ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
20 April 2026 (*)
( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Figurative mark GUSTO – Earlier EU word mark GUSTONI – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Impartiality – Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law )
In Case T‑234/25,
Deutsche Transnational Trustee Corporation, Inc., established in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island (Canada), represented by C. Bey, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
dennree GmbH, established in Töpen (Germany), represented by K. Röttgen, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),
composed of S. Kingston (Rapporteur), President, P. Zilgalvis and J. Hettne, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
makes the following
Order
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Deutsche Transnational Trustee Corporation, Inc., seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 31 January 2025 (Case R 1505/2024-1) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2        On 18 November 2021, the applicant designated the European Union in its international registration No 1 645 072 for the following figurative sign:
3        The mark applied for covered goods in Classes 29 and 30 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, inter alia, for each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 29: ‘Preserved, dry and cooked fruits and pulses; fruit snacks’;
–        Class 30: ‘Pastries, filled pastries, pastries containing wheat, refrigerated wheat products, wheat empanadas (turnovers/pasties/patties with a savoury filling), wheat tequeños (fried or baked breaded sticks, typically filled with cheese), buns, filled buns; sauces (condiments), frozen meals consisting mainly of pasta or rice, frozen grains, prepared grains; cereal-based preparations; cereal-based snacks; bread; cakes and confectionery’.
4        On 24 April 2022, the intervener, dennree GmbH, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for, inter alia, in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5        The opposition was based on EU word mark No 3 551 991 GUSTONI, filed on 24 November 2003, registered on 27 May 2005, and renewed on 13 November 2013 and 4 August 2023 (‘the earlier mark’), covering, inter alia, goods in Class 30 corresponding to the following description: ‘Coffee, muesli bars; pastas; noodles; vinegar, sauces (condiments), sauces for seasoning, salad dressings, prepared sauces, condiments and condiment preparations for food; essences for foodstuffs (except etheric essences and essential oils); flavourings other than essential oils; cereal bars’.
6        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
7        On 30 May 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in part, finding that there was a likelihood of confusion in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
8        On 25 July 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, for a significant part of the relevant public.
Forms of order sought
10      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        order EUIPO to pay all the costs incurred before the Court and before the Board of Appeal, as well as all the necessary costs incurred by the applicant in those proceedings.
11      EUIPO contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.
12      The intervener contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action in its entirety;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
13      Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where an action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the General Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
14      In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings, even though one of the parties – the applicant – has asked the Court to hold a hearing (see, to that effect, order of 20 May 2025, AirPlus International v EUIPO – Comeig Ramírez (R+ CASHLAB), T‑374/24, not published, EU:T:2025:544, paragraph 13).
15      In support of its action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law, alleging infringement (i) of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and (ii) of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
16      The second plea must be examined first of all.
The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001
17      In the context of its second plea, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 by finding that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public.
18      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
19      The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).
20      For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
21      Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods in question in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
22      As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 72 of the contested decision, that the goods in question were identical or similar at least to a low degree. There is no need to call into question that assessment, which, moreover, has not been disputed by the applicant.
The relevant public
23      In the contested decision, first of all, the Board of Appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the Opposition Division, considered that the relevant public, in this case, consisted of the general public with an average level of attention. Next, it, first, found that the relevant territory was the European Union as a whole and, second, based its assessment of the likelihood of confusion ‘on the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania’.
24      In the present case, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal limited its analysis of the relevant public to the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, on the sole ground that that was the position adopted by the Opposition Division and that such a position had not been challenged by the parties. The applicant argues that the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian markets are not relevant to the goods covered by the marks, have no connection with the parties and have no geographical, historical or cultural similarities, and that the Board of Appeal did not sufficiently justify its approach in that regard. According to the applicant, if the signs at issue have meaning for some consumers, the assessment of the similarity of the signs must focus on that part of the relevant public. Thus, the Board of Appeal should have carried out the comparison of the signs at issue (in particular the conceptual comparison) on the basis of the English-, Italian-, French-, Spanish-, Portuguese- and Romanian-speaking public. Furthermore, it argues, the contested decision contains an inadequate statement of reasons in that regard.
25      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
26      It must be noted, as a preliminary point, that it is common ground between the parties that the relevant public in this case is made up of the general public with an average level of attention. It is not necessary to call into question that finding.
27      In the first place, as regards the applicant’s line of argument that the Board of Appeal erred in focusing its assessment of the likelihood of confusion on the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public, it must be noted that, as follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 21 above, in order to refuse registration of an EU trade mark, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union.
28      It follows that, where the earlier mark relied on in support of an opposition is an EU trade mark, Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 does not require, for the mark applied for to be refused registration, that a likelihood of confusion must exist in all Member States and in all linguistic areas of the European Union. As the Board of Appeal rightly stated in paragraph 44 of the contested decision, the unitary character of the EU trade mark means that such an earlier mark can be relied on in opposition proceedings against any application for registration of a subsequent trade mark which would adversely affect the protection of the first mark, even if only in relation to the perception of consumers in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 September 2008, Armacell v OHIM, C‑514/06 P, not published, EU:C:2008:511, paragraphs 56 and 57, and of 20 March 2024, Sandhold v EUIPO – Grupo de Bodegas Vinartis (PATAPOUF), T‑540/23, not published, EU:T:2024:193, paragraph 38).
29      Thus, a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion for a non-negligible part of the relevant public is sufficient to uphold an opposition brought against an application for registration (see judgment of 20 March 2024, PATAPOUF, T‑540/23, not published, EU:T:2024:193, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
30      It follows from the foregoing that, contrary to the applicant’s contention, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment by taking into account the perception of the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public in the contested decision. In particular, first, since the earlier mark has been registered in the European Union, it is sufficient, for the mark applied for to be refused registration, that a likelihood of confusion exists for a non-negligible part of the relevant public in the European Union. Furthermore, the applicant has not disputed the fact that the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public constitute a non-negligeable part of the relevant public in the European Union within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 29 above.
31      As the applicant itself stated in paragraph 51 of the application, according to the case-law, in order to reject an opposition in the context of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is necessary to establish that there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the public throughout the territory in which the earlier mark or marks are protected (judgment of 21 April 2010, Coin v OHIM – Dynamiki Zoi (Fitcoin), T‑249/08, not published, EU:T:2010:151, paragraph 24).
32      It follows that the possible absence of a likelihood of confusion in other parts of the European Union, as argued by the applicant in relation to the English-, Italian-, French-, Spanish-, Portuguese- and Romanian-speaking public, is not such as to call into question the analysis carried out by the Board of Appeal in that regard.
33      Second, the applicant’s arguments concerning the absence of links between, on the one hand, the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian markets and, on the other hand, the parties to the present dispute and the foodstuffs covered by the marks at issue cannot call into question those findings. It must be borne in mind that the examination of the similarity of the marks at issue takes into consideration those marks in their entirety, as they have been registered or as they have been applied for (see judgment of 1 September 2021, Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe v EUIPO – Wong (GT RACING), T‑463/20, not published, EU:T:2021:530, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). In any event, as submitted by EUIPO, the applicant has not demonstrated that the goods in question were not present in the Finnish, Hungarian or Lithuanian markets.
34      Therefore, the applicant’s complaints challenging the public that was taken into account by the Board of Appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
35      In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal did not sufficiently justify its decision to take into account the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public, it must be noted that the Board of Appeal endorsed the Opposition Division’s approach in that regard, while observing that the parties had not challenged that conclusion.
36      The Opposition Division had considered it appropriate, in order to avoid multiple scenarios in the conceptual comparison of the signs, to limit the comparison of the signs to the part of the public for which the terms comprising the marks at issue had no meaning and therefore had an average degree of distinctiveness for the goods in question, namely the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public. Given that the Board of Appeal confirmed the Opposition Division’s decision in its entirety, and in view of the continuity in terms of their functions between the Opposition Divisions and the Boards of Appeal, as shown by Article 71(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2006, La Baronia de Turis v OHIM – Baron Philippe de Rothschild (LA BARONNIE), T‑323/03, EU:T:2006:197, paragraphs 57 and 58), that decision and its statement of reasons form part of the context in which the contested decision was adopted, a context which is known to the applicant and which enables the Court to carry out fully its judicial review as to whether the assessment of the likelihood of confusion was well founded (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 November 2007, Wesergold Getränkeindustrie v OHIM – Lidl Stiftung (VITAL FIT), T‑111/06, not published, EU:T:2007:352, paragraph 64).
37      Consequently, the applicant’s line of argument alleging a defect in the statement of reasons must be rejected. It is within the Board of Appeal’s competence to follow the Opposition Division’s approach, basing its assessment on the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, an approach which, moreover, was not disputed by the applicant before the Board of Appeal.
The comparison of the signs
–       The visual and phonetic similarity
38      In the contested decision, as regards the visual comparison, the Board of Appeal stated that a non-negligible part of the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, although it does not attribute any meaning to the contested sign, would read that sign as ‘gusto’. Since the figurative element is situated at the end of the mark, in a relatively high position, is of a notable size and is aligned practically at the same level as the other elements of the sign, and has a stylised appearance identical to those elements, it would be understood as the letter ‘o’. Next, the Board of Appeal concluded that the coincidence of the word element ‘gusto’, which constitutes the whole of the mark applied for, and five out of the seven letters of the earlier word mark GUSTONI, gave rise to an average degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue.
39      As regards the phonetic comparison, since the mark applied for consists of two syllables, ‘gus’ and ‘to’, and the earlier mark has three syllables, ‘gus’, ‘to’ and ‘ni’, the Board of Appeal observed that the first two syllables were phonetically identical. Furthermore, given that, according to the Board of Appeal, the relevant public reads from left to right and that the initial part of the sign is of greater importance, the Board of Appeal concluded, without taking into account the figurative elements, that the marks at issue had an above average degree of phonetic similarity.
40      The applicant disputes the comparison of the signs that was made by the Board of Appeal and considers that a neutral and impartial assessment would have led the Board of Appeal to recognise that the marks at issue are visually and phonetically different.
41      It should be noted, first of all, that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the mark applied for would be perceived by a non-negligible part of the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania as comprising the word ‘gusto’, and not ‘gust’, which led it to conclude that there was an average degree of visual similarity between the marks at issue and an above average degree of phonetic similarity. It follows from the case-law that, although it is true that, when faced with a mark consisting of stylised components, consumers will attempt to identify them in such a way that the sign results in a word or a combination of words which have meaning for them, it cannot, however, automatically be inferred from this that the relevant public must recognise the word element as a whole for it to be found that it will perceive a stylised component as a specific letter (see judgment of 6 September 2023, Bora Creations v EUIPO – True Skincare (TRUE SKIN), T‑576/22, not published, EU:T:2023:509, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
42      Consequently, given that the figurative element in question shares, with the other letters making up the mark applied for, the same stylistic aspect and is of a similar size, and is aligned practically at the same level as those letters, it cannot be ruled out that it will be perceived as the letter ‘o’ by the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public. That is particularly so because the average consumer is totally accustomed to the word elements of marks being composed of stylised letters (see judgment of 6 September 2023, TRUE SKIN, T‑576/22, not published, EU:T:2023:509, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
43      Furthermore, it should be noted that the applicant itself acknowledges that, for the public referred to by the Board of Appeal, a perception of the mark applied for as forming the word ‘gusto’ is possible.
44      It follows that the applicant’s line of argument is manifestly incapable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the marks at issue have an average degree of visual similarity and an above average degree of phonetic similarity.
–       The conceptual comparison
45      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that, conceptually, no comparison could be made because neither of the signs had any meaning for the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public.
46      The applicant considers that the Board of Appeal disregarded the rules applicable to the conceptual comparison of signs, in that it ignored the concepts conveyed by those signs to the English- and Italian-speaking public, as well as to the French-, Spanish-, Portuguese- and Romanian-speaking public. In the applicant’s view, the marks at issue differ conceptually and the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that a conceptual comparison was not possible.
47      As regards the semantic content of the earlier mark GUSTONI, first, the applicant submits that the first part of that mark, namely the element ‘gusto’, means ‘taste’ in Italian, whereas ‘oni’ is a typically Italian augmentative suffix. Consequently, the contraction of those two word elements within the sign ‘gustoni’ will, in its view, be understood by the Italian part of the public as referring to ‘something of great taste’. Second, the applicant submits that, since the earlier mark is similar to the word ‘gustus’ in Latin, it will be understood by consumers who speak French, Spanish, Portuguese or Romanian. Furthermore, it argues, it is apparent from a well-known Disney film that the English-speaking public would also understand the word ‘gusto’. It follows, according to the applicant, that the earlier mark GUSTONI will have meaning for a very large part of the European Union in relation to the goods in Class 30 for which it is registered, which the Board of Appeal ignored in its reasoning.
48      As regards the semantic content of the mark applied for, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal should have taken account of the meaning, in English, of the word ‘gust’ (a sudden strong wind), which would be understood by the English-speaking part of the public, representing almost one out of every two inhabitants in the European Union.
49      The applicant therefore considers that the Board of Appeal erred in limiting its analysis of the conceptual comparison to the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public, since they represent only 3.9% of the population of the European Union. Furthermore, by doing so, the Board of Appeal, in the applicant’s view, disregarded the rules set out in the EUIPO Guidelines.
50      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
51      In the first place, it should be noted that, by its line of argument concerning the conceptual comparison of the marks at issue, the applicant again challenges the Board of Appeal’s approach whereby its assessment of the likelihood of confusion should be based on the perception of the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public. However, it follows from the analysis carried out in paragraphs 27 to 37 above that such an argument must be rejected.
52      In the second place, as regards the applicant’s line of argument alleging infringement of the EUIPO Guidelines, it is sufficient to note that they are not binding legal acts for the purpose of interpreting provisions of EU law (judgment of 6 June 2019, Deichmann v EUIPO, C‑223/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:471, paragraph 49). In any event, it should be noted that the contested decision does not depart from those guidelines, in so far as, as stated in Section 3.4.3 of Chapter 4 of those guidelines, as regards the conceptual comparison, ‘only those concepts likely to be known by the relevant public, as defined by the relevant territory, matter’. Consequently, in the present case, since the relevant territory comprises Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, the fact that the marks at issue have a meaning in English, Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese or Romanian is irrelevant. Accordingly, that line of argument must be rejected.
53      It follows that the applicant’s line of argument that the Board of Appeal erred in disregarding the concepts conveyed by the marks at issue to the English-, Italian-, French-, Spanish-, Portuguese- and Romanian-speaking public must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
The likelihood of confusion
54      In the contested decision, in view of the relevant public referred to, namely the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, to whom the earlier mark conveyed no meaning, and the lack of evidence adduced to demonstrate that that public would understand Italian, the Board of Appeal concluded that the earlier mark had an average degree of inherent distinctiveness.
55      As regards the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal noted, first of all, that the relevant public was the general public with an average level of attention, and that the goods in question were identical or similar at least to a low degree. It then stated that the signs at issue had an average degree of visual similarity and an above average degree of phonetic similarity, whereas no conceptual comparison was possible. In view of the interdependence of those factors and the average degree of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, as well as the concept of ‘imperfect recollection’, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 for a significant part of the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, for all the goods covered by the appeal brought before it.
56      The applicant submits that, due to errors in the assessment of the semantic content of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal made several errors in its assessment of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark and the overall likelihood of confusion.
57      In the first place, the applicant argues that, given the meaning which the marks at issue in its view have, inter alia, for the English-speaking public, the Board of Appeal should have applied the neutralisation theory. The applicant claims that, in the present case, the conditions for the application of that principle are satisfied, since the word element of the earlier mark GUSTONI has a sufficiently clear and specific semantic meaning for the relevant English-speaking public, who will immediately understand that word as referring to ‘taste’ or to something ‘tasty’. Consequently, the conceptual difference with the mark applied for offsets, in the applicant’s view, the visual and phonetic similarities, thereby ruling out any likelihood of confusion. In support of its argument, the applicant refers to four decisions, both of the General Court and of EUIPO, in which the conceptual difference was such as to neutralise the visual and phonetic similarities between the signs at issue.
58      In the second place, and in the alternative, the applicant considers that the Board of Appeal reached an incorrect conclusion with regard to the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.
59      First, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal did not correctly assess the low degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark or the distinctiveness of the mark applied for. The applicant states that the earlier mark GUSTONI has a low degree of inherent distinctiveness, which is apparent from the fact that the word ‘gustoni’ originates from the Latin ‘gustus’ and is understood as referring to ‘taste’ or to something ‘tasty’ for the Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian public, in connection with the foodstuffs covered by that mark. The applicant also submits that there is no direct relationship between the word ‘gust’ included in the mark applied for, indicating a ‘sudden strong wind’, and the foodstuffs covered by the application for registration. Therefore, in its view, the mark applied for has inherent distinctiveness. It adds that the mark applied for also enjoys a strong reputation on the EU market because the applicant has been using it intensively for several years.
60      Second, according to the applicant, in view of the principle of the interdependence of factors in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it is apparent from the visual, phonetic and conceptual differences between the signs at issue, from the low degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark and from the inherent distinctiveness of the mark applied for, on the market, that the marks at issue are different overall, which is not called into question by the similarity, or even identity, of the goods covered by those marks.
61      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
62      In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging that the Board of Appeal failed to apply the ‘neutralisation theory’, it must be stated that, in order to be able to apply that theory, it is necessary that the marks at issue have conceptual differences. In that regard, it follows from the case-law that the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies that conceptual differences between two signs may counteract phonetic and visual similarities between them, provided that at least one of those signs has, from the point of view of the relevant public, a clear and specific meaning, so that the public is capable of grasping it immediately (judgments of 18 December 2008, Les Éditions Albert René v OHIM, C‑16/06 P, EU:C:2008:739, paragraph 98, and of 14 October 2003, Phillips-Van Heusen v OHIM – Pash Textilvertrieb und Einzelhandel (BASS), T‑292/01, EU:T:2003:264, paragraph 54).
63      In the present case, it is sufficient to note, as has already been observed, that neither of the marks at issue has a clear and specific meaning for the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public, and that the applicant’s line of argument concerning the alleged conceptual differences is based on an incorrect definition of the public in relation to which the likelihood of confusion must be assessed.
64      Consequently, the applicant’s line of argument concerning the neutralisation theory must be rejected.
65      In the second place, as regards the applicant’s line of argument based on an incorrect assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it should be noted that a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (see judgment of 18 September 2024, Richards Brothers Group v EUIPO – Masia Puigmoltó (EL CABRÓN), T‑1168/23, not published, EU:T:2024:628, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
66      It should also be noted that the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion (judgment of 11 November 1997, SABEL, C‑251/95, EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24).
67      In so far as the applicant’s complaints challenging the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion are also based, first, on the alleged low degree of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark according to the perception of the English-, Italian-, French-, Spanish-, Portuguese- or Romanian-speaking public and, second, on an alleged conceptual difference between the marks at issue in relation to all of that public, those complaints must be rejected on the same grounds as those set out in paragraph 63 above.
68      Furthermore, the alleged reputation of the mark applied for and its distinctiveness cannot call into question that conclusion, since they are irrelevant for the purposes of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, as EUIPO rightly observes. It is only the enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark which is relevant in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, because its distinctiveness determines the scope of protection of that mark (see judgment of 14 May 2025, Biogena v EUIPO – ACRAF (BIOGENA MOMENTS), T‑418/24, not published, EU:T:2025:491, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
69      In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments challenging the Board of Appeal’s global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
70      It follows that the second plea, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 41 of the Charter
71      By its first plea, the applicant submits that the comparison of the signs at issue that was carried out by the Board of Appeal is vitiated by a lack of impartiality. In essence, it submits that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 41 of the Charter, first, in so far as it reached a conclusion on the distinctiveness of the earlier mark at issue before comparing the signs at issue; second, in that it failed to take into account, in the contested decision, the applicant’s arguments concerning the relevant public and territory; and, third, in so far as it adopted the scenario that was the most favourable to the opponent by taking into consideration the perception of the signs at issue by the relevant public that was ‘more prone to confusion’. Accordingly, in the applicant’s view, the contested decision is in breach of the principle of impartiality enshrined in Article 41(1) of the Charter.
72      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
73      It follows from Article 41(1) of the Charter that ‘every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’. According to the case-law, under that principle, it falls to the administration to examine all the relevant particulars of a case with care and impartiality and to gather all the factual and legal information necessary to exercise its discretion and to ensure the proper conduct and effectiveness of proceedings which it sets in motion (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 June 2016, AF Steelcase v EUIPO, T‑652/14, not published, EU:T:2016:370, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
74      As regards the first complaint, in paragraph 47 of the contested decision the Board of Appeal noted that the earlier mark had no meaning in relation to the goods at issue and ‘[was], therefore, distinctive for the part of the relevant public under analysis’, before comparing the marks at issue.
75      In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant has not demonstrated how the Board of Appeal, by assessing the distinctiveness of the earlier mark as early as paragraph 47 of the contested decision, even if that assessment were premature, disregarded the duty of impartiality.
76      With regard to the second complaint, it should be noted that, as stated in paragraphs 36 and 37 above, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment by endorsing the Opposition Division’s approach of basing its assessment on the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania.
77      Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in stating, in paragraph 31 of the contested decision, that the applicant did not dispute that approach. It is apparent from the statement of grounds of appeal before the Board of Appeal, dated 29 September 2024, that, although the applicant generally disputed the perception of the marks at issue by the relevant public, it did not, however, dispute the Opposition Division’s choice to base its assessment on the Finnish, Hungarian and Lithuanian public.
78      For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal duly took into account the applicant’s arguments concerning the public’s perception and responded to those arguments in paragraphs 52 to 55, 58, 59, 66 and 67 of the contested decision.
79      As regards the third complaint, alleging that the Board of Appeal took into account a part of the relevant public that was ‘more prone to confusion’, it is sufficient to recall, as already stated in paragraphs 27 to 37 above, that the Opposition Division’s approach, as with the Board of Appeal’s choice, whereby they based their assessment on the public in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, was fully consistent with the case-law on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
80      It follows that the applicant’s arguments put forward in support of its first plea cannot be regarded as demonstrating that the Board of Appeal acted in breach of its duty of impartiality and must, therefore, be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
81      In view of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
Costs
82      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
83      Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener.
84      By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is held, EUIPO must, in the absence of a hearing, be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.      The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
2.      Deutsche Transnational Trustee Corporation, Inc. shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by dennree GmbH.
3.      The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs.
Luxembourg, 20 April 2026.
V. Di Bucci
S. Kingston
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.