Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
ĆAPETA
delivered on 13 November 2025 (1)
Case C‑438/24
Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised
joined parties:
Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon,
Riigikogu,
Õiguskantsler,
Justiitsminister
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus (Supreme Court, Estonia))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – European elections – Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom – Elections of members to
the European Parliament – Requirement to pay an electoral deposit – Exclusion of certain candidates from standing for election for non-payment of deposit – Amount of the deposit equal to five times the minimum monthly wage – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 17(1) and Article 39(2) – Proportionality of said deposit )
I.      Introduction
1.        ‘Put your money where your mouth is’ is a common expression to test somebody’s genuine intentions. But to what extent
can
a deposit requirement be used to assess the seriousness of a person’s candidacy to stand for election to the European Parliament?
2.        That question
has arisen in the context of constitutional review proceedings in which the political party Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised (Estonian Green Party, Estonia)
is challenging
the constitutionality of a provision of Estonian electoral law –
which mandates the payment of a specified deposit amount
for
all candidates wishing to stand in the European elections
– before
the Riigikohus (Supreme Court, Estonia), which is the referring court in the present case.
3.        More specifically, Paragraph 29(5) of the Euroopa Parlamendi valimise seadus (Law on elections to the European Parliament;
‘the EPVS’) requires a political party or an independent candidate to pay five times the fixed monthly minimum wage for each person nominated for registration, which results in 45 times the fixed monthly minimum wage for a party’s full list.
II.    Facts in the main proceedings, the question referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court
4.        On 20 April 2024, the Estonian Green Party, the applicant in the main proceedings, submitted to the
Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (National Electoral Committee, ‘the Electoral Committee’) a list of nine candidates for the European Parliament elections on 9 June 2024.
5.        The Electoral Committee registered, b
y decision No 103 of 29 April 2024, two of the Green Party’s nine nominations, but refused to register, by Decision No 102 adopted on the same day, the remaining seven Green Party nominations on the ground that the party had failed to submit a copy of the payment order certifying payment of the deposit for the remaining seven persons, pursuant to Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS. (2)
6.        On 2 May 2024, the applicant brought an action against Decision No 102 before the Riigikohus (Supreme Court), claiming that that court should: (i) declare Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS to be unconstitutional; (ii) annul Decision No 102; and (iii) order the Electoral Committee to include all the candidates nominated by the applicant on the list of candidates for the European Parliament elections.
The Electoral Committee maintained its position and claimed that the action should be dismissed.
7.        By order of 6 May 2024, the Riigikohus (Supreme Court)
determined that the constitutionality of Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS must be examined, and stated that the case may
require an examination of the compatibility of that provision with EU law. That court joined
the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament), the Õiguskantsler (Chancellor of Justice), the Justiitsminister (Minister for Justice), the minister representing the government, and
the Electoral Committee as interested parties in the proceedings, inviting all parties concerned to submit observations to that court.
8.        Explaining its reference for a preliminary ruling, the referring court highlights
the circumstance that
the Court of Justice has held, on the basis of Article 223(1) TFEU and Article 8 of the Electoral Act, (3) that the Member States remain competent, in principle, to regulate the electoral procedure for the European elections. (4)
9.        Furthermore, the referring court expresses the view that an obligation to pay a deposit in the European Parliament
elections is in itself not incompatible with EU law, as it pursues the legitimate aim of discouraging frivolous candidacies, which reduces the number of lost votes and ensures the appropriate use of public resourses.
10.      Nevertheless, the referring court acknowledges that the deposit requirement cannot be so excessive as to constitute an insurmountable barrier to standing for election, as such a restriction would be disproportionate and could threaten the emergence of a sufficiently representative political force and/or interfere with the principle of pluralism. (5)
11.      In the light of those considerations, the Riigikohus (Supreme Court) harbours doubts as to the proportionality of the deposit requirement under Paragraph 29 of the EPVS and therefore questions its compatibility with EU law.
12.      In those circumstances, the Riigikohus (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Must Article 17(1), first sentence, and Article 39(2), read in conjunction with Article 52(1), of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [(“the Charter”)] be interpreted as precluding an obligation, in order to stand in
elections to the European Parliament, to pay a deposit amounting to [5] times the fixed monthly minimum wage for each person nominated for registration and [45] times the fixed monthly minimum wage for a party’s full list?’
13.      At the same time, the Riigikohus (Supreme Court) suspended the validity of Decision No 102 by order of 14 May 2024 until such a time that a judgment concluding the proceedings becomes final, instructing the Electoral Committee to reconsider
the registration of the remaining seven Green Party nominations.
14.      By its Decision No 105 of 14 May 2024, the Electoral Committee registered the seven candidates whose registration had originally been refused, which enabled them to stand
for election to the European Parliament on 9 June 2024.
15.      In those elections, the Green party list garnered 0.62% of all votes cast
and thus failed to gain any seats in the European Parliament. (6)
16.      Written observations were submitted to the Court by the Estonian and Netherlands Governments, as well as the European Commission and the European Parliament.
17.      A hearing was held on 3 July 2025, at which the Estonian, Greek and Netherlands Governments, as well as the Commission and the Parliament, presented oral argument.
III. Analysis
18.      What began in 1952 as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community was soon renamed the European Parliamentary Assembly, before eventually changing its name to the ‘European Parliament’ in 1962. Initially, Members of the European Parliament (‘MEPs’) were appointed by the national parliament of each Member State. This changed after the enactment of the Electoral Act in 1976, which, respecting the principle of universal suffrage,
endowed every EU citizen with the right to elect his or her representative to the European Parliament. The first direct elections were held in June
1979 and the importance of the Parliament as the institution representing EU citizens has been growing ever since.
19.      Today, the Parliament is, together with the Council of the European Union, the main EU legislative body, ensuring that the principle of representative democracy, enshrined in Article 10 TEU, is respected in the European Union.
20.      The Electoral Act
does not establish
a uniform procedure for the election of MEPs. (7) That
act only provides that, in each Member State, MEPs
are to
be elected on the basis of proportional representation – using the list system or the single transferable vote system, authorising
each Member State to introduce preferential lists. (8)
21.      Article 8 of the Electoral Act provides that it is for the Member States to regulate the electoral procedure and lay down the conditions governing election to the European Parliament, provided that those national provisions do not affect the essentially proportional nature of the voting system.
22.      By enacting such legislation, Member States are implementing their obligation under Article 14(3) TEU and Article 1(3) of the Electoral Act to provide for the election of MEPs for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. (9)
23.      Therefore, national legislation governing the right to stand in
the European Parliament elections should be understood as implementing EU law, meaning that the Charter
applies to such legislation, in accordance with Article 51(1) thereof.
24.      In that light, the question of the referring court, which relates to Article 39 of the Charter in conjunction with Article 52(1) thereof, should be understood as asking whether the national rules at issue, which impose a deposit requirement on candidates wishing to stand for election to the European Parliament,
disproportionately infringe the right of EU citizens to stand
for election to the European Parliament (A). The part of the question concerning Article 17(1) of the Charter – which protects the right to property – should be dealt with separately (B).
A.      Infringement of Article 39 of the Charter read in conjunction with Article 52(1) thereof
25.      The referring court, in part of its question, asks whether
Article 39 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 52(1) thereof, must be interpreted as precluding a provision of Estonian legislation which requires the payment of a non-negligible amount of money as a condition to stand for election to the European Parliament, and which is refundable only under certain conditions. That question in essence asks whether a restriction of the right to stand in elections imposed by such legislation may be justified on the ground that it is proportionate to achieving the aim of filtering out frivolous candidacies and contributing to a more representative elected body.
26.      The applicant in the main proceedings submits that the requirement to pay a deposit laid down in Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS is disproportionate and therefore interferes with the right of candidates to stand for election.
27.      For its part, the European Parliament considers that, as a matter of principle, imposing an economic condition for standing as a candidate is in itself contrary to the principle of universal suffrage.
28.      Contrary to those positions, and subject to some variation, the governments that intervened before the Court, as well as the Commission, are of the view that the amount of the deposit required by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings is not disproportionate.
1.      Limitations of the right to stand for election to the European Parliament
29.      Article 39 of the Charter
protects the right of
every Union citizen
to vote and stand as a candidate for election to the European Parliament, recognising the fundamental status of those rights.
30.      The right to stand in European elections could be understood as the expression of the requirement that MEPs are elected by universal suffrage, as provided for in Article 14(3) TEU, and repeated in Article 39(2) of the Charter. (10) Additionally, Union citizens can exercise such rights in the Member State in which they reside, and not necessarily in the Member State of their nationality,
but this is not at issue in the present case. (11)
31.      The
participants
in those proceedings do not dispute that the right to stand for election to the European Parliament
is
restricted by national rules which impose a
pecuniary requirement, such as the one at issue in the present case,
as a condition to exercise the right to stand in those elections. The question that this case therefore raises is whether such a limitation can be justified.
32.      According to Article 52(1) of the Charter, rights may be limited as long as that limitation is provided by law and respects the essence of the right at issue. For such a limitation to be acceptable, the rules limiting rights must pursue
objectives in the general interest, which the European Union recognises as legitimate, and such rules must be proportionate to those objectives. (12)
33.      In the present case, it is clear that the limitation at issue is introduced by law:
the EPVS.
34.      Furthermore, it is not disputed that
that limitation respects the essence of the right to stand for election, since the limitation does not call into question that right as such.
35.      What remains to be assessed in greater detail is whether the objectives
of general interest offered as justification for the limitation at issue are
legitimate from the point of view of EU law (2), and whether the rules, as designed, are appropriate
(3) and necessary (4) to achieve the objectives they pursue.
2.      Legitimate aim of general interest
36.      For the purpose of assessing whether the restriction of a right guaranteed under EU law – in the present case, the right to stand for election to the European Parliament – is justified, it is first necessary to assess whether the objectives, as identified by national law, that that restriction pursues are
legitimate from the point of view of the EU legal order.
37.      As indicated by the referring court, and confirmed by the Estonian Government at the hearing, the deposit requirement is intended to discourage frivolous candidacies and to give candidates a greater sense of responsibility. Discouraging frivolous candidacies reduces the number of lost votes in elections and increases the correlation between election results and the actual will of the voters. It thus guarantees the right of voters to effective representation and the representativeness of the representative body. It also serves, as a secondary objective, to ensure that public resources, such as, for example, those needed to cover the costs to the State of holding of elections, the costs of reporting on debates in the public media, and so on, are not used inappropriately. (13)
38.      The discussions at the hearing revealed that two different legitimate aims could be discerned, depending on how one understands the term ‘frivolous candidate’.
39.      First, a
‘frivolous candidate’
can be understood as denoting individuals who lack the genuine intention of being elected to the European Parliament. Elections for the European Parliament serve the function of electing people who will faithfully represent the will of the electorate when carrying out their functions as MEPs and making decisions with regard to
EU policies. Therefore, candidates who wish to stand for election to that institution for other reasons, such as self-promotion or pursuing purely national or commercial interests,
are not ‘serious’ candidates.
40.      If the term ‘frivolous candidate’
is understood to denote those candidates who lack serious intentions, then discouraging
such candidates from standing for election to the European Parliament should be accepted as a legitimate objective at EU level. At the same time,
precluding such candidates from standing for election ensures that the public funds needed to cover the costs of holding the elections are not misused. (14)
41.      Second, the term ‘frivolous candidate’
can be understood as referring to a candidate who does not, from the outset, stand a chance of winning enough votes to be elected to the European Parliament.
42.      The Netherlands Government, explaining the reasons for its own system of deposits, used the term frivolous, or non-serious,
when referring to candidates who do not have a real chance
of being elected. Votes cast for such candidates are
regarded as ‘lost votes’ as they do not contribute to the election of a member to
the representative body.
Therefore, according to that government, a system which excludes such candidates in advance
results in an elected body which is more representative of the electorate. (15)
43.      Indeed, in electoral systems
with proportional representation by single transferable vote, votes for candidates who do not acquire a sufficient majority to win a seat in parliament (so called lost votes) are distributed to other candidates who are in turn elected to parliament. (16)
44.      Even if those votes are not necessarily ‘lost’ from the point of view of the voters, as they had expressed their political preferences,
and such votes therefore contribute to the understanding of the political climate of a society, they may, nevertheless, be seen as problematic from the point of view of producing a more representative elected body.
45.      I do not find it very convincing that reducing the number of ‘lost votes’ by eliminating candidates ahead of elections necessarily contributes to more representative election results, as voters who could not vote for ‘their’ candidates, but were only offered the possibility to vote for those who could stand in the elections, are not really represented by the elected parliamentarians. Either they vote for the candidate they deem ‘second best’, or, as often happens, they vote against the ‘worst option’.
46.      Nevertheless, since a fully representative elected body cannot be achieved
in practice, attempting to decrease the number of ‘lost votes’ is generally accepted as a legitimate aim when organising elections.
47.      Such an aim has been accepted as legitimate by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). (17)
48.      The functioning of the European Union is, according to Article 10 TEU, founded on the concept of representative democracy. Ensuring that the European Parliament is truly representative of EU citizens to the highest possible degree is, therefore, in line with one of the European Union’s foundational values:
democracy – as expressed in Article 2 TEU. (18)
49.      Therefore, the objective of decreasing the number of ‘lost votes’ by discouraging those candidates who do not have sufficient public support
from standing for election, in order to achieve a more representative body, could be accepted as a legitimate aim in the European Union. (19)
50.      Next, it is necessary to assess the appropriateness and necessity of the pecuniary requirement,
which is returned only if a candidate reaches the threshold of 5% of all votes cast. The latter must be assessed in the light of each of the two legitimate aims identified: (a)
discouragement of non-serious candidates; and (b) ensuring a more representative elected body by decreasing the number of lost votes.
3.      Appropriateness
(a)    Appropriateness of the deposit requirement for achieving the objective of discouraging non-serious candidates
51.      Is the pecuniary requirement, which is not returned unless a list succeeds in acquiring 5% of all votes cast, an appropriate method for eliminating candidates who do not really harbour serious intentions
when standing for election to the European Parliament (non-serious candidates)?
52.      To my mind, it is not.
53.      Though I am aware that money is often a means to achieve certain results, I do not believe that the imposition of a pecuniary requirement can constitute an appropriate measure for ensuring the seriousness of a candidacy for political election. Such a criterion filters candidates by their personal wealth or the wealth of their supporting party or organisation, and not on the basis of the seriousness of their candidacies.
54.      A
pecuniary requirement,
such as the one set out by the Estonian law, inevitably favours affluent candidates and entrenched political parties;
new candidates and emergent political movements are at a particular disadvantage, as they must bear both the cost of campaigning and the risk of losing the amount
paid. This pecuniary barrier hinders the entry of serious candidates from modest backgrounds and restricts the emergence of diverse political beliefs, ensuring the political field remains tilted in favour of established groups.
Conversely, a wealthy but opportunistic candidate will not be prevented from standing for election by such a pecuniary obligation.
55.      The practice has shown that money does not prevent ‘paper candidates’ from standing for election: in previous elections to the European Parliament in Estonia, as the referring court points out,
there have been independent candidates who, despite having paid the deposit, have received only 48 or 55 votes. (20)
56.      Therefore, a pecuniary requirement is not an appropriate measure for filtering out non-serious candidates. Rather, it filters candidates based on wealth.
57.      As the Estonian law at issue does not, to my mind, pass the test of appropriateness in relation to the objective of discouraging non-serious candidates, its necessity does not need to be assessed.
(b)    Appropriateness of the deposit requirement for achieving the objective of decreasing the number of ‘lost votes’
58.      Even if the pecuniary requirement is not an appropriate measure for filtering out non-serious candidates, such a requirement will nevertheless discourage some, even if not all,
‘frivolous’ candidates, especially those who do not believe they have a chance of winning a seat, from standing for election. Thus, it could lead to a decrease in ‘lost votes’.
59.      It may be accepted that the ability to raise money to pay a deposit, especially when combined with a low but meaningful threshold for refund, may be understood as evidence of some level of public support.
60.      Because money is often used in our societies as a pragmatic tool to test someone’s commitment, a candidate who is unable to gather a reasonable deposit from any source (a political party, independent donors, a platform of non-governmental organisations, and so forth) is revealing a lack of the fundamental organisational skills, network or commitment required to mount a serious campaign, making him or her a likely source of ‘lost votes’, rather than simply being under-resourced.
61.      In that perspective, excluding candidates unable to raise a deposit could be a tool to decrease the number of those candidates who are not likely to acquire a sufficient number of votes.
62.      I thus consider that a pecuniary requirement could be seen as an appropriate measure for achieving the objective of decreasing the number of ‘lost votes’, achieving a more representative elected body.
63.      As a next step, we must assess whether a pecuniary deposit, like that imposed by the Estonian law at issue, is in fact
necessary to achieve that objective.
4.      The necessity of a deposit requirement
64.      In its Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, the Venice Commission
did not find a deposit
to be an unacceptable means of reducing the number of lost votes. However, it stressed that ‘it must be refundable should the candidate or party exceed a certain score; the sum and the score requested should not be excessive’. (21)
65.      An excessively high deposit and/or threshold for its return might result in the exclusion of candidates from marginalised groups, new political movements or low-income individuals who, while not likely to win a seat, may embody genuinely important and unrepresented political demands and garner a respectable number of votes. By excluding these under-represented voices, the system has the result that those votes are never counted or expressed on the ballot.
66.      Likewise, despite the unquestionable importance of political parties for democratic participation, (22) an overly strict deposit requirement might prevent
the emergence of new parties.
That would be in contravention of the fundamental principle of political pluralism guaranteed under EU law.
67.      Therefore, a State imposing a deposit requirement must, as stated by the ECtHR, find an appropriate, if delicate, balance. (23)
68.      One may, thus, conclude that an overly excessive sum and too high a threshold could be understood as not being necessary for ensuring representativeness.
(a)    Does the Estonian legislation provide for an excessive sum and too high a threshold?
69.      The amount of deposit required by the Estonian law in the main proceedings for running in the European elections seems quite burdensome.
70.      First, according to the order for reference, at the time when the action was brought, the pecuniary requirement at issue
amounted to 215% of the average Estonian gross monthly wage and was 3.17 times the monthly median wage per candidate.
71.      Such a level of pecuniary requirement is significant for an average person’s wealth.
72.      Second, even if there is only a small minority of Member States that impose a pecuniary requirement as a condition to stand for election to the European Parliament, (24) the relative amount required in those States may serve as a comparator to assess the necessity of the amount required by the Estonian legislation at issue.
73.      For the purposes of this comparison, I will juxtapose the deposit requirement imposed by the Estonia with that imposed by the Netherlands, a Member State which
intervened before the Court and which also has a pecuniary requirement. The Netherlands Government confirmed at the hearing that the deposit requirement for standing for election to the European Parliament under Netherlands law pursues the same legitimate aims as those pursued by Paragraph 29 of the EPVS, namely to discourage frivolous candidates and
prevent the misuse of public funds and avoid lost votes. (25)
74.      The deposit requirement for a full list of candidates standing for election to the European Parliament in the Netherlands is laid down in Section H 12 of the Kieswet (Netherlands Electoral Law), (26) which requires a deposit payment of EUR 11 250 for each list of candidates, regardless of the number of candidates on that list. The maximum number of candidates for each election list to the European Parliament in the Netherlands is currently between 50 and 80, (27) which roughly equates to EUR 225 per candidate on a full list – considerably lower than the EUR 4 100 required for each candidate on a full list under Paragraph 29 of the EPVS.
75.      Accordingly, even if the maximum number of candidates per list were the same in the Netherlands as it is in Estonia, that is, nine candidates, the total deposit on a full list would still only amount to EUR 1 250 per candidate, almost 3.5 times less than the deposit requirement at issue in the main proceedings.
76.      Third, before the referring court, the Õiguskantsler (Chancellor of Justice) made a comparison of the pecuniary requirement in relation to the minimum number of members of a political party in Estonia. Given the minimum number of members which a party must comprise (500), a full list would mean that each member of the party would have to pay EUR 73.80.
77.      In that respect, as the referring court points out, the pecuniary requirement
for running in elections is not the only expense that the parties or their candidates have to bear, and their entire annual budget cannot be exhausted in order to stand in one
election.
78.      Finally, even if there are significant differences in the holding of national and European elections, (28) it should be noted that the pecuniary requirement for candidates to stand for election to the European Parliament in Estonia is five times more restrictive than for candidates wishing to stand for election to the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament).
79.      The necessity of the Estonian rule should also be assessed from the point of view of the threshold
of recovering the amount paid, even in the event that no seats are won.
80.      In this respect, there is a difference between national and European elections. For European elections, the threshold to be eligible for repayment of the deposit from the State budget is 5% of the total number of votes cast nationally. In contrast, at national elections, a party polling at least 2% of the vote in the
Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) qualifies for a State budget allocation for political parties. (29) There are properly speaking no conditions for the original payment in national elections to be refunded.
81.      It is not evident that such a high threshold for the recovery of the costs of participating in the election is justified as necessary to deter candidates who do not believe that they stand a chance of winning a seat.
82.      In sum, and subject to full assessment by the referring court, I am of the view that the pecuniary requirement at issue in the main proceedings, which amounts to five times the minimum monthly wage, together with a threshold of 5% for recovering such a payment,
exceeds the limits of what is necessary to decrease the number of ‘lost votes’.
(b)    Less restrictive alternatives
83.      An additional reason for considering
that the Estonian rule at issue is not necessary for deterring candidates with insufficient public support is the argument that there may exist other options capable of achieving the same aim of preventing
frivolous candidates from running, which are, however, less restrictive in relation to the right to stand for election.
84.      Arguing that the deposit requirement constitutes a disproportionate restriction of the right to stand for election, the applicant in the main proceedings suggested several less restrictive alternatives to prevent frivolous candidacies. Those alternatives include the option of conditional deposit exemption or replacing the financial burden with non-pecuniary requirements, such as supplying a clear political programme or providing supporting signatures to demonstrate popular support.
85.      All of those alternatives also have their pitfalls. For example, as submitted by the Estonian Government, collecting signatures is organisationally and financially burdensome for the State, and is equally a difficult requirement for some of the potential candidates. At the same time, subject to cybersecurity issues, collecting signatures and their verification might be achieved electronically nowadays.
86.      Given that the European Union has not enacted rules regulating a uniform procedure for the elections to the European Parliament in all the Member States, and given differences in political culture and other circumstances in the Member States, in my view, governments must be allowed a large margin of appreciation when weighing the pros and cons of different measures and when deciding on the most appropriate solution
in the specific circumstances of the State at issue.
87.      Nevertheless, such a choice cannot be left entirely without judicial scrutiny. It is for the national court to assess whether the government can offer reasonable explanations as to why other measures, or the combination of different
measures, were excluded as appropriate measures to achieve the same aim.
88.      Overall, I am of the view
that, subject to final assessment
by the referring court, the pecuniary requirement in the main proceedings
constitutes a severe restriction of the right to stand for election, both with respect to its amount and with respect to its
restitution threshold, where there are possible alternatives, which can be combined with or act as a substitute for said pecuniary requirement.
89.      Therefore, even if the Court considers the Estonian legislation at issue appropriate to decrease the number of lost votes and thus to ensure better representativeness in the European Parliament, I nevertheless have serious doubts, subject to the final decision by the national court, that the measures at issue are necessary to achieve that objective.
B.      Infringement of the right to property
90.      The referring court also asked whether the legislation at issue is in conformity with Article 17(1) of the Charter.
91.      I am of the view that the payment requirement at issue is not a limitation to the right of property and is not, therefore, necessary to assess the proportionality of that limitation.
92.      I am aware that the ECtHR has recognised a possible violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in similar cases, but that was in the context of differing circumstances, which are not entirely comparable to those in the main proceedings. (30) That court treated the requirement for payment to stand in the election at issue in that case as a deposit, which was not returned to one of the parties to that litigation.
93.      The requirement of payment in the present case is, to my mind, not a deposit (even if this is the wording used to describe it), even though, under certain circumstances, the candidates are entitled to reimbursement of the amount paid (or part of it).
94.      Unlike a deposit for a lease contract which is held as the tenant’s property with real guarantees for return, the
national legislation in the main proceedings
adds additional conditions which mean that its restitution is not actually guaranteed. It instead functions as a conditional payment, creating a personal claim for future restitution rather than a continuing, vested property interest in the specific funds. Thus, the legal right to retrieve the money is merely a potential debt claim and is not automatically afforded the fundamental protection reserved for property.
95.      For that reason, and as contended by the Netherlands Government, I consider that Article 17 of the Charter is not relevant in the present case.
IV.    Conclusion
96.      In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court answer the question referred by the Riigikohus (Supreme Court, Estonia)
as follows:
Article 39
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 52(1) thereof,
must be interpreted as meaning that the imposition of a pecuniary requirement
in order to stand for election to the European Parliament, which is intended to filter out frivolous (non-serious) candidacies, cannot be deemed to be an appropriate measure to achieve that objective.
A pecuniary requirement can be deemed appropriate for achieving the objective of decreasing the number of ‘lost votes’ and thus achieving a more representative elected body.
However, the amount of such a deposit, and the threshold for its return, should not be excessively burdensome and thus prevent the emergence of new political parties and
ideas. It is for the national court to assess whether the amount of the pecuniary requirement and the restitution threshold imposed by the national legislation have achieved an acceptable balance.
1      Original language: English.
2      Failure to submit to the Electoral Committee a copy of a payment order certifying payment of the deposit is a ground for refusing to register a candidate in accordance with Paragraph 31(3) of the EPVS. The referring court indicates that the national legislation at issue does not provide for the possibility of exempting a candidate from payment of the deposit.
3      Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976 (OJ 1976 L 278, p. 1), as most recently amended by Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 (OJ 2018 L 178, p. 1; ‘the Electoral Act’).
4      It relies on judgment of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies
(C‑502/19,  ‘Junqueras Vies’, EU:C:2019:1115, paragraph 69).
5      The referring court cites, to that effect,
ECtHR, 28 March 2006, Sukhovetskyyv. Ukraine
(CE:ECHR:2006:0328JUD001371602, §§ 72
and 73).
6      https://ep2024.valimised.ee/et/detailed-voting-result (last time consulted on 11th of November 2025).
7      Such a possibility, however, exists on the basis of Article 223 TFEU.
8      Article 1
of the Electoral Act.
9      See, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne (C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 33).
10      See, in that respect, the judgment in
Junqueras Vies, paragraph 86.
11      See, in that respect, Article 22(1) TFEU and Article 39(1) of the Charter. See judgment of 19 November 2024, Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962, paragraph 123), ‘with respect to the objective of Article 22 TFEU, that article seeks … to confer on EU citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals the right to participate in the democratic electoral process of that Member State. …
that right extends to participation in that process through the right to vote and to stand for election at European and local level’. For a similar finding, see judgment of the same day, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963, paragraph 121).
12      See, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne (C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraphs 46 to 48).
13      See paragraph 39 of the English-language summary of the order for reference and paragraph 57 of the French-language version of that order of reference.
14      As noted by the Estonian Government during the hearing, and as is clear from the order for reference, Estonian law requires that each candidate standing for election be given the same opportunities to express themselves. Therefore, public service broadcasters are obliged to ensure that all parties and independent candidates standing in the European Parliament elections have the same opportunities to explain their positions appropriately and free of charge.
15      See, in that respect, paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Netherlands Government’s written submission.
16      This is also true for proportional electoral systems which, like the Estonian system, use the D’Hondt method to distribute ‘lost votes’.
17      See ECtHR,
28 March 2006, Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, CE:ECHR:2006:0328JUD001371602, §§ 61 and 62.
18      See, in that respect, judgments of 19 November 2024, Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962, paragraphs 114 to 116), and of the same day, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963, paragraphs 112 to 114). See also, the judgment in
Junqueras Vies, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
19      However, preventing ‘lost votes’ on the basis of the assessment that certain programmes do not stand a real chance of winning sufficient votes seems to me to be problematic. Restricting a candidate’s right to stand for election based on a political programme deemed ‘frivolous’ for such a reason risks introducing arbitrary value judgements on the political manifestos of parties. As the European Parliament notes in its written observations, the power to assess the merits of a political platform ultimately rests with the electorate.
20      Paragraph 22 of the English-language summary
of the order for reference.
21      See, to that effect, Council of Europe:
Venice Commission,
‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters’, point 1.3.(vi.), available at:
https://www.venice.coe.int/images/SITE%20IMAGES/Publications/Code_conduite_PREMS%20026115%20GBR.pdf.
22      On the importance of political parties for European democracy, see judgments of 19 November 2024, Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962), and of the same day, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963).
23      See ECtHR,
28 March 2006, Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, CE:ECHR:2006:0328JUD001371602, § 67. In that case, the ECtHR was satisfied that the electoral deposit system adopted at the material time by the Ukrainian political institutions was an acceptable compromise between these competing interests.
24      European Parliament: Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs and Lehmann. W., The European Elections: EU legislation, national provisions and civic participation – Study for the AFCO Committee,
revised edition, 2014, p. 17, available at:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/493047/IPOL-AFCO_ET(2014)493047_EN.pdf;
Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l’Europe, ‘The electoral system’, available at: https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/d5906df5-4f83-4603-85f7-0cabc24b9fe1/b1415258-4e3a-499a-9620-61a51b013ab6.
25      The Netherlands Government commented at the hearing that the number of ‘lost votes’ during the last set of parliamentary elections represented only 2% of the total votes cast.
26      That provision states that ‘if the election is to the House of Representatives, a deposit of EUR [11 250] … shall be paid to the State for each group of lists’. Section Y 2 of that same law confirms that
‘Members of the European Parliament shall be elected … pursuant to Part II concerning the election of members of the House of Representatives’. The English-language version of that text can be found here: https://english.kiesraad.nl/publications/publications/2019/4/english-version-electoral-act/english-version-electoral-act.
27      https://www.kiesraad.nl/verkiezingen/europees-parlement/kandidaatstelling/kandidaten.
28      The Estonian Government explains that the higher pecuniary requirement for standing for election to the European Parliament is justified by the shorter list of candidates and the smaller number of seats to be allocated in those elections.
29      That is based on Paragraph 127 of the Erakonnaseadus (Law on Political Parties)
as stated in the order of reference and confirmed at the hearing by the Estonian Government.
30      See, for instance, ECtHR, 11 January 2007, Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia (CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD005506600, §§ 94 to 97).