ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
23 March 2026 (*)
( Interim relief – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures against Iran – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Application for suspension of operation – Failure to comply with procedural requirements – Inadmissibility )
In Case T‑865/25 R,
Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG, established in Hamburg (Germany), represented by J. Pfeil and F. Randolph, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by V. Piessevaux and D. Yovanof, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
makes the following
Order
1        By its application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG, seeks suspension of the operation of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2025/1971 of 29 September 2025 implementing Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L, 2025/1971) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1980 of 29 September 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L, 2025/1980) (‘the contested acts’), in so far as they reimpose the freezing of the applicant’s assets and financial resources, pending a ruling on the action which it has brought under Articles 263 and 275 TFEU.
Background to the dispute and forms of order sought by the parties
2        The applicant is a company governed by German law.
3        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 17 December 2025, the applicant brought an action seeking, inter alia, annulment of Implementing Decision 2025/1971 and Article 1 of Implementing Regulation 2025/1980.
4        By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 24 December 2025, the applicant made the present application for interim measures, in which it claims that the President of the General Court should:
–        suspend the operation of the contested acts, in so far as they reimpose the freezing of the applicant’s assets and financial resources, pending a ruling on the action which it has brought under Articles 263 and 275 TFEU;
–        order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.
5        In its observations on the application for interim measures, which were lodged at the Court Registry on 26 January 2026, the Council contends that the President of the General Court should:
–        dismiss the application for interim measures as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as manifestly unfounded;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
6        In accordance with Articles 278 and 279 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 256(1) TFEU, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of an act challenged before the Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, having regard to the rules on admissibility laid down in Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
7        The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.
8        Thus, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order suspension of the operation of an act and other interim measures if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law (fumus boni juris), and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main proceedings. Those conditions are cumulative, with the result that an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim measures is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
9        Furthermore, under Article 156(5) and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, an application for interim measures must, in particular, be made by a separate document, indicate the subject matter of the proceedings and contain a summary of the pleas in law and arguments relied on.
10      It follows from a combined reading of Article 156(4) and (5) and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure that an application for interim measures must be sufficient in itself to enable the defendant to prepare its observations and the judge hearing the application to rule on it, where necessary, without other supporting information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the proper administration of justice, it is necessary, if such an application is to be admissible, that the essential elements of fact and of law on which it is founded be set out coherently and comprehensibly in the application for interim measures itself. While the application may be supported and supplemented on specific points by references to particular passages in documents which are annexed to it, a general reference to other written documentation, even if annexed to the application for interim measures, cannot make up for the absence of essential elements in that application (see order of 4 December 2015, E‑Control v ACER, T‑671/15 R, not published, EU:T:2015:975, paragraph 8 and the case-law cited).
11      Moreover, point 284 of the Practice Rules for the Implementation of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court expressly states that the application for interim measures must be intelligible in itself, without necessitating reference to the application lodged in the main proceedings, including the annexes thereto.
12      Furthermore, it should be added that, in order to understand the application for interim measures, it is not for the judge hearing that application to examine the action in the main proceedings, if the provision of the Rules of Procedure which requires that the application for interim measures be made by separate document is not to be rendered ineffective (see order of 25 June 2003, Schmitt v AER, T‑175/03 R, EU:T:2003:179, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
13      Since failure to comply with the Rules of Procedure constitutes an absolute bar to proceeding, it is for the judge hearing the application for interim measures to examine of his or her own motion, if necessary, whether the applicable provisions of those rules have been complied with (see order of 14 February 2020, Vizzone v Commission, T‑658/19 R, not published, EU:T:2020:71, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).
14      In the present case, it should be noted that, in the application for interim measures, the applicant devotes almost no argument to the condition relating to the existence of a prima facie case.
15      The applicant merely listed a number of alleged illegalities affecting the contested acts, without expanding on those pleas in any way, and merely referred to the application in the main proceedings.
16      Such a brief and general list does not enable the judge hearing the application for interim measures to make a legal assessment of whether the pleas for annulment relied on in the main proceedings are prima facie well founded.
17      It follows that the application for interim measures is not intelligible in itself without referring to the application in the main proceedings.
18      That absence of sufficient explanation, in the application for interim measures, as to the constituent elements of a possible prima facie case cannot be compensated for by a reference to the application in the main proceedings.
19      In that regard, suffice it to recall that it is not for the judge hearing the application for interim measures to seek, in place of the party concerned, those matters contained in the annexes or in the main application which would support the application for interim measures. The imposition of such an obligation on the judge hearing the application for interim measures would, moreover, render ineffective the provision of the Rules of Procedure which requires that the application for interim measures be made by a separate document (see order of 29 July 2010, Cross Czech v Commission, T‑252/10 R, not published, EU:T:2010:323, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).
20      Accordingly, as regards the condition relating to the existence of a prima facie case, the application for interim measures does not meet the requirements laid down in Article 156(4) and (5) of the Rules of Procedure.
21      It follows from the foregoing that the present application for interim measures must be dismissed as inadmissible.
22      Pursuant to Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved.
On those grounds,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
hereby orders:
1.      The application for interim measures is dismissed.
2.      The costs are reserved.
Luxembourg, 23 March 2026.
V. Di Bucci
M. van der Woude
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.