JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
3 September 2025 (*)
( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Concept of ‘businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ – Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Right to effective judicial protection – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Proportionality – Right to property – Right to private life – Plea of illegality )
In Case T‑1117/23,
Alisher Usmanov, residing in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, M. Moretto, V. Villante, M. Pirovano, A. Bass and T. Marembert, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by D. Laurent and B. Driessen, acting as Agents, and by B. Maingain, lawyer,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed of R. Mastroianni, President, M. Brkan (Rapporteur) and I. Gâlea, Judges,
Registrar: M. Zwozdziak-Carbonne, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 12 March 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By his action, the applicant, Mr Alisher Usmanov, seeks the annulment, under Article 263 TFEU, of the following acts in so far as they concern him:
–        first, Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (together, ‘the September 2023 acts’);
–        secondly, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/847) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/849) (together, ‘the March 2024 acts’);
–        thirdly, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2456) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2455) (together, ‘the September 2024 acts’).
I.      Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action
2        The applicant is a citizen of Russia and Uzbekistan.
3        The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
4        On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, under Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16). That same day, it adopted, under Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).
5        On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria pursuant to which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be subject to the restrictive measures at issue.
6        Article 2(1)(a), (d) and (g) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, provided as follows:
‘1.      All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:
(a)      natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;
…
(d)      natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine;
…
(g)      leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine,
… shall be frozen.
2.      No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’
7        The detailed rules governing that freezing of funds were laid down in the subsequent paragraphs of Article 2 of Decision 2014/145, as amended.
8        Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, required the adoption of measures to freeze funds and laid down the detailed rules governing that freezing in terms essentially identical to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329. Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation essentially reproduced the wording of Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.
A.      Initial inclusion of the applicant’s name on the list annexed to Decision 2014/145, as amended, and on the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, and the maintenance of his name on those lists until 15 September 2023
9        On 28 February 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/337 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 59, p. 1) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 58, p. 1) (together, ‘the initial acts’), by which it added the applicant’s name to the list annexed to Decision 2014/145, as amended, and to the list set out in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (together, ‘the lists at issue’). Subsequently, the Council maintained the applicant’s name on those lists until 15 September 2023 by way of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 134) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 1) (together, ‘the March 2023 acts’).
10      The reasons for the initial inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, which remained unchanged following the adoption of the March 2023 acts, were as follows:
‘[The applicant] is [a] pro-Kremlin oligarch with particularly close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has been referred to as one of Vladimir Putin’s favorite oligarchs. He is considered to be one of Russia’s businessmen-officials, who were entrusted with servicing financial flows, but their positions depend on the will of the President. [The applicant] has reportedly fronted for President Putin and solved his business problems. According to FinCEN files he paid $6 million to Vladimir Putin’s influential adviser Valentin Yumashev. Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia and former President and Prime Minister of Russia, benefit[t]ed from the personal use of luxurious residences controlled by [the applicant].
Therefore he actively supported materially or financially Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
[The applicant] has interests in iron ore and steel, media and internet companies. His largest holding is steel giant Metalloinvest. When [the applicant] took control of business daily Kommersant, the freedom of the editorial staff was curtailed and the newspaper took a manifestly pro-Kremlin stance. The Kommersant under [the applicant’s] ownership published a propagandist anti-Ukrainian article by Dmitry Medvedev, in which the former President of Russia argued that it was meaningless to engage in talks with the current Ukrainian authorities, who in his opinion were under direct foreign control.
Therefore he actively supported the Russian government’s policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.’
11      By letter of 28 April 2022, the Council sent the applicant the materials in the file bearing the reference WK 2767/2022 (‘the first evidence file’) containing the evidence concerning him.
12      By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council sent the applicant the information in the file bearing the reference WK 17716/2022 INIT (‘the second evidence file’).
13      An action for annulment brought against the initial acts and the March 2023 acts was dismissed by judgment of 7 February 2024, Usmanov v Council (T‑237/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:56).
B.      Amendment of the criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue
14      On 5 June 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20) and Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1).
15      Decision 2023/1094 amended, with effect from 7 June 2023, the criteria for including the names of persons subject to the freezing of funds. Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 was replaced by the following:
‘(g)      leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’.
16      Regulation No 269/2014 was similarly amended by Regulation 2023/1089.
C.      Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue until 15 March 2024
17      By letter of 19 June 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue and sent him the information contained in the file bearing the reference WK 7871/2023 INIT (‘the third evidence file’).
18      By letter of 20 July 2023, the applicant submitted observations in response to the Council’s letter of 19 June 2023.
19      By letter of 10 July 2023, the Council sent the applicant the information in the file bearing the reference WK 5142/2023 INIT, drawn up on 20 April 2023 (‘the first horizontal evidence file’).
20      By letter of 18 August 2023, the Council sent the applicant the information contained in the file bearing the reference WK 5142/2023 INIT ADD 1, drawn up on 16 August 2023 (‘the second horizontal evidence file’). By letter of 31 August 2023, the applicant submitted observations in response to the Council’s letter of 18 August 2023.
21      On 13 September 2023, the Council adopted the September 2023 acts, the effect of which was to renew the restrictive measures against the applicant until 15 March 2024. The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended to read as follows:
‘[The applicant] is a pro-Kremlin leading businessperson having interests in iron ore and steel, media, telecommunications and internet companies. His largest holding is the steel giant Metalloinvest, which, together with other companies, is operating in the mineral sector, providing substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. [The applicant] has particularly close ties to the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. He has been referred to as one of Vladimir Putin’s favourite leading businesspersons. He is considered to be one of Russia’s businesspersons-officials, who were entrusted with servicing financial flows but whose positions depend on the will of the President. [The applicant] has reportedly fronted for the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and solved his business problems. He also has close ties with Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia and former President and Prime Minister of Russia, who benefitted from the personal use of luxurious residences controlled by [the applicant].
Therefore, he actively supported materially or financially and benefitted from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Furthermore, he is a leading businessperson operating in Russia and a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
When [the applicant] took control of the business daily “Kommersant”, the freedom of the editorial staff was curtailed and the newspaper took a manifestly pro-Kremlin stance. Kommersant under [the applicant’s] ownership published a propagandist anti-Ukrainian article by Dmitry Medvedev, in which the former President of Russia argued that it was meaningless to engage in talks with the current Ukrainian authorities, who in his opinion were under direct foreign control.
Therefore he actively supported the Russian government’s policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.’
22      By letter of 15 September 2023, the Council refused the applicant’s requests for reconsideration of 31 May, 26 June, 20 July and 31 August 2023, on the ground that his observations did not cast doubt on its assessment that maintaining his name on the lists at issue was substantiated by sufficient reasons.
23      By letter of 1 November 2023, the applicant submitted a request to the Council for reconsideration of the September 2023 acts.
D.      Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue until 15 September 2024
24      By letter of 21 December 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue and sent him the information contained in the file bearing the reference WK 16826/2023 INIT (‘the fourth evidence file’).
25      By letter of 11 January 2024, the applicant submitted observations in response to the Council’s letter of 21 December 2023.
26      By letter of 8 February 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain his name on the lists of restrictive measures and sent him the information contained in the file bearing the reference WK 5142/2023 ADD 2 (‘the third horizontal evidence file’). By letter of 19 February 2024, the applicant submitted observations in response to the Council’s letter of 8 February 2024.
27      On 12 March 2024, the Council adopted the March 2024 acts, the effect of which was to renew the measures against the applicant until 15 September 2024. The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were the same as those given in the September 2023 acts.
28      On 31 May 2024, the applicant submitted a request to the Council for reconsideration of the March 2024 acts.
E.      Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue until 15 March 2025
29      By letter of 27 June 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue on the basis of amended reasons and sent him the information contained in the file bearing the reference WK 8851/24 REV 1 (‘the fifth evidence file’).
30      By letter of 10 July 2024, the applicant submitted observations in response to the Council’s letter of 27 June 2024.
31      By letter of 23 July 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue on the basis of amended reasons.
32      By letter of 4 August 2024, the applicant submitted observations in response to the Council’s letter of 23 July 2024.
33      On 12 September 2024, the Council adopted the September 2024 acts, the effect of which was to renew the measures against the applicant until 15 March 2025. The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended to read as follows:
‘[The applicant] is a leading businessperson having interests in iron ore and steel, media, telecommunications and internet companies. [The applicant] owns the largest stake in his USM holding, a global conglomerate of metals and mining, telecommunications and technology companies which includes Metalloinvest, Udokan Copper, Akkerman Cement, MegaFon and other assets. [The applicant], directly or through USM, owns and controls assets in key sectors of the Russian economy. His largest holding is the steel giant Metalloinvest, which, together with other companies, is operating in the mineral sector, providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. Therefore, he is a leading businessperson operating in Russia as well as a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
[The applicant] has particularly close ties to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. He has been referred to as one of Vladimir Putin’s favourite leading businesspersons. He is considered to be one of Russia’s businesspersons-officials, who were entrusted with servicing financial flows but whose positions depend on the will of the President. [The applicant] is reputed to have acted on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation in a number of business deals of political and strategic importance. He also has close ties with Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and former President and Prime Minister of Russia, who benefitted from the personal use of luxurious residences controlled by [the applicant].
Therefore, he actively supported materially or financially and benefitted from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
[The applicant] is also the exclusive owner of the business daily Kommersant. When he took control of the business daily “Kommersant”, the freedom of the editorial staff was curtailed and the newspaper took a manifestly pro-Kremlin stance. Kommersant under Usmanov’s ownership published a propagandist anti-Ukrainian article by Dmitry Medvedev, in which the former President of Russia argued that it was meaningless to engage in talks with the current Ukrainian authorities, who in his opinion were under direct foreign control.
Therefore he actively supported the Russian government’s policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.’
II.    Forms of order sought
34      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the September 2023 acts, the March 2024 acts and the September 2024 acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) in so far as they concern him;
–        order the Council to pay the costs.
35      The Council contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the application;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
III. Law
36      In support of his action, the applicant puts forward six pleas in law, alleging, in essence (i) distortion of the evidence and of the relevant facts; (ii) manifest error of assessment and illegality of Article 1(1)(e) and Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1094, and of Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation No 2023/1089 (‘amended criterion (g)’); (iii) breach of the obligation to state reasons and of the right to effective judicial protection; (iv) breach of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination; (v) breach of the principle of proportionality; and (vi) breach of the right to property, of the right to respect for private life and of freedom of expression.
37      The Court considers it appropriate to deal first of all with the first part of the second plea, raising a plea of illegality in respect of amended criterion (g), and the fifth plea, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality.
A.      The first part of the second plea in law, raising a plea of illegality in respect of amended criterion (g), and the fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality
38      The applicant submits that Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1094, and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2023/1089, laying down amended criterion (g), are unlawful.
39      It should be borne in mind that Decision 2023/1094 and Regulation 2023/1089 amended, with effect from 7 June 2023, the criteria for listing the names of persons subject to the freezing of funds and that amended criterion (g) covers, inter alia, two categories of persons, namely ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ (‘the first part of amended criterion (g)’) and ‘businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ (‘the third part of amended criterion (g)’).
40      Under Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.
41      Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge indirectly, in seeking annulment of an act against which it can bring an action, the validity of previous acts of the institutions which form the legal basis of the contested act, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be annulled. The general act claimed to be illegal must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned and there must be a direct legal connection between the contested individual decision and the general act in question (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
42      It should also be noted that the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of primary EU law and the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the EU legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
43      The fact remains that the Council enjoys a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the legal criteria and procedures for adopting restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). Consequently, rules of general application defining those criteria and procedures – such as the provisions of the contested acts laying down the relevant criteria concerned by this plea in law – are subject to a limited judicial review, restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, that there has been no error of law, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2009, Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, EU:T:2009:266, paragraphs 44 and 45).
44      It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine, in the first place, the plea of illegality raised by the applicant in respect of the first part of amended criterion (g) and, in the second place, his plea of illegality in respect of the third part of amended criterion (g).
1.      The first part of amended criterion (g)
45      By the first part of the second plea, the applicant claims, by way of a plea of illegality, that the first part of amended criterion (g) is unlawful, arguing that there is no evidence to justify its adoption. By his fifth plea, the applicant alleges breach of the principle of proportionality. In response to a question put to him at the hearing, the applicant explained that, by means of that plea, he was claiming that the first part of amended criterion (g) infringed the principle of proportionality.
(a)    The lack of evidence to justify the adoption of the first part of amended criterion (g) and manifest error of assessment
46      The applicant submits that, by adopting the first part of amended criterion (g), the Council established – as is apparent from recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094 – an irrebuttable presumption of association between the Government of the Russian Federation and anyone with the status of leading businessperson operating in Russia.
47      He states that the evidence in the second horizontal evidence file cannot justify the adoption of the first part of amended criterion (g) because, inter alia, that file was drawn up after the adoption of that criterion and the documents contained in the first and second horizontal evidence files do not provide a sufficiently solid factual basis – owing in particular to the lack of probative value of that evidence – to infer that ‘a relationship of mutual benefit and support exists between the Government of the Russian Federation and leading businesspersons operating in Russia’.
48      The applicant adds that it is practically impossible to overturn such a presumption since that would require him to rebut every item of evidence in the first and second horizontal evidence files and would necessitate proof of negative facts, such as the absence of influence over Russian decision-makers. Besides, in Russia there is no practice that could be considered sufficiently universal to allow the Council to rely on such a presumption.
49      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
50      It should be noted that, prior to the adoption of amended criterion (g), that criterion covered ‘leading businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’. The effect of the amendment made to that criterion by Decision 2023/1094 was to extend the scope of the criterion to cover ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’, which is the effect contested by the applicant, and to cover ‘businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’.
51      In the present case, the applicant starts from the premiss, relying on recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094, that the first part of amended criterion (g) establishes a presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons and persons exercising political power in the Russian Federation.
52      In that regard, the first part of amended criterion (g) reproduces the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ which was employed prior to the amendments, with the result that that concept must be interpreted in same way, namely as referring to the importance of those businesspersons in the light, as the case may be, of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 143).
53      In other words, the amendment made to the first part of criterion (g) does not concern the definition of the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ as such, but was intended to broaden the scope of the restrictive measures so that they apply to all leading businesspersons, including those not involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
54      The reasons justifying the broadening of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, are set out in recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094. That recital describes how the Russian economy functions, characterised by the existence of a relationship of interdependence between leading businesspersons operating in Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation. Thus, by targeting those businesspersons, the Council seeks to exploit the influence that that category of persons is likely to exert on the Russian regime by compelling them to put pressure on that government to have it change its policy with regard to Ukraine. Therefore, by referring to the relationship of interdependence between leading businesspersons and persons exercising political power in the Russian Federation, the Council seeks to exploit the influence which those businesspersons are likely to exert on the Russian Government owing to their economic activities.
55      It follows that the applicant’s arguments that the Council established an irrebuttable presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons and persons exercising political power in the Russian Federation and on the need to adduce negative proof relating to the absence of influence over the leaders of the Russian Federation in order to overturn such a presumption must be rejected.
56      As regards the argument that the adoption of the first part of amended criterion (g) is not substantiated by sufficient evidence, it must be borne in mind, first, that the adoption of a criterion for the inclusion of a person or entity on the lists at issue constitutes an act of general application intended to achieve an objective falling within the scope of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), in the present case, in view of the seriousness of the situation, to increase pressure on the Russian authorities to bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine, and, secondly, that the Council enjoys a broad discretion as regards the adoption of such criteria.
57      It follows that, contrary to the applicant’s claims, the Council was not required to adduce evidence to prove the existence of a relationship of interdependence between the Government of the Russian Federation and leading businesspersons for the purpose of adopting the first part of amended criterion (g). Indeed, it is for the applicant to adduce, in support of his plea of illegality, any evidence capable of demonstrating that such a finding as to the existence of that relationship is manifestly incorrect and that it thus vitiates the legality of that part of amended criterion (g).
58      Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that the Council did not have a sufficiently solid factual basis to infer that ‘a relationship of mutual benefit and support exist[ed] between the Government of the Russian Federation and leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ must be rejected. In addition, the applicant’s argument that he would have to rebut each item of evidence contained in the first and second horizontal evidence files must also be rejected.
59      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the applicant’s argument that there is no evidence to justify the adoption of the first part of amended criterion (g) must be dismissed.
(b)    Breach of the principle of proportionality
60      In the fifth plea, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality, the applicant submits that there is no evidence that businesspersons in Russia are capable of exerting influence over political decision-makers and that, consequently, the measures taken under that criterion are not appropriate for achieving the objective pursued.
61      It should be recalled that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be such as to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain them (judgment of 13 March 2012, Melli Bank v Council, C‑380/09 P, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 52).
62      Moreover, the Council is not required to adduce evidence that the restrictive measures which it imposes produce the effects anticipated by the legislation concerned, but only that those measures are capable of achieving the objectives pursued by that legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 66).
63      In the present case, the Council adopted the first part of amended criterion (g) because, in the exercise of its broad discretion and in view of the worsening of the situation in Ukraine, it considered it appropriate, in order to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation, to be able to include leading businesspersons operating in Russia on the lists at issue.
64      First of all, it should be observed that the Council’s approach of widening the circle of persons covered by the restrictive measures at issue, in view of the worsening of the situation in Ukraine, in order to attain the objectives pursued, is based on the progressive impairment of rights according to the effectiveness of the measures (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 25 January 2017, Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defence v Council, T‑255/15, not published, EU:T:2017:25, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).
65      Next, targeting ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’, in view of their importance on an economic level, under the first part of amended criterion (g) is likely to increase pressure on the Russian Government and the costs of its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. Thus, the first part of amended criterion (g) reflects the Council’s intention to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities, with the result that it does not appear to be manifestly inappropriate for the purpose of attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the relevant legislation.
66      Lastly, the first part of amended criterion (g) is necessary in order to achieve and implement the objectives referred to in Article 21 TEU. It is apparent from recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094 that, by extending the scope ratione personae of the restrictive measures to cover leading businesspersons operating in any economic sector whatsoever in Russia, the Council made no error of assessment in considering that those measures contributed to increasing pressure on the Russian Government, which is responsible for the invasion of Ukraine. In that regard, it must be stated that the applicant has not shown that an alternative criterion with a narrower scope would have enabled the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures to be attained as effectively.
67      Furthermore, as is apparent from paragraphs 57 and 58 above, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Council was not required to adduce evidence to prove the existence of a relationship of interdependence between the Government of the Russian Federation and leading businesspersons for the purpose of adopting the first part of amended criterion (g), and the applicant has not adduced evidence to demonstrate that such a finding as to the existence of that relationship is manifestly incorrect. Consequently, the applicant’s argument that the measures taken pursuant to the first part of amended criterion (g) are not appropriate for achieving the legitimate objective pursued, since there is no evidence that businesspersons in Russia are capable of exerting influence over political decision-makers, must be rejected.
68      It follows from the above that the first part of amended criterion (g) is not manifestly disproportionate in the light of the objectives pursued by the relevant legislation.
69      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the plea of illegality raised by the applicant must be rejected in so far as it is directed against the first part of amended criterion (g).
2.      The third part of amended criterion (g)
70      It should be borne in mind that, having regard to the preventive nature of decisions adopting restrictive measures, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited, and of 18 May 2022, Foz v Council, T‑296/20, EU:T:2022:298, paragraph 178 (not published) and the case-law cited).
71      It is apparent from paragraphs 112, 123 and 137 below that, in order to justify the adoption of the contested acts, the Council put forward a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence capable of demonstrating that the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia, within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g).
72      It follows that, since the first part of amended criterion (g), as found in paragraph 69 above, is not vitiated by the defects alleged by the applicant and since the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first part of amended criterion (g) is not vitiated by an error of assessment, the plea of illegality directed against the provisions of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, providing for the third part of amended criterion (g), must be rejected as ineffective.
73      Accordingly, the first part of the second plea in law and the fifth plea in law must be rejected in their entirety.
B.      The first plea in law, alleging that the evidence has no probative value
74      The applicant challenges the probative value of the documents contained in the first to third evidence files. He claims that those documents consist predominantly of media reports that lack the necessary specificity, preciseness and consistency to be regarded as proof, especially since a large volume of incorrect information has been published about him over the years.
75      The applicant also complains that the Council relied on secondary data such as press reports, when it had access to non-public documents compiled by the authorities of the Member States and the European External Action Service (EEAS).
76      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
77      It should be noted that the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited).
78      In accordance with the principle that evidence may be freely adduced referred to in paragraph 77 above, the parties are entitled, in principle, to rely on any form of evidence in order to prove a particular fact (judgment of 10 September 2020, Hamas v Council, C‑386/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:691, paragraph 73).
79      The Court also points out that the context of the measures at issue must be taken into account and the standard of proof which may be required of the Council must be adapted in the light of the difficulty in obtaining evidence and objective information (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).
80      According to the case-law, press articles may be used in order to corroborate the existence of certain facts if they are sufficiently specific, precise and consistent as regards the facts there described (see judgments of 25 January 2017, Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defence v Council, T‑255/15, not published, EU:T:2017:25, paragraph 147 and the case-law cited, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
81      Furthermore, it must be observed that the situation of conflict involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information being provided (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).
82      First, as regards the objections raised by the applicant with regard to items of information contained in the first to third evidence files, which, as the case may be, allegedly lack the necessary specificity and consistency or are imprecise or even false, it should be noted that the applicant partly supports that argument by referring to explanations set out in an annex.
83      In that regard, it should be recalled that, under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is applicable to proceedings before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute, and under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, applications must state the subject matter of the dispute, the pleas and the arguments put forward, and must provide a summary of those pleas. Those elements must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his or her defence and the General Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, if an action is to be admissible, for the basic legal and factual particulars relied upon to be stated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see, to that effect, orders of 28 April 1993, De Hoe v Commission, T‑85/92, EU:T:1993:39, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and of 11 March 2021, Techniplan v Commission, T‑426/20, not published, EU:T:2021:129, paragraph 19). Whilst specific points in the text of the application can be supported and supplemented by references to specific passages in the documents attached, a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot compensate for the lack of essential information in the application. It is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the pleas and arguments on which it may consider the action to be based, since the annexes have a purely evidential and instrumental function (see, to that effect, order of 28 April 1993, De Hoe v Commission, T‑85/92, EU:T:1993:39, paragraph 22, and judgment of 5 July 2023, TIB Chemicals v Commission, T‑639/20, not published, EU:T:2023:374, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
84      In accordance with that case-law, it should be noted that to allow the annexes to provide the detail of an argument which is not presented in a sufficiently clear and precise manner in the application would be contrary to their purely evidential and instrumental function. Consequently, the applicant’s arguments concerning the evidence in the first to third evidence files – arguments that are developed in an annex to the application – must be rejected as inadmissible.
85      In addition, in the application, the applicant states that the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany) made a number of orders against the newspaper Kurier, prohibiting it from publishing the statement that he ‘[had] a reputation [as] Mr. Putin’s “favourite oligarch”, as Mr. Putin himself used to call him’, and against the newspapers Exxpress and Der Tagespiegel, prohibiting them from publishing statements concerning the applicant’s alleged ownership of properties in Germany. However, the articles referred to in the abovementioned orders of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) are not included in the first to third evidence files. Furthermore, the applicant relies on those orders to cast doubt on the Council’s use of press articles as evidence and refers in particular to exhibits 2, 3 and 10 in the first evidence file and exhibit 4 in the third evidence file.
86      Exhibits 2, 3 and 10 in the first evidence file consist of, respectively, an interview with Mr Piontkovsky published by the ‘Institute of Modern Russia’ on 24 March 2021, an article from The Times newspaper entitled ‘Ex-Russian president Medvedev “given run of luxury fishing resort linked to oligarch”’ published on 17 February 2022 and a post from Mr Aslund’s Twitter account dated 28 January 2022. In so far as those items of evidence are not mentioned in the analysis of the merits of maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue pursuant to the first part of amended criterion (g) by way of the September 2023 acts in paragraphs 98 to 113 below, it is not necessary to reject the applicant’s arguments relating to the probative value of those items of evidence as ineffective.
87      As regards exhibit 4 in the third evidence file, it should be noted that the applicant merely claims that the Council used that item of evidence to attribute to him the ownership of properties in Germany, but he does not put forward any argument to contest its sufficiently specific, precise and consistent nature. Consequently, the fact that exhibit 4 in the third evidence file states that the applicant owns properties in Germany, even though the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) had prohibited the newspapers Exxpress and Der Tagesspiegel from publishing similar statements, is not a factor capable of depriving that item of evidence of all probative value as regards the other information it contains concerning, in particular, USM Holding.
88      Secondly, the applicant’s argument that the Council relied on secondary data, such as press reports, when it had access to non-public documents compiled by the authorities of the Member States must be rejected.
89      It should be noted that such primary source documents are not necessarily freely accessible to the Council. Thus, as the Council rightly points out, the fact that it may have had access to certain orders made by the German courts does not mean that it is always able to access such primary source documents from the authorities of the Member States, even if it has diplomatic representations there.
90      The first plea in law must therefore be rejected.
C.      The second part of the second plea in law, alleging error of assessment
1.      Preliminary observations
91      As a preliminary point, it must be noted that, while it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraphs 54 and 55, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
92      In addition, it should be pointed out that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) requires in particular that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, was taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128).
93      That assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges its burden of proof if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
94      It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is necessary, however, that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57).
95      Moreover, it should be borne in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 58 and 59).
96      It follows that, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence as that justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of that person’s name on that list, provided that (i) the reasons for listing remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). In that respect, changes in the context include the taking into consideration of, first, the situation in the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures has been established as well as the specific situation of the person concerned (judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78; see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 101) and, secondly, all of the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the achievement of the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures (judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 82 to 84 and the case-law cited).
97      It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to ascertain whether the Council committed an error of assessment in deciding to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
2.      The September 2023 acts
98      The reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are set out in paragraph 21 above.
99      They show that the applicant was maintained on those lists on the basis of the criterion set out in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014 (‘criterion (a)’), the criterion set out in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 3(1)(d) of Regulation No 269/2014 (‘criterion (d)’) and amended criterion (g).
100    In order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council provided, in addition to the first and second evidence files, the third evidence file and the first and second horizontal evidence files. Together, those evidence files contain, inter alia, the following documents:
–        an article published by the magazine Forbes on 2 February 2022 (exhibit 1 in the first evidence file);
–        an extract from the website Metalinfo.ru, accessed on 15 November 2022 (exhibit 1 in the second evidence file);
–        an extract from the website of bne intellinews (www.intellinews.com), accessed on 31 May 2023 (exhibit 1 in the third evidence file);
–        an extract from the website of Izvestia (iz.ru), accessed on 31 May 2023 (exhibit 2 in the third evidence file);
–        an extract from the website of Metalloinvest, accessed on 31 May 2023 (exhibit 3 in the third evidence file);
–        an extract from the website codastory.com, accessed on 31 May 2023 (exhibit 4 in the third evidence file).
101    In support of this plea, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Council failed to provide specific, precise and consistent evidence constituting a sufficiently solid factual basis to justify maintaining his name on the lists at issue under criteria (a) and (d) and the first and third parts of amended criterion (g).
102    As regards, in particular, the first part of amended criterion (g), the applicant submits that he has retired from business life and that he transferred the management of his business to the business’s executives. According to the applicant, the concept of ‘leading businessperson’ entails the exercise of an activity in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. However, the applicant has no such influence, since he has not been involved in the business since retiring. Furthermore, the claim that Metalloinvest operates in the mining sector is not specific enough and is unfounded. The applicant describes himself as having only a non-controlling stake in USM Holding.
103    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
104    As regards the application to the applicant of the first part of amended criterion (g), it must be borne in mind that the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue by way of the September 2023 acts on the ground that he ‘[was] a … leading businessperson having interests in iron ore and steel, media, telecommunications and internet companies’ and that ‘his largest holding [was] the steel giant Metalloinvest, which, together with other companies, [was] operating in the mineral sector, providing substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government’.
105    The first part of amended criterion (g) requires two conditions to be met, namely, first, that the person concerned may be classified as a ‘leading businessperson’ and, secondly, that he or she operates in the Russian Federation. As is clear from paragraph 52 above, the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g) refers to the importance of those businesspersons in the light, as the case may be, of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities.
106    In the present case, it is apparent from exhibit 1 in the second evidence file and exhibits 1 and 4 in the third evidence file that the applicant is the founder of USM Holding and holds the largest stake in that company. Exhibit 4 in the third evidence file describes USM Holding as ‘a global conglomerate of metals and mining, telecommunications and technology companies’, the assets of which include Metalloinvest and Megafon. Metalloinvest is referred to as a ‘steel giant’ (exhibit 1 in the first evidence file), ‘a large iron and steel producer’ (exhibit 4 in the third evidence file) and ‘a leading supplier of iron ore products … on the global market’ (exhibit 1 in the second evidence file), while Megafon is the second largest mobile operator in Russia (exhibit 4 in the third evidence file), with more than 74 million subscribers and a turnover of 354 billion Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 4 billion) in 2021 (exhibit 1 in the third evidence file).
107    That is, moreover, confirmed by an article in the Wall Street Journal, updated on 31 March 2022 and produced by the applicant, which shows that the applicant holds a 49% stake in USM Holding, described as a mining and telecom conglomerate.
108    In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant does not deny having a stake in USM Holding, but merely states that it is a non-controlling stake.
109    It follows from the foregoing that, on the date of adoption of the September 2023 acts, the applicant was a major shareholder, with a 49% stake in USM Holding. Although it is true that this is a non-controlling stake, it is nonetheless a significant one. As is apparent from paragraph 52 above, the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g) refers, inter alia, to the extent of their capital holdings, without it being necessary for them to hold a controlling stake in a company or necessarily to exercise a function within a company. Consequently, given that the applicant still holds that stake in USM Holding, the Court must also reject his argument that he has retired from business life, that he no longer exercises any functions within USM Holding and that he has not exerted any influence since retiring.
110    In view of the scale of the applicant’s capital holdings in USM Holding and the importance of Metalloinvest and Megafon – both owned by USM Holding – in the mining and telecommunications sectors, it must be held that the Council has proven that the applicant had interests in companies in the iron ore, steel and telecommunications sectors and that he was, consequently, a leading businessperson within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g).
111    The second condition, relating to the pursuit of the activities concerned in Russia, is also satisfied, since all of the undertakings referred to in paragraph 106 are established and operate in Russia.
112    It follows that, when it adopted the September 2023 acts, the Council did not make an error of assessment in finding that the applicant satisfied the conditions laid down in the first part of amended criterion (g).
113    Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 70 above, the second part of the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded as regards the September 2023 acts, without there being any need to examine the substance of the other complaints raised by the applicant challenging the merits of maintaining his name on the lists at issue under criteria (a) and (d) and the third part of amended criterion (g).
3.      The March 2024 acts
114    It follows from Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, that the initial acts and successive maintaining acts are to be kept under constant review and are to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that their objectives have not been met. Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provides for the list annexed thereto to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.
115    It is apparent in particular from the case-law cited in paragraphs 95 and 96 above that the maintenance of a person’s name on the list at issue may be based on the same evidence as that justifying his or her initial inclusion or previous maintenance, provided that (i) the reasons for listing remain unchanged and (ii) the context, including also the specific situation of the person concerned, has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date.
116    In the present case, it must be observed that the grounds on which the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue in the March 2024 acts are identical to those set out in the September 2023 acts. In order to justify the adoption of the March 2024 acts, the Council provided, in addition to the first to third evidence files and the first and second horizontal evidence files, the fourth evidence file and the third horizontal evidence file, referred to in paragraphs 24 and 26.
117    It is therefore necessary to determine whether the context, the objectives of the restrictive measures in question and the applicant’s individual situation permitted his listing to be maintained on the basis of unchanged grounds.
118    In the first place, concerning the general context associated with the situation in Ukraine, on the date of adoption of the September 2023 acts maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the situation in Ukraine was clearly still a serious one. Similarly, the restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
119    In the second place, concerning the applicant’s individual situation, the applicant submits, in connection with the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue under amended criterion (g), that the evidence contained in the fourth evidence file is irrelevant as regards the application to him of amended criterion (g) and he reiterates that he has only a non-controlling stake of 49% in USM Holding and that he has retired from business life and is no longer actively involved in that company.
120    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
121    It should be noted that the applicant merely repeats the statement that he holds a non-controlling stake in USM Holding and that he has retired from the active management of that company.
122    It is apparent from the evidence referred to in paragraph 106 above that the applicant holds a significant stake in USM Holding, which encompasses, inter alia, Metalloinvest, one of the main producers of iron ore and steel in Russia, and Megafon, one of the largest mobile telephone operators in Russia. In addition to the evidence referred to in paragraph 106 above, which confirms that the applicant is a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g) solely on account of his capital holdings in USM Holding, exhibit 1 in the fourth evidence file, which is an extract from the financial media outlet Bloomberg, accessed on 26 October 2023, confirms that the applicant holds a 49% stake in USM Holding, which is not, moreover, disputed by the applicant.
123    It follows that the applicant’s individual situation has not changed as compared with the September 2023 acts and that, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 106 to 112 above, the Council was entitled to take the view that, on account of his capital holdings in USM Holding, the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g).
124    Furthermore, that conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments. The applicant restates the arguments put forward in relation to the September 2023 acts to the effect that his stake is a non-controlling stake and that, since retiring, he no longer exercises executive functions within USM Holding. As is apparent from paragraph 109 above, a non-controlling stake may be sufficient for a person to be classified as a leading businessperson. In addition, such leading status may stem solely from the person’s capital holdings in a company, without it being necessary for him or her to exercise executive functions within that company.
125    Therefore, the second part of the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded as regards the March 2024 acts, without there being any need to examine, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 70 above, the other arguments raised by the applicant challenging the merits of maintaining his name on the lists at issue under criteria (a) and (d) and the third part of amended criterion (g).
4.      The September 2024 acts
126    The reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by way of the September 2024 acts are set out in paragraph 33 above.
127    It follows from those reasons that the applicant was maintained on those lists under criteria (a) and (d) and the first and third parts of amended criterion (g).
128    As regards, more specifically, the application of the first part of amended criterion (g), the relevant section of the reasoning was amended and states that the applicant ‘owns the largest stake in his USM holding, a global conglomerate of metals and mining, telecommunications and technology companies which includes Metalloinvest, Udokan Copper, Akkerman Cement, MegaFon and other assets’ and, ‘directly or through USM, owns and controls assets in key sectors of the Russian economy’.
129    In order to justify the adoption of the September 2024 acts in respect of the applicant, the Council produced the fifth evidence file, referred to in paragraph 29 above, which contains, inter alia, the following materials:
–        an extract from the NTV website dated 15 November 2023 and accessed on 7 May 2024 (exhibit 2 in the fifth evidence file);
–        an extract from an article by Janis Kluge entitled ‘The future has to wait: 5G in Russia and the lack of elite consensus’ published on 25 November 2021 and accessed on 19 June 2024 (exhibit 5 in the fifth evidence file).
130    In the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, the applicant reiterates, first of all, as regards the application of amended criterion (g), that he has not exercised any functions within USM Holding since retiring and that the fact he owns shares does not, on its own, justify his being subject to restrictive measures. He again submits that his shareholding is not significant enough to give rise to ownership or control of USM Holding and states that the Council’s use of the word ‘owns’ in the reasons for listing suggests that he holds more than 50% of the proprietary rights in all of USM Holding’s assets. Next, he argues that the increase in his wealth alleged by the Council is irrelevant. Finally, he asserts that the reasons for listing do not link his stake in the newspaper Kommersant to amended criterion (g).
131    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
132    It is apparent from paragraphs 106 to 112 and paragraphs 119 to 124 above that the Council adduced proof that the applicant owned 49% of USM Holding, described as a global conglomerate of metals and mining, telecommunications and technology companies, and that, in the light of such a significant stake in that company which owns Metalloinvest and Megafon, key players in the mining and telecommunications sectors, the Council was entitled to take the view that, on the date of adoption of the September 2023 acts and the March 2024 acts, the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g).
133    As regards the September 2024 acts specifically, the significant nature of the assets held by USM Holding is confirmed by exhibits 2 and 5 in the fifth evidence file, according to which the applicant is the founder and largest shareholder of USM Holding, the main assets of which include Metalloinvest and Megafon, the latter being described as the second-biggest mobile telephone operator with a 29% share of the market and 75 million subscribers.
134    Concerning the September 2024 acts, it should be noted, first, that the applicant once again restates the arguments already put forward in connection with the September 2023 acts and the March 2024 acts to the effect that he has only a non-controlling stake and reiterates that, since retiring, he no longer exercises executive functions within USM Holding. As is apparent from paragraph 109 above, such arguments must be rejected. A non-controlling stake may be sufficient for a person to be classified as a leading businessperson within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g). In addition, such classification may be based solely on the person’s capital holdings in a company, without it being necessary for him or her to exercise executive functions within that company.
135    Secondly, the Court must also reject as ineffective the applicant’s argument that the reasons for listing do not link his stake in the newspaper Kommersant to amended criterion (g), since it is because of his capital holdings in USM Holding that the applicant is classified as a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g).
136    Thirdly, the applicant submits that the fact that the Council used the word ‘owns’ in the section of the reasoning which reads ‘directly or through USM [Holding], [he] owns and controls assets in key sectors of the Russian economy’ means that the Council is of the view that he holds more than a 50% stake in USM Holding. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant relies on the concepts of ownership and control as defined in the document entitled ‘EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures’, updated on 3 July 2024 (with reference ST 11623/24). In that regard, it should be recalled that it follows from paragraph 3 of that document that those practices must be regarded as containing non-exhaustive recommendations of a general nature for the effective implementation of restrictive measures in accordance with prevailing EU law and applicable national legislation. Those recommendations are not legally binding and should not be read as recommending any action which would be incompatible with EU law. Thus, the concepts of ownership and control are not intended to be used to interpret the first part of amended criterion (g) and do not have the effect of restricting its scope. Accordingly, the applicant cannot take issue with the Council for not having relied on those recommendations in order to determine whether he fell within the category of leading businesspersons operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g). In any event, it is apparent from the reasons for listing that the Council also states therein that the applicant ‘owns the largest stake in his USM [H]olding’. Thus, it does not follow from the reasons for listing that the Council is suggesting that the applicant holds more than 50% of the shares in USM Holding, but only that he is the shareholder with the largest stake. Consequently, the applicant’s argument to that effect must be rejected.
137    In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the Council has put forward a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence capable of demonstrating that the applicant was, on the date of adoption of the September 2024 acts, a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g).
138    Therefore, the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded as regards the September 2024 acts, without there being any need to examine, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 70 above, the other arguments raised by the applicant challenging the merits of maintaining his name on the lists at issue under criteria (a) and (d) and the third part of amended criterion (g).
139    Accordingly, the second part of the second plea in law must be dismissed in its entirety.
D.      The third plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons, of the right to effective judicial protection and of the Council’s obligation to reconsider its decision
140    The third plea is divided into two parts. In the first part, the applicant claims breach of the right to effective judicial protection and of the obligation to state reasons. In the second part, he submits that the Council failed to comply with its review obligation.
1.      The first part of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to effective judicial protection and of the obligation to state reasons
141    The applicant claims that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue by way of the September 2023 acts is vitiated by a breach of the obligation to state reasons and of the right to effective judicial protection. He argues that the information provided by the Council does not enable him to defend his position effectively. He states, in that respect, that the statement of reasons gives no explanation of the benefits he allegedly received from Russian decision-makers. Moreover, he adds that the evidence files do not contain information that is reliable and specific enough to supplement the ground relied on that he benefitted from Russian decision-makers.
142    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
143    According to settled case-law, the right to effective judicial protection, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those reasons. That is without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for the person concerned to defend his or her rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision in question (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).
144    Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the act in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measures for the purpose of assessing whether they are well founded and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 50; see also judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
145    The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of that act, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the act, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. In particular, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law or to provide a detailed answer to the considerations set out by the person concerned when consulted prior to the adoption of that act, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. Consequently, the reasons given for an act adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that act was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 54; see also judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
146    In addition, it has been made clear in the case-law that the statement of reasons for an act of the Council imposing a restrictive measure must not only identify the legal basis for that measure but also the actual and specific reasons why the Council considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure had to be adopted in respect of the person concerned (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).
147    In the first place, it should be noted that the general context which led the Council to adopt the restrictive measures at issue is clearly set out in the recitals of the September 2023 acts, which refer, in particular, to the continuing actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Similarly, the foundations in law on the basis of which those acts were adopted, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, are clearly stated.
148    In the second place, it is apparent from the reasons for the September 2023 acts set out in paragraph 21 above that they refer (i) to amended criterion (g) in so far as it is stated that the applicant ‘is a leading businessperson operating in Russia and a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’, (ii) to criterion (d) in so far as it is stated that the applicant ‘actively supported materially or financially and benefitted from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’, and (iii) to criterion (a) in so far as it is stated that the applicant ‘therefore … actively supported the Russian government’s policies of destabilisation of Ukraine’. Accordingly, even though the statement of reasons does not refer expressly to the provisions establishing criterion (a), criterion (d) and amended criterion (g), it necessarily relates to those provisions given that it is worded in almost identical terms.
149    In the third place, it should be noted that the applicant’s argument alleging failure to state reasons is directed solely against the section of the reasoning relating to the benefits which he was said to have received from Russian decision-makers inasmuch as that reasoning does not, it is argued, contain any explanation making it possible to understand the nature of those benefits. As is apparent from paragraph 148 above, that section of the reasoning relates to criterion (d).
150    By contrast, the applicant does not dispute the clarity of the statement of reasons relating to the application of criterion (a) and amended criterion (g). First, the considerations set out in those sections of the reasoning are precise and specific. Secondly, as is apparent from paragraphs 112, 123 and 137 above, the considerations relating to the application to the applicant of the first part of amended criterion (g) are not vitiated by errors of assessment and that finding is sufficient to justify the contested acts.
151    Consequently, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 70 above, the applicant’s argument that the section of the reasoning relating to criterion (d) lacks clarity must be rejected as ineffective.
152    In addition, it must be borne in mind that the obligation to state reasons provided for in Article 296 TFEU is an essential procedural requirement, as distinct from the question whether the reasons given are well founded, which goes to the substantive legality of the act at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 April 1998, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 67). The reasoning for a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, C‑413/06 P, EU:C:2008:392, paragraph 181).
153    It is clear that the applicant’s arguments relating to the content of the evidence files are actually concerned with an error of assessment rather than a breach of the obligation to state reasons. Those arguments will therefore be examined in connection with the second part of the second plea.
154    The first part of the third plea in law must therefore be rejected.
2.      The second part of the third plea in law, alleging breach of the Council’s obligation to reconsider its decision
155    In the reply, the applicant submits that the Council infringed his right to effective judicial protection by failing to take into account evidence he had forwarded to the Council, in particular the judgment delivered on 19 January 2024 by the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) concerning the publication of an article by the magazine Forbes on 2 February 2022 entitled ‘Meet Putin’s Oligarchs Most Likely To Get Slapped With Sanctions By Biden Over Ukraine’. That judgment prohibited that magazine from publishing statements alleging that the applicant ‘fronted for [President] Putin and solved his business problems’, ‘bought Reiman’s stake [in MegaFon]’ and ‘has properties in Munich’. Therefore, the Council infringed its review obligation.
156    In the statements of modification concerning the March 2024 acts and the September 2024 acts, the applicant also claims that the Council failed to comply with its obligation to reconsider its decision. In that regard, the applicant reiterates that the Council failed to take into account exculpatory evidence he had submitted, which includes the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) referred to in paragraph 155 above. He adds that the failure to take account of such a judgment amounts to a breach of his right to good administration provided for in Article 41 of the Charter and a breach of the duty of sincere cooperation between Member States and the European Union.
157    In addition, in the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, the applicant argues that the Council did not adduce proof that his observations had indeed been forwarded to the representatives of the Member States within the Council as part of the periodic review procedure.
158    At the hearing, the applicant alleged infringement of essential procedural requirements. The applicant submits that, under Article 14(3) of Regulation No 269/2014, it is for the Council to review its decision where observations have been submitted by a person subject to restrictive measures on the basis of that regulation. The applicant states that it follows from paragraph 33 of the Council’s observations on the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts that it is the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors within the Council and not the Council as an institution which examines the evidence adduced by a person subject to restrictive measures and that the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) adopts the regulation renewing the restrictive measures for six months without examining the files of each person whose name is maintained on the lists at issue. The applicant claims that the Council has not adduced proof that the review of his situation and in particular the exculpatory items of evidence produced by him were examined by the Council as an institution. According to the applicant, the evidence produced by the Council merely shows that his letters were forwarded to the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors. In that regard, the applicant seeks the adoption of a measure of organisation of procedure in order to have the Council produce the minutes of the Council meetings and the documents demonstrating that the ministers within the Council had the possibility of accessing the complete set of documents concerning him during the review of his situation. According to the applicant, the fact that it is not the Council as an institution which conducts the review constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements.
159    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
(a)    Preliminary observations
160    It should be borne in mind that respect for the rights of the defence includes, inter alia, the right to be heard, which is enshrined in Article 41(2) of the Charter (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
161    In the case of a decision to freeze funds by which the name of a person or entity already appearing on the list of persons and entities whose funds are frozen is maintained on that list, the adoption of such a decision must, in principle, be preceded by notification of the incriminating evidence and by an opportunity for the person or entity concerned to be heard (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 62, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 101).
162    The right to be heard prior to the adoption of acts maintaining the name of a person or entity on a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures is necessary where, in the decision maintaining that person or entity’s name on that list, the Council has included new evidence against the person or entity concerned, namely evidence which was not taken into account in the initial listing decision (see judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
163    However, where maintaining the name of the person or entity concerned on a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures is based on the same reasons as those which justified the adoption of the initial act without new evidence being adduced in respect of that person or entity, the Council is not obliged, in order to respect the right of that person or entity to be heard, to notify it again of the evidence against it (judgments of 7 April 2016, Central Bank of Iran v Council, C‑266/15 P, EU:C:2016:208, paragraphs 32 and 33, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 103).
164    Thus, when comments are made by the person concerned on the statement of reasons, the competent EU authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence provided with them (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 114).
165    In that connection, it should be recalled that although, for the rights of the defence and the right to be heard to be observed, the EU institutions must enable the person concerned by the act adversely affecting him or her to make his or her views known effectively, those institutions cannot be required to accept those views (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 July 2017, Arbuzov v Council, T‑221/15, not published, EU:T:2017:478, paragraph 84, and of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:T:2018:619, paragraph 330).
166    Similarly, the mere fact that the Council did not conclude that the renewal of the restrictive measures was not well founded, or even consider it necessary to carry out checks in the light of the observations submitted by the applicant, does not mean that it did not take cognisance of such observations (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:T:2018:619, paragraph 331).
(b)    The September 2023 acts
167    It should be observed that, as regards the September 2023 acts, the applicant raised for the first time in the reply a plea alleging breach by the Council of its obligation to conduct a periodic review, inasmuch as the Council did not take into account the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) of 19 January 2024, referred to in paragraph 155 above.
168    Without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of that argument raised for the first time in the reply, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the legality of an EU act must be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing at the time when the act was adopted (see judgment of 27 September 2006, Roquette Frères v Commission, T‑322/01, EU:T:2006:267, paragraph 325 and the case-law cited).
169    In the present case, since the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) referred to in paragraph 155 above is dated 19 January 2024, the Council cannot be criticised for not having taken it into account in the review of the applicant’s individual situation prior to the adoption of the September 2023 acts.
170    Consequently, the plea alleging breach of the review obligation must be rejected as regards the September 2023 acts.
(c)    The March 2024 acts
171    The applicant claims that, by failing to take into account, inter alia, the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) referred to in paragraph 155 above, the Council infringed its review obligation and, consequently, his right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter as well as the principle of sincere cooperation.
172    As regards, first, the principle of sincere cooperation, it should be recalled that that principle laid down in Article 4(3) TEU requires mutual respect and mutual assistance between the European Union and its Member States in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. It follows that the applicant cannot reasonably rely on such a principle, which governs relations between the EU institutions and the Member States, in order to establish an infringement of his rights in the context of the administrative procedure which led to his name being maintained on the lists at issue (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 December 2021, Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia-Kosakowo v Commission, T‑263/15 RENV, not published, EU:T:2021:927, paragraph 77).
173    Secondly, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council did not take into account the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) referred to in paragraph 155 above, it is apparent from paragraphs 24 and 25 above that the Council informed the applicant, on 21 December 2023, of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue and sent him the materials in the fourth evidence file, and that the applicant submitted observations, on 11 January 2024, in response to the Council’s letter of 21 December 2023. Furthermore, by letter of 31 January 2024, the applicant informed the Council of the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) of 19 January 2024, referred to in paragraph 155 above.
174    It follows from the letter of 13 March 2024 that the Council took account of the requests for reconsideration made by the applicant in his letters of 11 and 31 January and 20 February 2024 and his observations. Indeed, in the letter of 13 March 2024, the Council addresses inter alia the applicant’s arguments that amended criterion (g) is unlawful and too vague. It also addresses the applicant’s arguments that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue lacked sufficient documentary support. In that regard, the Council expressly states that it took account of the applicant’s observations on the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg), referred to in paragraph 155 above, delivered in proceedings between the applicant and the business magazine Forbes concerning an article included in the first evidence file, but asserts that it was not the only document on which it relied.
175    Thus, the Council took account of the abovementioned judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg), but concluded that, in the light of the other evidence available to it, the applicant’s arguments based on that non-final judgment did not call into question its decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
176    It follows that, having regard to the case-law cited in paragraphs 165 and 166 above, the Council did not infringe the obligation to review the applicant’s situation before adopting the March 2024 acts, nor did it infringe the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter.
(d)    The September 2024 acts
177    In his statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, the applicant puts forward two complaints. First, he restates the same arguments alleging that the Council infringed its review obligation and the principle of sincere cooperation inasmuch as it did not take into account the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) referred to in paragraph 155 above. Secondly, he claims that the Council did not properly review his individual situation, since it did not adduce proof that his observations had indeed been forwarded to the Member States’ representatives within the Council so that they could take an informed position on the review of his situation.
(1)    The first complaint, alleging breach of the review obligation and breach of the principle of sincere cooperation due to failure to take into account a judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg)
178    As regards, first, the breach of the principle of sincere cooperation alleged by the applicant, it is apparent from paragraph 172 above that the applicant cannot rely on that principle in the context of the review of his individual situation.
179    Secondly, as regards the alleged breach of the review obligation, it follows from the Council’s letter of 13 September 2024 that the Council addressed the applicant’s observations on the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) referred to in paragraph 155 above. In that letter, the Council rejected the applicant’s arguments relating to that judgment as irrelevant and stated that the judgment was not final, as the magazine Forbes had lodged an appeal. The Council also reiterated that that judgment was not such as to call into question the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, since numerous articles contained in its evidence files supported the reasons for listing it had relied on.
180    Thus, the Council took into consideration the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) referred to in paragraph 155 above. Furthermore, the fact that the Council amended the reasons for listing and no longer states that the applicant ‘fronted’ for President Putin and resolved his business problems also shows that it took into consideration the applicant’s observations on the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg) referred to in paragraph 155 above, which, inter alia, prohibited the magazine Forbes from publishing statements alleging that the applicant ‘fronted for [President] Putin and solved his business problems’.
181    Consequently, the complaint that the Council infringed its obligation to conduct a periodic review and the principle of sincere cooperation by failing to take into consideration the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg), referred to in paragraph 155 above, must be rejected.
(2)    The second complaint, alleging breach of the review obligation inasmuch as the Council failed to adduce proof that the observations and evidence produced by the applicant were actually forwarded to the Member States’ representatives so that they could take an informed position in the context of the review
182    The applicant claims, in the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, that the Council failed to adduce proof that his observations and the evidence he had produced had in fact been forwarded to the Member States’ representatives. At the hearing, the applicant pleaded infringement of essential procedural requirements in connection with the review of his individual situation. In that regard, the applicant submits that it follows from paragraph 33 of the Council’s observations on the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts that it is the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Working Party which reviews the evidence produced by the persons subject to the restrictive measures in question, whereas Coreper merely takes a position on the measures as a whole without discussing the individual situation of each person on the lists at issue. The applicant infers from this that the Council does not examine either the individual situation of each person on the lists at issue or the observations and evidence produced by him or her, contrary to Article 14 of Regulation No 269/2014. That complaint is related to and supplements the complaint put forward in the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, claiming that the Council did not adduce proof that the applicant’s observations and the evidence he had produced had in fact been forwarded to the Member States’ representatives. In any event, infringement of essential procedural requirements is a matter of public policy which may, and even must, be raised by the Courts of the European Union of their own motion.
183    The applicant states that, contrary to the requirements of Article 14(3) of Regulation No 269/2014, it was not the Council as an institution which examined the evidence produced by him and by all the persons on the lists at issue; instead, the review of his individual situation was carried out by the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors within the Council, while Coreper adopted the regulation renewing the restrictive measures for six months without examining the files of each person whose name was maintained on the lists at issue.
184    In that regard, it must be recalled that Article 14(3) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides that, ‘where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body accordingly’.
185    It should be observed that, in paragraph 33 of its observations on the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, the Council stated that the observations it had received from the applicant had been forwarded, via a portal, to the Member States’ delegations, in particular to two working parties composed of experts from the representations of the Member States, namely the advisers of the Member States sitting on the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Working Party and the advisers sitting on the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors within the Council. The Council also sent, as an annex to its observations on the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, the cover pages of the documents bearing the reference WK 6980/2024, dated 15 May 2024, WK 7893/2024, dated 4 June 2024, and WK 10034/2024, dated 11 July 2024. Those documents marked ‘WK’ are working documents and it follows from those cover pages that the purpose of the documents was to forward letters from the applicant’s representative to the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors and the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia within the Council, composed of experts from the Member States’ delegations. At the hearing, the Council explained that that portal, used to forward those documents, enabled all delegations from experts to ministers to familiarise themselves with the documents and take informed decisions within the Council.
186    It is apparent from Article 19(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, adopted by decision of 1 December 2009 (OJ 2009 L 325, p. 35), that ‘Coreper shall be responsible for preparing the work of all the meetings of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council’. Furthermore, under Article 19(3) of those rules, ‘committees or working parties may be set up by, or with the approval of, Coreper with a view to carrying out certain preparatory work or studies defined in advance’.
187    Thus, within the Council, experts from each Member State are tasked with carrying out the preparatory work for Council meetings in working parties such as the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors. Those working parties have the status of preparatory body of the Council, as is apparent from Article 19(3) of its Rules of Procedure. Those experts are answerable to their respective ministers in specific areas. In the field of restrictive measures, experts from the Member States analyse the documents relating to the maintenance of a person’s name on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures, in particular the observations and evidence produced by him or her, so as to examine the situation of each person subject to restrictive measures and to decide whether to maintain such measures against him or her. The Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors forward the results of their analysis to Coreper and, on that basis, the Council adopts the final decision on the maintenance of the restrictive measures either at Council meetings or by way of the written procedure provided for in Article 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council. Thus, it is always the Council that adopts the final decision. The fact that working groups composed of experts from Member States’ delegations are involved in the decision-making process within the Council does not cast doubt on that conclusion. A decision to maintain a person’s name on the lists at issue can be adopted only by the Council. Any other course of action would be contrary not only to the Rules of Procedure of the Council, but also to the Treaties which provide, in Article 29 TEU, that ‘the Council shall adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature’ and, in Article 215(2) TFEU, that ‘where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures under the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities’.
188    Consequently, the fact that the applicant’s observations and the documents he produced were forwarded to the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors within the Council, as shown by the annex submitted by the Council in its observations on the statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, means that the Council acted in accordance with its internal procedures governing the decision-making process within the Council.
189    Accordingly, the second complaint, alleging breach of the review obligation inasmuch as the Council failed to adduce proof that the observations and evidence produced by the applicant were actually forwarded to the Member States’ representatives, must be rejected, as must the complaint alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements in the context of the review procedure.
190    There are therefore no grounds for granting the applicant’s request to have the Council produce, by way of a measure of organisation of procedure, the minutes of the Council meetings relating to the adoption of Implementing Regulation 2024/2455.
191    In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the Council fulfilled its obligations as regards the review of the applicant’s situation with a view to extending the restrictive measures maintained in respect of him by way of the September 2024 acts. The second part of the third plea in law must therefore be rejected, as must, in consequence, the third plea in law in its entirety.
E.      The fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination
192    The applicant claims that the contested acts are vitiated by breach of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination in so far as the application of amended criterion (g) by the Council is discriminatory. Thus, the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is discriminatory inasmuch as all the persons listed on the basis of amended criterion (g) are Russian, whereas many foreign undertakings also operate on Russian soil and contribute to that State’s budget.
193    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
194    It should be observed that the applicant alleges breach not only of the principle of non-discrimination but also of the principle of equal treatment due to the difference in treatment to which he claims he was subject owing to his Russian nationality. He therefore alleges, in essence, discrimination based on his nationality. He argues that the restrictive measures at issue discriminate against him because he is a businessperson of Russian origin or with Russian citizenship and, for that reason, he is treated less favourably than foreign businesspersons operating in Russia in the same sectors.
195    Thus, even though the applicant does not directly rely on a provision of the Charter, his argument alleging discrimination and breach of the principle of equal treatment on grounds of nationality must be examined in the light of Article 21 of the Charter. Article 21 of the Charter is a particular expression of the principle of equal treatment (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2015, Léger, C‑528/13, EU:C:2015:288, paragraph 48).
196    Under Article 21(1) of the Charter, ‘any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’ is to be prohibited. Article 21(2) of the Charter provides that, within the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality is also to be prohibited.
197    It should be recalled that, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17) must be taken into consideration with a view to its interpretation.
198    According to the Explanations relating to the Charter, Article 21(2) of the Charter ‘corresponds to the first paragraph of Article 18 [TFEU] and must be applied in compliance with that Article’. Moreover, under Article 52(2) of the Charter, the rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. It follows that Article 21(2) of the Charter must be construed as having the same scope as the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU.
199    The first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU provides that, ‘within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’. That provision is in Part Two of that treaty, entitled ‘Non-discrimination and citizenship of the Union’. It concerns situations falling within the scope of EU law in which a national of one Member State is treated in a discriminatory manner compared with nationals of another Member State solely on the basis of his or her nationality. That provision is therefore not intended to apply to potential differences in treatment between nationals of Member States and nationals of non-member countries (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 237 and the case-law cited).
200    Accordingly, the applicant cannot plead, for his benefit, infringement of Article 21(2) of the Charter.
201    It follows that the fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of the applicant’s Russian nationality, must be rejected.
F.      The sixth plea in law, alleging breach of the right to property, of the right to respect for private life and of freedom of expression
202    The applicant claims that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue constitutes a disproportionate limitation of his fundamental rights, in particular his right to property and his right to private life. He argues that the temporary and limited nature of the restrictive measures must be assessed differently depending on the age of the persons included on the lists at issue. He states that, because of his age and health problems, the restrictive measures taken against him are more permanent than temporary.
203    In the statement of modification concerning the March 2024 acts, the applicant submits that the taking of restrictive measures against him on account of the publication of Mr Medvedev’s opinion constitutes a breach of the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter. He refers to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) to argue that newspaper owners, editors and journalists cannot be penalised for publishing statements, even statements from terrorist groups, where those statements cannot be interpreted as likely to encourage violence. He maintains that Mr Medvedev’s article merely sets out an opinion on the policy of Ukrainian officials and is part of the newspaper Kommersant’s tradition of allowing Russian and foreign officials to express their views. Consequently, the applicant argues that the Council maintained restrictive measures against him for respecting freedom of expression and the principles of independent journalism.
204    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
205    In the first place, it must be observed that the applicant has in no way explained how the restrictive measures taken against him infringe the right to respect for his private life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter. That argument must therefore be rejected as unsubstantiated.
206    In the second place, it should be recalled that the right to property is enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter.
207    In the present case, the restrictive measures entailed by the contested acts give rise to limitations on the exercise by the applicant of his right to property.
208    However, the right to property on which the applicant relies is not an absolute prerogative and its exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 May 2016, Bank of Industry and Mine v Council, C‑358/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:338, paragraph 55, and of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 80).
209    Thus, in order to comply with EU law, an interference with fundamental rights must satisfy four conditions. First, the limitation in question must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s right to property must have a legal basis for its actions. Secondly, the limitation in question must respect the essence of the right to property. Thirdly, it must effectively meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourthly, the limitation in question must be proportionate (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 145 and the case-law cited).
210    It is clear that those four conditions are satisfied in the present case.
211    First, the restrictive measures at issue are ‘provided for by law’ in so far as they are laid down in acts which, in particular, are of general application, namely Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, and they have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively.
212    Secondly, it is apparent from the case-law that restrictive measures do not infringe the essence of the right to property since they are, by their nature, temporary and reversible (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 September 2016, Yanukovych v Council, T‑346/14, EU:T:2016:497, paragraph 169 and the case-law cited, and of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 225). In the present case, the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is subject to regular review in order to check that such maintenance is still compatible with the listing criteria. Accordingly, it must be held that the nature and scope of the temporary freezing of funds at issue respect the essence of the right to property and do not undermine that right as such.
213    Thirdly, the restrictive measures at issue meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, such as to justify the possibility that, for certain operators, the consequences may be negative, even significantly so (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150). They aim to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. From that perspective, the restrictive measures at issue are consistent with the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 163).
214    Fourthly, it is necessary to determine whether the limitation at issue is proportionate to the aim pursued.
215    First of all, it must be ascertained whether the restrictive measures at issue are appropriate for achieving the objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. In the present case, the freezing of the applicant’s funds, as a measure forming part of the framework of a rapid, unified, graduated and coordinated response, implemented through a package of restrictive measures, is a measure appropriate for achieving the objective of exerting maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine.
216    Next, as regards the necessity of the measures, it should be pointed out that less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, are not as effective in achieving the goal pursued, namely to exert pressure on persons associated with those responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, having regard in particular to the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 178).
217    Finally, a weighing up of the interests at stake shows that the disadvantages entailed by the temporary freezing of funds are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued. The importance of the objectives pursued by the contested acts, which form part of the broader objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU, is such as to outweigh any negative consequences, even considerable ones, for certain operators. Furthermore, the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is kept under constant scrutiny and is subject to regular review in order to check that such maintenance is still compatible with the listing criteria. In the same vein, it should be observed that specific derogations from the measures may be granted by the authorities of the Member States in accordance with Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Articles 4 to 6 of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, in particular to meet the basic or essential needs of the persons concerned or to meet necessary expenditure.
218    It follows that the interference entailed by the measures freezing the applicant’s funds is proportionate, with the result that his right to property has not been infringed.
219    In the third place, as regards the alleged breach of the right to freedom of expression, it should be observed that freedom of expression is enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter.
220    In response to a question put to him at the hearing, the applicant clarified that, by means of that plea, he was alleging breach of his own freedom of expression as owner of the newspaper Kommersant.
221    In that connection, that alleged breach of the applicant’s freedom of expression relates to the section of the reasoning that reads, ‘[when the applicant] took control of the business daily “Kommersant”, the freedom of the editorial staff was curtailed and the newspaper took a manifestly pro-Kremlin stance’ and ‘Kommersant under [the applicant]’s ownership published a propagandist anti-Ukrainian article by Dmitry Medvedev, in which the former President of Russia argued that it was meaningless to engage in talks with the current Ukrainian authorities, who in his opinion were under direct foreign control’. That section of the reasoning is intended to support the applicant’s listing on the basis of criterion (a).
222    Thus, the applicant’s argument alleging breach of his freedom of expression rests on the premiss that he is subject to the restrictive measures at issue because of the publication by the newspaper Kommersant, which he owns, of an article by Mr Medvedev.
223    It should be noted that the section of the reasoning dealing with the applicant’s ownership of the newspaper Kommersant is concerned with the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue pursuant to criterion (a). It is apparent from paragraphs 123 and 137 above that the considerations relating to the application to the applicant of the first part of amended criterion (g) are not vitiated by errors of assessment and that finding is sufficient to justify the March 2024 acts and the September 2024 acts.
224    Consequently, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 70 above, the applicant’s argument alleging breach of his freedom of expression, as owner of the newspaper Kommersant, must be rejected as ineffective.
225    The sixth plea in law must therefore be rejected.
226    It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed.
Costs
227    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
228    In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders Mr Alisher Usmanov to pay the costs.
Mastroianni
Brkan
Gâlea
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 September 2025.
V. Di Bucci
O. Porchia
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.