62024CC0129
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
MEDINA
delivered on 27 March 2025 (
1
)
Case C‑129/24
Coillte Cuideachta Ghníomhaíochta Ainmnithe
v
Commissioner for Environmental Information,
joined parties:
Person(s) unknown AKA John and/or Jane Doe,
Ireland,
Attorney General,
Right to Know CLG
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland))
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Environment – Aarhus Convention – Directive 2003/4/EC – Public access to environmental information – Access to environmental information upon request – Concepts of ‘applicant’ and ‘request’ – Anonymous or pseudonymous request – Requirement that applicants provide their actual name and a current physical address – Invalidity of the request – Refusal of the request where it is manifestly unreasonable)
I. Introduction
1.
The right of access to environmental information is the first of the three pillars underpinning the Aarhus Convention, (
2
) together with the right to public participation and access to justice. (
3
) The ultimate objective of those rights is to enable every citizen to ‘assert’ the ‘right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, and [to observe] the duty, both individually and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations’. (
4
) The Aarhus Convention has a ‘dual identity’, (
5
) linking environmental rights and human rights. (
6
) Its ‘pillars’ are ‘mutually supportive’; (
7
) the right of access to environmental information is a precondition for the other rights to operate. (
8
)
2.
The first recital of Directive 2003/4 (
9
) reflects the importance of the right to information and expresses the aspiration that ‘increased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of such information [will] contribute to a greater awareness of environmental matters … and, eventually, to a better environment’.
3.
The present case concerns the question whether access to environmental information can, as a general rule, be subject to the requirement that applicants provide their name and physical address. The present case also raises the issue of the safeguards available to the public authorities when dealing with requests which they deem to be frivolous or vexatious.
II. Legal framework
A.
International law
4.
Article 4(1)(a) of the Aarhus Convention states:
‘(1)   Each party shall ensure that, subject to the following paragraphs of this article, public authorities, in response to a request for environmental information, make such information available to the public, within the framework of national legislation, including, where requested and subject to subparagraph (b) below, copies of the actual documentation containing or comprising such information:
(a)
without an interest having to be stated’.
B.
European Union law
5.
According Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4, ‘“applicant” shall mean any natural or legal person requesting environmental information.’
6.
Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4, entitled ‘Access to environmental information upon request’, states:
‘Member States shall ensure that public authorities are required, in accordance with the provisions of this Directive, to make available environmental information held by or for them to any applicant at his request and without his having to state an interest.’
C.
Irish law
7.
Article 6 of the European Communities (Access to Information on the Environment) Regulations 2007 to 2014 (‘the AIE Regulations’) states:
‘6. (1) A request for environmental information shall –
…
(c)
state the name, address and any other relevant contact details of the applicant …
…
(2) An applicant shall not be required to state his or her interest in making the request.’
III. Succinct presentation of the dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
8.
Between 13 March and 30 May 2022, a requester or requesters (probably one but possibly more than one) engaged in a sustained exercise of writing to Coillte (Ireland’s semi-state forestry company), in the form of a very large number of probably anonymous or pseudonymous requests in identical or near-identical format, seeking access to information on the environment. No physical addresses were provided. The names were inspired by film characters.
9.
Earlier requests using some of the names used by the applicants in these proceedings had been processed in the normal way by Coillte because, at that juncture, they appeared to be one-off requests. However, when anonymous requests of a similar style and type and with similar phraseology began to arrive from 20 March 2022, Coillte became aware of what appears to be part of an organised campaign and took steps to verify the identity of the requesters.
10.
Coillte formed the view, reasonably, in the opinion of the referring court, that those requests are not designed to elicit environmental information and appear to be a part of a wider campaign conducted by persons unknown for questionable motives. The campaign had very significant implications for Coillte’s operations and had the effect of diverting time and resources away from genuine requests for environmental information with attendant delays and frustration for genuine applicants for environmental information.
11.
Coillte replied to those requests by seeking a (current) address from the applicants and confirmation that the names were the applicants’ actual (legal) names. The referring court finds that Coillte formed the view, which was reasonable in the circumstances, that there was a prima facie question as to the genuineness of the identity information provided by the applicants. The referring court further finds that, given the number of requests made, the public authority concerned acted reasonably for the purposes of determining whether the requests were manifestly unreasonable by reference to the volume, nature and frequency of other requests made by the same applicant.
12.
The referring court finds that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the confirmation sought by Coillte of the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address was for the purpose of verifying the applicant’s identity, rather than for the purpose of determining the applicant’s interest.
13.
Since none of the information requested by Coillte was provided, the latter rejected the requests as invalid under Article 6(1)(c) of the AIE Regulations.
14.
The requesters then issued a request to Coillte to carry out an internal review. Coillte asked the requesters to confirm their actual legal names and to state their current addresses. As those requests for confirmation were again ignored, the requests for internal review were rejected as invalid.
15.
Several of the various refusals of the requests for information were appealed against to the Commissioner for Environmental Information (Ireland) (‘the Commissioner’). The Commissioner issued a decision on 29 August 2022 (‘the contested decision’), finding that he had jurisdiction to consider the appeals and that Coillte was not justified in treating the anonymous or pseudonymous requests as invalid under Article 6(1)(c) of the AIE Regulations.
16.
Coillte lodged an appeal on a point of law before the referring court against the contested decision.
17.
Ireland and the Attorney General were joined to the legal proceedings and Right to Know CLG (‘Right to Know’) was added as an amicus curiae.
18.
The referring court seeks to clarify the interpretation of the term ‘request’ in Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/4 and of the term ‘applicant’ in Article 2(5) of that directive.
19.
As regards the term ‘request’, the referring court points out that, according to Article 6 of the AIE Regulations, a request for environmental information must comply with certain formal requirements including stating a name and address. A request which does not comply with those formalities must be considered to be invalid. The referring court thus takes the view that the term ‘request’ can mean only a valid request which complies with Directive 2003/4 and with national transposing legislation.
20.
As regards the term ‘applicant’, the referring court considers that it means a natural or legal person identified by that person’s current legal name and physical address, as opposed to an anonymous or pseudonymous person. It states that the fact that Directive 2003/4 confers rights on natural and legal persons implies that the applicant must furnish an actual name and a physical address in order to establish entitlement to be treated as an applicant. The absence of that information can also lead to an unsatisfactory outcome when a dispute comes before a court, as has occurred in the case of the interested parties, who or which are not identifiable by the minimum information required to participate in proceedings.
21.
The referring court asks whether, were the Court to find that an ‘applicant’, within the meaning of Directive 2003/4, is not required to be identified, that directive precludes national legislation which requires applicants to furnish their names and/or a current physical address in order to make a request. The referring court takes the view that, in accordance with the principle of national procedural autonomy, a Member State may opt to transpose Directive 2003/4 in a manner that requires requesters to identify themselves so that the public authority is able to verify that they are the natural or legal persons on whom the rights of applicants are conferred.
22.
The referring court wishes to ascertain whether, were the Court to find that national legislation requiring that applicants be identified is precluded by Directive 2003/4, a public authority may nevertheless seek confirmation of the applicant’s name and/or a current physical address where it has reasonable grounds to suspect that the information provided is false or incomplete. The fact that such information could conceivably result in speculation as to the interest of the requester should not be relevant.
23.
Finally, the referring court is uncertain whether the authority may ask for information on the identity of the applicant for the purposes of determining whether a given request is manifestly unreasonable by reference to the volume, nature and frequency of other requests made by the same applicant.
24.
In those circumstances, the High Court (Ireland) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)
Does the word “request” in Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/4 read in the light of Article 4(1) of the [Aarhus Convention] mean only a request that is valid by reference to the Directive and by reference to the transposing domestic law of the [M]ember [S]tate concerned?
(2)
Does the word “applicant” in Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4 read in the light of inter alia Article 4(1)(b) and/or Article 6(1) and/or (2) and/or Articles 2(5) and 4(1) and (3)(b) of the [Aarhus Convention] mean a natural or legal person identified by their actual name and/or a current physical address, as opposed to an anonymous or pseudonymous person and/or an applicant whose contact details are identified by email only?
(3)
If the answer to the second question is No, does Article 3(1) and/or (5)(c) of Directive 2003/4 read in the light of Article 4(1) of the [Aarhus Convention] have the effect of precluding national legislation that requires an applicant to furnish his or her actual name and/or current physical address in order to make a request?
(4)
If the answer to the second question is No, and the answer to the third question in general is Yes, does Directive 2003/4 read in the light of Article 4 of the [Aarhus Convention] have the effect that where a public authority forms the reasonable view that there is a prima facie question over the genuineness of information regarding his or her identity provided by an applicant, the public authority is precluded from seeking confirmation as to the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address, for the purpose of verifying the identity of the applicant, and not for the purpose of determining the interest of the applicant, even if the provision of the actual name and/or current physical address of an applicant could indirectly create the potential for inference or speculation on the part of the public authority or otherwise as to the interest if any of the applicant referred to in Article 3(1) of the Directive?
(5)
If the answer to the second question is No, and the answer to the third question in general is Yes, does Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive read in the light of Article 4(3)(b) of the [Aarhus Convention] have the effect that a public authority is precluded from seeking confirmation as to the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address, for the purposes of determining whether a given request is manifestly unreasonable by reference to the volume, nature and frequency of other requests made by the same applicant, and not for the purpose of determining the interest of the applicant, even if the provision of the actual name and/or current physical address of an applicant could indirectly create the potential for inference or speculation on the part of the public authority or otherwise as to the interest if any of the applicant referred to in Article 3(1) of the Directive?’
25.
Coillte, the Commissioner, the Czech and Italian Governments, Ireland and the European Commission submitted written observations.
IV. Assessment
A.
Introductory observations
26.
First of all, it should be recalled that, by becoming a party to the Aarhus Convention, the European Union undertook to ensure, within the scope of EU law, a general principle of access to environmental information held by public authorities. (
10
)
27.
As recital 5 of Directive 2003/4 confirms, in adopting that directive the EU legislature intended to ensure the compatibility of EU law with that Convention in view of its conclusion by the European Union, by providing for a general scheme to ensure that any natural or legal person in a Member State has a right of access to environmental information held by or on behalf of the public authorities, without that person having to state an interest. (
11
)
28.
It follows that, for the purposes of interpreting Directive 2003/4, account is to be taken of the wording and aim of the Aarhus Convention, which that directive is designed to implement in EU law. (
12
)
29.
Moreover, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide may be regarded as an explanatory document, capable of being taken into consideration if appropriate among other relevant material for the purpose of interpreting that convention, even if the observations in the guide have no binding force and do not have the normative effect of the provisions of the convention. (
13
)
B.
The first question
30.
By its first question, the referring court asks in essence whether the term ‘request’ in Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention, must be interpreted as meaning only a request that is valid by reference to that directive and by reference to the transposing national legislation of the Member State concerned.
31.
Under Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/4, Member States must ensure that any ‘applicant who considers that his request for information has been ignored, wrongfully refused … inadequately answered or otherwise not dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3, 4 or 5, has access to a procedure in which the acts or omissions of the public authority concerned can be reconsidered by that or another public authority or reviewed administratively by an independent and impartial body established by law’.
32.
It is clear from the scheme of Directive 2003/4, as the Commission observed in essence, that the expression ‘request for information’ in Article 6(1) of that directive concerns a ‘request’ submitted under Article 3 of that directive.
33.
In accordance with Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4, environmental information held by public authorities is to be made available ‘to any applicant at his request and without his having to state an interest’.
34.
Directive 2003/4 neither defines the word ‘request’ nor imposes specific validity requirements in Article 3 for the submission of a request by an applicant.
35.
However, according to settled case-law, the right of access guaranteed by Directive 2003/4 applies only to the extent that the information requested satisfies the requirements for public access laid down by that directive, which presupposes, inter alia, that the information is ‘environmental information’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the directive. (
14
)
36.
The request must therefore satisfy the general requirements laid down in Article 3 for the right of access to apply, which presupposes that the request must be made by an ‘applicant’, to a ‘public authority’ and must seek to obtain ‘environmental information’ which is ‘held by or for’ the public authority. The meanings of those terms are defined in Article 2 of Directive 2003/4.
37.
In other respects, neither Article 2(5) nor Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4 imposes conditions relating to form or validity for the submission of a request. The term ‘request’ must be understood broadly as any request submitted in accordance with Article 3(1) of that directive.
38.
The need to understand the term ‘request’ broadly is confirmed by Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention, which obliges the parties to ensure that they make environmental information available to the public in response to a request for environmental information within the framework of national legislation. According to the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, ‘a “request” can be any communication by a member of the public to a public authority asking for environmental information’. (
15
) That guide also notes that ‘the convention does not specify the form of the request, thus implying that any request meeting the requirements of article 4, whether oral or written, will be considered to be such under the Convention’. (
16
)
39.
The issues raised by the first question are whether Member States can impose validity requirements for the submission of a request and whether they can render the right of access to justice under Article 6 of Directive 2003/4 subject to those requirements.
40.
In the first place, it must be pointed out that according to Article 3(5)(c) of Directive 2003/4, for the purposes of the exercise of the right of access to environmental information upon request, Member States are to ensure that ‘the practical arrangements are defined’ for ensuring that that right can be effectively exercised. Examples of such ‘practical arrangements’ include the designation of information officers, the establishment and maintenance of facilities for the examination of the information required and registers or lists of the environmental information held by public authorities or information points. Recital 15 of that directive states that ‘these arrangements shall guarantee that the information is effectively and easily accessible and progressively becomes available to the public’. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 3(5) refer to the obligation of Member States to ensure that officials support the public in seeking access to information and to ensure that lists of public authorities are publicly accessible. Moreover, according to the last subparagraph of Article 3(5), Member States must ensure that public authorities inform the public adequately of the rights they enjoy and to an appropriate extent provide information, guidance and advice to that end.
41.
Within the context of Article 3(5) of Directive 2003/4, the obligation to ensure the ‘practical arrangements’ for the effective exercise of the right of access to environmental information forms part of the duty of public authorities to facilitate use of their rights by the public. (
17
)
42.
Accordingly, the obligation set out in Article 3(5) of Directive 2003/4, to establish ‘practical arrangements’ for exercise of the right to request information differs from any establishment of validity requirements. Indeed, while ‘practical arrangements’ are intended to facilitate access to information, validity requirements are formalities or prerequisites with which the applicant must comply in order to obtain access to the relevant information.
43.
Although national legislation may lay down the framework for submitting and processing a request, the relevant rules may not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objective of Article 3(5) of Directive 2003/4, namely to safeguard easy and effective access to environmental information.
44.
In the second place, it follows from Article 6 of Directive 2003/4 that an act or omission of the public authority must be amenable to administrative and judicial review if the ‘request for information has been ignored, wrongfully refused (whether in full or in part), inadequately answered or otherwise not dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article 3, 4 or 5’.
45.
Thus, exercise of the right of access to justice does not depend on whether the public authority considers that the request is valid or that the conditions of implementation of the right to environmental information in national law are met. Whether or not there is a ‘request’ under Directive 2003/4 is – as is the case with all the other material conditions for a right of access to environmental information to arise – a matter that must be amenable to administrative and judicial review pursuant to Article 6 of that directive. It falls to the body responsible to ascertain whether a request for environmental information complies with the conditions set out in Article 3(1) of that directive.
46.
Were that not so, the right of access to justice and the jurisdiction conferred by Article 6 of Directive 2003/4 on the independent and impartial bodies established by law and the courts of law would depend on the interpretation of the conditions for access to environmental information followed by the national authorities. As the Commissioner submitted, the mechanism for ensuring access to justice could be undermined by the simple act of a public authority deeming a request to be invalid.
47.
In view of the foregoing, I consider that the term ‘request’ in Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention, must be interpreted as meaning a request that is submitted pursuant to Article 3(1) of that directive. The issue of whether a request falls within the scope of the latter provision must be amenable to administrative and judicial review pursuant to Article 6 of Directive 2003/4.
C.
The second question
48.
By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the word ‘applicant’ in Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Articles 2 and 4 of the Aarhus Convention, means a natural or legal person identified by that person’s actual name and/or a current physical address, as opposed to an anonymous or pseudonymous person and/or an applicant whose contact details are identified by email only.
49.
According to Article 2(5), the ‘applicant’ is ‘any natural or legal person requesting environmental information’.
50.
Pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4, public authorities are required to make environmental information held by or for them available to ‘any applicant at his request and without his having to state an interest’.
51.
The question arises of whether the concept of ‘applicant’ entails identification of the natural or legal persons by their actual name or whether it may also cover anonymous or pseudonymous applicants.
52.
It must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the need for the uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union. (
18
)
53.
It is necessary, in order to interpret a provision of EU law, to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part. (
19
)
54.
As regards the wording of Article 2(5), that provision classifies ‘any natural or legal person’ as an applicant. It does not specify that such natural or legal persons must be identified by their actual legal name and/or current physical address.
55.
The referring court considers that the conferral of rights on natural and legal persons implies that the applicant must furnish an actual name and/or a physical address in order to establish entitlement to be treated as an applicant.
56.
Coillte, the Czech and Italian Governments and Ireland endorse that view. They argue that only a person identified by that person’s name and address can make a request for environmental information. This is because the public authorities must be able to confirm the status of the person making the request, for which purpose the easiest and most obvious mechanism is a requirement to provide an actual name and/or a current physical address.
57.
By contrast, the Commissioner and Right to Know assert that the word ‘applicant’, in the absence of any reference to the identity of the applicant, does not entail a requirement for identification.
58.
The Commission submits that the reference to a ‘person’ in Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4 presupposes that such a person really exists and precludes a fictive person from making a request under that directive and from benefiting from its provisions. The Commission proposes also taking into consideration those ways in which environmental information can be made available which do not always require identification of the applicant.
59.
In my view, the requirement for identification of the applicant is not inherent in the concept of ‘applicant’. As the Commission observed in essence, the fact that a person is identifiable under Article 2(5) does not mean that identification is required under that provision. Indeed, it is one thing to accept that the applicant must really exist, as opposed to being an automated bot or a fictitious person. It is quite another to assume that that applicant must, as a matter of course, provide identity details in order to exercise the right conferred by Article 3(1) and be subject systematically to verification of identity.
60.
Therefore, as put by the Commission, as far as the definition of the ‘applicant’ within the meaning of Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4 is concerned, the mere existence of a natural or legal person is sufficient for that person to enjoy the rights under the directive.
61.
The foregoing is without prejudice to the margin of discretion that Member States enjoy to provide for situations in which it is necessary to identify the applicant, as will be discussed further in detail below in relation to the third, fourth and fifth questions.
62.
The Aarhus Convention, likewise, does not specify that applicants for environmental information must be identified in order to exercise their right of access to that information. The Aarhus Convention does not contain a definition of the term ‘applicant’. According to Article 4(1) of that convention, public authorities make environmental information available ‘to the public’ in response to a request for environmental information. According to Article 2(4), ‘the public’ means ‘one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legislation and practice, their associations, organisations or groups’. That broad definition of ‘the public’ is interpreted in the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide as applying the ‘any person’ principle. (
20
)
63.
As observed in the legal literature, (
21
) the absence of any requirement in the Aarhus Convention to provide identifying information when making a request and the absence of any requirement to state an interest entail that public authorities must adopt an ‘applicant blind’ approach. According to that approach ‘nobody – individuals, NGOs or others – requesting environmental information needs to identify themselves or justify their request’. (
22
)
64.
One of the reasons why the referring court considers that identification might be necessary is that it allows it to be verified that the applicants are the natural or legal persons on whom rights of applicants are conferred, as opposed, more particularly, to unincorporated bodies. Coillte shares that view as well as a number of the interested parties, including the Czech Government, which submits that Directive 2003/4 and the Aarhus Convention link the right to environmental information to the applicant’s legal personality.
65.
In that regard, it must be pointed out that it follows from recital 2 of Directive 2003/4 that it ‘expands the existing access granted under Directive 90/313/EEC’. (
23
) Under Directive 90/313 it was emphasized in the legal literature that the personal scope of the right to environmental information is broad and that it must be understood as including ‘practically everyone’, with no requirement for a specific legal form. (
24
) A broad understanding of the personal scope of the right to environmental information is supported by the aims of public access to environmental information which is, according to recital 1 of Directive 2003/4 ‘to contribute to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment’. Commentators have observed that Directive 2003/4 ‘placed access to information in the context of a human right’ and that therefore ‘the right was given not just to citizens of the Union, but to everybody, including associations’. (
25
)
66.
Moreover, according to Article 3(5)(a) of Directive 2003/4 officials are required to support ‘the public in seeking access to information’. Article 2(6) of that directive defines ‘the public’ as ‘one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organisations or groups’. It follows from a combined reading of those two provisions that natural or legal persons and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organisations, or groups must be able to seek access to environmental information.
67.
The requirement under Article 3(5)(a) of Directive 2003/4 for officials to support ‘the public’ in seeking access to information would be meaningless if certain categories of the ‘public’ and in particular associations that have no legal personality were denied any right to seek access to environmental information upon request pursuant to Article 3(1) of that directive.
68.
Moreover, as stated in the introductory observations above, for the purposes of interpreting Directive 2003/4, account is to be taken of the wording and aim of the Aarhus Convention, which that directive is designed to implement in EU law. (
26
) It that regard, it must be recalled that the Aarhus Convention follows the ‘any person’ principle with regard to the right of access to environmental information. (
27
)‘The public’ under the Aarhus Convention covers, specifically_‘associations, organisations or groups’ of natural or legal persons ‘in accordance with national legislation or practice’. Any requirements set by national law must meet the objective of the Aarhus Convention of ensuring ‘broad access’ to the rights it confers. (
28
) An interpretation that would allow the authorities to refuse the right to environmental information solely on the basis of the legal personality of the applicants would be liable to undermine that principle.
69.
In any event, individual natural persons who are members of an association that is not (yet) incorporated obviously have the right to request access to information. (
29
)
70.
Accordingly, to the extent that everyone has the right of access to environmental information, the verification of the legal status of the ‘applicant’ alone may not be a reason for requiring identification of the applicant.
71.
As regards the context of the term ‘applicant’, it must be recalled that pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4 public authorities are required, in accordance with that directive, to make environmental information available ‘to any applicant at his request and without his having to state an interest’. It follows from recital 8 of that directive that any natural or legal person has a right of access to environmental information without his or her having to state an interest.
72.
The right of ‘any’ applicant to request environmental information and the corresponding duty of the authorities to provide that information complements the proactive duty of the authorities to provide information which flows from Article 7 of Directive 2003/4. According to Article 1(b) of that directive, the proactive duty is intended to ensure that ‘as a matter of course, environmental information is progressively made available and disseminated to the public in order to achieve the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination to the public of environmental information’. Moreover, according to recital 9 of that directive, public authorities are to make available and disseminate environmental information to the general public ‘to the widest extent possible, in particular by using information and communication technologies’.
73.
It follows from Article 7 of Directive 2003/4, read in conjunction with Article 1(b) and in the light of recital 9 thereof, that environmental information must be ‘made available’‘as a matter of course’ to the public and ‘to the widest extent possible’, with the effect that the public does not even have to request that information. The expression ‘made available’ is sufficiently broad to include a variety of methods of making the information available. As Right to Know has argued, environmental information can be made available to an applicant at the offices of a public authority (either by inspection or by collection), via a website or by making it available for collection by an agent. In none of those situations is there any obvious reason why natural or legal persons wishing to exercise their right of access to environmental information must first identify themselves. Moreover, Directive 2003/4 does not specify the channel through which the information must be ‘made available’. The information can therefore be sent, for example, to the email address of the applicant if the applicant has contacted the administration using that means.
74.
The general duty of public authorities proactively to disseminate information to the public supports the interpretation according to which, when a member of the public seeks access to environmental information upon request, there is no specific requirement to provide identity information.
75.
Coillte, Ireland and the Czech Government argue that Article 6 of Directive 2003/4 supports the conclusion that the term ‘applicant’ requires identification of the applicant. In their view, to the extent that an applicant may seek an administrative review of a decision refusing a request for information, pursuant to Article 6(1), and a review before a court of law, pursuant to Article 6(2), the applicant must be identified when requesting environmental information.
76.
I am not convinced by the parallel drawn between the requirements for exercise of the right to environmental information and the procedure governing the bringing of an appeal before an administrative authority or an action for judicial review. The requirements laid down for the exercise of each of those rights must be examined separately. Recognising the possibility of submitting an anonymous request under Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4 would be, however, without prejudice to the rules that Member States may lay down for exercise of the right to an administrative review or judicial review. The rules established by Member States for enforcement of the right of access to environmental information fall under the principle of procedural autonomy, subject to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and the right to an effective remedy before an impartial tribunal, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (
30
)
77.
Nor am I convinced by the parallel drawn by the Commission between the scheme at issue and that applicable to public access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. (
31
) First, the scope of the beneficiaries of the right of access to documents under Regulation No 1049/2001 is more restrictive than the scope of the beneficiaries of the right to environmental information set out in Directive 2003/4. Indeed, according to Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the right of access to documents applies to ‘any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State’. There are no such qualifications of the scope of the beneficiaries of the right of access to environmental information. Second, public access to environmental information held by the EU institutions is governed by Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006. (
32
) That regulation, as observed in the academic literature, (
33
)‘extends the beneficiaries of the access right’ under Article 2 of Regulation No 1049/2001 by recognising an applicant as having a right of access to environmental information ‘without discrimination as to citizenship, nationality or domicile and, in the case of a legal person, without discrimination as to where it has its registered seat or an effective centre of its activities’. (
34
)
78.
In view of the differences in the scope of the beneficiaries, it is therefore inappropriate to impose a requirement that applicants under Directive 2003/4 be identified on the basis of the requirements set out in Regulation No 1049/2001.
79.
As regards the objectives of Directive 2003/4, according to Article 1(a) thereof, that directive seeks to guarantee the right of access to environmental information held by or for public authorities. That right, as follows from recital 1 of that directive and as already pointed out in point 65 above, contributes to ‘more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment’. Moreover, it follows from recital 2 of that directive that the right of public access to environmental information is part of ‘a process of change’ in relation to ‘openness and transparency’. (
35
) It also follows from recital 16 of that directive that the disclosure of information serves the public interest. Consequently, the right of access to information enabling disclosure serves a public interest purpose and does not depend on the interest of the particular individual requesting the disclosure. For that reason, and as is explicitly provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4, applicants do not have to state an interest.
80.
The fact that applicants can seek environmental information without having to identify themselves supports the objective of wide access to environmental information and transparency. Preserving anonymity may be particularly important, as the Commissioner and Right to Know have submitted in essence, for certain applicants where the inclusion of their legal name and address can indirectly reveal their interest in making the request. (
36
) The absence of a requirement of identification is also consistent with the public interest purpose of the right to information. (
37
)
81.
Coillte and a number of the interested parties have warned of the risk of artificial intelligence generating and sending access requests automatically. Such a risk, serious though it may be, does not appear to be inherent in anonymous requests. It relates rather to the use of information society means for communicating with the public authorities (as opposed to requests submitted physically). In order to prevent that risk, it is incumbent on the Member State to implement the necessary appropriate technical safeguards to ensure that the authorities process only requests which originate from a person rather than from an automated bot. (
38
)
82.
The governments that submitted written observations and Ireland have also warned of the risk of abuse as the result of anonymous or pseudonymous requests. It must be recalled that, according to Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4, Member States can refuse ‘manifestly unreasonable’ requests for environmental information. That ground of refusal is sufficiently broad to allow the public authority to refuse a request that is vexatious or that is designed to cause harassment or disruption. As I shall discuss below in relation to the fifth question, in the context of applying that exception, the public authorities may ask for identification.
83.
Thus, abuse of the right to information may lead to a request being refused, but it does not justify a restrictive interpretation of the term ‘applicant’.
84.
I conclude that it follows from the wording, context and purpose of Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4 that the concept of ‘applicant’ does not require the identification of the natural or legal person requesting environmental information in accordance with Article 3(1) of that directive.
85.
In view of the foregoing, I consider that the word ‘applicant’ in Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Articles 2 and 4 of the Aarhus Convention, must be interpreted as meaning that is not limited to a natural or legal person identified by that person’s actual name and/or a current physical address but also includes an anonymous or pseudonymous person and/or an applicant whose contact details are identified by email only.
D.
The third and fourth questions
86.
By its third and fourth questions, which must be examined together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires that applicants furnish their name and physical address in order to make a request for environmental information and as precluding the public authority from verifying the identity of the applicant, even when there is doubt as to the genuineness of the identifying information provided by the applicant.
87.
It will be necessary to answer that question if the Court follows the answer I propose to the second question.
88.
Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4, which as pointed out above lays down the obligation of public authorities to ‘make available environmental information held by or for them to any applicant at his request and without his having to state an interest’, corresponds to Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention. The latter provision obliges public authorities to provide environmental information to the public in response to a request for such information.
89.
As pointed out above in the answer to the second question, Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4 does not entail an inherent requirement for the applicant to provide identity details.
90.
The question raised is whether Member States can lay down such a requirement to provide identification in their national legislation.
91.
It follows from Article 288 TFEU that Member States, when transposing a directive, retain a broad discretion as to the choice of ways and means of ensuring that it is implemented. That freedom of choice does not affect the obligation imposed on all Member States to which the directive is addressed to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive concerned is fully effective in accordance with the objective which it seeks to attain. (
39
)
92.
As regards implementation of the right of access to environmental information, Article 3(5) of Directive 2003/4 states specifically that Member States are to define ‘the practical arrangements’ in order to ensure that that right ‘can be effectively exercised’. As pointed out above, (
40
) the objective of those practical arrangements is to facilitate the exercise of the right.
93.
The Aarhus Convention provides in Article 4(1) that public authorities are to make environmental information available ‘within the framework of national legislation’. According to the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, that means that ‘national legislation should set out a framework for the process of answering information requests in accordance with the [Aarhus] Convention’. (
41
) For the purposes of implementation of the right to environmental information, EU law, and more particularly Directive 2003/4, is considered to be part of the national law of the Member States. (
42
)
94.
It follows from Article 3(5) of Directive 2003/4 and Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention that in the context of defining the practical arrangements for the effective exercise of the right to environmental information, Member States have discretion to determine the framework of the process for submitting and answering requests for information.
95.
In that context, in the first place, identification of the applicant might be necessary in order for the authorities to answer the request. Public authorities might, for instance, require the applicant’s name and postal address if the applicant provides no other contact details.
96.
The identity details of the applicant may also be necessary where information is supplied subject to a (reasonable) charge, in accordance with Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4. (
43
)
97.
In the second place, identity details might be necessary when the request for information falls within one of the exceptions under Article 4 of Directive 2003/4.
98.
Article 4 of that directive specifically sets out the exceptions which Member States may establish to the right of access to environmental information. In so far as such exceptions have in fact been transposed into national law, it is permissible for the public authorities to rely on them in order to oppose requests for information that they receive. (
44
)
99.
Those exceptions cover, inter alia, a request which is manifestly unreasonable, a request concerning material in the course of completion, internal communications and situations in which the disclosure of information would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, international relations, public security or national defence, the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information or the confidentiality of personal data.
100.
The second subparagraph of Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/4 states that in every particular case, the public interest served by disclosure must be weighed against the interest served by the refusal. Accordingly, the refusal of access to environmental information on the grounds set out in Article 4 must always be founded on a weighing up of the interests involved.
101.
It is clear from the Court’s case-law that the interests must be weighed on the basis of an actual and specific examination of each situation brought before the competent authorities in connection with a request for access to environmental information made on the basis of Directive 2003/4. (
45
)
102.
Since the examination of a request for access must take account of the specific interests involved in each particular case, the public authority is also required to examine any particulars provided by the applicant as to the grounds that may justify disclosure of the information sought. (
46
)
103.
Moreover, according to Article 4(5) of Directive 2003/4 a refusal to make information available is to be ‘notified’ to the applicant in writing or electronically, if the request was in writing or if the applicant so requests. The notification must state the reasons for the refusal. Where a refusal is notified, the public authority no longer makes information available. It instead adopts an administrative decision for which the identity details of the applicant may be required. (
47
)
104.
It is apparent that, in the context of applying an exception to the right of access to information, the authority must engage with the applicant in a way that differs from simply making information available. In such situations, Member States might consider it necessary to require identification of the applicant. (
48
)
105.
However, where an applicant requests environmental information and provides contact details and the authority can make the information available without any particular engagement with the applicant and without applying an exception, the identification of the applicant does not appear to be a necessary requirement for exercise of the right of access. There is no apparent reason why, for example, a person who wishes to have access to the registers or lists of environmental information established and maintained under Article 3(5) of Directive 2003/4 or who is present in situ at a facility for the examination of environmental information must first identify him- or herself. The same applies, for instance, to a person who sends an email signed using a pseudonym, requesting environmental information. (
49
)
106.
As the Commissioner and Right to Know have argued in essence, systematically requiring all applicants for environmental information to identify themselves could dissuade certain persons from seeking information. As pointed out above in the answer to the first question, for certain applicants, their name could be a proxy for their interest and having to reveal it could amount to a requirement to state their interest, contrary to Directive 2003/4 and the Aarhus Convention. Those interested parties specifically emphasised the risk of harassment for persons exercising their right to environmental information, a risk that is not theoretical or abstract particularly where economic interests are at stake. The ‘applicant blind’ approach as well as the ‘motive blind’ approach can prevent the risk of retribution referred to in Article 3(8) of the Aarhus Convention. (
50
)
107.
Since identification of the applicant cannot be required as a general requirement for the exercise of the right to access to environmental information, doubts as to the genuineness of the identifying information provided by the applicant are not an appropriate ground on which the administration can seek confirmation of the applicant’s identity. The foregoing is, however, as will be discussed under the fifth question below, without prejudice to the situation in which confirmation is sought in order to determine whether a request is manifestly unreasonable, in accordance with Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4.
108.
In the light of the foregoing, I take the view that Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires, as a general rule, that applicants furnish their name and physical address in order to make a request for environmental information, even when there is doubt as to the genuineness of the identifying information provided by the applicant. The foregoing applies provided that identification is not necessary in order to answer the request and that no derogation is applicable under Article 4 of that directive.
E.
The fifth question
109.
By its fifth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Article 4(3)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, must be interpreted as meaning that a public authority is precluded from seeking confirmation of the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address for the purposes of determining whether a given request is manifestly unreasonable by reference to the volume, nature and frequency of other requests made by the same applicant.
110.
According to settled case-law, the right of access to environmental information provided for under Directive 2003/4 means that the disclosure of such information should be the general rule and that public authorities should be permitted to refuse a request for environmental information only in specific and clearly defined cases. The exceptions to the right of access should, consequently, be interpreted in a restrictive way, whereby the public interest served by disclosure should be weighed against the interest served by the refusal. (
51
)
111.
As pointed out above, (
52
) article 4 of that directive specifically sets out the exceptions which Member States may establish to the right of access to environmental information. In so far as such exceptions have in fact been transposed into national law, it is permissible for the public authorities to rely on them in order to oppose requests for information that they receive. (
53
)
112.
Thus, Member States may, pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4, provide for a request for environmental information to be refused if the request is ‘manifestly unreasonable’.
113.
The referring court asks specifically whether, in the context of applying that exception, public authorities may seek confirmation of the applicant’s identity and whether in determining the reasonableness of the request they may take into account the volume, nature and frequency of other requests made by the same applicant.
114.
It must be noted at the outset that certain language versions of the aforementioned provision employ the term ‘unreasonable’ (
54
) to describe a request while other language versions use the term ‘abusive’. (
55
) However, none of the language versions indicates specific criteria for assessing the manifest unreasonableness or abusive nature of the request.
115.
Article 4(3) of Directive 2003/4 establishes that where a Member State provides for exceptions, it may draw up a publicly accessible list of criteria on the basis of which the authority concerned may decide how to handle requests. (
56
)
116.
Member States therefore have discretion to determine the factors for the application of that ground of refusal.
117.
However, in so far as it constitutes an exception to the general rule that information must be provided, refusal on the ground of a manifestly unreasonable request must remain exceptional.
118.
To that effect, the standard for classifying a request as manifestly unreasonable must be high.
119.
In particular, with regard to the volume of the information requested, according to Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2003/4 that factor (as well as the complexity of the information requested) justifies an extension of the one-month time limit in which the administration must reply. It follows from a combined reading of Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2003/4 and Article 4(2)(b) of that directive that the volume of the requested information alone does not render a request manifestly unreasonable. (
57
)
120.
As regards the frequency of the requests, it must be recalled that the right of access to environmental information serves the general objective of contributing to a greater awareness of environmental matters. An applicant has the right to ask for environmental information from different authorities or from the same authority without limit as to the number of requests. The setting of an absolute numerical threshold, above which an application could be classified as manifestly unreasonable, would be liable to undermine the right to environmental information. (
58
)
121.
That said, according to settled case-law there is, in EU law, a general legal principle that EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends. (
59
) That general principle of law must be complied with by individuals, (
60
) including by applicants exercising their right to environmental information.
122.
The exception set out in Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4 reflects that case-law of the Court and confirms, as Ireland submitted, the importance of avoiding the abuse of the rights that directive confers.
123.
In order to find that a request is manifestly unreasonable, the authority in question must have regard to all the relevant circumstances of each case including the nature of the request and the source of the request. That is particularly the case, as the Czech Government has in essence pointed out, where the circumstances of the case show that the request is vexatious or frivolous, when it can cause harassment or disruption or when it reveals an intention on the part of the applicant or applicants to paralyse the functioning of the public authority by flooding it with requests. (
61
)
124.
In that context, confirmation of the applicant’s name and address might be necessary so that the authorities can notify to the applicant the reasons for the refusal to make available all or part of the information requested, as provided for in Article 4(5) of Directive 2003/4.
125.
It follows that determining whether a request is manifestly unreasonable depends not on the number, the nature or the frequency of requests taken in isolation, but on all the circumstances of each case. Those circumstances may include the use of a manifestly frivolous or vexatious pseudonym.
126.
In view of the above, I consider that Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Article 4(3)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, must be interpreted as meaning that a public authority is not precluded from seeking confirmation of the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address for the purposes of determining whether a given request is manifestly unreasonable by reference to the volume, nature and frequency of other requests made by the same applicant, to the extent that those criteria are not taken into account in isolation but in the context of an overall assessment of the circumstances of each case. That is especially so where the specific circumstances of the case show that the request is vexatious or frivolous, when it can cause harassment or disruption or when it reveals an intention on the part of the applicant or applicants to paralyse the functioning of the public authority.
V. Conclusion
127.
In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court of Justice answer the questions referred by the High Court (Ireland) as follows:
(1)
The term ‘request’ in Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC, read in the light of Article 4(1) of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, signed in Aarhus on 25 June 1998 and approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 (‘the Aarhus Convention’),
must be interpreted as meaning a request that is submitted pursuant to Article 3(1) of that directive. The issue of whether a request falls within the scope of the latter provision must be amenable to administrative and judicial pursuant to Article 6 of Directive 2003/4.
(2)
The word ‘applicant’ in Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Articles 2 and 4 of the Aarhus Convention,
must be interpreted as meaning that it is not limited to a natural or legal person identified by that person’s actual name and/or a current physical address but also includes an anonymous or pseudonymous person and/or an applicant whose contact details are identified by email only.
(3)
Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention,
must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires, as a general rule, that applicants furnish their name and physical address in order to make a request for environmental information, even when there is doubt as to the genuineness of the identifying information provided by the applicant. The foregoing applies provided that identification is not necessary in order to answer the request and that no derogation is applicable under Article 4 of that directive.
(4)
Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4, read in the light of Article 4(3)(b) of the Aarhus Convention,
must be interpreted as meaning that a public authority is not precluded from seeking confirmation of the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address for the purposes of determining whether a given request is manifestly unreasonable by reference to the volume, nature and frequency of other requests made by the same applicant, to the extent that those criteria are not taken into account in isolation but in the context of an overall assessment of the circumstances of each case. That is especially so where the specific circumstances of the case show that the request is vexatious or frivolous, when it can cause harassment or disruption or when it reveals an intention on the part of the applicant or applicants to paralyse the functioning of the public authority.
(
1
)	Original language: English.
(
2
)	Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, signed in Aarhus on 25 June 1998 and approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1; ‘the Aarhus Convention’).
(
3
)	See Ebbesson, J., et al., The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, 2nd edition, United Nations, Geneva, 2014, p. 19 (‘the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide’).
(
4
)	The Aarhus Convention, preamble, seventh and eighth paragraph.
(
5
)	Barritt, E., The Foundations of the Aarhus Convention, London, Hart Publishing, 2020, p. 5.
(
6
)	Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p. 15.
(
7
)	Whittaker, S., Reid, C.T. and Mendel, J., Freedom of Environmental Information: Aspirations and Practice, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2023, p. 38.
(
8
)	Access to and the provision of environmental information can be further justified by grounds such as the need to support sustainable development and improve the enforcement of environmental law. See, Bell, S. et al., Environmental Law, 9th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2024, p. 248.
(
9
)	Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC (OJ 2003 L 41, p. 26).
(
10
)	Judgment of 15 April 2021, Friends of the Irish Environment (C‑470/19, EU:C:2021:271, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
(
11
)	Judgment of 19 December 2013, Fish Legal and Shirley (C‑279/12, EU:C:2013:853, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
(
12
)	Judgment of 19 December 2013, Fish Legal and Shirley (C‑279/12, EU:C:2013:853, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
(
13
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2022, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (Approval of motor vehicles) (C‑873/19, EU:C:2022:857, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
(
14
)	Judgment of 15 April 2021, Friends of the Irish Environment (C‑470/19, EU:C:2021:271, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
(
15
)	Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p. 79 (emphasis added).
(
16
)	Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p. 79.
(
17
)	See Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p. 62.
(
18
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 15 April 2021, Friends of the Irish Environment (C‑470/19, EU:C:2021:271, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
(
19
)	Judgment of 16 January 2025, Banco de Santander (Representation of individual consumers) (C‑346/23, EU:C:2025:13, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
(
20
)	Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p. 55 (emphasis added).
(
21
)	Whittaker, S. et al., footnote 7, op. cit., p. 49.
(
22
)	Ibid.
(
23
)	Council Directive of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the environment (OJ 1990 L 158, p. 56).
(
24
)	See, Krämer, L., ‘La Directive 90/313/CEE sur l’accès à l’information en matière d’environement : genèse et perspectives d’application’ in Pallemaerts, M. (ed.), Het recht op informatie inzake leefmilieu – Le droit à l’information en matière d’environnement – The right to environmental information, E. Story-Scientia, Brussels, 1991, pp. 17 to 39, at page 32 (emphasis added); Klein, D.R., ‘Kapitel 3 Reaktive Umweltinformationspflichten’, Umweltinformation im Völker- und Europarecht: Aktive Umweltaufklärung des Staates und Informationszugangsrechte des Bürgers, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2011, p. 320, with further reference to legal literature.
(
25
)	Krämer, L. and Badger, C., Krämer’s EU Environmental Law, 9th ed., Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2024, p. 139 (emphasis added). See, in general, Boer, B. (ed.), Environmental Law Dimensions of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.
(
26
)	See point 28 above. This reflects, in the field of environmental law, the settled case-law according to which EU legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with international law, in particular where its provisions are intended specifically to give effect to an international agreement concluded by the European Union. See judgment of 6 July 2023, EIB and Commission v ClientEarth (C‑212/21 P and C‑223/21 P, EU:C:2023:546, paragraph 66). See, Krämer, L., ‘The Aarhus Convention and the European Union’ in Banner, C. (ed.), The Aarhus Convention, A Guide for UK Lawyers, Hart Publishing, London, 2015, Bloomsbury, p. 79.
(
27
)	See point 62 above.
(
28
)	See Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p. 55. See also my Opinion in Societatea Civilă Profesională de Avocaţi AB & CD (C‑252/22, EU:C:2023:592, points 37 and 38).
(
29
)	See Klein, D.R., footnote 24, op. cit., p. 321.
(
30
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, East Sussex County Council (C‑71/14, EU:C:2015:656, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
(
31
)	Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).
(
32
)	Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ 2006 L 264, p. 13).
(
33
)	Etemire, U., ‘Access to environmental information under EU Law’ in Peeters, M. and Eliantonio, M. (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Environmental Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2020, pp. 117 to 132, at p. 120.
(
34
)	Article 3 of Regulation No 1367/2006.
(
35
)	On the rights-based approach to transparency in the field of environmental law, see, among others, Hunter, B. D., ‘The emerging norm of transparency in international environmental governance’ in Ala’i, P., and Vaughn, G. R., (eds) Research Handbook on Transparency, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, United Kingdom, 2014.
(
36
)	The Commissioner gives the example of an individual who had previously made objections to a public authority in relation to the environmental impact of a project or of an individual who is seeking information on a measure or activity with environmental impact in their locality, or where information is sought by an organisation with particular environmental objectives.
(
37
)	See, Whittaker, S. et al., footnote 7, op. cit., p. 49, who points out that ‘it does not matter who submits a request (or requests) for environmental information, as everyone who does should be doing so with the aim of protecting and enhancing the environment for present and future generations’.
(
38
)	One example might be that electronic requests are submitted using a form where it is necessary, in order to submit the form, to verify that the applicant is not a robot.
(
39
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 2020, Commission v Austria (Railway safety authority) (C‑796/19, EU:C:2020:920, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
(
40
)	See point 41 above.
(
41
)	Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p. 79.
(
42
)	See Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, Communication ACCC/C/2006/18, Denmark.
(
43
)	On the meaning of ‘reasonable’ charges, see judgment of 9 September 1999, Commission v Germany (C‑217/97, EU:C:1999:395, paragraph 48).
(
44
)	Judgment of 23 November 2023, Right to Know (C‑84/22, EU:C:2023:910, paragraph 35).
(
45
)	See, to that effect, judgment of 20 January 2021, Land Baden-Württemberg (Internal communications) (C‑619/19, EU:C:2021:35, paragraph 59).
(
46
)	See judgment of 20 January 2021, Land Baden-Württemberg (Internal communications) (C‑619/19, EU:C:2021:35, paragraph 63).
(
47
)	See, Karg, M., ‘Informationszugang auf Antrag – §4 Antrag und Verfahren – B. Antragserfordernis (Abs. UIG § 4 Absatz 1)’, in Gersdorf, H. and Paal, B.P. (eds.), BeckOK, Informations- und Medienrecht, 45th ed., C.H. Beck, Munich, 2021, paragraph 5.
(
48
)	For instance, according to the Swedish law transposing Directive 2003/4 (Lag (2005:181) om miljöinformation hos vissa enskilda organ (Law (2005:181) on environmental information of certain individual bodies), everyone can request access to environmental information. It follows from Article 3 of that law that persons requesting information are not required to state their name or to state the reasons for the request. However, identification might be necessary in order for the administration to examine whether there are obstacles to the disclosure of the information. The obstacles are essentially the same as those set out under Article 4 of Directive 2003/4. In Finland, the national law transposing Directive 2003/4 is the Laki vesihuoltolain 16 §:n muuttamisesta 28.01.2005/54 (Law 2005/54 modifying Article 16 of the Law on water supply). However, the national legislation already complied effectively with the requirements of Directive 2003/4 in view of the relevant provisions of the Laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta 21.5.1999/621 (Law 1999/621 on access to information). According to Article 13 of the latter law, the persons requesting access need not identify themselves or provide reasons for the request, unless it is necessary for the exercise of the authority’s discretion or in order to determine whether the person requesting access has the right of access to the document. The Greek law transposing Directive 2003/4 (Ypourgiki apofasi HP 11764/653, Prosvasi toy koinou stis dimosies arches gia parochi pliroforion sxetika me to perivallon (Ministerial decision HP 11764/653, Public access to environmental information, FEK B’327/17.03.2006, as codified by the Proedriko Diatagma 28/2015, Kodikopoiisi diataxeon gia tin prosvasi se dimosia eggrafa kai stoixeia (Presidential Decree 28/2015, Codification of the provisions for the access to public documents and elements of public information (FEK A’34/23.03.2015)), does not specify whether the application can be anonymous. It is, however, worth noting that since 1 January 2025, the Kodikas Dioikitikis Diadikasias (Greek Code of Administrative Procedure, Law 2690/1999, FEK A’ 45/9.3.1999), which applies to all public authorities unless provided otherwise, explicitly allows the submission of anonymous requests. Nonetheless, the authority has no obligation to respond in the case of refusal of an anonymous request or of a request that is manifestly vague or repetitive.
(
49
)	That said, if the pseudonym used reveals an abusive intention on the part of the applicant, the request might fall under the exception set out in Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2003/4.
(
50
)	See Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, which states, at page 71, that: ‘as in many situations that involve openness and transparency and where economic interests are at stake, persons who take the risk of demanding that the rules be complied with and proper procedures followed may need to be protected from retribution.’
(
51
)	Judgment of 23 November 2023, Right to Know (C‑84/22, EU:C:2023:910, paragraph 34).
(
52
)	Point 98 of the Opinion.
(
53
)	Judgment of 23 November 2023, Right to Know (C‑84/22, EU:C:2023:910, paragraph 35).
(
54
)	That is the case, by way of illustration, of the Bulgarian-language (‘неоснователно’), Czech-language (‘nepřiměřená’), Latvian-language (‘nepamatots’), Spanish-language (‘irrazonable’), Dutch-language (‘onredelijk’) and Greek-language (‘παράλογη’) versions.
(
55
)	That is the case, by way of illustration, for the French-language (‘abusive’), German-language (‘missbräuchlich’) and Portuguese-language (‘abusivo’) versions.
(
56
)	The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide states, at page 84, that where a Party (to the Aarhus Convention) decides to provide for this exception ‘it will need to define “manifestly unreasonable” so as to assist public authorities in determining when a request is so unreasonable that it may be refused under this exception, and to protect the public’s interest that the test will not be applied arbitrarily’.
(
57
)	The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide confirms that approach, pointing out, at page 84, that ‘although the convention does not give direct guidance on how to define “manifestly unreasonable”, it is clear that it must [concern] more than just the volume and complexity of the information requested.’
(
58
)	See, by analogy, judgment of 9 January 2025, Österreichische Datenschutzbehörde (Excessive requests) (C‑416/23, EU:C:2025:3, paragraph 47).
(
59
)	Judgment of 19 September 2024, Matmut (C‑236/23, EU:C:2024:761, paragraph 51).
(
60
)	Ibid., paragraph 52.
(
61
)	See, by analogy, judgment of 9 January 2025, Österreichische Datenschutzbehörde (Excessive requests) (C‑416/23, EU:C:2025:3, paragraph 57).