JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
3 December 2025 (*)
[Text rectified by order of 2 February 2026]
( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark NOOKA YOUR SPACE – Earlier EU word mark NOKIA – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )
In Case T‑617/24,
Nokia Oyj, established in Helsinki (Finland), represented by M. Alhonnoro, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by A. Ringelhann, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Nooka Space Ltd, established in Cork (Ireland), represented by A.-M. Baciu, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),
composed of N. Półtorak, President, G. Hesse (Rapporteur) and I. Dimitrakopoulos, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Nokia Oyj, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 1 October 2024 (Case R 585/2024‑2) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2        On 7 February 2022, the intervener, Nooka Space Ltd, filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:
3        The mark applied for covered goods and services in Classes 9, 35, 38, 42 and 45 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 9: ‘Downloadable software application for reserving and booking office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment; downloadable software application for accessing a website where users can post ratings, reviews, and recommendations on real estate listings, temporary accommodations, office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment; downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application used to access a searchable database in the field of rental of office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment; downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application used to access guides and reviews of services providers in the field of rental of office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment’;
–        Class 35: ‘Office functions [such as appointment scheduling services, reminder services, data search in computer files for others, computerized file management, document and file management services, and telephone switchboard services]; office machines and equipment rental; rental of office equipment in co-working facilities’;
–        Class 38: ‘Providing online chat rooms, instant messaging services, and electronic bulletin boards in relation to the rental of office facilities, office space, coworking facilities and office equipment; Providing online electronic bulletin boards and forums for transmission of messages and photos among computer users in relation to services provided in the field of office spaces, office facilities, office and co-working space rentals and office equipment’;
–        Class 42: ‘Providing online non-downloadable computer software for uploading, manipulating, storing and sharing photographs, graphics, video, and other multimedia over the internet to be used in relation to the rental of office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment; provision of Internet search engines with information in relation to the rental of office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment; platform as a service (PaaS) services featuring computer software for accessing, browsing, and searching online databases with information relation to the rental of office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment; computer services, namely, creating an online community for registered users to participate in discussions, get feedback from other users, and form virtual communities with respect to the activity of renting office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment; providing online non-downloadable computer software for reserving and booking office space, office facilities, co-working space and office equipment; platform as a service (PaaS) services featuring computer software for accessing, monitoring, tracking, searching, saving, and sharing information on office space, office facilities, co-working space and office equipment; software as a service (SaaS) services featuring computer software for accessing, browsing, and searching online databases with information in relation to the rental of office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment; software as a service (SaaS) services featuring computer software for accessing, monitoring, tracking, searching, saving, and sharing information in relation to the rental of office space, office facilities, co-working space and office equipment’;
–        Class 45: ‘Online social networking services with respect to the activity of renting office facilities, office space, co-working facilities and office equipment’.
4        On 29 April 2022, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5        The opposition was based, inter alia, on the EU word mark NOKIA, registered on 29 May 2017 under No 16147902, for goods and services in, inter alia, Classes 9, 35, 37, 38, 42 and 45, consisting of a wide range of electronic devices, software, telecommunications services, construction, maintenance and installation of equipment, as well as technological and security solutions, intended to facilitate communication, data processing and digital interaction in various fields.
6        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
7        On 22 February 2024, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition.
8        On 19 March 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public as to the origin of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.
Forms of order sought
10      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        alter the contested decision by declaring the opposition brought against the mark applied for to be well founded and refusing registration of that mark in respect of all the goods and services concerned;
–        order EUIPO to pay the costs for the proceedings before the Court and the Board of Appeal.
11      EUIPO contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
12      The intervener contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
13      In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
14      The applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the mark applied for, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.
15      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
16      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
17      The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).
The relevant public and territory
18      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal noted that the goods and services concerned were aimed at the general public and professionals with specific professional knowledge or expertise. It stated that the level of attention of the professional public was high, whereas that of the general public could vary from average to high, depending on the price, nature and type of goods and services offered. It also specified that the relevant territory was that of the European Union, in so far as the opposition was based on an EU trade mark. The applicant does not dispute those assessments.
The comparison of the goods and services
19      It is apparent from the contested decision that, like the Opposition Division, the Board of Appeal based its analysis on the assumption that all the goods and services covered by the mark applied for were identical to those covered by the earlier mark, with the exception of mobile phones.
20      That assumption is not disputed, as such, by the applicant.
21      It is therefore in the light of the assumption referred to in paragraph 19 above that the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue must be examined.
The comparison of the signs
22      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs
23      In the present case, the mark applied for is a composite figurative mark. It consists of the letters ‘n’, ‘k’ and ‘a’, two circular figurative elements, namely a black ring, which is the largest element of the sign, and a smaller red circle, as well as the word element ‘your space’.
24      The earlier mark is a word mark consisting of the word ‘nokia’.
25      The Board of Appeal found, in the light of the various elements making up the mark applied for, that that mark could be perceived in several ways. Given that the circular figurative elements are placed between the letter ‘n’ and the letter ‘k’, at the heart of a word, each of them could be perceived as the letter ‘o’, contributing to the formation of the word ‘nooka’ or, if the red circle were not perceived as a letter, the word ‘noka’. Thus, according to the Board of Appeal, the mark applied for could be perceived as ‘nooka your space’, ‘noka your space’ or the ‘possibly unpronounceable’ letter sequence ‘n’, ‘k’ and ‘a’, followed by the expression ‘your space’. It found that, for at least part of the relevant public, the element ‘noka’ or ‘nooka’ had no meaning and was therefore distinctive. The Board of Appeal stated that, even though the element ‘your space’ is written in smaller letters, it remains clearly visible and would therefore not be ignored by that public. In addition, the words ‘your’ and ‘space’ are part of basic English vocabulary and would therefore be understood throughout the European Union. The word ‘your’ corresponds to the possessive form of the pronoun ‘you’ and the word ‘space’ means an ‘empty area’. The expression ‘your space’ would therefore be understood, throughout the European Union, as meaning ‘an empty area belonging to you’. The Board of Appeal concluded that the mark applied for did not contain any element that was more dominant or distinctive than another.
26      As regards the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal found that the word ‘nokia’ did not, as such, have any meaning, even though it was the name of a town in Finland. According to the Board of Appeal, the earlier mark therefore has a normal degree of inherent distinctiveness.
27      The applicant disputes the assessments made by the Board of Appeal in the examination of the distinctive and dominant elements of the mark applied for.
28      First, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal incorrectly assessed the way in which the mark applied for was likely to be perceived by the relevant public. In particular, it criticises the Board of Appeal for having stated that the black ring in the mark applied for may or may not be understood as representing the letter ‘o’. According to the applicant, that black ring will necessarily be perceived as the letter ‘o’ and, although it is the largest element of that mark, the relevant public will not focus its attention on that element specifically, but rather on the whole of the element ‘noka’.
29      In that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 25 above, the Board of Appeal did not rule out the possibility that the letters ‘n’, ‘k’ and ‘a’ and the two circular figurative elements could be perceived by the relevant public as forming the word ‘noka’ and therefore that the black ring would be perceived as the letter ‘o’ contributing to the formation of that word. Consequently, the applicant’s abovementioned argument is not capable of demonstrating that the Board of Appeal incorrectly assessed the way in which the mark applied for was likely to be perceived by the relevant public and must therefore be rejected.
30      Second, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal incorrectly assessed the dominant elements of the mark applied for. According to the applicant, the element ‘noka’ dominates the overall impression created by that mark on account of its larger size, thicker and darker font, striking stylisation and the fact that it is placed at the beginning of that mark. Conversely, the expression ‘your space’ is written in a small font and is placed at the end of the mark applied for. The applicant adds that the letters of the element ‘your space’ are so small that that element is not clearly visible in the normal use of the mark applied for, which the Board of Appeal overlooked when it stated that it would not be ignored.
31      It should be recalled that assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).
32      According to the applicant, the element ‘noka’ alone dominates the image of the mark applied for which the relevant public retains, with the result that the element ‘your space’ is negligible in the overall impression created by that mark.
33      In the present case, it is common ground that the black ring is the largest element of the mark applied for. However, on account of its simplicity and its position between the letters ‘n’ and ‘k’, which give it the appearance of the letter ‘o’, that element is not more dominant than the other elements of that mark.
34      [Text rectified by order of 2 February 2026] In addition, although the size of the letters ‘n’, ‘k’ and ‘a’ and that of the two circular elements forming the element ‘noka’ or ‘nooka’ are larger than the size of the characters forming the element ‘your space’, that latter element is not, contrary to what the applicant claims, negligible (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2022, Nemport Liman İşletmeleri Ve Özel Antrepo Nakliye Ticare v EUIPO – Newport Europe (NEMPORT LİMAN İŞLETMELERİ), T‑18/22, not published, EU:T:2022:815, paragraph 35). Despite that element’s smaller size, the expression ‘your space’ remains clearly visible to the relevant public, with the result that it will not be ignored, as the Board of Appeal correctly noted.
35      Moreover, as the applicant acknowledges, the Board of Appeal must assess the mark applied for as it was filed, irrespective of actual use of that mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 October 2014, Tifosi Optics v OHIM – Tom Tailor (T), T‑531/12, not published, EU:T:2014:855, paragraph 72). In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal cannot be criticised for not having taken into account the possible size of the various elements of the mark applied for in the context of the actual use of that mark.
36      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal correctly found that no element of the mark applied for was more dominant than any other. As a result, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal incorrectly assessed the dominant elements of that mark must be rejected.
37      Third, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal failed to identify the non-distinctive elements of the mark applied for. According to the applicant, the expression ‘your space’ is descriptive and laudatory and therefore devoid of distinctive character in relation to the goods and services concerned.
38      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, inter alia, that the expression ‘your space’ would not be perceived as laudatory by the relevant public in relation to the goods and services concerned, since those goods and services were not directly linked to the concept of ‘space’, given that the word ‘space’ is not the equivalent of the word ‘workspace’.
39      In the present case, it is common ground that, in the context of the mark applied for, the expression ‘your space’ means ‘an empty area belonging to you’. However, according to the applicant, that expression is descriptive or laudatory, given that almost all the goods and services covered by the mark applied for refer to office space or otherwise directly relate to the use of office space. However, it must be stated that, even if that assertion were proven, the applicant has failed to establish that that expression is descriptive or laudatory in relation to the goods and services at issue, in so far as its meaning, namely ‘an empty area belonging to you’, does not allude to offices. The expression ‘your space’ does not directly describe, as such, a characteristic, quality or nature of the goods and services concerned.
40      It is true that, in support of its argument, the applicant referred to examples of marks containing the word ‘space’ or ‘spaces’ which had been refused registration by EUIPO.
41      However, as regards Case R 1844/2021‑2 concerning the international registration designating the European Union in respect of the trade mark OPEN SPACE, it should be borne in mind that the registration of a sign as a mark depends on specific criteria, which are applicable in the factual circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of which is to ascertain whether the sign at issue is caught by a ground for refusal (judgments of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 77, and of 25 April 2018, Romantik Hotels & Restaurants v EUIPO – Hotel Preidlhof (ROMANTIK), T‑213/17, not published, EU:T:2018:225, paragraph 41).
42      In the present case, it is apparent that, contrary to what may have been the case with regard to the international registration designating the European Union in respect of the mark OPEN SPACE, the expression ‘your space’ is neither descriptive nor laudatory in relation to the goods and services at issue.
43      As regards the other examples relied on by the applicant, they consist, as EUIPO notes, of decisions of examiners. In that regard, it should be noted that the Boards of Appeal cannot, in any event, be bound by the decisions of lower-ranking adjudicating bodies of EUIPO (judgment of 18 October 2023, Sports Group Denmark v EUIPO (ENDURANCE), T‑566/22, not published, EU:T:2023:655, paragraph 77).
44      In the light of the foregoing and the reasons given by the Board of Appeal, set out in paragraph 25 above, the Board of Appeal correctly found that no element of the mark applied for was more distinctive than any other. Consequently, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal failed to identify the non-distinctive elements of the mark applied for must be rejected.
45      It follows that the Board did not err in its assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue.
The similarity of the signs
46      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, in the scenario most favourable to the applicant, the marks at issue were visually similar to a very low degree, phonetically similar to a below-average degree and conceptually different.
47      The applicant disputes those assessments. According to the applicant, the element ‘noka’ dominates the visual impression created by the mark applied for and coincides with the earlier mark NOKIA in all its letters placed in the same order, with the exception of the letter ‘i’. In addition, phonetically, the first syllables of the marks at issue are identical and the second syllables are very similar on account of the sound of the letter ‘k’ at the beginning of those marks and the sound of the letter ‘a’. The applicant concludes from that that the element ‘noka’ of the mark applied for is visually and phonetically similar to the earlier mark and that, consequently, those marks have a high degree of overall similarity. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal’s finding as to the conceptual difference between the marks at issue is incorrect, given that it is based on a negligible element of the mark applied for, whereas the dominant element of that mark and that of the earlier mark have no meaning.
48      As regards, first, the visual comparison of the marks at issue, it must be stated at the outset that, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 30 to 36 above, contrary to what the applicant claims, the element ‘noka’ or ‘nooka’ does not dominate the visual impression produced by the mark applied for.
49      Furthermore, it must be stated, as the Board of Appeal found, that the earlier mark is a word mark, whereas the mark applied for is a fanciful figurative mark with a very different structure. That mark includes, inter alia, a black ring and a red circle, which may or may not be interpreted as letters, and the word element ‘your space’. As the Board of Appeal observed, the circular figurative elements of the mark applied for, like the expression ‘your space’, are clearly visible and will be noticed by the relevant public. Those elements therefore play as important a role as the letters ‘n’, ‘k’ and ‘a’ in the visual impression produced by the mark applied for. Accordingly, although both marks contain the letters ‘n’, ‘k’ and ‘a’, and possibly ‘o’, there are, as the Board of Appeal stated, significant differences between them. In particular, the earlier mark contains the letter ‘i’, which has no counterpart in the mark applied for, and the mark applied for contains several figurative and word elements which are unique to it. In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal correctly found that the similarities between the marks at issue were, to a large extent, offset by significant visual differences.
50      In the light of the foregoing and the applicant’s arguments, which are not capable of establishing that the marks at issue are visually similar to a high degree, there are no grounds to object to the Board of Appeal’s finding that those marks are visually similar only to a very low degree.
51      Second, as regards the phonetic comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal took into account the scenario most favourable to the applicant, namely that in which the relevant public would perceive the circular figurative elements of the mark applied for as representations of the letter ‘o’.
52      In that regard, contrary to what the applicant claims, the element ‘noka’ or ‘nooka’ of the mark applied for will not be the only element to be pronounced. It must be held, as the Board of Appeal found, that the element ‘your space’, which is not devoid of distinctive character, will also be pronounced. That element therefore plays a role in the phonetic impression created by the mark applied for and distinguishes it from the earlier mark on account, in particular, of its impact on the length of that mark. In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal correctly found that, if the circular figurative elements of the mark applied for were pronounced like the letter ‘o’, the marks at issue would be phonetically similar to a below-average degree.
53      In the light of the foregoing and the applicant’s arguments, which are not capable of establishing that the marks at issue have a high degree of phonetic similarity, there are no grounds to object to the Board of Appeal’s finding that those marks are phonetically similar to a below-average degree.
54      As regards, third, the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal found that the word ‘nokia’ making up the earlier mark had no meaning and could at most be understood as a reference to the Finnish town of Nokia, whereas, in the mark applied for, the element ‘your space’ would be understood throughout the European Union as meaning an ‘empty area belonging to you’. It concluded from that that the marks at issue were conceptually different.
55      The applicant merely criticises the Board of Appeal for having relied on a negligible element, namely the element ‘your space’. However, for the reasons already set out in paragraphs 30 to 36 above, it cannot be held that that element is negligible.
56      In the light of the foregoing and the applicant’s arguments, which are not capable of establishing the contrary, there are no grounds to object to the Board of Appeal’s finding that the marks at issue are conceptually different.
57      It follows that the Board did not err in its assessment of the similarity of the marks at issue.
The likelihood of confusion
58      The existence of a likelihood of confusion depends on numerous factors, in particular the recognition of the trade mark on the market, the association which can be made with the earlier mark, and the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and between the goods or services in question. The likelihood of confusion must therefore be appreciated globally, taking into account all the relevant factors of the particular case (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson, C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
59      A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
60      The Board of Appeal noted, first of all, that the earlier mark had acquired enhanced distinctiveness through use in relation to mobile phones. However, it found that those goods were dissimilar to all the goods and services covered by the mark applied for. As regards the other goods and services covered by the earlier mark, it found that that mark had a normal degree of inherent distinctiveness. Next, it noted that those other goods and services had been found to be identical to those covered by the mark applied for. Last, it found that the slight similarities between the marks at issue were not sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public, even for identical goods and services.
61      The applicant is of the view, by contrast, that there is a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. First, it submits that the earlier mark is an unusual word which has no meaning in relation to the goods and services concerned and that, accordingly, it has a relatively high or, at the very least, normal degree of inherent distinctiveness. It adds that the earlier mark has acquired enhanced distinctiveness through use in relation to mobile phones. Next, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal attached great importance to the visual comparison of the marks at issue, stating that the choice of the goods and services at issue was primarily made visually. However, the Board of Appeal failed to take into account the fact that, according to the case-law resulting from paragraph 53 of the judgment of 23 September 2011, NEC Display Solutions Europe v OHIM – C More Entertainment (see more) (T‑501/08, not published, EU:T:2011:527), the phonetic impression cannot be overlooked for goods usually sold ‘as seen’. Last, the applicant submits that the element ‘noka’ in the mark applied for is capable of dominating, on its own, the image of that mark which the relevant public will retain, with the result that the marks at issue must be regarded as visually and phonetically highly similar overall. According to the applicant, the relevant public, which is accustomed to variations in logo styles, could easily mistake the mark applied for for a new logo of the applicant.
62      As regards the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, it must be borne in mind that the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion will be. Therefore, marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of their recognition by the public, enjoy broader protection than marks with less distinctive character (see, by analogy, judgments of 11 November 1997, SABEL, C‑251/95, EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24; of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 18; and of 22 June 1999, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, C‑342/97, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 20).
63      In the present case, it is common ground that the word ‘nokia’ does not, as such, have any meaning in relation to the goods and services concerned. However, contrary to what the applicant claims, it cannot be inferred from that fact alone that the earlier mark has a relatively high degree of inherent distinctiveness. The Board of Appeal was therefore correct in finding that the inherent distinctive character of that mark was normal in respect of the goods and services concerned.
64      The Board of Appeal also correctly noted that the enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark, acquired through use, in respect of mobile phones, had no bearing on the present case. As the Board of Appeal stated, those goods are different from the goods and services covered by the mark applied for. As is apparent from paragraph 16 above, in the absence of similarity or identity between the goods and services covered by the marks at issue, the conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 were not satisfied.
65      As regards the importance attached to the visual comparison of the marks at issue, it is true that the Board of Appeal stated that the choice of the goods and services concerned – which, in contrast to the judgment of 23 September 2011, see more (T‑501/08, not published, EU:T:2011:527), were not computers or computer accessories – was primarily made visually and that the visual aspect was therefore of particular importance as regards the perception of those marks. However, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Board of Appeal did not, thereby, disregard the phonetic impression of the marks at issue.
66      It is apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal took into account the very low degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue, the absence of any conceptual similarity between those signs, the normal distinctiveness of the earlier mark and the average to high level of attention of the relevant public, in order to conclude that there was no likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, even for identical goods and services, despite a below-average phonetic similarity between the marks at issue.
67      Moreover, even if, as the applicant submits, the goods concerned can be advertised orally, on radio or by other consumers, that does not invalidate the Board of Appeal’s finding that, given that the goods and services concerned are software and related services, the relevant public is unlikely to order them solely on the basis of the phonetic impression of the marks in question, but will instead refer to their visual appearance as seen in stores, catalogues or on websites.
68      Therefore, it has not been established that, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal overemphasised the visual aspects of the marks at issue to the detriment of the phonetic impression of those two marks.
69      As regards the overall impression created by the mark applied for, it must be borne in mind, as is apparent from paragraphs 30 to 36 above, that even if the relevant public were to interpret the letters ‘n’, ‘k’ and ‘a’ and the two circular figurative elements of that mark as forming the word ‘noka’, that word would not, contrary to what the applicant claims, dominate the image of that mark in the mind of that public, with the result that it would disregard its other elements.
70      It follows that overall, having regard to the fact that the level of attention of the relevant public may vary from average to high, that the goods and services concerned are considered to be identical, that the distinctive character of the earlier mark is normal and that, in the scenario most favourable to the applicant, namely that in which the circular figurative elements of the mark applied for are perceived as representations of the letter ‘o’, the marks at issue are visually similar to a very low degree, phonetically similar to a below-average degree and conceptually dissimilar, the Board of Appeal correctly found that there was no likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
71      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, since the single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, relied on by the applicant in support of its claims is unfounded, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
72      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
73      Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener.
74      Furthermore, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, as no hearing has been organised, be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders Nokia Oyj to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Nooka Space Ltd;
3.      Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.
Półtorak
Hesse
Dimitrakopoulos
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 December 2025.
V. Di Bucci
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.