62022CJ0776_RES
Case C‑776/22 P
Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 4 September 2025
(Appeal – Action for annulment – Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Representation of non-privileged parties in direct actions before the Courts of the European Union – Representation of a law firm by a partner of that firm – Lawyer having the status of third party in respect of the applicant – Presumption of independence – Rebuttal of the presumption – Conditions)
Judicial proceedings – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements – Conditions relating to a signatory – Status of a third party in relation to the parties – Requirement of independence – Representation of a law firm by a partner of that firm – Whether permissible
(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19, third and fourth paras; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 51(1))
(see paragraphs 49-52, 58-62, 64-69)
Judicial proceedings – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements – Conditions relating to a signatory – Status of a third party in relation to the parties – Representation of a legal person by a lawyer – Infringement of the requirement of independence – Ground involving a question of public policy – Obligation of the General Court to warn the applicant of the irregularity – Possible regularisation by the appointment of a new lawyer
(Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 19 and 21; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 51(2) to (4) and 78(1) to (6))
(see paragraphs 70-80)
Résumé
Hearing an appeal, the Court of Justice, sitting as the Grand Chamber, sets aside the order of the General Court in Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO. (
1
) In its judgment, the Court of Justice clarifies the extent to which a law firm may be represented before the Courts of the European Union by a partner of that law firm. In addition, it rules on the scope of the requirement of independence of the representatives of non-privileged parties and on the possibility for a party to put in order an application not satisfying that requirement.
On 26 September 2017, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante, a professional partnership of lawyers established under Italian law (‘the law firm’) filed with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) an application for revocation of the EU word mark UGHI E NUNZIANTE in respect of all the services for which that mark had been registered.
By decision of 23 February 2021, the Cancellation Division of EUIPO granted that application in respect of all the services, with the exception of ‘legal services’. (
2
) On 1 March 2021, the law firm filed a notice of appeal against that decision with EUIPO, which was dismissed by a decision of 8 April 2022 of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO.
The law firm then brought an action before the General Court for annulment of that decision. By the order under appeal, the General Court dismissed that action as manifestly inadmissible. It found that the law firm was represented by three lawyers, who practised within that firm as partners, and that that status was not compatible with the requirements of independence necessary in order to represent that firm before the Courts of the European Union. More specifically, according to the General Court, those lawyers were not independent third parties in relation to the applicant. Furthermore, it held that that breach was not capable of being remedied. It is in that context that the law firm brought an appeal against that order before the Court of Justice.
Findings of the Court
In the first place, the Court recalls that the representation of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the European Union must satisfy two cumulative conditions. First, those parties must be represented by a lawyer and, second, only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement may represent or assist a party before the Courts of the European Union. (
3
)
As regards the condition relating to the authorisation of a lawyer to practise before the courts of a Member State, the Court notes that it has already held that the meaning and scope of that condition must be interpreted by reference to the national law concerned. (
4
) Given that, in the present case, the lawyers instructed by the law firm were authorised to practise before the Italian courts, the Court of Justice finds that the General Court erred in law in holding that the action at first instance had not been brought in accordance with that condition.
As regards the condition consisting of the obligation for non-privileged parties to be represented by a lawyer, the Court of Justice recalls that that condition requires compliance with two requirements. First, that condition imposes a prohibition on ‘self-representation’, that is to say, those parties may not under any circumstances represent themselves, with no derogation from, or exception to, that prohibition being provided for by the Statute of the Court or by the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. Second, that condition requires the representatives of such non-privileged parties to comply with a requirement of independence, which is determined both negatively, namely by the absence of any employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination, between a party and its representative, and positively, by reference to professional rules and codes of conduct. In that regard, any lawyer, irrespective of the form in which he or she practices his or her profession, authorised by the applicable laws, professional rules and codes of conduct, is presumed to satisfy the requirement of independence arising from the foregoing condition, unless there is a relationship of subordination between the party concerned and the lawyer who has been instructed to represent it.
Indeed, that requirement of independence necessarily presupposes the absence of any employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination, between the party and the representative whom it has instructed. Consequently, the presumption of independence does not apply where there is such an employment relationship. That would be the case, in particular, if lawyers, who in accordance with the applicable national law practice their profession as employees of the law firm that employs them, were to represent that firm before the Courts of the European Union. The same would apply if in-house lawyers, who are members of the Bar of a Member State and entitled under the national law of that Member State to represent – before the national courts – the legal person to which they are bound by an employment relationship, had to represent that same person before the Courts of the European Union. Other than in cases where there is an employment relationship, that presumption of independence applies and may be rebutted only where it is apparent from specific evidence that there are connections between the party concerned and the representative that it has instructed, which have a manifestly detrimental effect on that representative’s capacity to carry out his or her task by acting in his or her client’s interests to the greatest possible extent, or that that representative does not comply with the national professional rules and codes of conduct applicable. (
5
)
According to the Court, where lawyers have the status of partners in the law firm that they represent before the Courts of the European Union, that circumstance cannot in itself be regarded as incompatible with the requirement of independence. First, such a circumstance cannot be equated with that in which there is an employment relationship. Second, in the absence of specific evidence establishing the existence of connections between the law firm and the partner whom it has appointed as its representative, which have a manifestly detrimental effect on that representative’s capacity to carry out his or her task of representation by acting in the interests of the party concerned to the greatest possible extent, or that that partner does not comply with the national professional rules and codes of conduct applicable, the presumption of independence of the partner cannot be regarded as being rebutted.
Therefore, the Court of Justice holds that, in the present case, the General Court misconstrued the scope of the requirement of independence and erred in law.
In the second place, the Court of Justice recalls that any circumstance which relates to the admissibility of the action for annulment brought before the General Court, including that relating to the representation of a legal person by a lawyer for the purpose of bringing that action, is likely to constitute a matter of public policy which the Courts of the European Union are required to raise of their own motion. (
6
) The fact that such an action was not brought in accordance with the requirements laid down by the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court, as interpreted by the case-law of the Court of Justice, constitutes such a circumstance. However, the obligation on the Courts to raise of their own motion a matter of public policy is without prejudice to respect for the rights of the defence and, consequently, as a rule, the Courts must first invite the parties to submit their observations on that plea.
In the present case, the Court of Justice observes that the General Court confined itself to holding that the applicant was a law firm which had instructed three lawyers, who practised as partners within that firm, to represent it, and to drawing the conclusion therefrom – misconceived in law – that those lawyers could not represent that firm in conditions compatible with Article 19 of the Statute of the Court, such incompatibility, moreover, not being capable, in the General Court’s view, of being remedied after the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings.
According to the Court of Justice, the General Court ought to have ascertained, possibly by having recourse to the measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 64 of its Rules of Procedure, first of all, whether there was an employment relationship between those three lawyers and the law firm. In the absence of such an employment relationship, only specific evidence establishing either that the connections between the law firm and the partners representing it were such as to have a manifestly detrimental effect on the partners’ capacity to carry out their task, or that those lawyers did not comply with the national professional rules and codes of conduct applicable, would have made it possible to conclude that there was a lack of independence for the purposes of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court.
Next, the Court of Justice holds that the General Court ought, before ruling on that matter, to have invited the applicant to submit its observations, in order to ensure the effectiveness of its rights of defence. Lastly, if it considered that the requirement of independence was not satisfied, the General Court ought, before declaring the action inadmissible, to have invited the applicant to appoint a new lawyer. Indeed, in view of the seriousness of the consequences which follow from an infringement of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court for the applicant, namely the irremediable declaration of the inadmissibility of its action, it must, after being put in a position to know the evidence justifying, in the General Court’s view, a decision of inadmissibility and to express its views on that evidence, be able to appoint a new lawyer.
In addition, the Court of Justice notes that it follows from the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (
7
) that a party must not be penalised by the inadmissibility of its action – without having first been invited to put the situation in order – on the ground that its application does not satisfy the required conditions. (
8
) It is also apparent from those rules of procedure (
9
) that the same is true in the case of conduct of a lawyer which is held to be incompatible with the dignity of the General Court or with the proper administration of justice during the proceedings. In such cases, the relevant provisions of those rules guarantee the continuity of the proceedings, by providing, as the case may be, that the party concerned may produce the required documents or appoint a new representative, within a reasonable period set by the Registry. Moreover, the Court of Justice notes that Article 21 of the Statute of the Court does not lay down an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which an application may be put in order and it further notes that it has already held, without this being precluded by that article, that it was appropriate to invite an appellant to put an appeal in order, where an appeal signed by that appellant himself had been submitted. (
10
)
Furthermore, the Court states that it is apparent from the current practice of the Member States that, where national law provides that the validity of a party’s procedural acts is called into question by a failure to comply with the rules concerning the requirement that that party’s representative be independent, that breach may, at the very least, be rectified in the course of the proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court of Justice sets aside the order under appeal and refers the case back to the General Court.
(
1
)	Order of 10 October 2022, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO – Nunziante and Ughi (UGHI E NUNZIANTE) (T‑389/22, EU:T:2022:662) (‘the order under appeal’).
(
2
)	Those were services in Class 45 within the meaning of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended.
(
3
)	Conditions referred to respectively in the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Statute of the Court’).
(
4
)	See, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA (C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 56), and of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA (C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
(
5
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA (C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 64).
(
6
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 8 February 2024, Pilatus Bank v ECB (C‑256/22 P, EU:C:2024:125, paragraphs 34 and 36 and the case-law cited).
(
7
)	Article 78(6) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, read in conjunction with Article 51(2) to (4) thereof.
(
8
)	The conditions are set out in Article 78(1) to (5) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
(
9
)	Article 55(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
(
10
)	See, to that effect, order of 5 December 1996, Lopes v Court of Justice (C‑174/96 P, EU:C:1996:473, paragraph 3).