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QORTI CIVILI – PRIM’AWLA 
ONOR. IMHALLEF DR. MIRIAM HAYMAN LL.D. 
 
Rikors Guramentat Nru.: 600/2017 MH 
 
Illum, 19 ta’ Gunju, 2019 
 
Bet-at-home.com Entertainment Limited (C35055) 
Vs. 
Vectra S.A. (KRS 0000089460) 
 
Il-Qorti;  
 
Rat ir-rikors1 tal-kumpannija attrici li gie prezentat  fit-3 ta’ Lulju 2017 li 
permezz tieghu esponew: 
 
1. “Illi s -socjeta’ rikorrenti hija operatur ta’ loghob tal -azzard online 
awtorizzat mill -Malta Gaming Authority (MGA) u tiggestixxi, topera u 
toffri ghall -pubbliku l -istess loghob tal -azzard tramite sit tal -internet li 
jinsab fuq id-domain bl-indirizz www.bet-at-home.com; 
 
                                                           
1 Folio 1
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2. Illi s -socjeta’ intimata hi internet service provider ( ISP) fil -Polonja u 
tipprovdi servizzi tal-internet fil-Polonja, li hu wiehed minn fost il -pajjizi 
minn fejn gugaturi jistghu jaccedu ghas -sit tal-internet sureferit li jinsab 
fuq id-domain bl-indirizz www.bet-at-home.com; 
 
3. Illi ghal diversi granet matul ix -xhur ta’ Mejju u Gunju 2017, minghajr 
ebda raguni jew gustifikazzjoni valida fil-ligi u ghalhekk b’mod abbusiv u 
illegali, s-socjeta’ intimata bblukkat l-access ghas-sit tal-internet li jinsab 
fuq id-domain bl-indirizz www.bet-at-home.com u/jew wettqet redirection 
mid-domain bl -indirizz www.bet-at-home.com ghal fuq is -sit tal -
Ministeru tal-Finanzi fil-Polonja, b’mod ghalhekk li gugaturi fil -Polonja 
li ppruvaw jidhlu u jaccedu  ghas-sit tal-internet li jinsab fuq id -domain 
bl-indirizz www.bet-at-home.com ma nghatawx access; 
 
4. Illi tali agir mhux talli m’huwiex awtorizzat jew gustifikat fil -ligi izda fil-
fatt hu bi ksur ta’ diversi Regolamenti tal-Unjoni Ewropea; 
 
5. Illi dan l-agir tas-socjeta’ intimata kkawza u qieghed jikkawza danni lis -
socjeta’ rikorrenti, kif se jigi ppruvat waqt il-kawza; 
 
6. Illi Gerald Fineder jaf b’dawn il-fatti personalment; 
 
7. Illi ghalhekk kellha ssir din il-kawza.  
 
Ghaldaqstant, in vista tas-suespost, is-socjeta’ rikorrenti titlob bir-rispett lil din 
l-Onorabbli Qorti joghgobha:
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1. Tiddikjara u tiddeciedi illi l -agir in kwistjoni tas -socjeta’ intimata hu 
abbusiv u illegali; 
 
2. Tordna lis -socjeta’ intimata sabiex b’mod im medjat tieqaf u tiddesisti 
milli twettaq tali agir in kwistjoni; 
 
3. Tiddikjara u tiddeciedi li s-socjeta’ rikorrenti sofriet danni kawza tal-agir 
in kwistjoni da parte tas-socjeta’ intimata; 
 
4. Tillikwida d-danni hekk sofferti mis -socjeta’ rikorrenti kawza tal -agir in 
kwistjoni da parte tas-socjeta’ intimata, occorendo bin-nomina ta’ periti; 
 
5. Tikkundanna u tordna lis -socjeta’ intimata thallas lis -socjeta’ rikorrenti 
dawk id-danni hekk likwidati. 
 
Bl-imghax u bl -ispejjez a karigu tas -socjeta’ intimata li hi minn  issa ngunta in 
subizzjoni.” 
 
Rat ir-risposta2 tal-kumpannija konvenuta li giet prezentata fis-6 ta’ Dicembru 
2017 li permezz taghha esponew: 
 
1. “Illi preliminarjament, qed tiġi ssolevata l -eċċezzjoni tan -nuqqas ta` 
ġurisdizzjoni ta` din l-Onorabbli Qorti biex tisma` u tiddeċiedi r-rikors fl-
ismijiet premessi. 
 
                                                           
2 Folio 14
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2. Illi wkoll in linea preliminari, il-liġi li għandha tapplika għall-vertenza de 
quo hija l-liġi tal-Polonja, u dan kif rikjest inter alia mir-regolament (KE) 
Nru 864/2007 Tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill. 
 
3. Illi wkoll in linea preliminari u mingħajr preġudizzju għas -suespost, l -
kumpannija attriċi trid iġġib prova illi hija s -sid tas-sit tal-internet mertu 
ta’ din il-kawża. 
 
4. Illi mingħajr preġudizzju għas -suespost, u fil -mertu, it -talbiet attriċi  kif 
dedotti fil-konfront tal-kumpannija esponenti għandhom jiġu respinti fit -
totalita` tagħhom stante illi huma nfondati fil -fatt u fid-dritt u dan kif ser 
jirriżulta aħjar waqt it -trattazzjoni tal-kawża u senjatament minħabba s -
segwenti raġunijiet: 
 
i. Illi l-esponenti ma kisret l -ebda liġi jew regolament kif allegat fir -
rikors promotur. 
 
ii. Illi mingħajr preġudizzju għall -premess, mhuwiex minnu illi l -
kumpannija intimata ibblukkat l -aċċess għas -sit tal -internet in 
kwistjoni. 
 
iii. Illi mingħajr preġudizzju għall -premess, mhuwiex minnu li l -
kumpannija attriċi soffriet xi danni; 
 
iv. Illi mingħajr preġudizzju għall -premess, kemm -il darba l -
kumpannija attriċi soffriet xi danni, l -esponenti ma hijiex 
responsabbli għal tali danni.
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Għaldaqstant, għar -raġunijiet hawn imsemmija u hekk kif ser jiġi elaborat 
matul is-smiegħ tal-proċeduri odjerni, it-talbiet attriċi għandhom jiġu miċħuda 
fit-totalita` tagħhom minn dina l -Onorabbli Qorti prevja kwalsiasi 
provvedimenti illi jidhrilha xierqa u opportuni fiċ-ċirkostanzi.  
 
Salv eċċezzjonijiet ulterjuri skont kif tippermetti l-liġi, 
 
Bl-ispejjeż kontra l-kumpannija attriċi illi minn issa hija nġunta in subizzjoni.” 
  
Rat li fis-seduta tal-11 ta’ Jannar, 2019 il-partijiet talbu lil Qorti biex tgħaddi 
biex in primis tiddeċidi l-eċċezzjoni mressqa fuq ġurisdizzjoni. 
 
Konsegwentement din hi sentenza preliminari relattata mal-eċċezzjoni 
mressqa li taqra:- 
 
1“Illi preliminarjament, qed tiġi ssolevata l -eċċezzjoni tan -nuqqas ta` 
ġurisdizzjoni ta` din l-Onorabbli Qorti biex tisma` u tiddeċiedi r -rikors fl-
ismijiet premessi. 
 
Rat ukoll li minħabba hekk il -partijiet ġew mogħtija xahar żmien kull wieħed 
biex jissottomettu noti ta’ sottomissjonijiet. 
 
Rat l-atti kollha tal-kawza. 
 
Semgħet it-trattazzjonijiet
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Ikkonsidrat  
 
Illi l -liġi nostrana applikabbli hija l -artikoli 741 u 742 et seq  tal-Kap 12 tal -
Ligijiet ta’ Malta.  
 
Illi a priori għandu jingħad illi l -partijiet jaqbblu illi fil-kaz odjern illi l-artikoli  
appena msemmija  mhux applikabbli għal kaz in ezami  fis -sens illi l -
ġurisdizzjoni applikabbli hija dik regolata ai termini ta’ l -artikoliu 7(2) tar -
Regolament 1215/2012EC cioe’ ir-Regolament  tal -Parlament Ewropew u 
tal-Kunsill tat -12 ta’ Diċembru, 2012 dwar il -Ġurisdizzjoni u r -
Rikonoxximent u l -Eżekuzzjoni ta’ Sentenzi fi kwistjonijiet Ċivili u 
Kummerċjali minn issa  ‘l quddiem imsejjħa ir-regolament jew Recast.   
 
Huwa paċifiku illi  ir-regolament imsemmi, anke misjuba in common parlance 
bħala Brussels Recast,  huwa applikabbli b’mod dirett f’pajjizna in vista tal -fatt 
illi Malta bħala Stat Membru ta’ Unjoni Ewropea hija direttament milquta bil -
provedimenti/regolamenti  tiegħu. 
 
Huwa ukoll paċifiku bejn il-partijiet li hawn si tratta ta’ vertenza naxxenti minn 
danni, tort, delict or quasi- delict. Dan huwa ċar mit -talbiet imressqa li 
magħhom il-Qorti hija strettament marbuta.
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Tibda l-Qorti biex tagħmel referenza għal dak li in sibu fil prambolu ta’ l -istess 
Regulation dwar l-iskop ta’ l-istess Recast- 
 
“(15) The rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable and founded on the 
principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile. 
Jurisdiction should always be available on this ground save in a few well -
defined situations in which the subject-matter of the dispute or the autonomy of 
the parties warrants a different connecting factor. The domicile of a legal 
person must be defined autonomously so as to make the common rules more 
transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction.  
 
(16) In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative grounds 
of jurisdiction based on a close connection between the court and the action or 
in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice. The existence of a close 
connection should ensure legal certainty and avoid the possibility of the 
defendant being sued in a court of a Member State which he could not 
reasonably have foreseen. This is important, particularly in disputes concerning 
non-contractual obligations arising out o f violations of privacy and rights 
relating to personality, including defamation.”. 
 
M’għandux jkun hemm dubbju li dan il -ftehim bejn l -iStati Membri,  illum 
f’forma ta’ regulazzjoni tal -Parlament Ewropew u l -Kunsill  ta’ l -Ewropa,   
huwa intiż  biex joħlo q srtuttura ta’ armonizażżjoni f’dik li għandu jkun il -
forum appropju fejn isir it-tixlija.
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Insibu illi l-Recast Regulation ġie in vigore fl -10 ta’ Jannar, 2015.  Qabilha fuq 
l-istess tematika kien hemm il -Brussels I, li ġiet rimpjazzata bir -Recast  li bħal 
il-Konvenzzjoni ta’ Lugano 3  hija  maħsuba  ukoll biex  tarmonizza l -
ġurisdizzjoni appropja fost l -oħrajn f’kwistjonijiet li huma ta’ natura ta’ Dritt 
Privat Internazzjonali. 
 
Kif ġia espost fir -Recital tar-Recast ċitat il -prinċipju generali  mħaddan fejn si 
tratta ta’ ġurisdizzjoni huwa dak ta’ actor sequitur forum rei , ġia  bħaż -żewġ 
regimi legali internazzjonali imsemmija ta’ qabblu, għalhekk illi li huwa d -
domiċilju tal -mixli li għandu jiddettermina l -forum korett li għandu jkun adit 
biex jikkonsidra u jiddettermina  l-vertenza mressqa. 
 
Għal dan il -prinċipju generali, l -aktar imħaddan f’kwistjonijiet naxxenti minn 
vertenzi kontrattwali, l -istess Recast taħseb għal hekk imsejjħa special 
jurisdiction rules li jsegwi li  l -ġurisdizzjoni alternattiva t a’ lex loci damni  li 
għandha marbuta magħha  il -ħsieb tal -prossimita’ ta’ obbligazzjoni/vertenza  
ma Stat membru fejn issir ix -xilja, din ir -regola hija waħda maħsuba u sanċita 
fl-artikolu 7(2) ta’ l-istess Recast. 
 
Għandu jiġi notat illi fil -kwistjonijiet relattati u marbuta ma tort, delitti u kwazi 
delitti, in vista tal-prosimita’ tal-kelma tar-Regola ġia  stabbilta’ fl -artikolu 5(3) 
ta’ dak li kien ir -Regolament applikabbli Brussels1,  ma dak li segwih u ħadlu 
postu ‘l hekk imsejjaħ Recast, ma l -artikolu 7(2) ta’ dak ta’ l -aħħar, kull 
referenza għal ġurisprudenza tal -Qorti Ewropea li jirrigwarda l -ewwel 
regolament jibqgħu applikabbli ghal-artikolu 7(2) in vigore llum.  
                                                           
3 Tas-16 ta’ Settembru, 1988
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L-artikoli tar-Recast vigenti għas-soluzzjoni ta’ din il-vertenza huma:-  
 
“Article 4  
1. Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, 
whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.  
 
2. Persons who are not nationals of the Member State in which they are 
domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals 
of that Member State.  
  
Article 5  
1. Persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of another 
Member State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of this 
Chapter.  
 
2. In particular, the rules of national jurisdiction of which the Member States 
are to notify the Commission pursuant to point (a) of Article 76(1) shall not be 
applicable as against the persons referred to in paragraph 1.  
 
SECTION 2  
Special jurisdiction
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Article 7  
A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State:  
(1) (a) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of 
performance of the obligation in question;  
(b) for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, the place of 
performance of the obligation in question shall be:  
— in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a Member State where, under the 
contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered,  
— in the case of the provision of services, the place in a Member State where, 
under the contract, the services were provided or should have been provided;  
(c) if point (b) does not apply then point (a) applies;  
 
 
(2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi -delict, in the courts for the place 
where the harmful event occurred or may occur;”  
 
Huwa paċifiku bejn  il-partijiet li hawn hija applikabbli dik ir -regola hawn fuq  
emfasizzata ċioe’ dik  li tolqot ir -regola speċjali għal ġurisdizzjoni generali 
applikabbli bħala eċċezzjoni għal dik mħaddna tal -lex domicilli  tal-konvenut. 
Minn naħa tieghu r -regolament 7(2) j uri biċ -ċar lil -ġurisdizzjoni hija radikata 
taħt żewg aspetti, lex loci damni  u lex loci delictii   u dan kif se jidher li ġie 
żvillupat mill-Qorti Ewropea.
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Hu miżmum illi il -pern u t -termini ta’ l -azzjoni hija deduċibbli mir -rikors 
ġuramantat u t-talba tieghu;- 
Fil-każ Jonathan Ellul et vs Jesmond Mercieca et de ċiż fl-14 t’April 2016 4 
ingħad hekk-  
“Illi huwa wkoll mi żmum b ħala prin ċipju ġenerali li n -natura u l -indoli tal -
azzjoni għandhom jinstiltu mit-termini ta’ l-att li bih ikunu nbdew il-proċeduri5. 
Normalment, b’dan wie ħed jifhem li dak li kellu f’mo ħħu min ikun feta ħ il-
kawża jkun irid jirri żulta mill -att promotur innifsu u mhux minn provi li 
jitressqu iżjed ’il quddiem fil-kawża6. B’dan il-mod, jekk id-difett fit-tfassila tal-
att li bih tkun inbdie t il -kawża ma jgibx pre ġudizzju serju lill -parti m ħarrka, 
allura ma jistax jing ħad li l -att promotur huwa milqut min -nuqqas ta’ siwi jew 
li l -proċedura ma tkunx tista’ ti ġi salvata, imbasta li dan ma jaffettwax is -
sustanza tal-azzjoni jew tal-eċċezzjonijiet7; 
Imbagħad fil-każ George Micallef vs Anthony Grima et de ċiż fid-29 t’April 
2016 il-Qorti tal-Appell qalet hekk8- 
“In tema legali din il -Qorti tikkunsidra opportuni s -segwenti prin ċipji 
identifikati mill -ġurisprudenza interpretattiva u li huma relevanti ghad-
determinazzjoni tal-vertenza soggett ta’ dan l -appell. “L-indoli tal-azzjoni tiġi 
deżunta mhux tant mill -kliem piu o meno e żatti ta’ l -att istituttiv tal -ġudizzju, 
imma mill-iskop li għaliha huwa intiż il-ġudizzju [Vol.XXXIV.III.746].  
……. 
“Biex tiġi fissata n-natura vera ta’ l-azzjoni li tigi eżerċitata wieħed irid iħares 
                                                           
4 Rik Gur 1190/10MCH 
5 App 07/03/1958 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet Tabone vs DeFlavia (Kollez. Vol: XLII.i.87) 
6 App 30/03/1998 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet Raymond Bezzina vs Anthony Galea (mhix pubblikata) 
7 PA 24/06/1961 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet Falzon vs Spiteri et (Kollez. Vol: XLV.ii.696) 
8 Rik Nru 4/14
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mhux lejn il -kliem kemm lejn dak li sostanzjalment ġie mitlub 9 biċ-ċitazzjoni, 
jiġifieri l-fondament u l-oġġett tal-pretensjoni fiha dedotta. Vol.lXXXV.II.776].” 
[App.S Carmelo Scicluna et vs Angelo Scicluna, 27 Frar 2015].” 
 
Huwa ċar mill -qari ta’ l -att promotur li din hija kawza msejjsa fuq allegat aġir 
abusiv da parti tas -soċjeta’ estera konvenuta u li kawza ta’ hekk is -soċjeta’ 
atttriċi qegħda tippretendi danni minnha soffert i.  Illi m’hemmx għalhekk 
kontestazzjoni  dwar il -fatt li l -artikolu li għandu jidettermina l -eżami ta’ l -
eċċezzjoni preliminari mressqa jaqa taħt id-dettami ta’  l-artikolu 7(2) ċitat.  
 
Interessanti ukoll illi l -istituti u l -ażżjonijiet ta’ it -tort, delict u kwazi delict  
huma f’dan l-artikolu mitfugħa f’keffa waħda, bla ebda distinzzjoni bejn kunċett 
legali u ieħor mħaddan fil-ġurisdizzjonijiet diversi ta’ l-iStati membri.  Ir-raguni 
ta’ dan huwa li Qorti Ewropea, l -CJEU/ECJ għal bosta drabi  spjegaw  li dawn 
il-kunċetti għandhom jingħataw interpretazzjoni awtonoma minn dik marbuta 
magħhom f’kull ġurisdizzjoni ta’ kull stat membru fejn fil -fatt huma 
applikabbli.10 Ir-ratio wara dan il-ħsieb ta’ interpretazzjoni jibqa dejjem dik ta’ 
armonizazzjoni fl-applikabilta’ għal kull stat membru.  
Għalhekk ingħad fid-deċizzjoni Kalfelis11:- 
“In order to ensure uniformity in all the Member States, it must be recognized 
that the concept of "matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict" covers all 
actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not 
related to a "contract" within the meaning of Article 5 (1).”    
                                                           
9 Sottolinear tal-Qorti 
10 Ara Folien Fischer AG and Fofitec AG vs RitramaSpA 2012 E.C.R. (Case C-133/11); Zuid-Chemie(2009) E.C.R. 
(Case C-189/08) para 19; eData Advertising and Others (2011) ECR para 38  
11 (Kalfelis vs Schroder 1988) E.C.R. (Case 189-87) para 19Oliver
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Stabbilit il -pern ta’ din il -eċċezzjoni u dak li għandu jidettermina il -kors lil 
Qorti trid tagħmel biex tasal għal ġurisdizzjoni ġusta,  jibqa  biex jiġu stabbilit 
skont l-artikolu 7(2) tar -Recast fejn hu il -post li jaqa fit -terminu ta’ “ the place 
were the harmful event occurred or may occur”, fil-fatt l-“bone of contention” 
bejn il-partijiet.    
 
Fl-istudju intitolat EU on top Court on International Jurisdiction on tort 
cases: localising pure international Fiancial Loss, continued12insibu: 
 
“Conclusion 
The two Austrian cases discussed above, Lober and  Volkswagen, show that 
international jurisdiction based on the Erfolgsort13 in cases purely financial 
damage will depend on a comprehensive assessement of all the evidence before 
the court seized. The CJEU d id not offer a more general catalogue of 
circumstances on which claimants can rely inorder to determine the jurisdiction 
of courts  in tort claims claiming financial damages. It is clear , however , that 
it is not enough to rely only on the confluence of d omicile and location of a 
bank account in which damage is directly suffered. A claimant should state 
additional circumstances that justify derogation from the main rule that only 
the court of the defendant’s domicile has jurisdiction.” 
 
                                                           
12 Oliver Schotel; Associate Amsterdam: 12.10.2018 EU LAW. 
13 Place where the damage occurred.
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Fl-imsemmija kawzi f’Lober14 insibu li hawn si tratta ta’ sinjura  Lober li kienet 
domiċiljata ġewwa l -Awstrija u kull pagament li għamlet fil -konfront ta’ 
securities mixtrija saru minn kont li kien bażat ġewwa bank Awstrijak. Il -Qorti 
ħadet ukoll is -segwenti fatturi biex wasslet biex tistabilixxi l -ġurisdizzjoni 
appropja: 
 
“1.the securities were purchased on the Austrian secondary market;  
2.the prospectus in relation  to the securities at issue was notified with  the 
Austrian Finanacial supervisory authority; 
3.Ms Lober relied on misleading prospectus when making an investment 
decision; and 
4.the contract obliging her to make the investmet, which resulted in the 
definitive reduction in her assets, was signed in Austria.”15 
Il-Qorti hawn sabet ghal gurisdizzjoni Awstrijaka 
 
Minn naħa l -oħra fid -deċiżjoni Volkswagen il-fatturi li ddetterminaw il -
ġurisdizzjoni kienu li nvestitur ilmenta li minħabba li kellu Volkswagen 
securities investiti fil -kont bankarju tiegħu ġewwa l -Awstrija, u inkwantu il -
misrappresentanza tas-soċjeta’ Volkswagen fil -konfront ta’ magni diesel, huwa 
spiċċa soffra telf finanzjarju fl -investimenti direttament ġewwa l-Awstrja.  Pero 
l-ġurisdizzjoni ġusta ġiet determinata li kienet gewwa l -Germanja nkwantu għal 
fatt li is -suq regolarizzat fil -konfront ta’ dawn is -securities ukoll ‘l hekk 
imsejjaħ il -global note  ukoll l -issuer ta’ l -istess kienu lokalizzati ġewwa il -
                                                           
14 Case C-304/17 
15 Ibid.
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Germanja. Għalhekk il -Qorti straħet fu q dawk imsejjħin ir -relevant connecting 
factors biex tasal għal ġurisdizzjoni koretta. Qieset li it-telf fnanzjarju ġewwa l-
Awstrija kien biss wieħed indirett.     
 
Ikkonsidrat  
 
Illi l-Qorti għalhekk se tieħu spunt wara ezami ta’ dawn id -deċizjonijiet riferuti 
(u oħrajn li se jiġu msemmija aktar ‘l quddiem)    u tqies li fl -ewwel lok 
għandha tħares lejn il -provi mressqa lilha s’issa in determinazzjoni ta’ l -
eċċezzjoni mressqa, dan a dejjem fl -isfond ta’ dak stabbilit illi l -Qorti f’dan l -
ezerċizzju hija tenuta tifli l-fatti kollha ta’ kull kaz speċifiku.  
 
 
Il-kumpanija konvenuta Vectra resqet l-afidavit ta’ ċertu Dariusz Nowosadko16 
li in suċċint spjega li hu membru tal -management board tal-Vectra S.A. Spjega 
li din is -soċjeta’ topera  fl -industrija ta’ telekomunikazzjoni u tipprovdi fost l -
oħrajn servizzi ta’ internet lil konsumatur ġewwa il -Polonja. Qal li dan is -
servizz provdut kien biss tramite il -Polish cable infrastructure  u li Vectra ma 
kienetx tipprovdi dan is -servizz lil persuni residenti ġo pajjizi oħra.  Qal 
għalhekk li Vectra ma kellha ebda relazzjoni kuntrattwali ma sidien ta’ domains 
jew internet platforms. Ukoll illi Vectra ma lanqas ma  kienet tipprovdi servizzi  
bħal ma huma hosting.  
 
                                                           
16 Folio 26
600/2017  MH 
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Spjega lil klijenti ta’ Vectra setgħu jaċċedu third party domains , internet 
platforms jew applikazzjonijiet simili bl -uzu ta’ l -internet connection provduta 
minn Vectra.  Isegwi li anke jekk klijenti ta’ Vectra jista jkollhom  arrangamenti 
ma sidien  ta’ dawn id-domains, xorta Vectra ma kellha ebda relazzjoni  ma 
dawn id-domains, providers ta’ internet platforms jew applications inkluz 
għalhekk ma s-soċjeta’ attriċi.  
    
Żid illi sakemm is -soċjeta konvenuta bdiet tirċievi ittri mingħa nd is -soċjeta’ 
attriċi biex tiddesiti mill -aġir ta’ l -allegat  blocking,  qatt qabel ma kienet 
semgħet bl-istess soċjeta’ estera.  
 
Għal ittri mibgħuta mis -soċjeta’ attriċi lil Vectra biex tiddesiti milli  tibbloka l -
aċċess tal -klijenti għas -soċjeta’ attri ċi  minn fuq is -siti tagħha, qal li  Vectra 
wieġbet billi innegat dan l-aġir. Qal li għal ittra simili mibgħuta Vectra wiegbet 
li ma kientx qegħda tezerċita “ any traffic discriminatory management 
practices”17. 
 
Da parti tagħha s -soċjeta’ attriċi presentat affidavit redatt minn Gerald 
Fineder18 direttur ta’ l -istess. Igħid  li hija soċjeta’ liċenzjata mill -Malta 
Gaming Authority. Spjega li fil 5 ta’  Mejju, 2017 il -customer service tagħhom 
beda jirċievi lanjanzi mingħand klijenti tagħhom polakki li ma setgħux jaċċedu 
l-web site  tagħhom relattiva. Dawn il -klijenti stqarru li l -internet provider  
tagħhom kienet is-soċjeta’ konvenuta bbazata ġewwa il-Polonja.  Qal li fil-fatt l-
                                                           
17 Folio 27 tergo 
18 Folio 35
600/2017  MH 
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istess soċjeta’ Polakka kienet anke ħarget stqarrija li kient qed tadotta blocking 
measures a bazi ta’ l-artikolu 15f(5) tal-Polish Gambling Act. 
  
Qal li meta irċeva din l -informazzjoni u ċioe li Vectra kienet qed tezerċita dan 
it-tip ta’ blocking, huma bagħtu di versi ittri lil istess soċjeta’ estera tramite l -
avukati Polakki minnhom inkarigati biex din tiddesisti fl-aġir tagħha.  
 
Igħid li aktar tard għalkemm Vectra innegat aġir da parti tagħha ta’ blocking,  
ammettiet li kienet skontrat  ċertu istanzi ta’ diffik ulta’ ta’ aċċess għal ċertu siti 
minħabba network failures u short tests of blocking measures.    
 
Qal li fit -12 ta’ Gunju, 2017 il -klijenti tas-soċjeta’ attriċi irraportaw lil istess li 
issa setgħu jaċċedu għas-siti tagħha tramite l-Vectra internet connection.  
 
Pero dan l -aġir ta’ blocking  reġa’ ġie ripettut bi blokkar ieħor da parti ta’ 
Vectra,  ukoll fis -7 ta’ Gunju, 2017 u għalhekk is -soċjeta’ attriċi reggħet kellha 
ilmenti mas -soċjeta’ konvenuta  ta’ nuqqas ta’ aċċess mill -klijenti  għas -siti 
tagħha ta’ on line gaming.  
  
Qal lis-soċjeta’ attriċi soffriet danni monetarju minħabba l-aġir ta’ Vectra.  
 
Ikkunsidrat ulterjorment.
600/2017  MH 
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Tqies li mill-qari tan-noti ta’ sottomissjonijiet huwa ċar lil punto di partenza tal-
partijiet dwar l -ġurisdizzjoni tal -Qorti ġusta tistrieħ fuq l -interpretazzjonii tal -
frazi misjuba fl -artikolu 7(2) tar -Recast  “ the place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occurr” 
 
Ħarsa lejn ir-recital 12 ta’ l-istess regolament insibu illi; 
  
“In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative grounds of 
jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action in  order to 
facilitate the sound administration of justice.” 
 
Jidher  li allura il -ħsieb kien u hu  li biex tiġi  assikurata l -aħjar 
amministrazzjoni tal-ġustizzja  illi ix -xilja ssir fil-lok fejn jkun jinstab l -aħjar u 
l-aktar irbit bejn il-Qorti tax-xilja u l-lok fejn seħħ id-dannu,  biex b’hekk ikunu 
aktar aċċessibbli l -provi u l -makinarju ġudizzjarju li fuq kollox igħin kemm lil 
attur u l -konvenut biex jressaq bl -aktar mod faċli, effiċċjenti u effettiv il -kaz 
jew id -difiza tagħhom  bl -inqas intopp u xkiel possibbli u b’hekk il -kors tal -
ġustizzja jkun wieħed aktar effikaċi u effettiv. 
 
Fil-fehma tal -Qorti  huwa logiku u mistenni lil ġurisdizzjoni għandha tkun 
vestita fil-lok fejn tinstab l -evidenza, fejn hemm allura l -aħjar konnessjoni bejn 
il-fatt dannuz, d -danni sofferti u l -Qorti adita,  li ġia minnu jassigura ġustizja
600/2017  MH 
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aktar spedittiva u inqas ingombrusa b’sistemi mtawla bħal ma huma xhieda 
b’ittri rogatorji per ezempju.   
 
Fl-landmark judgement moghtija taħt ir-regime l-antik inkorporata taħt l-ewwel 
regulazzjoni Brussels1 fil-kawza Bier19 intqal:, 
“7 article 5 of the convention provides : ' a person domiciled in a contracting 
state may , in another contracting state , be sued : . . . (3) in matters relating to 
tort, delict or quasi -delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event 
occurred '. 
8 that provision must be interpreted in the context of the scheme of conferment 
of jurisdiction which forms the subject-matter of title ii of the convention. 
9 that scheme is based on a general rule, laid down by article 2, that t he courts 
of the state in which the defendant is domiciled shall have jurisdiction. 
10 however, article 5 makes provision in a number of cases for a special 
jurisdiction, which the plaintiff may opt to choose. 
11 this freedom of choice was introduced havin g regard to the existence, in 
certain clearly defined situations, of a particularly close connecting factor 
between a dispute and the court which may be called upon to hear it , with a 
view to the efficacious conduct of the proceedings . 
12 thus in matters  of tort, delict or quasi -delict article 5 (3) allows the plaintiff 
to bring his case before the courts for ' the place where the harmful event 
occurred'.  
                                                           
19 Handelskwekerij GJ Bier NV vs SA Mines de Potasse d’alsace (1976) E.C.R. (Case 21/76)
600/2017  MH 
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13 in the context of the convention , the meaning of that expression is unclear 
when the place of the event which is at the origin of the damage is situated in a 
state other than the one in which the place where the damage occurred is 
situated  as is the case inter inter alia with atmospheric or water pollution 
beyond the frontiers of a state . 
14 the form of words ' place where the harmful event occurred ' , used in all the 
language versions of the convention , leaves open the question whether , in the 
situation described , it is necessary , in determining jurisdiction , to choose as 
the connecting facto r the place of the event giving rise to the damage , or the 
place where the damage occurred , or to accept that the plaintiff has an option 
between the one and the other of those two connecting factors . 
15 as regards this, it is well to point out that the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage no less than the place where the damage occurred can , depending 
on the case , constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of view of 
jurisdiction . 
16 liability in tort, delict or quasi -delict can only arise provided that a causal 
connexion can be established between the damage and the event in which that 
damage originates. 
17 taking into account the close connexion between the component parts of 
every sort of liability, it does not appear appropr iate to opt for one of the two 
connecting factors mentioned to the exclusion of the other , since each of them 
can , depending on the circumstances , be particularly helpful from the point of 
view of the evidence and of the conduct of the proceedings . 
18 to exclude one option appears all the more undesirable in that, by its 
comprehensive form of words, article 5 (3) of the convention covers a wide 
diversity of kinds of liability .
600/2017  MH 
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19 thus the meaning of the expression ' place where the harmful event occurr ed 
' in article 5 ( 3 ) must be established in such a way as to acknowledge that the 
plaintiff has an option to commence proceedings either at the place where the 
damage occurred or the place of the event giving rise to it . 
20 this conclusion is supported  by the consideration, first, that to decide in 
favour only of the place of the event giving rise to the damage would , in an 
appreciable number of cases , cause confusion between the heads of jurisdiction 
laid down by articles 2 and 5 ( 3 ) of the convent ion, so that the latter provision 
would, to that extent, lose its effectiveness . 
21 secondly, a decision in favour only of the place where the damage occurred 
would , in cases where the place of the event giving rise to the damage does not 
coincide with t he domicile of the person liable, have the effect of excluding a 
helpful connecting factor with the jurisdiction of a court particularly near to the 
cause of the damage . 
22 moreover, it appears from a comparison of the national legislative 
provisions and national case -law on the distribution of jurisdiction - both as 
regards internal relationships, as between courts for different areas , and in 
international relationships - that , albeit by differing legal techniques , a place 
is found for both of the two connecting factors here considered and that in 
several states they are accepted concurrently . 
23 in these circumstances, the interpretation stated above has the advantage of 
avoiding any upheaval in the solutions worked out in the various national 
systems of law, since it looks to unification, in conformity with article 5(3) of the 
convention , by way of a systematization of solutions which , as to their 
principle,, have already been established in most of the states concerned .
600/2017  MH 
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24 thus it should be answered that where the place of the happening of the event 
which may give rise to liablity in tort , delict or quasi delict and the place where 
that event results in damage are not identical, the expresson ' place where the 
harmful event occurred ' , in article  5 ( 3 ) of the convention , must be 
understood as being intended to cover both the place where the damage 
occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it . 
25 the result is that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the plaintiff , 
either in the courts for the place where the damage occurred or in the courts for 
the place of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of that damage . 
... 
Operative part 
On those grounds 
The court 
In answer to the question referred to it by the gerechtshof, the hague, by 
judgment of 27 february 1976, hereby rules : 
Where the place of the happening of the event which may give rise to liability 
in tort , delict or quasidelict and the place where that event results in damage 
are not identical , the expression ' place where the harmful event occurred ' , 
in article 5 ( 3 ) of the convention of 27 september 1968 on jurisdiction and 
the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters , must be 
understood as being intended to cover both the plac e where the damage 
occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it . 
The result is that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the plaintiff, 
either in the courts for the place where the damage occurred or in the courts
600/2017  MH 
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for the place of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of that 
damage.” 
Minn hawn huwa deduċibbli li allura hawn il -Qorti Ewropea ħalliet ix-xelta tal-
ġurisdizzjoni tax -xilja f’idejn l -attur. Fl -opinjoni ta’ din il -Qorti  tali 
interpretazzjoni tista twassal għal i nċertezza fil -konfront tal -mixli  ukoll tista 
tagħti spunt mhux negliġbbli ta’ kunċett kemm xejn odjuz ta’ forum shopping. 
Forsi ġudizzju aktar qarib għal dak li kienet il -vera spirtu tar -regolament u 
jneħħi   l-perikolozita’ ta’ l’hekk imsejjaħ forum shopping bi pregudizzju ovvju 
għal konvenut hu dak li l -istess Qorti tat fir -referenza li rċeviet mill -Qorti tal-
Cassassjoni Taljana fl -ismijiet Marinari vs Lloyds Bank and Other 20, hawn 
insibu kunċett żvillupat dwar initial damage  li jkun seħħ ġo gurisdizz joni 
partikolari ad differenza minn dannu li jitħass f’ġurisdizzjoni oħra sussegwenti.   
Tħoss il-Qorti li dan fil -fatt fih innifsu huwa żvilup ieħor fuq it -teorija adottata 
f’Shevill li għalih se ssir referenza aktar ‘l quddiem.  
“1 By order of 21 January 1993, received at the Court on 26 July 1993, the 
Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) referred to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling under the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the 
interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27  September 1968 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the Convention of 9 October 
1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland, and of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain  and Northern Ireland (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 1, and — 
amended text — p. 77) and by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the 
accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ 1982 L 388, p. 1, hereinafter 'the 
Convention') a question on the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Convention. 
                                                           
20 Case C-364/93 19/09/1995
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2 That question was raised in the course of proceedings between Mr Marinari, 
who is domiciled in Italy, and Lloyds Bank, whose registered office is in 
London. 
3 In April 1987, Mr Marinari lodged with a Manchester branch of Llo yds Bank 
a bundle of promissory notes with a face value of US $752 500 000, issued by 
the Negros Oriental province of the Republic of the Philippines in favour of 
Zubaidi Trading Company of Beirut. The bank staff, after opening the envelope, 
refused to return the promissory notes and advised the police of their existence, 
stating them to be of dubious origin, which led to Mr Marinari's arrest and 
sequestration of the promissory notes.   
4 Having been released by the English authorities, Mr Marinari sued Llo yds 
Bank in the Tribunale di Pisa, seeking compensation for the damage caused 
by the conduct of its staff. The documents forwarded by the national court 
show that Mr Marinari is claiming not only payment of the face value of the 
promissory notes but also c ompensation for the damage he claims to have 
suffered as a result of his arrest, breach of several contracts and damage to 
his reputation. Lloyds Bank objected that the Italian court lacked jurisdiction 
on the ground that the damage constituting the basis of jurisdiction ra tione 
loci had occurred in England. Mr Marinari, supported by Zubaidi Trading 
Company, applied to the Corte Suprema di Cassazione for a prior ruling on 
the question of jurisdiction. 
 5 In its order for reference, the Corte Suprema di Cassazione raises the issue 
of the jurisdiction of the Italian courts in relation to Article 5(3) of the 
Convention, as interpreted by the Court of Justice.  
6 It observes that, in Case 21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace [1976] 
ECR 1735, the Court considered that the term 'place where the harmful event 
occurred' was to be understood as intended to cover both the place where the
600/2017  MH 
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damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, and that Mr 
Marinari contends that the expression 'damage occurred' r elates not only to 
the physical result but also to damage in the legal sense, such as a decrease 
in a person's assets.  
7 It also notes that in Case C -220/88 Dumez France and Tracoba v 
Hessische Landesbank [1990] ECR 1 -49, the Court held that account shoul d 
not be taken, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of 
the Convention, of indirect financial damage. The national court, in those 
circumstances, questions whether that also applies where the harmful effects 
alleged by the plainti ff are direct, not indirect. s In those circumstances, it 
decided to stay the proceedings pending a preliminary ruling on the 
following question 
'In applying the jurisdiction rule laid down in Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention of 27 September 1968, a s interpreted in the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities of 30 November 1976 in Case 
21/76 Handelskwekeńj G. J. Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace SA [1976] 
ECR 1735, is the expression "place where the harmful event occurred" to b e 
taken to mean only the place in which physical harm was caused to persons 
or things, or also the place in which the damage to the plaintiff's assets 
occurred?'  
9 By way of derogation from the general principle laid down in the first 
paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention that the courts of the State where 
the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction, Article 5 provides: 'A 
person domiciled in a Contracti ng State may, in another Contracting State, 
be sued: . in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi -delict, in the courts for 
the place where the harmful event occurred;  
…
600/2017  MH 
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10 As the Court has held on several occasions (in Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, 
cited above, paragraph 11, Dumez France and Tracoba, cited above, 
paragraph 17, and Case C -68/93 Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance 
[1995] ECR 1 -415, paragraph 19), that rule of s pecial jurisdiction, the 
choice of which is a matter for the plaintiff, is based on the existence of a 
particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and courts other 
than those of the State of the defendant's domicile which justifies the 
attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound 
administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings.  
11 In Mines de Potasse d'Alsace (paragraphs 24 and 25) and Shevill 
(paragraph 20), the Court held that where the p lace of the happening of the 
event which may give rise to liability in tort, delict or quasi -delict and the 
place where that event results in damage are not identical, the expression 
'place where the harmful event occurred'in Article 5(3) of the Convention  
must be understood as being intended to cover both the place where the 
damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, so that the 
defendant may be sued, at the option of the plaintiff, in the courts for either of 
those places.  
12 In those two judgments, the Court considered that the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage no less than the place where the damage occurred 
could constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of view of 
jurisdiction. It added that to decide in f avour only of the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage would, in an appreciable number of cases, cause 
confusion between the heads of jurisdiction laid down by Articles 2 and 5(3) 
of the Convention, so that the latter provision would, to that exten t, lose its 
effectiveness.
600/2017  MH 
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13 The choice thus available to the plaintiff cannot however be extended 
beyond the particular circumstances which justify it. Such extension would 
negate the general principle laid down in the first paragraph of Article 2 of 
the Convention that the courts of the Contracting State where the defendant 
is domiciled are to have jurisdiction. It would lead, in cases other than those 
expressly provided for, to recognition of the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
plaintiff's domicile, a solution which the Convention does not favour since, in 
the second paragraph of Article 3, it excludes application of national 
provisions which make such jurisdiction available for proceedings against 
defendants domiciled in the territory of a Contracting State. 
14 Whilst it has thus been recognized that the term 'place where the harmful 
event occurred' within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Convention may 
cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event 
giving rise to it, that term cannot be construed so extensively as to encompass 
any place where the adverse consequences can be felt of an event which has 
already caused damage actually arising elsewhere.   
15.  Consequently, that term cannot be construed as including the place 
where, as in the present case, the victim claims to have suffered financial 
damage following upon initial damage arising and suffered by him in another 
Contracting State.  
16 The German Government submits, however, that, in interpreting Article 
5(3) of the  Convention, the Court should take account of the applicable 
national law on non -contractual civil liability. Thus, where, under that law, 
an actual adverse effect on goods or rights is a precondition for liability (as, 
for instance, under paragraph 823(1)  of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch — the 
German Civil Code), the 'place where the harmful event occurred' means 
both the place of that adverse effect and the place of the event giving rise to
600/2017  MH 
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it. On the other hand, it considers that where national law does no t make 
redress conditional upon an actual adverse effect upon property or a right 
(as, for instance, under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code and Article 
2043 of the Italian Civil Code), the victim may choose between the place of 
the event giving rise to the damage and the place where he suffered financial 
damage. 
17 The German Government also considers that that interpretation would not 
be such as to lead to a multiplication of courts enjoying jurisdiction. Nor 
would it lead systematically to the result  that the court for the place where 
the financial damage was suffered would be the same as the court of the 
plaintiff's domicile. Moreover, it would not enable the victim, by moving his 
assets, to determine the competent court, since account would be taken  of the 
location of his assets when the obligation of reparation arose. Finally, that 
interpretation has the advantage of not according preference to the laws of 
certain States at the expense of others. 
18 It must, however, be noted that the Convention did  not intend to link the 
rules on territorial jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the 
conditions under which non -contractual civil liability is incurred. Those 
conditions do not necessarily have any bearing on the solutions adopted by 
the Member States regarding the territorial jurisdiction of their courts, such 
jurisdiction being founded on other considerations. 
19 There is no basis for interpreting Article 5(3) of the Convention by 
reference to the applicable rules on non -contractual civil lia bility, as 
proposed by the German Government. That interpretation is also 
incompatible with the objective of the Convention, which is to provide for a 
clear and certain attribution of jurisdiction (see Case 241/83 Rosier v 
Rottwinkel [1985] ECR 99, paragra ph 23, and Case C -26/91 Handte v
600/2017  MH 
29 
 
Traitments Mécano -Chimiques des Surfaces [1992] ECR 11 -3967, 
paragraph 19). The delimitation of jurisdiction would then depend on 
uncertain factors such as the place where the victim's assets suffered 
subsequent damage and the applicable rules on civil liability. 
20 Finally, as regards the argument as to the relevance of the location of the 
assets when the obligation to redress the damage arose, the proposed 
interpretation might confer jurisdiction on a court which had no co nnection 
at all with the subject -matter of the dispute, whereas it is that connection 
which justifies the special jurisdiction provided for in Article 5(3) of the 
Convention. Indeed, the expenses and losses of profit incurred as a result of 
the initial har mful event might be incurred elsewhere so that, as far as the 
efficiency of proof is concerned, that court would be entirely inappropriate.  
21 The answer to the national court's question should therefore be that the 
term 'place where the harmful event occ urred' in Article 5(3) of the 
Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters does not, on a proper 
interpretation, cover the place where the victim claims to have suffered  
financial damage f ollowing upon initial damage arising and suffered by 
him in another Contracting State. 
… 
THE COURT, in answer to the question referred to it by the Italian Corte 
Suprema di Cassazione by order of 21 January 1993, hereby rules: The term 
'place where the har mful event occurred' in Article 5(3) of the Convention 
of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters does not, on a proper interpretation, I - 
2742 MARINARI v LLOYDS BANK AND ANOTHER cover the place
600/2017  MH 
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where the victim claims to have suffered financial damage following upon 
initial damage arising and suffered by him in another Contracting State.” 
Deċizjoni o ħra minn referenenza ngħatat f il-kawza ukoll imsem mija mil l-
partijiet fin-nota tagħhom hekk imsejjħa eDate21, din kienet tirrigwarda ksur 
ta’ personality rights  u kompliet fil -fehma ta’ din il -Qorti tizvillupa in -
nozzjoni ta’ ġurisdizzjoni kif ennunċjata fid-deċizzjonijiet msemmija.  
“It is settled case -law that the rule of special jurisdiction laid down, by way 
of derogation from the principle of jurisdiction of the courts of the place of 
domicile of the defendant, in Article 5(3) of the Regulation is based on the 
existence of a particularly close connecting factor  between the dispute and 
the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies the 
attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound 
administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings 
(Zuid-Chemie, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). 
41      It must also be borne in mind that the expression ‘place where the 
harmful event occurred’ is intended to cover both the place where the 
damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it. Tho se two 
places could constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of 
view of jurisdiction, since each of them could, depending on the 
circumstances, be particularly helpful in relation to the evidence and the 
conduct of the proceedings (see Cas e C -68/93 Shevill and Others  [1995] 
ECR I-415, paragraphs 20 and 21). 
42      In relation to the application of those two connecting criteria to actions 
seeking reparation for non -material damage allegedly caused by a 
defamatory publication, the Court has held that, in the case of defamation 
by means of a newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States, 
                                                           
21 C-509/09 G.C. 25/10/2111
600/2017  MH 
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the victim may bring an action for damages against the publisher either 
before the courts of the Contracting State of the place where the publis her 
of the defamatory publication is established, which have jurisdiction to 
award damages for all of the harm caused by the defamation, or before the 
courts of each Contracting State in which the publication was distributed 
and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, 
which have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in the 
State of the court seised (Shevill and Others, paragraph 33). 
43      In that regard, the Court has also stated that, while it is true that the 
limitation of the jurisdiction of the courts in the State of distribution solely 
to damage caused in that State presents disadvantages, the plaintiff always 
has the option of bringing his entire claim before the courts either of the 
defendant’s domicile or of the place where the publisher of the defamatory 
publication is established (Shevill and Others, paragraph 32). 
44      Those considerations may, as was noted by the Advocate General at point 
39 of his Opinion, also be applied to other media and mea ns of 
communication and may cover a wide range of infringements of 
personality rights recognised in various legal systems, such as those 
alleged by the applicants in the main proceedings. 
45      However, as has been submitted both by the referring courts and by the 
majority of the parties and interested parties which have submitted 
observations to the Court, the placing online of content on a website is to 
be distinguished from the regional distribution of media such as printed 
matter in that it is intende d, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that 
content. That content may be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of 
internet users throughout the world, irrespective of any intention on the 
part of the person who placed it in regard to its consultat ion beyond that
600/2017  MH 
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person’s Member State of establishment and outside of that person’s 
control. 
46      It thus appears that the internet reduces the usefulness of the criterion 
relating to distribution, in so far as the scope of the distribution of content 
placed online is in principle universal. Moreover, it is not always possible, 
on a technical level, to quantify that distribution with certainty and 
accuracy in relation to a particular Member State or, therefore, to assess 
the damage caused exclusively within that Member State. 
47      The difficulties in giving effect, within the context of the internet, to the 
criterion relating to the occurrence of damage which is derived 
from Shevill and Others contrasts, as the Advocate General noted at point 
56 of hi s Opinion, with the serious nature of the harm which may be 
suffered by the holder of a personality right who establishes that 
information injurious to that right is available on a world-wide basis. 
48      The connecting criteria referred to in paragraph 42 of the present 
judgment must therefore be adapted in such a way that a person who has 
suffered an infringement of a personality right by means of the internet 
may bring an action in one forum in respect of all of the damage caused, 
depending on the plac e in which the damage caused in the European 
Union by that infringement occurred. Given that the impact which material 
placed online is liable to have on an individual’s personality rights might 
best be assessed by the court of the place where the alleged victim has his 
centre of interests, the attribution of jurisdiction to that court corresponds 
to the objective of the sound administration of justice, referred to in 
paragraph 40 above. 
49      The place where a person has the centre of his interests corre sponds in 
general to his habitual residence. However, a person may also have the
600/2017  MH 
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centre of his interests in a Member State in which he does not habitually 
reside, in so far as other factors, such as the pursuit of a professional 
activity, may establish the  existence of a particularly close link with that 
State. 
50      The jurisdiction of the court of the place where the alleged victim has the 
centre of his interests is in accordance with the aim of predictability of the 
rules governing jurisdiction (see Ca se C-144/10 BVG [2011] ECR I-0000, 
paragraph 33) also with regard to the defendant, given that the publisher 
of harmful content is, at the time at which that content is placed online, in 
a position to know the centres of interests of the persons who are th e 
subject of that content. The view must therefore be taken that the centre-of-
interests criterion allows both the applicant easily to identify the court in 
which he may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee before which 
court he may be sued (see Cas e C -533/07 Falco Privatstiftung and 
Rabitsch [2009] ECR I-3327, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). 
51      Moreover, instead of an action for liability in respect of all of the 
damage, the criterion of the place where the damage occurred, derived 
from Shevill and Others , confers jurisdiction on courts in each Member 
State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been 
accessible. Those courts have jurisdiction only in respect of the damage 
caused in the territory of the Member State of the court seised. 
52      Consequently, the answer to the first two questions in Case C-509/09 and 
the single question in Case C -161/10 is that Article 5(3) of the Regulation 
must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an alleged 
infringement of personality rights by means of content placed online on an 
internet website, the person who considers that his rights have been 
infringed has the option of bringing an action for liability, in respect of all
600/2017  MH 
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the damage caused, either before the courts of the Member State in which 
the publisher of that content is established or before the courts of the 
Member State in which the centre of his interests is based. That person 
may also, instead of an action for liability in respect of all the damage 
caused, bring h is action before the courts of each Member State in the 
territory of which content placed online is or has been accessible. Those 
courts have jurisdiction only in respect of the damage caused in the 
territory of the Member State of the court seised. 
... 
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules: 
1.      Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No  44/2001 of 
22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be 
interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an alleged infringement 
of personality rights by means of content placed online on an 
internet website, the person who considers that his rights have been 
infringed has the option of bringing an action for liability, in 
respect of all the damage caused, either before the courts of the 
Member State in which the publisher of that content is established 
or before the courts of the Member State in which the centre of his 
interests is based. That person may also, instead of an action  for 
liability in respect of all the damage caused, bring his action before 
the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content 
placed online is or has been accessible. Those courts have 
jurisdiction only in respect of the damage caused in th e territory of 
the Member State of the court seised.
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Għalhekk hawn naraw żvillup ieħor fil -konfront ta’ l’hekk imsejjaħ mosiac 
concept,  ċioe’ dak li l-attur jista jirrikorri għal aktar minn ġurisdizzjoni waħda, 
li s sib il -limitazzjoni fil -konfront tar -rizultat ta’ l -azzjoni n kwantu jekk 
tingħazel il -ġurisdizzjoni fejn inħass id -dannu, ad differenza ta’ minn fejn 
origina, allura huma biss dawk id -danni naxxenti f’dak l -iStat membru li 
jistgħtu jkunu akkordati kontra l-mixli.  
Interessanti dak li nsibu fl -istudju appropju bl -isem  Cyber tort Brussels 
Recast under Brussels 1 Bis Regulation 22, studju li jagħti varji soluzzjonijiet 
għat-tisjib tal-ġurisdizzjoni ġusta f’kwistjonijiet ta’ tfittix ta’ dannu:- 
“The tort rule w as first interpreted by the Court of Justice in Bier v Mines de 
Potasse d’Alsace (1976), which involved environmental damage caused by 
negligence. In that case, the Court ruled that, what is now art. 7(2) of Brussels I 
BIS Regulation, allows the claimant to bring an action, at his option, either 
before the courts of the place where the damage occurred, or before the courts 
of the place of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of that damage, 
in other words that is where the event giving rise to damage produces its 
harmful effects upon the victim.  
 
One of the reasons given by the Court for that duplication of jurisdiction is that 
the place of damage often coincides with the place of the defendant’s domicile 
under art. 4(1), so that having that location as the sole connecting factor under 
art. 7(2) wo uld render this provision ineffective. Secondly, a decision in favor 
only of the place where the damage occurred would, in cases where the place of 
the event giving rise to the damage does not coincide with the domicile of the 
                                                           
22 Themis Competition 2016 Semi-Final C: International Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters-European Civil 
Procedure; Team Romania, page 4 et. seq.
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person liable, have the effec t of excluding a helpful connecting factor with the 
jurisdiction of a court particularly near to the cause of the damage.  
 
The findings in Bier were revised by the ECJ in Shevill23, where the Court has 
further limited the scope of the forum damni. ECJ rule d that the courts of the 
Member State where damage occurred may only adjudicate the claim in respect 
of the portion of the damage that occurred in that State. By contrast, the courts 
of the Member State where the event giving rise to damage occurred can 
adjudicate the whole dispute. This restriction is based on the consideration that 
court of the place where damage occurred is the best placed to  assess the libel 
committed in that State – and not elsewhere – and to determine the extent of the 
corresponding damage.  
 
The case of Shevill involved an action for non -material damages allegedly 
caused by the distribution of a defamatory newspaper article in several Member 
States. The claimant, a United Kingdom national resident in England, 
considered the article de famatory and brought libel proceedings before the 
English High Court in respect of the copies of the newspaper distributed and 
sold in England and Wales. The publisher, a company incorporated under 
French law and registered in Paris, sought to challenge th e jurisdiction of the 
High Court on the grounds that no harmful event within the meaning of art. 7(2) 
had occurred in England. 
  
The Court ruled that in such context, the victim may bring an action for damage 
to his reputation against the publisher, either  before the court of the place 
                                                           
23 ECJ (C-68/93, (1995) ECR-415.
600/2017  MH 
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where the publisher is established – place where the event giving rise to 
damage occurred, in which case the court has jurisdiction to award damages 
for all the harm caused by the defamation, or before the courts of each Memb er 
State where the publication was distributed and where the victim claims to have 
suffered injury to his reputation – place where the damages occurred, in which 
case the courts have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in 
the States of the court seised, the so-called ‘Mosaic principle’.  
 
But these findings are misleading in one aspect: the fact that the claimant may 
sue before the courts of the state where the publisher is established already 
follows from art. 4 Brussels I BIS Regulat ion, and not from art. 7(2). However, 
it follows from Article 7(2) that the claimant may sue at the place in which the  
publication originated. This might mostly be the country where the publisher is 
established; however, this is not necessarily the case.  
The ‘Shevill doctrine’ considers the necessity to concentrate lawsuits aiming at 
full compensation to just one – or maximally two – jurisdiction(s). However, it 
also allows the claimant to bring a lawsuit where he has been defamed, albeit 
the lawsuit is li mited to the harm caused in this jurisdiction. In conclusion, 
Shevill strikes a fair balance between the interests of the publisher and of the 
allegedly defamed person: the publisher of the contested statement may choose 
the country where to establish his business and – at least to a certain degree – 
where to publish his article, and may calculate the risk of running into a lawsuit 
in these places.” 
Fl-istess studji msemmi insibu referenza għal tlett teoriji oħra żvillupati fil -
konfront ta’ dik li għandħa t kun l -għazla ġusta ta’ ġurisdizzjoni ghax -xilja 
ċioe’  l-access based doctrine, targeting doctrine u casual approach doctrine,
600/2017  MH 
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dana dejjem fil -konfront ta’ danni naxxenti minn personality rights 
infringements. 
Jispjega dan l -istudju li fl -access based test  konvenut jista jiġi mixli   “...in 
any jurisdiction where the infringing content could be accessed online. 
Despite presenting undeniable advantages to the plaintiffs, the access 
approach has been criticized for several reasons. It has been contended, in 
particular, that it opens the door to jurisdictional abuse (e.g. pursuing of 
various insignificant claims, forum shopping by the right holders) and that it 
undermines the principle of a close connection between the court seised and 
the action, enshrined in recital 16 of Regulation 1215/2012. Furthermore, it 
would fail to strike a fair balance between the interests of the claimants and 
the interests of the defendants, as the latter could not reasonably foresee in 
which of the available jurisdictions would the former choose to sue.” 
Fir-rigward ta’ ‘l hekk imsejjaħ targeting doctrine   ġie spjegat hekk: - ... that 
jurisdiction should be vested only in the courts of those Member States towards 
which the harmful activity has been directed, which implies intent to target a 
specific audience on the part of the potential infringer. In its previous case -law, 
the Court of Justice provided several criteria in order to determine the targeting 
intention. In Lagardère Active Broadcast it ruled that amongst the parameters 
taken into account ought to be included, `in particular, the actual audience, the 
potential audience a nd the language version of the broadcast` (that case 
involved acts of broadcasting by a television station, but we consider them 
applicable to a website as well). In Donner it mentioned, again, the  the 
language of the website as a relevant factor, alongsi de its content and the 
distribution channels of a trader.
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Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof case dealt with jurisdiction regarding contracts 
concluded with consumers, under Article 17(1)(c) of Regulation 1215/2012, but 
the Court here also provides a series of c riteria for determining whether a 
certain activity is directed towards a Member State that may be transposed in 
torts cases: the international nature of the activity at issue, such as certain 
tourist activities; mention of   telephone numbers with the inte rnational code; 
use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the 
trader is established, for example ‘.de’, or use of neutral top -level domain 
names such as ‘.com’ or ‘.`eu`.”  
Mentri l-“causal event` method, the place of the harmful event would be only 
the place from where the defendant acted to initiate the allegedly infringing 
activity. This test has been objected to, based on the fact that it would weaken 
the position of the right holders since in the majority of cases the place from 
where the defendant acted would be situated in foreign jurisdictions. Also, 
most of the time, it would lead to the same result as the `defendant’s 
domicile` rule, as usually the act of infringement takes place where the 
alleged perpetrator is established”. 
Esposti dawn il -linji adottati mill -Qorti Ewropeja u kitbiet ta’ studjuzi fir -
rigward, huwa faċilment deduċibbli li t -tisjib tal-ġurisdizzjoni ġusta mhux faċli 
u lanqas konformi n vista tal -ħsiebijiet kollha mressqa u żvillupati varji fir -
rigward.  
Il-Qorti tista pero tislet l -ħsieb illi biex wieħed jiddetermina il -forum ġust huwa 
neċessarju lli jsir eżami tal -fatti kollha lilha esposti, anke jekk s’issa huma 
kemm xejn limitati għal żewġ  affidavits u tara ukoll r -rikors u r -risposta  
guramentata. Din il-konsiderazzjoni ġiet ukoll meqjusa fil -Qorti Ewropea, anke 
jekk fil-kaz li se jiġi ċitat l-konvenut kien saħansitra ressaq provi fil-mertu, anke 
f’dan il -kaz il -Qorti riedet li fl -ezami ta’ eċċezzjoni ta’ ġurisdizzjoni jiġu
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eżaminati kull prova u sottomissjo ni mressqa mill -konvenut f’dan ir -rigward. 
Dan ingħad fid-deċizzjoni fl-ismijiet  Universal Music International Holding 
BV v Michael Tetreault Schilling and Others24, fejn inghad hekk:- 
45. Although the national court seised is not obliged,  if the defendant  contests 
the applicant`s claims,  to conduct a comprehensive taking of evidence at  the 
stage of determining jurisdiction, the Court  has held that both the objective of 
the sound  administration of justice, which underlies  Regulation No 44/2001, 
and respect for the  independence of the national court in the  exercise of its 
functions require the national  court seised to be able to examine its  
international jurisdiction in the light of all the  information available to it, 
including, where  appropriate, the defend ant`s arguments  (judgement of 28 
January 2015 in Kolassa, C-375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 64). 
 
46. On the basis of the foregoing, the answer to the  third question asked is 
that, in the context of the  determination of jurisdiction under Regulation  No 
44/2001, the court seised must assess all the   evidence available to it, 
including, where appropriate, the  arguments put forward by the defendant25 
 
Ikkonsidrat; 
  
Bla dubbju u n linea generali  r -Recast jinsisti fuq r-regola ġia ben stabblita fir -
regolament ta’ qablu  illi għandu jkun d -domiċilju tal -mixli li jiddetermina l -
forum ġust. Dan kif rajna huwa ntiż biex l -istess konvenut jkollu ċertezza ta’ 
fejn jista jirrinfaċja x-xilja,  ukoll minħabba r -rabta ta’ provi li jistghu jkunu, u 
                                                           
24 CJEU 16/06/2016 ; Case C12/15.  
25 Enfasi ta’ din il-Qorti.
600/2017  MH 
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fil-maggor parti ta’ drabi huma, f’dik il -ġurisdizzjoni biex b’hekk tiġi garantita 
l-aħjar amministrazzjoni tal -ġustizja. Din hija regola soda li ssib partenza biss  
fl-eċċezzjonijiet  stabbiliti u li għandhom,  la hemm dipartenza mir -regola 
generali,  kif ingħad jiġu nterpretatati b’mod ristrettiv.  
Kif rajna varji huma t-teoriji mħaddna  u kull kaz jimerita ezami n funditus biex 
jiġi stabbilit dak il -lok fejn ġie generat id -dannu, u u koll in linea ma Shevill u 
oħrajn fejn inħass,  li f’bosta drabi ma jkunux u mhux neċessarjament huma l -
istess lok,  aktar u aktar meta si tratta ta’ dannu generat tramite siti, web sites, 
għalhekk fid -dinja vasta tal -internet li ma taf ebda limitu ta’ ġur isdizzjoni fl -
operat intrinsiku tagħha. 
Tqies illi- 
1. Mill-fatti liha s’issa mressqa jirrizulta illi, u fuq dan hemm qbil bejn il -
partijiet, illi ma hemm ebda relazzjoni kuntrattwali bejn l-istess; 
2. Illi ma nġabet ebda prova li qabel l-inċident li wassal għal din ix-xilja li 
kien hemm xi tip ta’ relazzjoni oħra  bejn il-partijiet; 
3. Vectra tipprovdi servizzi ta’ użu ta’ internet lil klijenti tagħha  biss 
ġewwa l-Polonja; 
4. Vectra m’għandhiex ebda relazzjoni jew tipprovdi ebda servizz ta’/jew  
websites, domains jew platforms lis-soċjeta’ attriċi; 
5. Vectra tipprovdi internet connections  li tramite tagħhom wieħed jista 
jaċċedi domain u platforms bħal ma huma dawk użati mill -klijenti tas-
soċjeta’ attriċi; 
6. Vectra l -ewwel ma semgħet bis -soċjeta’ attriċi kien meta rċevie t 
mingħandha ittri legali li ddiffidewha milli tkomppli fl -aġir tagħha ta’ 
blocking u re-directing ta’ l-aċċess tramite l-internet għal klijenti tagħha 
għal fuq platforms tas-soċjeta’ attriċi;
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7. Vectra nnegat kull aġir abbusiv jew illegali fil -konfront tas -soċjeta’ 
attriċi; 
8. Il-klijenti tas-soċjeta attriċi irraportawlha għal diversi drabi li kellhom 
diffikolta’ li jaċċedu s-siti ta’ logħob minħabba aġir ġia spjegat; 
9. Is-soċjeta’ attriċi tinsiti illi l -istess soċjeta’ konvenuta ammetiet l -aġir 
tagħha b’dikjarazzjoni pubblika, press release; 
10. Illi s-soċjeta’ attriċi ma nkorriet ebda dannu materjali fil -ġurisdizzjoni 
Polakka. 
11. Illi s-soċjeta’ attriċi m’ghandha ebda konessjoni mal Polonja  u l -operat 
kollu tagħha huwa bbażat fil-ġurisdizzjoni Maltija. 
12. Illi s-soċjeta’ attriċi żżomm l-assi tagħha f’pajjiżna u inkorriet hawn d -
danni minnha reklamati.  
Jiġi nnotat illi fin -nota tagħhom is -soċjeta’ konvenuta/intimata tressaq l -
argument illi skontha għandu jorbot r -rabtiet tas -soċjeta’ attriċi mal -Polonja  
billi tgħid illi huma ngaġġaw avukati polakki li saħansitra kitbulhom bil -lingwa 
Polakka, ukoll li l-aġir tagħha kieku biss effettwa biss il-klijenti tagħha reġistrati 
ġewwa l-Polonja  fejn hi registrata l -istess soċjeta’ konvenuta. Iżid ukoll, pero 
dan ma ġiex pruvat, illi  s-soċjeta’ attriċi għandha konnessjonijiet oħra mal 
Polonja. Tgħid ukoll illi n vista tad -domiċilju tagħha ġewwa l -Polonja għandha 
tkun din il-ġurisdizzjoni li tipprevalixxi.   
Vectra targumenta għalhekk illi minn dak espost għandu jiġi eskluss  kull 
ground of connecting factor  bejn id-disputa nnifisha u l -Qrati siesed għalhekk 
dawk Maltin.  Tqies li x -xilja tagħha fil-ġurisdizzjoni maltija mhux konduċenti 
għal aħjar amministrazzjoni tal-ġustizzja.    
Minn naħa l -oħra s-soċjeta’ attriċi tressaq  l -argument illi hi registrata Malta u 
għandha awtorizzazzjoni li topera fis -settur tal -logħob t’azzard online mill-
Malta Gaming Authority fil-qafas tal-ligijiet Maltin.
600/2017  MH 
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Targumenta ukoll illi bl -aġir ta’ Vectra, bl -imblukaar u redirecting ta’ l-aċċess 
għas-siti ta’ internet użat minnha, għalhekk bir -rizultat ta’ impossibilta ta’ 
aċċess għas-siti ta’ logħob mill -klijenti tagħha, Vectra kkagunatilha dannu fil -
ġurisdizzjoni maltija.   
Tgħid l -attriċi li għalkemm id -dannu origina fil -Polonja, l -effett dirett dannuz 
tagħha ġie registrat u soffert biss ġo pajizna. 
Tinsisti li l -assi tagħha qegħdin ġewwa Malta u m’għandha ebda impjegati, 
liċenzji,  uffiċċji jew servizzi ġewwa l -Polonja. Tgħid ukoll li lanqas customer 
service m’għandha f’dan il-pajjiz.     
Ikkunsidrat  
Illi fl -ewwel lok hija l -fehma tal -Qorti li l -argument imressaq mis -soċjeta’ 
Vectra li l -ġurisdizzjoni Polakka hija arġinata bil -fatt ta’ ingaġġar ta’ avukati 
polakki hu għal kollox dgħajjef u pwerili. Daqstant ieħor il -fatt li nbagħat  
lilhom ittri legali bil-lingwa polakka.  
Illi mill-ġurisprudenza suriferita huwa paċifiku lil Qorti tista tislet il -fattur illi l-
ġurisdizzjoni attribwita bl -artikolu 7(2) tar -Recast hija l -eċċezzjoni għar-regola 
u għandu jkollu interpretazzjoni restritti va. Pero lanqas m’għandu jiġi 
interpretat b’mod li jwassal għal tneħħija ta’ l -utilita’ u effikaċja tiegħu. 
Għalhekk mhux awtomatiku li f’kawzi bħal dawk in ezami li għandu jkun il -lex 
domiċilii tal-konvenut li jidettermima il -forum ġust kif  hi tal -fehma s-soċjeta’ 
konvenuta.  
Tqies lil Qorti għandha tfittex dawk il -links, relevant connecting  factors,  area 
of interests, initial damage,  dan  fid-dawl ta’ dak espost preċedentement  biex 
tasal għal ġurisdizzjoni ġusta tal -Qorti li għandha tkun adita bis -smiegħ tal -
kawza.
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Kif għamlet il -Qorti Ewropea, din il -Qorti tasal biex tiddistingwi il -lok fejn 
seħħ immedjatament id -dannu ad differenza tal -lok fejn verament inħass id -
dannu. Hu paċifiku li dan ta’ l -ewwel originu ġewwa l-Polonja pero kellu effett 
dirett,  imm edjat u biss ġewwa Malta n kwantu s -soċjeta’ attrici ma tirritjeni 
ebda assi jew konessjoni oħra  ġol Polonja, anzi m’għandha ebda tip ta’ rbiet ma 
dik il -ġurisdizzjoni u l -klijenti tagħha anke jekk barranin,  jutilizaw servizz 
minnha offrut lokalment.   Fil -fatt dan n-nuqqas ta’ rbiet hu aċċettat anke minn 
Vectra.  Dan bil -fors kien fatt prevedibbli għas -soċjeta’ konvenuta, tant li tibqa 
nsistenti fuq in -nuqqas ta’ relazzjoni mas -soċjeta’ attriċi; lanqas kienet tafha 
qabel l-inċident de quo.  L-intimata taf biss dawk il-gugaturi li juzaw is-servizzi 
ta’ internet provdut minnha, bħala internet provider. L-effetti ta’ l -aġir tagħha 
pero inħass b’mod dirett u immedjat ġo pajjizna. Il -konvenuta bilfors kellha 
konoxxenza ta’ l-effett li jista jkollu l -aġir tagħha u ċioe’ li kien se jkollu effett 
f’dik il-ġurisdizzjoni estera  lil klijenti tagħha kienu qegħdin jaċċedu tramite s -
servizz minnha mogħtija għaliex is -servizzi minnha provduti jagħtu aċċess 
ampju għal ġurisdizzjonijiet oħra.  
Il-Qorti ġia espremiet  ir-riservi tagħha dwar id -doppja jew multi ġurisdizzjoni 
kif żvillupata fil -ġurisprudenza esposta għalkemm tqies ukoll li f’dinja fejn l -
azzjoni u l-effett tagħha huma spartiti bejn pajjiż u ieħor hija soluzzjoni ekwa u 
ġusta. Tqies li kull kawza għandha t-tifsila tagħha u għalhekk tillimita u tinċidi 
fuq d-danni li jistgħu jiġi akkordati minn ġurisdizzjoni għal oħra.   
Fid-dinja hekk imsejħa ta’ l -internet waħda ubiquitous, fis -sens ta’ l -effett 
tagħha immedjat ma l-erba’ kantunieri tad-dinja,  fil-mument li metaforikament 
Vectra għafset il -buttuna biex taffettwa l -blocking u r -redirecting ta’ l -aċċess 
għal klijenti tas -soċjeta’ attriċi, hi allegatament kkagunat reazzjoni  ta’ telf 
pekunjarju, skont it -tezi attriċi, li inħass fil -portfolio finanzjarju li l -attriċi 
għandha ġewwa pajjiżna.
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Għalhekk adottata l-linja ukoll ubiquitous26 stabbilita f’Shevill u oħrajn, il-Qorti 
hija tal-fehma li għal aħjar amministrazzjoni tal -ġustizzja, prossimita’ ta’ provi,  
konnessjoni tad-dannu mal-lokalita’ u  prevedibilta’ tas -soċjeta  konvenuta għal 
dak li hu l -effett ta’ l -aġir tagħha,  għandha tkun il -Qorti Maltija li tgawdi l -
ġurisdizzjoni għas -smiegħ ta’ din il -kawza u dan fil -konfront tad -danni 
sofferti f’din il-ġurisdizzjoni.   
 
Konsegwentement tiċħ ad l -ewwel eċċezzjoni bi spejjez għas -soċjeta’ 
konvenuta.  
 
 
 
Onor. Dr. Miriam Hayman LL.D. 
Imhallef 
 
 
 
 
Victor Deguara 
Dep. Reg. 
 
 
                                                           
26 Ara International Review of Law, Computers & Technology; Vol 26, 2012-issue 2-3: Current Development in 
Cyber Law (SLS  Cyberlaw Section 2011)