measures have not expired and as long as the obliged entity in question is not aware of other new circumstances that may have an impact on the risk assessment of the customer concerned, provided that the fact that no such new circumstances have been identified is not due to deficiencies in the continuous monitoring provided for in Article 13(1)(d) of Directive 2015/849, as amended, which that entity must carry out.
5.      Article 11(d) of Directive 2015/849, as amended by Directive 2018/843,
must be interpreted as requiring obliged entities to apply customer due diligence measures each time that, upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, the transaction concerned amounts to EUR 2 000 or more, irrespective of whether that transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked.
[Signatures]
*      Language of the case: Latvian.