JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)
6 April 2022 (*)
(Civil service – Members of the contract staff – EEAS staff – Psychological harassment – Administrative investigation – Article 12a of the Staff Regulations – Request for assistance – Rejection of the request – Article 24 of the Staff Regulations – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Reasonable time – Liability)
In Case T‑425/20,
KU, represented by A. Tymen, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European External Action Service (EEAS), represented by S. Marquardt, R. Spáč, G. Pasqualetti and E. Orgován, acting as Agents,
defendant,
ACTION under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of the EEAS of 17 September 2019 rejecting the applicant’s request for assistance and, secondly, compensation for the harm which she claims to have suffered as a result of psychological harassment,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber),
composed of J. Svenningsen, President, C. Mac Eochaidh and J. Laitenberger (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: I. Pollalis, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 9 November 2021,
gives the following
Judgment
Background to the dispute
1        On 16 October 2016, the applicant, KU, joined the [confidential](1) division of the European External Action Service (EEAS), as a member of the contract staff, for a period of 12 months with the possibility of renewal.
2        In [confidential], the applicant contacted the trade union representatives and the EEAS mediator regarding her working conditions and alleged harassment. On [confidential], a meeting between the applicant, the trade union representatives and A, her head of division, was organised.
3        In [confidential], the applicant received an email telling her that her contract would be terminated. The latter came to an end in [confidential].
4        In December 2017, the applicant contacted the Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the European Commission (IDOC), responsible for conducting administrative investigations on behalf of the EEAS.
5        On 8 May 2018, the applicant submitted a request for assistance under Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) within the meaning of Article 24 of those Staff Regulations.
6        In her request for assistance, the applicant relied, inter alia, on psychological harassment at work by A, head of division, and B and C, heads of sector within that division.
7        On 26 June 2018, an interview with the applicant was arranged by IDOC and by the appeals and case monitoring unit. On 5 July 2018, the applicant sent additional evidence to IDOC.
8        On 24 July 2018, IDOC received a mandate from the EEAS to open an administrative inquiry with respect to A, of which the applicant was informed on 3 September 2018.
9        During the investigation conducted between October and December 2018, various witnesses were heard. A hearing of the applicant was held on 21 November 2018.
10      On 5 and 7 April 2019, the applicant contacted IDOC in order to submit new evidence relating to A’s conduct.
11      On 14 May 2019 IDOC invited the applicant to submit observations solely on the facts established concerning A in the context of the administrative inquiry. The applicant submitted her observations on 24 May 2019.
12      On 24 June 2019, IDOC sent to the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment of the EEAS (‘the AECE’) its final inquiry report containing its findings and stating that the inquiry had not made it possible to establish the existence of inappropriate conduct or psychological harassment by A against the applicant. On 3 July 2019, the AECE, referring to the IDOC report, decided to close the case.
13      On 17 September 2019, the AECE stated, in a note addressed to the applicant, that the facts alleged against A did not reveal the existence of inappropriate conduct within the meaning of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations or conduct constituting psychological harassment within the meaning of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations vis-à-vis the applicant (‘the contested decision’). As regards the alleged conduct of B and C, the AECE stated that it had decided not to open an administrative inquiry with respect to them, since the evidence submitted by the applicant was not sufficient to be regarded as prima facie evidence of her claims. For those reasons, the AECE stated that it took the view that it had fulfilled its duty to provide assistance to the applicant by opening an administrative inquiry into the claims made against A.
14      On 27 November 2019, the applicant requested that IDOC provide her with the final investigation report. A non-confidential version of that document was sent to the applicant on 12 December 2019.
15      On 17 December 2019, she lodged a complaint against the contested decision under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.
16      On 3 April 2020, the complaint was rejected by decision of the AECE (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).
Procedure and forms of order sought
17      The applicant brought the present action by application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 3 July 2020.
18      The EEAS lodged its defence on 30 October 2020.
19      On 24 November 2020, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, the General Court (Eighth Chamber) sent questions to the parties for written answers in the reply and rejoinder, by way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
20      The applicant lodged its reply and its responses to the Court’s questions on 7 January 2021. The EEAS lodged its rejoinder, including its responses to the Court’s questions on 31 March 2021.
21      By document lodged at the Court Registry on 7 May 2021, the applicant requested that a hearing be held pursuant to Article 106(2) of the Rules of Procedure. By the same document, the applicant requested, by way of measures of inquiry referred to in Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure, that D be heard as a witness. The EEAS submitted its observations on that request within the prescribed period.
22      The parties presented oral argument and answered the written and oral questions put by the Court at the hearing on 9 November 2021.
23      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint;
–        order the EEAS to pay her damages in the amount of EUR 15 000 by way of fair compensation for the harassment suffered;
–        order the EEAS to pay the costs.
24      The EEAS contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action as being baseless;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The action for annulment
25      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to established case-law and in accordance with the principle of procedural economy, the Court may decide that it is not appropriate to rule specifically on the heads of claim directed against the decision rejecting the complaint where it finds that those claims have no independent content and are, in reality, the same as those directed against the decision against which the complaint has been made (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
26      In the present case, in so far as the decision rejecting the complaint merely confirms the contested decision, it has no independent effect. Accordingly, the applicant’s application for annulment must be regarded as being directed against the contested decision alone. The fact that, in her first plea, the applicant also refers specifically to the statement of reasons for the decision rejecting the complaint is irrelevant in that regard. In such a situation, the lawfulness of the contested decision must be examined by taking account of the statement of reasons given in the decision rejecting the complaint, since the reasons given are supposed to coincide with those given in the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 2021, BK v EASO, T‑277/19, not published, EU:T:2021:161, paragraph 43).
27      In support of its application for annulment of the contested decision, the applicant raises four pleas in law. The first alleges infringement of the obligation to state reasons and a failure to examine evidence; the second alleges an error of law by reason of an infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations; the third alleges a manifest error of assessment; and the fourth alleges infringement of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations.
The first plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons and failure to examine evidence
28      The applicant submits that the EEAS did not provide an adequate statement of reasons for the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint and that those decisions are unfounded.
29      More specifically, the applicant submits that, in its statement of reasons, the EEAS merely uses vague formulations which have no specific connection with the evidence provided and do not refer to that evidence. The EEAS barely mentioned, in the contested decision and in the decision rejecting the complaint, the IDOC inquiry and the evidence which she had provided in her request for assistance and in her complaint. The decision rejecting the complaint makes no reference to her arguments relating to the tasks she performed that do not appear in her job description, even though she expounded upon them in her complaint in response to the EEAS’s assertion, in the contested decision, that she had not explained which of the tasks she performed did not, in her view, fall within her job description. The EEAS also disregarded other evidence which demonstrated that A had carried out disproportionate investigations into her. In that regard, the applicant refers to the description of her appraisal report as ‘sensitive’ by A and to the fact that he asked a colleague to contact her former employer with respect to possible irregularities concerning her. At the hearing, the applicant added that the AECE also failed to mention in the contested decision certain material, which she describes as key evidence, relating to two meetings to which she was not invited. In addition, the applicant complains that the EEAS failed to take into account a number of witness statements relating to her alleged isolation lodged with IDOC by former colleagues.
30      Overall, the applicant complains that the EEAS relied excessively on the assessment made in the IDOC report even though that report contains several inconsistencies.
31      At the hearing, the applicant stated that the first plea was well founded in so far as the AECE did not substantiate its assessment that certain items of evidence, which she considered to be particularly important items of evidence, were neither decisive nor conclusive. Thus, according to the applicant, the first plea related not to the AECE’s assessment of the evidence, but to the absence of any reference to that evidence and to its assessment in the contested decision, with the result that it must be inferred that that evidence was not examined.
32      The EEAS contends that the first ground of appeal is inadmissible for breach of the rule of correspondence between the complaint and the application, in so far as it is raised for the first time before the Court.
33      The EEAS also alleges a lack of consistency and clarity in the application which is contrary to the applicants’ obligation to set out clearly and separately their pleas and arguments, which also calls into question the admissibility of the first plea.
34      In the event that the first plea is declared admissible, the EEAS contends that it should be rejected as unfounded.
35      As regards the obligation to state reasons, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that pleas alleging a failure to provide a statement of reasons or the inadequacy of the reasons stated are a matter of public policy, and may be raised both by the Court of its own motion and by the parties at any stage of the proceedings. An applicant cannot therefore be barred from relying on that plea on the ground that it did not raise it in its complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 September 2005, Napoli Buzzanca v Commission, T‑218/02, EU:T:2005:343, paragraph 55).
36      Moreover, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the applicant has already put forward in the complaint the arguments relating to the failure to examine evidence, even though that evidence was not submitted as a separate plea.
37      It follows from the foregoing that the plea alleging an inadequate statement of reasons and failure to examine evidence is admissible.
38      As regards the merits of the present plea, it should be recalled that the right to good administration includes, inter alia, in accordance with Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions (judgment of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraph 83). The purpose of the obligation to give reasons is to enable interested parties to know the justification for the measure so as to enable them to protect their rights and to enable the Courts of the European Union to exercise their power to review the legality of the decision. That obligation, laid down by the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations, merely reiterates the general obligation laid down in Article 296 TFEU (judgment of 9 July 2019, VY v Commission, T‑253/18, not published, EU:T:2019:488, paragraph 48), which requires that the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the authority which adopted the measure in question (judgment of 28 June 2018, EUIPO v Puma, C‑564/16 P, EU:C:2018:509, paragraphs 64 and 65).
39      However, although the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution concerned, it must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of concern within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, may have in obtaining explanations. Furthermore, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons relating to a measure is adequate must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. In particular, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are adequate if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2019, ZQ v Commission, T‑647/18, not published, EU:T:2019:884, paragraph 118).
40      It follows that a statement of reasons need not be exhaustive but must, on the contrary, be regarded as adequate if it sets out the facts and legal considerations which are of decisive importance in the general scheme of the decision (see judgment of 13 December 2017, CJ v ECDC, T‑692/16, not published, EU:T:2017:894, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited). The institutions are not required to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on before them by the parties concerned (see judgment of 12 December 2014, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, T‑643/11, EU:T:2014:1076, paragraph 130 (unreported and the case-law cited)).
41      In the present case, it is apparent from the contested decision that the AECE took the view that the IDOC inquiry report permitted the inference that the facts concerning A could not be described as inappropriate conduct within the meaning of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, or psychological harassment within the meaning of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations. It therefore concluded that it had fulfilled its duty to provide assistance to the applicant by opening an administrative inquiry to examine the factual allegations. In addition, the AECE set out exhaustively, in the decision rejecting the complaint, the reasons for which it relied on that inquiry report.
42      In that regard, it should be noted that, in the contested decision, the AECE, under the heading ‘As to the rest of your claims’, reproduced the substance of the findings set out in paragraph 5.4 of the inquiry report, concerning the facts established during that inquiry.
43      Furthermore, as is apparent from paragraph 14 above, a non-confidential version of the inquiry report, which itself provided a statement of reasons, was sent to the applicant, which enabled her to assess whether it was appropriate to bring an action and, in particular, to verify whether the contested decision was vitiated by an illegality concerning the AECE’s conclusion that the administrative inquiry had not made it possible to establish the existence of conduct capable of being characterised as psychological harassment by A.
44      In those circumstances, since the AECE is not required, when stating the reasons for a measure adversely affecting a person, to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on before it, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 40 above, it must be held that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is adequate. It sets out in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning on the basis of which the AECE concluded, inter alia, that A’s conduct did not constitute psychological harassment. The applicant was therefore put in a position to understand the scope thereof and to assert her rights before the General Court, and the Courts of the European Union were able to exercise their power to review the lawfulness of that decision.
45      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the first plea must be rejected as unfounded.
The second plea in law, alleging an ‘error of law [on account of] infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations’, and the third plea, alleging a ‘manifest error of assessment’
46      By her second plea, the applicant claims that the EEAS infringed Article 12a of the Staff Regulations. That infringement allegedly stems from the refusal to find that A’s conduct, as described in the request for assistance, constituted psychological harassment within the meaning of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations. Even if the established facts concerning A, taken in isolation, do not permit a finding that A’s conduct constitutes psychological harassment, which the applicant disputes, the combination of those occurrences are alleged to constitute harassment.
47      By her third plea, the applicant claims that the EEAS committed a manifest error of assessment in refusing to consider that A’s conduct, as described in the request for assistance, constituted psychological harassment. The assessment of that conduct is set out in the context of the second plea.
48      The EEAS contends that the second and third pleas in law should be rejected. It contends that those pleas are inadmissible and, in any event, challenges the assessment made by the applicant in the second plea, alleging infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations. According to the EEAS, in accordance with the rule of correspondence, the applicant’s arguments should be taken into consideration only in order to determine whether it committed a manifest error of assessment. The EEAS contends that it did not manifestly err in its assessment that the alleged conduct did not constitute harassment.
49      In the first place, the EEAS submits that the presentation of the claims is confusing and inconsistent and does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure. In the second plea, the applicant merely reproduces the case-law and general definitions of harassment, without indicating any specific ‘error of law’ made by the AECE in its reasoning. In addition, the applicant disputes the assessment of the facts carried out by the AECE and provides her own interpretation by means of general references to the various elements constituting harassment within the meaning of the case-law. The third plea is inadmissible because it contains no real presentation of legal arguments.
50      In the second place, the EEAS submits that the second plea, alleging an error of law, which is, in reality, a plea alleging an error of assessment, is inadmissible since, in her complaint, the applicant alleges only a manifest error of assessment.
51      In the present case, it should be noted that, formally, the applicant raises two separate pleas. She submits, on the one hand, a plea alleging an ‘error of law’ and, on the other, a plea alleging a ‘manifest error of assessment’. However, the arguments raised in the context of the two pleas are similar, if not identical.
52      Consequently, and as the applicant confirmed at the hearing in response to a question put by the Court, in the present case the scope of the third plea is identical to that of the second plea. The applicant asks the Court, in the context of those two pleas, to examine whether the AECE committed an error, which she describes as a ‘manifest error of assessment’, in finding, in the contested decision, that the facts which she presented, taken either in isolation or as a whole, did not meet the requirements of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations.
53      It follows from the foregoing that the applicant’s second and third pleas, in fact, constitute a single plea in law. Given that the administration does not have a broad discretion in the application of the definition of psychological harassment set out in Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, that plea alleges an error of assessment of the facts in the light of that definition and not a manifest error of assessment in relation to those facts.
54      Consequently, the objection of inadmissibility raised by the EEAS in respect of the third plea, to the effect that that plea does not contain any real statement of legal arguments, must be rejected.
55      Moreover, the structure of the pleas in law in the application and the arguments put forward in support of them is not so unclear that the EEAS was thereby prevented from defending itself. That is confirmed by the fact that the EEAS itself identified the second plea as alleging, in actual fact, an error of assessment.
56      As regards the alleged infringement of the rule of correspondence, it should be borne in mind that, in order for a plea not expressly raised in the prior administrative complaint to be admissible before the Court, it is sufficient for the applicant to have referred to it implicitly at that stage. Since the pre-litigation procedure is informal in character and those concerned are generally acting without the assistance of a lawyer at that stage, the administration is required not to interpret complaints restrictively but, on the contrary, to examine them with an open mind (judgments of 29 January 1997, Vanderhaeghen v Commission, T‑297/94, EU:T:1997:8, paragraph 37, and of 25 October 2013, Commission v Moschonaki, T‑476/11 P, EU:T:2013:557, paragraph 76). Moreover, Article 91 of the Staff Regulations should not have the effect of binding, strictly and absolutely, the judicial stage of the proceedings, where applicable, provided that the action changes neither the legal basis nor the subject matter of the complaint (see judgment of 25 June 2020, XH v Commission, T‑511/18, EU:T:2020:291, paragraph 59 (unreported and the case-law cited)).
57      In the present case, the applicant’s arguments, raised, on the one hand, as part of the first plea in the complaint, alleging a ‘manifest error of assessment’, and, on the other, as part of the second and third pleas of the application, which constitute, in reality, a single plea alleging an error of assessment, are very similar, if not identical.
58      Therefore, despite the different headings of the first plea, raised in the complaint, and the second plea, formally raised in the application, those pleas and the third plea raised in the application relate to one and the same claim and, therefore, one and the same cause of action.
59      It follows that the plea alleging an error of assessment is admissible.
60      The concept of ‘psychological harassment’ is defined, in Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, as ‘improper conduct’ in the form of physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts, which takes place ‘over a period’ and is ‘repetitive or systematic’, suggesting that psychological harassment must be understood as a process that occurs over time and presupposes the existence of repeated or continual behaviour which is ‘intentional’, as opposed to ‘accidental’. Secondly, in order to fall under that definition, such physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts must have the effect of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person (see judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
61      Accordingly, it is not necessary to establish that the physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts in question were committed with the intention of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person. In other words, there can be psychological harassment without it being established that there has been any intention on the part of the harasser, by his or her conduct, to discredit the victim or to cause a deliberate deterioration in the latter’s working conditions. It is sufficient that such improper conduct, provided that it was intentional, led objectively to such consequences (see judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
62      In addition, under Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, the conduct in question must be improper. It follows that the finding that it constitutes ‘harassment’ is subject to the condition that the factual components thereof are objectively sufficiently borne out. An impartial and reasonable observer of normal sensitivity placed in the same circumstances would have to regard the conduct or act in question as excessive and open to criticism (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
63      Finally, where it results from a continuous process over time, psychological harassment may, by definition, be the result of a series of different forms of conduct which, taken in isolation, do not necessarily constitute psychological harassment per se, but which, viewed as a whole and in context, including by reason of their accumulation over time, could be regarded as such (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2021, ZU v Commission, T‑671/18 and T‑140/19, not published, EU:T:2021:715, paragraph 59; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 93).
64      Consequently, when examining whether the acts alleged by the applicant constitute psychological harassment, those facts should be examined both individually and jointly as part of the general working environment created by the behaviour of one member of staff towards another (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 94, and of 9 December 2020, GV v Commission, T‑705/19, not published, EU:T:2020:660, paragraph 79).
–       The alleged requests to perform tasks which did not fall within the applicant’s job description
65      As regards the alleged requests to perform tasks which did not fall within the applicant’s job description, the AECE inter alia stated in the contested decision that the applicant had not specified which tasks, in her view, did not form part of the job description. Moreover, A, as head of division, enjoys a wide discretion in the organisation and distribution of tasks. There is no evidence in the file confirming that A assigned tasks to the applicant for reasons other than those relating to the needs of the service.
66      In that regard, IDOC mentioned in its report that the applicant had provided copies of emails exchanged with her superiors and her colleagues, in which she had been asked to accept certain responsibilities and to carry out certain tasks. According to that report, however, the applicant did not specify which tasks or responsibilities were not covered by her job description. The report states that she had accepted them without expressing any concerns in that regard. Lastly, it is also stated in that report that, in any event, A, as head of division, enjoys a wide discretion in the organisation and distribution of tasks and that there is no evidence in the file to confirm that he assigned those tasks and responsibilities to the applicant for reasons other than those related to the needs of the service.
67      As a preliminary point, and contrary to what the applicant claimed at the hearing, neither the IDOC report nor the contested decision confirm that A assigned tasks to her which did not, in substance, fall within the job description. Nor is it apparent from those documents that the AECE took the view that the concept of psychological harassment required the person responsible for the conduct at issue to harbour an intention to cause harm, as the applicant also stated at the hearing. It is therefore necessary to examine the applicant’s claim that the requests in question were not part of her job description and, if necessary, to examine whether those requests constituted psychological harassment.
68      In that regard, it is settled case-law that, in view of the broad discretion enjoyed by the institutions in the organisation of their departments, neither administrative decisions relating to questions concerning the organisation of departments, even if they are difficult to accept, nor disagreements with the administration on those same questions, can by themselves prove the existence of psychological harassment (see judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 108, and the case-law cited).
69      Furthermore, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 62 and 63 above, it is necessary to take into account the circumstances and factual context in which the alleged harassment takes place in order to determine whether the factual components thereof are objectively sufficiently borne out. In the present case, that factual context is characterised in particular by the fact that the applicant was recruited for a newly created division and, as stated by the EEAS, for horizontal tasks which were still to be more determined within existing structures. The applicant acknowledges that that factual context could justify a degree of flexibility, but submits that that need should have been reflected in the job description and that it did not justify the assignment of an expert on [confidential] to creative and graphic design tasks on a daily basis.
70      First, it should be noted that the description of the applicant’s post indicates that the person to be recruited must be capable of working in ‘working groups with mixed composition’ and in a ‘challenging environment’ and that it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the applicant was aware of the specific factual context. It is also stated in that job description that the person to be recruited was to provide, inter alia, administrative support for the mission support platform.
71      Secondly, it is apparent from the file, and in particular from the applicant’s self-assessment in her probation report covering the period from [confidential] to [confidential], that the applicant in particular carried out tasks relating to her job description within the field of [confidential], such as contributions to [confidential], work relating to [confidential], contributions to [confidential], [confidential] and assessments of the [confidential].
72      That finding is not called into question by the applicant’s argument, unsupported by facts, that a self-assessment does not necessarily reflect reality and may be flattering in tone. The applicant does not specify which aspects of her self-assessment do not reflect reality. Moreover, any potentially flattering tone used in the self-assessment does not explain the reference by the applicant to tasks which, in reality, were not carried out, especially since the report was also validated by A as a hierarchical superior. Lastly, other documents in the file and, in particular, emails annexed to the request for assistance and additional material submitted by the applicant confirm the existence of numerous tasks falling within the field of [confidential], including the applicant’s contributions to [confidential].
73      By contrast, the other tasks which, according to the applicant, did not fall within her job description, such as contributions to annual reports, the compilation of statistics for the division she worked in and the policy notes on the achievements of the mission support platform, are more occasional. In any event, it may be considered that those tasks are ancillary to the main work of [confidential]. That is also the case for certain administrative, formatting, graphic and computer aided design tasks directly related to the tasks falling within her main role.
74      That is not necessarily the case as regards the applicant’s contribution to the annual report of [confidential]. Contrary to what is suggested by the EEAS, it should be noted that the request addressed to the applicant to carry out that task is attributable, to a certain extent, to A, although it was made by E. It is apparent from an email from E of 1 June 2017 that A, who was copied into the email, proposed that E ask the applicant to support the French version of the annual report of [confidential].
75      However, it is also apparent from the exchange of emails between the applicant and E that that request was exceptional and motivated by the fact that the EEAS graphic designer had been unable to carry out that task within the time limits. The applicant had voluntarily accepted it by thanking E. In her self-assessment in her probation report covering the period from [confidential] to [confidential], the applicant stated that she ‘[was] proud’ that that request had been addressed to her and that she ‘[was] always glad to participate and contribute with [her] skills’.
76      Such a request, made politely and on an exceptional basis, which was duly justified by the needs of the service and which was, moreover, accepted by the applicant on a voluntary and positive basis, cannot be classified as ‘psychological harassment’ within the meaning of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, in that it is neither improper, nor does it take place over a period, nor is it repetitive or systematic and nor can it be regarded as undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of the applicant.
77      That finding is not called into question by the applicant’s argument in her reply that she felt subject to strong pressure to accept such tasks in the light of her contractual situation and in view of her wish to have a career within the institutions. Since the request at issue was made solely in the interests of the service, the applicant’s contractual situation and her wish to have a career in the institutions are not such as to permit the inference that the assessment of those facts by the AECE is vitiated by an error of assessment.
–       The argument that the applicant worked outside contractual hours
78      As regards the assertion that the applicant worked outside the contractually defined working hours, the AECE states in the contested decision that there is no evidence in the file to show that she was required on several occasions to work on weekends or during annual leave.
79      In that regard, it should first of all be noted that, according to the description of the applicant’s post, the position involved ‘unpredictable working hours and a considerable workload’.
80      However, the applicant refers only to two specific situations in which she was forced to work, respectively, on a Sunday, namely [confidential], and during annual leave or sick leave, namely [confidential].
81      In addition, it is not apparent from the emails submitted by the applicant in support of her claim that she was in fact forced to work on the [confidential]. In that regard, E, in her email from the [confidential], replied ‘[as soon as possible]’ to the applicant’s question concerning the time available to her for carrying out the requested task and stated that the graphic designer could not perform that task before ‘[confidential], which [would have made it very] late’. Although it is indeed apparent from that email that there was some urgency, there is nothing in the file to indicate that the applicant was obliged to carry out that task on Sunday [confidential].
82      As regards the [confidential], it must be noted that A was copied in to an email dated [confidential] sent by E to the applicant and asking her to work on the annual report of [confidential], but was no longer copied into the subsequent exchange relating to deadlines.
83      As regards the second situation referred to by the applicant, namely that in which B contacted her while she was on annual leave or on sick leave, it is apparent from an email sent by the latter dated [confidential], submitted by the applicant in an annex to her request for assistance, that B was not informed of the fact that she was on sick leave when he contacted her. It is also apparent that B was later informed of this by A, and not by the applicant. In that email, B acknowledges that he should not have sent any work to the applicant and apologised. That email confirms the EEAS’s argument that A attempted to protect the applicant from undue professional pressure.
84      Consequently, the applicant’s argument that those situations are attributable to A as head of division must be rejected. Furthermore, in the present case, there is nothing to indicate that A was aware of the hours in question during which the applicant had worked, and the material in the file rather supports the EEAS’s argument that A intervened in the applicant’s favour as soon as he became aware of those hours.
85      The witness statement to which the applicant refers in support of her claims does not call those findings into question. As the EEAS has stated, without being contradicted on that point by the applicant, the witness statement is the witness statement of the EEAS mediator whom the applicant consulted. According to the final report of IDOC, the mediator stated having learnt, ‘further to several discussions with [the applicant], that she … felt obliged to respond to requests for work even while on annual or sick leave’. He also ‘confirmed that [the applicant] was called during her holidays or her sick leaves’, without, however, being able to ‘offer further information on these issues’. First, that witness statement does not provide any additional evidence as to the situations in which the applicant allegedly worked outside the statutory hours or as regards A’s alleged liability in that regard. Second, it is an indirect witness statement which merely repeats the information provided by the applicant. The applicant’s argument, raised at the hearing, that the IDOC report is inconsistent in that IDOC had first requested a witness statement from the mediator before rejecting it, cannot be accepted. The fact that IDOC was in possession of that witness statement attests to the fact that it carried out an investigation, but clearly does not prejudge the question of whether that statement had any probative value.
–       The alleged absence of occupational training
86      As regards the alleged absence of occupational training, the AECE states in the contested decision that the administrative inquiry did not reveal that the applicant had requested assistance or that she had been refused such assistance. In any event, the knowledge necessary for the use of certain IT tools, in particular the Sysper system, is usually acquired during the performance of duties connected with the post occupied.
87      In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant has not mentioned any specific request for training or assistance relating to certain tools that she was refused. She merely stated that she had not received any occupational training, for example in relation to the Sysper system.
88      The only evidence which the applicant puts forward in support of her assertions is an email exchange dated [confidential] between A and his assistant, D, according to which the applicant asked D to verify the status of her probation report in the Sysper system. That exchange is not capable of substantiating the applicant’s assertions, nor does it indicate that the applicant requested assistance or training in connection with the Sysper system which had been refused to her.
89      Furthermore, the applicant herself stated, in the self-assessment in her probation report covering the period from [confidential] to [confidential], that she had ‘attended each and every session and training dedicated to newcomers’ and that she ‘[had] managed also to learn quickly how to use the most important IT tools, such as SYSPER, MiPS, JSIS, e-Tarjeta’. The applicant states in that regard, in the reply, that those training courses are not intended either to teach the use of IT tools or to develop professional skills and states, in her reply of 7 January 2021 to a measure of organisation of procedure sent to her by the Court, that the training for new starters which she actually attended focussed on security issues, which is disputed by the EEAS. The applicant states that, in her self-assessment, she focused on positive aspects by adopting a laudatory tone. However, those clarifications do not explain the contradictions between that self-assessment and the arguments put forward in support of the present action. Furthermore, such an approach to self-assessment, adopted by the applicant, runs directly counter to the very objective of self-assessment, which is, inter alia, to inform line management of how the member of staff concerned is faring in the workplace. In the absence of information consistent with the applicant’s true position, she cannot complain of alleged breaches on the part of her line management.
90      Consequently, the applicant’s assertions that she did not receive occupational training and needed specialised training on the Sysper system are contradicted by the material in the file.
–       The applicant’s alleged isolation from her team
91      As regards the applicant’s alleged isolation from her team, the AECE states, inter alia, in the contested decision, that it is not apparent from the file that the applicant occupied four different offices, over a short period, for reasons other than, first, those relating to the proper functioning of the service and, secondly, those relating to requests from the applicant herself. Furthermore, the administrative investigation revealed the existence of only one meeting to which the applicant had not been invited, due to an administrative error attributable to a secretary, who immediately apologised. Moreover, the applicant finally participated in that meeting. Finally, the AECE found in the decision rejecting the complaint that the witness statements included in the IDOC report indicated that the applicant had been forced to work in different places, in particular because of the set-up of her new division and related aspects of its organisation.
92      In that regard, in view of the broad discretion enjoyed by the institutions in the organisation of their departments, neither administrative decisions over questions relating to the organisation of departments, even if they are difficult to accept, nor disagreements with the administration over those same questions, can by themselves prove the existence of psychological harassment (judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 108 and the case-law cited).
93      It is certainly true that the number of moves by the applicant over a short period appears, prima facie, to be high.
94      However, it should be noted that neither the location of an office nor the move to one or more offices over a six-month period constitute, as such, acts of psychological harassment.
95      Accordingly, it is necessary to examine whether the applicant has demonstrated or, at the very least, adduced evidence to show that, in the present case, the initial location of her office or moves to other offices subsequently originated in particular circumstances which make it possible to regard these factors as evidence of psychological harassment.
96      In that regard, it is not disputed that one of the applicant’s office moves occurred in order for her to move closer to her team. Thus, the EEAS remedied the situation criticised by the applicant in relation to the distance from her colleagues from [confidential].
97      It is also common ground that the applicant’s office was further moved in order to bring her closer to A. In that regard, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the file, the working relationship between the applicant and A was not uneventful. In such a situation, a move to an office located close to that of the head of division so that the latter may supervise the person concerned more closely may be justified by the need to improve the running of the department, as the EEAS contends.
98      The applicant’s argument that such a justification contradicts what A indicated to IDOC does not call that finding into question. Although A stated to IDOC that the applicant had never worked directly for him, but rather under the direct supervision of the Deputy Head of Division and Head of Sector, it is common ground, as is also apparent from the applicant’s probation report, that A was indeed her hierarchical superior. In any event, A also mentioned to IDOC two tasks which he assigned directly to the applicant. Consequently, the contradiction alleged by the applicant cannot be established.
99      The parties disagree as to the circumstances justifying the initial move.
100    However, there is nothing to indicate that that move occurred in specific circumstances enabling the Court to regard it as constituting psychological harassment, in particular because it was in fact based on reasons other than those stated by the administration. The applicant does not put forward any argument capable of calling into question the reasons provided by the EEAS. More specifically, the general context relied on by the applicant in relation to her moves, namely her alleged isolation, is not capable of explaining that first move, given that that move did not cause her to move away from her colleagues in [confidential].
101    Moreover, the EEAS does not dispute that the applicant had to move more frequently than other colleagues, but argues that, because of the specific situation of the division in question, several colleagues also had to change office during the period in question. That latter fact is also confirmed by the file, and in particular by an email from B dated [confidential], in which he informed the applicant and three of her colleagues of the date of their respective office moves.
102    Consequently, it is established that, because of the particular situation of the newly created division, several of the applicant’s colleagues were also required to move during the period in question.
103    As regards the initial location of the applicant’s office, which, in her view, was far removed from those of her team members, the EEAS argued, in the rejoinder, that, as an expert in [confidential] of that [confidential], the applicant was placed in the same building as the ‘[confidential]’ sector because she had to be in close contact with that sector. At the hearing, the applicant criticised the fact that the EEAS raised that argument only at the stage of the rejoinder and that it does not appear in the contested decision.
104    In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, first, the applicant has not disputed the fact that her first office was located in the same building as those of her colleagues in the ‘[confidential]’ sector or that she had worked with those colleagues and, secondly, that, although it is more detailed, the EEAS’s argument is entirely consistent with the reasoning set out in the decision rejecting the complaint referred to in paragraph 91 above, which it merely clarifies.
105    Consequently, the EEAS’s argument may be taken into consideration as a clarification of the needs of the service which, in its view, justified the initial location of the applicant’s office.
106    Nor do the witness statements to which the applicant refers as evidence of her alleged isolation from her team demonstrate that the initial location of her office or the following moves were based on reasons other than those relating to the needs of the service, or that A contributed to the applicant’s isolation.
107    The first witness statement to which the applicant refers in support of her alleged isolation is that of the EEAS mediator. According to the final report of IDOC, the mediator stated that the applicant ‘felt isolated and singled out and … closely controlled, but could not offer further information on these issues’.
108    In that regard, it must be held that this is an indirect witness statement which repeats the information provided by the applicant and which reflects the way in which the applicant felt. On the other hand, that witness statement does not provide any objective evidence either as to A’s conduct or as to A’s role in the alleged isolation of the applicant.
109    That is also true of the third witness statement to which the applicant refers in that regard. The witness, a staff representative, stated that the applicant had told him ‘that she felt isolated and marginalised, and that some colleagues were “afraid” of being seen with her’.
110    In accordance with the findings set out in paragraph 85 above and contrary to what the applicant argued at the hearing, it is not inconsistent first to examine one or more witnesses and not subsequently to take into account, in the assessment of any evidence that may prove her claims in the present case, testimony which merely reproduces information obtained from the applicant herself.
111    Lastly, according to the second witness statement to which the applicant refers in that context, namely that of D, A placed the applicant in the office ‘“most isolated from colleagues” with the aim to “ignore” her’. However, that assertion is contradicted by the objective facts established in the file or by the facts not disputed by the parties. First, it cannot be held that the applicant was placed in an isolated office if that office was close to those of the colleagues with whom she was regularly interacting at the time or was even shared with those colleagues, even though they were not members of the [confidential]. Secondly, at the time of the last move, the applicant was placed close to A, which contradicts the latter’s alleged objective of ignoring her.
112    As regards the meetings to which the applicant was allegedly not invited, it must be stated, first of all, that the applicant does not dispute that the absence of an invitation to the meeting of the [confidential] was the result of an administrative error committed by a secretary.
113    However, the applicant denies that that meeting was the only one to which she was not invited and refers in that regard to two other ‘meetings’, namely that of [confidential] and that of [confidential].
114    As regards the ‘meeting’ of [confidential], the applicant relies on an email exchange between herself and a colleague, of [confidential], contained in the additional evidence which she submitted to IDOC on 26 June 2018. In that exchange, the applicant asked her colleague whether there had been ‘a meeting with [A] about [confidential]’. The colleague answered as follows: ‘Yes I met [A] yesterday and he paid us a visit in the office this morning.’
115    It is not apparent from that email either that a formal meeting took place or that the applicant was not invited to that meeting even though she should have been.
116    As regards the ‘meeting’ [confidential], the applicant relies on an exchange which she had with a colleague through an email service on [confidential], which appears in the additional evidence which she submitted to IDOC on 26 June 2018. The colleague wrote as follows: ‘We have [confidential] meeting now[.]’ The applicant then asked her: ‘When was it communicated[?]’ The colleague answered as follows: ‘I don’t know[.] Come[.]’
117    In that regard, it should be noted that there is no evidence in those messages that the meeting in question was organised by A. Nor is there any evidence that the applicant was excluded from that meeting. On the contrary, the colleague expressly invited the applicant to take part in it and the applicant does not provide any evidence that that colleague had acted contrary to A’s intention or that of the organiser of the meeting.
118    In any event, even if the applicant had shown that she was not invited, for various reasons, to three meetings over a period of one year, that circumstance would not demonstrate her systematic exclusion. When questioned at the hearing by the Court, the parties confirmed, moreover, that several other meetings took place during the year in which the applicant did participate.
119    Lastly, in so far as the applicant claims that she had difficulty in being added to the list of meetings of the [confidential], it is sufficient to note that she does not specify what those difficulties consisted of or in what way they would be attributable to A. She refers in that regard to an email in her request for assistance, in which she asks to be added to that list and asserts that neither she nor C received an invitation to a meeting of the [confidential]. That email does not support the applicant’s claim. In any event, it must be held that this is the meeting mentioned in paragraph 112 above, to which she was not invited because of a secretarial error.
120    Consequently, the applicant has not submitted any evidence capable of calling into question the AECE’s finding that the inquiry did not reveal the existence of other meetings from which the applicant was excluded.
–       The alleged use of inappropriate language vis-à-vis the applicant
121    As regards the applicant’s claims that, on several occasions, A spoke to her and of her in a degrading manner, the AECE stated in the contested decision that there was no evidence in the file corroborating those claims. As regards A’s alleged comment to D, in which he ‘told her shortly after [the applicant]’s arrival that he [was] to be “suspicious of her and not to trust her” without any further explanations’, the AECE stated, in the decision rejecting the complaint, that such a comment, even if proved, would certainly be clumsy. However, such conduct does not constitute harassment. Moreover, in the absence of more details or evidence provided by the applicant, the applicant’s assertions do not prove that A spoke of her in a degrading manner.
122    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the fact that an official has difficult, or even conflictual, relations with his or her colleagues or superiors does not in itself constitute proof of psychological harassment (judgment of 16 April 2008, Michail v Commission, T‑486/04, EU:T:2008:111, paragraph 61). Moreover, negative comments addressed to a staff member do not necessarily undermine his or her personality, dignity or integrity where they are formulated in measured terms and are not based on allegations that are unfair and have no connection with objective facts (judgment of 19 December 2019, ZQ v Commission, T‑647/18, not published, EU:T:2019:884, paragraph 78).
123    In the first place, it is apparent from A’s email of [confidential], in which he stated that the applicant had reacted ‘aggressively’ to the fact that she had not been invited to a meeting and that she had been ‘extremely pushy to benefit from missions’, that the tone used is indeed direct and that that email contains criticisms concerning the applicant. However, it does not contain any unfair allegations or any defamatory or malicious wording. In that email, A also presented the facts which gave rise to the criticisms. It stated that the applicant had been correct to emphasise the fact that she had, in error, not been invited to that meeting. He merely criticised her aggressive reaction, which, moreover, was contrary to what A had asked her at a meeting held on the previous day. It is not apparent from the file that the criticisms in that email were unrelated to objective facts, and nor has the applicant asserted such a claim.
124    In the second place, as regards the classification of the assessment in the applicant’s probation report as ‘sensitive’, it is necessary to take into account the context in which A used that description in an email dated [confidential] addressed to his assistant, D. It is apparent from the email exchange at issue that A had found that, according to the Sysper system, D had consulted the applicant’s probation report. In that context, and taking into account the confidential content of any appraisal report, it was entirely appropriate for A, as D’s hierarchical superior, to ask her to refrain from consulting her colleagues’ reports. The explanation provided by A to D that the applicant’s assessment was ‘sensitive, more sensitive than any other in the division’ is not unfair and cannot be regarded as undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of the applicant.
125    In the third place, and contrary to what the applicant claims, nor does the witness statement referred to in the final report of IDOC, according to which the witness ‘learned that [the applicant] was addressed without respect and that negative stories circulated in her back’ demonstrate the existence of psychological harassment by A. First, that witness statement is made by the mediator of the EEAS who reported what he learned ‘based on several discussions with [the applicant]’ and not on his own observations. Secondly, that witness does not state either that A failed to show respect for the applicant or that he contributed to the spread of rumours concerning her.
126    In the fourth place, as regards, first, D’s witness statement, mentioned in the final report of IDOC, according to which ‘A told [her] shortly after the arrival of [the applicant] to be “suspicious of her and not to trust her” without any further explanations’ and, secondly, A’s alleged request of D to conduct investigations into the applicant in the unit in which she had completed a probation period, it must be held that A’s conduct, even if it were established, may admittedly be deemed negative. However, neither of the two instances of the conduct alleged is defamatory or degrading against the applicant nor otherwise undermines her personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity.
127    In the light of the foregoing considerations and the facts relied on by the applicant, the Court concludes that the applicant’s assertions and the evidence on which she relies do not establish, as such, the existence of conduct constituting psychological harassment of the applicant by A.
128    The Court also finds that nor do the facts established have the effect of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of the applicant when assessed as a whole, in a contextual manner and taking into consideration the period of time over which they occurred. It is apparent from the foregoing that almost all the conduct referred to by the applicant can be explained by objective facts. Certain conduct, even if proved, is evidence of an employment relationship which is sometimes difficult which does not correspond to the applicant’s expectations. However, such a situation cannot, in the present case, be described as psychological harassment. Consequently, even taken as a whole and not in isolation, the applicant’s assertions and the evidence on which she relies do not establish the existence of conduct constituting psychological harassment of her by A.
129    Consequently, it must be concluded that, in the present case, the AECE did not err in its assessment of the facts in adopting the contested decision.
130    Accordingly, the plea alleging an error of assessment of the facts in the light of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations must be rejected.
The fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations
131    By the first part of her fourth plea, the applicant submits that the EEAS failed to fulfil its duty to provide assistance and thus infringed Article 24 of the Staff Regulations by failing to assist her in the face of the psychological harassment to which she was subjected. Furthermore, it did not ‘jointly and severally compensat[e] her’ for the damage resulting from the deterioration in her working conditions and psychological well-being.
132    By the second part of her fourth plea, the applicant alleges infringement by the EEAS and IDOC of the obligation to conduct administrative procedures within a reasonable time, and consequently of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. That infringement is reflected, first, in the unreasonable period between the date of the request for assistance and the date of the opening of the administrative inquiry, which occurred more than two months later, and, secondly, in the unreasonable length of the conduct of the administrative procedure as a whole, which was brought to a close more than 16 months after the submission of the request for assistance.
133    The EEAS contends that the fourth plea, alleging breach of the duty to provide assistance, should be rejected as unfounded.
134    As regards the duty to provide assistance, it should be noted that Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, which imposes on the European Union a duty to assist its officials and which is applicable by analogy to members of the contract staff under Article 92 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, appears in Title II, relating to the ‘rights and obligations of officials’. Accordingly, in each situation in which the required factual conditions are met, that duty to provide assistance is the counterpart of a right of the official concerned under the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2011, Commission v Q, T‑80/09 P, EU:T:2011:347, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).
135    It should be noted that, where a request for assistance for the purposes of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations is made to the AECE, pursuant to Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations, it must, by virtue of the duty to provide assistance and when faced with an incident which is incompatible with the good order and smooth running of the service, intervene with all the necessary vigour and respond with the level of expediency and concern required by the circumstances of the case so as to ascertain the facts and, having done so, to take the appropriate action in full knowledge of the matter. To that end, it is sufficient that the official or other member of staff who is seeking the protection of his or her institution provide prima facie evidence that the incidents of which he or she claims to have been the victim actually took place. When such evidence is provided, the institution concerned is then under an obligation to take the necessary measures, in particular by conducting an administrative inquiry, with the cooperation of the complainant, in order to determine the facts which gave rise to the complaint (see judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑570/16, EU:T:2017:283, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
136    In cases of allegations of harassment, the duty to provide assistance includes, in particular, the duty of the administration to examine seriously, expeditiously and in total confidentiality, the request for assistance alleging harassment and to inform the complainant of the action to be taken in respect of that complaint (see judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑570/16, EU:T:2017:283, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
137    It should be noted that, with regard to the measures to be taken in a situation covered by Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, the administration enjoys a broad discretion – subject to review by the EU judicature – regarding the choice of measures and methods for implementing Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. The review by the Courts of the European Union is limited to the question of whether the institution concerned has acted within reasonable limits and has not exercised its discretion in a manner which is manifestly incorrect (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2007, Lo Giudice v Commission, T‑154/05, EU:T:2007:322, paragraph 137 and the case-law cited).
138    In that regard, the Court finds that, in view of the seriousness of the alleged facts, the AECE decided to open an administrative inquiry on 24 July 2018 in order to investigate the facts alleged in so far as they concerned A. It should be noted that, in the presence of prima facie evidence, as indicated in paragraph 135 above, the opening of an inquiry is in itself an appropriate measure for responding to a request made in accordance with Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. In so far as the AECE had, without committing an error of assessment and without infringing Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, found that the facts referred to in the request for assistance which were the subject of the administrative inquiry should not ultimately be regarded as constituting psychological harassment, that authority did not have to adopt additional measures of assistance or to make good alleged damage.
139    Therefore, the first part of the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
140    As regards the second part of the fourth plea, concerning, first, the time taken by the administration to open an administrative inquiry and, secondly, the total length of time taken to deal with the request for assistance, it should be recalled that, in so far as the Staff Regulations do not lay down any specific provision as to the period within which an administrative inquiry must be conducted by the administration, in particular in relation to psychological harassment, the AECE is required to observe the reasonable time principle. In that regard, the EU institution, body, office or agency concerned must, when conducting an administrative inquiry, ensure that each measure is adopted within a reasonable time following the previous measure (see judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).
141    Nevertheless, the fact that the AECE did not reply with the promptness required to request assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, even if it were established, cannot in itself affect the lawfulness of the contested decision. Infringement of the reasonable time principle can justify annulment of a decision taken at the end of an administrative procedure, such as the contested decision, only where the undue delay is likely to have an effect on the actual substance of the decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited), which is not the situation in the present case.
142    In the present case, first, it should be noted that the applicant submitted her request for assistance almost [confidential] months after the end of her contract and, consequently, after the end of the alleged harassment to which she claims to have been subjected. Thus, the allegedly excessive duration of the administrative procedure had no bearing on the course of the alleged occurrences or, therefore, on the assessment of those occurrences. Secondly, it should be noted that, as in the case of the occurrences giving rise to the contested decision, nor has the legal framework changed during the administrative procedure. Thus, even supposing that the AECE should have adopted an earlier decision, the facts to be assessed and the provisions to be applied would have been identical. Consequently, the allegedly excessive time period is not likely to have had an effect on the actual content of the contested decision. That is confirmed by the fact that the AECE decided to close the case without further action on 3 July 2019, that is to say, more than two months before the contested decision was adopted. Thus, even if a shorter period had elapsed between the closure of the case and the adoption of the contested decision, that would have had no bearing on the actual content of that decision.
143    It follows that, in the present case, even supposing that the AECE infringed the principle that action must be taken within a reasonable time, such a circumstance cannot, in itself, justify annulment of the contested decision.
144    In any event, as regards, first, the alleged delay in opening the administrative inquiry, it should be noted that that inquiry was opened on 24 July 2018, that is to say, more than two months after the submission on 8 May 2018 of the request for assistance. However, account must be taken of the fact that on 26 June 2018 a meeting with the applicant was arranged by IDOC, following which, on 5 July 2018, the applicant submitted additional evidence. In the light of those circumstances and the need to examine the new evidence, submitted 20 days before the opening of the investigation, the period between the submission of the request for assistance and the opening of the investigation does not appear unreasonable. In addition, it should be noted that the applicant was also kept informed of the progress of the procedure by means of a note sent to her on 3 September 2018.
145    As regards, secondly, the duration of the administrative procedure as a whole, it must be stated that the period of more than 16 months between the submission of the request for assistance and the adoption of the contested decision cannot be regarded as unreasonable in the light of all the allegations, the high number of witnesses heard, the established facts which the AECE was required to analyse and the volume of evidence submitted. It is apparent from the file that IDOC devoted the period between October 2018 and January 2019 to the hearing of various witnesses, the applicant and A, with an appropriate period between the various hearings. The period of four months which elapsed between the last hearing, namely that of A on 15 January 2019, and the note sent to the applicant on 14 May 2019, inviting her to submit her observations on the facts established concerning A, does not appear unreasonable, particularly in view of the fact that the applicant submitted new evidence on 5 and 7 April 2019. Similarly, the time which elapsed until the final investigation report of IDOC was sent to the AECE on 24 June 2019, which was followed, nine days later, by the adoption of the decision to close the inquiry without further action, appears justified in the light of all the allegations, the high number of witnesses heard, the facts to be assessed and the volume of evidence submitted.
146    It follows, therefore, that neither the period for opening the administrative investigation nor the duration of the administrative procedure as a whole can establish in the present case an infringement of the principle that the administration must act within a reasonable time.
147    The second part of the fourth ground of appeal is therefore ineffective and, in any event, unfounded.
148    Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be rejected in its entirety and, accordingly, the claim for annulment rejected.
The claim for damages
149    The applicant claims that the Tribunal should order the EEAS to pay damages in the amount of EUR 15 000 by way of fair compensation for the harassment allegedly suffered.
150    The EEAS contends that the claim for damages should be rejected.
151    Claims for compensation for material or non-material damage must be rejected where, as in the present case, they are closely associated with claims for annulment which have themselves been dismissed as unfounded (judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑570/16, EU:T:2017:283, paragraph 69; see also, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 129).
152    Since the application for annulment of the contested decision must be rejected, the claim for damages must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
The request for examination of a witness
153    The applicant requests, by way of the measures of inquiry referred to in Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure, that D, A’s assistant and one of her former colleagues, be heard as a witness.
154    In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it (see judgment of 22 November 2007, Sniace v Commission, C‑260/05 P, EU:C:2007:700, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
155    In that context, where a request for the examination of witnesses, made in the application, states precisely the facts and reasons in respect of which the witness or witnesses should be examined, it falls to the Court to assess the relevance of the request having regard to the subject matter of the dispute and the need to examine the witnesses named (see judgment of 26 January 2017, Duravit and Others v Commission, C‑609/13 P, EU:C:2017:46, paragraph 109 and the case-law cited).
156    In the present case, there is no need to proceed with the witness examination requested by the applicant.
157    First, the request for the examination of witnesses referred to in paragraph 21 above was not submitted until after the closure of the written part of the procedure and the applicant has not provided any argument to justify that late request.
158    Secondly, the applicant does not state with the necessary precision the matters on which the witness should be examined, but merely states in general terms that D’s testimony is crucial and would enlighten the Court, in so far as that witness was present when some of the harassment of which she complains occurred.
159    Thirdly, it must be pointed out that the information in the file and the explanations given at the hearing are sufficient to enable the Court to rule on the forms of order sought, the latter having been able to rule on the heads of claim, pleas in law and arguments put forward during the proceedings, and on the basis of the documents lodged by the parties.
Costs
160    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
161    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by EEAS.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders KU to pay the costs.
Svenningsen
Mac Eochaidh
Laitenberger
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 6 April 2022.
E. Coulon
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.
1      Confidential data omitted