62022CJ0633_RES
Case C‑633/22
Real Madrid Club de FútbolandAE
v
EE and Société Éditrice du Monde SA
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation, France)
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 4 October 2024
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 – Articles 34 and 45 – Recognition and enforcement of judgments – Revocation of a declaration of enforceability of judgments – Grounds for refusal – Public policy in the State in which recognition is sought – Penalty imposed on a newspaper and one of its journalists for harm caused to the reputation of a sports club – Damages – Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Freedom of the press)
Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Regulation No 44/2001 – Recognition and enforcement of judgments – Grounds for refusal – Infringement of the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought – Scope – Penalty imposed on a newspaper and one of its journalists for harm caused to the reputation of a sports club – Freedom of expression – Freedom of the press – Manifest infringement – Included
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 11 and 51(1); Council Regulation No 44/2001, Arts 34(1) and 43 to 45)
(see paragraphs 41-44, 49, 50, 53-61, 66, 67, 70, 73, 74 and operative part)
Résumé
In a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) the Court of Justice, sitting as the Grand Chamber, rules on the use of the public policy clause to refuse enforcement of a judgment delivered by a court of a Member State which gives rise to infringement of the freedom of the press.
In December 2006, the newspaper Le Monde published an article in which the author, EE, a journalist employed by that newspaper, claimed that Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (‘Real Madrid’) and Fútbol Club Barcelona had retained the services of the head of a doping ring in the cycling world. Many media outlets, Spanish media outlets in particular, shared that article. In that same month, Le Monde published a letter of denial it had received from Real Madrid, but made no comment on it.
In May 2007, Real Madrid and AE, a member of its medical team, brought an action for damages before a Spanish court, based on harm done to their honour, against the newspaper company Société Éditrice du Monde and EE. That court ordered the latter to pay EUR 300000 to Real Madrid and EUR 30000 to AE by way of compensation for non-material damage and ordered that its decision be published in the newspaper Le Monde and in a Spanish newspaper. That judgment was upheld on appeal and the appeal against that judgment was dismissed by the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain).
In 2014, by two orders, the Spanish court of first instance ordered the enforcement of that judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) and the payment of the abovementioned principal amounts plus EUR 90000 by way of interest and costs to Real Madrid and EUR 3000 by way of interest and costs to AE.
The tribunal de grande instance de Paris (Regional Court, Paris, France) issued two declarations of enforceability relating to that judgment and those orders, but the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris, France) overturned those declarations on the ground that the penalties were manifestly contrary to French international public policy inasmuch as they infringed the freedom of expression.
Hearing the appeal lodged by Real Madrid and AE, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) seeks to ascertain in which circumstances the enforcement of a judgment ordering, as in the present case, a newspaper publishing house and one of its journalists to pay damages by way of compensation for non-material damage must be refused under the Brussels I Regulation, (
1
) on the ground that it constitutes a manifest infringement of the freedom of the press, enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
Findings of the Court
As a preliminary point, the Court recalls the exceptional nature of the public-policy exception provided for by Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, which can be envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment given in another Member State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the Member State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it would infringe a fundamental principle, either of the national law of that Member State or of EU law. In that regard, it is for the national court to ensure with equal diligence the protection of rights established in national law and rights conferred by EU law.
This is so inter alia with respect to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, with which a national court must comply when applying the Brussels I Regulation and, in so doing, when implementing EU law. (
2
) However, given the fundamental importance of the principle of mutual trust in that implementation, the Member States may be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, save in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, it is only if the enforcement of a judgment in the Member State in which enforcement is sought would give rise to a manifest breach of a fundamental right as enshrined in the Charter that enforcement of that judgment may be refused or, as the case may be, the declaration of enforceability pertaining to that judgment revoked.
As regards the freedom of expression in particular, the Court states that that constitutes one of the essential foundations of a pluralist, democratic society, and is one of the values on which, under Article 2 TEU, the European Union is founded. Interferences with the freedom of expression, such as those concerning journalists and also publishers and press organisations, must therefore be limited to what is strictly necessary.
Similarly, it is apparent from the settled case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (
3
) leaves little scope for restrictions on freedom of expression in, inter alia, the fields of political speech and matters of public interest, (
4
) which includes matters relating to professional sports. In that context, considerable weight must be attached to the interest of a democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press in the determination of whether the interference in question is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Thus, any judgment awarding damages for harm to reputation must comprise a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the amount awarded and the harm in question.
In that regard, there is a difference between a sanction in favour of a legal entity and one in favour of an individual, since harm to an individual’s reputation may have repercussions on the individual’s dignity, whereas the reputation of a legal entity is devoid of that moral dimension. As regards the proportionality of a sanction, any undue restriction on freedom of expression entails a risk of obstructing or paralysing future media coverage of similar questions. In particular, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the most careful scrutiny is called for when the measures taken or the sanctions imposed are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates over matters of legitimate public concern and, therefore, have a deterrent effect on the exercise of the freedom of the press in respect of such matters.
On the basis of those considerations, the Court of Justice finds that the enforcement of a judgment ordering a newspaper publishing house and one of its journalists to pay damages by way of compensation for the non-material damage suffered by a sports club and one of the members of its medical team due to harm caused to their reputation by the publication of information about them must be refused where it would give rise to a manifest infringement of the freedom of the press, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter. Such a manifest infringement comes within public policy in the Member State in which enforcement is sought and therefore constitutes the ground for refusal laid down in Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 45 thereof. (
5
)
It is for the referring court to determine, taking account of all of the circumstances of the case, including not only the resources of the persons against whom judgment is given but also the seriousness of their wrong and the extent of the harm as found in the judgments at issue in the main proceedings, whether the enforcement of those judgments would give rise to such a manifest infringement. To that end, it is for that court to ascertain whether the damages awarded in those judgments are manifestly disproportionate to the reputational harm in question and thus risk having a deterrent effect on future media coverage of similar matters in the Member State in which enforcement is sought or, more generally, on the exercise of the freedom of the press, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter.
In the context of that verification, it may take account of the amounts awarded for similar harm in the Member State in which enforcement is sought. However, any discrepancy between those amounts and the amount of damages awarded in the judgments at issue in the main proceedings is not in itself sufficient for a finding that those damages are, automatically and without subsequent verification, manifestly disproportionate to the reputational harm in question. Moreover, that verification cannot involve a review of the substantive assessments carried out by the court in the Member State of origin, as that would amount to a review of the merits, which is expressly prohibited by Article 36 and Article 45(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. Lastly, should that court find that there is a manifest infringement of the freedom of the press, it should limit the refusal to enforce those judgments to the manifestly disproportionate portion, in the Member State in which enforcement is sought, of the damages awarded.
(
1
)	Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1) (‘the Brussels I Regulation’).
(
2
)	Under Article 51(1) of the Charter.
(
3
)	The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’).
(
4
)	See Article 10(2) ECHR.
(
5
)	For an action such as the one in the present case, concerning a judgment given in an action brought against a declaration of enforceability, Article 45 of the Brussels I Regulation refers to the listed grounds of refusal, including Article 34 of that regulation.