62003CC0456_EN
Opinion of the Advocate-General
Opinion of the Advocate-General
1. The Commission seeks a declaration that Italy has failed to fulfil its obligations under the harmonising legislation on biotechnological patents.
2. What is unusual about these proceedings is that it was only in its defence that the defendant Member State contested the Commission’s claims. The attitude of the defendant during the administrative phase could have led the Commission to conclude that the defendant tacitly acknowledged the alleged breach, since the defendant maintained that the relevant implementing legislation was shortly to be enacted.
3. Furthermore, the defendant’s stance has limited the exchange of arguments between the parties, to the detriment of the proper conduct of these proceedings for infringement of the Treaty.
Directive 98/44
4. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 (hereinafter ‘the Directive’) (2) is aimed at harmonising the legislation of the Member States on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions.
The Directive was adopted pursuant to Article 189b of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 251 EC).
5. It is important to note that, according to the preamble, the Directive seeks to clarify the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (fourth recital), following establishment of the fact that differences exist in the laws and practices of the different Member States which could create barriers to trade and hence impede the proper functioning of the internal market (fifth recital).
The preamble goes on to state that uncoordinated development of those national systems is detrimental to the industrial development of such inventions (seventh recital), notwithstanding which, in the opinion of the European Parliament and the Council, it is not necessary to create a separate body of law and it will suffice for the rules of national patent law to remain the essential basis, albeit adapted or added to, for the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (eighth recital).
6. The ninth recital in the preamble states that since, in certain cases, such as the exclusion from patentability (3) of plant and animal varieties and of essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals, certain concepts in national laws based upon international patent and plant variety conventions have created uncertainty regarding the protection of biotechnological and certain microbiological inventions, that uncertainty must be clarified by means of harmonisation.
7. In accordance with the 13th recital in the preamble to the Directive, ‘the Community’s legal framework for the protection of biotechnological inventions can be limited to laying down certain principles as they apply to the patentability of biological material as such, such principles being intended in particular to determine the difference between inventions and discoveries with regard to the patentability of certain elements of human origin, to the scope of protection conferred by a patent on a biotechnological invention, to the right to use a deposit mechanism in addition to written descriptions and lastly to the option of obtaining non-exclusive compulsory licences in respect of interdependence between plant varieties and inventions, and conversely’.
8. The preamble also states that it would be advantageous to encourage, by means of the patent system, progress in the treatment of diseases thanks to the existence of medicinal products derived from elements isolated from the human body or from technical processes aimed at obtaining elements similar in structure to those existing naturally in the human body (17th recital).
However, since the patent system alone is insufficient to encourage research into and production of biotechnological medicines which are needed to combat rare or ‘orphan’ diseases, the Community and the Member States have a duty to respond adequately to this problem (18th recital).
Finally, the Community legislature makes it clear that an invention susceptible of industrial application which is based on an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process is not excluded from patentability, even where the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element, given that the rights conferred by the patent do not extend to the human body and its elements in their natural environment (20th recital).
9. Article 1(1) of the Directive provides: ‘Member States shall protect biotechnological inventions under national patent law. They shall, if necessary, adjust their national patent law to take account of the provisions of this Directive.’
10. Under Article 3(1) of the Directive, ‘inventions which are new, which involve an inventive step and which are susceptible of industrial application shall be patentable even if they concern a product consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or used’.
11. In accordance with Article 5(2) of the Directive, ‘[a]n element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element’.
12. Article 6 of the Directive provides:
‘1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public
or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation.
2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable:
(a) processes for cloning human beings;
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings;
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes;
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.’
13. Chapter II of the Directive concerns the scope of the protection conferred by a biotechnological patent. It contains the following provisions:
Article 8
‘1. The protection conferred by a patent on a biological material possessing specific characteristics as a result of the invention shall extend to any biological material derived from that biological material through propagation or multiplication in an identical or divergent form and possessing those same characteristics.
2. The protection conferred by a patent on a process that enables a biological material to be produced possessing specific characteristics as a result of the invention shall extend to biological material directly obtained through that process and to any other biological material derived from the directly obtained biological material through propagation or multiplication in an identical or divergent form and possessing those same characteristics.’
Article 9
‘The protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic information shall extend to all material, save as provided in Article 5(1), in which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic information is contained and performs its function.’
Article 10
‘The protection referred to in Articles 8 and 9 shall not extend to biological material obtained from the propagation or multiplication of biological material placed on the market in the territory of a Member State by the holder of the patent or with his consent, where the multiplication or propagation necessarily results from the application for which the biological material was marketed, provided that the material obtained is not subsequently used for other propagation or multiplication.’
Article 11
‘1. By way of derogation from Articles 8 and 9, the sale or other form of commercialisation of plant propagating material to a farmer by the holder of the patent or with his consent for agricultural use implies authorisation for the farmer to use the product of his harvest for propagation or multiplication by him on his own farm, the extent and conditions of this derogation corresponding to those under Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94.
2. By way of derogation from Articles 8 and 9, the sale or any other form of commercialisation of breeding stock or other animal reproductive material to a farmer by the holder of the patent or with his consent implies authorisation for the farmer to use the protected livestock for an agricultural purpose. This includes making the animal or other animal reproductive material available for the purposes of pursuing his agricultural activity but not sale within the framework or for the purpose of a commercial reproduction activity.
3. The extent and the conditions of the derogation provided for in paragraph 2 shall be determined by national laws, regulations and practices.’
14. With regard to compulsory cross-licensing, Article 12 of the Directive provides:
‘1. Where a breeder cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety right without infringing a prior patent, he may apply for a compulsory licence for non-exclusive use of the invention protected by the patent inasmuch as the licence is necessary for the exploitation of the plant variety to be protected, subject to payment of an appropriate royalty. Member States shall provide that, where such a licence is granted, the holder of the patent will be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the protected variety.
2. Where the holder of a patent concerning a biotechnological invention cannot exploit it without infringing a prior plant variety right, he may apply for a compulsory licence for non-exclusive use of the plant variety protected by that right, subject to payment of an appropriate royalty. Member States shall provide that, where such a licence is granted, the holder of the variety right will be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the protected invention.
3. Applicants for the licences referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 must demonstrate that:
(a) they have applied unsuccessfully to the holder of the patent or of the plant variety right to obtain a contractual licence;
(b) the plant variety or the invention constitutes significant technical progress of considerable economic interest compared with the invention claimed in the patent or the protected plant variety.
4. Each Member State shall designate the authority or authorities responsible for granting the licence. Where a licence for a plant variety can be granted only by the Community Plant Variety Office, Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 shall apply.’
15. Pursuant to Article 15, Member States were required to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive not later than 30 July 2000, and forthwith to inform the Commission thereof.
The prior administrative procedure
16. Italy did not inform the Commission that it had enacted any of the measures required in the Directive. Since the Commission had no reason to believe that the defendant Member State had transposed the provisions of the Directive into national law, on 20 November 2000 it sent that Member State a letter requiring it to do so, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 226 EC.
17. The Commission did not receive a reply to that letter and, therefore, on 19 December 2002, it sent the Italian authorities a reasoned opinion in which it stated that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions required to transpose the Directive into national law, the Italian Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, and granted the Italian Republic a period of two months in which to effect the transposition.
18. On 6 February 2003, Italy’s Permanent Representation to the European Union sent a letter to the Commission in which it stated that no measures implementing the Directive had yet been enacted. In a subsequent letter, dated 10 July 2003, the Permanent Representation stated that the procedure for drawing up the said measures was at an advanced stage.
Procedure before the Court of Justice
19. Since it had received no further information, the Commission brought this action, which was lodged at the Court Registry on 27 October 2003.
20. The application, defence, reply and rejoinder were lodged, following which neither party requested a hearing. I find surprising that waiver of a procedural stage during which the Commission would at least have had the opportunity to put forward its view regarding the total failure of the defendant to cooperate in good faith throughout these proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation.
Arguments of the parties
21. In the application, the Commission merely complained that the defendant had failed to transpose the provisions of the Directive into national law, and did not elaborate further. It was in the reply, therefore, that the matters at issue in these proceedings were first really debated. That delay in putting forward the claims in these proceedings can be attributed to the attitude of the Italian authorities during the pre-litigation phase.
22. In the defence, the defendant Member State argues that, although the enabling legislation designed to transpose the Directive into national law is still at the drafting stage, the measures currently in force already comply with the principles arising from the Community legislation, and the defendant places on the Commission the burden of proving the alleged breach.
23. The defendant also pleads Article 1 of the Directive, which requires transposition only in the event that it is necessary, and, by way of information, the defendant refers to Royal Decree No 1127 of 29 June 1939, in particular to Articles 12 and 13 thereof.
Under Article 12 of the Royal Decree, inventions which involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application are patentable. The provision does not exclude from patentability the items defined therein, with the exception of discoveries, theories, plans, principles, processes and programmes. However, processes for the surgical or therapeutic treatment of humans or animals and diagnostic procedures used on humans or animals are not regarded as inventions for those purposes.
Furthermore, when the Corte di cassazione (Court of Cassation) interpreted Article 12 it made the patentability of a chemical invention conditional on the requirement that it must be original, and as such must give rise to a form of intrinsic ‘inventive leap’ capable of bringing about an evolution in the state of the technology concerned such that it differs from what was available previously; that criterion is akin to the discovery or to the identification of a new use for previously acquired knowledge, since, from a scientific standpoint, the latter are no less important than the ‘straightforward’ creation of a product. (4)
24. The Italian Government infers from the aforementioned legislation and case-law that the concept of a patentable invention is wide enough in scope to encompass the protection of biotechnological inventions, as defined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive.
25. As regards Article 13 of Royal Decree No 1127, although it excludes from patentability inventions whose exploitation would be contrary to public policy or morality, this does not concern a mere legal or administrative prohibition.
Article 13 provides that animal breeds and essentially biological processes for obtaining them are unpatentable. The provision does not apply to microbiological processes or to the product obtained using such processes.
26. The Italian Government claims that the aforementioned provisions are compatible with the requirements of the Directive.
27. With regard to the prohibition of the creation and use of human embryos, the Italian legislation was subsequently supplemented by Articles 13 and 14 of the Law on Medically Assisted Reproduction, which was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 10 February 2004.
28. Lastly, as regards Article 1(2) of the Directive (continued compliance with the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity), the Italian Government contends that those international agreements were transposed into national law some time ago. More recently, pursuant to Law No 27 of 15 January 2004, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, relating to the Convention on Biological Diversity, also entered into force in Italy. Article 11 et seq. of that protocol govern measures for the prevention of risks linked to the use of living modified organisms, which are patentable under the rules laid down in the Directive.
29. Therefore, the Italian Government argues that it has fulfilled the objectives laid down in the Directive, from both a substantive and a procedural point of view, and on those grounds it claims that the application should be dismissed.
30. In the reply, the Commission puts forward claims of a procedural nature and claims relating to substantive law.
31. In the former, the Commission draws attention to certain aspects of the conduct of the defendant Member State (failure to notify under Article 15(2) of the Directive; tacit admission of the breach during the administrative phase; drafting of legislation aimed at transposing the Directive into national law) in support of its contention that the measures required by the situation were not taken.
32. With regard to substantive law, the Commission ‘for completeness’ refers to five specific breaches of the Directive where no implementing provisions have been adopted in Italian law:
1. concerning the possibility of obtaining a patent for an invention which concerns a product consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or used (Article 3(1) of the Directive);
2. concerning the possibility of patenting an element isolated from the human body (Article 5(2)), having regard to the fundamental aim of the Directive which is to establish a uniform body of Community law in that sphere (17th to 20th recitals in the preamble to the Directive);
3. concerning the prohibition of patentability in relation to certain specified procedures, such as the cloning of human beings and the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes (Article 6(2));
4. concerning the protection conferred by a patent relating to a biotechnological invention (Articles 8 to 11 of the Directive), which, as the 13th recital in the preamble thereto makes clear, is an essential element of the Directive;
5. specifically concerning the relationship of dependence which can arise between a patent for a biotechnological invention and the system of protection for plant varieties (Article 12).
33. I will analyse the claims put forward in the rejoinder when dealing with the substance of the action and it is therefore unnecessary to go into the details at this juncture.
34. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the Court held in Commission
v Italy (5) that the transposition of a directive into national law does not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express specific legislation; a general legal context may, depending on the content of the directive, be adequate for the purpose provided that it does indeed guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so that, where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the persons concerned may ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before the national courts. However, in order to secure full implementation of directives in law and not only in fact, Member States must establish a specific legal framework in the area in question. (6)
35. The Commission seeks a declaration against the Italian Republic on account of the latter’s conduct during the administrative phase, and, in the alternative, on account of the failure of Italian national legislation to comply with the Community requirements.
36. I should like to begin by pointing out that these proceedings have not been conducted in the normal way or in accordance with the established procedures. Article 226 EC provides for a complex form of action which is designed to ensure that a Member State complies with Community law, and which, as a last resort, can lead to a declaration by the Court of Justice that the Member State concerned has failed to fulfil its obligations. The pre-litigation administrative phase, which concludes with the reasoned opinion of the Commission setting out the breach and fixing a period in which to remedy it, is followed, where applicable, by the judicial phase.
However, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion for remedying the breach. (7) It is at that point that the subject-matter of the action is determined, meaning that when the Court rules on the substance it is not required to take into account subsequent events.
37. In the case before the Court, by the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, the Italian Government had already indicated acquiescence by its silence, and had also made a vague reference to draft legislation in progress.
38. The Commission complains about those matters and, while failing to state as much clearly (in the reply the Commission implies that it is dealing with the substantive legal aspects of the action only for the sake of completeness), appears to be of the opinion that such conduct tips the balance in its favour.
39. I do not share that opinion. There is no question that where the conduct of a Member State in proceedings impedes the Commission in its role, entrusted to it under the Treaties, as the guardian of Community law, that Member State deserves to be strongly reprimanded. However, such conduct can lead only to a political or moral reprimand and can never of itself lead to a declaration that the Member State concerned has failed to fulfil its obligations, even where the conduct in question can be classed as a breach of the duty to cooperate in good faith which is incumbent on the Member States; where applicable, it would be possible for such a breach to be punished by the Court in separate proceedings brought for that purpose.
40. The Commission implies that the attitude of the Italian Government in the pre-litigation phase is tantamount to acquiescence, but, as I pointed out on a previous occasion, (8) it is not for the parties to decide how an action under Article 226 EC is to be disposed of, and the acquiescence or lax attitude of a defendant during such proceedings does not lead automatically to the action against that defendant being upheld.
41. For its part, the defendant claims that the action should be dismissed because the application does not cite any specific complaints.
42. In accordance with Article 21 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain, inter alia, a brief statement of the pleas in law on which the application is based. In any application made under Article 226 EC, the Commission must indicate the specific complaints on which the Court is called upon to rule and, at the very least in summary form, the legal and factual particulars on which those complaints are based. (9)
43. The Italian Government cannot plead a situation which it helped to create. The lack of precision in the application can be attributed to the conduct of the defendant in the proceedings, from which it follows that that complaint cannot succeed.
44. It is therefore necessary to examine the five complaints put forward by the Commission, since there is no presumption that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations and the burden of proof falls on the party alleging that failure. (10)
45. First of all, the Commission complains that Italian law infringes Article 3(1) of the Directive, in that it does not permit the patenting of a product consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or used.
46. In the defence, the Italian Government cites Articles 12 and 13 of Royal Decree No 1127/39 and the wide definition of patentable inventions contained therein, as interpreted in the case-law of the national courts.
47. The reply does not clarify the extent to which that approach is supposedly contrary to the obligation laid down in Article 3(1) of the Directive and to the aims pursued by the Directive in general.
The reply also fails to refute the arguments put forward by the defendant and to prove the breach. Accordingly, the first complaint must be dismissed.
48. Second, the Commission complains that Article 5(2) of the Directive, which permits the patenting of an element isolated from the human body, has not been implemented in Italian law.
49. The Italian Government again refers to the wide definition of a patentable invention which applies in Italy. It adds that the only rule‑making aspect of Article 5(2) is in its final phrase, which states ‘even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element’. In the opinion of the Italian Government, such circumstances do not give rise to any difficulty because, under the case-law of the Corte di cassazione, artificial processes capable of bringing about technical progress are patentable and such progress occurs every time a natural function is artificially reproduced.
50. It is appropriate to apply to this complaint the same reasoning as was used with regard to the previous complaint; in other words, no evidence has been adduced to indicate that the definition of a patentable invention which is in force in Italy conflicts with the letter or the spirit of the Community provision, and, in particular, that it threatens the coherence of the Community legal order in that sphere.
I do, however, have doubts about the explanation relating to the final phrase of Article 5(2). Nevertheless, that new complaint
was not put forward by the applicant on whom it is incumbent to prove the failure to fulfil obligations, nor are there any grounds for the Court to examine the complaint of its own motion.
51. The second complaint must therefore be dismissed in its entirety.
52. The basis for the third complaint is that the requirement that certain processes, such as the cloning of human beings and the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, are to be regarded as unpatentable has not been transposed into Italian law, as prescribed in Article 6(2) of the Directive.
The Commission is of the opinion that Article 13 of Royal Decree No 1127/39 sets out only the general rule, which prohibits the patenting of inventions where their exploitation would be contrary to public policy or morality, and that, as such, it is an accurate reflection of Article 6(1) of the Directive.
53. The Italian Government pleads Article 13 of Law No 40 of 19 February 2004 on Medically Assisted Reproduction, which prohibits experimentation involving human embryos and provides that the production of human embryos and their selection for eugenic purposes, cloning, and fertilisation by gametes from other species are punishable by a prison sentence, a fine and suspension from professional practice. The Italian Government further claims that legislation of such a nature unequivocally classifies the practices of cloning and of altering a person’s genetic identity as contrary to public policy, thereby categorically precluding the patentability of such practices.
54. As a preliminary point, it is important to note that the national provision referred to was enacted after the expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and also after the Commission had brought this action for failure to fulfil obligations on 27 October 2003. Accordingly, the provision cannot be taken into account for the purpose of analysing the conduct complained of.
55. Purely for academic purposes, it is appropriate to point out that notwithstanding that, in the light of the wording of Article 13 of Law No 40/2004, the competent authorities would, pursuant to Article 13 of Royal Decree No 1127/39, probably reject a patent application for processes involving cloning or manipulation of human embryos for commercial or industrial purposes, Article 6(1) of the Directive requires that inventions be considered unpatentable where their exploitation would be contrary to ordre public
(public policy) and provides that ‘exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation’.
That statement may be interpreted as requiring the transposition of the principle that commercial processes involving the use of human embryos are not patentable. In any event, it is clear from a careful reading of the Directive that the principle must be transposed.
56. For the reasons set out in point 54 of this Opinion, it is appropriate to declare, with regard to the third complaint, that there has been a failure to fulfil obligations.
57. The fourth complaint put forward by the Commission is more ambiguous in nature than the previous ones, and focuses on ascertaining whether, under Italian law, patents in respect of biotechnological inventions receive treatment equivalent to that granted in Articles 8 to 11 of the Directive.
58. The Italian Government claims that those provisions merely extend the protection provided by a biotechnological patent to material resulting from application of the patented process.
In its view, Article 1bis(1)(b) of Royal Decree No 1127/39 meets those criteria in that it confers on the holder of the patent the exclusive right to apply a particular process, and to use, market, sell or import for such purposes the product directly obtained from the process concerned.
59. I am not convinced by the defence put forward in that regard. Without undertaking an interpretation of Italian law, it is clear from merely reading Articles 8 to 11 of the Directive and Article 1bis of the Royal Decree that the Community provisions govern specific situations which fall outside the scope of the protection accorded to the product of a patent under the Italian legislation.
60. Thus, for example, Article 8 of the Directive governs the protection of a product but, unlike the Italian legislation, it refers not only to patentable processes but also to the biological material itself, provided that such material is capable of propagation or multiplication.
Article 9 of the Directive provides specifically for protection to be extended to products containing patented genetic material in which the latter continues to perform its function. That case differs conceptually from the connection between the process and the product, which is the only case governed by the Italian legislation.
Articles 10 and 11 contain specific derogations from the general rule providing for the extension of the protection (propagation or multiplication for placing on the market; specific features of agricultural use) which are not reflected at all in Article 1bis of Royal Decree No 1127/39.
61. On those grounds, it is appropriate to uphold this part of the application.
62. Finally, by its fifth complaint the Commission contends that Italian law contains no provision governing the entitlement of a holder of a registered plant variety right to obtain, on reasonable terms, a compulsory licence from the proprietor of a biotechnological invention where the licence is necessary for the exploitation of the plant variety concerned.
63. The Italian Government invokes Article 5 of Royal Decree No 1127/39, which precludes the application or use of a protected invention to exploit another industrial invention without the consent of the holder. Moreover, the Italian Government states that the Royal Decree provides for an extensive system of compulsory licensing.
Article 54(2)(b) of Royal Decree No 1127/39 permits such licences where it is not possible to use the patented invention without infringing rights attaching to a prior patent. In such cases, it is appropriate to grant protection to the holder of the subsequent right to the extent necessary for exploitation of the invention, provided that the latter constitutes significant technical progress of considerable economic importance compared with the first invention.
The Italian Government also asserts that, although the wording of the legislation implies that, in principle, the administrative authorities have a margin of discretion when it comes to granting such licences, in practice they grant licences only provided that the other conditions are met.
64. Italian law does not provide for all the cases of compulsory cross-licensing governed by Article 12 of the Directive, although it is clear that both are underpinned by the same philosophy.
In addition to the apparently discretionary nature of the licence under Royal Decree No 1127/39, an interpretation of the national legislation by reference to the Directive requires that the rules governing patents be extended by analogy to plant varieties and that the concept of an ‘appropriate royalty’ as consideration for the use of the licence also be introduced. Furthermore, Article 12(3)(a) expressly makes the grant of a licence conditional on the provision by the applicant of proof that he has applied unsuccessfully to the holder of the patent or of the plant v ariety right to obtain a contractual licence, a requirement which is absent from the Italian legislation.
65. For the reasons set out, this part of the application must be declared well founded.
Costs
66. The Italian Republic has not applied for costs from the applicant, and accordingly it must bear its own costs, in accordance with Article 69(5) of the Rules of Procedure.
67. As regards the Commission’s costs, given the fact that each party has been partially unsuccessful, and, above all, the evasive procedural strategy of the defendant Member State, which has prevented the proceedings from progressing in the usual manner, I propose that those costs be shared equally between the parties, in accordance with Article 69(3) of the Rules of Procedure.
Conclusion
68. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice should declare that the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(2) and Articles 8 to 12 of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, that the remainder of the application should be dismissed, and that the defendant Member State should be expressly ordered to pay its own costs and half of the costs incurred by the Commission.
(1) .
(2)
–	OJ 1998 L 213, p. 13.
(3)
–	This footnote is not relevant to the English translation.
(4)
– Cass. 28 June 2001, No 8879.
(5)
–	Case 363/85 [1987] ECR 1733, paragraph 7.
(6)
–	Case C-131/88 Commission
v Germany
[1991] ECR I-825, paragraph 8.
(7)
– See, for example, Case C-152/98 Commission
v Netherlands
[2001] ECR I‑3463, paragraph 21; Case C-384/97 Commission
v Greece
[2000] ECR I-3823, paragraph 35; and Case C-214/96 Commission v Spain
[1998] ECR I-7661, paragraph 25.
(8)
–	Joined Opinion in Case C-367/98 Commission
v Portugal, Case C-483/99 Commission
v France
and Case C-503/99 Commission
v Belgium
[2002] ECR I-4731, point 76.
(9)
–	Case C-347/88 Commission
v Greece
[1990] ECR I-4747, paragraph 28.
(10)
–	See particularly Case 96/81 Commission
v Netherlands
[1982] ECR 1791, paragraph 6; Case C‑404/00 Commission
v Spain
[2003] ECR I-6695, paragraph 26; and Case C-434/01 Commission
v United Kingdom
[2003] ECR I-13239, paragraph 21.