Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition)
23 July 2025 (*)
( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Error of assessment – Rights of the defence – Proportionality )
In Case T‑1095/23,
OT, represented by J.-P. Hordies and P. Blanchetier, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by V. Piessevaux and M.‑C. Cadilhac, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition),
composed of R. Mastroianni, President, M. Brkan (Rapporteur), I. Gâlea, T. Tóth and S.L. Kalėda, Judges,
Registrar: P. Núñez Ruiz, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:
–        the application lodged at the Court Registry on 21 November 2023,
–        the decision of 28 February 2024 granting the applicant’s request for anonymity,
–        the statement of modification lodged at the Court Registry on 18 May 2024,
further to the hearing on 26 March 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, OT, seeks annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (‘the acts of September 2023’) and, second, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/847) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/849) (‘the acts of March 2024’), in so far as the foregoing acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) maintain his name on the lists annexed to those acts.
I.      Background to the dispute
2        The applicant is a Cypriot national.
3        The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
4        Following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, the Council of the European Union, on 17 March 2014, adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), on the basis of Article 29 TEU.
5        On the same date, on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).
6        On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted, first, Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and, second, Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order, in particular, to amend the criteria on the basis of which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be subject to the restrictive measures at issue.
7        Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, provides:
‘1.      All funds and economic resources belonging to …:
…
(d)      natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine;
…
(g)      leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine,
…
… shall be frozen.
2.      No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’
8        The detailed rules governing that freezing of funds are laid down in the subsequent paragraphs of Article 2 of Decision 2014/145, as amended.
9        Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, required that measures be adopted to freeze funds and laid down the detailed rules governing that freezing in terms essentially identical to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended. In particular, Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation largely reproduced Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.
10      By Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/429 of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 87 I, p. 44)
and by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427 of 15 March 2022 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 87
I, p. 1) (‘the initial acts’), the applicant’s name was added to
the lists annexed to Decision 2014/145 and to the latter regulation (‘the lists at issue’).
11      On 13 April 2022, the Council sent file WK 3073/2022 INIT to the applicant.
12      By Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 134) and also by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1) and by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 1), the Council maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
13      By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council sent file WK 17621/2022 INIT to the applicant.
14      By letter of 9 May 2023, the applicant sent the Council a request for reconsideration.
15      On 5 June 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20) and Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1).
16      Decision 2023/1094 amended the criteria for including the names of persons subject to the freezing of funds. The wording of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 was replaced by the following wording:
‘(g)      leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine …’
17      Regulation 2023/1089 amended Regulation No 269/2014 in a similar way.
18      By letter of 19 June 2023, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to maintain his name on the lists at issue on the basis of amended reasons.
19      By letter of 29 June 2023, the applicant sent the Council a further request for reconsideration.
20      By letter of 5 July 2023, under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43), the applicant applied for access to the Council’s file in order to be sent the documents from which he could identify the Member States which had instigated the proposal to include his name on the lists at issue.
21      By letter of 10 July 2023, the Council sent the applicant file WK 5142/2023 INIT of 20 April 2023, containing information on the Russian business environment and economy.
22      By letter of 18 August 2023, the Council sent the applicant file WK 10555/2023
INIT of 14 August 2023 and file WK 5142/2023 ADD 1 of 16 August 2023, containing additional information on the Russian business environment and economy.
23      By letter of 28 August 2023, in response to his application for access to the file under Regulation No 1049/2001, the Council disclosed a number of documents to the applicant and stated that the disclosure of certain other documents could not be envisaged for reasons of data protection and international relations, in particular in respect of files WK 10524/2023 of 9 August 2023 and WK 10524/2023 REV 1 of 10 August 2023.
24      By letter of 29 August 2023, the applicant made a further request for reconsideration in which he also requested to be sent file WK 10524/23 REV 1, which was referred to in the Council’s letter of 18 August 2023 but had not been sent with that letter.
25      By letter of 1 September 2023, under Regulation No 1049/2001, the applicant made a confirmatory application for access to documents.
26      By the adoption of the acts of September 2023, the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue for the following reasons:
‘[The applicant] is a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium, which includes Alfa Bank, one of Russia’s largest taxpayers. He is believed to be one of the most influential persons in Russia.
He has [well-established] ties to the president of the Russian Federation[,] Vladimir Putin.
Vladimir Putin rewarded Alfa Group’s loyalty to the Russian authorities by providing political help to Alfa Group’s foreign investment plans.
The insurance company AlfaStrakhovanie, subsidiary of Alfa Group [c]onsortium, provides insurance [for] the vehicles of the Federal Service of the National Guard of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia), whose units operate in the occupied regions of Ukraine under Russian control, as well as the bodyguard vehicles of the President of the Russian Federation[,] Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, X5 Retail Group, another subsidiary of [the] Alfa Group Consortium, cooperates with JSC Voentorg, an entity subject to restrictive measures which provides catering and laundry services, as well as military uniforms, to the armed forces of the Russian Federation and whose subsidiary sells T-shirts bearing the “Z” military symbol used by Russian propagandists to promote Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. [The applicant] has therefore been actively supporting materially or financially and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. He is also a leading businessperson operating in Russia and a businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’
27      By letter of 15 September 2023, the Council informed the applicant that his name had been maintained on the lists at issue and responded to his requests for reconsideration.
28      By letter of 23 October 2023, in response to the applicant’s confirmatory application, the Council disclosed a number of documents to him and stated that access to other documents, including files WK 10524/2023 and WK 10524/2023 REV 1, was being refused pursuant to the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) and Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001.
29      By letter of 26 October 2023, the Council sent the applicant file WK 10524/2023 REV 1.
30      An action for annulment was brought against the acts of 15 March 2022 referred to in paragraph 10 above and the acts of 14 September 2022 referred to in paragraph 12 above, which was dismissed by the judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council (T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716).
II.    Facts subsequent to the bringing of the action
31      By letter of 8 February 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue and sent him file WK 1303/2024
INIT of 29 January 2024 and file WK 5142/2023 ADD 2 of 29 January 2024, containing additional information on the Russian business environment and economy.
32      By letter of 18 February 2024, the applicant requested that the Council reconsider the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue.
33      By letter of 21 February 2024, the Council reiterated to the applicant its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue.
34      By letter of 27 February 2024, the applicant requested that the Council reconsider the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue.
35      By the acts of March 2024, the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue for the following reasons:
‘[The applicant] is a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium. He is ranked among the most influential persons in Russia.
Vladimir Putin rewarded Alfa Group’s loyalty to the Russian authorities by providing political help to Alfa Group’s foreign investment plans.
The insurance company AlfaStrakhovanie, subsidiary of Alfa Group [c]onsortium, provides insurance [for] the vehicles of the Federal Service of the National Guard of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia), whose units operate in the occupied regions of Ukraine under Russian control, as well as the bodyguard vehicles of the President of the Russian Federation[,] Vladimir Putin.
AlfaStrakhovanie has provided insurance to companies such as the JSC Kalashnikov Concern and the Central Scientific – Research Institute for Precision Machine Engineering (TsNIITochMash), whose weapons are widely used by the Russian military in Ukraine including during the atrocities in Bucha.
…
Furthermore, X5 Retail Group, another subsidiary of Alfa Group [c]onsortium, cooperates with JSC Voentorg, an entity subject to restrictive measures which provides catering and laundry services, as well as military uniforms, to the armed forces of the Russian Federation and whose subsidiary sells T-shirts bearing the “Z” military symbol used by Russian propagandists to promote Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. [The applicant] has therefore been actively supporting materially or financially and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine.
He is also a leading businessperson operating in Russia and a businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’
36      By letter of 15 March 2024, the Council informed the applicant that his name had been maintained on the lists at issue and responded to his requests for reconsideration.
37      By letter of 10 April 2024, following delivery of the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215), the applicant requested reconsideration.
38      An action for annulment was brought against the acts of 13 March 2022 referred to in paragraph 12 above, which was dismissed by the judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council (T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606).
III. Forms of order sought by the parties
39      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested acts in so far as they concern him;
–        order the Council to remove his name from the lists at issue;
–        order the Council to pay the costs.
40      The Council claims that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
IV.    Law
A.      The Court’s jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s second head of claim
41      By his second head of claim, the applicant requests that the Court order the Council to remove his name from the lists at issue. Accordingly, by that head of claim, he is in essence asking the Court to issue a direction to the Council.
42      It is sufficient to recall in that regard that, when exercising judicial review of legality under Article 263 TFEU, the Court has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see order of 26 October 1995, Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission, C‑199/94 P and C‑200/94 P, EU:C:1995:360, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgments of 9 June 2021, Borborudi v Council, T‑580/19, EU:T:2021:330, paragraph 34 (not published), and of 8 March 2023, Prigozhina v Council, T‑212/22, not published, EU:T:2023:104, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited) even where they concern the manner in which its judgments are to be complied with
(orders of 22 September 2016, Gaki v Commission, C‑130/16 P, not published, EU:C:2016:731, paragraph 14, and of 19 July 2016, Trajektna luka Split v Commission, T‑169/16, not published, EU:T:2016:441, paragraph 13).
43      It follows that, in the context of an action brought under Article 263 TFEU, even in the case of the annulment of acts adopting or maintaining restrictive measures in respect of a natural person, legal person, entity or body, the Court does not have jurisdiction to order the removal of the name of that natural person, legal person, entity or body from the lists at issue.
44      It is clear from the foregoing that the second head of claim must be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
B.      Substance
45      In support of his action, the applicant raises three pleas in law, alleging, first, an error of assessment, second, infringement of the principle of proportionality and, third, infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to an effective judicial remedy.
46      The Court finds it appropriate to examine, first of all, the third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to an effective judicial remedy, next, the first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment, and, last, the second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality.
1.      The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection
47      It is necessary to examine, first, the applicant’s arguments relating to the acts of September 2023 and thereafter, second, those relating to the acts of March 2024.
(a)    The acts of September 2023
48      The applicant claims that his rights of the defence and his right to effective judicial proceedings were infringed,
on the ground that the Council failed to send him certain items of evidence, even though they had been requested in the context of an application for access to documents.
49      The applicant also takes issue with the Council for failing to take into consideration the arguments set out in his requests for reconsideration, for failing to respond to those requests individually, for sending him only an incomplete file rather than a file of solid evidence and for refusing to give him a hearing.
50      The applicant states that the Council overlooked the fact that the evidence produced was insufficient to support the reasons relied on against him as justification for maintaining his name on the lists at issue.
51      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
52      On that point, in the first place, it should be noted that the right to be heard in all proceedings, laid down in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), which is inherent in respect for the rights of the defence, guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of a decision in relation to that person that is liable to affect his or her interests adversely (judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 75, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council,
T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 79).
53      It should also be recalled that, in the case of acts by which the name of a person or entity already appearing on the lists imposing restrictive measures is maintained, an element of surprise is no longer necessary in order to ensure that those measures are effective, with the result that the adoption of such acts must, in principle, be preceded by notification of the incriminating evidence and by the person or entity concerned being allowed an opportunity to be heard (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 62; of 1 October 2020, Makhlouf v Council, C‑157/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:777, paragraph 44; and of 18 May 2022, Foz v Council, T‑296/20, EU:T:2022:298, paragraph 66 (not published)).
54      Furthermore, respect for the rights of the defence also includes the right of access to the file, subject to legitimate interests in maintaining confidentiality, which is enshrined in Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 99, and of 12 June 2024, Shammout v Council, T‑649/22, not published, EU:T:2024:376, paragraph 36).
55      In that regard, the Court of Justice has made clear that the element of protection afforded by the requirement to notify incriminating evidence and the right to make representations before the adoption of acts maintaining the name of a person or entity on a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures was fundamental and essential to the rights of the defence. That is all the more the case because the restrictive measures in question have a considerable effect on the rights and freedoms of the persons and groups concerned (judgments of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 64, and of 18 May 2022, Foz v Council, T‑296/20, EU:T:2022:298, paragraph 67 (not published)).
56      The purpose of the rule that the addressee of a decision affecting that person adversely must be placed in a position to submit observations before that decision is adopted is to enable the authority concerned effectively to take into account all relevant information. In order to ensure that addressees are in fact protected, the object of that rule is, in particular, to enable them to correct an error or produce such information relating to their personal circumstances as will tell in favour of the decision’s being adopted or not, or of its having this content or that (judgments of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 65, and of 24 November 2021, Aman Dimashq v Council, T‑259/19, EU:T:2021:821, paragraph 69).
57      In the present case, it should be noted that the reasons for inclusion set out in the acts of September 2023 were amended in part as compared with the earlier acts, although retaining the reason that the applicant is ‘one of the main shareholders’ of the Alfa Group consortium, wording which corresponds, in essence, to the expression ‘major shareholder’
(‘grand actionnaire’ in French) in the reasons contained in the initial acts or the expression ‘major shareholder’ (‘actionnaire majeur’ in French) in the acts of 13 March 2023 referred to in paragraph 12 above.
In the acts of September 2023, in respect of the applicant the Council applied the provisions laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1094, that is to say, those targeting ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ (‘the first part of the amended (g) criterion’) and those targeting ‘businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ (‘the third part of the amended (g) criterion’).
58      It should be noted that, by the letter of 19 June 2023, the Council had informed the applicant of its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue on the basis of an amended draft statement of reasons. Subsequently, by the letter of 18 August 2023, the Council confirmed to the applicant its intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue on the basis of an amended draft statement of reasons. By that letter, it informed the applicant that, annexed to that letter, it was sending
him file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 of 10 August 2023, file WK 10555/2023 INIT, containing information about his personal situation, and file
WK 5142/23 ADD 1, containing additional information on the Russian business environment and economy.
59      By letter of 29 August 2023, sent to the external relations department of the Council responsible for the reconsideration of restrictive measures, the applicant informed that department that he had not been sent file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 and requested that it be forwarded to him as soon as possible.
60      It should be noted, having regard in particular to the replies given at the hearing, that the Council has not demonstrated that file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 had been sent to the applicant before the acts of September 2023 were adopted. Accordingly, in the light of the evidence in the case file, it must be found that that file was sent to the applicant only on 26 October 2023, that is to say, more than a month after the adoption of those acts.
61      Accordingly, because it failed to send file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 to the applicant before the adoption of the acts of September 2023, the Council infringed the applicant’s rights of the defence, in particular his right to be heard and his right of access to the file, guaranteed in Article 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Charter.
62      However, it must be borne in mind that it is clear from settled case-law that, in order for an infringement of the rights of the defence to give rise to annulment of the contested act,
it is necessary that, in the absence of that irregularity, the procedure could have led to a different result, which is for the person relying on the infringement to demonstrate (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2020, Vnesheconombank v Council, C‑731/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:500, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
63      In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant has not, in the application or in the reply, set out the reasons according to which, if file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 had been sent to him before the adoption of the acts of September 2023, the procedure to reconsider the measures taken against him could have led to a different result. The applicant’s arguments do not relate specifically to the consequences of the failure to send that file during the procedure to reconsider
the measures taken against him but seek, in essence, to dispute the letter of 23 October 2023 from the department of the Council responsible for public access to documents of the institutions, by which he was refused access to certain documents pursuant to the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) and Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001.
64      In addition, it should be noted that, as is apparent from paragraphs 54 to 56 above, the purpose of the right of access to the file of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures is to enable them to make observations on the information relied on against them. Consequently, that right is strictly limited to the person or entity subject to restrictive measures in order to mount a defence in the context of the procedure to reconsider
the measures taken against that person or entity. In the present case, the applicant criticises the Council, inter alia, for failing to send him the file with reference WK 10524/2023 INIT, that is to say, an earlier version of file WK 10524/2023 REV 1. That argument cannot succeed since the Council did not rely on file WK 10524/2023 INIT to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in September 2023.
65      In order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue in September 2023, the Council relied, inter alia, on files WK 3073/2022 INIT of 12 March 2022 and WK 17621/2022 INIT of
14 December 2022, which had been sent to the applicant following the adoption of the acts of 15 March 2022 referred to in paragraph 10 above and in the context of the reconsideration procedure that led to the adoption of the acts of 13 March 2023 referred to in paragraph 12 above. It also relied on file WK 10555/2023 INIT of 14 August 2023 and file WK 10524/2023 REV 1. Although it is true that the latter file was sent to the applicant only after adoption of the acts of September 2023, it is nevertheless clear that, in his written submissions, the applicant has not indicated in what respect it could not be ruled out that the result of the reconsideration
procedure might have been different if he had been sent that file before those latter acts were adopted. Similarly, examined on that point at the hearing, the applicant merely stated in the abstract that he could have made observations on the documents in the file in question, but did not indicate in what respect the taking into account of those observations could have led to a different result.
66      Consequently, in the light of the case-law summarised in paragraph 62 above, it must be found that the infringement of the right of access to the file and of the right to be heard does not give rise to annulment of the acts of September 2023.
67      As regards the applicant’s arguments in respect of the refusal, sent to him by the department of the Council responsible for public access to documents under Regulation No 1049/2001, to send him certain documents concerning the inclusion and maintenance of his name on the lists at issue, including information relating to the Member States that had proposed that restrictive measures be taken against him, it is necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, the rules relating to the right of public access to documents held by the institutions laid down by Regulation No 1049/2001 and, on the other, compliance with the rights of the defence, which is enshrined in Article 41(2) of the Charter and includes the right to be heard and the right of access to the file subject to legitimate interests in maintaining confidentiality. The beneficiaries and the objectives of the right of public access to documents of the institutions pursuant to Regulation No 1049/2001 differ appreciably from the beneficiaries and the purpose of the right of access to the file in the context of a procedure for reconsideration of the restrictive measures applied to a person targeted by those measures.
68      In accordance with recital 1 thereof, Regulation No 1049/2001 flows from the wish expressed in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, according to which
decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen. As recalled in recital 2 of that regulation, the right of public access to documents of the institutions is related to the democratic nature of those institutions (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 July 2008, Sweden and Turco v Council, C‑39/05 P and C‑52/05 P, EU:C:2008:374, paragraph 34). In order to achieve those objectives, under Article 2(1) of that regulation, any citizen of the European Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State is a beneficiary of the right of access to documents of the institutions. It follows that the purpose of the regulation is to guarantee access for everyone to public documents and cannot be limited to access for the requesting party to documents concerning that party (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2005, Sison v Council, T‑110/03, T‑150/03 and T‑405/03, EU:T:2005:143, paragraph 50). Under Article 6(1) of that regulation, the applicant is not required to demonstrate any interest in order to have access to the documents requested, with the effect that that person’s application must be examined in the same way as an application from any other person (judgments of 6 July 2006, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑391/03 and T‑70/04, EU:T:2006:190, paragraph 82, and of 20 December 2023, OCU v SRB, T‑496/18, not published, EU:T:2023:857, paragraph 43). In addition, it should be borne in mind that the particular interest which may be asserted by a requesting party in obtaining access to a document concerning that party personally cannot be taken into account when applying the mandatory exceptions provided for by Article 4(1)(a) of the same regulation (judgment of 26 April 2005, Sison v Council, T‑110/03, T‑150/03 and T‑405/03, EU:T:2005:143, paragraph 52).
69      Consequently, to the extent that the applicant is seeking to challenge the fact
that, by the decision of 23 October 2023 adopted under Regulation No 1049/2001, the Council – in his view unduly –
refused him access to certain documents, it is sufficient to note that the applicant is not seeking annulment of that decision in his heads of claim.
70      In the second place, it should be noted that the provisions of EU law on the basis of which the restrictive measures were taken against the applicant, that is to say, Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, do not confer a right to a formal hearing on the persons concerned. Similarly, nor is it apparent from Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter that a formal hearing is the only way of ensuring effectively that the persons concerned can exercise their right to be heard (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 May 2022, Boshab v Council, C‑242/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:375, paragraph 62, and of 9 February 2023, Boshab v Council, C‑708/21 P, not published, EU:C:2023:84, paragraph 54). It follows that the applicant is not justified in claiming that the failure to hold an oral hearing infringed his rights of the defence.
71      In the third place, the applicant’s argument that the Council failed to take the observations sent by him into consideration and failed to respond to his requests individually must also be rejected. In addition to the fact that the Council was not obliged to reply point by point to the observations and documents sent (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 October 2008, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council, T‑256/07, EU:T:2008:461, paragraph 95), the fact that it did not respond to all the observations and documents sent by the applicant does not demonstrate that it failed to take them into consideration in the context of reconsidering his situation. Furthermore, it is clear from its letter of 15 September 2023 that the Council referred to the similarity between the arguments on which the applicant relied in the request for reconsideration and in the case that gave rise to the judgments of 15 November 2023, OT v Council (T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716), and of 11 September 2024, OT v Council (T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606), and that it referred to the pleadings and observations lodged by the applicant in that case. Moreover, in that letter, it replied expressly to the applicant’s observations regarding the company AlfaStrakhovanie.
72      In the fourth place, it should be borne in mind that the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those reasons, without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for that person to defend his or her rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to review the legality of the decision in question (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 100).
73      In the present case, by 26 October 2023 at the latest, the Council had communicated to the applicant all the evidence on which it had relied in adopting the acts of September 2023, including file WK 10524/2023 REV 1. It must be found that all the relevant evidence was therefore available to the applicant approximately one month before expiry of the time limit for bringing an action to dispute the legality of those acts and more than three weeks before that action was in fact brought. In any event, the fact that an evidence file on the basis of which the Council extended the application of restrictive measures was not sent before an action was brought has no effect on the right to effective judicial protection of the person concerned provided that that file was sent to the applicant so that the latter could express a view on it in the reply (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 June 2024, Shammout v Council, T‑649/22, not published, EU:T:2024:376, paragraphs 52 and 53). Consequently, the applicant is not justified in claiming that the Council infringed his right to effective judicial protection governed by Article 47 of the Charter by sending file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 after the adoption of the acts of September 2023, since it was available to him before he brought the action disputing the legality of those acts in the present proceedings.
74      It is clear from the foregoing that the third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to an effective judicial procedure, must be rejected in so far as it seeks to dispute the legality of the acts of September 2023.
(b)    The acts of March 2024
75      The applicant alleges that the Council failed to respond to his request for reconsideration by which, following delivery of the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215), he had requested the removal of his name from the lists at issue.
76      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
77      In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant’s arguments alleging infringement of the rights of the defence are based on a letter sent to the Council after the adoption of the acts of March 2024, that is to say, on 11 April 2024. According to settled case-law, the legality of an EU act must be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and law existing at the date on which the act was adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 November 2021, Aman Dimashq v Council, T‑259/19, EU:T:2021:821, paragraph 110 (not published) and the case-law cited). The fact that the Council did not reply to that letter cannot therefore call into question the legality of the acts of March 2024.
78      Consequently, the applicant has not demonstrated an infringement of his rights of the defence in the reconsideration procedure that gave rise to the adoption of the acts of March 2024.
79      The third plea in law, alleging an infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection, must therefore be rejected in its entirety.
2.       The first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment
80      The applicant claims that the Council made an error of assessment when it maintained his name on the lists
at issue by adopting the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024.
81      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
(a)    Preliminary observations
82      As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, while it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the legality of all European Union acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 121).
83      The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires in particular that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or at the very least one of those reasons, deemed to be sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122).
84      Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing that person’s funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgments of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124).
85      It is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. For that purpose, there is no requirement that the Council produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act sought to be annulled. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraphs 66 and 67; see, also, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited).
86      In such a situation, it is the task of the Courts of the European Union to determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and to assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124).
87      As regards, specifically, the review carried out of the legality of the acts maintaining the name of the person concerned on a list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, it should be borne in mind that those measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgments of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67).
88      It follows that, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on a list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence as that justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the name of the person in question on that list, provided that, first, the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and, second, the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). In that respect, assessment of the changes in the context involves taking into consideration, first, the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established and the particular situation of the person concerned (judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78;
see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 101) and, second, all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been achieved (judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 82 to 84 and the case-law cited).
89      It is in the light of those principles that it is necessary to examine whether, as a result of the adoption of the acts of September 2023, and then as a result of
the adoption of the acts of March 2024, the Council made an error of assessment by deciding to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
90      In that regard, it is apparent from the wording of the contested acts that the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue on the basis of the criterion of supporting materially or financially Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine (Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended (‘the (d) criterion’)). It was also included on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion.
91      The Court finds it appropriate to determine, first of all, whether the Council made an error of assessment by maintaining the applicant’s name on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion.
(b)    The acts of September 2023
92      By his arguments disputing the legality of the acts of September 2023, the applicant claims that the evidence put forward by the Council is unreliable and submits that his name was wrongly maintained on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion.
(1)    The reliability of the evidence
93      The applicant claims that many of the sources used by the Council are mediocre in quality, and specifically disputes the reliability of certain items of evidence.
94      The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
95      In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the EU Courts is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In that regard, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited).
96      In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment by the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59).
97      Furthermore, it must be observed that the situation of armed conflict involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigative difficulties may therefore be a factor in preventing the provision of specific evidence and objective information
(see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).
98      In the present case, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, the Council relied on the evidence in file WK 3073/2022 INIT of 12 March 2022, including on an article entitled ‘Why Mueller named a Russian Oligarch in Court’, published on 6 April 2018 on the website of The Daily Beast (Exhibit 1).
99      The Council also relied on one of the items in file WK 17621/2022 INIT to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, namely a page from the ‘Putin’s list’ website, relating to the applicant, consulted on 23 November 2022 (Exhibit 2).
100    The Council also took into account, to support its justification for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, certain items in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 of 10 August 2023, namely:
–        a presentation of AlfaStrakhovanie published on that company’s website, consulted on 25 May 2023 (Exhibit 2);
–        an article entitled ‘AlfaStrakhovanie ruled out the sale of business to third-party buyers’, published on 4 May 2023 on the website of Radio Liberty (Exhibit 9);
–        a presentation of the shareholdings in X5 Retail Group published on that company’s website, consulted on 1 June 2023 (Exhibit 10);
–        a page from the Rupep website, on the applicant’s business relations, consulted on 12 June 2023 (Exhibit 17);
–        an article entitled ‘AlfaStrakhovanie confirmed the change of ownership of the company’, published on 4 May 2023 on the website of Vedomosti (Exhibit 19);
–        an article entitled ‘Fridman’s Alfa Group to exit all Russian assets’, published on 5 May 2023 on the website of bne IntelliNews (Exhibit 20).
101    To justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, the Council also took into consideration a number of items in file WK 10555/2023 INIT of 14 August 2023, namely:
–        a letter of 5 June 2023 from the Central Bank of Ukraine to the European Commission relating to Ukraine’s concerns regarding attempts to circumvent sanctions (Exhibit 1);
–        a Central Bank of Ukraine press release relating to Sense Bank, published on 20 July 2023 (Exhibit 2).
102    As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, at the hearing, the applicant withdrew his arguments on the unreliability of the TAdivser
information source.
103    In addition, as regards the arguments by which the applicant claims, on the basis of an article published by POLITICO and annexed to the application, that the great majority of the sources used by the Council are mediocre in quality, it should be noted that the article in question does not systematically question all the information in the evidence files prepared by the European External Action Service (EEAS), but rather raises only questions about the reliability of certain sources of information, such as social media, blogs or information generated by artificial intelligence.
104    It should be noted that the article in question does not refer to the evidence files on which the Council relies in the present case and that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the items of evidence referred to in paragraphs 98 to 101 are from sources whose reliability is called into question by that article.
105    As regards the applicant’s arguments that, in essence, the information about him given in documents 19 and 20 of evidence file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 is unreliable because it relies on anonymous sources, it should be noted that those documents are articles from specialised economic media, that is to say, Vedomosti and bne IntelliNews, which rely on facts referred to in a BBC article, on the reported statement by a member of the board of directors of ABH Holdings highlighting the need to relocate that company’s assets and on anonymous sources. The mere fact that some information in those documents is from anonymous journalists’ sources does not render them unreliable. Since these are sources inside the companies that are the subject of investigation by those specialised economic media, to require the journalists systematically to reveal the identity of their sources to the public could breach the protection of journalists’ sources.
106    As regards the applicant’s arguments disputing the reliability of document 1 in evidence file WK 5142/2023 ADD 1 relating to evidence of the Russian business environment and economy, that is to say, an investigation report published on the ‘Proekt’ website, those arguments must be rejected as ineffective since the Council did not rely on that document to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion.
107    In the light of the foregoing, having regard to the specific context of the situation of the Russian Federation and because the Council has no investigative powers in third countries (see paragraphs 96 and 97 above), the applicant has failed to produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the probative value of the documents in the evidence files referred to in paragraphs 98 to 101 above.
(2)    Application of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion to the applicant
108    The applicant submits that the Council was wrong to maintain his name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion.
109    In the first place, the applicant claims that the Council made an error of assessment by finding him to be a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium, which includes Alfa Bank, Alfrastrakhovanie and X5 Retail Group.
110    First of all, the applicant asserts that the Alfa Group consortium has no structure and does not exist in legal terms. Next, he maintains that he has provided evidence that he transferred his shares, first, in ABH Holdings, which owns Alfa Bank Russia, Alfa Bank Ukraine and AlfaStrakhovanie, and, second, in CTF Holdings, which owns A1, X5 Retail Group and IDS Borjomi. According to the applicant, the Council cannot argue that he did not transfer those shareholdings to Mr [confidential]. (1)
111    In addition, the applicant submits that the transfer of his shares in CTF Holdings is proven by an extract from the register of beneficial owners of that company.
112    Furthermore, the applicant alleges that the Council denied the probative value of the documents produced to substantiate the share transfer in reliance on the unsubstantiated fact that a counter-letter was purportedly concluded with the purchaser of his shares, that is to say, Mr [confidential].
He therefore claims that the Council is requiring him to produce evidence of a negative in order to prove the transfer of the shares in question.
113    What is more, the applicant disputes the Council’s arguments that he controls AlfaStrakhovanie, on the ground that the information available to the Council is hypothetical.
114    In the second place, the applicant claims, in essence, that he is the only businessperson whose name is included on the lists at issue without account being taken of past or present executive functions. In that regard, he submits that the Council should have taken into account the fact that he performed no executive function in the 10 years preceding the initial inclusion of his name on those lists.
115    In the third place, the applicant states that he does not pursue an economic activity
in one or more sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation and therefore submits that he cannot be regarded as a leading businessperson in Russia. According to the applicant, it is clear from both the case-law on Value Added Tax (VAT) and from the recent case-law on restrictive measures adopted in the context of the invasion of Ukraine that the mere fact that he holds shares does not mean that the Council can find that he pursues an activity
in an economic sector.
116    In the fourth place, the applicant submits that the presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons and the Russian Government contained in the provisions of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is not applicable to him.
He maintains that the documents in files WK 5142/2023 INIT and WK 5142/2023 ADD1 containing information on the Russian business environment and economy do not mention him and that certain documents relating to the companies in the Alfa Group consortium establish that Alfa Bank does not form part of the close circle of dominant economic players close to Mr Putin. He asserts that neither he nor the companies in that consortium nor his partners belong to one of the categories of interdependent businesspersons, are friends of Mr Putin linked to the KGB or to Mr Putin’s network in Saint Petersburg (Russia), operate in state-controlled sectors or benefit from public contracts, tax advantages or special treatment. Similarly, according to the applicant, none of the companies in that consortium has had a minister in the Russian Government or a personal trustee on its board of directors.
117    In the fifth place, the applicant submitted at the hearing that Rosvodokanal did not provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation because that company represented only between 25% to 30% of the private water supply and waste water treatment sector in Russia, representing only 10% of that sector as a whole.
118    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
119    As regards the general context associated with the situation in Ukraine, it is clear that, on the date on which the acts of September 2023 were adopted, the situation in Ukraine remained grave. Similarly, the restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
120    It should be noted that, before it was amended, the (g) criterion covered only ‘leading businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’. The amendment of that criterion by Decision 2023/1094 had the effect of extending its scope to ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ (first part of the amended (g) criterion) and to ‘businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ (third part of the amended (g) criterion).
121    In the first place, as regards the first part of the amended (g) criterion, it should be noted that the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ refers to the importance of the businesspersons in the light of, as the case may be, their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 143).
122    It is clear from the first part of the amended (g) criterion that the amendment of the initial (g) criterion was intended only to extend the scope of the restrictive measures so that they apply to all leading businesspersons operating in Russia, including those not involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
123    The reasons justifying extension of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, are set out in recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094. That recital describes the functioning of the Russian economy, in which there is a relationship of interdependence between the leading businesspersons operating in Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, by targeting those businesspersons, the Council aims to exploit the influence which that category of person is likely to exert over the Russian regime, by prompting them to put pressure on that government so that it changes its policy with regard to Ukraine.
124    In order to apply the first part of the amended (g) criterion to the individual situation of each person whose name is included on the lists at issue, the Council must show, first, that a natural person
can be classified as a ‘leading businessperson’ within the meaning given in paragraph 121 above and, second, that that natural person operates in Russia. In that regard, it should be emphasised that the mere fact of belonging to the category of leading businesspersons operating in Russia is sufficient to justify the necessary restrictive measures being taken under that part, and there is no requirement to provide evidence of a link between being a leading businessperson and the Russian regime, or between being a leading businessperson and support to or a benefit derived from that regime (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 66, and order of 6 September 2022, Haikal v Council, C‑113/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:640, paragraph 41).
125    In the present case, as regards the applicant’s personal situation, it is clear from the reasons for inclusion that he is regarded as being one of the largest shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium.
126    According to the information in, inter alia, document 1 in file WK 3073/2022 INIT, the applicant is a co-founder of the Alfa Group consortium, a major Russian private industrial and financial group with interests in various economic sectors.
127    It should also be noted that a presentation of the Alfa Group consortium by Alfa Bank Ukraine, dated June 2019, submitted as Annex B.2 to the defence, refers to the companies in that consortium, which include ABH Holdings, AlfaStrakhovanie, X5 Retail Group and A1, and supports information in document 2 in file WK 17621/2022 INIT (judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council,
T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606, paragraph 94). That information is also confirmed by document 2 in file
WK 10524/2023 REV 1, which indicates that, as at 26 May 2023, Alfa Group consortium included Alfa Bank, AlfaStrakhovanie, Rosvodokanal, X5 Retail Group and A1.
128    Furthermore, it is common ground and clear from documents 9 and 19 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 that ABH Holdings, established in Luxembourg, indirectly owns, first, Alfa Bank Russia, including via ABH Financial, established in Cyprus, and via AB Holding, established in Russia, and, second, AlfaStrakhovanie, including via AlfaStrakhovanie Holdings, established in Cyprus, and via Yuns-Holdings, established in Russia.
It should be noted that, as is apparent from, inter alia, document 17 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, the applicant does not dispute that he held 16.3239% of ABH Holdings.
129    Moreover, it is clear from document 10 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 and is not disputed by the applicant that 47.86% of X5 Retail Group is owned by CTF Holdings, established in Luxembourg.
Similarly, at the hearing, it was common ground that CTF Holdings also owned A1 indirectly via companies established in Cyprus and in Russia. It is apparent from that file that CTF Holdings indirectly owns A1 via A1 Investment Holding, established in Luxembourg, via A1 Capital, established in Cyprus, and via Management Company Group A1, established in Russia. It should be noted that the applicant disputes neither that he is one of the founders of CTF Holdings, as is apparent from document 2 in evidence file WK 17621/2022 INIT, or that he held shares in that company, which is established in Luxembourg. At the hearing, the applicant disputed the Council’s claim that he held 11% of the shares in that company via Intertrust Trustees but acknowledged that, as is apparent from Annex C.12 to the reply, he had held approximately [confidential]% of the capital of CTF Holdings.
130    Accordingly, the Council considers that, as a result of his shareholdings in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings, the applicant was one of the largest shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium.
131    The applicant criticises the Council, first, for failing to take into account the fact that he transferred his shares in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings in March 2022 and, second, for reversing the burden of proof by requiring him to produce additional evidence showing that he had relinquished any capital holding in the Alfa Group consortium.
132    It is therefore necessary to determine, first, whether the Council is unduly reversing the burden of proof by requiring the applicant to produce evidence proving that he transferred his capital holdings and, second, in the light of the evidence produced by the applicant, whether the Council made an error of assessment when it found that he was still one of the largest shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium.
133    As regards the applicant’s argument concerning reversal of the burden of proof, it is true that, as noted in paragraph 85 above, it is for the Council to establish the validity of the reasons relied on against the person or entity whose name is included on the lists at issue. However, where persons subject to restrictive measures, such as the applicant, claim that their personal situation has changed compared with facts established by the Council, it is for the person concerned to provide evidence demonstrating that such a change has in reality occurred and, therefore, that the Council erred in its assessment of that evidence.
134    In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 126 to 130 above, the Council had a body of evidence demonstrating that the applicant was one of the largest shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium as a result of his capital holdings in a number of companies belonging to that consortium, in particular via ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings. It is therefore for the applicant to demonstrate that he did in fact transfer his shares in those companies and did in fact relinquish his prerogatives as a shareholder of those companies and of the entities associated with them. That requirement does not constitute a reversal of the burden of proof, since it is the applicant who is relying on the change in his personal situation and is required to demonstrate that change, namely the transfer of his shares in the companies in the Alfa Group consortium (see, by analogy, judgments of 11 September 2019, HX v Council, C‑540/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:707, paragraph 50, and of 27 June 2024, Servier and Others v Commission, C‑201/19 P, EU:C:2024:552, paragraph 124). Since the evidence of the procedures, arrangements and conditions for transferring shares in companies takes the form of documents to which neither the Council nor the Member States have access, the applicant is therefore best placed to provide such evidence in order to substantiate the change in his personal situation (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 September 2024, Timchenko and Timchenko v Council, T‑644/22, under appeal, EU:T:2024:621, paragraph 64).
135    In the present case, according to the applicant, his holdings of approximately 16% in ABH Holdings and approximately [confidential]% in CTF Holdings were transferred to the purported transferee on 14 March 2022, that is to say, the day before his name was included on the lists at issue. Furthermore, as the applicant notes, the purported transferee of those holdings also
acquired, at the same time, approximately [confidential]% of the shares in ABH Holdings and approximately [confidential]% of the shares in CTF Holdings held by a different shareholder.
A single transferee, Mr [confidential], therefore simultaneously acquired not only approximately 36% of the shares in ABH Holdings but also approximately 54% of the shares in CTF Holdings. In view of the assets held by ABH Holdings, that is to say, Alfa Bank Russia and AlfaStrakhovanie, and by CTF Holdings, that is to say, the distribution company X5 Retail Group and the Russian investment firm A1, the applicant confirmed at the hearing that the purported transfers involved significant sums.
136    Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of the present case and given that the applicant is relying, inter alia, on a change in his personal situation occurring the day before his name was included on the lists at issue, it was for him to submit evidence to demonstrate that, before that inclusion, the purported transfers had constituted an
effective transfer of ownership of his holdings to an identifiable transferee at arm’s length. Accordingly, the evidence of the transfers to the purported transferee of the shares owned by the applicant in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings must serve to establish that the transfer complied with the provisions of EU law relating to restrictive measures, which, in the present case, involved establishing that the share transfers had become effective, in accordance with national law and the applicable provisions of the statutes, before the measures to freeze the applicant’s funds came into force. In the present case, therefore, the evidence of the effective transfers of shares in those two holding companies had to include, inter alia, the documents relating to the transfer of those shares, the relevant provisions of the applicable national law and the provisions of the statutes of the holding companies in question.
137    In addition, in order to demonstrate that he had in actual fact relinquished his prerogatives as shareholder, the applicant was required to provide evidence of the conditions and arrangements for the purported transfers and of the other contracting parties, and in particular of the transfer price of those shares. Contrary to the applicant’s submissions at the hearing, that evidence of the transfer price is necessary in order to determine whether the purported transfers of his shares involve an effective relinquishment of his prerogatives as a shareholder of ABH Holdings and of CTF Holdings. Where a transferor sells shares for a price manifestly below the value of the assets transferred, the transfer cannot be regarded as being made to a third party at arm’s length (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council, T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraph 101), since, in those circumstances, by reason of the favour that that price would represent for the transferee, the transferor might continue, through the transferee, to exert influence over the business of the company whose shares were transferred, which would cast doubt on the credibility of that transfer (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2025, Ponomarenko v Council, T‑249/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2025:202, paragraph 130). Accordingly, in the present case, the evidence submitted was also required to contain information about the price for which the shares were transferred and the arrangements for paying for them.
138    It should be noted that, in the circumstances of the present case, production of the evidence referred to in paragraphs 136 and 137 above cannot represent an unreasonable burden or one involving the undue disclosure of confidential information. The applicant is best placed to provide evidence of the effective transfer of his shares in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings and of the effective relinquishment of his prerogatives as a shareholder of those companies and of the entities associated with them (see paragraph 134 above).
139    Moreover, in circumstances such as those of the present case, involving significant share transfers that allegedly took place the day before measures to freeze the applicant’s funds came into force (see paragraph 135 above) and the use of legal arrangements entailing companies established in several countries (see paragraphs 128 and 129 above), the efficiency and effectiveness of the restrictive measures could be jeopardised if purported transfers of company shares were taken into account without any evidence to demonstrate that they were genuine.
140    As regards the evidence produced in the present action, it is necessary to determine whether that evidence is
sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant had effectively transferred his shares in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings and effectively relinquished his prerogatives as a shareholder of those companies and of the entities associated with them and, accordingly, that the Council made an error of assessment when it found that he was still one of the main shareholders of Alfa Group consortium.
141    First, the applicant claims that the purported transfer of shares in CTF Holdings to Mr [confidential] took place the day before that on which his name was included on the lists at issue, namely 14 March 2022.
142    As is apparent from paragraph 136 above, it is nevertheless for the applicant to provide, in particular, evidence to demonstrate that the transfer in question took place in compliance with the provisions of EU law relating to restrictive measures.
143    In accordance with Article 2 of Decision 2022/429 and Article 2 of Implementing Regulation 2022/427, the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant came into force on the date on which those acts were published in the Official Journal of the European Union, namely 15 March 2022, that is to say, the day after the purported transfer of the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings.
144    In that regard, it must be noted that Article 2(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides, in particular, that all the funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies whose names are included on the lists at issue are to be frozen.
Under Article 1(f) of that regulation, the concept of ‘freezing of funds’ is defined as ‘preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or any other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management’. According to Article 1(g) of that regulation, the concept of ‘funds’ is defined as financial assets and benefits of every kind, which include, as is apparent from Article 1(g)(iii), publicly- and privately traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts.
145    In the present case, therefore, from 15 March 2022, all the funds that the applicant owned, held or controlled in the territory of the European Union were frozen, including the company shareholdings he owned in the European Union, which could no longer undergo any
move, transfer, alteration, use or access that would result, inter alia, in a change in their ownership or possession or any other change that would enable them to be used. Consequently, the aforementioned shareholdings owned by the applicant could only be unfrozen either by his name being removed from the lists at issue or by the competent authorities granting one of the derogations under Regulation No 269/2014.
146    In order to demonstrate the transfer of his shares in CTF Holdings, the applicant produced three documents.
147    First of all, as regards the document submitted as being an extract of the share register of CTF Holdings (Annex A.27 to the application), the applicant indicates, as at 16 May 2023, the number of shares by absolute value held by each of the two companies established in Cyprus referred to in that document, without any further information. Although it is not necessary to rule on the probative value of that document, suffice it to note that it does not serve to demonstrate that the transfer of the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings took place before 15 March 2022.
148    Next, the applicant produces a declaration of ownership relating to a company established in Lichtenstein, confirming, according to the applicant, that on 18 January 2022 he was the ultimate beneficial owner and shareholder of that company (Annex C.10 to the reply). Although it is not necessary to rule on the probative value of that document, suffice it to note that that declaration is irrelevant for the purposes of demonstrating any transfer of ownership of his shares in CTF Holdings before 15 March 2022. That declaration, dated 18 January 2022, merely states that the applicant was the ultimate beneficial owner of the company in question, established in Lichtenstein, before the purported change of ownership of
CTF Holdings.
149    Last, the applicant submits an extract of the register of effective beneficial owners of CTF Holdings drawn up by Luxembourg Business Registers (Annex C.11 to the reply), which effectively indicates that all the shares in the capital of that company were held indirectly by Mr [confidential] and Mr [confidential].
150    Nevertheless, it should be noted that the extract in question contains no indication of the date on which the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings were transferred to Mr [confidential] or of the terms of that transfer. The information relating to the effective beneficial owners contained in that extract therefore does not serve to establish that the applicant did in fact
transfer the ownership of those shares before the restrictive measures taken against him came into force on 15 March 2022.
151    Examined by the Court at the hearing on the fact that the extract in question did not state the date on which his shares in CTF Holdings were actually transferred and that it indicated that information had been amended on 25 April 2023, that is to say, more than a year after the freezing of his funds came into force on 15 March 2022, the applicant maintained that the extract demonstrated that the transfer of those shares took place before that date on the ground that the registrar had verified the information declared. Since he has not substantiated that claim by demonstrating, in particular on the basis of the national legislation applicable to that register, that the registrar in question was obliged systematically to verify the declarations submitted to it, it must be found that the extract in question does not serve to prove that those shares had
actually
been transferred before 15 March 2022.
152    It must therefore be found that the evidence produced
by the applicant does not serve to demonstrate that he actually transferred his shares in CTF Holdings before the restrictive measures taken in relation to him came into force on 15 March 2022.
153    Moreover, it must be noted that, since the purported transfer took place close to the date on which the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue, the production of a sale agreement pre-dating 15 March 2022 cannot, on its own, suffice to demonstrate an effective transfer of ownership of the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings before the measures freezing his funds came into force. First, in order to find that the transfer of ownership was effective and complied with EU law, it must be demonstrated that it took place before the entry into force of those measures in accordance with the rules of national law and the applicable provisions of the statutes. Second, given that the applicant acknowledged at the hearing that he had still not been paid the price for those shares, he must also demonstrate that the contractual provisions governing the transfer were not coupled with a condition allowing rescission in the event of non-payment of the sale price or of deferred
payment.
154    It should moreover be recalled that, from 15 March 2022, all the holdings owned by the applicant in companies established in the European Union had been frozen, with the consequence that, from that date, any move, transfer or alteration of the holdings he owned in companies established in Luxembourg would have required an authorisation to be obtained from the competent authorities (see paragraphs 143 to 145 above). It is clear that the applicant is not relying on any derogation issued by the competent authorities in order to have those shareholdings unfrozen after the adoption of the restrictive measures relating to him.
155    It follows that, since there is no evidence that the purported transfer of the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings complied with the provisions of EU law on restrictive measures, or of an effective transfer with no contractual provisions providing for rescission, the Council did not make an error of assessment when it found that, at the time when the acts of September 2023 were adopted, the applicant was a shareholder of that company.
156    Second, as regards the purported transfer of his shares in ABH Holdings, the applicant submits that it took place the day before that on which his name was included on the lists at issue, that is to say, 14 March 2022.
157    It is indeed apparent from documents 9, 19 and 20 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, which are press articles reporting a transfer to Russia, allegedly involving the applicant, of Russian assets held by ABH Holdings, that the applicant transferred his shares in that company to Mr [confidential] in March 2022. However, those articles give no indication of the exact date on which ownership of the applicant’s shares was actually transferred to Mr [confidential] or, in particular, of whether that transfer was finalised before adoption of the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant.
158    Similarly, as regards the evidence from the National Bank of Ukraine, it is true that it is clear from document 1 in file WK 17621/2022 INIT and from document 2 in file WK 10555/2023 INIT, namely press releases from that institution published on 28 October 2022 and 20 July 2023 respectively, that Mr [confidential] (2) owned a 40.9614% qualifying holding in Sense Bank (formerly Alfa Bank Ukraine, which was owned by ABH Holdings) following a purported transfer of the shares in that latter company held by the applicant and another shareholder. Nevertheless, those press releases from the Ukrainian national bank also state that the acquisition of those shares had taken place without its prior authorisation. In addition, it is clear from a letter of 5 June 2023 from that national bank to the Commission (document 1 in file WK 10555/2023 INIT), that, under Ukrainian law, the consent allowing Mr [confidential] to acquire a significant shareholding in Sense Bank had to be treated as null and void.
159    As regards the decision of the National Bank of Ukraine of 15 April 2022 annexed to the reply (Annex C.3 to the reply), it must be noted that, in point 1 of the enacting provisions of that decision, the institution notes the acquisition by Mr [confidential] of a substantial shareholding in Sense Bank in breach of Ukrainian law, which, in principle, requires any person intending to acquire a substantial holding in a Ukrainian financial institution to inform that national bank in advance and to await its prior approval. In addition, neither the enacting provisions nor the grounds of that decision state explicitly that Mr [confidential] acquired ownership of the applicant’s shares in ABH Holdings on 14 March 2022. Accordingly, as regards the assets of ABH Holdings located in Ukraine, that national bank found only that the transfer took place in breach of Ukrainian banking law.
160    It follows that the decision of the National Bank of Ukraine of 15 April 2022 cannot prove that ownership of the applicant’s shares in ABH Holdings had been transferred to Mr [confidential] before 15 March 2022.
161    It should be noted that the other evidence produced by the applicant is likewise not such as to prove that ownership of his shares in ABH Holdings had actually
been transferred to Mr [confidential] before 15 March 2022.
162    As regards the statement drawn up by the auditors of ABH Holdings (Annex A.30 to the application) and the statement drawn up by the legal firm acting for that company (Annex A.25 to the application), it should be noted that neither of those statements concludes unequivocally that the transfer of the ownership of the applicant’s shares in that company was effective before that date. The first of those statements indicates that ‘in March 2022 [the applicant] sold all his shares and was no longer [a] shareholder of [the company in question]’, without expressly indicating the exact date of the effective transfer of the shares. The second of those statements, for its part, merely notes that the shareholders could vote freely. That statement admittedly sets out a list of documents which include the transactional documentation relating to the sale of the applicant’s interests in that company to Mr [confidential] on 14 March 2022, the articles of association of the company in question, a shareholders’ agreement, information about the contractual relationships between that company and designated persons and a deed of undertaking executed on 25 April 2022 by that company and Mr [confidential]. Nevertheless, since those documents, which are not annexed to the statement, have not been produced, it is impossible to determine whether the transfer of ownership of those shares was effective before 15 March 2022.
163    As regards the statement issued on 6 April 2022 by the director of ABH Holdings (Annex A.30 to the application), according to which the applicant had no longer held any ownership interests since the sale of his holdings in that company to a third party, which purportedly took place on 14 March 2022, it should be noted, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 95 above, that the probative value of that
statement, which originates from the director of the company of which the applicant was a shareholder, should be qualified (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 153).
Accordingly, in the absence of other evidence supporting that assertion, that statement
is not, on its own, capable of proving that the transfer of ownership of those shares was effective as from 14 March 2022.
164    As regards the extract from the register of effective beneficial owners of ABH Holdings drawn up by Luxembourg Business Registers, irrespective of the reliability of that document, which is not signed by the registrar, it must be noted that the date of the most recent amendment is given as 22 March 2022, that is to say, a week after the measures freezing the applicant’s funds came into force.
In the circumstances of the present case, which involve significant share transfers that allegedly took place the day before those measures came into force (see paragraph 135 above), that extract cannot be sufficient to prove that the applicant had actually
transferred the ownership of his shares in that company before his funds were frozen. For the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 151 above, that extract is not capable of proving that the transfer of ownership of those shares was effective before 15 March 2022.
165    It must also be noted that, since the purported transfer took place close to the date on which the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue, the production of a sale agreement pre-dating 15 March 2022 cannot be sufficient, on its own,
to demonstrate an effective transfer of ownership of the applicant’s shares in ABH Holdings before the fund-freezing measures came into force. First, in order for the transfer of ownership to comply with EU law, it must be demonstrated that it was finalised, in accordance with the rules of national law and the applicable provisions of the statutes,
before the entry into force of those measures. Second, given that the applicant acknowledged at the hearing that he had still not been paid the transfer price for those shares, he must also demonstrate that the contractual terms of the transfer were not coupled with a condition allowing rescission in the event of non-payment of the sale price or of deferred
payment.
166    Accordingly, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 157 to 165 above, the Council did not make an error of assessment when it found that, at the time of adoption of the acts of September 2023, the applicant was a shareholder of ABH Holdings.
167    Accordingly, since the Council was correct to find that the applicant was a shareholder of CTF Holdings (see paragraph 155 above) and of ABH Holdings (see paragraph 166 above), it cannot be accused of making an error of assessment by describing him as being one of the main shareholders of Alfa Group consortium at the time when the acts of September 2023 were adopted.
168    It is not in issue that Alfa Bank Russia is one of the largest Russian private commercial and investment banks, that AlfaStrakhovanie is one of the largest insurance companies in Russia or that X5 Retail Group is one of the most important companies in the retail sector in Russia. A1 (formerly Alfa-Eco), for its part, appears to be an investment firm based in Russia.
169    Consequently, in view of the importance of the business carried on in Russia by the companies in the Alfa Group consortium, the Council was entitled, without thereby making an error of assessment, to find that the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of the amended (g) criterion.
170    The applicant’s other arguments cannot call that conclusion into question.
171    First, the applicant’s arguments that performance of an executive function is a necessary condition in order to be regarded as ‘leading’ within the meaning of the first part of the amended (g) criterion cannot succeed. Since merely owning significant capital holdings in one or more important companies may be sufficient for a person to be described as a leading businessperson, performance of an executive function is not a necessary condition for a natural person to be described as a
‘leading’ businessperson (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 151). Consequently, the fact that, a number of years before the adoption of the initial acts, the applicant was no longer performing an executive function in the entities associated with the Alfa Group consortium is irrelevant.
172    Second, it is also appropriate to reject the applicant’s arguments that he did not operate in Russia on the ground that it was clear from the VAT case-law that the mere holding of shares, whether actual or presumed, was insufficient, in itself, to amount to pursuit of an ‘economic activity’. It is sufficient to bear in mind that the concept of ‘economic activity’ in relation to VAT belongs to a different legal context from that of the amended (g) criterion, the first part of which refers to leading businesspersons ‘operating
[in French, literally, ‘pursuing activities’] in Russia’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council, T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606, paragraph 92).
173    Third, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s arguments that he did not fall within the presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons and the Russian Government because he did not belong to the category of businesspersons close to Mr Putin and because none of his companies had enjoyed preferential treatment by the public authorities. In that regard, first of all, it must be noted that the sole purpose of the first part of the amended (g) criterion was to introduce an objective, autonomous and sufficient criterion capable of justifying the inclusion of the names of certain persons on the lists at issue, which requires the Council to prove two cumulative elements, namely, first, that the person targeted is a leading businessperson and, second, that the person in question operates in Russia. Consequently, the applicant cannot maintain that the first part of that criterion established a presumption (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited). Next, as noted in paragraph 124 above, in order to justify inclusion of a person’s name under that part, it is not necessary to provide evidence of a link between the applicant and the Russian regime, or of support provided to that regime or of a benefit derived from it. Accordingly, for the purposes of applying the first part of the amended (g) criterion, whether the applicant is a close associate of Mr Putin linked to the KGB or to the Saint Petersburg network, whether he operates in state-controlled sectors or whether he benefited from public contracts, tax advantages or special treatment is irrelevant.
The same is true of the fact that none of his companies has had a minister in the Russian Government or a personal trustee on its board of directors.
174    Fourth, in so far as the applicant is attempting to argue that the Council made an error of assessment because the Alfa Group consortium has no legal personality, with the consequence that it is impossible to be a shareholder of it, those arguments cannot succeed. Status as a shareholder of that consortium can cover all the companies that are part of it (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council, T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606, paragraph 116). In addition, as is apparent from document 2 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, namely a page from the website of AlfaStrakhovanie, that company presents itself as belonging to the ‘[Alfa Group [financial and industrial c]onsortium’.
175    It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not demonstrated that the Council made an error of assessment when it maintained his name on the lists at issue, by the acts of September 2023, on the basis of the first part of the amended (g) criterion.
176    In the second place, for the avoidance of doubt, it should be noted that, by contrast to Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 in its initial version resulting from Decision 2022/329 and to the first part of the amended (g) criterion, which refer specifically to ‘leading businesspersons’, the third part of the amended (g) criterion extends the scope rationae personae of the restrictive measures by no longer requiring businesspersons to be ‘leading’.
177    It should be noted that, in the light of the objectives pursued by the Council, set out in recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094, consisting of exerting maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine, the concept of ‘businesspersons’ refers only to natural persons who pursue a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, in respect of whom the inclusion of their names on the list at issue is therefore likely to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and, consequently, to increase the pressure exerted on the Russian Federation which is responsible for the invasion of Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2025, Vinokurov v Council, T‑1106/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2025:106, paragraph 48).
178    Moreover, as regards the economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, it is unequivocally clear from the wording of the third part of the amended (g) criterion that it is the economic sector rather than the natural or legal person whose name is included on the lists at issue that must provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Admittedly, Decision 2014/145, as amended, does not define the concept of ‘substantial source of revenue’. Nevertheless, the fact remains that use of the adjective ‘substantial’, qualifying the nominal group ‘source of revenue’, means that the source of revenue in question must be significant and therefore non-negligible (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2025, Vinokurov v Council, T‑1106/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2025:106, paragraph 49).
179    In the present case, the applicant acknowledges that, at the time of adoption of the acts of September 2023, he was still a shareholder of Rosvodokanal. It must be noted that, in the document presenting the Alfa Group consortium (Annex B.2 to the defence), that company is described as being one of the leading Russian private operators in the field of water supply and treatment, providing services to approximately 5 million customers, operating in seven Russian cities and employing approximately 10 000 people. In addition, as is apparent from document 2 in evidence file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, that company is referred to as belonging to
the Alfa Group consortium.
180    Consequently, it must be found that, due solely to the fact of being a shareholder of Rosvodokanal, the applicant pursues a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity, with the result that he qualifies as a businessperson within the meaning of the third part of the amended (g) criterion.
181    According to the case-law, the water supply and treatment sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government given that it had generated tax revenue of more than 94 billion Russian roubles
(RUB) (approximately EUR 967 million) in 2022 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council, T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606, paragraphs 126 and 127).
182    The applicant’s arguments, raised at the hearing, that the tax paid by Rosvodokanal represents only a very small part of the total tax paid by that sector cannot succeed. As noted in paragraph 178 above, it is the revenue generated by the sector that is relevant rather than the tax paid by the person or entity concerned.
183    It follows that the mere fact that the applicant was a shareholder of Rosvodokanal at the time when the acts of September 2023 were adopted was sufficient for his personal situation to fall within the third part of the amended (g) criterion.
184    In the light of all the foregoing, the Council did not make an error of assessment when it found that, on the date on which the acts of September 2023 were adopted, the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of the amended (g) criterion and a businessperson involved in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation within the meaning of the third part of the amended (g) criterion.
185    According to case-law, with regard to the review of the legality of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 186).
186    Accordingly, with no requirement to examine the applicant’s other arguments disputing the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue under the (d) criterion, it is necessary to reject the first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment by the Council when it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by adopting the acts of September 2023.
(c)    The acts of March 2024
187    The applicant claims that, since March 2022, he has no longer been a shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium. He submits that he transferred his shares in Alfa Bank Russia, AlfaStrakhovanie Russia and CTF Holdings.
188    In view of the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215), the applicant asserts that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue constitutes an unjustified difference in treatment between his personal situation and that of the applicants in the cases that gave rise to those judgments.
189    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
190    As regards the general context justifying the Council’s adoption of the restrictive measures at issue (see paragraph 88 above), it is clear that, on the date on which the acts of March 2024 were adopted, the situation in Ukraine remained grave. Similarly, those restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
191    As regards the applicant’s personal situation, in the reasons for the inclusion of his name, in the acts of March 2024, he is no longer described as being ‘one of the largest [in French, ‘l’un des plus grands’]
shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium’, but as being ‘a major shareholder [in French, ‘un actionnaire majeur’] of the Alfa Group consortium’. It must therefore be found that these are, in essence, the same reasons as those of the acts of September 2023.
192    In that regard, it should be noted that, in the context of the reconsideration procedure that led to adoption of the acts of March 2024, the applicant did not rely on any new evidence to demonstrate that he was no longer a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium.
193    In connection with the statement of modification, in order to demonstrate that he was no longer a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium, via ABH Holdings, the applicant produced
an extract from the register of effective beneficial owners of that company, issued by Luxembourg Business Registers (Annex E.5 to that statement), which, unlike the extract in Annex A.28 to the application, is signed by the registrar.
194    First, as regards application of the first part of the amended (g) criterion to the applicant, it should be noted that the applicant has not produced
any new evidence to demonstrate that the transfer of ownership of his shares in CTF Holdings was effective before the date on which the restrictive measures taken against him came into force. Consequently, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 142 to 155 above, it must be found that the Council did not make an error of assessment by finding that the applicant was a shareholder of that company at the time when the acts of March 2024 were adopted.
195    As regards the purported transfer of his shares in ABH Holdings, since the extract of the register of effective beneficial owners signed by the registrar does not refer to the exact date on which those shares were transferred to the transferee, it should be found, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 164 and 165 above, that that extract cannot be sufficient to demonstrate that ownership of those shares had in actual fact
been transferred before 15 March 2022. Similarly, given that the transferee had not discharged his payment obligation, it is also necessary to demonstrate that the contractual provisions governing the transfer were not coupled with a condition allowing rescission in the event of non-payment of the price. Consequently, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 157 to 166 above, it must be found that the Council did not make an error of assessment by finding that the applicant was a shareholder of that company at the time when the acts of March 2024 were adopted.
196    It follows that the Council was entitled to find that the applicant was a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium at the time when the acts of March 2024 were adopted, with the effect that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue under the first part of the amended (g) criterion was well founded.
197    In any event, since the applicant acknowledged at the hearing that he was still a shareholder of Rosvodokanal at the time when the acts of March 2024 were adopted, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 179 to 183 above, due solely to the fact that he was a shareholder of that company, the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue is justified under the third part of the amended (g) criterion.
198    In addition, the applicant cannot argue that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue constitutes an unjustified difference in treatment compared with the situation of Mr Fridman and of Mr Aven because the acts concerning them were annulled by the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215). As is apparent from the grounds of the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215), the inclusion of the respective applicants’
names on the lists at issue in the cases that gave rise to those judgments was based neither on the initial (g) criterion nor on the amended (g) criterion.
199    In the light of the foregoing, the Council did not make an error of assessment when it found that, on the date on which the acts of March 2024 were adopted, the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of the amended (g) criterion and a businessperson involved in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation within the meaning of the third part of the amended (g) criterion.
200    According to case-law, with regard to the review of the legality of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 186).
201    Accordingly, with no requirement to examine the applicant’s other arguments disputing the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue under the (d) criterion, it is necessary to reject the first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment at the time of adoption of the acts of September 2024.
202    The first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment, must therefore be rejected in its entirety.
3.      The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality
203    The applicant claims that the restrictive measures taken against him infringe the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 5(4) TEU. According to the applicant, as Alfa Bank’s name was included on the lists at issue by the acts of 13 March 2023 referred to in paragraph 12 above, it is inappropriate to maintain the restrictive measures taken against him in order to achieve the objectives pursued. He submits that, since he at no time ran that company, which is subject to restrictive measures, since he does not live in Russia and since he is not a taxpayer in that country, maintenance of his name on the lists at issue cannot achieve the objectives pursued, that is to say, it cannot exert pressure on Russian decision-makers. He also claims that, as he is no longer a company shareholder and holds no management or executive position in any company, he is not in a position to exert influence over any companies.
204    In addition, the applicant claims that the derogations under which the unfreezing of certain funds can be requested in order to meet basic needs are ineffective, in view of the obstacles he is experiencing in connection with their implementation by the national authorities and in having funds made available by financial institutions.
205    Moreover, the applicant submits that, in view of the Commission’s plans to adopt rules allowing frozen assets to be confiscated and seized, the restrictive measures can no longer be regarded as not being temporary, precautionary and preventive.
206    The applicant also criticises the Council for failing to review the impact of the restrictive measures in order to ascertain whether they had in fact contributed to achieving the objectives sought. He submits that the objectives sought by the restrictive measures have not been achieved in the circumstances of the present case, given that the war has been lost.
207    The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
208    It should be noted that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law and is reflected in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 133).
209    The case-law makes clear in that respect that, with regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689,
paragraph 179 and the case-law cited).
210    In the present case, it must be noted that the restrictive measures at issue meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, capable of justifying the possibility that, for certain operators, the consequences may be negative, even significantly so (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150). They are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to bring to an end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. Specifically, by adopting restrictive measures targeting leading businesspersons operating in Russia and businesspersons involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, the Council is seeking, first, to exploit the influence which those persons are likely to exert over the Russian regime, by prompting them to put pressure on that government to change its policy and, second, to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. It is therefore apparent that the European Union is seeking to reduce the revenue of the Russian State and to put pressure on the Russian Government with the aim of limiting its capacity to finance the actions of that State undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and of bringing an end to those actions
in order to maintain European and global stability. That is an objective among those pursued under the common foreign and security policy and referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, such as the preservation of peace, the prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of international security.
211    It must therefore be found that the restrictive measures taken in respect of the applicant are not manifestly inappropriate in the light of the objectives pursued. That finding is not called into question by the fact that the name of Alfa Bank was added to the lists at issue. Since the applicant falls within the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, the mere fact that an entity with which he is associated is also subject to restrictive measures is not such as to render the measures in respect of the applicant manifestly inappropriate for the purposes of achieving the objectives pursued, given that his personal funds cannot be combined with the funds of that company. Furthermore, it must be noted that the Alfa Group consortium is not limited to that company, but also includes AlfaStrakhovanie, X5 Retail Group, A1 and Rosvodokanal.
212    As regards whether the restrictive measures at issue are necessary, it should be noted that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, set out in paragraph 210 above (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 182 and the case-law cited).
213    In that regard, to the extent that the applicant is arguing that the inclusion of the name of Alfa Bank on the lists at issue may constitute a less restrictive alternative measure that is likely to be as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, those arguments must be rejected.
The applicant’s assets are distinct from those of Alfa Bank and are not limited to the assets held by that financial institution.
214    Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the restrictive measures are temporary and reversible restrictions and that possible derogations from them have been established.
215    The applicant cannot cast doubt on that finding by claiming that he is experiencing difficulties in relation to implementation of the derogations under Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and under Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014. In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is for the competent national courts alone to review the validity of national measures implementing EU acts
(see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 1996, Branco v Commission, T‑271/94, EU:T:1996:103, paragraph 53, and of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 268).
Accordingly, if the national courts were to encounter difficulties in interpreting the aforementioned derogations, it is possible for them to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. Similarly, the General Court does not have jurisdiction, under Article 263 TFEU, to hear disputes between the applicant and financial institutions that decline to make funds available to him even though authorisation has been granted by the competent national authority.
216    Nor is the fact that the restrictive measures are temporary and reversible called into question by the Commission’s plans with a view to confiscating frozen assets. As the Council notes, the legislation in force at the time of adoption of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024 lays down no possibility to confiscate the funds of the persons subject to restrictive measures unless there is infringement of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. In that regard, it should be noted that Article 15(1) of that regulation provides for ‘appropriate measures’ of confiscation of the proceeds of infringements of that regulation. The Council accordingly left a measure of discretion to the national authorities as regards the definition, nature and scope of that confiscation (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, Timchenko and Timchenko v Council, T‑644/22, under appeal, EU:T:2024:621, paragraph 104). It must also be noted that the applicant is not claiming that the restrictive measures taken against him involved the confiscation of his funds. Consequently, the applicant has no grounds for claiming that those measures are no longer temporary and reversible in nature.
217    It follows that, in the present case, the disadvantages to the applicant are not manifestly disproportionate in view of the importance of the objectives pursued by the contested acts.
218    Last, the applicant is incorrect to maintain that the Council failed to review the impact of the restrictive measures and that, at the time when the contested acts were adopted, because the war had been lost, maintenance of the restrictive measures taken against him was no longer justified. As is apparent from recital 3 of Decision 2023/1767 and from recital 4 of Decision 2024/847, at that time, the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine was continuing, thereby justifying the extension of the restrictive measures for a period of six months. Moreover, contrary to his assertions, his personal situation was reviewed periodically, which resulted in the Council maintaining the restrictive measures taken against him. As is apparent from examination of the first plea in law, the Council correctly established that the applicant fell within the categories of persons covered by the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion.
219    It follows from the foregoing that the second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, must be rejected.
220    Accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
V.      Costs
221    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders OT to pay the costs.
Mastroianni
Brkan
Gâlea
Tóth
Kalėda
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 July 2025.
[Signatures]
Table of contents
I.
Background to the dispute
II.
Facts subsequent to the bringing of the action
III.
Forms of order sought by the parties
IV.
Law
A.
The Court’s jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s second head of claim
B.
Substance
1.
The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection
(a)
The acts of September 2023
(b)
The acts of March 2024
2.
The first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment
(a)
Preliminary observations
(b)
The acts of September 2023
(1)
The reliability of the evidence
(2)
Application of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion to the applicant
(c)
The acts of March 2024
3.
The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality
V.
Costs
*      Language of the case: French.
1 Confidential information redacted.
2 Confidential information redacted.