62023CC0158
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
MEDINA
delivered on 6 June 2024 (
1
)
Case C‑158/23 [Keren] (
i
)
T.G.
v
Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands))
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Asylum policy – Directive 2011/95/EU – Beneficiaries of international protection – Refugees – Article 34 – Access to integration facilities – Obligation to ensure access to integration programmes – Geneva Convention – Article 34 – National legislation imposing on refugees a civic integration obligation – Obligation to attend courses and to bear the costs thereof – Possibility of applying for a loan in order to finance those costs – Obligation to pass an examination within three years – Failure to complete an integration programme within the prescribed period – Obligation to pay a fine – Obligation to repay the loan)
1.
The integration of refugees is an important and complex process which requires efforts to be made by all parties concerned, that is to say, the refugees themselves and the society of the host country. The process of integration encompasses legal, economic, social and cultural aspects. Therefore, it is only natural that international instruments, such as the Geneva Convention, (
2
) impose a legal obligation on contracting States to facilitate the ‘assimilation and naturalisation’ of refugees. (
3
) That obligation was transposed into EU law by Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, (
4
) which provides for an obligation on Member States to ‘ensure access to integration programmes …, or create pre-conditions which guarantee access to such programmes’.
2.
The present request for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceedings between T.G. and the Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (Minister for Social Affairs and Employment, the Netherlands; ‘the Minister’). The dispute concerns the Minister’s decision, first, to impose a fine of EUR 500 on T.G., who is a refugee, for not passing a civic integration examination within the time limit, and, second, to order T.G. to repay a loan of EUR 10000 which had been granted to him by the Netherlands public authorities in order to enable him to finance the costs of civic integration programmes. The reason for that decision was that T.G. had not fulfilled his civic integration obligation within the prescribed period.
3.
Against that backdrop, the referring court asks, in essence, whether and to what extent Member States may impose on beneficiaries of international protection (‘refugees’), (
5
) under the Qualification Directive, an obligation, on pain of a fine, to pass a civic integration examination in due time and to pay the costs of that examination and the related preparation courses. One specific feature of this case is that national civic integration programmes are, in the context of shared competences between the European Union and Member States, both a right for a refugee under EU law and an obligation for a refugee by virtue of national law.
I. Legal framework
A. European Union law
4.
Recitals 3, 4, 12, 13, 15, 16, 40, 41 and 47 of the Qualification Directive are relevant to the present case.
5.
Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, headed ‘Access to integration facilities’, provides:
‘In order to facilitate the integration of beneficiaries of international protection into society, Member States shall ensure access to integration programmes which they consider to be appropriate so as to take into account the specific needs of beneficiaries of refugee status or of subsidiary protection status, or create pre-conditions which guarantee access to such programmes.’
B. Netherlands law
6.
Article 34 of the Qualification Directive was transposed into Netherlands law by the Wet inburgering (‘the Law on civic integration’), which aims to encourage foreign nationals to take responsibility for their own integration. Under Article 3 of that law, in the version applicable at the time of the facts at issue in the main proceedings, refugees are subject to the civic integration obligation in the same way as holders of certain other residence permits, such as long-term residents. In principle, every person subject to the civic integration obligation must pass all parts of the civic integration examination within a period of three years (‘the civic integration period’).
7.
The referring court states that, according to Article 7b of the Law on civic integration, the Minister is to extend that period for civic integration in cases where the person subject to the civic integration obligation cannot be blamed for having exceeded that period or where he or she is attending a literacy course. The Minister may extend the civic integration period in cases where the person subject to the civic integration obligation has made demonstrable efforts to integrate. In certain cases, the Minister may exempt the person concerned from that obligation.
8.
The referring court adds that, as a rule, the costs of national integration programmes are to be borne by the persons subject to the civic integration obligation, who can apply for a loan of up to EUR 10000 for that purpose. The loan can be used for civic integration courses, civic integration examinations and/or literacy courses. Refugees are not required to repay the loan if they pass all parts of the civic integration examination within the civic integration period or if they are exempted or relieved from the civic integration obligation within that period. If they do not fulfil their civic integration obligation or fulfil it too late, they must, in principle, repay the loan in full.
9.
Article 4.16a of the Regeling inburgering (Rules on civic integration) entered into force on 1 January 2022. Under that provision, which applies to persons in the process of repaying their loan on that date, all or part of the loan may be waived. In principle, the Minister will only waive part of the debt if the person subject to the civic integration obligation fulfils that obligation within six months of the expiry of the time limit or is relieved of that obligation within that period. In exceptional cases, the Minister may also partially cancel the debt if the person subject to the civic integration obligation has not fulfilled the civic integration obligation within six months, or may cancel the debt completely.
10.
The period for repayment of the loan may not exceed 10 years, taking into account the debtor’s ability to pay. In case of inability to pay, the Minister may set the amount to be repaid at EUR 0 per month. Any balance remaining after 10 years is to be written off, with the exception of overdue instalments.
11.
Article 31(1) of the Law on civic integration provides that the Minister is to impose an administrative fine on any person subject to the civic integration obligation who has not passed certain parts of the civic integration examination within the three-year period or within the extended period.
12.
Article 32 of that law provides:
‘In the decision imposing the fine referred to in Article 31(1), the Minister shall prescribe a new maximum period of two years within which the person subject to the civic integration obligation must, after notification of the decision imposing the fine, ultimately pass the parts of the civic integration examination referred to in Article 7(2)(b) and (c).’
13.
Under Article 33 of that law:
‘1.   The Minister shall impose an administrative fine on a person subject to the civic integration obligation who has not passed the parts of the civic integration examination referred to in Article 7(2)(b) and (c) within the time limit laid down under Article 32. Article 32 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
2.   If the person subject to the civic integration obligation fails, after the expiry of the period laid down in Article 32, to pass the parts of the civic integration examination referred to in Article 7(2)(b) and (c), the Minister shall impose an administrative fine on that person every two years.’
14.
Article 1(1) of the Beleidsregel boetevaststelling inburgering (Guidelines for the determination of fines in the context of civic integration), in the version applicable at the time of the facts at issue in the main proceedings, lays down the criteria to be taken into account for the purposes of determining the amount of the fine. Those criteria include the number of hours of attendance by the person subject to the civic integration obligation at a civic integration course or a course in Dutch as a second language, the number of times the person concerned has taken parts of the civic integration examination or the State examination in Dutch as a second language, and the number of parts of those examinations that the person has passed. Article 1(2) of the Guidelines states that the amount of the fine is determined on the basis of the table of fines, as set out in the annex to those guidelines.
15.
The Annex to Article 1(2) contains a table according to which the fine is set at EUR 1250 for 0 to 149 hours of lessons attended, EUR 875 for 150 to 299 hours attended and EUR 500 for 300 or more hours attended. Furthermore, an extension to the civic integration period may be granted, in which case no fine is to be imposed. The amount of the fine may be reduced by 20% if one part of the examination is passed, 40% if two parts are passed, 60% if three parts are passed and 80% if four or more parts are passed.
II. The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
16.
T.G., an Eritrean national, arrived in the Netherlands at the age of 17. He subsequently obtained a temporary residence permit issued to persons granted asylum, enabling him to receive international protection in the Netherlands.
17.
On 8 January 2016, when T.G. was 18 years old, the Minister informed him that, as of 1 February 2016, he would be subject to the civic integration obligation under the Law on civic integration. This meant that, in principle, he had to pass all parts of the civic integration examination within a period of three years. The Minister extended that period until 1 February 2020 on the ground that T.G. had been housed in an accommodation centre for a considerable length of time and had undergone training.
18.
Since T.G. did not fulfil his civic integration obligation within the prescribed period, the Minister imposed on him a fine of EUR 500 and ordered the repayment in full of the EUR 10000 loan he had taken out with the Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs (Education Executive Agency, Netherlands).
19.
T.G. lodged an objection against that decision, which was declared to be unfounded by the Minister on 25 February 2021. On 4 November 2021, the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam, Netherlands) dismissed the action brought by T.G. against the decision of 25 February 2021 as unfounded. That court held that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not infringe Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, given that it establishes a scheme offering possibilities for extensions and exemptions. It also enables any loan granted to be repaid on the basis of the individual’s financial capacity. That court found that the principle of proportionality was not infringed, given that the Minister addressed and weighed up all the circumstances in a reasoned manner. According to the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam), the Minister took sufficient account of the personal situation of the applicant in the main proceedings by extending the civic integration period from three to four years and by reducing the amount of the fine. That court did not consider the fine to be too high by reference to the judgment in P and S. (
6
) According to that court, the Minister was not required to waive the fine or the obligation to repay the loan.
20.
On 2 December 2021, that is to say, 1 year and 10 months after the expiry of the civic integration period, T.G. was exempted from the civic integration requirement because, according to the Minister, he had, at that time, made sufficient efforts to complete the civic integration course. That exemption was without prejudice to T.G.’s obligation to pay the fine and repay the loan.
21.
T.G. brought an appeal before the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands), which is the referring court, against the judgment of 4 November 2021.
22.
The referring court asks whether Article 34 of the Qualification Directive precludes the imposition of a civic integration obligation on beneficiaries of international protection – which entails the obligation to pass, on pain of a fine, an examination, in principle within three years – and precludes the costs of integration programmes being borne by the persons subject to that obligation.
23.
As regards, first, the civic integration obligation, the referring court harbours doubts as to whether the judgment in P and S (
7
) is applicable to the present case, since that judgment concerns Article 5(2) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, (
8
) which provides that Member States may impose an integration obligation, whereas no such possibility is available under the Qualification Directive.
24.
Second, in the event that a civic integration obligation may be imposed under EU law, the referring court wishes to know whether a positive right derived from EU law to access integration programmes can ultimately, under national law, lead to a prohibited practice, which may be penalised if that right is not exercised.
25.
Third, as regards the costs of integration programmes, the referring court is of the view that requiring refugees to pay those costs in full is contrary to Article 34 of the Qualification Directive. In that respect, Article 34 of that directive requires Member States to ensure access to integration programmes for all refugees. The referring court adds that the fact that the persons concerned may enter into a payment arrangement does not seem to be relevant, given that the obligation to repay a substantial debt subsists for a period of up to 10 years, which may hinder effective integration in the host Member State.
26.
Fourth, the question arises as to whether the level of the fines and of the loan undermines the attainment of the objective and effectiveness of Article 34 of the Qualification Directive. In that regard, the referring court points out that the national authorities are required to reduce the fine if that is necessary to ensure that it is proportionate. However, the loan, together with the fine, could be regarded as going beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective pursued by that provision, namely to facilitate integration. Certain repayment arrangements could mitigate the effects of those financial penalties. However, T.G. claims in the main proceedings that the measure at issue may act as a disincentive to work, which undermines his integration.
27.
In those circumstances the Raad van State (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)
Must Article 34 of the Qualification Directive be interpreted as precluding a national rule such as that laid down in Article 7b of the [Law on civic integration], pursuant to which [refugees] are placed under the obligation, on pain of a fine, to pass a civic integration examination?
(2)
Must Article 34 of the Qualification Directive be interpreted as precluding a national rule based on the premiss that [refugees] themselves bear the full costs of integration programmes?
(3)
In answering the second question, is it significant that [refugees] can receive a government loan to cover the costs of integration programmes and that that loan is waived if they pass their civic integration examination on time or are exempted from or released from the civic integration obligation in good time?
(4)
If it is permissible, under Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, that [refugees] are obliged, on pain of a fine, to pass a civic integration examination, and that [refugees] bear the full costs of integration programmes, does the amount of the loan to be repaid, whether or not together with the fine, then undermine the achievement of the purpose and useful effect of Article 34 of the Qualification Directive?’
28.
Written observations have been submitted by T.G., the Netherlands Government and the European Commission. Those parties presented oral argument at the hearing on 20 February 2024.
III. Assessment
29.
The present reference for a preliminary ruling raises the question of the extent to which Member States may, under the Qualification Directive, impose on refugees, first, an obligation to pass a civic integration examination, on pain of a fine, and, second, an obligation to bear all or part of the costs of civic integration courses and the related examination.
30.
As a preliminary point, I observe that Netherlands law contains four distinct types of obligations, that is, first, the obligation to take part in civic integration courses, second, the obligation to bear the costs of those courses (for which a loan may be granted), third, the obligation to sit and to pass a civic integration examination (and to pay the fees thereof), and, fourth, the financial obligations that arise in case of failure to pass that examination, namely to pay a fine and to repay the loan.
31.
Since the obligation to attend the civic integration courses entails the obligation to bear the costs thereof, those two obligations go hand in hand and should be analysed together. Chronologically, those two obligations precede the obligation to sit and to pass an integration examination and the financial obligations that arise from failure to pass that examination. Therefore, in this Opinion, I shall examine whether those obligations comply with Article 34 of the Qualification Directive not in the order indicated by the referring court, but rather in their chronological order. Furthermore, by its fourth question, the referring court asks the Court, in essence, to examine whether the abovementioned obligations undermine the effectiveness (effet utile) of that directive. I will address that issue together with the other questions.
32.
Against that background, I will begin by examining the obligation to attend civic integration courses and to bear the costs thereof, which are the subject of the second and third questions, and the first part of the fourth question (Section A). Then, I turn to the obligation to sit and to pass the civic integration examination and the financial obligations arising in case of failure to pass that examination, which are the subject of the first question and the second part of the fourth question (Section B).
A. The obligation to attend civic integration courses and the obligation to bear the costs thereof
33.
By its second and third questions, and the first part of the fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 34 of the Qualification Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires refugees to bear the full costs of civic integration courses, and whether it is of any relevance that refugees may receive a public loan in order to finance the costs of those courses and that the loan is waived if they pass the civic integration examination or have been exempted from the civic integration requirement in good time.
34.
Before answering those questions, I consider it necessary to make some preliminary remarks with respect to the concepts of integration, civic integration courses and integration examinations. Next, since the obligation to take part in those courses entails the obligation to pay for them, I will analyse the compatibility of the former obligation with Article 34 of the Qualification Directive. It is only then that I turn to examining the latter obligation.
1.
Preliminary remarks with respect to civic integration courses and examinations for refugees
35.
At the outset, first, I should point out that, as explained by the referring court, neither the grant nor the maintenance of refugee status depends on the national rules at issue in the main proceedings.
36.
Second, I understand from the referring court’s explanations that, under Netherlands law, the persons subject to the civic integration obligation must, within a period of three years – which may, however, be extended – pass an examination consisting of various tests, including on oral and written skills in the Dutch language, at least A2 level, and on knowledge of Netherlands society. (
9
) The courses appear to be linked to that examination, encompassing thus language courses and knowledge of Netherlands society. (
10
) Therefore, for the purposes of the analysis in the present Opinion, the term ‘civic integration courses’ refers to courses related to knowledge of the host country’s language and society (the ‘civic’ element of that expression), and the same goes for ‘civic integration examination’, which includes an examination of the knowledge of the host country’s language and society. (
11
)
37.
Third, for the purposes of the present Opinion, it is important to distinguish between the concept of third-country national and that of refugee, with only the latter concept falling within the scope of the Geneva Convention and the Qualification Directive. (
12
)‘Where refugees are subsumed into the broader class of “migrants”, the control of their movement is likely to take precedence over meeting their protection needs. As the line between “migrant” and “refugee” blurs, so does the distinction between migration control and refugee protection.’ (
13
)
38.
In that respect, the Court held, in paragraph 48 of the judgment in P and S (
14
) that an obligation to pass a civic integration examination makes it possible to ensure that the third-country nationals concerned acquire knowledge which is undeniably useful for establishing links with the host Member State and that such an obligation, together with a fine, may contribute to the attainment of the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/109. However, given that Article 5(2) of that directive provides that Member States may impose an integration obligation, whereas no such possibility is available under the Qualification Directive, that judgment is not applicable mutatis mutandis to the present case.
39.
In the present case, since T.G. was granted refugee status, this Opinion deals only with the rights granted to refugees. Against that background, the key question is whether Member States, which are under a positive obligation to facilitate the integration of refugees, may impose obligations on refugees with respect to integration measures and, if so, which ones.
2.
Obligation to attend civic integration courses
40.
It appears from the reference for a preliminary ruling that the Netherlands civic integration scheme is regarded, to the extent that it provides for an obligation for the Member States to grant access to integration programmes and a corollary right for refugees to obtain access to such programmes, as a measure transposing Article 34 of the Qualification Directive. (
15
) It is therefore necessary to examine the legal nature of that measure and the requirements of Article 34 of the Qualification Directive in order to establish whether Member States can impose an obligation on refugees to attend civic integration courses.
(a)
Member States enjoy discretion as to whether participation in integration programmes is compulsory or not
41.
It should be noted at the outset that, in the area of freedom, security and justice, the European Union and the Member States share competences, pursuant to Article 4(2)(j) TFEU. (
16
) According to Article 2(2) TFEU, when the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific area, Member States can exercise their competence as long as the Union has not exercised its competence. (
17
) With respect to integration programmes, the EU legislature adopted Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, which imposes on Member States an obligation to ensure access to integration programmes. This obligation follows from the very wording of that provision, which states that ‘Member States shall ensure access to integration programmes’. As a corollary to that obligation, Article 34 of the Qualification Directive confers on refugees a right of access to those programmes. (
18
)
42.
It follows that this provision establishes an obligation for the Member States – and for the Member States alone – to guarantee access to those programmes and, in granting that access, they must take into account the specific needs of refugees. (
19
) Therefore, nothing in the wording of that provision suggests that refugees are required to participate in integration measures. In my view, such a requirement would go beyond what the EU legislature intended. (
20
) In respect of refugees, the Qualification Directive grants a right of access to integration programmes and does not impose a corresponding duty on a refugee. Provided that the exercise of that right is not subject to limitations that run counter to EU law and, in particular, to the Qualification Directive, Member States enjoy discretion as to whether participation in integration programmes is compulsory or not. Subject to that proviso, a Member State may oblige refugees to attend civic integration courses, given that that obligation falls outside the scope of that directive and thus of EU law. (
21
)
43.
The question that arises next is to what extent Article 34 of the Qualification Directive prevents Member States from providing in their national legislation that refugees are obliged to participate in integration programmes, on the ground that such an obligation may undermine the rights attaching to refugee status, including the right to access those programmes.
(b)
Requirements under the Qualification Directive
44.
As the Court has already stated, Member States may not apply national legislation liable to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Qualification Directive and thus deprive that directive of its effectiveness. (
22
) It is important that the national provisions applicable must not be capable of compromising the minimum standards introduced by that directive and, in particular, Article 34 thereof.
45.
According to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. (
23
)
(1) Textual interpretation
46.
With respect to the wording of Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, as I have stated above, (
24
) first, that article provides for an obligation on the Member States to guarantee access to integration programmes and a corollary right for refugees to access those programmes.
47.
With respect to the terms ‘integration’ and ‘facilitation’, it is important to draw a distinction between those two concepts. Integration typically occurs when individuals are able to adopt the cultural norms of the dominant or host culture while maintaining their culture of origin – and is therefore often synonymous with biculturalism – (
25
) whereas the expression ‘facilitation of integration’ should be understood as adopting measures that, among other things, provide refugees with support and counselling, safety, stability, integration programmes, cultural links, language courses or courses for learning culture, national values, fundamental norms, principles and ways of life. (
26
) It follows that the objective of facilitating integration conveys an obligation that lies with the society of the host Member State. Therefore, when Article 34 of the Qualification Directive mentions such facilitation, it imposes an obligation on Member States, which have to take positive measures enabling refugees to integrate. (
27
) Furthermore, that term encompasses not only courses, but the forging of other legal, economic and social, and cultural links and the putting in place of an array of means of support. It follows that integration programmes, which usually take the form of integration courses, is one way, among many others, of facilitating integration. As is apparent from recital 47 of the Qualification Directive, such programmes include, if need be, language training and ‘the provision of information concerning individual rights and obligations relating to [refugees’] protection status in the Member State concerned’. (
28
)
48.
Second, Article 34 of the Qualification Directive provides for an obligation to ‘ensure access to integration programmes’or to ‘create pre-conditions which guarantee access to such programmes’. The expression ‘to create pre-conditions which guarantee access to [integration] programmes’ suggests that Member States are under a positive obligation to establish conditions that ensure that refugees have the opportunity to participate in integration programmes. Notwithstanding the use of the conjunction ‘or’ in that provision, the logical inference is that the obligation to create those pre-conditions is a supplementary obligation to that of ensuring access to integration programmes, and is one which arises if the person concerned needs assistance with accessing those programmes.
49.
Third, Article 34 of the Qualification Directive states that integration programmes must ‘be appropriate so as to take into account the specific needs of refugees’. That obligation entails that, as stated in recital 47, the integration programmes provided to refugees should take into account, as far as possible, the specific needs and particularities of the situation of refugees, including, where appropriate, language training and the provision of information concerning individual rights and obligations relating to their protection status in the Member State concerned.
50.
It follows that, while a literal interpretation of Article 34 of the Qualification Directive obliges Member States to take into account the specific needs of the refugees, it does not make it possible to ascertain whether Member States may impose an obligation on refugees to attend civic integration courses. It is therefore essential to examine the context of this provision and the purpose of the directive.
(2) Contextual interpretation
51.
According to the Court’s case-law, the Qualification Directive must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Geneva Convention and the other relevant treaties referred to in Article 78(1) TFEU as well as with the rights recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). (
29
) Moreover, account should be taken of the case-law with respect to the rights granted by Chapter VII of that directive.
(i) Article 34 of the Geneva Convention
52.
Article 34 of the Qualification Directive transposes, albeit partially, Article 34 of the Geneva Convention into EU law, meaning that the former must be interpreted in the light of that convention provision, but only to the extent that it has been incorporated into EU law. Article 34 of the Qualification Directive must provide a level of protection at least equivalent to that afforded by Article 34 of the Geneva Convention. (
30
)
53.
In that respect, it is clear from the wording of Article 34 of the Geneva Convention that the Contracting States are required, inter alia, to facilitate the assimilation of refugees, as far as possible. The Commentary on the Geneva Convention (
31
) supports the proposition that the Geneva Convention obliges States Parties to provide access to language learning. The term ‘assimilation’ refers to language courses and knowledge of society. Thus, Article 34 of the Qualification Directive must therefore be read as setting a minimum standard of integration into the society of the host Member State.
54.
Furthermore, it follows from the concept of ‘facilitation’ in Article 34 of the Geneva Convention that States must take into account the vulnerabilities of persons with refugee status which are central to that convention. The drafters of the Geneva Convention excluded the imposition of coercion or an obligation on refugees. (
32
) The Office of the UNHCR also stresses that due to the specific vulnerability of refugees, no sanctions should be imposed on refugees who fail to pass a language test. (
33
) The purpose of ‘facilitating integration’ under Article 34 of the Geneva Convention is to enable refugees to enjoy a series of rights attaching to refugee status. It follows that Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, read in the light of the Geneva Convention, is to be interpreted as aiming to promote integration and not to impose restrictions that could hinder that objective. Similarly, that provision is to be interpreted as meaning that, in facilitating integration, the Member States must take into account the vulnerabilities of persons with refugee status and ensure the enjoyment of the rights attaching to that status.
(ii) Right to asylum enshrined in Article 18 of the Charter
55.
Article 18 of the Charter enshrines the ‘right to asylum’. According to the explanations relating to that provision, which must be taken into account when interpreting it, (
34
)‘the text of the Article has been based on [ex Article 63 EC], now replaced by Article 78 [TFEU], which requires the Union to respect the Geneva Convention on refugees’. The explanations therefore suggest, as some academics have argued, that Article 18 of the Charter has no autonomous content, but merely gives effect to the guarantees set out in the Geneva Convention and its Protocol. (
35
)
56.
However, the referral to the Geneva Convention does not mean that Article 18 of the Charter has no added value. To begin with, the right to asylum is not grounded in secondary EU legislation but has been enshrined in primary EU law, and not only as a legal basis enabling the EU legislature to incorporate the Geneva Convention into the EU legal order, but also as a fundamental right. Unlike the Geneva Convention which may be read as merely imposing international obligations upon the Contracting Parties, the Charter gives a fundamental rights dimension to the right of asylum.
57.
In my view, that dimension supports the contention that Article 34 of the Qualification Directive and the other provisions set out in Chapter VII thereof are to be interpreted as laying down rights, since they give concrete expression to Article 18 of the Charter. (
36
) Hence, the fact that it is for the Member States to decide whether to impose on refugees an obligation to attend civic integration courses cannot call into question the right to asylum as such, nor compromise the effectiveness of the rights attaching to refugee status.
58.
Therefore, it seems to me that Article 18 of the Charter serves to strengthen the idea that the right to asylum is, first and foremost, about conferring rights on refugees as opposed to imposing obligations that are capable of compromising the effectiveness of those rights.
(iii) The rights granted by Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive
59.
Account should be taken of the specific nature of Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive. In particular, with respect to the rights granted by Chapter VII of Directive 2004/83, which preceded Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive, the Court has ruled that ‘as those rights conferred on refugees result from the granting of refugee status …, the refugee, as long as he [or she] holds that status, must benefit from the rights guaranteed to him [or her] by Directive 2004/83 and they may be limited only in accordance with the conditions set by Chapter VII of that directive, since Member States are not entitled to add restrictions not already listed there’. (
37
) Since Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive contains provisions that are almost identical to its predecessor’s Chapter VII, that case-law remains relevant. In that respect, the Court has held that a Member State has no discretion as to whether to continue to grant or to refuse a refugee the substantive benefits guaranteed by Chapter VII of Directive 2004/83. (
38
)
60.
Accordingly, it is necessary to ascertain whether the obligation to attend civic integration courses at issue in the main proceedings adds restrictions to the rights attaching to refugee status which are not laid down in Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive and, in particular, whether it affects the access of refugees to integration programmes guaranteed to them by that directive. (
39
)
(3) Teleological interpretation
61.
As I have already pointed out, Member States cannot prevent refugees from having effective access to integration programmes and from enjoying other rights attaching to refugee status. (
40
) Therefore, when Member States impose conditions that refugees must fulfil in order to participate in integration programmes, they must respect the two objectives that Article 34 of the Qualification Directive pursues: first, to ensure access to integration programmes or create pre-conditions which guarantee access to such programmes; second, to take into account the specific needs of refugees.
62.
As regards the first objective, in the travaux préparatoires, the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Commission proposal states that the aim of integration programmes is to provide ‘specific support for disadvantaged groups’‘rather than only allowing them equal access into mainstream employment and education opportunities’. (
41
) Therefore, to the extent that Article 34 of the Qualification Directive constitutes a measure of levelling up of a ‘disadvantaged group’, in order to put that group on a similar level as nationals of the host Member States for the purposes of employment and education opportunities, that measure should be implemented in a way that it effectively allows access to integration programmes. (
42
) Otherwise, such a measure will not reach its levelling-up objective.
63.
With respect to the second objective, under Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, Member States are also ‘to take into account the specific needs of beneficiaries of refugee status’. (
43
) In that regard, recital 47 adds that the specific needs and particularities of the situation of refugees should be taken into account, as far as possible, in the integration programmes provided to them including, where appropriate, language training and the provision of information concerning individual rights and obligations relating to their protection status in the Member State concerned.
64.
Furthermore, in the travaux préparatoires, the Commission stated, inter alia, as regards access to integration facilities and the content of protection under the Qualification Directive, that ‘to ensure the effective exercise of the rights formally granted to beneficiaries of protection, it is necessary to address the specific integration challenges they face’. (
44
) With respect to access to integration facilities, according to the Commission, ‘effective integration opportunities of [refugees] would be significantly enhanced if the different educational and professional backgrounds or other specificities of their situation were adequately taken into account in the integration facilities’. (
45
)
65.
The impact assessment for that proposal cites as examples of such integration programmes ‘introduction programmes and language training courses tailored as far as possible to these specific needs’. (
46
) The reference to ‘appropriateness’ means that Member States ‘have the flexibility to apply the measures they consider most adequate and effective, taking into account relevant factors such as the educational levels and professional backgrounds of the persons concerned, the size and the composition of the communities of beneficiaries of international protection’. (
47
)
66.
It follows, in my view, that the imposition of an obligation on refugees to attend civic integration courses is not in itself a restriction on the right of access to integration programmes and is therefore not precluded by Article 34 of the Qualification Directive. However, in the light of the objective to facilitate integration, those courses should be tailored as far as possible to the needs of refugees and, where appropriate, contribute to the levelling-up of a ‘disadvantaged group’.
(c)
Application to the present case
67.
In the present case, it is beyond doubt that the acquisition of knowledge of the language and society of the host Member State contributes to facilitating the daily exercise of most of the rights guaranteed by the Qualification Directive, in particular as regards access to employment, education, social protection, healthcare or housing. Therefore, attending civic integration courses is likely to facilitate the attainment of the objectives of the Qualification Directive, and to render effective the enjoyment of the rights attaching to refugee status. It follows that an obligation to take part in such courses does not in itself have to be regarded as limiting access to the rights conferred under Chapter VII of that directive and, in particular, under Article 34 thereof.
68.
However, the assessment would be different if, in practice, an obligation to take part in such courses were to restrict or hinder the ability of refugees to exercise their rights and receive the benefits guaranteed by the Qualification Directive. As pointed out by the Commission, this may be the case, for example, if the frequency and duration of lessons, or the workload involved in preparing for those lessons, hinders refugees from working or seeking employment, or hampers their right to education and vocational training. (
48
) The same applies where the integration courses are not adapted to the specific needs of refugees, such as when a refugee is confronted with limited education opportunities or has a poor level of literacy. For the sake of completeness, I should point out that as I will deal with the financial aspect of those courses and examinations in Section B of the Opinion, this consideration does not refer to that aspect.
69.
Therefore, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether the obligation to attend the civic integration courses at issue and, in particular, its practical implementation limits access to the rights conferred by the Qualification Directive and, in particular, those conferred under Chapter VII thereof. In addition, it is for the referring court to determine whether the content and the terms of those courses, which are made mandatory for refugees under national law, takes into account their specific needs. For that purpose, an analysis should be carried out of whether the difficulty and volume of courses are adapted to the specific needs of the refugee, in order to achieve the levelling-up objective referred to above.
3.
Obligation to bear the costs of civic integration courses
70.
The referring court has stated that the scheme provided for in the national legislation at issue is based on the principle that refugees themselves must bear the costs of integration programmes. For that purpose, they can apply for and take out a loan of up to EUR 10000. Refugees are not required to repay the loan if they pass all parts of the civic integration examination within the civic integration period or if they are exempted or relieved from the civic integration obligation within that period. Conversely, if they do not fulfil their civic integration obligation or fulfil it too late, they must, in principle, repay the loan in full.
71.
At the outset, I should point out that, in the present case, T.G. used the entire EUR 10000 in order to attend civic integration courses and to take the examination. At this stage, I shall therefore analyse his specific situation, leaving aside other cases where a person may need fewer courses to pass the examination and, thus, may be paying less in tuition fees.
72.
Under the Qualification Directive, Member States may lay down, in accordance with their national laws, the conditions that must be met in order to fulfil the obligation to attend integration courses, provided that they ensure that refugees have effective access to the integration programmes and the effective enjoyment of the other rights provided for in Chapter VII of that directive. Subject to that proviso, Member States may decide that refugees themselves must bear some or all of the costs entailed by that obligation or that taxpayers must assume those costs. Be that as it may, as I have already stated, (
49
) if a Member State chooses the first option, the conditions imposed by its national law cannot jeopardise the objectives pursued by Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, whereby first, Member States shall ensure access to integration programmes or create pre-conditions which guarantee access to such programmes; second, they must take into account the specific needs of refugees. (
50
)
73.
As to the first objective, to the extent that Article 34 of the Qualification Directive constitutes a measure of levelling up of a ‘disadvantaged group’, in order to put that group on an equal footing with nationals of the host Member State for the purposes of employment and education opportunities, (
51
) the price that refugees must pay for examinations should be fixed at a level that effectively allows access to integration programmes. (
52
) Otherwise, such a measure will not reach its levelling-up objective. (
53
)
74.
Moreover, in fixing that level, it seems to me that the Member State concerned must examine whether the integration programmes at issue are potentially eligible for financing under the European Refugee Fund, (
54
) which became the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) in 2014, (
55
) and, if so, whether that fund is actually used to finance part of those programmes. In the present case, it is for the referring court to establish whether the programmes at issue receive financing from that fund and, if they do, the impact of that financing on the costs of language courses.
75.
Where a Member State requires refugees to bear the costs of integration programmes, which are fixed at a level that effectively allows access to integration programmes, (
56
) the national courts must also look at the payment conditions attaching to those costs. Those conditions may not limit the right of access to those programmes. As stated above, Member States may not apply national legislation liable to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Qualification Directive and thus deprive that directive of its effectiveness. (
57
) It follows that the amount left for refugees to pay should not make the exercise of the right to integration excessively difficult or impossible, since Member States are under the obligation to facilitate integration. Moreover, the amount payable should not have the consequence of interfering with the exercise of other rights under Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive, such as housing, medical care or education. Refugees should not have to compromise those rights in order to be able to pay to fulfil the civic integration obligation.
76.
In that respect, in determining whether a person should bear the costs of integration programmes, national authorities must assess the financial situation of the refugee individually. Such an individual assessment serves to determine the extent to which the refugee should participate financially in paying for integration programmes and examinations. (
58
) In other words, the financial obligation at issue should be imposed in accordance with the financial and social situation of the refugee and not on the basis of whether or not he or she has passed the civic integration examination. If national authorities shift the costs of civic integration programmes to the refugee without taking into account his or her financial and social situation, they fail to ‘create the pre-conditions’ which effectively ‘guarantee access to such programmes’ within the meaning of Article 34 of the Qualification Directive. In my view, the term ‘pre-conditions’ means that such an individual assessment should be carried out at the outset, that is to say before the person starts the integration courses. (
59
)
77.
Furthermore, if the level of tuition fees is too high, the question arises as to whether the Member State has effectively ensured access to integration programmes, by making the refugee pay the fees of civic integration courses. Since the recognition of refugee status creates a right to effective access to integration benefits under the Qualification Directive pursuant to Article 34 thereof, access to integration programmes under onerous financial conditions due to the high costs involved for the refugee does not constitute effective access.
78.
The fact that persons subject to the civic integration obligation can apply for a loan in order to finance the costs of integration programmes does not alter this assessment, since a loan is merely a way of postponing the payment obligation. Furthermore, if interest is charged on the loan, which seems to be the case under national legislation, but which is for the referring court to verify, then the payment obligation covers not just the payment of fees, but also the payment of interest on the loan.
79.
Under the national legislation at issue, even with the grant of a loan to the refugee, the obligation to bear the costs of integration ultimately falls on the refugee. If a refugee does not pass the civic integration examination or does not pass it on time, he or she will have to repay the loan in full and will be left with a high level of debt. Refugees who start their life in the host Member State indebted are likely to find it difficult to integrate into the society of that Member State. Accordingly, there is a risk of a double disadvantage: first, the disadvantage of being part of a vulnerable group as a refugee and, second, the disadvantage of having to pay back a (large) loan for failing to pass the civic integration examination. What is more, if a person fails the integration examination, it is likely to be more difficult for him or her to find a job, which means that refugees who fail the examination are probably the most disadvantaged and vulnerable group of all refugees. That double disadvantage may, in my view, put a refugee into a situation of social exclusion, which puts pressure on public resources and results in financial dependence and loss of dignity for the refugees. (
60
) That is exactly the opposite of what the EU legislature had in mind when it decided that the Member States had to facilitate integration. (
61
) Finally, in the light of the objectives of Article 34 of the Qualifications Directive, the system of billing for integration courses or examinations should not be converted into a punitive mechanism for refugees with bad examination results or into a business opportunity for undertakings which make a profit from those courses and examinations.
80.
In that respect, I observe that T.G. pointed out that the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (‘the ECRI’) (
62
) has expressed concern about a group of refugees who had successfully applied for asylum before 2022, as they continued to be subject to the national legislation at issue and, inter alia, to the obligation to pay the high costs of civic integration tuition and, as the case may be, to the obligation to pay a relatively large fine for non-compliance within the prescribed period. (
63
) Furthermore, the ECRI has concluded that a punitive approach to integration, with significant penalties and the repayment of significant loans, cannot be regarded as a two-way process that would facilitate, support and promote integration.
81.
With respect to the second condition whereby Member States must take into account the specific needs of refugees, (
64
) as stated above, this condition seems to be aimed at the substantive part of the courses, which should, as far as possible, be tailor-made to refugees. In that respect, the cost of the courses inevitably depends on the needs of the refugees. However, the specific amount charged to refugees should not be so high as to restrict effective access to the courses. Moreover, the amount should not be higher for the refugees with learning difficulties, since they would need to take more courses and end up paying more despite being in a particularly vulnerable situation. The approach that the more vulnerable you are, the more courses you need and the more you have to pay should be ruled out.
82.
In the light of the above, I take the view that Article 34 of the Qualification Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which imposes on refugees the obligation to bear the costs of civic integration programmes, without the national authorities having previously carried out an individual assessment of their financial and social situation, on the ground that that obligation is incompatible with the obligation to ensure access to integration programmes and does not create pre-conditions which guarantee access to those programmes. In any case, the costs – if imposed – must not be so high as to deprive the right of access to integration programmes of its effectiveness.
B. The obligation to sit and to pass a civic integration examination and the penalties for failing to do so
83.
By its first question and the second part of the fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 34 of the Qualification Directive must be interpreted as precluding a national rule according to which refugees are placed under the obligation, on pain of a fine, to pass a civic integration examination.
1.
Compatibility of the integration examination with the Qualification Directive
84.
As mentioned above, Article 34 of the Qualification Directive does not expressly prevent Member States from obliging refugees to participate in civic integration programmes and to take integration courses. Furthermore, those courses may lead to an examination and that provision does not prevent Member State from obliging refugees to sit civic integration examinations. (
65
) Viewed from that perspective, it is necessary to examine whether the obligation at issue in the main proceedings to sit and to pass an examination affects the access of refugees to integration programmes or other rights guaranteed to them by the Qualification Directive. (
66
) However, before analysing the distinction between sitting an integration examination and passing that examination, I shall assess the relevance of the case-law relating to the compatibility of integration examinations with other directives applicable to third-country nationals.
(a)
Case-law on integration examinations with respect to other directives
85.
First, in P and S, (
67
) the Court held that Directive 2003/109 does not preclude national legislation which imposes on third-country nationals who already possess long-term resident status the obligation to pass a civic integration examination, on pain of a fine, provided that the means of implementing that examination are not liable to jeopardise the achievement of the objectives pursued by that directive, which was a matter for the referring court to determine.
86.
In support of that conclusion, the Court pointed out, inter alia, that, as regards the obligation to pass the civic integration examination, ‘it cannot be disputed that the acquisition of knowledge of the language and society of the host Member State greatly facilitates communication between third-country nationals and nationals of the Member State concerned and, moreover, encourages interaction and the development of social relations between them. Nor can it be contested that the acquisition of knowledge of the language of the host Member State makes it less difficult for third-country nationals to access the labour market and vocational training’. (
68
)
87.
The Court also emphasised that, since the obligation to pass an examination ‘ensures that the third-country nationals concerned acquire knowledge which is undeniably useful for establishing connections with the host Member State, it must be held that such an obligation does not, by itself, jeopardise the achievement of the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/109, but may on the contrary contribute to their achievement’. (
69
)
88.
Second, in K and A, (
70
) the Court held, in the same vein, that Directive 2003/86 does not preclude Member States from requiring third-country nationals to pass a civic integration examination. It held that the requirement to pass a civic integration examination at a basic level is capable of ensuring that the nationals of third countries acquire knowledge which is undeniably useful for establishing connections with the host Member State.
89.
It is true that the considerations set out in the judgment in P and S (
71
) and K and A (
72
) cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to the present case. The first judgment concerns only third-country nationals who applied for long-term resident status under Directive 2003/109, (
73
) which recognises a right to long-term resident status for third-country nationals who have resided for a period of five years in the territory of a Member State and which, in Article 5(2), explicitly allows Member States to adopt integration conditions for the purposes of acquiring such a status. The second judgment concerns Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/86, which allows Member States to require third-country nationals to comply with integration measures, in accordance with national law, for the purposes of family reunification under that directive. By contrast, there is no provision in the Qualification Directive equivalent to those two provisions. In that respect, as is apparent from Article 13 of the Qualification Directive, Member States are required to grant refugee status where the conditions laid down in Chapters II and III of that directive are met. Integration is not a requirement for obtaining refugee status. Moreover, it follows from recital 12 of the Qualification Directive that the main aim of the provisions of that directive is not to ensure the integration of refugees as such, but to guarantee the application of common criteria for the identification of persons in need of international protection and a minimum level of benefits for those persons in all Member States (uniform status). (
74
)
90.
That being said, the Court’s considerations in those two cases concerning the usefulness and necessity of acquiring knowledge of the language and society of the host Member State for the purposes of accessing the labour market and educational system are, in principle, universal and may be applied to all third-country nationals, regardless of their status. Those considerations are thus valid with respect to refugees. Since, unlike the provisions of Directives 2003/109 and 2003/86, Article 34 of the Qualification Directive contains a right of access to integration programmes, a distinction should be drawn between the obligation to sit an integration examination and the obligation to pass such examination.
(b)
Obligation to sit an integration examination
91.
If a refugee has a right of access to integration programmes, an obligation to take civic integration courses and to sit an examination may to a certain extent promote the acquisition of the knowledge acquired during those courses and thereby facilitate integration. For the refugee, preparing for an examination makes a person assimilate knowledge and motivates him or her to put in some extra effort. For the Member State, organising examinations is a way to assess whether a person has assimilated the knowledge provided at a course. Thus, carrying out examinations may be a useful tool to measure and to monitor the effectiveness of the courses – even more so if those courses are funded by public resources. In addition, it may be a useful tool to enable the Member States to gather feedback about the integration skills and knowledge not only of refugees as a group, but also of refugees individually, as means of providing them with more tailor-made solutions.
92.
Therefore, I would argue that the participation in examinations in the context of integration courses may contribute to the learning process and thus facilitate the integration of refugees. I take the view that, in such a case, the fact that Member States require refugees to sit an examination at the end of the programme is not in itself such as to compromise the attainment of the objectives of the Qualification Directive, provided that the deadline for the examinations and the required workload do not affect the effective enjoyment of the other rights and benefits guaranteed by the Qualification Directive. In that respect, it is important to note that the referring court should also assess whether the obligation to sit the examination within three years, as is currently the case under the national legislation at issue, is appropriate, taking into account aspects, such as, first, the content, the amount and the relevance of the knowledge imparted at the courses, second, the capacity of the person concerned to assimilate that knowledge, third, the time needed to acquire that knowledge, and, fourth, whether the examination itself is structured and organised in a way that the person sitting it is able to demonstrate the knowledge acquired.
93.
However, unlike the provisions of Directives 2003/109 and 2003/86, Article 34 of the Qualification Directive contains an obligation for Member States to tailor integration programmes as far as possible to the needs of refugees, (
75
) which means that, if Member States decide to hold such examinations, the content of and the deadlines for them should be adapted to those needs, which might require adjustments to be made to examination methods.
94.
It follows that the obligation to sit an examination may be a means to ensure that the person concerned acquires knowledge which, for refugees, is undeniably useful for establishing connections with the host Member State. Therefore, it can be held that the obligation to sit an examination does not, by itself, jeopardise the achievement of the objectives pursued by the Qualification Directive, but may on the contrary contribute to their achievement. (
76
) However, taking into account the objective of the examination as mentioned above, the examination fee should, in my view, be waived for the refugees. Although, in the present case, sitting the examination on a single occasion costs EUR 290, the amount spent will increase in the event of resits, (
77
) which probably means that refugees in that situation will have less resources available to exercise other rights under Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive.
95.
In that respect, it is important to note that the Court held in the judgments in the two abovementioned cases – P and S (
78
) and K and A (
79
) – that the amount of the fees for the civic integration examination was liable to jeopardise, respectively, the attainment of the objective of integration of third-country nationals under Directive 2003/109 and the exercise of the right to family reunification under Directive 2003/86, depriving those directives of effectiveness. (
80
) The issue in those two cases was the payment of a fine penalising failure to comply with the obligation to pass the civic integration examination, in addition to payment of the costs incurred in relation to the examinations sat. Those rulings are therefore relevant for refugees, who may struggle to pay examination fees once or several times. Since the right of access to integration programmes is a right conferred on refugees by the Qualification Directive, a fee for sitting an examination deprives Article 34 of its effectiveness.
(c)
Obligation to pass an integration examination
96.
With respect to the obligation to pass an integration examination, Netherlands law essentially provides that refugees are required to pass an examination testing their knowledge of Dutch language and society within a certain deadline.
97.
It should be observed that, in its case-law, the Court has dealt with integration pre-conditions for acquiring long-term residents’ status and for the right to exercise the right to family reunification. (
81
) However, in the present case, integration examinations can only be regarded as a means of enhancing the person’s skills and knowledge within the exercise of that person’s rights under Article 34 of the Qualification Directive. As mentioned above, the obligation to sit and to pass civic integration examinations has no bearing on the acquisition of refugee status. Consequently, as stated by the Commission, on this point, considerations stemming from the case-law relating to Directives 2003/109 and 2003/86 cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to the Qualification Directive.
98.
An obligation to pass an examination implies that there is a pass mark to achieve in order to be successful at the examination. In the context of the Qualification Directive, the imposition of such a pass mark may not create a situation that renders the right of access to integration programmes – and to complete those programmes successfully – excessively difficult or impossible. The consequences stemming from the failure to comply with the obligation to achieve a pass mark in a test may be demotivating or alienating to refugees, thus hinder their integration in a practical sense.
99.
In its Note on the Integration of Refugees in the European Union, the UNHCR emphasised that the introduction of stringent language tests and examinations on the history and culture of the host country may penalise certain categories of refugees, in particular the elderly or illiterate persons. (
82
)
100.
In the light of those considerations, under Article 34 of the Qualification Directive, Member States are not, in my view, entitled to require refugees to reach a certain pass mark in integration examinations as proof of integration. Consequently, the fact that a Member State imposes an obligation to pass an examination on the knowledge of the language or society of the host Member State cannot be regarded as a measure contributing to the attainment of the objectives of that directive.
101.
Furthermore, the requirement to pass an integration examination necessarily implies, in order to ensure that the pass is mandatory, I assume, the imposition of a penalty (whether of a financial or other nature). I will deal with that aspect next.
2.
The penalties: obligation to pay the fine and obligation to repay the loan
102.
There are two aspects to the system of penalties. First of all, failure to pass the integration examination attracts a fine of up to EUR 1250, the imposition of which may be repeated by the Minister. However, in the present case, the Minister imposed on T.G. a fine of EUR 500 and there is no mention in the file of that fine being imposed again. Therefore, the present case is not concerned with the maximum amount of the fine or with its repeated imposition. Secondly, there is an obligation to repay the loan up to a maximum of EUR 10000. Whilst it is not classified by the national court as a ‘penalty’, it may become one if the refugee fails to pass the integration examination in due time and, in those circumstances, it acquires a punitive character. These two ‘penalties’ coexist and are imposed cumulatively. In the present case, T.G. has in fact been exempted from his integration obligation since December 2021 in view of the efforts he has made, but those two financial penalties remain.
103.
At the outset, I should recall that, as the UNHCR also emphasises, due to the specific vulnerability of refugees, no penalties should be imposed on persons who fail to pass an integration examination. The drafters of the Geneva Convention expressly did not intend to impose coercion or an obligation on refugees. (
83
) The absence of coercion should be the guide when interpreting Article 34 of the Qualification Directive. (
84
) In particular, the absence of coercion means that measures which seek to facilitate integration cannot have a punitive nature.
104.
With respect to the obligation to repay the loan, Article 34 of the Qualification Directive obliges Member States to ‘create pre-conditions’ which guarantee that refugees have access to integration programmes. Therefore, the obligation to bear the costs of civic integration courses and examinations where a refugee fails to pass the civic integration examination within the prescribed time limit has a punitive nature and, as such, undermines the objective pursued by that provision. The most vulnerable refugees who do not succeed in passing the examinations on time are among the persons most affected by that punitive measure. (
85
)
105.
The fact that refugees may enter into a payment scheme which takes into account their ability to pay is of lesser importance in this respect. In those circumstances, the obligation to repay a significant debt remains in place for up to 10 years, which may actually hinder effective integration in the Member State. As stated by the ECRI, a punitive approach to integration, by means of penalties and the repayment of large loans, cannot be regarded as a process that would facilitate, support and promote integration. (
86
)
106.
In addition, the imposition of such a fine on refugees necessarily leads to a reduction in their financial resources, which may have a negative impact on the exercise of their rights set out in Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive, in particular if their financial resources are already limited.
107.
As stated by the Commission, the imposition by a Member State of an obligation to pass a integration examination, on pain of a fine, could discourage third-country nationals from applying for international protection in the Member State concerned or lead to secondary movements to Member States which do not impose such an obligation. However, one of the objectives of the Qualification Directive is to contribute to limiting secondary movements between Member States, as is apparent from recital 13 of that directive.
108.
In any event, if the Court were to decide that a fine penalising failure to comply with the obligation to pass the civic integration examination may be imposed, the amount of EUR 500 appears to be disproportionate and therefore contrary to EU law. (
87
)
109.
For those reasons, I consider that the imposition by a Member State of an obligation requiring refugees to pass an integration examination, on pain of having to repay a loan and receiving a fine, jeopardises the attainment of the objectives of the Qualification Directive and undermines the effectiveness of Article 34 thereof.
IV. Conclusion
110.
In the light of the above considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands) as follows:
The provisions of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, and, in particular, Article 34 thereof,
must be interpreted as
–
not precluding national legislation which requires refugees to attend civic integration courses, provided that that obligation does not limit access to the rights conferred on them by that directive and, in particular, by Chapter VII thereof, and takes account of their specific needs;
–
precluding national legislation which imposes on refugees the obligation to bear high costs of integration programmes, without the national authorities having previously carried out an individual assessment of their financial and social situation, on the ground that that obligation is incompatible with the obligation to ensure access to integration programmes and does not create pre-conditions which guarantee access to those programmes;
–
not precluding national legislation which requires refugees to sit a civic integration examination covering oral and written skills in the official language of the host Member State and knowledge of the society of that Member State; and
–
precluding national legislation which requires refugees to pass such an examination, on pain of having to repay a loan and receiving a fine, as it jeopardises the attainment of the objectives of Directive 2011/95 and undermines the effectiveness of Article 34 thereof.
(
1
)	Original language: English.
(
i
)	The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.
(
2
)	The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 150, No 2545 (1954)), entered into force on 22 April 1954. It was supplemented and amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, concluded in New York on 31 January 1967, which entered into force on 4 October 1967 (‘the Geneva Convention’).
(
3
)	Article 34 of that convention, headed ‘Naturalisation’, states that ‘the Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalisation proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings’.
(
4
)	Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).
(
5
)	Whilst the reference for a preliminary ruling and the questions that it contains refer to ‘beneficiaries of international protection’, as is apparent in that reference, T.G. holds the status of refugee and it does not seem necessary to analyse the situation of the subsidiary protection holders in the present Opinion. The first subparagraph of Article 1(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention provides that the term ‘refugee’ is to apply to any person who, ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country’. That definition has been incorporated in Article 2(d) of the Qualification Directive.
(
6
)	Judgment of 4 June 2015 (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369).
(
7
)	Judgment of 4 June 2015 (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369, paragraph 48).
(
8
)	OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44.
(
9
)	Article 7(2) of the Law on civic integration.
(
10
)	See Article 16 of the Law on civic integration.
(
11
)	Professor Grahl-Madsen states, inter alia, that ‘[w]hat it meant in Article 34 is in fact the laying of foundations, or stepping stones, so that the refugee may familiarise himself with the language, customs and way of life of the nation among whom he lives, so that he - without any feeling of coercion - may be more readily integrated in the economic, social and cultural life of his country of refuge’(see United Nations High Commission for Refugees [‘the UNHCR’] Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 (Articles 2-11, 13-37), October 1997, p. 146).
(
12
)	See, in particular, recitals 3, 4 and 15 of the Qualification Directive.
(
13
)	Feller, E., former Assistant High Commissioner for Protection with the UNHCR.
(
14
)	Judgment of 4 June 2015 (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369).
(
15
)	See paragraph 4 of the order for reference.
(
16
)	Article 67(2) TFEU provides that the European Union shall frame a common policy on, inter alia, asylum. Moreover, Article 78(1) TFEU provides that the Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, which is in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Article 78(2) TFEU adds that, for that purpose, the EU legislature is to adopt measures.
(
17
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2013, Panellinios Syndesmos Viomichanion Metapoiisis Kapnou (C‑373/11, EU:C:2013:567, paragraph 26).
(
18
)	See, to that effect, recitals 12 and 40 and Article 23(2) of the Qualification Directive, and judgments of 24 June 2015, T. (C‑373/13, EU:C:2015:413, paragraphs 95, 96 and 97), and of 14 May 2019, M and Others (Revocation of refugee status) (C‑391/16, C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, EU:C:2019:403, paragraphs 91 and 99).
(
19
)	See, in particular, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection (COM(2001) 0510 final). With respect to Article 31 (which became Article 34 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (OJ 2004 L 304, p. 12)), the Commission explains that it is ‘necessary to provide specific support for disadvantaged groups, including many refugees, rather than only allowing them equal access into mainstream employment and education opportunities’.
(
20
)	By contrast, in its Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (COM/2016/0466 final), the legislature introduced a provision allowing Member States to make the participation of beneficiaries of international protection in integration measures mandatory (Article 38(2) of that proposal).
(
21
)	See, by way of analogy, judgments of 24 October 2013, Drozdovs (C‑277/12, EU:C:2013:685, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited), and of 14 September 2017, Delgado Mendes (C‑503/16, EU:C:2017:681, paragraph 47).
(
22
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2015, P and S (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369, paragraph 45). See also, Article 4(3) TEU, from which it follows that it is the duty of Member States to take any appropriate measure to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Qualification Directive and to refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of that directive. See, by analogy, judgments of 4 March 2010, Chakroun (C‑578/08, EU:C:2010:117, paragraph 43), with respect to family reunification, and of 28 April 2011, El Dridi (C‑61/11 PPU, EU:C:2011:268, paragraphs 53 to 55), with respect to immigration and illegal stays.
(
23
)	Judgment of 10 September 2014, Ben Alaya (C‑491/13, EU:C:2014:2187, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
(
24
)	See points 41 and 42 above.
(
25
)	Berry, J.W., ‘Acculturation and adaptation in a new society’, International Migration, Vol. 30, 1992, pp. 69 to 85.
(
26
)	Academics have proposed a conceptual framework for integration, grouped into four key areas: (i) Foundational: refugee status, access to rights, and citizenship; (ii) Functional: access to housing, health, social security, decent work, financial services and education; (iii) Social: social connections and bonds within the host community, social bridges, networks, social links; (iv) Facilitation: language, training, counselling, cultural knowledge, safety, and stability. See Ager, A., and Strang, A., ‘Understanding integration: A conceptual framework’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 21, 2008, pp. 166 to 191; https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article/21/2/166/1621262. Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive gives concrete expression to some of those areas in the form of rights granted to refugees.
(
27
)	In human rights law, a distinction may be drawn between obligations to respect, obligations to protect and obligations to implement rights, although that distinction is not well-settled. Article 34 of the Qualification Directive falls in the third category. Alternatively, a distinction may be drawn between positive and negative obligations.
(
28
)	See also the Explanatory Memorandum to the original proposal for Directive 2004/83, cited in footnote 19, where the Commission refers to Guideline No 7 of the Employment Guidelines for 2001 (Council Decision 2001/63/EC of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States’ employment policies for the year 2001 (OJ 2001 L 22, p. 18)) whereby ‘programmes designed to facilitate the integration of refugees into the society of the Member State could for instance include’ a ‘tailor made plan of action’ regarding ‘employment and education’, ‘language courses’, ‘basic and advanced training courses’, ‘measures aimed at promoting self-maintenance’, ‘events organised to provide an introduction to the history and culture of the Member State’, and ‘events arranged jointly with citizens of the Member State to promote mutual understanding’.
(
29
)	See, inter alia, judgment of 9 November 2021, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Maintaining family unity) (C‑91/20, EU:C:2021:898, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
(
30
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2019, M and Others (Revocation of refugee status) (C‑391/16, C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, EU:C:2019:403).
(
31
)	Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951, Articles 2-11, 13-37, published by the Division of International Protection of the UNHCR, 1997, p. 146.
(
32
)	See Professor Grahl-Madsen’s commentary cited in footnote 11.
(
33
)	See UNHCR, Note on the Integration of Refugees in the European Union, May 2007, available at: https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/unhcr/2007/en/41624.
(
34
)	See Article 52(7) of the Charter.
(
35
)	Lock, T., ‘Article 18 CFR’, in Manuel Kellerbauer, Marcus Klamert, and Jonathan Tomkin (eds), The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, p. 2154.
(
36
)	It is important to note that recital 16 states that the Qualification Directive seeks to ‘ensure full respect for human dignity and the right to asylum of applicants for asylum and their accompanying family members and to promote the application of Articles 1, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 34 and 35 of that Charter, and should therefore be implemented accordingly’.
(
37
)	Judgment of 24 June 2015, T. (C‑373/13, EU:C:2015:413, paragraph 97).
(
38
)	Ibid., paragraph 95.
(
39
)	Ibid., paragraph 98.
(
40
)	See point 44 above.
(
41
)	See Article 31 of the Explanatory Memorandum cited in footnote 19.
(
42
)	See point 44 above.
(
43
)	See also recital 41 of the Qualification Directive.
(
44
)	Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the protection granted (SEC(2009) 1373) (SEC(2009) 1374)/(COM(2009) 551 final) – COD 2009/0164/ ‘Legal elements of the proposal’, point 7.
(
45
)	Ibid.
(
46
)	Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the protection granted – Impact Assessment (COM(2009) 551) (SEC(2009) 1374), p. 33.
(
47
)	Ibid.
(
48
)	See, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in P and S (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:39, point 81).
(
49
)	See point 44 above.
(
50
)	See points 62 and 63 above.
(
51
)	See the Explanatory Memorandum cited in footnote 19.
(
52
)	See, by analogy, Article 9(4) of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, signed in Aarhus on 25 June 1998 and approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1), which specifies that the national review procedures should not be prohibitively expensive (judgment of 15 March 2018, North East Pylon Pressure Campaign and Sheehy, C‑470/16, EU:C:2018:185, paragraph 48).
(
53
)	Moreover, since it is a levelling-up measure, account should be taken of similar educational courses offered to nationals of the host Member State or other third-country nationals (such as workers or students) which are also aimed at levelling up those social groups, in order to avoid the potential discrimination of refugees vis-à-vis of those groups.
(
54
)	On 28 September 2000, the Council adopted Decision 2000/596/EC establishing a European Refugee Fund as a solidarity measure to promote a balance in the efforts made by Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons.
(
55
)	See Article 8(d) of Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and repealing Decisions No 573/2007/EC and No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision 2007/435/EC (OJ 2014 L 150, p. 168), which states that the Fund shall support ‘comprehensive civic orientation courses and language tuition’.
(
56
)	See point 44 above.
(
57
)	In particular, on the issue of effectiveness, in P and S, with respect to civic integration examinations imposed under Directive 2003/109, the Court was called upon to rule on the maximum amount of the fine for failure to pass such examinations. As part of its assessment, the Court analysed the registration fees for the examination attempts, the possible preparation costs, and the fact that those costs were not reimbursed in the event of failure to pass the examination. In that case, the Court ruled that the payment of a fine, in addition to the costs associated with the examinations taken, was liable to jeopardise the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/109 and thereby deprive it of its effectiveness. See judgment of 4 June 2015, P and S (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369, paragraph 54). In the judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A (C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453), the Court examined Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12) and the obligation under Netherlands legislation to pass a basic civic integration examination abroad before entering that Member State’s territory. In particular, with regard to costs, the Court held that, in principle, Member States are free to require third-country nationals to pay costs and to fix the amount thereof, but the amount of the costs must not have the purpose or effect of making the exercise of the right to family reunification excessively difficult or impossible.
(
58
)	See, by analogy, the case-law regarding the individual capacity to pay with respect to the principle of effective legal protection under Article 47 of the Charter. As stated by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion in Edwards (C‑260/11, EU:C:2012:645, point 38), legal aid may even be absolutely necessary if the risks in terms of costs, which are acceptable in principle, constitute an insurmountable obstacle to access to justice on account of the limited capacity to pay of the person concerned. See also the case-law cited in the judgment of 22 December 2010, DEB (C‑279/09, EU:C:2010:811, paragraphs 60 and 61), and the order of 13 June 2012, GREP (C‑156/12, EU:C:2012:342, paragraph 40 et seq.).
(
59
)	An ex post assessment of financial ability may also interfere with the refugee’s right to exercise other rights, such as the right to work, because the taking into account of his or her financial situation after the integration programme may interfere with his or her economic and social well-being.
(
60
)	See recital 16 of the Qualification Directive.
(
61
)	Explanatory Memorandum cited in footnote 19.
(
62
)	ECRI Conclusions of 3 March 2022 on the Netherlands (CRI(2022) 03), page 4, available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/netherlands.
(
63
)	Ibid.
(
64
)	See points 49, 62, 63 and 65 above.
(
65
)	See, by analogy, judgment of 24 June 2015, T. (C‑373/13, EU:C:2015:413, paragraphs 47 and 48), in which the Court held that the fact that the wording of Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/83 does not expressly exclude the possibility of revoking a residence permit previously issued to a refugee is one of the arguments supporting an interpretation allowing Member States to have recourse to such a measure.
(
66
)	See, by analogy, judgment of 24 June 2015, T. (C‑373/13, EU:C:2015:413, paragraph 98).
(
67
)	Judgment of 4 June 2015 (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369).
(
68
)	Ibid., paragraph 47.
(
69
)	Ibid., paragraphs 47, 48 and 50.
(
70
)	Judgment of 9 July 2015 (C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453).
(
71
)	Judgment of 4 June 2015 (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369).
(
72
)	Judgment of 9 July 2015 (C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453).
(
73
)	They applied for that status between 1 January 2007 and 1 January 2010.
(
74
)	Judgment of 14 May 2019, M and Others (Revocation of refugee status), (C‑391/16, C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, EU:C:2019:403, paragraph 79).
(
75
)	See points 49, 62, 63 and 65 above.
(
76
)	See, by analogy, judgment of 4 June 2015, P and S (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369, paragraph 48).
(
77
)	Indeed, it appears from the file that the examination fee is paid every time the examination is taken.
(
78
)	Judgment of 4 June 2015 (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369, paragraph 54).
(
79
)	Judgment of 9 July 2015 (C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 69).
(
80
)	See judgments of 4 June 2015, P and S (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369, paragraph 54), and of 9 July 2015, K and A (C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 69).
(
81
)	Ibid.
(
82
)	Note on the Integration of Refugees in the European Union, May 2007, available at: https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/unhcr/2007/en/41624.
(
83
)	See commentary cited in footnote 11 above.
(
84
)	See point 54 above.
(
85
)	According to media reports, half of refugees and migrants do not complete the integration requirements on time, that is within the three years to pass the integration examination; see https://nos.nl/artikel/2100445-helft-nieuwkomers-haalt-inburgeringsexamen-niet.
(
86
)	See point 80 above.
(
87
)	Judgment of 4 June 2015, P and S (C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369, paragraphs 51 to 54).