Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
BIONDI
delivered on 30 October 2025 (1)
Joined Cases C‑440/24 P and C‑441/24 P
Republic of Latvia
v
Petr Aven
(C‑440/24 P)
and
Mikhail Fridman (C‑441/24 P)
( Appeal – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Inclusion on the lists of persons, entities and bodies concerned – Article 2(1)(a) and (d) of Decision
2014/145/CFSP – Criterion of support for actions or policies – Criterion of supporting, materially or financially, responsible Russian decision-makers – Criterion of benefitting from Russian decision-makers – Effective judicial protection – Comprehensive
review by the EU Courts
of the restrictive measures – Relevance of the context in the assessment of the merits of the grounds for inclusion – Failure to distance oneself )
1.        The present appeals brought by the Republic of Latvia, which was an intervener before the General Court of the European Union, provide the Court of Justice with a chance to
reiterate and further clarify the extent of the Council of the European Union’s discretion, its burden of proof and the standard of judicial review which the EU Courts are required to guarantee.
2.        The Republic of Latvia seeks the annulment of the judgments in Aven v Council (2) and Fridman v Council (3) (taken together, ‘the judgments under appeal’) by which the General Court respectively upheld the actions of Mr Petr Aven and of Mr Mikhail Fridman both seeking the annulment, first, of Decision (CFSP) 2022/337 (4) and of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 (5) (taken together, ‘the initial acts at issue’) and, second, of Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 (6) and of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 (7) (taken together, ‘the maintaining acts at issue’), in so far as those acts (taken together, ‘the acts at issue’)
concern them.
3.        Mr Aven and Mr Fridman were included on the lists of persons whose assets are to be frozen on the basis of two criteria laid down in Article 2(1) of Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 of 25 February 2022 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1). The Council included Mr Aven and Mr Fridman on the ground that it considered that they ‘[were] supporting or implementing’ actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and its stability and security (Article 2(1)(a)
of Decision 2014/145, as amended, ‘criterion (a)’) and that they were ‘supporting, materially or financially, …
Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine’ or that they ‘[were] benefitting from [those decision-makers]’ (Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, ‘criterion (d)’).
I.      Background to the dispute and the judgments under appeal
4.        As regards the background to the dispute, I refer to paragraphs 2 to 14 of the judgment in Aven v Council and paragraphs 2 to 14 of the judgment in Fridman v Council.
5.        In his action before the General Court, Mr Aven relied on two pleas in law, the first alleging errors of assessment by the Council which led it incorrectly to include and maintain his name
on the lists at issue and the second, directed against the maintaining acts, alleging infringement of the obligation to review periodically his situation and the obligation to state reasons. The General Court examined the merits of the inclusion and maintenance of Mr Aven on those lists under criteria (a) and (d) in the light, in particular, of the alleged errors of assessment of the facts by the Council. (8) From its analysis, it concluded that none of the grounds set out in the contested acts before it was substantiated to the requisite legal standard and that there was therefore no reason to include and maintain Mr Aven on the lists. (9) The General Court therefore upheld the first plea in law and annulled the acts at issue in so far as they concerned Mr Aven.
6.        Mr Fridman, for his part, raised the same two pleas in law before the General Court, which examined only the first plea alleging errors of assessment. Analysing the alleged errors of assessment of the facts by the Council, the General Court concluded that none of the grounds set out in the contested acts was substantiated to the requisite legal standard and that there was therefore no reason to include and maintain Mr Fridman on the lists at issue. (10) The General Court therefore upheld the first plea in law and annulled the acts at issue in so far as they concerned Mr Fridman.
II.    Procedure before the Court of Justice and forms of order sought by the parties
7.        In Case C‑440/24 P, the Republic of Latvia claims that the Court should set aside the judgment in Aven v Council and order each party to bear its own costs. Mr Aven contends that the Court of Justice should, principally, dismiss the appeal as in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded, alternatively, dismiss the appeal and, in any event, order the Republic of Latvia to pay the costs.
8.        In Case C‑441/24 P, the Republic of Latvia claims that the Court should set aside the judgment in Fridman v Council and order each party to bear its own costs. Mr Fridman contends that the Court of Justice should, principally, dismiss the appeal as in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded, alternatively, dismiss the appeal and, in any event, order the Republic of Latvia to pay the costs.
9.        By decisions of the President of the Court of 29 October 2024 and of 6 November 2024, the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania were granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Republic of Latvia in these cases which were then joined for the purposes of the oral procedure and of the judgment. (11)
III. The appeals
10.      In each of its two appeals, the Republic of Latvia raises four similar grounds of appeal.
11.      The first alleges failure to have regard to the case-law established in Kadi, (12) the second alleges distortion of the evidence adduced by the Council, the third alleges an error of law in the application of criterion
(d), and the fourth alleges an error of law in that the General Court did not characterise the failure to distance oneself as support for the purposes of criterion (a).
A.      Preliminary observations
12.      Before I analyse the present appeals, I would like to make two preliminary observations.
1.      The depth of the judicial review and the analytical framework
13.      The various grounds of appeal relied on in the present action may be summarised in a single question: that of the standard of judicial review to be carried out by the EU Courts
on the lawfulness of the restrictive measures adopted by the Council. That is not a novel question. The EU Courts are expected to achieve a delicate, but ultimately fair balance between different, and potentially contradictory, principles and legal standards.
14.      The two sides of the scale are, on the one hand, the Council’s power as regards adoption of restrictive measures and, on the other hand, the protection of the rights of persons who are affected by those measures.
15.      It is also impossible to ignore the fact that these appeals are set in the context of the invasion of Ukraine, a flagrant violation of international law and of the United Nations Charter, (13) which constitutes one of the most serious threats to European security and the international order since the end of the Second World War. It is an ever-present concern in the Republic of Latvia’s line of argument.
16.      The importance of the objectives pursued by the Council, which form part of the wider objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action stated in Article 21 TEU, and the progressive increase, according to their effectiveness, of the restrictive measures adopted by the Council in reaction to the Russian Federation’s actions destabilising Ukraine, has already been acknowledged. (14) The schemes of restrictive measures resulting from the acts at issue are aimed at exerting maximum pressure on the Russian Federation by increasing the costs of its actions
designed to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
17.      There is no doubt as to the broad discretion available to the Council
in deciding the appropriateness of the restrictive measures and in defining the conditions for them. I would add that that discretion extends to the degree of severity of those measures and to their, in practice, unlimited nature, for the purposes of determining whether they are capable of putting an end to the very serious violation of international law by the Russian Federation.
18.      That discretion cannot, however, absolve the Council from ensuring and demonstrating the well-founded nature of the grounds which led to the inclusion and maintenance of the names of the persons to the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures, that is to say, of individual decisions affecting them adversely to a considerable degree. (15)
19.      In that regard, I would point out
that,
before it analysed the merits of the inclusion and maintenance of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman on the lists pursuant to criteria (a) and (d),
the General Court made preliminary observations which fully reflect the analytical framework developed by the Court of Justice in its case-law.
20.      The Court has also recently reiterated, first, that ‘as part of the review of the lawfulness of the reasons which are the basis of the decision to include or to maintain a person’s name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects the person concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated.’ (16)
21.      Second, it confirmed that such an assessment ‘must be carried out by examining the evidence not in isolation but in the context in which it fits, and the Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person subject to a measure freezing his or her funds and the regime being combated …
. Furthermore, it is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. Although there is no requirement that that authority produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged, it is, however, necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned’. (17)
22.      It is also clear from the case-law of the Court that, in
reviewing restrictive measures, the EU Courts must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the Treaties, ensure the review – in principle the comprehensive
review – of the lawfulness of EU acts, which also applies to the review of acts establishing restrictive measures. (18)
23.      It is therefore with that analytical framework in mind that the present appeals must be examined.
2.      The listing criteria
24.      It is then appropriate to recall briefly the criteria used by the Council to include and maintain the names of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman on the lists of persons whose assets are to be frozen.
25.      Those criteria were defined by the Council, which exercised for that purpose the broad discretion conferred upon it in that regard (19) and which is not disputed here. Decision 2022/329 amended the listing criteria, in a context characterised by the urgent need to adopt additional restrictive measures in view of the gravity of the situation. (20)
26.      The General Court explicitly ruled out the possibility that the inclusion and maintenance on the lists – both in the case of Mr Aven and in the case of Mr Fridman – could have been based on other criteria, (21) as implied by the Council, in the proceedings before the General Court. That conclusion is not called into question in the present appeals. Criteria (a) and (d) must therefore be regarded as the only criteria that are relevant to the analysis.
27.      It is therefore clear from criterion (a) that the funds and economic resources (22) of natural persons who ‘are supporting or implementing’ actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine or its stability and security, are to be frozen.
28.      Criterion (d), on the other hand, is targeted in particular at freezing the funds of natural persons either because they are supporting, materially or financially, Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine, or because they are benefitting from those decision-makers.
29.      Those acts do not contain any definition of the concepts of ‘support’, ‘material or financial support’, or ‘Russian decision-makers’
or of what is understood by the expression ‘benefit from’. They also do not contain information as regards how such concepts are to be proven. (23)
30.      It follows from paragraph 41 of the judgments under appeal that the General Court held that criterion (a) ‘implies that a direct or indirect link is established between the activities or the actions of the person …
targeted and the situation in Ukraine, underpinning the adoption of the restrictive measures concerned. … Those persons must, by their conduct, have supported persons responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’.
31.      It follows from paragraph 42 of those judgments that the General Court held that criterion (d) ‘applies in a targeted and selective manner to natural
persons … who, even [if they]
do not, as such, have any link with the
annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine, support, materially or financially, or benefit from Russian decision-makers responsible for that annexation or destabilisation’. Criterion (d), according to the General Court, comprises two elements: material or financial support for Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine and the fact that they benefit from those decision-makers. Those two criteria are not cumulative and, as regards benefit, it is sufficient that the person concerned benefits from Russian decision-makers without it being necessary to establish a link between the benefits enjoyed by the designated persons or entities and the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine.
B.      The first ground of appeal in Cases C‑440/24 P and C‑441/24 P, alleging an error of law in that the General Court failed to have regard to the case-law established in the judgment in Kadi
1.      Summary of the arguments of the parties
32.      Before setting out its arguments, the Republic of Latvia, supported by the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania, makes a series of general remarks concerning the need to establish consistent case-law and to take into consideration the broader context of the Russian regime and of its influence. Such an assessment must be carried out bearing in mind the requirements laid down in Article 3(1) and (5) and Article 21(1) and (2)(a) and (c) TEU.
33.      According to the Republic of Latvia, the General Court misapplied the case-law stated in paragraph 31 of the judgments under appeal in that it merely examined the items of evidence produced by the Council individually and in isolation, whereas that examination should have been supplemented by an overall joint assessment of the evidence taking into account the context in which that evidence was set.
34.      Accordingly, the Republic of Latvia maintains that judicial review of the restrictive measures should take place in three stages. First, the General Court should have examined whether one of the pleas in law justified, in itself, inclusion on the lists. If none of the grounds taken individually could justify inclusion, the General Court should have examined the items of evidence together. It should then have used information outside of the limits of the items of evidence adduced, something which is essential
to the assessment of the lawfulness of restrictive measures. The external context is a tool at the General Court’s disposal for assessing the evidence where that evidence is inseparable from a given situation (24) and where the Council encounters difficulties in gathering evidence, as is the case in the Russian context. Evidence concerning the proximity of a person with a government and his or her status as an ‘oligarch’ in an authoritarian regime should be assessed in the light of that specific context, including the fact that the business world is forced to show support for the policies of an authoritarian regime. The General Court did not take into account information clarifying that context provided by the Council’s rejoinder before the General Court. The Republic of Latvia cites, in particular, a press article dating from 2012, a report by the Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies and a statement made by Mr Aven on the Russian economic environment and the decision-makers’ involvement in its advancement. Lastly, by analogy with the judgment in Council v Bamba, (25) the General Court should have concluded that, in the light of the context supporting the inextricable link between
the Russian economic environment and the political leaders, the statement of reasons for the acts at issue was sufficient.
35.      First of all, Mr Aven and Mr Fridman suggest that the Court of Justice make use of Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure. They also contend, principally, that the line of argument developed by the Republic of Latvia in the first ground of its appeal is unclear and that it should be rejected as inadmissible. Alternatively, they contend that the appellant’s line of argument amounts to requesting the General Court to substitute its own reasoning for that of the author of the act at issue, which is precluded by the case-law. (26) The Council’s reasons should be assessed only on the basis of the evidence on which the Council relied when taking its decision. (27) Mr Aven and Mr Fridman maintain that the General Court cannot go beyond the Council’s documentary basis by taking into account the functioning of the Russian regime. In any event, even if the General Court had had to undertake such an analysis, the conclusion would not have been different.
2.      Analysis
36.      It should be stated at the outset that, contrary to what Mr Aven and Mr Fridman maintain, the present appeals do not seem
to be either manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded and cannot be dealt with by an order adopted pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure.
37.      The complaint based on the inadmissibility of that first ground of appeal must also be rejected. Contrary to what Mr Aven and Mr Fridman maintain, the appellant’s line of argument is completely clear and is easily understood,
as is, moreover, attested by the fact that Mr Aven and Mr Fridman succeeded in adopting a position on the substance of that ground of appeal in order to conclude that it is unfounded.
38.      Concerning the substance of the first ground of appeal, the Republic of Latvia seeks, in general, to challenge the manner in which the General Court conducted its analysis. It claims that it separated the grounds for inclusion and the items of evidence allegedly supporting them whereas it should have conducted an overall joint analysis of those grounds and items of evidence in the light of the surrounding context. In that sense, the first ground of appeal is closely linked to the second ground of appeal which it raised.
39.      I propose to group the Republic of Latvia’s arguments relating to that first ground of appeal into two issues: (i) the taking into account of the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures; (ii) the complaint alleging failure to have regard to the case-law in the judgment in Kadi as a result of examining the items of evidence in isolation and of a failure to take the external context into account.
40.      First, as to the Republic of Latvia’s argument maintaining that the assessment of the lawfulness of the restrictive measures must be carried out bearing in mind the requirements laid down in Articles 3 and 21 TEU, there is no question here of denying the importance of the restrictive measures for the achievement of the European Union’s objectives and actions on the international stage. I must point out, however, that the EU Courts’
standard of review, as defined in the Court’s case-law, also responds to a primary normative
imperative, since it follows from Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In other words, even where Articles 3 and 21 TEU are relied on, a comprehensive judicial review is necessary.
41.      It should also be noted that the judicial review aims to ensure that the Council has fulfilled its obligations. In that regard, I would point out
that it is obliged, when adopting restrictive measures, to respect fundamental rights, (28) including the right to good administration, from which the right of every person to have his or her affairs handled fairly and impartially follows. (29)
42.      Second, as regards the General Court’s obligations when ruling on the merits of the grounds for including or maintaining a person on the lists of persons whose assets are to be frozen, I would point out
that it is incumbent on that court to ensure that
decisions to include or maintain persons on the lists have a sufficiently solid factual basis. The facts alleged in the statement of reasons must be verified and the review cannot limit itself to an assessment of their likelihood in the abstract. The information and evidence produced by the Council must be able to substantiate at least one of the reasons for inclusion
and the EU Courts
must be able to establish whether that information and evidence is factually accurate and to assess their probative value according to the circumstances of the present case and in the light of the observations submitted by the person concerned.
43.      Moreover, the lawfulness of the grounds for inclusion may also be assessed by examining the evidence not in isolation, but in its context, with the Council discharging the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts
a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person subject to a measure freezing his or her funds and the regime being combated. (30) Recourse to the context enables the Council to satisfy the burden of proof in situations where access to information is difficult, as is, for example, the case in the judgment in Anbouba v Council. (31)
44.      Undeniably, context may be used to assess the lawfulness of the listing criteria, (32) as may the merits of the grounds for inclusion. However, although context may always support a ground or item of evidence, it cannot take the place of one.
45.      In the judgment in Anbouba v Council, the grounds for including the person concerned made reference to a certain number of items of evidence
relating, inter alia, to certain positions held by the person concerned in the Syrian economy. Those grounds were based on facts that were recognised and relevant at the time of that person’s inclusion. Examined in isolation, those facts did not indicate support; taken together and shown in context, they became a body of evidence sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that that person provided economic support for the Syrian regime. (33)
46.      In my view, the difficulty in the present appeals lies in the fact that the grounds for the inclusion of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman and the evidence supporting them were based on factors incapable of indicating support within the meaning of criterion (a) or (d) or benefit within the meaning of criterion (d). In other words, at the end of the General Court’s analysis in the judgments under appeal, there was no longer anything that could be clarified by the context.
47.      The Republic of Latvia’s position is as follows: since Mr Aven and Mr Fridman are Russian oligarchs, they could only achieve such a level of economic success by supporting or being supported – and therefore benefitting from – the Russian regime in general and Mr Putin in particular.
48.      It is highly likely that that statement is factually correct.
49.      The fact remains that the standard of judicial protection under EU law is more demanding and if
the review is to
be comprehensive, it must take into account the content of the listing criteria and ensure correspondence between the grounds for inclusion, the evidence supporting them and the criterion itself. A comprehensive
review cannot be reconciled with the establishment of a presumption by recourse to context.
50.      An interpretation of the evidence in the light of the context
cannot go so far as to change the nature of the criterion itself.
51.      Moreover, the contextual factors submitted by the Republic of Latvia, which partly restate factors from the Council’s rejoinder before the General Court, cannot hide the fact that such
context was not adduced in the acts at issue. (34) The Council was therefore required to state the detailed and specific grounds – where appropriate, a body of specific, precise and consistent evidence – tied to facts capable of indicating conduct such as those referred to in criteria (a) and (d), as stated by me at the beginning of the analysis.
52.      Therefore, in my view, the General Court was
correct in so far as it held that, although the various grounds stated in paragraph 44 of the judgments under appeal were such as to establish a form of proximity with Mr Putin or his entourage, they were unable to demonstrate that Mr Aven and Mr Fridman had supported actions or policies undermining Ukraine, within the meaning of criterion (a), or that they had benefitted from those decision-makers within the meaning of criterion (d). (35)
53.      Since the criteria adopted are of a general nature and the provisions establishing them contain no definition of what is meant by ‘support’ for the actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, ‘materially or financially supporting Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine’ or the expression ‘benefit from’ those decision-makers, nor any details on how those matters are to be proved, there is no reason, in my view, to depart from the line of case-law according to which the determination whether the inclusion of a person on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures is well founded always requires evidence of factors capable of showing that the person in question provided economic support to the regime or that he or she benefitted from that regime. (36) No presumption follows from the wording of criteria (a) and (d) of any support for the Russian regime, or of any benefit from Russian decision-makers merely because of the status of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman in the Russian economy. (37)
54.      As regards the argument based on the fact that the judicial review of restrictive measures is a review in three stages as described by the appellant in the appeal, I do not find any support for it in the Court’s case-law.
55.      In particular, the assertion that, if none of the grounds taken individually may justify inclusion, the General Court must examine the evidence as a whole, seems difficult to reconcile with the principle, repeatedly stated, that if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the grounds referred to is sufficiently detailed and specific,
is substantiated and constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such grounds cannot justify the annulment of that decision. (38) If a single ground can suffice, it must at least be well-founded. However, if none of the grounds is substantiated, analysing them as a whole cannot cause a different conclusion to be reached.
56.      The argument based on the judgment in National Iranian Oil Company v Council (39) is unconvincing. The Republic of Latvia seeks to argue that the Court acknowledged, in paragraph 78 of that judgment, that the ‘external’ context is a tool at the General Court’s disposal for assessing the evidence where it is inseparable from a given situation and where the Council encounters difficulties in gathering evidence, as is the case in the Russian context.
57.      However, first, in paragraph 78 of the judgment in National Iranian Oil Company v Council, although the Court recognises the possibility of recourse to the context for the purpose of interpreting decisions adopted in the field of the common foreign and security policy, that is in examining the lawfulness of the listing criteria and not of the evidence intended to support the grounds for inclusion. Second, it is not apparent from the judgments under appeal that the Council intended to rely on difficulties in obtaining evidence. (40)
58.      I shall now turn to the argument that the General Court should have taken into account the external context surrounding the restrictive measures against Mr Aven and Mr Fridman and that the information provided by the Council in its rejoinder before the General Court should have been taken into consideration as evidence capable of demonstrating that, in the light of the context, the statement of reasons of the acts at issue was sufficient; that argument it clearly stems from confusion between, on the one hand, the review of compliance with the obligation to state reasons and, on the other hand, the examination of the merits of the inclusion, which requires ascertaining whether the evidence relied on by the Council for the purposes of inclusion is established and whether it is capable of justifying the adoption of those measures. (41) The General Court’s review in the two judgments under appeal, however, related
solely to the latter examination.
59.      For all the foregoing reasons, I propose that the first ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded.
C.      The second ground of appeal in Cases C‑440/24 P and C‑441/24 P, alleging distortion of the evidence adduced by the Council
1.      Summary of the parties’ lines of argument
60.      By its second ground of appeal which it considers to be closely linked to the first, the Republic of Latvia, supported by the interveners, argues, in essence, that the General Court distorted the evidence produced by the Council by not examining it in its context.
61.      As regards paragraph 74 of the judgment in Aven v Council, according to the Republic of Latvia, the interpretation adopted of items of evidence No 3 and No 7 runs counter to the objective pursued by the measures adopted by the Council and the question whether American sanctions were ultimately adopted is irrelevant to the assessment
of the probative value of the evidence submitted by the Council intended to highlight the close relationship between Mr Aven and Mr Putin and the fact that Mr Aven became an integral part of the Russian regime.
62.      As regards items of evidence No 4 and No 12, it is claimed that the General Court limited itself
to a mechanical interpretation of the facts, whereas both the ‘Salié’ Committee of Inquiry and the lobbying of Mr Putin on behalf of Alfa Bank, one of Russia’s main private banks, illustrates the close, long-standing and special relationship between Mr Aven and the Russian regime as well as mutual and indissociable support.
63.      Items of evidence No 10 and No 11 again allegedly indicate the proximity of Mr Aven with Mr Putin in so far as Mr Putin’s daughter was concerned.
64.      As regards items of evidence No 2 and No 3, it is claimed that they prove that Mr Aven engaged in the Kremlin’s efforts to lift the Western sanctions and that Mr Aven was involved in a certain number of discussions with the Russian Government.
65.      It allegedly follows from all those items of evidence that Mr Aven is not acting independently from the Russian Government but, on the contrary, forms part of the Russian regime to which he is inextricably linked and that he had to be aware of the policies, approach and priorities of that regime when he acted as emissary. The responsibilities and tasks entrusted to Mr Aven demonstrate that.
66.      As regards items of evidence No 8 and No 9, it is claimed that examination of that evidence in its context would have enabled the General Court to find that it was not merely a matter of exercising a constitutionally guaranteed right, in view of the erosion of the rule of law and of the independence of the Prosecutor General
and the concentration of powers in the hands of the Russian President. The General Court may have been more convinced by the probative value of a legal opinion on a letter sent by Mr Aven to the Russian President without taking into account the circumstances under which that opinion was obtained.
67.      As regards the judgment in Fridman v Council, the Republic of Latvia maintains that the General Court erred in rejecting the probative value of item of evidence No 7 which, however, establishes lobbying of Mr Putin on behalf of Alfa Group Turkey rewarding the loyalty of the Alfa Group – a conglomerate established in 1989 which includes Alfa Bank – to the Russian regime. Such lobbying clearly illustrates the close, long-standing and special relationship between Mr Fridman and the Russian regime. Contrary to what the General Court held in paragraph 49 of the judgment in Fridman v Council, the ground based on political support in 2005 should have been taken into account for the purposes of justifying Mr Fridman’s inclusion on the lists.
68.      As regards items of evidence No 1 and No 2 relating to Mr Fridman’s status as a billionaire shareholder of Alfa Bank, it is claimed that the General Court, once again, ignored the broader context which it was required to take into consideration, (42) whereas that evidence establishes Mr Fridman’s status in the Russian economy.
69.      Mr Fridman’s closeness to the Russian President is also allegedly illustrated by items of evidence No 5 and No 6.
70.      The Republic of Latvia submits that item of evidence No 2 clearly indicates that Mr Fridman engaged in the Kremlin’s efforts to lift the Western sanctions. Evidence has been adduced proving that Mr Fridman does not act independently of the Russian Government but, on the contrary, forms part of the Russian regime to which he is inextricably linked. He could not be unaware of the policies, approach and priorities of that regime when he acted as its emissary. The responsibilities and tasks entrusted to Mr Fridman substantiate the close and inextricable links between Mr Putin and Mr Fridman.
71.      Ultimately, it is claimed that the examination of all the evidence was vitiated since the General Court considered it solely through a fundamentally warped lens.
72.      Mr Aven and Mr Fridman contend, principally, that that second ground of appeal is inadmissible and, alternatively, that it is manifestly unfounded.
2.      Analysis
73.      I refer to the Court’s settled case-law according to which, under Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts and the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence does not, therefore, save where they have been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal. Furthermore, where an appellant alleges a distortion of the evidence by the General Court, he or she must indicate precisely the facts and evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in his or her view, led to such distortion. Lastly, that distortion must be obvious from the erroneous nature of the assessment of the existing facts and evidence, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of them. (43)
74.      Contrary to what Mr Aven and Mr Fridman maintain, the second ground of appeal is admissible, since the Republic of Latvia’s line of argument satisfies the requirements that I have just mentioned, as it sets out, in a precise and detailed manner, the distortion of a whole number of items of evidence owing to the fact that the General Court did not take into account the context in which they are set.
(a)    The allegation of distortion of the evidence concerning Mr Aven
75.      As regards the evidence contained in items of evidence No 3 and No 7, the General Court examined the ground stating that Mr Aven had a meeting with Mr Putin in 2016 who warned him of the possible adoption of additional sanctions against him or against Alfa Bank by the United States. The General Court then held that that evidence sought to establish that Mr Aven had benefitted from Russian decision-makers within the meaning of criterion (d). (44) However, the General Court concluded, in paragraph 74 of the judgment in Aven v Council, that, although Mr Aven does not dispute the facts, it was not apparent from the evidence file that the additional American sanctions had ultimately been adopted.
76.      The mere mention of a possibility, without any specific benefit being obtained, was not considered capable of establishing the benefit, and consideration of the context would not alter that conclusion. Criterion (d) is not so worded as to cover the mere possibility of benefit. It must be stated that the conclusion which the General Court reached in paragraph 74 of the judgment in Aven v Council is not manifestly erroneous and does not, therefore, constitute a distortion.
77.      As the Republic of Latvia maintains, although it is possible to argue that increased efficiency of restrictive measures and more rapid achievement of the objectives they pursue render it necessary to allow inclusions of persons even in such cases, it is nevertheless for the Council to formulate the criterion to that effect.
78.      As regards the evidence contained in items of evidence No 4 and No 12, the Republic of Latvia complains that the General Court gave a mechanical interpretation of the facts. I find it difficult to understand how a mechanical interpretation of the facts – that is to say, excessively close to the facts – can be found to be manifestly erroneous.
79.      In any event, and in the first place, as regards the ground based on the fact that Mr Putin rewarded Alfa Group, of which Mr Aven was a major shareholder, for its loyalty in providing political support in 2005 for the group’s investment plans in Türkiye, the General Court held that that ground was intended to establish that Mr Aven benefitted from Russian decision-makers within the meaning of criterion (d). The General Court held that the Russian decision-makers responsible for the benefits referred to in that criterion must have begun to prepare for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of
Ukraine for it to be found that the recipients of those benefits could not have been unaware of the involvement of those decision-makers in that preparation. Finding that those policies and actions were implemented from the end of February 2014, the General Court held that the ground of political support obtained in 2005 was not such as to be taken into account. The question whether the General Court’s assessment contained in paragraph 48 of the judgment in Aven v Council is well-founded is a question of law which is the subject of the third ground of appeal, and I refer to my analysis of that ground. As regards the remaining assessment of item of evidence No 12, no distortion owing to the failure to take the context into consideration was found.
80.      In the second place, the General Court also held that the ground based on the fact that Mr Aven assisted Mr Putin in the Salié Committee of Inquiry was intended to establish material or financial support for Russian decision-makers within the meaning of criterion (d).
81.      Finding that the facts dated back to 1991 and 1992, the General Court rejected the ground, considering that it related to a period too remote from the period of Mr Aven’s inclusion and maintenance on the lists for it to be able to be taken into account, particularly because, at that time, the preparation of the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine had not begun. Consideration of the context is not capable of changing that conclusion.
82.      Subject to the examination of the third ground of appeal, it must be concluded that there was no distortion as regards items of evidence No 4 and No 12.
83.      As regards the evidence contained in items of evidence No 8 and No 9, it should be noted, first of all, that the General Court’s analysis did not relate to item No 9. (45)
84.      As regards the ground based on the fact that Mr Aven wrote a letter to Mr Putin complaining about a decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court made in proceedings concerning his undertaking’s interests and that Mr Putin instructed the Prosecutor General of
Russia to investigate that case, the General Court held that it was intended to establish that Mr Aven had benefitted from Russian decision-makers, within the meaning of criterion (d). (46)
85.      Item of evidence No 8 consists of an article which appeared on a website in 2019, the content of which is described in paragraph 62 of the judgment in Aven v Council. It is clear from the following paragraph of that judgment that Mr Aven does not dispute that information.
86.      However, the General Court did not consider that that evidence was such as to characterise a benefit within the meaning of criterion (d), since the possibility of turning to the Russian President in those circumstances and for that purpose is provided for in the Constitution and item of evidence No 8 was not capable of establishing that Mr Aven had particularly benefitted from that action.
87.      It may appear obvious
to find that the actions described
in item of evidence No 8 ultimately constitute
nothing more than an attempt to seek legal redress, whereas
the Russian Federation is no longer a State governed by the rule of law. I perfectly understand what the Republic of Latvia is trying to argue. However, in my view, that renders the Council’s failure in that regard even more flagrant. It was incumbent on it to consolidate the ground by recourse to evidence capable of
indicating the absence of separation of powers, the lack of judicial independence or the erosion of the rule of law, to adopt the applicant’s wording, which it could probably have easily achieved.
88.      The General Court’s assessment of item of evidence No 8 does not therefore seem
to contain any distortion.
89.      Lastly, as regards the probative value of the legal opinion adduced by Mr Aven, it must be stated that the Republic of Latvia is misreading paragraph 66 of the judgment in Aven v Council, since it merely follows from that paragraph that the simple fact that a document was adduced by a party for the purposes of his or her defence cannot deprive it of all probative value. To consider otherwise would be to reduce considerably the means of defence of the persons concerned. Such a document appears to have relative probative force, which the General Court fully
acknowledged. In any event, it was not on the basis of that opinion alone that the General Court concluded that the ground was not substantiated. The General Court found that the facts established by the Council were insufficient to demonstrate that Mr Aven’s request and the consequences arising from it constituted a benefit exceeding the exercise of an ordinary remedy not only because of the legal opinion adduced, but also because of the information available on the Russian Presidency’s website. (47) Item of evidence No 8 was rebutted by evidence
to the contrary, which is the very principle of the rights of the defence, but was not, however, distorted.
90.      As regards items of evidence No 10 and No 11, they were intended to support the ground that links between Alfa Group and Mr Putin existed through his daughter. (48)
91.      It is apparent from that evidence that Mr Putin’s eldest daughter set up a charity project run by the research centre from which she obtained her doctorate, the purpose of which was to help sick children. That project was funded by Alfa Bank. (49)
92.      Without distorting that evidence, the General Court held that it was insufficient either to establish an act of material or financial support or benefit derived by Mr Aven from his relationship with Mr Putin within the meaning of criterion (d), (50) or to establish support within the meaning of criterion (a), (51) since any relationship entertained with Mr Putin’s daughter would, at best, be capable of substantiating a degree of proximity between Mr Aven and her. However, it does not follow either from criterion (a) or from criterion (d) that mere proximity to Russian decision-makers constitutes a reason for inclusion.
93.      As regards items of evidence No 2 and No 3, (52) the Republic of Latvia claims, in essence, that that evidence shows that Mr Aven is not acting independently from the Russian Government, of which he forms part, because he is inextricably linked to it.
94.      That argument does not succeed in demonstrating distortion of items of evidence No 2 and No 3, since the reason for including Mr Aven is not to be found in the fact that he belongs to the Russian Government or even in the fact that he maintains so close a relationship with it that he is inseparable from it. I would point out
that the only criteria examined by the General Court in the judgment in Aven v Council are criteria (a) and (d), and that association has another legal basis. (53)
95.      Moreover, it follows from item of evidence No 2 that the meeting in Washington DC was held in 2018, that is, four years before the adoption of the initial acts. In view of the distance in time between that event and Mr Aven’s initial inclusion, (54) that fact alone was incapable of supporting the current nature of the behaviour criticised at the time of inclusion. (55)
96.      It must therefore be concluded that there was no distortion of the evidence concerning Mr Aven.
(b)    The allegation of distortion of the evidence concerning Mr Fridman
97.      As regards the complaints alleging distortion of items of evidence No 7, No 5 and No 6, I refer, mutatis mutandis, to my analysis of that evidence concerning Mr Aven.
98.      As regards items of evidence No 1 and No 2, the Republic of Latvia claims that Mr Fridman’s status as a billionaire shareholder was established. The General Court failed to have regard, in particular in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Fridman v Council, to the context, from which it follows that that status alone is sufficient to establish support for political actions within the meaning of criterion (a) or support for Russian decision-makers or benefitting from them within the meaning of criterion (d). That evidence establishes Mr Fridman’s status in the Russian economy and his place in the Russian regime.
99.      Those arguments clearly echo the first ground of appeal, and I refer to my analysis of that ground.
100. It is apparent from paragraph 51 of the judgment in Fridman v Council that items of evidence No 1 and No 2 state that Mr Fridman is a major shareholder of Alfa Group which includes Alfa Bank, of which Mr Fridman is also a shareholder. Mr Fridman is named as one of the group’s billionaires and one of the directors of Alfa Group.
101. The General Court inferred from that evidence, without distorting it, that it establishes that Mr Fridman was a major shareholder of Alfa Group (56) and it also compared it, without distorting it, to the listing criteria in order to infer from it that it was not capable of substantiating that Mr Fridman had supported actions or policies within the meaning of criterion (a) or materially or financially supported or benefitted from Russian decision-makers within the meaning of criterion (d). (57) In the absence of evidence in the acts at issue capable of establishing a link between the position occupied by a businessman in the Russian economy and the necessary existence of support in order to come to occupy and remain in that position, the facts established by items of evidence No 1 and No 2 do not corroborate the grounds for inclusion and seem to be
disconnected from criteria (a) and (d), which are the only criteria
for including Mr Fridman on the list of persons whose assets are to be frozen.
102. It follows from all the foregoing analysis that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
D.      The third ground of appeal in Cases C‑440/24 P and C‑441/24 P, alleging an error of law in the interpretation and application of criterion (d)
103. The Republic of Latvia, supported in its line of argument by the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania, divides the third ground of appeal into two parts. By the first part, it criticises the General Court for holding that criterion (d) could be applied only if the Russian decision-makers had already begun preparation for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. The second part alleges an error of law in that the General Court did not take into account the inextricable link between the Russian regime and the oligarchs.
1.      The first part of the third ground of appeal
104. The Republic of Latvia claims, in essence, that the General Court adopted too narrow an interpretation of
the judgment in Rotenberg v Council (58) which runs counter to the case-law on the assessment of the validity of the grounds for inclusion.
Such an assessment requires that the evidence be examined in its context. It also follows from that case-law that the Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents a body of evidence sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person concerned and the regime. (59) Although the evidence should be considered only from the time when the decision-makers began preparing for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine, the context of the restrictive measures is not taken into account. The actions and policies referred to in criterion (d) were planned before 2014. Moreover, there is no need to apply the judgment in Rotenberg v Council to the measures adopted after 23 February 2022. (60) Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the relevant criterion was that of ‘active support’. Decision 2022/329 amended the criterion so that it now covers only support. The abovementioned case-law therefore relates to a separate listing criterion.
105. Mr Aven and Mr Fridman contend that that first part of the ground of appeal is partly inadmissible, since the Republic of Latvia never claimed until now that Russia’s policies and actions were already planned before the end of February 2014. As to the remainder, Mr Aven and Mr Fridman contend that that part of the ground of appeal is unfounded.
106. The argument alleging the inadmissibility of the first part of the ground of appeal must be rejected, since the Court has repeatedly held that an appellant is entitled to lodge an appeal relying on grounds which arise from the judgment under appeal and seek to criticise, in law, its correctness. (61) It can therefore be concluded that the applicant’s criticism seeks to dispute the General Court’s interpretation of the judgment in Rotenberg v Council for the purposes of determining the scope of criterion (d).
107. As to the substance, in paragraph 48 of the judgments under appeal, the General Court held that, for criterion (d) to be applicable, the Russian decision-makers responsible for the benefits received by the persons concerned must have at least already begun to prepare for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine. The General Court held that it is only from the time when the decision-makers began that preparation that it may be concluded that the recipients of those benefits were aware of the decision-makers’ involvement and could expect their resources to be targeted by restrictive measures in order to prevent them from supporting those decision-makers. Relying on the judgment in Rotenberg v Council according to which the policies and activities targeted were implemented from the end of February 2014, the General Court inferred from this that the ground based on political support provided by Mr Putin in 2005 was, even assuming it to be true, not capable of being taken into account for the purposes of justifying the inclusion of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman on the lists at issue. (62)
108. It follows from the wording of criterion (d) that it refers in particular to natural persons ‘materially or financially supporting Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine’ or ‘benefitting from those decision-makers’. As the General Court held in paragraph 42 of the judgments under appeal, ‘that criterion applies in a targeted and selective manner to natural and legal persons … which,
even if they do not, as such, have any link with the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine’, provide such support or receive such benefit from those decision-makers, those two elements not being cumulative. The General Court also correctly held that that criterion ‘does not require that the persons … benefit personally from the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine’. (63) It is sufficient that they benefit from one of the Russian decision-makers responsible for those events, and it is not necessary to establish a link between the
benefits and those events.
109. The General Court’s definition of criterion (d) seems to be correct.
110. It follows from the wording of criterion (d) that material and financial support must have been provided to the Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. The benefit must have been received from those decision-makers. However, for those –
undefined – decision-makers to be regarded as responsible, the act for which they are held responsible must have actually occurred.
111. Relying on the judgment in Rotenberg v Council, the General Court held that the ‘policies and activities’ referred to in criterion (d) were implemented from the end of February 2014, (64) without ruling on the date from which it could be considered that Russian decision-makers had prepared
for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. However, since it found that the evidence relating to the Salié Committee of Inquiry (concerning Mr Aven) and that relating to the political support provided by Mr Putin in 2005 for the foreign investments of Alfa Group (concerning Mr Aven and Mr Fridman) was not capable of substantiating
the ground for including the names of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman on the lists under that criterion owing to the fact that it had arisen at a time when preparation for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine had not begun, the General Court necessarily determined the date of commencement of the preparation of the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine as being later than 2005.
112. Without it being necessary, in my view, for the Court to rule on the precise date of commencement of preparation for those events, the following should be noted.
113. The Court has held previously that ‘the Council [may] take into account, when assessing whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as criterion (a) or criterion (d), information or evidence relating to circumstances predating the adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence substantiates the grounds supporting that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and taking into account all relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue …
. In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation’. (65)
114. Therefore,
the sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence that makes it possible to establish that there is an
adequate link between the person subject to a measure freezing his or her funds and the regime being combated on which the Council may rely can, of course, be based on historic evidence predating the adoption of the listing acts provided that, in any event, continuity between that evidence and the situation at the time of inclusion is also established.
115. I should add that, as the General Court stated in connection with criterion (a), (66) criterion (d) implies, owing to the use of the present indicative [in the French version, with the English version using a present participle], that Russian decision-makers are materially or financially supported on the date of their inclusion and maintenance on the lists. The same applies in the case of benefitting.
116. Therefore, even though the political support given in 2005 by Mr Putin to Alfa Group for its investments abroad should have been regarded as having occurred at a time when preparation for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine had begun, the fact remains that the Council should have established that, despite the passage of time, Mr Aven and Mr Fridman continued to benefit from it, within the meaning of criterion (d), at the time of their inclusion and maintenance on the lists.
117. Accordingly, the first part of the third ground of appeal is, in my view, ineffective.
2.      The second part of the third ground of appeal
118. By the second part of that ground of appeal, the Republic of Latvia claims, in essence, that the General Court interpreted the expression ‘benefit from’, contained in criterion (d), too narrowly. Proximity with Russian decision-makers already constitutes benefit in the Russian context because of the inextricable link between the Russian Government and the Russian elite. The Russian economic environment and the examples of the cooperation of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman with Mr Putin constitute two indications of that situation. The inextricable link between the Russian economic environment and the political leaders was highlighted by the Council in paragraphs 89 and 91 of its defence before the General Court and paragraphs 14 and 16 of its rejoinder before the General Court. The evidence examined together with the contextual information demonstrates an inextricable link between Mr Aven and Mr Fridman and Russian decision-makers. That proximity is revealed and recognised, in particular, in paragraph 45 of the judgments under appeal. It is also supported by the exercise, over a long period, of activities having the effect of supporting or benefitting Mr Putin, as shown by items of evidence No 3, No 4, No 10 and No 11 concerning Mr Aven and No 2, No 5  and No 6 concerning Mr Fridman. The favourable action of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman undertaken on behalf of Mr Putin enabled them to obtain preferential treatment. Even though items of evidence No 12 concerning Mr Aven and No 7 concerning Mr Fridman do not come within a relevant period, they provide information on the status of their relationship with Russian decision-makers, their proximity to them and the benefits they derive from it. That prolonged and sustained proximity enabled them to obtain support for investments, assistance in navigating ongoing proceedings and a supply of information and advice from Mr Putin.
119. For their part, Mr Aven and Mr Fridman contend that, in paragraph 84 of the judgment in Aven v Council and paragraph 66 of the judgment in Fridman v Council, the General Court merely concluded that an allegation pursuant to criterion (d) was unfounded after rejecting the merits of that same allegation pursuant to criterion (a). As to the remainder, that part does not express any criticism as a matter of law and merely seeks to require the Court of Justice to re-examine the facts.
120. In so far as the Republic of Latvia seeks a reassessment of items of evidence No 3, No 4, No 10, No 11 and No 12 concerning Mr Aven and No 2, No 5, No 6 and No 7 concerning Mr Fridman, I refer to my analysis of the second ground of appeal.
121. As to the remainder, I would observe
that criterion (d) establishes a reason for inclusion, namely, benefit which must be derived by the person concerned from Russian decision-makers, the specific nature of which must be substantiated. The applicant’s line of argument consists in claiming that the evidence establishing the proximity of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman with those Russian decision-makers must be regarded as substantiating benefit within the meaning of criterion (d). In that regard, I would point out
that it is not apparent from the wording of criterion (d) that proximity is a ground for listing. Nor is that apparent from the immediate normative environment surrounding the provision laying down that criterion.
122. Since criterion (d) is formulated in a general manner and also does not contain any details regarding how those matters are to be proved, the determination whether the inclusion of a person on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures is well founded always requires evidence capable of showing that the person in question benefitted from Russian decision-makers. (67)
123. Contrary to what the Republic of Latvia maintains, there is, in the wording of that criterion, no presumption that proximity with Russian decision-makers necessarily has benefits within the meaning of criterion
(d). The Republic of Latvia’s line of argument seeks to establish
the inextricable nature of the link between the Russian Government and the Russian economic elite potentially maintained with the regime by personalities occupying a prominent economic position in Russia. (68) However, the burden of proof borne by the
Council did not relate to that inextricable link. It was for the Council to adduce evidence which occurred within the relevant timeframe capable of characterising an individual benefit to Mr Aven and Mr Fridman derived from Russian decision-makers.
124. Paragraph 89 of the Council’s defence before the General Court in Aven v Council (69) sets out the content of the article constituting item of evidence No 1 in a section of that defence on the credibility and reliability of the evidence. It is clear from paragraph 21 of the judgments under appeal that that article establishes that Mr Aven and Mr Fridman controlled Alfa Group and that they were the subject of proceedings in connection with allegations of corruption and unlawful conduct. The appeal does not dispute that presentation of item of evidence No 1. As such, neither the control of Alfa Group nor the allegations of corruption or unlawful conduct seem
capable of characterising a benefit derived from Russian decision-makers within the meaning of criterion (d).
125. Paragraph 91 of the Council’s defence before the General Court in Fridman v Council (70) refers to Annex A.23 of Mr Aven’s application before the General Court and Annex B.13 of the Council’s defence before the General Court in that case (71) which refers to the economic and even political power of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman by means of statements, again, of a general nature which do not concern a period close to that of the listing.
126. Paragraphs 14 and 16 of the Council’s rejoinder before the General Court in Aven v Council and Fridman v Council state generalities on the links existing between the Kremlin and the Russian oligarchs who, even though they were stated by Mr Aven, (72) say nothing about the specific and individual nature of the benefit that he derived. The same finding results from a reading of paragraph 16 of those rejoinders.
127. It follows from the foregoing that the General Court did not err in law in finding that certain grounds were potentially capable of establishing the proximity of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman with the responsible Russian decision-makers – which, sometimes, is not even disputed – without succeeding in demonstrating that they benefitted from those Russian decision-makers, within the meaning of criterion (d).
128. If it were to be held otherwise, that is to say, if the benefit necessarily had to follow from the person’s position in the Russian economy without further evidence, it may be questioned whether there is a difference between criterion (d) and criterion (g). (73)
129. As to the inextricable nature of the link relied on, it also seems to me to relate to another criterion, which was rejected by the General Court without being contested in the appeals. (74)
130. I propose therefore that the Court of Justice rule that the second part of the third ground of appeal is unfounded, and, accordingly, that the third ground of appeal is unfounded.
E.      The fourth ground of appeal in Cases C‑440/24 P and C‑441/24 P, alleging an error of law in that the General Court did not examine the allegation relating to the failure to distance oneself in its context
131. The Republic of Latvia, supported by the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania, argues, in essence, that the General Court misinterpreted the case-law referred to in paragraph 82 of the judgment in Aven v Council and paragraph 64 of the judgment in Fridman v Council, (75) since it did not examine the Council’s allegation that Mr Aven and Mr Fridman did not distance themselves from the Russian regime in the context of the other items of evidence. The distancing of a person from the Russian regime constitutes one of the means by which a person targeted by restrictive measures can limit their applicability. The effect produced by the distancing justifies interpreting it strictly, that is to say, the cessation of all support to or cooperation with the regime targeted as a result of the choice of the person subject to the restrictive measures, the consequences of which are irreversible in the near future. Although the Republic of Latvia recognises that the failure to distance oneself cannot, in itself, justify the imposition of restrictive measures, the case-law of the General Court distinguishes between particular cases. The evidence produced by the Council demonstrates so close a link between Mr Aven and Mr Fridman and the regime that it is impossible to lift the restrictive measures unless they distance themselves from it. The General Court did not therefore assess the failure of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman to distance themselves from the Russian regime in the particular situation of persons enjoying a special status within that regime and in the context of the inextricable link between the Russian economic and political regimes. The inaction of such persons can only be regarded as support for the regime. The Republic of Latvia adds that the participation of Mr Aven in the meeting of oligarchs following the invasion of Ukraine, called by Mr Putin on 24 February 2022 should also be taken into consideration. The Republic of Latvia calls upon the EU Courts
to understand the scale of the challenge posed by the present geopolitical situation and to recognise that a mere formal assessment of the situation isolated from its context is not apt to meet that challenge.
132. After stating that they were among the rare businessmen who publicly took a stand against the war, Mr Aven and Mr Fridman contend, first, that the judgment referred to in paragraph 82 of the judgment in Aven v Council and in paragraph 64 of the judgment in Fridman v Council imposes no obligation to examine the Council’s argument that they did not distance themselves from the Russian regime. It is apparent from those same paragraphs that the General Court nonetheless examined the Council’s argument which led it to conclude that the alleged failure to take a stand against the invasion of Ukraine could not be regarded as an act of support within the meaning of criterion (a). In any event, Mr Aven and Mr Fridman regard the fourth ground of appeal as superfluous, since the Council’s criticism addressed in paragraphs 82 and 64 of the judgments under appeal is not capable of calling into question the General Court’s assessment of the evidence relating to their participation in a delegation sent to Washington. Since the remainder of the ground of appeal
consists merely of a further request to the Court to re-examine the facts, Mr Aven and Mr Fridman contend that that ground of appeal should be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded.
133. The ground of inadmissibility relied upon by Mr Aven and Mr Fridman must be rejected from the outset. The Republic of Latvia is not requesting the Court to re-examine
the facts. The fourth ground of appeal concerns the question of law as to whether the failure to distance oneself may be characterised as ‘support’ when reviewing the merits of the listing of persons subject to restrictive measures on the basis of criterion (a). (76) As regards legally characterising such a failure in the light of criterion (a), the ground of appeal should be found to be admissible.
134. As regards substance, it is apparent from the judgments under appeal that the General Court examined the Council’s argument that Mr Aven and Mr Fridman had not taken a firm stand against the invasion of Ukraine in analysing the ground that they were involved in the Kremlin’s efforts to lift the Western sanctions by participating in the Atlantic Council meeting in May 2018. I would observe
that the General Court held that that participation was not capable of constituting support, at the time of adoption of the initial acts, (77) by Mr Aven and Mr Fridman for the actions and policies undermining the sovereignty of Ukraine.
135. The General Court stated that the failure to distance oneself might be a factor to be taken into account ‘in support of the maintenance of restrictive measures’ (78) provided that that failure represents only one item of evidence among a body of evidence to be relied on by the Council. The Court’s recent judgment in Timchenko v Council
seems to confirm this. (79) However, at that stage of the General Court’s analysis, none of the grounds examined seemed
to be substantiated. Therefore, a different conclusion from that arrived at by the General Court in paragraph 82 of the judgment in Aven v Council and in paragraph 64 of the judgment in Fridman v Council would necessarily have resulted in the failure to distance oneself being treated as individual conduct equivalent to a positive and current act of support. However, that is not the scope of criterion (a) and the Republic of Latvia acknowledges that. (80)
136. The Council’s argument concerning the lack of distancing cannot have the effect of extending the effects of the alleged support in 2018 to the time of inclusion on the lists.
137. Although I understand the applicant’s concern, reiterated here, to achieve the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures, the achievement of those objectives cannot justify the failure to distance oneself from the regimes or situations being combated being in itself, and systematically, indicative of guilt or, in any event, of support within the meaning of criterion (a), in particular because such regimes are generally characterised by brutal repression of any expression of a differing opinion.
138. Moreover, in my view, a factual basis consisting merely of a failure to distance oneself is not sufficiently solid and does not meet the standards established by the case-law. (81)
139. Lastly, the participation of Mr Aven in the meeting of 24 February 2022 at the Kremlin is not mentioned in the grounds for the acts at issue. As an item of evidence, it could have substantiated the ground relating to Mr Aven’s status as an oligarch (82) because of his closeness to the Kremlin and because of the collusion between the political and economic spheres indicated by it, but it was support that had to be established. Mr Aven’s participation in that meeting also suggests that he is associated with persons targeted by restrictive measures, but the General Court held that it was apparent from the statement of reasons for the acts at issue that the only criteria on the basis of which the inclusion of Mr Aven and Mr Fridman was decided are criteria (a) and (d). (83) Above all, it is apparent from paragraph 144 of the Council’s defence before the General Court that the Council mentioned Mr Aven’s participation in the meeting of 24 February 2022 essentially in order to counter his denials intended as a defence against his being part of the group of 50 oligarchs.
140. I therefore propose that the fourth ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded.
F.      Closing remarks
141. It follows from my analysis of the appeals in these joined cases that they must be dismissed. It must therefore be found that Mr Aven and Mr Fridman have, as the General Court held, been unduly included and maintained on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures by the acts at issue.
142. The pre-eminence of EU law, of a Community based on the rule of law and of the values of the European Union which it embodies must be obstinately reaffirmed when warmongers are knocking at our door.
143. It must be clearly stated that what was expected of the Council is neither an excessively high standard or impossible to prove. (84) The General Court’s analysis in the judgments under appeal is in line with the Court of Justice’s undertaking, since the judgment in Kadi, to carry out a comprehensive
review of restrictive measures and ensure a fair balance. Upon the adoption of individual decisions imposing restrictive measures on persons, the political varnish of those measures cracks, allowing the full force of the protection of the individual offered
by EU law to be deployed. That force cannot vary according to the economic or political importance of the persons concerned, or, moreover, according to the stakes at play. (85)
IV.    Costs
144. Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184 thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
145. Since Mr Aven and Mr Fridman have
applied for costs to be awarded against the Republic of
Latvia, the Republic of Latvia must be ordered to pay the costs in Joined Cases C‑440/24 P and C‑441/24 P.
146. In accordance with Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which also applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184 thereof, the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania shall bear their own costs.
V.      Conclusion
147. In the light of the foregoing considerations,
I propose that the Court should:
(1)      Dismiss the appeals.
(2)      Order the Republic of Latvia to pay the costs in these joined cases.
(3)      Order the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania to bear their own costs.
1      Original language: French.
2      Judgment of 10 April 2024 (T‑301/22, ‘the judgment in Aven v Council’, EU:T:2024:214).
3      Judgment of 10 April 2024 (T‑304/22, ‘the judgment in Fridman v Council’, EU:T:2024:215).
4      Council Decision of 28 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 59, p. 1).
5      Council Implementing Regulation of 28 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 58, p. 1).
6      Council Decision of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149).
7      Council Implementing Regulation of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (JO 2022 L 239, p. 1).
8      See paragraph 39 et seq. of the judgment in Aven v Council.
9      See paragraph 87 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
10      See paragraph 69 of the judgment in Fridman v Council.
11      In accordance with the decision of the President of the Court of 31 January 2025.
12      Judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518; ‘the judgment in Kadi’).
13      See resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’ of 1 March 2022 (A/ES-11/L.1).
14      See judgment of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council (C‑729/18 P, EU:C:2020:499, paragraphs 59 and 82).
15      Thus, the Court held – admittedly in a very different field – that ‘even judicial review of limited scope requires that the EU institutions that have adopted the act in question must be able to show before the Court that in adopting the act they actually exercised their discretion, which presupposes the taking into consideration of all the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to regulate. It follows that the institutions must at the very least be able to produce and set out clearly and unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into account as the basis of the contested measures of the act and on which the exercise of their discretion depended’ (judgment of 3 September 2019, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, C‑482/17, EU:C:2019:1035, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).
16      Judgment of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:605, paragraph 38). To the same effect, see paragraph 30 of the judgments under appeal.
17      Judgment of 1 August 2025,
Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:605, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). See, to the same effect, paragraphs 31 to 33 of the judgments under appeal.
18      See, for a more recent restatement, judgment of 3 July 2025, Grodno Azot and Khimvolokno Plant v Council (C‑326/24 P, EU:C:2025:522, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
19      See, inter alia, judgments of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited); of 7 April 2016, Akhras v Council (C‑193/15 P, EU:C:2016:219, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited); and of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council (C‑732/18 P, EU:C:2020:727, paragraphs 91 and 105).
20      See recitals 8 to 11 of Decision 2022/329. On the situation of urgency, see also Opinion of Advocate General Medina in Khudaverdyan v Council (C‑704/23 P, EU:C:2025:410, paragraph 84).
21      See paragraph 27 of the judgments under appeal.
22      For the remainder of the analysis, I shall refer to freezing of funds and economic resources as ‘freezing of funds’.
23      That seems
to be the Council’s current practice in the matter: see, for example, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council (C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 42).
24      The Republic of Latvia relies here on the judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
25      Judgment of 15 November 2012 (C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraphs 59 to 62).
26      Mr Aven and Mr Fridman rely here on the judgments of 4 June 2020, Hungary v Commission (C‑456/18 P, EU:C:2020:421, paragraphs 70 to 73), and of 6 October 2021, World Duty Free Group and Spain
v Commission (C‑51/19 P and C‑64/19 P, EU:C:2021:793, paragraph 70).
27      Mr Aven and Mr Fridman rely here on the judgment of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council (T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, EU:T:2013:409, paragraphs 47 to 56).
28      See, in particular, judgments of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraph 27); of 11 July 2019, Azarov v Council (C‑416/18 P, EU:C:2019:602, paragraph 28); and of 26 September 2019, Klymenko v Council (C‑11/18 P, EU:C:2019:786, paragraph 22).
29      See judgment of 29 November 2018, Bank Tejarat v Council (C‑248/17 P, EU:C:2018:967, paragraph 85).
30      Judgment of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:605, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
31      See judgment of 21 April 2015 (C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46).
32      See judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraph 78).
33      See judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council (C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 51).
34      In connection with another regime of restrictive measures, the context had been adduced in the Council’s acts in order to explain the content of the criterion itself. That context could therefore have constituted a parameter at the EU Courts’
disposal. The Court then held that it did not follow from that criterion, read in the light of the context relied on in the act, that the Council was required to adduce evidence of a link between the status of influential businessperson and the Syrian regime; see judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council (C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 69).
35      See paragraph 45 of the judgments under appeal.
36      See, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council (C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
37      See, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council (C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
38      See judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72).
39      Judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128).
40      Those difficulties, if relied on, would be perfectly capable of justifying a certain adjustment of the burden of proof borne by the Council owing to the fine line on which restrictive measures are positioned, in general, and the permanent pursuit of a certain balance between, on the one hand, the maintenance of international peace and security and, on the other hand, the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the persons and entities listed (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 131). On the admissibility of an adjustment of the burden of proof, see Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Anbouba v Council (C‑605/13 P and C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:2, paragraph 204 et seq.) It is interesting to note, in that regard, that the applicant himself admitted that the Syrian situation ‘complicate[d] the task of adducing evidence’ (see point 204 of that Opinion). The Court also took that situation into consideration when assessing whether the Council had discharged the burden of proof borne by it at that time (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council (C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 52)).
41      See, in particular, judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba (C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 61). It is apparent from that judgment that the Court had recourse to the context surrounding the restrictive measures against the person concerned, as shown by the Council in an annex to its appeal, in order to assess whether the statement of reasons for those measures was sufficient [see judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba (C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 62)].
42      On the basis of the jurisprudence established by the judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council (T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532).
43      See judgments of 28 April 2022, Yieh United Steel v Commission (C‑79/20 P, EU:C:2022:305, paragraphs 52 and 53), and of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraphs 33 and 34).
44      The General Court seems, in that respect, to have been guided by the information provided by the Council, which itself established, in its defence before the General Court, the criterion to which each ground related.
45      See paragraph 21 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
46      See paragraph 61 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
47      See paragraph 63 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
48      See paragraph 58 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
49      See paragraph 57 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
50      See paragraphs 58 and 59 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
51      See paragraph 60 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
52      See, respectively, paragraph 77 and paragraph 72 of the judgment in Aven v Council.
53      See point 26 of this Opinion. The criterion of association is referred to in Article 2(1) in fine of Decision No 2014/145, as amended.
54      See, to a similar effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 156).
55      See, by contrast, the General Court’s analysis of the evidence against RT France in the judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, (T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraphs 176 to 188).
56      See paragraph 52 of the judgment in Fridman v Council.
57      See paragraph 53 of the judgment in Fridman v Council.
58      Judgment of 30 November 2016 (T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689; ‘the judgment in Rotenberg v Council’).
59      The applicant here relies,
in particular, on the judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council (C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraphs 50 to 52), and of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council (C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraphs 51 to 53).
60      See paragraph 50 of the appeal in case C‑440/24 P and paragraph 44 of the appeal in case C‑441/24 P.
61      See judgment of 11 June 2024, Commission v Deutsche Telekom (C‑221/22 P, EU:C:2024:488, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
62      See paragraph 49 of the judgments under appeal.
63      See paragraph 42 of the judgments under appeal.
64      See paragraph 48 of the judgments under appeal. By referring to ‘policies and activities’, that paragraph has more the lexical scope of criterion (a) than criterion (d), which, however, was the one analysed.
65      See judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
66      See paragraph 80 of the judgment in Aven v Council and paragraph 62 of the judgment in Fridman v Council.
67      See, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council (C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
68      See, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council (C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 63).
69      Or paragraph 87 of the Council’s defence before the General Court in Fridman v Council.
70      Or paragraph 89 of the Council’s defence before the General Court in Fridman v Council.
71      Or Annex A.23 of Mr Fridman’s application before the General Court and Annex B.6 of the Council’s defence before the General Court in Fridman v Council.
72      According to the Council’s allegations; see paragraph 14 of the Council’s rejoinder before the General Court.
73      By way of reminder, that criterion (g) referred to ‘leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’. The link established by the Council between leading businesspersons and the Russian regime is stated in Council Decision 2025/904 of 13 May 2025, amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP (OJ L, 2025/904, p. 1) (see, in particular, recitals 1 and 2 of that decision).
74      See point 26 of this Opinion.
75      Namely, the judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council (T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253).
76      See, to the same effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:605, paragraph 27), and the Opinion of Advocate General Medina in that case (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:273, point 33).
77      The reference to the active nature of the support, in paragraph 81 of the judgment in Aven v Council, is a regrettable confusion, since it is apparent from a historical analysis of criterion (a) that that reference was removed when the restrictive measures against Mr Aven were adopted. Paragraph 63 of the judgment in Fridman v Council does not refer to the active nature of the support.
78      See paragraph 82 of the judgment in Aven v Council and paragraph 64 of the judgment in Fridman v Council. The failure to distance oneself may also be taken into account at the time of the initial listing.
79      Judgment of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:605, paragraph 36). Moreover, that also applies in the case of unlawful cartels, where an undertaking’s failure to publicly distance itself ‘forms only one factor amongst others to take into consideration with a view to establishing whether an undertaking has actually continued to participate in an infringement or has, on the contrary, ceased to do so’ (see judgment of 17 September 2015, Total Marketing Services v Commission, C‑634/13 P, EU:C:2015:614, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
80      See paragraph 76 of the appeal in Case C‑440/24 P and paragraph 66 of the appeal in Case C‑441/24 P.
81      See, in particular, judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraph 28).
82      By that, I mean the preliminary considerations of the statement of reasons, that is to say, the first four sentences.
83      See point 26 of this Opinion.
84      I note that the grounds now relating to Mr Aven and Mr Fridman have been considerably updated and supplemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of 14 March 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (OJ L, 2025/527, p. 1).
85      I cannot put it better than what was recently stated, in a legal system different from ours, by Lord Leggatt in his dissenting opinion on the judgment of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in Shvidler v. Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] UKSC 30 of 29 July 2025: ‘the courts are failing in their duty if they simply rubber-stamp assertions made by the executive to justify invading individual liberties without subjecting those assertions to critical scrutiny’.