Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Third Chamber)
30 April 2026 (*)
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Directive (EU) 2016/343 – Articles 3 and 4 – Presumption of innocence – Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Order that no further action be taken – Judicial decision that is not a decision on guilt – Setting aside and referral back to a lower court – Findings made by the higher court as to whether the constituent elements of the offence concerned are present – Obligation on the part of the lower court to comply with the rulings of the higher court – Appropriate measures in the event of breach of the presumption of innocence )
In Case C‑748/24 [Kotaňák], (i)
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Mestský súd Bratislava I (Bratislava I City Court, Slovakia), made by decision of 25 April 2024, received at the Court on 29 October 2024, in the criminal proceedings against
AC,
other party:
Okresná prokuratúra Bratislava III,
LZ,
THE COURT (Third Chamber),
composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, O. Spineanu-Matei, S. Rodin, N. Fenger and A. Kornezov, Judges,
Advocate General: D. Spielmann,
Registrar: I. Illéssy, Administrator,
having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 16 October 2025,
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
–        AC, by M. Mandzák, P. Pechanec and M. Pohovej, advokáti,
–        the Slovak Government, by their Agents,
–        the Hungarian Government, by Zs. Biró-Tóth and M.Z. Fehér, acting as Agents,
–        the European Commission, by R. Lindenthal and M. Wasmeier, acting as Agents,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 15 January 2026,
gives the following
Judgment
1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 4 and 6 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1), Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and of the principles of effectiveness and of the primacy of EU law.
2        The request has been made in criminal proceedings against AC for defamation.
Legal context
Directive 2016/343
3        Recitals 16 and 48 of Directive 2016/343 state:
‘(16)      The presumption of innocence would be violated if public statements made by public authorities, or judicial decisions other than those on guilt, referred to a suspect or an accused person as being guilty, for as long as that person has not been proved guilty according to law. Such statements and judicial decisions should not reflect an opinion that that person is guilty. This should be without prejudice to acts of the prosecution which aim to prove the guilt of the suspect or accused person, such as the indictment, and without prejudice to judicial decisions as a result of which a suspended sentence takes effect, provided that the rights of the defence are respected. This should also be without prejudice to preliminary decisions of a procedural nature, which are taken by judicial or other competent authorities and are based on suspicion or on elements of incriminating evidence, such as decisions on pre-trial detention, provided that such decisions do not refer to the suspect or accused person as being guilty. Before taking a preliminary decision of a procedural nature the competent authority might first have to verify that there are sufficient elements of incriminating evidence against the suspect or accused person to justify the decision concerned, and the decision could contain reference to those elements.
…
(48)      As this Directive establishes minimum rules, Member States should be able to extend the rights laid down in this Directive in order to provide a higher level of protection. The level of protection provided for by Member States should never fall below the standards provided for by the Charter or by the [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (ECHR)], as interpreted by the Court of Justice and by the European Court of Human Rights [(ECtHR)].’
4        Article 2 of that directive provides:
‘This Directive applies to natural persons who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings. It applies at all stages of the criminal proceedings, from the moment when a person is suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence, or an alleged criminal offence, until the decision on the final determination of whether that person has committed the criminal offence concerned has become definitive.’
5        Article 3 of that directive states:
‘Member States shall ensure that suspects and accused persons are presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.’
6        Article 4 of that directive, entitled ‘Public references to guilt’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 2:
‘1.      Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, for as long as a suspect or an accused person has not been proved guilty according to law, public statements made by public authorities, and judicial decisions, other than those on guilt, do not refer to that person as being guilty. This shall be without prejudice to acts of the prosecution which aim to prove the guilt of the suspect or accused person, and to preliminary decisions of a procedural nature, which are taken by judicial or other competent authorities and which are based on suspicion or incriminating evidence.
2.      Member States shall ensure that appropriate measures are available in the event of a breach of the obligation laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article not to refer to suspects or accused persons as being guilty, in accordance with this Directive and, in particular, with Article 10.’
7        Under Article 6(1) of Directive 2016/343:
‘Member States shall ensure that the burden of proof for establishing the guilt of suspects and accused persons is on the prosecution. This shall be without prejudice to any obligation on the judge or the competent court to seek both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, and to the right of the defence to submit evidence in accordance with the applicable national law.’
8        Article 10(1) of that directive reads as follows:
‘Member States shall ensure that suspects and accused persons have an effective remedy if their rights under this Directive are breached.’
Slovak law
9        Paragraph 373(1) and (2) of the Trestný zákon (Criminal Code), which defines the criminal offence of defamation, reads as follows:
‘(1)      Whoever communicates false information about another person which is capable of considerably damaging the respect of fellow citizens for such a person, their career and business, their family relations, or which causes them other grievous harm, shall be punished by a prison sentence of up to two years.
(2)      A prison sentence of one to five years shall be imposed upon an offender if they commit an act referred to in paragraph 1[:]
…
(c)      publicly, …’
10      Paragraph 327(1) of the Trestný poriadok (Code of Criminal Procedure) provides:
‘The court to which the matter was returned for a new hearing and decision shall be bound by the legal opinion which the appeal court expressed in its ruling, and shall be obliged to proceed with the acts and the taking of evidence ordered by the appeal court.’
The main proceedings and the questions referred
11      On 18 November 2020, the Okresná prokuratúra Bratislava III ((Bratislava III District Prosecutor’s Office, Slovakia), filed an indictment with the Okresný súd Bratislava III (Bratislava III District Court, Slovakia) against AC for defamation, an offence under Paragraph 373(1) and (2)(c) of the Criminal Code, which he is accused of having committed by posting several videos online containing a series of false allegations.
12      By order of 8 November 2021, the Okresný súd Bratislava III (Bratislava III District Court) closed the proceedings on the ground that the conduct referred to in the indictment did not constitute a criminal offence.
13      The Okresná prokuratúra Bratislava III (Bratislava III District Prosecutor’s Office) appealed against that order. By order of 8 February 2022, the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava, Slovakia) set aside the order of the court of first instance and referred the case back to that court so that it could hear and determine the case again while re-examining all the evidence.
14      In the grounds of its order the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava), inter alia held that, ‘the false information of a purely intimate nature, which the accused shared with a large number of followers via his post, is – due to its content – liable to cause serious damage to the aggrieved person’s romantic, family and social relations, and to undermine trust in her’.
15      By order of 3 October 2022, the Okresný súd Bratislava III (Bratislava III District Court) again dismissed the indictment against AC.
16      The Okresná prokuratúra Bratislava III (Bratislava III District Prosecutor’s Office) appealed against that order. By order of 18 April 2023, the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava) set aside the order of 3 October 2022 of the court of first instance and referred the case back to that court so that it could hear and decide the case once again.
17      In the grounds of its order, the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava) reiterated the rulings set out in its order of 8 February 2022 and added, inter alia, the following information:
‘The evidence taken during the pre-trial investigation and on which the [court of first instance] also based its findings shows beyond doubt that the accused has been using lies about her and attacking her, which has placed her in a very unpleasant situation in her relations with her family and acquaintances. The intimate relationship between her and SB is a figment of the accused’s imagination, and the events to which the accused referred in his statements never took place … As regards the determination of which of the published statements were false, they are undoubtedly statements whose veracity was ascertained in the pre-trial investigation based on the evidence taken, and which concerned the intimate relationship between the aggrieved person and the witness SB, and the sexual practices which the accused clearly described in his post.’
18      Following a reorganisation of the Slovak judicial system, jurisdiction to rule on the case in the main proceedings was transferred, on 1 June 2023, to the Mestský súd Bratislava I (Bratislava I City Court, Slovakia), which is the referring court.
19      Before that court, AC argues that certain of the rulings of the appeal court infringe the presumption of innocence, in so far as they leave no room for any finding other than a guilty verdict, even though it was not necessary for the appeal court to assess whether the charges against him were well founded. AC therefore considers that the referring court should disregard the rulings of the appeal court.
20      The referring court notes that, under the Slovak rules of procedure, it is bound by the rulings of the appeal court. However, it considers that those rulings infringe the presumption of innocence enjoyed by AC and his rights of defence.
21      In that regard, that court has doubts, in particular, as to the proportionality of those rulings, in so far as, under the Slovak legislation, the higher court could have found merely that the decision at first instance was incorrect and required the court of first instance to take evidence. In addition, the referring court questions the relevance of the fact that the higher court ruled solely on the basis of the evidence gathered during the pre-trial investigation and without the accused person having had the opportunity to comment on that evidence.
22      Furthermore, the referring court asks what appropriate measures, within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2016/343, should, if necessary, be adopted in order to remedy a breach of the presumption of innocence. More specifically, it raises the question of whether it is necessary to set aside the legally binding rulings of the higher court or even to decide, in addition, on the recusal of the judges of that court.
23      In those circumstances, the Mestský súd Bratislava I (Bratislava I City Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)      Does the right to respect for the presumption of innocence pursuant to Article 48(1) of the [Charter] in conjunction with Article 4(1) and Article 6(1) of [Directive 2016/343], and also the principle of proportionality and the rights of the defence pursuant to Article 48(2) of the [Charter], preclude a court of higher instance, in appeal proceedings brought by a prosecutor against an order handed down by a court of first instance discontinuing criminal proceedings, from setting out in the grounds of its ruling, before the case has been decided on the merits and without the court taking evidence in the case, the following findings of fact and law:
“The false information of a purely intimate nature, which the accused shared with a large number of followers via his post, is – due to its content – liable to cause serious damage to the aggrieved person’s romantic, family and social relations, and to undermine trust in her … The evidence taken during the pre-trial investigation and on which the [court of first instance] also based its findings shows beyond doubt that the accused has been using lies about her and attacking her, which has placed her in a very unpleasant situation in her relations with her family and acquaintances. The intimate relationship between her and SB is a figment of the accused’s imagination, and the events to which the accused referred in his statements never took place … As regards the determination of which of the published statements were false, they are undoubtedly statements whose veracity was ascertained in the pre-trial investigation based on the evidence taken, and which concerned the intimate relationship between the aggrieved person and the witness SB, and the sexual practices which the accused clearly described in his post[”?]
(2)      Is the answer to the first question influenced by the fact that neither national legislation nor national practice require the court of higher instance to carry out an assessment of the factual and legal issues in the grounds for the order setting aside the ruling, and that those grounds could be limited to a simple statement that the ruling handed down by the lower court was flawed because the court of first instance is required to take evidence at the main hearing and to rule accordingly?
(3)      Is the answer to the first question influenced by the fact that the court of higher instance, when deciding on the prosecutor’s appeal, ruled solely on the basis of the evidence taken during the pre-trial investigation, which had not yet been heard before a court of first instance?
(4)      In the event that the first question is answered in the affirmative: should the following actions and rulings be regarded as appropriate measures for ensuring respect for the presumption of innocence within the meaning of Article 4(2) of [Directive 2016/343]:
–        the actions of a national court of first instance, which – invoking the principle of the primacy and effectiveness of EU law – disregards the findings of fact and law made by the court of higher instance in the grounds for its ruling to the extent that they are contrary to EU law, even though those findings would otherwise have been legally binding under national legislation, and itself decides the case after the evidence has been properly taken; or
–        the actions of a national court of first instance, which – invoking the principle of the primacy and effectiveness of EU law – disregards the findings of fact and law made by the court of higher instance in the grounds for its ruling to the extent that they are contrary to EU law, even though those findings would otherwise have been legally binding under national legislation, and itself decides the case again, handing down the same ruling to discontinue the criminal proceedings that had already been set aside once by the court of higher instance; or
–        the recusal of the judges of the court of higher instance from the proceedings on the grounds of their lack of impartiality due to the fact that they had failed to observe the presumption of innocence, based on the plea of lack of impartiality entered by the suspect?’
The admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling
24      The Slovak Government disputes the admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling.
25      First, that government submits that the referring court has not specified the reasons why it had decided to make that request, with the result that the Court does not have sufficient information on the factual and regulatory context of the questions referred.
26      Second, that government submits that the interpretation of EU law sought by the referring court is not necessary in order to resolve the case in the main proceedings. The main proceedings do not correspond to an action seeking the adoption of appropriate measures within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2016/343. In that context, even if it were found that the reasoning of the decision of the appeal court disregards the presumption of innocence, such a finding would have no effect on the lawfulness of that decision, the findings of which, moreover, do not prevent the referring court from ruling on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, after taking evidence from both parties. Furthermore, the referring court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the recusal of judges of the appeal court.
27      It must be noted that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see judgments of 21 April 1988, Pardini, 338/85, EU:C:1988:194, paragraph 8, and of 24 July 2023, Lin, C‑107/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:606, paragraph 61).
28      It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see judgments of 13 July 2000, Idéal tourisme, C‑36/99, EU:C:2000:405, paragraph 20, and of 24 July 2023, Lin, C‑107/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:606, paragraph 62).
29      In that regard, in the first place, it must be pointed out, as regards the arguments based on the allegedly incomplete nature of the order for reference, that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, now reflected in Article 94(a) and (b) of its Rules of Procedure, the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary for the national court to define the factual and regulatory context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, to explain the factual hypotheses on which those questions are based. Furthermore, it is essential, as stated in Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure, that the request for a preliminary ruling itself contain a statement of the reasons which prompted the referring court or tribunal to enquire about the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of EU law, and the connection between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (see judgment of 26 January 1993, Telemarsicabruzzoand Others, C‑320/90 to C‑322/90, EU:C:1993:26, paragraph 6; order of 28 June 2000, Laguillaumie, C‑116/00, EU:C:2000:350, paragraph 16; and judgment of 4 October 2024, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Landeck (Attempt to access personal data stored on a mobile telephone), C‑548/21, EU:C:2024:830, paragraph 48).
30      In the present case, it should be noted that the order for reference sets out the factual and regulatory context of the questions referred. In addition, that order sets out, as is apparent from paragraphs 20 to 22 of the present judgment, the reasons which prompted the referring court to inquire about the interpretation of certain provisions of EU law.
31      It follows that that order satisfies the requirements laid down in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure and therefore contains sufficient information to enable the Court to answer those questions.
32      In the second place, as regards the arguments alleging that there is no need to obtain an answer from the Court to the questions referred in order to be able to rule in the main proceedings, it should be noted that the referring court has stated that, under Slovak legislation, it is required, when examining the case in the main proceedings, to comply with the rulings made by the appeal court.
33      In that context, the questions referred seek to enable the referring court to determine whether those rulings are compatible with the requirement of respect for the presumption of innocence under Directive 2016/343 and Article 48(1) of the Charter and, as the case may be, to draw the appropriate conclusions from any incompatibility of those assessments with that requirement.
34      Accordingly, it is not obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought bears no relation, in general, to the actual facts or the purpose of the main proceedings.
35      By contrast, as regards, more specifically, the third part of the fourth question, it is not apparent from the order for reference that the Mestský súd Bratislava I (Bratislava I City Court), which is a court of first instance, has jurisdiction to rule on the potential recusal of judges of an appellate court or that it could give due effect to a potential obligation, arising under EU law, to require the recusal of such judges.
36      Consequently, it is clear that an interpretation of the EU rules seeking an assessment of whether they impose such an obligation bears no relation to the subject matter of the main proceedings.
37      In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the fourth question is inadmissible in so far as it relates to the recusal of judges of an appellate court and that the questions referred are, as to the remainder, admissible.
Consideration of the questions referred
The first to third questions
38      By its first three questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 4(1) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2016/343, read in conjunction with Article 48 of the Charter, concerning the presumption of innocence, must be interpreted as precluding a criminal court ruling on an appeal against a decision closing criminal proceedings on the ground that there was no offence, from taking a position, in detail, on incriminating evidence by carrying out a factual and legal assessment of whether the constituent elements of the criminal offence at issue are present, when that court is not required to do so, under national legislation, in order to give a ruling, and that assessment is based solely on the evidence gathered in the course of the investigation procedure, without the accused person having had the opportunity to comment on that evidence.
39      Article 4(1) of Directive 2016/343 provides that Member States are to take the necessary measures to ensure that, for as long as a suspect or an accused person has not been proved guilty according to law, public statements made by public authorities, and judicial decisions, other than those on guilt, do not refer to that person as being guilty. That provision states that it is to be without prejudice to acts of the prosecution which aim to prove the guilt of the suspect or accused person, and to preliminary decisions of a procedural nature, which are taken by judicial or other competent authorities and which are based on suspicion or incriminating evidence.
40      It is apparent from Article 6(1) of that directive that Member States are to ensure that the burden of proof for establishing the guilt of suspects and accused persons is on the prosecution. That is to be without prejudice to any obligation on the judge or the competent court to seek both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, and to the right of the defence to submit evidence in accordance with the applicable national law.
41      In order to determine the scope of those provisions as regards the examination which may be carried out by a criminal court in a situation such as that referred to in the first three questions, it must be borne in mind, at the outset, that Directive 2016/343 provides only for minimal harmonisation of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraphs 45 and 46).
42      In the context of that minimal harmonisation, that directive distinguishes between judicial decisions on guilt, which necessarily occur at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, and other procedural acts, such as acts of the prosecution and preliminary decisions of a procedural nature (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2019, Spetsializirana prokuratura, C‑653/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1024, paragraph 32).
43      In the present case, the first to third questions relate to a preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings, during which an appeal court must rule on the lawfulness of a decision at first instance determining whether an indictment constitutes a sufficient basis for holding a trial.
44      Such a decision of the appeal court must, in the light of its purpose, be regarded as constituting a judicial decision other than a decision on guilt, within the meaning of Article 4(1) of that directive.
45      That directive does not contain rules specifying the substantive and procedural conditions for the adoption of such a decision.
46      In particular, it does not determine either the nature of the elements which must be present in order to be able to adopt that decision or the detailed rules for assessing the evidence for the purpose of adopting that decision.
47      In that regard, it should be noted in particular that, although Article 6 of Directive 2016/343 lays down certain rules relating to the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal proceedings, those rules relate to the establishment of the guilt of suspects and accused persons, with the result that they are not intended to govern the taking of evidence when adopting a preliminary decision such as that at issue in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2019, Spetsializirana prokuratura, C‑653/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1024, paragraph 33).
48      Furthermore, given that the substantive and procedural conditions for the adoption of a decision such as that at issue in the main proceedings fall within the scope of national law alone (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2019, Spetsializirana prokuratura, C‑653/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:1024, paragraph 38), the general procedural rules governing the preliminary stage of criminal proceedings leading to the adoption of such a decision cannot be regarded as concerning the implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Accordingly, Article 48(2) of the Charter, which provides for respect for the rights of the defence, is not applicable to that preliminary stage of criminal proceedings.
49      By contrast, in the light of the definition of the scope of Directive 2016/343 set out in Article 2 and of the general principle expressed in Article 3, it must be held that the latter article, which provides that Member States are to ensure that suspects and accused persons are presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law, applies, without any particular limitation, at all stages of criminal proceedings against natural persons, including the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings such as that at issue in the main proceedings.
50      Similarly, it is apparent from the wording of Article 4(1) of Directive 2016/343, which prohibits a suspect or an accused person from being referred to as being guilty for as long as he or she has not been proved guilty according to law, that that provision applies inter alia to judicial decisions other than those on guilt.
51      As regards the scope of Article 3 and Article 4(1) of that directive in proceedings such as those at issue in the main proceedings, it follows from the Court’s case-law that those provisions, read in conjunction with recital 16 of that directive, do not preclude the adoption of preliminary decisions of a procedural nature which are based on suspicions or incriminating evidence, provided that such decisions do not refer to the suspect or the accused person as being guilty (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraphs 44 and 48).
52      It follows from the foregoing, first of all, that Directive 2016/343 does not preclude a criminal court from carrying out, for the purpose of adopting a preliminary decision of a procedural nature, an assessment of the incriminating evidence, with a view to assessing whether the presence of the constituent elements of an offence may be envisaged in a given case.
53      Next, nor does that directive preclude such a preliminary decision from being adopted where not all the evidence has been taken and where the accused person has not had the opportunity to comment on it.
54      Lastly, as the Advocate General stated in point 80 of his Opinion, there is no provision of that directive that precludes such a preliminary decision from being based on detailed reasoning.
55      However, that reasoning must be formulated, in accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 2016/343, in compliance with the obligation not to refer to the suspect or accused person as being guilty.
56      Although Article 4(1) of Directive 2016/343 gives Member States discretion in adopting the necessary measures for the purposes of that provision, the fact remains, as is evident from recital 48 to that directive, that the level of protection offered by Member States should never be below the standards set out in the Charter and the ECHR, including those relating to the presumption of innocence (judgment of 5 September 2019, AH and Others (Presumption of innocence), C‑377/18, EU:C:2019:670, paragraph 40).
57      In that regard, it should be noted that the presumption of innocence is enshrined in Article 48(1) of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 6(2) ECHR, as is apparent from the explanations to the Charter. It follows, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, that it is necessary to take account of Article 6(2) ECHR for the purpose of interpreting Article 48(1) of the Charter, as a minimum threshold of protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 September 2019, AH and Others (Presumption of innocence), C‑377/18, EU:C:2019:670, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
58      In those circumstances, it is necessary, for the purpose of interpreting Article 4(1), read in conjunction with Article 48(1) of the Charter, to draw on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Article 6(2) ECHR (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 September 2019, AH and Others (Presumption of innocence), C‑377/18, EU:C:2019:670, paragraph 42).
59      It follows from that case-law that the principle of the presumption of innocence will be infringed if a judicial decision or a statement by a public official concerning a person charged with a criminal offence contains a clear declaration, in the absence of a final conviction, that the person concerned has committed the crime in question (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 27 February 2014, Karaman v. Germany, CE:ECHR:20140227JUD001710310, § 63, and judgment of 5 September 2019, AH and Others (Presumption of innocence), C‑377/18, EU:C:2019:670, paragraph 43).
60      In that regard, a distinction must be drawn between such decisions or statements which reflect an opinion that the person concerned is guilty, which infringe the presumption of innocence, and those which merely describe a state of suspicion (ECtHR, 28 November 2002, Marzianov. Italy, CE:ECHR:2002:1128JUD004531399, § 31, and 15 October 2013, Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, CE:ECHR:2013:1015JUD003452910, § 192). Such a breach of that presumption may nevertheless occur even in the absence of a formal finding of guilt, since reasoning suggesting that the court regards the person concerned as guilty is sufficient to run foul of that presumption (ECtHR, 19 September 2006, Matijasevic v. Serbia, CE:ECHR:2006:0919JUD002303704, § 45, and 9 March 2023, Rigolio v. Italy, CE:ECHR:2023:0309JUD002014809, § 94).
61      In order to assess whether there has been such a breach of the presumption of innocence, regard must be had both to the choice of words by the judicial authorities and of the particular circumstances in which they were made and of the nature and context of the proceedings at issue (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 27 February 2014, Karaman v. Germany, CE:ECHR:20140227JUD001710310, § 63, and judgment of 5 September 2019, AH and Others (Presumption of innocence), C‑377/18, EU:C:2019:670, paragraph 43).
62      Thus, as the Advocate General stated in point 53 of his Opinion, the European Court of Human Rights was entitled to consider that the context surrounding the ‘unfortunate’ use of words which appear to indicate that the guilt of the person concerned has been established may make it possible to rule out a breach of the presumption of innocence (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 10 October 2000, Daktaras v. Lithuania, CE:ECHR:2000:1010JUD004209598, §§ 44 and 45).
63      However, the European Court of Human Rights has also clarified that taking into account the proceedings in which a statement is made requires more detailed examination of statements made by judges (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 21 September 2006, Pandy v. Belgium, CE:ECHR:2006:0921JUD001358302, §§ 43 and 45).
64      It is also apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, in order to review compliance with the presumption of innocence, it is necessary always to analyse a judicial decision and its reasoning as a whole, since any explicit reference, in certain parts of a judicial decision, to the absence of guilt of a person would be devoid of sense if other parts of that decision were likely to be understood as a premature expression of his or her guilt (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 September 2019, AH and Others (Presumption of innocence), C‑377/18, EU:C:2019:670, paragraph 46).
65      Furthermore, certain findings relating to a person’s participation in a criminal offence or to the presence of the constituent elements of such an offence may be made without undermining the presumption of innocence, where those findings are necessary for the decision to be taken by the court concerned and provided that it is clearly stated that the guilt of that person has not been legally established (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 27 February 2014, Karaman v. Germany, CE:ECHR:20140227JUD001710310, §§ 64 and 65; and 9 March 2023, Rigolio v. Italy, CE:ECHR:2023:0309JUD002014809, §§ 97, 125 and 126; and judgment of 5 September 2019, AH and Others (Presumption of innocence), C‑377/18, EU:C:2019:670, paragraph 45).
66      Although it is ultimately for the referring court to determine whether Article 4(1) of Directive 2016/343, read in conjunction with Article 48(1) of the Charter, was complied with in the course of the proceedings before the appeal court, the Court may, however, in the context of the judicial cooperation provided for in Article 267 TFEU, on the basis of the case file before it, provide that court with an interpretation of EU law which may be useful to it in assessing the effects of those provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2024, Vivacom Bulgaria, C‑369/23, EU:C:2024:1043, paragraph 41).
67      To that end, it must be pointed out that it follows from the foregoing that, in order to rule on compliance with the presumption of innocence, the referring court will have to focus both on the choice of words used by the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava) as well as on the particular circumstances in which they were used and the nature and context of the main proceedings, in order to determine whether the contested rulings of that court reflect an opinion that AC is guilty of the offence alleged against him.
68      In that regard, it should be noted, in the first place, that the use of words indicating a belief on the part of the appeal court that all the constituent elements of the offence at issue are present would, if established by the referring court, constitute a clear indication that that court expressed an opinion that the accused person is guilty of that offence.
69      In that regard, the choice of words such as those noted by the Advocate General in point 59 of his Opinion appears to indicate, subject to the verifications which it is for the referring court to carry out, that the appeal court went beyond an expression of suspicions concerning the accused person.
70      As regards, in the second place, the particular circumstances in which the words at issue in the main proceedings were used and the nature and context of the main proceedings, it must be pointed out, first, that, since the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava) is a court, the reasoning of its decision must, as is apparent from paragraph 63 of the present judgment, be subject to a more detailed examination.
71      Secondly, it will be for the referring court to take account of the fact that, as recalled in paragraph 43 of the present judgment, the decision of the appeal court relates to a preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings, during which an appeal court must rule on the lawfulness of a decision at first instance determining whether an indictment constitutes a sufficient basis for holding a trial.
72      In that context, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that, in the operative part of its decision, the appeal court merely ordered that the case be referred back to the court of first instance for a fresh assessment of the evidence and a new ruling. That factor may be relevant for the purpose of determining the scope of the words used in the grounds of that decision, in particular if it were to be considered that those words are somewhat ambiguous.
73      However, the wording of the operative part of that decision is not sufficient, in itself, to rule out any breach of the presumption of innocence.
74      It is necessary, as recalled in paragraph 64 of the present judgment, to take into consideration the reasoning of the decision at issue as a whole, and it is not possible to focus solely on the fact that certain passages of that decision imply that the guilt of the accused person has not been established.
75      Moreover, as the Advocate General observed in point 63 of his Opinion, to take the view that the fact that a decision was adopted at a preliminary stage of criminal proceedings not intended to rule on the guilt of the accused person is sufficient to rule out any breach of the presumption of innocence would directly contravene the principle that that presumption applies to the criminal proceedings as a whole. Moreover, such an approach would render Article 4(1) of Directive 2016/343 largely devoid of purpose.
76      Thirdly, it must be pointed out that, in so far as the referring court has stated that the adoption of a decision such as that at issue in the main proceedings is in no way conditional, under national legislation, on a finding that the constituent elements of the criminal offence at issue are present, such a finding cannot be regarded as necessary in order to enable the appeal court to give a ruling.
77      It follows that the situation at issue in the main proceedings cannot be compared to those referred to in the case-law cited in paragraph 65 of the present judgment.
78      Fourthly, as the Slovak Government and the European Commission maintain, the words chosen by the appeal court must be interpreted in the light of the fact that that court, which is subject by national legislation to an obligation to state reasons, twice set aside orders of the court of first instance ordering that no further action be taken in respect of the indictment, with the result that it was entitled to take the view that it was necessary to express its position more firmly and in a more comprehensive manner.
79      However, that fact cannot, in any event, justify the use of words reflecting an opinion that the accused person is guilty of the offence alleged against him, when, as the Advocate General stated in point 66 of his Opinion, it is entirely possible, at a preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings, to use expressions which respect the presumption of innocence, while being sufficiently convincing to justify referring the accused person to a trial court.
80      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first three questions is that Article 3, Article 4(1) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2016/343, read in conjunction with Article 48 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding a criminal court ruling on an appeal against a decision closing criminal proceedings on the ground that there was no offence, from taking a position, in detail, on incriminating evidence by carrying out a factual and legal assessment of whether the constituent elements of the criminal offence at issue are present, when that court is not required to do so under national legislation in order to give a ruling, and that assessment is based solely on the evidence gathered in the course of the investigation procedure, without the accused person having had the opportunity to comment on that evidence, provided that that assessment does not reflect an opinion that that person is guilty of that criminal offence.
The fourth question
81      By its fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 4(2) of Directive 2016/343, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness and the principle of primacy of EU law, must be interpreted as meaning that a court of first instance must, first, disregard the rulings of an appeal court, which has set aside an order to dismiss the case and ordered that it be referred back to that court of first instance, where those rulings are incompatible with the presumption of innocence, even if national legislation requires that court of first instance to comply with those rulings and, second, refrain from following the procedural measures imposed by that appeal court.
82      Article 4(2) of Directive 2016/343 states that Member States are to ensure that appropriate measures are available in the event of a breach of the obligation under Article 4(1) of that directive not to refer to suspects or accused persons as being guilty, in accordance with that directive and, in particular, with Article 10.
83      Article 10 of that directive requires Member States to ensure that suspects and accused persons have an effective remedy if their rights under that directive are breached.
84      Although Article 4(2) of Directive 2016/343 requires ‘appropriate measures’ to be laid down, it must nevertheless be stated that it does not specify the nature of those measures. In the absence of harmonisation in that regard, it is for the Member States to define such measures, by virtue of the principle of procedural autonomy. Nonetheless, those measures must meet the dual requirement that they should be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and should not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, by analogy, judgment of 24 June 2025, GR REAL, C‑351/23, EU:C:2025:474, paragraph 56).
85      In the present case, the referring court provides no indication as to the measures which may be adopted, under Slovak legislation, in the event of a breach of the presumption of innocence.
86      Furthermore, although the Slovak Government has referred to certain measures provided for that purpose by the national legislation, it must be held, without it being necessary to take a view on the adequacy of such measures in order to meet the requirements of Article 4(2) of Directive 2016/343 or on compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, that those measures do not, in any event, have the object or effect of limiting the scope, with regard to a court of first instance, of rulings made by an appeal court in proceedings such as those at issue in the main proceedings.
87      As the Advocate General observed in point 99 of his Opinion, irrespective of the appropriate measures which a Member State must adopt in order to remedy, in accordance with Article 4(2), a breach of the presumption of innocence, a court of first instance placed in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings may be required to take measures intended to ensure respect for the presumption of innocence.
88      Such a court must, in general, comply with Article 3 of Directive 2016/343, which requires suspects and accused persons to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
89      A court of first instance cannot, without infringing Article 3 of that directive, when it adopts a preliminary decision of a procedural nature, comply with a finding made by an appeal court entailing the view that the accused person is guilty before his or her guilt has been established according to law, in so far as that court of first instance would, in such a situation, itself have to regard that person as being guilty prematurely.
90      Since Article 3 is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to confer on it direct effect, it is for the referring court, in accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law, to disapply, where appropriate, national legislation which would prevent its application in the case before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
91      In that context it must be noted, in addition, that EU law precludes a national court which is called upon to decide a case referred back to it by a higher court hearing an appeal from being bound, in accordance with national procedural law, by legal rulings of the higher court, if it considers, having regard to the interpretation which it has sought from the Court, that those rulings are inconsistent with EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 October 2010, Elchinov,
C‑173/09, EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 32), and of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 75).
92      It follows that, if the referring court were to consider that, in the light of the answer given to the first three questions, certain rulings of the appeal court are incompatible with the presumption of innocence, enshrined in Article 3 and Article 4(1) of Directive 2016/343, read in conjunction with Article 48(1) of the Charter, it would, in giving judgment, be required to set aside those rulings, without hindrance by any national rule obliging it to comply with those rulings.
93      However, it cannot be inferred from this that a court placed in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings should set aside the decision of the appeal court in its entirety.
94      The fact that some of the rulings of an appeal court disregard the presumption of innocence does not necessarily mean that the decision containing those rulings is, as a whole, incompatible with that presumption.
95      In particular, it cannot be held that the procedural measures ordered by an appeal court, in a decision part of whose reasoning is based on such rulings, must be regarded as being, in themselves, contrary to that presumption.
96      Thus, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the measure consisting of referring a case back to a court of first instance, after the setting aside of an order that no further action be taken handed down by that court, for re-examination, does not, in itself, entail any position as to the guilt of the person concerned.
97      Therefore, it cannot be held that the obligation to set aside rulings which are incompatible with the presumption of innocence resulting from Article 3 of Directive 2016/343 precludes a court of first instance from being required, in accordance with national legislation, to comply with the procedural measures ordered by a court of appeal, including where the decision of that court is based in part on such rulings.
98      Consequently, the answer to the fourth question is that Article 3 of Directive 2016/343, read in conjunction with the principle of the primacy of EU law, must be interpreted as meaning that a court of first instance must disregard the rulings of an appeal court, which has set aside an order that no further action be taken and ordered the case to be referred back to that court of first instance, where those rulings are incompatible with the presumption of innocence, even if the national legislation requires that court of first instance to comply with those rulings, without, however, Article 3 of that directive precluding that court of first instance from being required to pursue the procedural measures ordered by that appeal court.
Costs
99      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby rules:
1.      Article 3, Article 4(1) and Article 6(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, read in conjunction with Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
must be interpreted as not precluding a criminal court ruling on an appeal against a decision closing criminal proceedings on the ground that there was no offence, from taking a position, in detail, on incriminating evidence by carrying out a factual and legal assessment of whether the constituent elements of the criminal offence at issue are present, when that court is not required to do so under national legislation in order to give a ruling, and that assessment is based solely on the evidence gathered in the course of the investigation procedure, without the accused person having had the opportunity to comment on that evidence, provided that that assessment does not reflect an opinion that that person is guilty of that criminal offence.
2.      Article 3 of Directive 2016/343, read in conjunction with the principle of the primacy of EU law,
must be interpreted as meaning that a court of first instance must disregard the rulings of an appeal court, which has set aside an order that no further action be taken and ordered the case to be referred back to that court of first instance, where those rulings are incompatible with the presumption of innocence, even if the national legislation requires that court of first instance to comply with those rulings, without, however, Article 3 of that directive precluding that court of first instance from being required to pursue the procedural measures ordered by that appeal court.
[Signatures]
*      Language of the case: Slovak.
i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.