61997CC0210_EN
Opinion of the Advocate-General
Opinion of the Advocate-General
1 This question which has been referred to the Court by the Verwaltungsgericht Köln (Administrative Court, Cologne) asks in essence whether the right of residence which the child of a Turkish worker has under the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council (1) (`Decision No 1/80'), where that child has completed a course of vocational training in a Member State, is subject to the presence or even employment of his parent in that State at the time when he proposes to join the labour force.
Legal context
2 Decision No 1/80 was adopted pursuant to Article 36 of the Additional Protocol (2) to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (3) (`the Agreement').
Article 36 provides that freedom of movement for workers between Member States of the Community and Turkey is to be secured by progressive stages, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement, whereby the Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty establishing the Community.
3 Chapter II, `Social Provisions', of Decision No 1/80 contains a Section 1, entitled `Questions relating to employment and the free movement of workers',
which include access of Turkish nationals to the labour force of a Member State.
Two provisions in particular may confer upon them such a right, one in their capacity as workers duly registered as belonging to the labour force and the other as members of the family of a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force.
4 Firstly, therefore, the status as a worker of a Turkish national is taken into account, according to the duration of legal employment in the Member State in question, in Article 6(1) of Section 1, which is worded as follows:
`1. Subject to Article 7 on free access to employment for members of his family, a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State:
- shall be entitled in that Member State, after one year's legal employment, to the renewal of his permit to work for the same employer, if a job is available;
- shall be entitled in that Member State, after three years of legal employment and subject to the priority to be given to workers of Member States of the Community, to respond to another offer of employment, with an employer of his choice, made under normal conditions and registered with the employment services of that State, for the same occupation;
- shall enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of his choice, after four years of legal employment.'
5 Secondly, under Article 7, Turkish nationals may, as members of the family of a Turkish worker, be granted a right of access to employment either if they have been authorised to join their parent (first paragraph) or because they are children of Turkish workers and have completed a course of vocational training in the host State (second paragraph):
`The members of the family of a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State, who have been authorised to join him:
- shall be entitled - subject to the priority to be given to workers of Member States of the Community - to respond to any offer of employment after they have been legally resident for at least three years in that Member State;
- shall enjoy free access to any paid employment of their choice provided they have been legally resident there for at least five years.
Children of Turkish workers who have completed a course of vocational training in the host country may respond to any offer of employment there, irrespective of the length of time they have been resident in that Member State, provided one of their parents has been legally employed in the Member State concerned for at least three years.'
6 Finally, before seeking employment, Turkish children have a right, under Article 9 of Decision No 1/80, to access to education in the host State, subject to certain conditions. This article is worded as follows:
`Turkish children residing legally in a Member State of the Community with their parents who are or have been legally employed in that Member State, shall be admitted to courses of general education, apprenticeship and vocational training under the same educational entry qualifications as the children of nationals of that Member State.
They may in that Member State be eligible to benefit from the advantages provided for under the national legislation in this area.'
Facts and procedure
7 The question referred by the national court has arisen in connection with a dispute between Mr Akman (`the plaintiff in the main proceedings'), a Turkish national born in 1960, and the German authorities responsible for residence permits (Oberkreisdirektor des Rheinisch-Bergischen Kreises), concerning the refusal of a permit to reside in Germany.
8 Shortly after he arrived lawfully in the Federal Republic of Germany, the plaintiff in the main proceedings was issued with a residence permit of limited
duration, in January 1980, in order to take a course of vocational training, which he completed successfully in April 1993. On his arrival, he lived at first with his father, who had been employed in Germany since 1971.
In 1981 he moved in order to be nearer his place of study.
His father left Germany in 1986 and returned to Turkey.
9 The plaintiff's residence permit was first extended until 1982 and then regularly renewed for limited periods for the purpose of studying engineering.
Finally, from 1990, the permit included an ancillary condition prohibiting him from taking up gainful employment except for part-time and vacation work.
10 On 16 January 1991 the plaintiff obtained an unconditional work permit of unlimited duration.
On this basis he worked part-time for two employers in succession, first from 1 May 1991 to 31 August 1993 and then from 5 April 1994.
At the date of the hearing in the main proceedings (8 November 1995) he was not in gainful employment, but referred to various offers of employment. (4)
11 After obtaining his diploma, he applied on 24 June 1993 for an extension of his residence permit in the form of a residence permit of unlimited duration or, alternatively, in the form of leave to remain in order to complete his studies.
12 The German authorities granted the alternative application by issuing an authorisation to remain until 25 August 1994 to enable him to take an additional course of study at the University of Essen.
13 After lodging a first, unsuccessful, objection to that decision in so far as it failed to grant his main application, the plaintiff again submitted an application on 19 August 1994 for an extension of his residence permit. The defendant authority has not yet given a decision on that application.
14 Faced with inertia on the part of the competent administrative authority, the plaintiff instituted proceedings before the Verwaltungsgericht Köln, claiming that, having completed a course of vocational training in Germany as the child of a Turkish worker and as his father had been legally employed in Germany for more than three years, he had a right under the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 to respond to any offer of employment and a corresponding right of residence by virtue of the judgment in the Eroglu case. (5)
15 Conversely, the defendant authority claimed that the conditions for applying the second paragraph of Article 7 were not fulfilled since the plaintiff's father was neither resident nor employed in Germany at the time when the plaintiff applied for access to the labour force.
16 The national court found that there was uncertainty as to the correct application of the abovementioned Community provision and has referred the following question to the Court:
`For a child of a Turkish worker to have the right to extension of his residence permit, which, according to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-355/93 Eroglu v Land Baden-Württemberg, arises from the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council on the development of the Association, must the employed parent still be resident in Germany, or even still be in an employment relationship, at the time when the child has completed his course of vocational training, or is that provision sufficiently complied with if the Turkish parent was legally employed at an earlier time for at least three years?'
Discussion
17 To begin with, there is no doubt that this question is admissible.
The Court has consistently held that the decisions of the Council of Association giving effect to the Agreement, in the same way as the Agreement itself, form an integral part of the Community legal system and may be the subject of a reference to the Court for interpretation under Article 177 of the EC Treaty. (6)
18 It should also be observed, so that it will be unnecessary to revert to this point, that Decision No 1/80, particularly Articles 6 and 7, `does not encroach upon the competence retained by the Member States to regulate both the entry into their territories of Turkish nationals and the conditions under which they may take up their first employment, but merely regulates ... the situation of Turkish workers already integrated into the labour force of a Member State'. (7)
It was not the intention of the Contracting Parties to regulate access to the territories of the Member States, but to establish gradually freedom of movement between them for workers (8) on a pre-accession basis. (9)
19 On the other hand, once Turkish nationals have been granted access by a Member State to its territory, they may have a right of residence, this time under Decision No 1/80, subject to certain conditions.
The Court has inferred, from the direct effect of the provisions granting a right of access to employment, (10) a corresponding right of residence, as `those two aspects of the personal situation of a Turkish worker are closely linked'. (11)
20 The close connection between access to employment and the right of residence was first established in the context of the third indent of Article 6(1) which, `by granting to [a Turkish worker], after a specified period of legal employment in the Member State, access to any paid employment of his choice, ... necessarily [implies] - since otherwise the right granted by [that provision] to the Turkish worker would be deprived of any effect - the existence, at least at that time, of a right of residence for the person concerned'. (12)
The same reasoning was applied to the first indent of Article 6(1) `... since without a right of residence the grant to the Turkish worker, after one year's legal employment, of the right to renewal of his permit to work for the same employer would likewise be deprived of any effect'. (13)
Finally, in the Eroglu judgment, to which the national court specifically refers, the Court observed that `... it must also be accepted that the right conferred on a person by the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 to respond to any offer of employment necessarily implies the recognition of a right of residence for that person'. (14) It followed that `... a Turkish national who satisfies the conditions set out in the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 and may therefore respond to any offer of employment in the Member State concerned may, by the same token, also rely on that provision to obtain the extension of his residence permit.' (15)
21 The Verwaltungsgericht Köln is therefore right to ask itself, by reference to the Eroglu judgment, whether the plaintiff has right of access to employment on the basis of Decision No 1/80 from which to infer a corresponding right of residence.
22 In this connection, although the national court refers in its question in particular to the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80, it did consider whether other provisions of the Decision could apply in the present case, but found that none could, since it seeks to establish, very broadly, `whether entitlement to a residence permit can be derived from Community law'. (16)
23 Like the national court, I consider that the second paragraph of Article 7 is the only provision which could apply as neither Article 6(1) nor the first paragraph of Article 7 are relevant in the present situation.
24 Firstly, with regard to Article 6(1), only the third indent could concern the plaintiff.
He wishes to have access to any offer of employment and is not seeking to continue employment with the same employer after one year's employment (the situation covered by the first indent) or to continue in the same occupation after three years of legal employment (second indent of Article 6(1)). (17)
However, the third indent of Article 6(1) requires two conditions to be fulfilled for a Turkish national to have the right to free access to any gainful employment of his choice.
First, he must be legally employed in a Member State and, secondly, he must already have been in legal employment for four years.
The `legality' of the plaintiff's periods of employment is not at issue, (18) and it is sufficient to observe that he has not completed four years' employment in Germany.
25 The first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 is not relevant either in the present circumstances.
26 Since the Kadiman judgment, cited above, the Court has clearly settled that that provision, the purpose of which is `... to favour employment and residence of Turkish workers duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State by ensuring that their family links are maintained there', (19) aims to create conditions conducive to family unity. (20)
Therefore the rights which it confers on the person concerned depend on the conditions under which he was granted rights of entry and of residence: `... the first paragraph of Article 7 expressly states that the family member must have been authorised by the Member State concerned to "join" the Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of that State'. (21)
In addition, the benefit of that provision presupposes `actual cohabitation in a household with the worker' (22) for the specified period unless `... objective circumstances justified the failure of the migrant worker and the members of his family to live under the same roof in the host Member State'. (23)
It is clear that this is not Mr Akman's situation. Firstly, he has not been `authorised to join' his father within the meaning of the Kadiman judgment because he entered Germany legally for the purpose of a course of study and he obtained a residence permit `for the purpose of attending a college of further education'. (24) Secondly, I doubt whether the fact that the plaintiff left his father's home in order to live alone in the year following his arrival in Germany was motivated by an `objective circumstance'.
Although in the Kadiman judgment the Court found that the fact that `the distance between the worker's residence and ... a vocational training establishment attended by [the member of the family] required him or her to live in separate accommodation', (25) would be an objective circumstance of that kind, nevertheless such interruptions must not be intended `to detract from residence together in the host Member State'. (26)
The contrary is true in the present case, however, since the findings of the national court show that the plaintiff clearly moved out with no intention of returning to live with his father at a later date.
27 Consequently it is in the light of the second paragraph of Article 7 that the question whether the plaintiff in the main proceedings can rely on a right of residence arising from a right of access to employment must be examined.
28 As the Greek Government points out, (27) the wording of this provision itself shows that there are three conditions which must all be fulfilled in order for the person concerned to rely on it.
29 The person concerned must (1) be the child of a Turkish worker; (2) have completed a course of vocational training in the host country; and (3) prove that one of his parents `has been legally employed in the Member State concerned for at least three years'.
30 Although the question before the Court relates essentially to the third condition, it is necessary to ensure first that the plaintiff in the main proceedings satisfies the first condition, which is denied by the Greek Government. (28)
The second condition has not been discussed by the parties and I shall not consider it either.
31 The question is, therefore, whether the plaintiff can continue to rely on his status as the son of a `Turkish worker' in spite of the fact that his father had left the host country for good and, a fortiori, the labour force of that State at the time when the plaintiff wished to avail himself of that status.
32 On this point it seems to me that the Court's case-law on the subject of freedom of movement for Community workers is particularly illuminating.
33 Article 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 (29) was interpreted in the Brown case (30) as meaning that it grants rights of access to education in a host State only to a child who has lived with his parents or either one of them in that Member State whilst at least one of his parents resided there as a worker, and therefore it could not apply to a child born after the worker ceased to reside and work in the host State.
It followed from this judgment that the status of a child of a (Community) worker was not subject to the parent's presence in the host State.
The Echternach and Moritz judgment (31) provided the occasion for stating, clearly this time and without the need for contrary inference, that `the child of a worker of a Member State who has been in employment in another Member State retains the status of member of a worker's family within the meaning of Regulation No 1612/68 when that child's family returns to the Member State of origin and the child remains in the host State, even after a certain period of absence, in order to continue his studies, which he could not pursue in the State of origin'. (32)
34 Although Turkish nationals cannot be directly recognised as entitled under the provisions relating to the freedom of movement of Community workers and their families because Turkey does not belong to the Community, their situation is nevertheless clearly intended, under Community law, to be as close as possible to that of Community nationals.
35 It must be remembered that the aim of the Association Council, in adopting the social provisions of Decision No 1/80, was to go one stage further, pursuant to Article 12 of the Agreement and guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty, towards securing freedom of movement for workers, in accordance with the pre-accession nature of the Agreement.
In order to ensure compliance with that objective, the Court considered it `essential to transpose, so far as possible, the principles enshrined in those Treaty articles to Turkish workers who enjoy the rights conferred by Decision No 1/80'. (33)
36 I therefore propose that the Court construe the term `children of Turkish workers' by analogy with `child of a worker', as interpreted by the Court in the context of the provisions relating to freedom of movement for Community workers, particularly in the light of the Brown and Echternach and Moritz judgments which I have cited.
37 I conclude that a Turkish national who has legally entered a Member State in order to take a course of vocational training does not lose the status of `child of a Turkish worker' for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 merely because his parent is no longer resident or employed in that State at the time when he wishes to avail himself of that status.
38 In the present case it is common ground that, for the first six years of Mr Akman's residence in Germany, his father was a Turkish worker legally employed in that State. It cannot therefore be validly argued that he has lost the status of child of a Turkish worker solely because his father no longer resides in Germany.
39 Once it is established that the plaintiff in the main proceedings can still claim his family relationship with a Turkish worker, it is still necessary to ascertain whether he also fulfils the condition that one of his parents `has been legally employed in the Member State concerned for at least three years' in order for him to be recognised as having a right of residence arising from the right of access to employment which he would have under the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80.
40 The two interpretations of this condition that were proposed in the course of the procedure before the Court lead to radically different results.
41 According to the German, Greek and Austrian Governments, the right of a child of a Turkish worker to obtain an extension of his residence permit pursuant to the second paragraph of the abovementioned Article 7 depends not only on one of his parents having been legally employed in the host State for at least three years, but also on that parent still being in that employment at the time when the right of residence is claimed by the child.
42 On the other hand, the Commission and the plaintiff in the main proceedings contend that the second paragraph of Article 7 merely requires the person concerned to have completed a course of vocational training in the host State and one of his or her parents to have been legally employed there for at least three years.
The Commission and the plaintiff do not, however, consider it necessary for the migrant worker in question to be still so resident and/or employed at the time when the child wishes to respond to an offer of employment.
43 I am certain that the latter approach is correct.
44 First of all, it seems to be supported by a literal interpretation of the wording.
45 As I see it, the French version certainly does not refer necessarily to a present situation because it uses a past tense (the past subjunctive, `à condition qu'un des parents ait légalement exercé') and, in the same sentence, a preposition (`depuis') which `denotes the time from which an action (or state) began which is still continuing at the time when the speaker is speaking or at the time where he mentally places himself'. (34)
It seems to me more likely that this wording envisages two types of situations: those which have been completed and those which, having begun in the past, still exist in the present.
In any case, if the legislature had intended to refer only to an existing situation, as alleged by the Governments which intervened in the course of the procedure, the use of the present tense (or present subjunctive) would certainly have been more appropriate.
The article in question would then have referred to the condition that one of the parents `exerce (or exerçat) ... un emploi ... depuis trois ans au moins'.
Furthermore, the first paragraph of Article 7 is worded in the present tense as it necessarily refers to a present situation, not one which is in the past [`lorsqu'ils y résident régulièrement depuis trois ans (or cinq ans) au moins']. Therefore the choice of the past tense in the second paragraph of Article 7 seems to me quite significant.
46 However, like the Commission, the German Government observes that the preposition used in the different language versions (for example, the French, English, German and Dutch versions use the words `depuis', `for', `seit' and `gedurende' respectively) may lead to confusion and may suggest different meanings, depending on the language in which that provision is read.
47 Although I must agree that, on its own, a literal interpretation cannot be determinant the underlying rationale of the second paragraph of Article 7 nevertheless precludes the meaning suggested by the German, Greek and Austrian Governments.
48 As I have said, the unity of Article 7 as a whole arises from the group of persons upon whom it confers rights: the family members of a Turkish worker.
Nevertheless it is clear, on reading the two paragraphs of that article, that the Contracting Parties intended to single out for special treatment, within that group, the children of Turkish workers.
49 The first paragraph of Article 7 clearly refers to the aim of family unity, as the Court observed in the Kadiman judgment cited above, which gives rise to the family member's obligation to live with the parent, which the Court infers in particular from the words `[who have been authorised] to join him'. (35)
50 In contrast, the second paragraph is not specifically intended to create favourable conditions for family unity. This appears to follow as much from the Court's case-law as from the practical effect of that provision.
Firstly, in finding, in the Eroglu judgment, that the fact that the right of entry or residence was not originally given to the children of Turkish workers `with a view to reuniting the family but, for example, for the purposes of study does not ... deprive the child of a Turkish worker who satisfies the conditions of the second paragraph of Article 7 of the enjoyment of the rights conferred thereunder', (36) the Court necessarily distinguishes the situations governed by the second paragraph of Article 7 from those considered in the Kadiman judgment, cited above, to which the first paragraph of Article 7 applies.
In addition, to interpret the second paragraph, which applies specifically to `children of Turkish workers', as also aiming to create favourable conditions for reuniting the family would deprive it of all practical effect.
If construed in this way, it would add nothing new in relation to the first paragraph, which refers more broadly to reuniting `the members of the family', who obviously include the children.
Finally, if the second paragraph of Article 7 also aimed at reuniting the family, it seems to me that there would have been no reason, in the context of Decision No 1/80, for the requirement for one of the parents to have been employed for at least three years.
Some light is thrown on this by comparing the two paragraphs.
As the first paragraph is specifically concerned with reuniting the family, it contains only conditions concerning the legal employment of the parent and nothing regarding the duration of employment, which is not relevant to the purpose of the provision.
51 As the second paragraph of Article 7 does not have the specific purpose of reuniting the family, it may be observed straightaway that it cannot be read as requiring the parent and child to be living together at the time when the child wishes to seek employment on completion of his vocational training.
52 In actual fact, the rationale of the second paragraph of Article 7 is quite different from that of reuniting the family.
As the Commission suggests, it is conducive to treating the child as an independent person who has completed his or her studies in a Member State precisely in order to improve his chances of finding work himself, so that he is no longer dependent on his parent to provide for his needs.
Where the children of Turkish workers have completed a course of vocational training, the second paragraph of Article 7 aims to encourage them to join the labour force, in preference to such children who have no vocational training.
This interpretation ties up with the concept of vocational training which the Court set out, in relation to Community nationals, in the Gravier judgment: (37) `[a]ccess to vocational training is in particular likely to promote free movement of persons throughout the Community, by enabling them to obtain a qualification in the Member State where they intend to work ...'.
53 Consequently the completion of vocational training qualifies the child of a Turkish worker for an independent right to work, provided that his parent belonged or belongs to the labour force of the Member State.
54 Apart from this independent underlying rationale of the second paragraph of Article 7, as compared with the first paragraph, I think the context of that provision really must be taken into account.
55 The reason is that `the coherence of the system' set up by Decision No 1/80, to which the Court attaches the greatest importance, (38) would be affected if the second paragraph of Article 7 were construed as requiring the Turkish parent of a child who has completed his studies to be still working when the child wishes to join the labour force.
56 In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind Article 9 of Decision No 1/80, which regulates the access of Turkish children to vocational training.
This provision is intended to be applied necessarily before the search for employment, unlike the second paragraph of Article 7, which governs the situation of those children of Turkish workers who have completed their vocational training.
The conditions set out in Article 9 for the admission of Turkish children to `courses of general education, apprenticeship and vocational training' include, in addition to a requirement that the children should be residing legally with their parents in the host State, a requirement that the parents `are or have been legally employed in that Member State'.
Consequently there is no requirement for the parent of a child seeking training to be legally employed at the time when the child claims the benefit of Article 9.
I think it would be somewhat inconsistent, not to say absurd, to impose such a requirement on the completion of vocational training.
If the Turkish parent is no longer employed when his child begins a course of vocational training, which may be the case under Article 9, how can he reasonably be expected or required to be employed a few years later, when his child completes his vocational training?
57 I therefore consider that the condition of at least three years' employment of the parent in the host State, required in the second paragraph of Article 7, means either present or past employment.
58 I am not persuaded otherwise by the German Government's argument that an interpretation contrary to that proposed by it would lead to the children of Turkish workers being treated more favourably than those of Community nationals who, pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70, (39) have the right to remain in the host State only if they exercise it within two years of the termination of the activity of the worker who has exercised his right to freedom of movement.
Article 5 of the abovementioned Regulation does not have the same scope ratione materiae and ratione personae as the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80. Firstly, the Regulation relates to the right of family members to remain, not the right to respond to an offer of employment and, secondly, the Regulation applies only to descendants under the age of 21 years or persons treated as such. (40)
59 On the other hand, when applying the second paragraph of Article 7, it seems to me important to maintain certain parallels with Article 6.
This means that, where the children of Turkish workers have completed a course of vocational training, however short, they do not receive more favourable treatment, in relation to rights of residence, than their parents, who may have worked for decades in the host State.
60 As we know, the Court held in the Bozkurt judgment that a Turkish worker who has ceased for good to belong to the labour force of a Member State because he has, for example, reached retirement age or become totally and permanently incapacitated for work does not have the right to remain in that State by virtue of Article 6(2) of Decision No 1/80. On the other hand, it is clear from the Tetik judgment that where a Turkish national is considered to be `genuinely seeking new employment, complying where appropriate with the requirements of the legislation in force in the host Member State', he is not to be regarded as having permanently left the labour force of that State.
Like Community nationals in the same situation, (41) he must be regarded as still belonging to the labour force of that State `for the period reasonably necessary for him to find new employment'. (42)
61 Consequently, for the sake of consistency, I consider that although, under the second paragraph of Article 7, a child of a Turkish worker is free to respond to any offer of employment after completing his vocational training and has a corresponding right of residence, that right must be exercised within a `reasonable period', meaning a period `in which to apprise himself, in the territory of the Member State which he has entered, of offers of employment corresponding to his occupational qualifications and to take, where appropriate, the necessary steps in order to be engaged', according to the wording of the Tetik judgment, (43) based on the Antonissen judgment, (44) applicable to Turkish nationals.
In the present case, this requirement appears to be fulfilled as the plaintiff in the main proceedings claimed before the national court that he had various offers of employment .
Conclusion
62. On the foregoing grounds I propose that the Court give the following reply to the question from the Verwaltungsgericht Köln:
A child of a Turkish worker may claim the right of residence arising from the right of access to employment provided for in the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association, adopted by the Association Council set up by the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, within a reasonable period after completing vocational training in the host Member State, if one of his parents is or was legally employed in that Member State for at least three years, and it is not necessary for that parent still to be working or even residing in that Member State at the time when the child proposes to enter the labour force.
(1) - The Decision of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association came into force on 1 July 1980.
It was not published in the Official Journal, but appears in a work published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Accord d'association et protocoles CEE-Turquie et autres textes de base, Brussels, 1992.
(2) - Signed at Brussels on 23 November 1970 with a view to laying down the conditions, arrangements and timetables for implementing the transitional stage, and concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2760/72 of 19 December 1972 (English text published in OJ 1973 C 113, p. 17).
(3) - Signed at Ankara on 12 September 1963 by the Republic of Turkey, on the one hand, and the Member States of the EEC and the Community, on the other hand, and concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 64/732/EEC of 23 December 1963, OJ 1973 C 113, p. 1.
(4) - According to the facts given in the order for reference.
(5) - Case C-355/93 Eroglu [1994] ECR I-5113.
(6) - Case 30/88 Greece v Commission [1989] ECR 3711, paragraph 13, and Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] ECR I-3461, paragraphs 9 and 12.
(7) - Case C-237/91 Kus [1992] ECR I-6781, paragraph 25. See also the Eroglu judgment cited above, paragraph 10, and the judgment in Case C-171/95 Tetik [1997] ECR I-329, paragraph 21.
(8) - Case C-434/93 Bozkurt [1995] ECR I-1475, paragraphs 14 and 19, and the Tetik case, cited above, paragraph 20.
(9) - Article 28 of the Agreement provides: `As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community'.
(10) - For Article 6(1) and the second paragraph of Article 7, see, for example, the Eroglu judgment, cited above, paragraph 17; for the first paragraph of Article 7, reference may be made to the judgment in Case C-351/95 Kadiman [1997] ECR I-2133, paragraph 28.
(11) - See, in particular, the Eroglu judgment, cited above, paragraph 18.
(12) - See the Sevince judgment, cited above, paragraph 29.
(13) - See the Kus judgment, cited above, paragraph 30.
(14) - See the Eroglu judgment, cited above, paragraph 20.
(15) - Ibid., paragraph 23.
(16) - See the order for reference.
(17) - See the Tetik judgment, cited above, paragraph 26.
(18) - With regard to legality for the purpose of Article 6(1), see the Sevince judgment, cited above, paragraph 30: `the legality of the employment within the meaning of [Article 6(1)] ... presupposes a stable and secure situation as a member of the labour force [of a Member State]'.
This was followed in the Kus judgment, paragraph 14, and the Bozkurt judgment, paragraph 26, both cited above.
The latter added, in paragraph 27, that `[t]he legality of employment ... must be determined in the light of the legislation of the host State ...'.
(19) - Paragraph 34.
(20) - Paragraphs 35, 36 and 38.
(21) - Paragraph 39.
(22) - Paragraph 40.
(23) - Paragraph 42.
(24) - See the order for reference.
(25) - Paragraph 42.
(26) - Paragraph 48.
(27) - See p. 5 of its observations.
(28) - Ibid.
(29) - Council Regulation of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (II), p. 475.
(30) - See Case 197/86 [1988] ECR 3205, paragraph 30.
(31) - See Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87 [1989] ECR 723.
(32) - Ibid., paragraph 23, emphasis added.
(33) - See the Bozkurt judgment, cited above, paragraph 20, and, more recently, the Tetik judgment, cited above, paragraphs 20 and 28.
(34) - J. Girodet, `Dictionnaire Bordas des pièges et difficultés de la langue française", Les Référents Bordas.
(35) - Paragraph 29, emphasis added.
(36) - See the Eroglu judgment, cited above, paragraph 22.
(37) - See Case 293/83 [1985] ECR 593, paragraph 24.
(38) - See Case C-386/95 Eker [1997] ECR I-2697, paragraph 23.
(39) - Commission Regulation of 29 June 1970 on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State (OJ, English Special Edition 1970 II, p. 402).
(40) - Article 1 provides that the Regulation applies to members of families as defined in Article 10 of Regulation No 1612/68, cited above, that is to say, in respect of descendants, in accordance with paragraph 1(a) of that Article: `their descendants who are under the age of 21 years or are dependants'.
(41) - See Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, paragraphs 13, 15 and 16, referred to by the Tetik judgment cited above, paragraph 27.
(42) - See the Tetik judgment, cited above, paragraph 46.
(43) - Paragraphs 27 to 30.
(44) - Paragraphs 13, 15 and 16.