Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
RICHARD DE LA TOUR
delivered on 23 October 2025 (1)
Case C‑621/24
Landkreis Schweinfurt
v
FB
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundessozialgericht (Federal Social Court, Germany))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Asylum policy – Directive
2013/33/EU – Reception of persons applying for international protection – Article 17 – General rules on material reception conditions – Scope of the requirement relating to the provision of an adequate standard of living – Equal treatment – Article 20(1) – Restriction of material reception conditions – Concept of ‘subsequent application’ – National rule excluding from the benefits intended to cover needs in terms of clothing, household goods and consumables applicants in respect of whom a transfer decision has been adopted under Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, unless they demonstrate special circumstances – Whether permissible )
I.      Introduction
1.        This request for a preliminary ruling relates, essentially, to the scope of the right granted to applicants for international protection (2) in the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33/EU (3) to material reception conditions providing them an adequate standard of living to protect their physical and mental health and guarantee their subsistence on the territory of the Member State in which they are seeking asylum. (4)
2.        The reference for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceedings between FB, a young Afghan national and applicant for international protection, and Landkreis Schweinfurt (District of Schweinfurt, Germany), concerning the legality of a decision by which that person had the grant of the benefits intended to cover his needs in terms of clothing, household goods and consumables withdrawn
on the ground that he was to be removed from the territory as a consequence of the enforcement
of a transfer decision adopted pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 604/2013. (5)
3.        The Bundessozialgericht (Federal Social Court, Germany) asks, first of all, the Court of Justice
whether the host Member State may treat applicants in respect of whom a transfer decision has been adopted under that regulation less favourably than applicants who are, on the contrary, to remain on the territory of that State.
4.        That court seeks, next, to ascertain whether the said Member State provides applicants an adequate standard of living which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental health when it provides them with benefits in kind covering housing, food and personal and health care, but excludes them, as a matter of principle, from the grant of a clothing allowance and a financial allowance to cover their household goods and consumables needs.
5.        Last, the referring court asks the Court whether such a restriction
of material reception conditions may be adopted on the basis of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 20(1) of Directive 2013/33 on the ground that the application lodged by the third-country national constitutes, in this instance, a subsequent application within the meaning of Article 2(q) Directive 2013/32/EU. (6)
6.        I shall begin by setting out the reasons why I consider that Article 17(2), first subparagraph, and (5)
of Directive 2013/33 precludes a national rule which excludes, as a matter of principle,
from the benefits intended to cover needs in terms of clothing, household goods and consumables applicants in respect of whom a transfer decision has been adopted,
but not yet implemented. I shall rely, in that regard, on the principles successively established by the Court in the judgments of 27 September 2012, Cimade and GISTI; (7) of 12 November 2019, Haqbin; (8) of 14 January 2021, The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others, (9) and, finally, of 1 August 2022, Ministero dell’Interno (Withdrawal of material reception conditions). (10) I shall recall, in particular, that the obligation on the host Member State to provide applicants an adequate standard of living which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental health requires granting those without financial autonomy a clothing allowance and a daily expenses allowance,
with that grant continuing until they are actually transferred to the Member State responsible for examining their application for international protection.
7.        I shall then go on to explain that such exclusion could not in the present case be based on the provisions laid down in point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 20(1) of Directive 2013/33, in so far as an application such as that lodged by FB did not constitute a ‘subsequent application’ for the reasons set out by the Court in the judgment in Khan Yunis and Baabda, (11) delivered on 19 December 2024, some months after the present request for a preliminary ruling was made.
II.    Legal framework
A.      European Union law
1.      Directive 2013/32
8.        According to Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32, ‘subsequent application’ means ‘a further application for international protection made after a final decision has been taken on a previous application, including cases where the applicant has explicitly withdrawn his or her application and cases where the determining authority has rejected an application following its implicit withdrawal in accordance with Article 28(1)’.
2.      Directive 2013/33
9.        Recitals 8, 11 and 35 of Directive 2013/33 state:
‘(8)      In order to ensure equal treatment of applicants throughout the Union, this Directive should apply during all stages and types of procedures concerning applications for international protection, in all locations and facilities hosting applicants and for as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory of the Member States as applicants.
…
(11)      Standards for the reception of applicants that will suffice to ensure them a dignified standard of living and comparable living conditions in all Member States should be laid down.
…
(35)      This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. [(12)] In particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for human dignity and to promote the application of Articles 1, 4, 6, 7, 18, 21, 24 and 47 of the Charter and has to be implemented accordingly.’
10.      According to Article 1, the purpose of that directive is to lay down standards for the reception of applicants in Member States.
11.      Article 2(g) of the said
directive defines ‘material reception conditions’ as ‘the reception conditions that include housing, food and clothing provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in vouchers, or a combination of the three, and a daily expenses allowance’.
12.      In accordance with Article 3(1) thereof, the same
directive ‘shall apply to all third-country nationals … who make an application for international protection on the territory … of a Member State, as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory as applicants’.
13.      Article 17 of Directive 2013/33, entitled ‘General rules on material reception conditions and health care’, provides, in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 thereof and in paragraphs 3 and 5 thereof:
‘2.      Member States shall ensure that material reception conditions provide an adequate standard of living for applicants, which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental health.
…
3.      Member States may make the provision of all or some of the material reception conditions and health care subject to the condition that applicants do not have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate for their health and to enable their subsistence.
…
5.      Where Member States provide material reception conditions in the form of financial allowances or vouchers, the amount thereof shall be determined on the basis of the level(s) established by the Member State concerned either by law or by the practice to ensure adequate standards of living for nationals. Member States may grant less favourable treatment to applicants compared with nationals in this respect, in particular where material support is partially provided in kind or where those level(s), applied for nationals, aim to ensure a standard of living higher than that prescribed for applicants under this Directive.’
14.      Article 20 of that directive, entitled ‘Reduction or withdrawal of material reception conditions’, provides:
‘1.      Member States may reduce or, in exceptional and duly justified cases, withdraw material reception conditions where an applicant:
…
(c)      has lodged a subsequent application as defined in Article 2(q) of Directive [2013/32].
…
5.      Decisions for reduction or withdrawal of material reception conditions … shall be taken individually, objectively and impartially and reasons shall be given. Decisions shall be based on the particular situation of the person concerned … taking into account the principle of proportionality. Member States shall under all circumstances ensure access to health care in accordance with Article 19 and shall ensure a dignified standard of living for all applicants.
6.      Member States shall ensure that material reception conditions are not withdrawn or reduced before a decision is taken in accordance with paragraph 5.’
3.      The Dublin III Regulation
15.      Recitals 11 and 12 of the Dublin III Regulation state:
(11)      Directive [2013/33] should apply to the procedure for the determination of the Member State responsible as regulated under this Regulation, subject to the limitations in the application of that Directive.
(12)      Directive [2013/32] should apply in addition and without prejudice to the provisions concerning the procedural safeguards regulated under this Regulation, subject to the limitations in the application of that Directive.
16.      Article 18
of that regulation sets out the ‘obligations of the Member State responsible’ in the following manner:
‘1.      The Member State responsible under this Regulation shall be obliged to:
…
(c)      take back, under the conditions laid down in Articles 23, 24, 25 and 29, a third-country national or a stateless person who has withdrawn the application under examination and made an application in another Member State or who is on the territory of another Member State without a residence document;
…
2.      …
In the cases falling within the scope of paragraph 1(c), when the Member State responsible had discontinued the examination of an application following its withdrawal by the applicant before a decision on the substance has been taken at first instance, that Member State shall ensure that the applicant is entitled to request that the examination of his or her application be completed or to lodge a new application for international protection, which shall not be treated as a subsequent application as provided for in Directive [2013/32]. In such cases, Member States shall ensure that the examination of the application is completed.
…’
B.      German law
1.      The Law on material reception conditions
17.      According to
Paragraph 1(1)(5) of the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (Law on the conditions granted to asylum seekers), in the version published on 5 August 1997, (13) as last amended by Paragraph 18
of the Gesetz zur Stärkung der Impfprävention gegen COVID-19 und zur Änderung weiterer Vorschriften im Zusammenhang mit der COVID-19-Pandémie (Law to strengthen vaccination against COVID-19 and to amend other provisions in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic) (14) of 10 December 2021 (‘the Law on material reception conditions’):
‘(1)      Those entitled to benefits under this Law are foreign nationals who actually reside on federal territory and who
…
5.      are under an obligation to leave the country, even if a removal warning is not yet or is no longer enforceable.’
18.      Paragraph 1a of that law, entitled ‘Restriction
of rights’, provides:
‘(1)      Those entitled to conditions granted under Paragraph 1(1)(5) whose date of departure and possibility of departure are established shall not be entitled to the conditions granted under Paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 from the day following the date of departure unless the departure could not take place for reasons beyond their control. Until their departure or until the implementation of their removal, they shall be granted only conditions covering their food and housing needs, including heating, as well as physical and health needs. Other conditions referred to in the first sentence of Paragraph 3(1) may be granted to them only in special cases, where there are special circumstances. The conditions shall be granted in kind.
…
(7)      The beneficiaries of conditions granted under Paragraph 1(1)(1) or (5) whose application for asylum has been rejected as inadmissible by a decision of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Germany]
adopted on the basis of Paragraph 29(1)(1) of the Asylgesetz (AsylG) [(Law on the right to asylum), (15) of 26 June 1992], read in conjunction with Paragraph 31(6) of that law, and in respect of whom removal has been ordered pursuant to the second scenario in the first sentence of Paragraph 34a(1) of that law, shall be granted conditions only under subparagraph 1, even if that decision is still amenable to challenge. The first sentence shall not apply where a court has ordered that the action against the removal order is to have suspensory effect.’
19.      Paragraph 3(1) of the Law on material reception conditions provides:
‘Those entitled to benefits under Paragraph 1 shall be granted conditions covering their needs in terms of food, housing, heating, clothing, health care and household consumables (essential needs). In addition, they shall be granted conditions covering personal needs for daily life (essential personal needs).’
20.      Paragraph 6(1) of that law is worded as follows:
‘Other conditions may inter alia be granted if, in an individual case, they are essential to ensure subsistence or health, if they are required to cover the special needs of children or if they are required to fulfil an obligation to cooperate laid down in administrative law. …’
2.      The Law on the right to asylum
21.      Paragraph 29
of the Law on the right to asylum, in the version published on 2 September 2008, (16) as last amended by Paragraph 9 of the Gesetz zur Weiterentwicklung des Ausländerzentralregisters (Law on the development of the Central Register of Foreigners), (17) of 9 July 2021, entitled ‘Inadmissible applications’, provides, in subparagraph 1(1) thereof:
‘An application for asylum shall be inadmissible where:
1.      another State
(a)      pursuant to the [Dublin III] Regulation …
…
is responsible for implementing the asylum procedure.’
22.      According to
Paragraph 34a(1) of that law:
‘If the foreign national must be removed … to a State responsible for implementing the asylum procedure … the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees shall order his or her removal to that State as soon as it is established that that removal may be implemented. That shall also apply where the foreign national has lodged the application for asylum in another State responsible for implementing the asylum procedure owing to provisions of European Union law or an international treaty, or where he or she withdrew the application before the decision of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees was adopted. …’
III. The facts of the dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
23.      FB is an Afghan national who entered Germany on 25 August 2021 at the age of 19 years and who was registered as an applicant for international protection on 6 September 2021. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees requested Romania to take FB back on the ground that he had previously lodged an application for international protection in that Member State on 6 August 2021 which he subsequently implicitly withdrew. (18)
24.      As regards the material reception conditions that were granted to him from September 2021, FB was housed in a first reception centre in the District of Schweinfurt. He received the benefits in kind provided for in Paragraphs 3 and 3a of the Law on material reception conditions, namely heated and maintained housing, food, clothing, domestic energy, personal care and hygiene products as well as access to the local wireless network. In addition, he received a financial allowance to cover his ‘essential personal needs’, in the amount of EUR 101.25 for the period from 6 to 30 September 2021 and EUR 121.50 per month from October 2021. (19)
25.      Following the acceptance by Romania to take FB back, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
adopted a decision on
25 October 2021 declaring inadmissible his application for international protection and ordered that he be transferred to that Member State. (20) The deadline for that transfer was set at 22 April 2021. FB brought an action against the transfer decision, which was dismissed by a judgment of the Verwaltungsgericht Würzburg (Administrative Court, Würzburg, Germany) dated 21 December 2021.
26.      After having heard FB, the District of Schweinfurt, by a decision of 9 December 2021, restricted the material reception conditions that had been granted to him, relying on Paragraph 1a(7) of the Law on material reception conditions. (21) That decision was applicable for the period from 1 January
to 30 June 2022. From 1 January 2022, FB thus received benefits in kind covering his needs in terms of housing, food, heating and physical and health care, as well as, in the event of sickness, medical assistance benefits. On the other hand, he lost the benefits provided to cover (i) his ‘essential needs’ in terms of clothing, household goods and consumables, and (ii) his ‘essential personal needs’ referred to in the second sentence of Paragraph 3(1) of that law, that is to say, expenses for
transport, communication, leisure, entertainment, culture, accommodation, restaurant services  and other goods and services. It is apparent from the decision at issue, annexed to the national file made available to the Court, that FB has not relied on special circumstances to justify the grant of those other benefits. The transfers initially planned for 19 January 2022 and then for 2 March 2022 could not be implemented for reasons beyond FB’s control, as Romania was no longer accepting incoming transfers from 1 March 2022 on account of the war in Ukraine. On 23 February 2022, FB was transferred to another district where he benefited from conditions which are not disputed in these proceedings. It is therefore common ground that, in the present case, the relevant period runs from 1 January 2022 to 22 February 2022.
27.      FB brought an action before the Sozialgericht Würzburg (Social Court, Würzburg, Germany) seeking the grant of more favourable material reception conditions and, in particular, a financial allowance to cover his essential personal needs during that period.
28.      Although that action was dismissed by that court by a decision of 20 January 2023, it was upheld by the Bayerisches Landessozialgericht (Higher Social Court, Bavaria, Germany), by a judgment of 31 May 2023, on the ground that the restriction provided for in Paragraph 1a(7) of the Law on material reception conditions required proof of the existence of conduct contrary to an obligation, which was not established in this instance. The District of Schweinfurt therefore lodged an appeal on a point of law (Revision) before the referring court against that judgment.
29.      In those circumstances, the Bundessozialgericht (Federal Social Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)      Does a regulation of a Member State that only grants applicants …, depending on their status as persons obliged to leave the country within the time limit for transfers under [the Dublin III] Regulation, a right to accommodation, food, personal care and health and treatment in the event of illness, and, depending on the circumstances of the individual case, clothing, household goods and consumables, meet the minimum level described in Article 17(2) and (5) of Directive [2013/33]?
(2)      If Question 1 is answered in the negative:
(a)      Is [point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 20(1)] of Directive [2013/33] in conjunction with Article 2(q) of Directive [2013/32] to be interpreted as meaning that a subsequent application also covers cases in which the applicant has already previously lodged an application for international protection in another Member State and, on that basis, the [Federal Office for Migration and Refugees] has rejected the application as inadmissible under [the Dublin III] Regulation and ordered the applicant’s removal?
(b)      Is the question whether there is a subsequent application within the meaning of Article 2(q) of Directive [2013/32] in this situation dependent on the time of a withdrawal or the time of a decision of the other Member State under Article 27 or Article 28 of [that directive]?
(c)      Is [point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 20(1)] in conjunction with Article 20(5) and (6) of Directive [2013/33] in conjunction with the [Charter] to be interpreted as meaning that it is permissible to restrict reception conditions to benefits covering food and accommodation, including heating, as well as personal care and health and benefits in the event of illness and, depending on the individual case, clothing, household goods and consumables?’
30.      Written observations have been lodged by FB, by the German and Belgian Governments and by the European Commission. Those parties and interested persons (apart from the Belgian Government) took part in the hearing on 4 September 2025, at which they also answered the questions for oral answer put by the Court.
IV.    Analysis
A.      Preliminary observation
31.      In view of the content of the exchanges which took place at the hearing before the Court, I consider it useful to make a preliminary observation on the scope of the questions asked by the referring court.
32.      At the hearing, the German Government maintained that Article 27(3)(a) of the Dublin III Regulation, in that it confers on the person concerned the right to remain in the Member State concerned pending the outcome of his or her appeal against, or application for review of, the transfer decision, should be interpreted as precluding the application of Directive 2013/33. According to the German Government, because the transfer decision adopted in respect of FB became final, he no longer had the right to reside in German territory and, consequently, fell outside the scope of that directive, as defined in Article 3(1) thereof, even if the transfer had not actually been carried out.
33.      I note that that argument has not been raised by the German Government in its written observations and examining it would go beyond the scope of the dispute defined by the referring court. The referring court proceeds from the premiss that, for the relevant period, FB falls within the scope of Directive 2013/33, notwithstanding the dismissal of the action that he brought against the decision ordering his transfer to Romania and the definitive nature of that decision. In that context, the referring court merely asks the Court as to the interpretation of Article 17(2) and (5) and Article 20 of that directive as regards the extent of the right conferred on that applicant to benefit from the material reception conditions providing him an adequate standard of living. I however recall that, according to settled case-law, it is for the national court alone to define the subject matter of the questions which it wishes to refer to the Court. (22)
34.      In those circumstances, I do not think that the Court can extend the subject matter of the referring court’s questions by examining them in the light of Article 27(3) of the Dublin III Regulation
and by ascertaining whether, on account of the exhaustion of the remedy provided for in that provision, FB no longer had the right to reside on German territory, even if the transfer decision had not been enforced, and, consequently, fell outside the scope of Directive 2013/33. As that question goes considerably beyond the perimeter defined by the referring court, I think that the Court must confine itself to interpreting the provisions of that directive expressly referred to by the referring court.
B.      The conditions of application of the general rules relating to the material reception conditions set out in Article 17 of Directive 2013/33 (first question)
35.      By its first question, the referring court
asks the Court, in essence, whether Article 17(2), first subparagraph, and (5)
of Directive 2013/33 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which the competent authority withdraws the grant of the benefits intended to cover needs in terms of
clothing, household goods and consumables, paid in kind or in the form of financial allowances, from applicants in respect of whom a transfer decision has been adopted pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation, unless they establish the existence of special circumstances.
36.      That question requires analysing the treatment which the host Member State is required to provide to an applicant who is to be transferred to the Member State responsible for the examination of his or her application for international protection before examining the scope of the requirement relating to the guarantee of an adequate standard of living set out in the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33. I shall carry out this examination in the light of the situation of an applicant who, like FB, did not have his or her own resources, as was made clear at the hearing.
1.      The treatment to be granted to applicants in respect of whom a transfer decision has been adopted
37.      As its title indicates, Article 17
of Directive 2013/33 sets out the general rules on material reception conditions.
38.      Paragraph 2 of that article defines the subject matter and purpose of the measures relating to material reception conditions, requiring Member States to ensure that those measures provide an adequate standard of living for ‘applicants’ which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental health.
39.      Paragraph 5 of that article, for its part, defines the rules applicable to the determination of the amount of the financial allowances or vouchers provided for that purpose, stating that Member States may grant less favourable treatment to applicants compared with nationals in that respect, in particular where material support is partially provided in kind or where the levels established by the Member State concerned, applied for nationals, aim to ensure a standard of living higher than that prescribed for applicants under Directive 2013/33.
40.      The referring court asks the Court whether, in addition to the permitted difference in treatment between an applicant and a national, the host Member State may also treat differently applicants in respect of whom a decision that they be transferred to the Member State responsible for examining their application has been adopted, such applicants being treated less favourably than other applicants.
41.      In the light of the objective of Directive 2013/33 and of the words in which it is expressed, there is no doubt that the EU legislature did not wish to introduce a take-charge regime of variable geometry in which the applicant’s reception arrangements would depend, in reality, on whether the Member State in which he or she is present is the Member State which will rule definitively on his or her application for international protection. With the exception of the special provisions expressly laid down by the EU legislature with regard to vulnerable persons (Articles 21 to 25 of that directive), to those placed in detention (Article 10 of the said directive) or indeed to those subject to a sanction on account of their conduct (Article 20 of the same directive), no element, whether of a textual, contextual or teleological nature, permits the establishment of such a difference in treatment.
42.      First, as EU law currently stands, none of the instruments forming part of the common European asylum regime establishes a specific legal status for applicants in respect of whom a transfer decision has been adopted or provides for a specific legal regime in respect of him or her. (23)
43.      Thus, as regards Directive 2013/33, the Court held in the judgment in IPAT
that ‘applicants who are subject to the “procedures concerning applications for international protection” established by the Dublin III Regulation are clearly included in the scope ratione personae of that directive’ (24) and that that
regulation makes no distinction as to whether or not the applicant is the subject of a transfer procedure. (25) The Court observed that the EU legislature takes a uniform and transversal approach to the concept of ‘applicant’ in Article 2(b) of the said directive, which refers to ‘only one category of applicants’, comprising all third-country nationals or stateless persons who make an application for international protection on which a final decision has not yet been taken. (26) In so far as a transfer decision does not constitute a final decision on an application for international protection, the Court considered that the adoption of such a decision cannot therefore have the effect of depriving the person concerned of his or her status of ‘applicant’ within the meaning of that provision and of the rights associated with that status. (27) It must be pointed out, however, that Article 17(2) of the same directive refers to ‘applicants’ without distinguishing between them.
44.      Second, the objective of Directive 2013/33 is not to guarantee that applicants are integrated in the host Member State, but to ensure that their essential and immediate needs are provided for in order to ensure, in accordance with recitals 11
and 35 of that directive, respect for their fundamental rights.
45.      In that context, the Court has held that respect for human dignity and the right to asylum, recognised in Articles 1 and 18, respectively, of the Charter, applies not only with regard to asylum seekers present in the territory of the Member State responsible for examining their application, but also to those awaiting a decision on which State will be held responsible. (28)
46.      That reasoning must be extended to applicants who are awaiting their actual transfer to the Member State responsible for examining their application. The very concept of ‘reception’ requires taking into account an objective criterion, namely the place where the applicant is present, and not the operation of the rules set out in the Dublin III Regulation
and the associated practice, from which it follows that the date of the transfer and the date on which it is carried out remain ultimately uncertain. The Court has quite rightly emphasised that point, moreover, recalling that the exclusion of applicants from certain material reception conditions could not be justified in the light of the brevity of the procedure for the determination of the Member State responsible, having regard to the brevity of the time limits applicable to the procedure for taking charge or taking back and for transfer laid down in Articles 21 to 25 and in Article 29
of the Dublin III Regulation
and also to the situation in which the transfer is not carried out within the periods prescribed. (29) The present case is an illustration of that since not only was the maximum period within which the transfer had to be implemented six months – which is an extremely long period if the applicant, deprived of financial autonomy, does not receive a clothing allowance or a daily expenses allowance – but also that decision has never been implemented.
47.      To exclude applicants from material reception conditions on the ground that they are not ‘in the right place’ pursuant to the responsibility criteria set out by the Dublin III Regulation
would disregard their fundamental rights. Objectively, they are in a situation similar to that of applicants who are residing in the Member State responsible for their application or are waiting for that State to be determined. Their needs are the same: while they are not subject to the cooperation obligations imposed by the examination of their application, they must nevertheless be housed, fed and clothed and have a sum of money allowing them to retain a minimum of dignity and autonomy in order to enjoy the rights conferred on them by Directive 2013/33.
48.      Such an approach would also disregard the objective of Directive 2013/33, as it is expressed in recital 8 thereof, of ‘ensur[ing] equal treatment of applicants throughout the Union, [applying] during all stages and types of procedures concerning applications for international protection, in all locations and facilities hosting applicants and for as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory of the Member States as applicants’. (30) The procedure for transfer of and taking charge of or taking back an applicant by the Member State responsible for examining his or her application, carried out pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation, is, by its very nature, a ‘procedure concerning applications for international protection’. (31) It follows, moreover, from a combined reading of recital 11
and
Article 20(5) of that regulation that the standards for reception laid down in Directive 2013/33 are to apply to the procedure for the determination of the Member State responsible, that procedure being completed only once the applicant is taken charge of or taken back by that State. That was confirmed in the judgment in IPAT, where the Court held that the obligation on the Member State concerned to grant material reception conditions to the applicant ‘ceases only when that applicant is finally transferred to the requested Member State’. (32)
49.      Third, and last, to accept that the host Member State may discontinue the taking charge of applicants on the ground that it is not the Member State responsible for examining their application would run counter to the purpose of the common European asylum system by subjecting a significant proportion of applicants to national standards far less favourable than the harmonised rules established in that system. Clearly, such a measure would not make it possible to ‘ensure continuity in the protection and rights afforded by [the Dublin III Regulation] and by [the] other relevant asylum legal instruments’ as sought by the EU legislature in Article 31 of that regulation.
50.      In the light of those factors, therefore, I consider that Article 17(2), first subparagraph, and (5) of Article 17
of Directive 2013/33 preclude a national rule pursuant to which applicants in respect of whom a decision requiring their transfer to the Member State responsible for examining their application for international protection has been adopted receive less favourable treatment than other applicants.
51.      It is now appropriate to examine the second aspect of the referring court’s first question: does a Member State provide applicants an adequate standard of living ensuring their subsistence and protecting their physical and mental health if it excludes them from a clothing allowance and a daily expenses allowance intended to cover the purchase of household goods and consumables?
2.      The scope of the requirement relating to the provision of an adequate standard of living
52.      I recall that the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33 sets out the principle that national measures relating to material reception conditions are to provide an adequate standard of living for applicants which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental health.
53.      In order to determine the scope and modalities of the taking charge required in that provision, the referring court
asks the Court to clarify the scope of the requirement relating to the provision of an adequate standard of living and the content of the resulting obligations for Member States.
54.      In economic law, the expression ‘standard of living’ refers to the economic and social well-being of a person or group of persons, and in particular to his or her ability to meet his or her essential and non-essential needs.
In the context of Directive 2013/33, the EU legislature refers to both the requirement relating to the provision of an ‘adequate’ standard of living and to that relating to the preservation of a ‘dignified’ standard of living, without defining the scope of those requirements. The referring court therefore seeks to ascertain whether it is possible to draw a parallel between them.
55.      In the first place, the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33 contains no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining the meaning and the scope of ‘adequate standard of living’. In accordance with settled case-law, it is therefore necessary to identify an autonomous and uniform interpretation of that concept, by taking into account not only the wording of that provision but also its context and the objectives pursued by that directive. (33)
56.      It is in accordance with that method that the Court has defined the scope of the requirement relating to the preservation of a dignified standard of living set out in Article 20(5) of Directive 2013/33 as prohibiting Member States from placing the applicant in a situation of extreme material deprivation that would not allow him or her to meet his or her most basic needs, such as a place to live, food, clothing and personal hygiene, and which would be harmful to his or her physical or mental health and which would put him or her in a state of degradation that is incompatible with that dignity. (34) In the judgment in Cimade and GISTI, the Court had held that an applicant could not be deprived of the protection of the minimum reception standards laid down in Directive 2003/9 – even for a temporary period of time after the making of the application and before being actually transferred – at the risk inter alia of
disregarding the purpose of that directive and the requirements of Article 1 of the Charter according to which human dignity must be respected and protected. (35)
57.      In the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33, the EU legislature requires Member States to ensure that material reception conditions provide not a ‘dignified’ standard of living, but an ‘adequate’ standard of living.
58.      I note that Member States must provide that standard of living through measures relating to ‘material reception conditions’, which thus constitute the components of it. Those conditions are defined in Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33 as including ‘housing, food and clothing provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in vouchers, or a combination of the three, and a daily expenses allowance’. Although the EU legislature grants Member States a margin of discretion as to the form in which those conditions are provided, conversely, it defines their content precisely by identifying the needs to be met. As the use of the word ‘and’ shows, material reception conditions are cumulative and must be regarded as inseparably linked in that they are the means of providing an adequate standard of living for an applicant lacking financial autonomy. In the context of the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of that directive, the right to an adequate standard of living is therefore conceived as a composite right the enjoyment of which depends on the simultaneous satisfaction of each of those conditions. (36)
59.      Consequently, the Member States cannot provide for an ‘à la carte’ regime by withdrawing or removing one of those components. In that regard, I note that the words of the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33 differ from those used in Article 17(3) of that directive, which allows Member States to grant ‘all or some’ of those conditions where the applicant has his or her own resources. It follows that, pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of that directive, Member States cannot avoid their obligation to provide for both the applicant’s need for housing and food and the need for clothing and to pay him or her a daily expenses allowance.
60.      In the second place, the word ‘adequate’ implies the grant of benefits which are appropriate for the purpose of ensuring not access to a set of economic, social and cultural rights, but the subsistence of the applicant and the protection of his or her physical and mental health.
In Article 17(3) of Directive 2013/33, moreover, the EU legislature refers expressly to sufficient means to have ‘a standard of living adequate for [the applicant’s] health and to enable [his or her] subsistence’. (37) That implies the grant of benefits the content of which will be adapted to the applicant’s individual situation in a specific society and at a specific time. (38) The wording of Article 17(5) of that directive is particularly enlightening in that regard, as it requires, to that end, that the amount of the financial allowances or vouchers provided as material reception conditions is to be determined ‘on the basis of the level(s) established by the Member State concerned’. Conversely, if clothing assistance is provided in kind, I think that it must allow the applicant to have access to clothing and footwear of reasonably decent appearance, appropriate for the applicant’s gender and age, the season and in sufficient quantity.
61.      In the light of those textual elements, the requirement relating to the provision of an adequate standard of living referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33, if it covers the applicant’s basic needs, therefore goes beyond the mere right to survival. He or she must be able to lead a dignified life with access to resources which are sufficient and adapted for meeting his or her needs for housing, food, clothing and care, and for enjoying a minimum of autonomy in a given society and at a given time. (39)
62.      The context of that provision supports the interpretation that that requirement has a much broader material scope than that relating to the preservation of a dignified standard of living.
63.      The requirement relating to the provision of an adequate standard of living comes within the context of the grant of material reception conditions the modalities of which are defined in Article 17 of Directive 2013/33, whereas that relating to the preservation of a dignified standard of living comes within the context of the restriction – or indeed withdrawal – of those conditions, provided for in Article 20
thereof. (40) The latter requirement therefore constitutes an exception, which is applicable only in situations characterised by an abuse of rights or conduct contrary to the rules of law on the part of the applicant. In requiring that the integrity and dignity of the applicant be ensured, when all or some of the material reception conditions are withdrawn from him or her, the EU legislature institutes a minimum threshold below which the Member States cannot go.
64.      On the other hand, the requirement relating to the provision of an adequate standard of living referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33 constitutes the norm and necessarily is broader in scope. That may be seen in the judgment of 27 February 2014, Saciri and Others, (41) in which
the Court requires that the material reception conditions, in particular the financial aid paid for that purpose, be sufficient to ensure a standard of living that is ‘dignified … and adequate’ for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence.
65.      Last, withdrawing from the material reception conditions provided for in Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33 the benefits intended to cover an applicant’s needs for clothing, household goods and consumables would clearly frustrate the aim pursued by the EU legislature.
66.      As regards clothing aid, it is accepted that clothing is a precondition of the enjoyment of human rights in general. (42) I recall that, according to the Court, the need to clothe oneself is a ‘basic’ need, on an equal basis with the need to house oneself and to feed oneself, as it contributes to
respect for human dignity. The wearing of torn, dirty clothes, moreover, is the most visible and most revealing aspect of deprivation. Being clothed not only contributes to the protection of mental health, but clearly also to the maintenance of the physical health of the person concerned, since adapted clothing protects the body against inclement weather, cold, rain, etc. Being clothed is also the means of ensuring the useful effect of the rights which are recognised to the applicant, such as the right of movement, the right to follow vocational training or the right of access to the labour market.
67.      As regards the daily expenses allowance, this too is an essential element of material reception conditions since, as the Commission emphasised on numerous occasions at the hearing, it allows the applicant to enjoy a minimum of autonomy. Intended to be spent as the applicant sees fit and conceived as ‘pocket money’, the amount of which depends on each Member State, that allowance must allow him or her to buy everyday consumer goods, such as physical hygiene products or indeed travel tickets. According to the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), (43) that allowance pursues a number of objectives: first, to allow applicants to reach a minimum level of physical subsistence, beyond the basic necessities of housing, food or clothing; second, to ensure them a minimum standard of participation in the socio-cultural life of the Member State in which they are residing, and, third, to enable them to enjoy a certain degree of financial autonomy. (44) I would add that that allowance also allows applicants to satisfy their obligation to cooperate in the context of the procedure for examination of their application for international protection by responding to the various invitations and attending interviews, and also allows them to take advantage of the rights conferred on them to receive, for example, vocational training or to have access to health care.
68.      In that regard, I note that, in international law, it is accepted that the right to an adequate standard of living – which is also referred to as a ‘sufficient’ or an ‘appropriate’ standard of living – requires that everyone be able to have access not only to adequate food, adequate housing and adequate clothing as well as to medical care and the necessary social services, but also to other economic, social and cultural rights, necessary in a given society at a given time, such as the right to education or the right to work. (45) The goods and services must be available in sufficient quantity and be of sufficient quality, adapted to gender or age and appropriate from a cultural point of view. While opinions may differ as to the precise scope of that right, it is thus acknowledged that that right is linked to the exercise of other rights, some of which are less binding than others, and has as its basis the right to human dignity. (46) Thus, in purely economic terms, the World Bank considers that an adequate standard of living means living above the poverty line of the society in question. In its view, the provision of an adequate standard of living involves covering two types of expenses: the expenses necessary to feed oneself and to buy basic commodities and additional expenses, which reflect the cost of participating in daily life in society and which vary depending on the country. (47)
69.      It follows from all of those elements that the requirement relating to the provision of an adequate standard of living set out in the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33 therefore precludes a Member State from depriving an applicant of the benefits intended to cover his or her needs in terms of
clothing, household goods and consumables.
70.      A national rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings seems to me to be all the more problematic as it is based on an automatic exclusion from those benefits.
71.      I recall, in that regard, that the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33 is predicated on a grant as a matter of principle of the daily expenses allowance and the benefits intended to cover an applicant’s housing, food and clothing needs. That grant as a matter of principle is all the more necessary as the applicant lacks financial autonomy and from the outset cannot access the labour market in order to provide for his or her own needs and thereby ensure a certain standard of living for him or herself. The host Member State can withdraw all or part of the benefit of those material reception conditions only where the applicant has his or her own resources referred to in Article 17(3) of that directive or where he or she has abused the reception system, or has been sanctioned for a serious breach of the rules of the accommodation centre or for seriously violent behaviour, referred to in Article 20(1) to (4) of that directive.
72.      A legal regime such as that at issue is predicated on the opposite principle to that on which the first subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Directive 2013/33 is based, however, since it establishes an exclusion as a matter of principle from the benefits intended to cover the applicant’s needs in terms of
clothing, household goods and consumables. It is apparent from the
discussions which took place at the hearing that the administrative decision excluding an applicant from those benefits is automatic where a transfer decision has been taken and is adopted without consideration of the applicant’s individual situation. The applicant is then required to make application to the competent national authority by which he or she may seek reinstatement of the clothing assistance only if he or she can demonstrate special circumstances. (48) In this instance, it seems to me that the decision at issue was adopted without having been preceded by an individual examination allowing an evaluation of FB’s needs and of the consequences that his exclusion from the clothing assistance and financial allowance entailed for the continuation of his stay on the national territory.
73.      In the light of all of those considerations, I consider that Article 17(2), first subparagraph, and (5) of Directive 2013/33 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which automatically excludes an applicant from the benefits intended to cover his or her needs in terms of clothing, household goods and consumables on the sole ground that a transfer decision has been adopted in respect of him or her, pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation.
C.      The restriction or withdrawal of the material reception conditions where a subsequent application has been lodged (second question)
74.      The referring court submits its second question in the event that the legal regime at issue in the main proceedings does not meet the requirement relating to the provision of an adequate standard of living set out in Article 17(2), first subparagraph, and (5) of Directive 2013/33.
75.      By the three sub-questions that that question comprises, the referring court
seeks to ascertain whether a regime such as that at issue may be justified on the basis of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 20(1) of Directive 2013/33, by virtue of which the host Member State may restrict material reception conditions where an applicant has lodged a subsequent application as defined in Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32. According to that court, the application for international protection lodged in Germany might constitute a ‘subsequent application’ within the meaning of the latter provision. However, neither of those provisions determines whether there is a subsequent application also in a situation involving more than one Member State. In addition, the said court asks whether such a regime satisfies the guarantees expressly provided for in Article 20(5) and (6) of the said directive, in particular that relating to respect for human dignity.
76.      It should be observed at the outset that those questions were referred to the Court before it had provided essential clarifications on the concept of ‘subsequent application’ in the judgment in Khan Yunis and Baabda, to which I refer.
77.      In that judgment, the Court confirmed, in essence, that the concept of ‘subsequent application’, as defined in Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32, also covers the case in which an applicant makes a further application after another Member State has already taken a decision on an application that the applicant has previously lodged. (49) However, the Court took care to make clear that the first Member State with which the applicant lodged his or her application must have taken a ‘final decision’ on that application within the meaning of Article 2(e) of that directive. (50)
78.      It follows from the information in the order for reference, however, that the further application made by FB on 6 September 2021 in Germany
cannot be characterised as a ‘subsequent application’ within the meaning of Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32, thus rendering point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 20(1) of Directive 2013/33 inapplicable. All the participants in the hearing are thus in agreement that the said application was lodged before the taking of a final decision on the application that he had previously lodged in Romania on 6 August 2021 and then implicitly withdrew.
79.      A period of four weeks was clearly too short to allow the Romanian authorities to carry out a full examination of that initial application, allowing them to determine whether FB met the conditions to be granted the status of refugee or that conferred by subsidiary protection.
80.      In addition, the decision declaring inadmissible the application lodged by FB in Germany was adopted before the expiry of the nine-month period that the Member States are asked to observe in Article 28(2) of Directive 2013/32 before treating a new application as a subsequent application where the initial application has been implicitly withdrawn.
81.      Last, I understand that, pursuant to
Article 20(5) and Article 23(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, Germany
has engaged the responsibility of Romania and requested that FB be taken back on the basis of Article 18(1)(c) of that regulation on the ground that he had lodged a new application with the German authorities after having implicitly withdrawn the application previously lodged with the Romanian authorities. Romania has indeed agreed to take the applicant back on the basis of that article. That basis presupposes to my mind, however, that the initial application was not rejected and, consequently, that a final decision was not adopted. (51)
82.      In those circumstances, I propose that the Court rule that Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32, to which point (c) of the first subparagraph of
Article 20(1) of Directive 2013/33 refers, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘subsequent application’ does not cover the situation in which an applicant lodges a new application in one Member State before another Member State has adopted a final decision on an application that he or she lodged previously.
V.      Conclusion
83.      Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Bundessozialgericht (Federal Social Court, Germany) as follows:
(1)      Article 17(2), first subparagraph, and (5)
of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection,
must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which automatically excludes a person applying for international protection from the benefits intended to cover his or her needs in terms of
clothing, household goods and consumables
on the sole ground that a transfer decision has been adopted in respect of him or her, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person.
(2)      Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, to which point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 20(1) of Directive 2013/33 refers,
must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘subsequent application’ does not cover the situation in which an applicant for international protection lodges a new application in one Member State before another Member State has adopted a final decision on an application that he or she lodged previously.
1      Original language: French.
2      The ‘applicants’.
3      Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 26 June 2013
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection
(OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96).
4      The ‘host Member State’.
5      Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person
(OJ 2013 L180, p. 31; ‘the Dublin III Regulation’).
6      Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).
7      C‑179/11, ‘the judgment in Cimade and GISTI’, EU:C:2012:594.
8      C‑233/18, EU:C:2019:956.
9      C‑322/19 and
C‑385/19, ‘the judgment in IPAT’, EU:C:2021:11.
10      C‑422/21, EU:C:2022:616. See, also, the Sidi Bouzid
case (C‑184/24), currently pending.
11      C‑123/23 and C‑202/23, ‘the judgment in Khan Yunis and Baabda’, EU:C:2024:1042.
12 The ‘Charter’.
13      BGBl. 1997 I, p. 2022.
14      BGBl 2021 I, p. 5162.
15      BGBl. 1992 I, p. 1126.
16      BGBl. 2008 I, p. 1798.
17      BGBl 2021 I, p. 2467.
18      This situation corresponds to that described in point (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 2013/32.
19      It follows from national law that the ‘essential personal needs’ of applicants include expenses for transport, communication, leisure, entertainment, culture, accommodation, restaurant services and other goods and services.
20      The ‘transfer decision’.
21      The ‘decision at issue’.
22      See judgments of
23 October 1997, Franzén (C‑189/95, EU:C:1997:504, paragraph 79), and of
17 October 2024, Sony Computer Entertainment Europe (C‑159/23, EU:C:2024:887, paragraph 28).
23      See, in that regard, my Opinion in Joined Cases The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others (C‑322/19 and C‑385/19, EU:C:2020:642, point 53).
24      Judgment in IPAT (paragraph 65), emphasis added. See, also,
paragraphs 61
to 73 – paragraph 67 in particular – of that judgment. In that judgment, the Court ruled that Article 15
of Directive 2013/33 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which excludes an applicant for international protection from a reception condition, namely access to the labour market, on the sole ground that a transfer decision has been taken in his or her regard under the Dublin III Regulation. The judgment in IPAT
is based on the principles developed by the Court in paragraphs 36
to 50 of the judgment in Cimade and GISTI. In that judgment, the Court ruled that a Member State which has received an application for international protection is obliged to grant the minimum conditions for reception of asylum seekers laid down in Council Directive 2003/9/EC of
27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (OJ 2003 L 31, p. 18), which was repealed and replaced by Directive 2013/33, even to an asylum seeker in respect of whom it decides, under Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national
(OJ 2003 L 50, p. 1), which was repealed and replaced by the Dublin III Regulation, to call upon another Member State to take charge of or take back that applicant.
25      See judgment in IPAT (paragraph 64).
26      See judgments in IPAT (paragraph 67) and in Cimade and GISTI (paragraph 40).
27      See, to that effect, judgment in IPAT (paragraphs 64
and 68).
28      See judgment in Cimade and GISTI (paragraphs 42
and 43).
29      See judgment in Cimade and GISTI (paragraphs 44
and 45).
30      Emphasis added.
31      See my Opinion in Joined Cases The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others (C‑322/19 and C‑385/19, EU:C:2020:642, point 67).
32      See judgment in IPAT (paragraph 68).
33      See judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck (292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12);
of 29 February
2024, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl (Subsequent religious conversion) (C‑222/22, EU:C:2024:192, paragraph 25); and of 4 September
2025, Casa Judeţeană de Asigurări de Sănătate Mureș and Others (C‑489/23, EU:C:2025:651, paragraph 31).
34      See judgment of 1 August 2022, Ministero dell’Interno (Withdrawal of material reception conditions) (C‑422/21, EU:C:2022:616, paragraphs 39
and 40), which refers to the judgment of 12 November 2019, Haqbin (C‑233/18, EU:C:2019:956, paragraphs 46
to 48).
35      See judgment in Cimade and GISTI (paragraph 56).
36      See, in that regard, in international law, Eide, A., and Eide, W.B., ‘Adequate Standard of Living’, in Moeckli, D., et al, International Human Rights Law, 4th Ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 187
to 208.
37      Emphasis added.
38      See, on that topic, Smith, R.K.M., International Human Rights Law, 10th
Ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, in particular Chapter 16, entitled ‘The right to an adequate standard of living’, pp. 307
to 321, paragraph 16.1.2, and also Eide, A. and Eide, W.B., ‘Article 25’, in Alfredsson, G., and Eide, A., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a Common Standard of Achievement, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2023, pp. 523
to 550.
39      See Eide, A., and Eide, W.B., ‘Adequate Standard of Living’, op. cit., in particular paragraph 2. See also Trebilcock, A., ‘La notion de droit à un niveau de vie suffisant’, in Thouvenin, J.-M., and Trebilcock, A., Le droit international social: Droits Économiques, Sociaux et Culturels, pp. 1664 to 1680, in particular paragraph 19.
40      See, also,
recitals 11
and 35 of Directive 2013/33.
41      C‑79/13, EU:C:2014:103, paragraph 40.
42      On the subject of a right to adequate clothing, see Graham, L.G., ‘Reasserting the Right to Adequate Clothing in International Human Rights Law’, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 24, No 1, 2024.
43      EUAA has replaced the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).
44      EUAA, Guidance on Reception – Operational standards and indicators, September 2016, p. 31.
45      This right is enshrined, in particular, in Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, which states that ‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control’ (see Eide, A. and Eide, W.B., ‘Article 25’, op. cit., in particular pp. 531
and 532). This right is also enshrined in Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976 and which provides, in paragraph 1 thereof, that ‘the States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions’).
46      See Trebilcock, A., op. cit., in particular paragraphs 14, 20 and 21, and Smith, R.K.M., op. cit., in particular paragraph 16.1.
47      See Eide, A., and Eide, W.B., ‘Adequate Standard of Living’, op. cit., in particular paragraph 2.
48      It is apparent from the order for reference that the applicant was ‘heard’ in the context of the adoption of the decision at issue.
49      See judgment in Khan Yunis and Baabda (paragraph 53).
50      See judgment in Khan Yunis and Baabda (paragraph 74). ‘Final decision’ means, in accordance with Article 2(e) of Directive 2013/32, ‘a decision on whether the third-country national or stateless person be granted refugee or subsidiary protection status by virtue of Directive 2011/95/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011
on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted
(OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9)] and which is no longer subject to a remedy within the framework of Chapter V of … Directive [2013/32]’.
51      In accordance with the provisions laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, in those circumstances it is for the requested Member State to ensure that ‘the applicant is entitled to request that the examination of his or her application be completed or to lodge a new application for international protection, which shall not be treated as a subsequent application’ (emphasis added).