ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
16 November 2018 (*)
(Civil service — Members of the temporary staff — Candidature submitted for the post of Director of the EMCDDA — Rejection of the candidature — Lis pendens — Rejection of a request for assistance — No interest in bringing proceedings — Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded)
In Case T‑576/16,
OT, a former member of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, represented by D. Sobor, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Commission, represented by F. Simonetti and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents,
defendant,
APPLICATION on the basis of Article 270 TFEU and seeking, on the one hand, annulment (i) of ‘the decision of 26 September 2014 of [the Commission] refusing to accept the [a]pplicant’s candidature for the post of Director of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction’ (EMCDDA), (ii) of the decision of 9 April 2015, by which the Commission rejected her complaint against that decision and the request for assistance, and, (iii) of the decision of 22 October 2015, by which the Commission rejected her complaint against the rejection of her request for assistance, and, on the other hand, compensation in respect of the material and non-material harm allegedly suffered by the applicant.
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed of I. Pelikánová, President, P. Nihoul (Rapporteur) and J. Svenningsen, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Background to the dispute
1        A vacancy notice, bearing the reference COM/2013/10339, for the post of Director of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union of 15 October 2013 (OJ 2013 C 299 A, p. 1).
2        Pursuant to Article 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the EMCDDA (recast) (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 1), the Director is appointed by the Management Board of the EMCDDA on a proposal from the European Commission for a renewable five-year term.
3        According to the vacancy notice published on 15 October 2013, the person chosen was to be employed as a member of the temporary staff at grade AD 14.
4        The selection procedure was described in that vacancy notice as follows:
‘A preselection panel will be set up for the selection process. This panel will invite applicants with the best profile for the specific requirements of the post …, who have been selected on the basis of their merits and the criteria set out above[, to an interview]. Candidates shortlisted by the preselection panel will then be called for an interview with the Commission’s Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA) and will have to undergo testing in an assessment centre run by external recruitment consultants. Candidates who are shortlisted by the CCA will then be interviewed by the relevant Commissioners.
Following these interviews, the Commission will adopt a list of eligible candidates, which will be communicated to the Management Board of the [EMCDDA]. The latter will interview the shortlisted candidates and select a candidate from among them. Inclusion on the shortlist does not guarantee appointment. Candidates may be required to undergo further interviews and/or tests in addition to those indicated above.’
5        On 14 November 2013, the applicant, OT, submitted her candidature for the post of Director of the EMCDDA, as did 34 other candidates. She had previously worked as a member of the temporary staff at the EMCDDA, from 1 May 2008 to 30 April 2013.
6        On 28 May 2014, she received a letter informing her that the preselection panel had decided not to invite her to an interview for the following reason:
‘…other candidates have a better mix of skills and experience [as] specified in the vacancy notice [published on 15 October 2013]’.
7        That letter informed her of the possibility of lodging an appeal, by 6 June at the latest, at an address specified therein.
8        The applicant lodged an appeal on 5 June 2014. By letter of 13 June 2014 she was invited to an interview, scheduled for 19 June 2014, before the preselection panel, with ten other candidates. Following that interview, she was classed in eleventh position.
9        By letter of 26 September 2014, the Commission’s Consultative Committee on Appointments (‘the CCA’) informed the applicant that it had found no reason to deviate from the preselection panel’s recommendation and that she would not be invited to another interview. The reasons given in that letter were also that ‘other candidates [had] a better mix of the skills and experience as specified in the vacancy notice [published on 15 October 2013]’. The CCA added that she could contact the Chair of the preselection panel if she would like to receive ‘feedback on [her] performance during [her] interview with the preselection committee’.
10      The applicant contacted the Chair of the preselection panel on 8 October 2014 to obtain that information.
11      After offering to answer the applicant by telephone, the Chair of the preselection panel repeated, in a letter dated 3 November 2014, that the panel had found that other candidates had ‘a better mix of the skills and experience as specified in the vacancy notice [published on 15 October 2013]’. In addition, he specified that although the applicant had the relevant technical skills and experience, she had not managed to ‘convince the panel with regards to the required management skills’.
12      On 12 December 2014, the applicant submitted a complaint to the Commission. In that complaint she requested:
–        ‘annulment of both rejecting decisions made by the preselection panel and/or the CCA [with] regard to [her] candidacy’,
–        compensation in respect of the harm she considered herself to have suffered as a result of those decisions, namely EUR 1 033 908.17 in respect of material harm and EUR 100 000 in respect of non-material harm,
–        the launching of an administrative inquiry in order to ‘shed light [on] the questionable aspects of the contested selection procedure’.
13      On 21 January 2015, the Secretary of the preselection panel informed the applicant that, following a decision of the Commission dated 3 December 2014 and the 50th meeting of the Management Board of EMCDDA, it had been decided not to establish a shortlist of suitable candidates and to launch a new selection procedure. The letter stated that it served as formal notification on behalf of the AECE (authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment) that the procedure was now closed.
14      On 23 January 2015, a new vacancy notice for the post of Director of the EMCDDA, bearing reference COM/2015/20002, was published in the Official Journal (OJ 2015 C 22 A, p. 1). That other procedure culminated in the recruitment, on 14 October 2015, of a new Director. The applicant did not participate in that recruitment procedure.
15      On 9 April 2015, the Commission rejected the complaint of 12 December 2014 in its entirety. That decision was communicated to the applicant on 13 April 2015.
16      On 3 July 2015, the applicant submitted a complaint against the decision of 9 April 2015, in so far as that decision rejected, first, her complaint against the rejection of her candidature and, secondly, her request that an inquiry be launched.
17      On 22 October 2015, the Commission rejected the complaint of 3 July 2015, finding that it concerned only the rejection of her request that an inquiry be launched.
Procedure and forms of order sought
18      On 22 January 2016, the applicant submitted an application for legal aid to the Civil Service Tribunal on the basis of Article 110 of its Rules of Procedure.
19      By order of 7 April 2016, the President of the Civil Service Tribunal granted the applicant legal aid.
20      By order of 20 July 2016, the President of the Civil Service Tribunal designated the applicant’s lawyer.
21      By application lodged at the Registry of the Civil Service Tribunal on 12 August 2016, the applicant brought Case T‑552/16, initially brought as Case F‑75/15.
22      By application lodged at the Registry of the Civil Service Tribunal on 15 August 2016, the applicant brought the present action, initially registered as Case F‑4/16.
23      Pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on the transfer to the General Court of jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the European Union and its servants (OJ 2016 L 200, p. 137), the present case was transferred to the General Court as it stood on 31 August 2016. That case was thus registered as Case T‑576/16 and assigned to the First Chamber.
24      By letter of 27 October 2016, the applicant submitted an application seeking anonymity, which the General Court granted by decision of 21 November 2016.
25      On 30 January 2017, the Commission lodged the defence.
26      On 28 March 2017, the applicant lodged the reply.
27      On 15 June 2017, the Commission lodged the rejoinder.
28      By letter lodged at the Registry on 11 July 2017, the applicant requested that a hearing be held, in accordance with Article 106(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
29      On 24 January 2018, the Court put questions to the parties in the context of measures of organisation of procedure, seeking in particular to obtain from the applicant her observations on her interest in bringing proceedings and on the basis of her request for assistance.
30      The parties replied to the Court’s questions by letters of 8 February 2018.
31      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul ‘the [d]ecision of 26 September 2014 of [the Commission] refusing to accept [her] candidature for the post of Director of the [EMCDDA]’ (‘the “decision” of 26 September 2014’);
–        annul ‘the [d]ecision of 9 April 2015 of [the Commission] rejecting [her first] complaint and [her] request for assistance…’;
–        annul the decision of 22 October 2015 rejecting the complaint of 3 July 2015;
–        order the Commission to pay the sum of EUR 2 836 107 by way of compensation in respect of the material harm suffered;
–        order the Commission to pay the sum of EUR 100 000 by way of compensation in respect of the non-material harm suffered;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs.
32      The Commission contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the application;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
33      On a number of occasions, the applicant requested in her written pleadings that measures of inquiry be ordered seeking, in particular, the designation of an expert or that an expert analysis be made in order to assess the authenticity of the recording which she had made of her interview with the preselection panel.
Law
34      Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure, where the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the General Court may, without taking further steps in the proceedings, decide to give a decision by reasoned order.
35      In the present case, the Court considers itself to have sufficient information from the material in the file, in particular from the replies of the parties to the questions put to them, and has decided, on that basis, to rule without taking further steps in the proceedings in accordance with Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure.
Subject matter of the action
36      In the application the applicant is seeking annulment of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 rejecting her candidature, the decision of 9 April 2015 rejecting her first complaint and her request for assistance and the decision of 22 October 2015 rejecting her second complaint.
37      It is settled case-law that claims for annulment formally brought against a decision to reject a complaint have the effect, where that decision lacks any independent content, of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 January 1989, Vainker v Parliament, 293/87, EU:C:1989:8, paragraph 8).
38      In the present case, inasmuch as it rejects the first complaint, the decision of 9 April 2015 does not have any independent content in relation to the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014, whose reasoning it simply makes clear. The claim for annulment must therefore be regarded as directed against the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014, even if, in the examination of its legality, the statement of reasons in the decision rejecting the complaint must be taken into consideration, that statement of reasons being deemed to supplement the statement of reasons in the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 December 2009, Commission v Birkhoff, T‑377/08 P, EU:T:2009:485, paragraphs 58 and 59).
39      Likewise, inasmuch as it rejects the complaint of 3 July 2015, the decision of 22 October 2015 does not have any independent content in relation to the decision of 9 April 2015 in so far as the latter decision rejected ‘the request for assistance’, so that, pursuant to the case-law mentioned in paragraph 37 above, the claim for annulment must be regarded as directed also against that decision of 9 April 2015, in addition to the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 (see judgment of 18 April 2012, Buxton v Parliament, F‑50/11, EU:F:2012:51, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
40      There are thus two claims for annulment before the Court, one directed against the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 and the other directed against the decision of 9 April 2015 in so far as the latter decision rejected the applicant’s ‘request for assistance’.
41      The claims for damages, for their part, seek compensation in respect of the alleged harm resulting, first, from the illegalities in the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 and, secondly, from the illegalities in the decision of 9 April 2015 in so far as the latter decision rejected the applicant’s ‘request for assistance’.
The claims for annulment
The claim for annulment of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014
42      The applicant puts forward eight pleas in law in her claim for annulment of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014, which are worded as follows:
–        ‘violation of Article 2 of … Commission Decision [2000/407/EC] of 19 June 2000 relating to gender balance within the committees and expert groups established by it[;] maladministration[;] violation of Article 3 of Annex III to the [Staff Regulations], of the principle of legitimate expectations, and of the duty to state reasons’;
–        ‘violation of the vacancy notice, violation of [s]ection 6.4 of the Guidelines for Candidates on Senior Management Appointment Procedures’;
–        ‘violation of the obligation to indicate the possibilities of appeal’;
–        ‘the falseness of the stated grounds’;
–        ‘violation of Articles 21 and 23 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’)], and of Article [1d(1) and (2)] of the Staff Regulations’;
–        ‘violation of Article 21 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour[;] violation of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11 of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data]’;
–        ‘compromised independence of the members of the [p]reselection panel’;
–        ‘violation of [the] principle of good administration’.
43      In the defence the Commission contends that, inasmuch as the applicant is challenging again the legality of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014, the action must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.
44      It is settled case-law that an action must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible when it has the same subject matter as an action brought previously, is between the same parties and is based on the same pleas (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 1988, France v Parliament, 358/85 and 51/86, EU:C:1988:431, paragraph 12).
45      In the present case, the claim for annulment brought by the applicant has the same subject matter as that set out in Case T‑552/16, brought prior to the present action, it is between the same parties and is based on the same pleas, even if they are sometimes placed in a different order or headed differently.
46      In those circumstances, the claim for annulment of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 must be declared manifestly inadmissible on the ground of lis pendens with the claim made in the action brought in Case T‑552/16.
47      For the sake of completeness, the claim for annulment of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible on the grounds put forward in paragraphs 39 to 84 of the order delivered today in Case T‑552/16.
48      The claim for annulment of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 must therefore be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.
The claim for annulment of the decision of 9 April 2015
49      In support of her claim for annulment of the decision of 9 April 2015 in so far as it rejects her ‘request for assistance’, the applicant puts forward, in addition to the pleas mentioned in paragraph 42 above, a plea worded as follows: ‘violation of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations and of Article 41 of the Charter … [and of] the [a]pplicant’s right to be heard’.
–       The admissibility of the claim
50      As the applicant confirms in point 46 of her application, the request for assistance which she made in her letter of 12 December 2014 sought that an inquiry be launched for the purpose of establishing the alleged irregularities which took place in the selection procedure initiated by the vacancy notice bearing reference COM/2013/10339.
51      It is settled case-law that the conditions for the admissibility of an action concern an absolute bar to proceeding with the action which the Courts of the European Union must consider of their own motion should such an issue arise (see judgment of 8 February 2011, Paroc v OHIM (INSULATE FOR LIFE), T‑157/08, EU:T:2011:33, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
52      The absence of an interest in bringing proceedings is included among those conditions concerning an absolute bar to proceeding (see order of 22 November 2006, Sanchez Ferriz v Commission, T‑436/04, EU:T:2006:360, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
53      It is also settled case-law that, for an applicant to be able, within the framework of an action brought under Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’), applicable by analogy to members of the temporary staff by virtue of Article 46 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, to seek the annulment of an act which adversely affects him, within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, he must have, at the time he brings the action, a vested and present interest, which is sufficiently established to have that act annulled, such an interest assuming that the action is likely, if successful, to benefit him (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 December 2010, Commission v Strack, T‑526/08 P, EU:T:2010:506, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
54      As a condition of admissibility, the applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must be evaluated at the time when the action is brought (see judgment of 9 December 2010, Commission v Strack, T‑526/08 P, EU:T:2010:506, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
55      In the present case, the applicant brought the action before the Court on 15 August 2016.
56      At that date, the new Director of the EMCDDA had already been designated upon the conclusion of a second procedure initiated by the vacancy notice bearing reference COM/2015/20002 (see paragraph 14 above). The documents produced by the Commission show that the new Director was designated on 14 October 2015.
57      The applicant has not brought any action against the decisions relating to that second procedure.
58      In those circumstances, it must be held that launching an inquiry in order to establish the alleged illegalities in the first procedure would not enable the applicant, assuming those illegalities were found to be established, to obtain the post at issue.
59      In response to a question put to her by the Court in the context of a measure of organisation of procedure concerning her interest in bringing proceedings, the applicant submits, in the first place, that she is also seeking in that action compensation in respect of the material and non-material harm resulting from the illegalities vitiating the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 and the decision of 9 April 2015.
60      However, that statement does not establish the applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings.
61      The claim for compensation in respect of the harm resulting from the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible on the ground of lis pendens (see paragraph 87 below).
62      As regards the claim for compensation in respect of the harm resulting from the decision of 9 April 2015, it is settled case-law that, where an applicant is no longer in a position to fill the post to which the act which he is seeking to have annulled relates, he loses his interest in seeking the annulment of that act, even though he retains an interest in seeking that a judgment be delivered on the legality of that act in the context of a claim seeking compensation in respect of the harm resulting from it (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 December 1990, Moritz v Commission, T‑20/89, EU:T:1990:80, paragraph 16, and 12 September 2007, Combescot v Commission, T‑250/04, EU:T:2007:262, paragraph 30).
63      For the same reasons, that is also true as regards the claim seeking, in that context, the annulment of the act rejecting a request for assistance submitted for the purpose of establishing at the end of an inquiry that the applicant was unlawfully excluded from the procedure. Since the post concerned is no longer available, the applicant no longer has the necessary interest to seek annulment of such an act.
64      In the second place, the applicant submits that she wishes to prevent the illegalities she is alleging from occurring again in a procedure for the replacement of the newly-recruited Director of the EMCDDA.
65      It must be recalled in this connection that interest relied on by the applicant must be personal and actual.
66      The interest claimed in the present case does not have those qualities.
67      The applicant claims that the illegalities committed by the Commission in the procedure are due to the former Director of the EMCDDA, who she claims still exercised considerable influence within that agency. However, she has provided nothing such as to establish that on the expiry of the mandate of the new Director of the EMCDDA, the former Director will still be in a position to exercise that alleged influence.
68      Moreover, the applicant has not stated that she has the intention of re-submitting her candidature for the post concerned.
69      In those circumstances, it must be held that the applicant has not established that she has an interest in bringing proceedings, so that the claim for annulment must be declared manifestly inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the decision of 9 April 2015 by which the Commission rejected her request for assistance.
70      For the sake of completeness, the Court considers it desirable to examine the substance of the claim.
–       Substance of the claim
71      In her complaints of 12 December 2014 and 3 July 2015, the applicant simply requested that an inquiry be launched, without specifying the basis of her request. However, it is apparent from the application, in particular the first plea thereof, and the answer given to a question put by the Court that that request was based on Articles 24 and 90(1) of the Staff Regulations and on the right to be heard.
72      Under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, applicable by analogy to members of the temporary staff pursuant to Article 11 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, ‘the Union shall assist any official, in particular in proceedings against any person perpetrating threats, insulting or defamatory acts or utterances, or any attack to person or property to which he or a member of his family is subjected by reason of his position or duties’.
73      As the Commission points out, it is settled case-law that the purpose of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations is to defend officials against the acts of third parties and not against acts emanating from their own institution (judgments of 9 December 1982, Plug v Commission, 191/81, EU:C:1982:421, paragraph 21, and 30 June 1992, Arto Hijos v Council, T‑25/91, EU:T:1992:77, paragraph 58).
74      In the present case, the objective of the inquiry which the applicant was seeking to have launched was to expose the irregularities in the selection procedure carried out by the Commission.
75      In point 89 of her first complaint, in which she sets out for the first time her request for assistance, the applicant wrote the following:
‘Due to the above described illegalities I experienced in the course of the selection procedure, ordering an administrative inquiry, conducted by an investigator with an impeccable reputation, with an attitude of seeking the truth without compromise… and without having regard to various political and/or bureaucratic interests and whose objectivity and impartiality is beyond reproach would be more than justified. Accordingly, I am requesting the ordering of such an internal investigation in order to shed light [on] the questionable aspects of the contested selection procedure and I am hereby declaring my willingness to cooperate with such an investigator or … investigation committee.’
76      Likewise, in point 46 of the application, the applicant described the purpose of her request for assistance as follows:
‘The subject matter that constitutes the grounds of the present case was the rejection of the [a]pplicant’s request for assistance with regard … to conducting an administrative inquiry, in order to further expose the irregularities experienced by the [a]pplicant in the course of the selection procedure organised and conducted by the Commission’s various executive bodies mandated by the [d]efendant and entrusted with the selection procedure, most notably the [p]reselection panel and the CCA.’
77      The claim for annulment of the decision of 9 April 2015 must therefore be declared manifestly unfounded in so far as it is based on Article 24 of the Staff Regulations.
78      Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations, which is also relied upon by the applicant, may not serve as a basis for her request separately from Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, since its purpose is solely to set out the procedural rules in relation to all requests made by officials vis-à-vis their administration.
79      With regard to the right to be heard, the applicant submits that if the Commission had heard her before rejecting her complaint against the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014, she would have been able to convince that institution to adopt a different decision and to admit her to the next stage of the procedure.
80      That argument must be rejected for two reasons.
81      First, Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations does not provide that an official who submits a complaint must be heard before a decision is adopted on that complaint.
82      Secondly, in a recruitment procedure, there is no obligation for the candidate to be heard unless the procedure so provides (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2001, Coget and Others v Court of Auditors, T‑95/01, EU:T:2001:239, paragraphs 136 and 137). In the present case, the vacancy notice provided that the shortlisted candidates were to be heard by the CCA. Conversely, the candidates who were not shortlisted by the preselection panel were not to be granted such an interview. Since she did not have the right to be heard, the applicant may not claim an inquiry seeking to establish that such a right, which she did not enjoy, was breached.
83      Thus, nor would the right to be heard confer on the applicant the right to have an inquiry launched.
84      The claim for annulment of the decision of 9 April 2015 must therefore be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, manifestly unfounded without its being necessary for the Court to rule on the measures of inquiry requested by the applicant.
The claims for damages
The claim for damages in relation to the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014
85      The applicant is seeking compensation in respect of the material and non-material harm which she claims to have suffered on account of the illegalities purportedly vitiating the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014.
86      That claim for damages has the same subject matter as the claim for damages made in Case T‑552/16, brought prior to the present action, it is between the same parties and is based on the same arguments, even if those arguments are less developed than the arguments in Case T‑552/16.
87      That claim for damages must therefore be rejected of the Court’s own motion as manifestly inadmissible on the ground of lis pendens, in accordance with the case-law set out in paragraphs 44 and 51 above.
88      In any case, since the claim for annulment of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014 has been declared manifestly inadmissible, the present claim for damages, which seeks compensation in respect of the material and non-material harm allegedly suffered by the applicant on account of the illegalities purportedly vitiating that ‘decision’, must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.
89      It is settled case-law that claims seeking compensation in respect of material or non-material harm must be dismissed where they are closely linked with claims for annulment which have themselves been dismissed as either inadmissible or unfounded (see judgment of 15 May 1997, N v Commission, T‑273/94, EU:T:1997:71, paragraph 159 and the case-law cited).
90      In the present case, the claim for damages is closely linked to the claim for annulment of the ‘decision’ of 26 September 2014, since it seeks compensation in respect of the harm allegedly caused to the applicant by the purported illegalities in that ‘decision’.
91      It must therefore be dismissed.
The claim for damages in relation to the decision of 9 April 2015
92      The applicant claims compensation in respect of the material and non-material harm which she claims to have suffered on account of the failure to launch an inquiry into the selection procedure. She submits in that regard that, had an inquiry been launched, the recruitment procedure would have had a different outcome. She argues that she would thereby have had the opportunity of disclosing facts and evidence about which she had until that time kept silent in order not to endanger the persons concerned, so that, upon reading the inquiry report, the Commission would have had to adopt a different decision concerning her candidature. She also claims that the rejection of her request and her complaint generated in her a feeling of helplessness and impotence, which caused her serious health problems, such as anxiety, sleep disorder and depression.
93      In respect of the material harm incurred, the applicant claims damages equivalent to the remuneration and allowances which she would have obtained over the duration of the contract and to the retirement pension which she would have received until the age of 78.7, which corresponds to the life expectancy of a Hungarian woman born in 1968. She thus assesses her material harm at EUR 2 836 107.
94      In respect of the non-material harm incurred, the applicant claims damages of EUR 100 000.
95      Since the claim for annulment of the decision of 9 April 2015 by which the Commission rejected the request that an inquiry be launched has been declared manifestly unfounded, the claim for damages based on that decision must be treated likewise, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraph 89 above.
96      In the present case there is a close link between, on the one hand, the claim for annulment of the decision of 9 April 2015 and, on the other, the claim for damages based on the purported unlawfulness of that decision.
97      The present claim for damages based on the purported illegalities in the decision of 9 April 2015 must therefore be declared manifestly unfounded.
98      It follows from all the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
99      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
100    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.      The action is dismissed.
2.      OT shall pay the costs.
Luxembourg, 16 November 2018.
E. Coulon
I. Pelikánová
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.