62024CO0406
ORDER OF THE COURT (Sixth Chamber)
11 September 2025 (
*1
)
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Principles of EU law – National procedure for appointing a representative for a person with a mental disability – Difficulty in finding an appropriate representative – Doubts as to the judicial nature of the procedure before the body making the reference)
In Case C‑406/24,
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Bezirksgericht Linz (District Court, Linz, Austria), made by decision of 3 June 2024, received at the Court on 11 June 2024, in proceedings for the appointment of a guardian for
RC,
the other party to the proceedings being:
VertretungsNetz, established in Linz (Austria),
THE COURT (Sixth Chamber),
composed of A. Kumin, President of the Chamber, T. von Danwitz (Rapporteur), Vice-President of the Court, and S. Gervasoni, Judge,
Advocate General: J. Richard de la Tour,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to rule by reasoned order, pursuant to Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice,
makes the following
Order
1
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 3 to 5, 12, 19 and 28 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, concluded in New York on 13 December 2006 and approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 (OJ 2010 L 23, p. 35; ‘the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’), Articles 1, 20, 21 and 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and the general principles of EU law referred to in Article 6(3) TEU, in particular the principles of equality and non-discrimination, practical effect and effective legal protection.
2
The request has been made in proceedings brought by the Bezirksgericht Linz (District Court, Linz, Austria) of its own motion concerning the appointment of a guardian for RC.
Legal framework
International law
3
Under Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the purpose of that convention is to ‘promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity’.
4
Article 2 of that convention, entitled ‘Definitions’, provides:
‘For the purposes of the present Convention:
…
“Discrimination on the basis of disability” means any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation;
“Reasonable accommodation” means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;
…’
5
Article 3 of that convention, entitled ‘General principles’, states:
‘The principles of the present Convention shall be:
…
(b) Non-discrimination;
(c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society;
…
(e) Equality of opportunity;
(f) Accessibility;
…’
6
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, entitled ‘General obligations’, is worded as follows:
‘States Parties undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability. To this end, States Parties undertake:
(a)
To adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in the present Convention;
(b)
To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities;
…’
7
Article 5 of that convention, entitled ‘Equality and non-discrimination’, states, in paragraphs 1 to 3:
‘1.   States Parties recognise that all persons are equal before and under the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law.
2.   States Parties shall prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds.
3.   In order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, States Parties shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided.’
8
Article 12 of that convention, entitled ‘Equal recognition before the law’, provides, in paragraphs 2 and 3:
‘2.   States Parties shall recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.
3.   States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.’
9
In accordance with Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, entitled ‘Living independently and being included in the community’, the contracting parties ‘recognise the equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in the community, with choices equal to others, and shall take effective and appropriate measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion and participation in the community …’.
10
Article 28 of that convention, entitled ‘Adequate standard of living and social protection’, provides, in paragraph 1:
‘States Parties recognise the right of persons with disabilities to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions, and shall take appropriate steps to safeguard and promote the realisation of this right without discrimination on the basis of disability.’
Austrian law
11
Paragraph 271 of the Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Austrian General Civil Code; ‘the ABGB’) reads as follows:
‘A court shall appoint a guardian for an adult, at the adult’s request or of the court’s own motion, where
1.
the adult concerned is unable to deal with certain affairs without posing a risk of harm to himself or herself due to a mental illness or a comparable impairment affecting his or her decision-making capacity;
2.
the adult concerned has no representative for that purpose;
3.
the adult concerned is unable or unwilling to choose a representative; and
4.
legal guardianship is not possible.’
12
Paragraph 272(1) of the ABGB provides that ‘a guardian may be appointed only to handle specific affairs or certain categories of affairs that require intervention at that point in time and are clearly defined.’
13
Paragraph 274 of the ABGB provides:
‘(1)   A person designated under an enduring power of attorney, a guardianship agreement or a guardianship order shall, with his or her consent, be appointed guardian in preference to other candidates.
(2)   If such a person is not available or suitable, a person close to the adult and suited to the task shall be appointed with that person’s consent.
(3)   If the appointment of such a person is not possible, an adult protection service shall be appointed with its consent.
(4)   If the appointment of an adult protection service is also not possible, the court shall appoint, in accordance with Paragraph 275, a notary (trainee notary) or a lawyer (trainee lawyer) or, with his or her consent, another suitable person.
(5)   A notary (trainee notary) or a lawyer (trainee lawyer) shall be appointed first where the management of the affairs concerned primarily requires legal knowledge. An adult protection service … shall be appointed first where the guardianship otherwise involves special requirements.’
14
In accordance with Paragraph 275(1) of the ABGB, a notary or a lawyer who is not duly registered on the list of notaries or lawyers holding the special qualification required to be able to act as a guardian under an enduring power of attorney or to act as a court-appointed guardian may refuse to act as a court-appointed guardian inter alia where the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge.
The main proceedings and the questions referred
15
By decision of 18 July 2022, the Bezirksgericht Linz (District Court, Linz), which is the body making the reference in the present case, initiated proceedings of its own motion to examine whether it was necessary to appoint a guardian for RC.
16
The body making the reference intends to appoint a guardian for RC to manage the affairs of that person which do not primarily require legal knowledge within the meaning of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings. In the main proceedings, RC has also applied for such support.
17
According to the information provided in the request for a preliminary ruling, the proceedings have been ready for final judgment since October 2022 and there has been a need to appoint a guardian for RC since then. However, the body making the reference has been unable to appoint any of the natural persons or adult protection services referred to in Paragraph 274(1) to (3) of the ABGB as guardian for RC without the consent of those persons and services as required for that purpose by those provisions. In accordance with Paragraph 274(4) of the ABGB, the body making the reference subsequently approached notaries and lawyers. However, none of them agreed to act as guardian on the ground that the management of RC’s affairs did not primarily require legal knowledge, within the meaning of Paragraph 275(1) of the ABGB.
18
The body making the reference is unsure about the compatibility of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings with Articles 3 to 5, 12, 19 and 28 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 1, 20, 21 and 26 of the Charter and with the principles of equality and non-discrimination, practical effect and judicial protection.
19
It considers that, in accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the other rights and principles of EU law referred to in the preceding paragraph take precedence over the law of the Member States, which must be disapplied in the event of conflict.
20
In those circumstances, the Bezirksgericht Linz (District Court, Linz) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)
Is national legislation (Paragraphs 274 and 275 of the ABGB) which does not specify, as a legal consequence, whom the court must appoint as the representative of a vulnerable person, where [members] of the professional categories of notary or lawyer, including persons aspiring to join those professions, called last in the order of appointment laid down in that legislation, may invoke as a ground for refusal that “the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge”, compatible with the “general principles” of the [UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities], enshrined in Article 3 of that convention, and more specifically with the principles of non-discrimination, full and effective participation and inclusion in society, respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity, equality of opportunity and accessibility, contained therein?
(2)
Is national legislation (Paragraphs 274 and 275 of the ABGB) which does not specify, as a legal consequence, whom the court must appoint as the representative of a vulnerable person, where [members] of the professional categories of notary or lawyer, including persons aspiring to join those professions, called last in the order of appointment laid down in that legislation, may invoke as a ground for refusal that “the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge”, compatible with the “general obligations” of the [UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities], enshrined in Article 4 of that convention, and more specifically with the principles set out therein and according to which the State Parties commit to adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in that convention, and to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities?
(3)
Is national legislation (Paragraphs 274 and 275 of the ABGB) which does not specify, as a legal consequence, whom the court must appoint as the representative of a vulnerable person, where [members] of the professional categories of notary or lawyer, including persons aspiring to join those professions, called last in the order of appointment laid down in that legislation, may invoke as a ground for refusal that “the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge”, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 5 of the [UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities], and more specifically with the obligation, set out therein, that [the State Parties recognise that] all persons are equal before and under the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law and that those States are to prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and to guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds?
(4)
Is national legislation (Paragraphs 274 and 275 of the ABGB) which does not specify, as a legal consequence, whom the court must appoint as the representative of a vulnerable person, where [members] of the professional categories of notary or lawyer, including persons aspiring to join those professions, called last in the order of appointment laid down in that legislation, may invoke as a ground for refusal that “the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge”, compatible with the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 12 of the [UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities], and more specifically with State Parties’ recognition of the fact that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life, and that those States are to take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity, set out therein?
(5)
Is national legislation (Paragraphs 274 and 275 of the ABGB) which does not specify, as a legal consequence, whom the court must appoint as the representative of a vulnerable person, where [members] of the professional categories of notary or lawyer, including persons aspiring to join those professions, called last in the order of appointment laid down in that legislation, may invoke as a ground for refusal that “the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge”, compatible with the obligation of inclusion [in the community] enshrined in Article 19 of the [UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities], which provides that the State Parties to that convention are to recognise the equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in the community, with choices equal to others, and are to take effective and appropriate measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of that right and their full inclusion and participation in the community?
(6)
Is national legislation (Paragraphs 274 and 275 of the ABGB) which does not specify, as a legal consequence, whom the court must appoint as the representative of a vulnerable person, where [members] of the professional categories of notary or lawyer, including persons aspiring to join those professions, called last in the order of appointment laid down in that legislation, may invoke as a ground for refusal that “the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge”, compatible with the obligation enshrined in Article 2[8] of the [UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities], according to which the State Parties are to recognise the right of persons with disabilities to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions, and are to take appropriate steps to safeguard and promote the realisation of that right without discrimination on the basis of disability?
(7)
Is national legislation (Paragraphs 274 and 275 of the ABGB) which does not specify, as a legal consequence, whom the court must appoint as the representative of a vulnerable person, where [members] of the professional categories of notary or lawyer, including persons aspiring to join those professions, called last in the order of appointment laid down in that legislation, may invoke as a ground for refusal that “the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge”, compatible with the fundamental rights set out in the [Charter] according to which human dignity is inviolable and must be respected and protected (Article 1), everyone is equal before the law (Article 20), any discrimination based on any ground such as disability is to be prohibited (Article 21) and [the European Union recognises] the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community (Article 26)?
(8)
Is national legislation (Paragraphs 274 and 275 of the ABGB) which does not specify, as a legal consequence, whom the court must appoint as the representative of a vulnerable person, where [members] of the professional categories of notary or lawyer, including persons aspiring to join those professions, called last in the order of appointment laid down in that legislation, may invoke as a ground for refusal that “the management of the affairs concerned does not primarily require legal knowledge”, compatible with the general principles of EU law within the meaning of Article 6(3) TEU, in particular the principle of equality and the principle of non-discrimination, the obligation to give practical effect to EU law and to protect the rights which it confers (‘principle of effectiveness’) and the obligation of effective judicial protection?’
Procedure before the Court
21
In its request for a preliminary ruling, the body making the reference requested that the Court deal with the present case under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
22
In the light of the decision of the Court to rule by order in accordance with Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure, there is no longer any need to adjudicate on that request.
Admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling
23
Under Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where a request for a preliminary ruling is manifestly inadmissible, the Court, after hearing the Advocate General, may at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
24
That provision must be applied in the present case.
25
As a preliminary point, the information contained in the request for a preliminary ruling raises the question whether, when hearing proceedings concerning the appointment of a guardian, the Bezirksgericht Linz (District Court, Linz) may be regarded as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU ruling in proceedings intended to deliver a decision of a judicial nature. However, it is not necessary to rule on that point of law in the present case, since all the questions referred for a preliminary ruling are inadmissible for other reasons.
26
According to settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. It follows that questions concerning EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 7 September 2023, Groenland Poultry, C‑169/22, EU:C:2023:638, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
27
In that regard, the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court means that the national court is bound to observe scrupulously the requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, of which the referring court should be aware (judgment of 17 October 2024, FA.RO. di YK & C., C‑16/23, EU:C:2024:886, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). Those requirements are also set out in paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 of the Recommendations of the Court of Justice of the European Union to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2019 C 380, p. 1), which now appear in paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 of the Recommendations of the Court of Justice of the European Union to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ C, C/2024/6008).
28
Thus, in accordance with Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure, it is essential that the order for reference contain a statement of the reasons which prompted the national court to inquire about the interpretation of certain provisions of EU law, and the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings (judgment of 8 May 2024, Instituto da Segurança Social and Others, C‑20/23, EU:C:2024:389, paragraph 49).
29
In that respect, it should also be noted that the information provided in the order for reference must enable, first, the Court to provide useful answers to the questions referred by the national court and, secondly, the governments of the Member States and other interested parties to exercise the right conferred on them by Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to submit observations. It is the Court’s duty to ensure that that right is safeguarded, given that, under that provision, only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties (judgment of 19 December 2024, SISTEM LUX, C‑717/22 and C‑372/23, EU:C:2024:1041, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
30
In the present case, by its first to sixth questions, the body making the reference asks the Court, in essence, whether Articles 3 to 5, 12, 19 and 28 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities preclude national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings governing the representation of persons with disabilities.
31
In that regard, it should be recalled that although the representation of persons with disabilities falls within the competence of each Member State, that competence must be exercised in compliance with EU law (see, by analogy, judgments of 15 October 2024, KUBERA, C‑144/23, EU:C:2024:881, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and of 29 April 2025, Commission v Malta (Citizenship by investment), C‑181/23, EU:C:2025:283, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).
32
It is true that, since the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was approved on behalf of the European Union by Decision 2010/48, the provisions of that convention are an integral part of the EU legal order from the time of that decision’s entry into force (judgment of 11 September 2019, Nobel Plastiques Ibérica, C‑397/18, EU:C:2019:703, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
33
However, that convention is a mixed agreement concluded by the European Union and its Member States on the basis of shared competence. As regards such agreements, where a case is brought before the Court in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, it has jurisdiction to define the obligations which the European Union has assumed and those which remain the sole responsibility of the Member States and for that purpose to interpret the provisions of such an agreement. Next, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of a mixed agreement provided that they are in a field in which the European Union has exercised its powers and adopted provisions to implement the obligations which derive from it (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 March 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, C‑240/09, EU:C:2011:125, paragraphs 31, 32 and 34, and of 14 July 2022, ÖBB-Infrastruktur Aktiengesellschaft, C‑500/20, EU:C:2022:563, paragraphs 40 and 41).
34
Furthermore, the Court has held that a specific issue governed by agreements concluded by the European Union and its Member States falls within EU law, even though it has not yet been the subject of EU legislation, where that issue concerns a field largely covered by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, C‑240/09, EU:C:2011:125, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
35
It is also settled case-law that, where a provision of an international agreement can apply both to situations falling within the scope of national law and to situations falling within the scope of EU law, it is clearly desirable, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, that the provision should be interpreted uniformly by the Court, whatever the circumstances in which it is to apply (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2022, ÖBB-Infrastruktur Aktiengesellschaft, C‑500/20, EU:C:2022:563, paragraphs 42 and 43 and the case-law cited).
36
It must be stated that the request for a preliminary ruling clearly does not contain the information necessary to enable the Court to determine whether it has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 33 to 35 above. In particular, the body making the reference has not established the existence of a link between the provisions of that convention, the interpretation of which is sought, and EU legislation, as required by that case-law.
37
Although, by its first to sixth questions, the body making the reference asks the Court about the possible obligations concerning the representation of disabled persons which arise, as the case may be, from that convention, it refers, in its request for a preliminary ruling, only to Articles 3 to 5, 12, 19 and 28 of that convention, without, however, explaining how the questions thus raised fall within either a specific provision adopted by the European Union in the exercise of its powers or a field largely within the scope of EU law.
38
Nor does the request for a preliminary ruling contain any indication as to whether the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the interpretation of which is sought, can apply both to situations falling within the scope of national law and to situations falling within the scope of EU law.
39
It follows that, as regards the first to sixth questions, the request for a preliminary ruling clearly does not satisfy the requirements set out in the case-law cited in paragraphs 27 and 28 above.
40
By its seventh and eighth questions, the body making the reference asks the Court, in essence, whether the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 1, 20, 21 and 26 of the Charter and certain general principles of EU law, in particular the principle of equality and non-discrimination, the principle of practical effect and the principle of effective judicial protection, preclude the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings.
41
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the scope of the Charter, in so far as the action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. That provision confirms the Court’s settled case-law on the general principles of EU law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations. Where, on the other hand, a legal situation does not fall within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon and the general principles of EU law cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others, C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 33; of 13 January 2022, Marcas MC, C‑363/20, EU:C:2022:21, paragraphs 33 to 36; and of 25 January 2024, Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Craiova, C‑58/22, EU:C:2024:70, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
42
In the present case, although the body making the reference asks the Court about the interpretation of fundamental rights and of the general principles of EU law referred to in paragraph 40 above, it does not explain the link it establishes between the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings and a rule of EU law other than the rules set out in the Charter or those general principles.
43
Thus, as regards the seventh and eighth questions, the request for a preliminary ruling clearly does not satisfy the requirements arising from Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure, read in conjunction with Article 51(1) of the Charter.
44
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the present request for a preliminary ruling is, under Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure, manifestly inadmissible.
Costs
45
Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the body making the reference, the decision on costs is a matter for that body.
On those grounds, the Court (Sixth Chamber) hereby orders:
The request for a preliminary ruling from the Bezirksgericht Linz (District Court, Linz, Austria), made by decision of 3 June 2024, is manifestly inadmissible.
[Signatures]
(
*1
)	Language of the case: German.