Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
MEDINA
delivered on 12 March 2026 (1)
Case C‑60/25 [Livronsa] (i)
SR
v
FT SpA,
other party to the proceedings:
Assoutenti
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte d’appello di Cagliari (Court of Appeal, Cagliari, Italy))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Article 101(2) TFEU – Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 – Article 16(1) – Euro interest rate derivatives
sector – Binding force of the European Commission’s decision on a national court – Dispute between a borrower and the lending bank concerning the validity of an interest rate indexed to Euribor )
I.      Introduction
1.        The present Opinion
concerns a request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 101(2) TFEU and Article 16(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. (2) The reference has been made by the
civil law chamber of the
Corte d’appello di Cagliari (Court of Appeal, Cagliari, Italy) in the context of a dispute between a borrower, SR, and the bank that granted him a mortgage loan, FT. The dispute
concerns the validity of a clause that determines
the interest payable on that loan
by reference to the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) benchmark.
2.        The request is rooted in
the European Commission’s decisions of 4 December 2013 (3) and 7 December 2016, (4) in which that institution found that certain banks involved in the panel responsible for establishing the Euribor had participated in a cartel between September 2005 and May 2008. (5) More specifically, the Commission concluded that those banks had infringed Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement by engaging in a single and continuous infringement, which consisted of agreements and/or concerted practices that had as their object the distortion of the normal course of pricing components of Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (EIRDs). (6) The General Court, (7) at first instance, and the Court of Justice, on appeal, (8) confirmed the merits of the Commission’s findings, endorsing, in particular, the characterisation of the infringement as a restriction of competition by object. (9)
3.        By its reference, the referring court seeks to ascertain the impact of the EIRDs decisions – and the Court of Justice’s judgment related to them – on the validity of a clause which refers to the Euribor in a mortgage
loan agreement
concluded between
an individual and a bank that did not participate in the infringement established by the Commission.
In essence, that court wishes to determine, first,
whether Article 101(2) TFEU, which provides that any agreements or decisions
prohibited pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU
are to
be automatically void, should lead
to the nullity of that clause, even where the loan agreement concerned is concluded outside the EIRDs market. Second, the referring court queries whether,
and to what extent,
the Euribor manipulation established by the Commission has probative value in the context of national proceedings in accordance with Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003.
II.    Facts, procedure and the question referred
4.        On 15 December 2005, SR and FT entered into a mortgage loan agreement. The interest rate on that loan was fixed
for an
initial
period of six
months. That rate was subsequently recalculated on the basis of
a variable component linked to Euribor. The agreement was further renegotiated on 20 February 2015.
5.        SR brought an action before the Tribunale di Oristano (District Court, Oristano, Italy). By that action, he sought, first, a recalculation of the amount due by way of interest on the mortgage
loan and, second, a declaration that
a credit
was due to him.
SR argued that certain clauses of the agreement, including the clause
determining the interest rate
by reference to Euribor, were invalid on the grounds of vagueness and unreliability. By its judgment,
that court held
that the interest rate agreed in the loan agreement
was determined in accordance with the applicable legislation. It also observed that the variable rate was based on
pre-established and objective criteria not subject to the discretion of the lending institution, thereby excluding any ground of nullity of the agreement.
6.        SR has brought an
appeal against that judgment before the Corte d’appello di Cagliari (Court of Appeal, Cagliari), the referring court in the present case. In his appeal, he has requested that the clause in the loan agreement containing the reference to the Euribor be declared invalid and that the repayment schedule under that agreement be recalculated. In particular, SR
contends that he
was unable correctly to assess
the application of the Euribor
to his loan due to its artificial manipulation,
as found
by the Commission in the EIRDs decisions. In the course of the proceedings, the appellant
requested that a question be referred
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
7.        The referring court considers it necessary, for the resolution of the case in the main proceedings, and for many other pending disputes, to clarify the scope of Article 101(2) TFEU
and
the probative value of the EIRDs decisions for national courts under Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003. In particular, that court is uncertain as to how those provisions should be interpreted for the purpose of assessing the validity of a clause contained in a mortgage
loan agreement which,
during the infringement period found by the Commission, determined the interest rate of that loan by reference to Euribor.
8.        In that regard, the referring court points out, first and foremost, that the case-law of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy) appears to
be characterised by divergent approaches, which the order for reference
describes in the following terms.
9.        On the one hand, according to a first line of case-law, the Euribor manipulation established in the EIRDs decisions should be regarded as having enhanced probative value in support of an action seeking a declaration that
a contractual clause referring to
Euribor is void, regardless of whether the bank
that is party to the loan agreement
concerned participated in the infringement found by the Commission. Moreover, according to that line of case-law, where the external index specified in the loan agreement no longer constitutes a reliable
reflection of the intention expressed by the parties, due to its unlawful manipulation, the subject
matter of the contractual clause cannot be determined.
Under national civil law,
that situation
entails that the clause must be regarded as invalid in part for the period covered by the infringement.
Furthermore, only an action for a declaration of invalidity, as opposed to an action for damages, is capable of ensuring full protection of the final consumer, shielding
him or her from the effects of the agreement restricting competition.
10.      On the other hand, according to a second and more recent line of case-law,
the EIRDs decisions, while being binding on national courts in accordance with Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, do not constitute evidence of a significant probative value for the purpose of declaring invalid a clause
which determines
the interest rate in a loan agreement
by reference to Euribor. That line of case-law recognises that
the infringement identified by the Commission in those decisions
consisted in conduct intended to reduce the cash flows which the participants in the cartel would have otherwise incurred under the EIRDs. Therefore, that restriction of competition concerns only the EIRDs
market and could not have any effect on the market for variable-rate loans linked to Euribor.
11.      In any event, the referring court inclines towards the view that, once a reference rate has been found to have been manipulated, that manipulation must be regarded as established in all the markets in which that rate is applied. It would be contradictory to consider that the Euribor manipulation found by the Commission in its decisions concerned exclusively the EIRDs market and not other markets, including the market for variable-rate loans.
Moreover, the referring court
suggests that an interpretation according to which Article 101(2) TFEU produces no
effects on contractual relationships referring to the Euribor during the infringement period would undermine the deterrent effect of that provision.
12.      In those circumstances,
the Corte d’appello di Cagliari (Court of Appeal, Cagliari) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘In the light [of] Article 16(1) of [Regulation No 1/2003], is the evidence of manipulation of the Euribor [rate], as established in the [EIRDs] decisions and in the judgment [in HSBC Holdings and Others], to be regarded as having been definitively established also for national courts, and does the restriction of competition that was the subject of [those] Commission decisions and [that] Court judgment constitute a cartel prohibited by Article 101 [TFEU] solely on the market for [euro interest rate] derivatives, or on any market on which the manipulated Euribor [rate] was used?’
13.      The request for a preliminary ruling was lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 28 January 2025. The appellant, the respondent, the intervener in the main proceedings and the Commission submitted written observations. No hearing has been held in the present case.
III. Assessment
14.      By its question, the referring court asks whether Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that the finding by the Commission, in a decision establishing an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU,
that an interest rate benchmark has been manipulated should be regarded as definitively established for national courts in proceedings before them. That court also queries whether that finding entails that an agreement referring to that benchmark, concluded outside the market to which the Commission’s decision relates, constitutes a prohibited agreement under Article 101 TFEU.
15.      I will address, first of all, the part of the question referred that relates to the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU (first part),
before turning to the part of the question referred that relates to the interpretation of Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 (second part).
16.      As regards the first part of the question referred, it can be inferred from the order for reference that the referring court’s doubts regarding the scope of that provision relate to the legal consequences of the findings of the EIRDs decisions,
as confirmed by the Court’s judgment in HSBC Holdings and Others. More specifically, the referring court wonders whether the finding that an interest rate benchmark has been manipulated in a specific market, giving rise to an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, may render void a clause contained in an agreement concluded in a different market and referring to that benchmark during
the infringement period, in accordance with Article 101(2) TFEU.
17.      Pursuant to Article 101(2) TFEU, any agreements or decisions
prohibited under
Article 101(1) TFEU
are to be automatically void.
According to the Court’s case-law, an agreement which does not meet the conditions set out in Article 101(3) TFEU becomes null and void in so far as its object or effect is incompatible with the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU. (10) Moreover, since the nullity referred to in Article 101(2) TFEU is absolute, an agreement which is null and void by virtue of that provision has no effect, either past or future,
as between the contracting parties. (11) Nor may such an agreement
be relied upon against third parties. (12)
18.      The Court has therefore delineated the scope of Article 101(2) TFEU (13) by limiting its application to agreements that come within the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU. (14) It is true that,
according to the case-law, the automatic nullity of a prohibited agreement can be relied on by anyone and the courts are bound by it. (15) However, it is only the decision or agreement caught by Article 101(1) TFEU that becomes unenforceable, in principle in its entirety, unless the restrictive elements can be severed from the remainder of the agreement. (16) As the Court
has stated, the consequences
of the nullity provided for by Article 101(2) TFEU for those parts of the agreement that are not incompatible with Article 101(1), and for any orders and deliveries made on the basis of the agreement, and the resulting financial obligations, are not a matter for EU law. (17)
19.      The rationale behind the Court’s rulings
can be easily explained, in my view, by reference, first, to the need
to prevent a cascading effect of the kind envisaged by the referring court in the order for reference, namely on contractual relationships concluded between third parties not implicated in the specific agreement found by the Commission
to be prohibited. That is, in particular, the situation of a clause
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which concerns a product and a market distinct from those covered by the Commission’s decisions concerning the Euribor manipulation
in connection with EIRDs. The unpredictability of the legal and economic consequences that could
stem from the systemic declaration of nullity of any agreement or any clause not, as such,
found to be prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU
appears to me to justify the Court’s interpretative approach
with regard to Article 101(2) TFEU.
20.      Second, the Court’s
interpretation of Article 101(2) TFEU is
also consistent,
as the defendant in the main proceedings argues, with the
principle that
liability for
infringements of EU competition rules is personal in nature. According to the case-law,
only the undertaking which infringes those rules must answer for that infringement. (18) Although that case-law has emerged in the context of preliminary rulings concerning actions for damages, it follows logically that the nullity provided for
in Article 101(2) TFEU in respect of
agreements and decisions that are contrary to Article 101(1) cannot extend to contractual relationships entered into
by parties that are not implicated in the infringement.
21.      It is true that, in the judgment in Allianz Hungária, (19) referred to
by the Commission in its written observations, the Court held that vertical agreements concluded in order to implement a horizontal (market-sharing) agreement contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU could also be declared unlawful under that
latter provision. (20) More specifically, the issue raised by that
case was whether vertical agreements by which two motor insurance undertakings agreed bilaterally,
either with car dealers or with a professional association representing them, on the hourly rate payable for the repair of insured vehicles constituted a restriction by object of Article 101(1) TFEU. In its judgment, the Court found that the existence of a horizontal agreement between those two undertakings,
designed
to share the market,
was capable of
rendering unlawful also
the vertical agreements concluded in order to implement it.
22.      However, the judgment
in Allianz Hungária cannot be transposed to the present case. It is apparent from that judgment that
the Court did not extend the nullity provided for in Article 101(2) TFEU to agreements not coming within the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU. On the contrary, it held that vertical agreements necessary for the implementation of the horizontal agreement, without which that latter agreement could not be carried out, could also be regarded as contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU and, therefore, as null in their own right, subject to the assessment to be carried out by the referring court in that case.
23.      In that regard, suffice it to observe that the loan agreement at issue in the main proceedings
does not form part of any infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU found by the Commission. Moreover, unlike the situation at issue in the judgment in Allianz Hungária, that agreement was not concluded in order to implement or give effect to the restrictive agreement found by the Commission in the EIRDs decisions. It merely made
reference to the Euribor benchmark for the purpose of determining the variable interest rate applicable to a mortgage loan granted to an individual by a bank,
which, a fortiori, bore no relation to the unlawful conduct established by the Commission. In that context, it is clear to me that
that agreement
cannot be regarded as being subject to the effect prescribed by Article 101(2) TFEU, which, according to the case-law cited in point 18 of the present Opinion,
applies only to agreements
that are contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU.
24.      It follows that Article 101(2) TFEU cannot be interpreted as meaning that a finding by the Commission, in
a decision establishing an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, that an interest rate benchmark has been manipulated
must
render void a clause contained in a loan agreement referring to that benchmark, where that clause
does not form part of the restrictive agreement referred to in the Commission’s decision and has not, as such, been found to be contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU.
25.      At this stage, it is important to note that the fact that
Article 101(2) TFEU does not provide a legal basis for declaring null and void a clause contained in a loan agreement not coming within Article 101(1) TFEU
does not mean that the parties to that agreement do not have other legal remedies available to them
in order to claim the invalidity of that clause. (21) In that respect, it must be recalled that, as is apparent from the Court’s case-law, the consequences which an agreement prohibited
under Article 101(1) TFEU might have for contractual relationships involving third parties fall to be determined by national courts in accordance with their own law. (22)
26.      In the present case, the information provided by the referring court in that regard is rather limited. Nevertheless, it can be inferred from the order for reference that the main proceedings concern an action for the declaration of invalidity based on the alleged unreliability of a clause which determines the interest rate of a loan agreement by reference to the Euribor benchmark. Having regard to the case-law cited in point 25 above, nothing prevents the referring court from assessing the validity and effects of that
clause in the light of the applicable national provisions, for instance, those relating to the lawfulness of the subject matter of contracts, cited in the order for reference. (23)
27.      It is precisely in that situation that the interpretation of Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003 – to which the second part of the question referred relates –
assumes particular relevance
in a case such as that in the main proceedings, in particular in connection with the EIRDs decisions. By that part, the referring court seeks to ascertain, in essence, whether the manipulation established by the Commission in those decisions has probative value in the context of proceedings concerning the validity, under national law, of a clause referring to Euribor during the infringement period.
28.      Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003, under the heading ‘Uniform application of [EU] competition law’,
provides that, when national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. (24) That provision codifies previously existing case-law, (25) in which the Court
had essentially
held that, in a system
of competition law enforcement bestowed on multiple actors, including national courts, the principles of legal certainty and the uniform application of EU competition rules require
that conflicting decisions be avoided. (26)
29.      Furthermore, in its case-law, the Court has defined the limits of the rule deriving from Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003. For instance, in the context of a civil action for damages, in which harmful conduct, loss and a direct causal link between that conduct and the loss
must be established, the national court is bound by the Commission’s finding that
an agreement is prohibited and by the legal qualification of that agreement. (27) The General Court has also established, in case-law which, in my view, could readily be endorsed by the Court of Justice, (28) that national courts are likewise bound by the Commission’s findings regarding the temporal and geographic scope of the conduct examined and
by the liability or non-liability of the persons investigated in relation to the conduct at issue. (29)
30.      In the present case, as regards the EIRDs decisions, it is important to point out that the Commission found that certain banks in the Euribor panel had participated in a cartel on the EIRDs market, which essentially lasted from September 2005 to May 2008. (30) In particular, the Commission found that, during that period, the participants in the cartel had engaged in a series of practices aimed at distorting the normal course of the price components of the EIRDs, namely the Euribor. Those practices included the exchange of information on their preferences for unchanged, low or high interest rates (fixings) for certain Euribor maturities, depending on their trading positions or exposures. The participants also exchanged confidential information about their trading positions or intentions with regard to future Euribor submissions for specific maturities. On occasion, traders also explored the possibility of aligning at least one of their banks’ future Euribor submissions based on the information received from other participants. (31)
31.      It might be useful to recall that Euribor is a widely used reference interest rate on international money markets. (32) It aims to reflect the cost of interbank loans denominated in euros. The calculation is performed on a daily basis, with data from multiple financial institutions within a designated panel being used to inform the process. It is based on the quotations provided by the banks on the panel, which estimate the rates at which a hypothetical first-class bank would lend funds to another first-class bank. Euribor rates are reflected in the pricing of EIRDs, which are globally traded financial products. These products are used by large companies, financial institutions, hedge funds and other international companies to manage their exposure to interest rate risk (hedging for both borrowers and investors) or for speculative purposes. (33)
32.      As the Commission correctly submits in its written observations, particular attention must be paid to the fact that
the EIRDs decisions do not contain any specific findings as to the effects of the restrictive agreement on the level of the Euribor. In particular, it is apparent from those decisions that the level of the Euribor could be manipulated upwards, downwards or kept unchanged by the banks involved in the panel, depending on the positions of the parties to the cartel on the derivatives market. (34) The EIRDs decisions do not, therefore, determine whether the cartel had a tendency to push the Euribor upwards or downwards. While it may be reasonable to assume, based on the conduct of the banks involved in the prohibited agreement, that the Euribor did not follow its normal course during the period of the cartel, (35) the Commission did not make any definitive finding as to the overall direction in which that benchmark was manipulated. By their respective judgments, (36) both the General Court and the Court of Justice confirmed the Commission’s findings and concluded that the infringement in question constituted a restriction ‘by object’ under Article 101(1) TFEU concerning only the EIRDs market. (37)
33.      It follows from the foregoing considerations that, as regards the EIRDs decisions, Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003 would require national courts to regard as definitively established the existence of a manipulation of the Euribor during the period defined by the Commission. By contrast, since the infringement at issue was classified as a restriction by object, no specific effects on the Euribor level may be inferred solely from the actions found by the Commission to be contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU.
34.      As to the present case, the question still remains whether Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003 constitutes a proper legal basis for concluding that, in a case where a national court has to decide on the validity of a contractual clause in accordance with its own national law – in particular as regards the lawfulness of the subject matter of that clause – the findings made by the Commission in a decision establishing an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU are binding on that national court.
35.      In that regard, it suffices to point out that Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003 is a provision that requires national courts to refrain from taking decisions that are contrary to those adopted by the Commission only ‘when [they] rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article [101] or Article [102 TFEU]’. Since, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the national court would not, in any event, be applying the EU competition rules for solving the dispute before it, Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003 cannot be said formally to constitute a legal basis that obliges a national court to take as established the findings made by the Commission in the EIRDs decisions.
36.      In this context, the argument could be made that, where a national court is assessing a case exclusively in the light of its own national law, the binding nature of the Commission’s findings in a decision establishing an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU must likewise be determined in accordance with that law. However, such an approach cannot be accepted for two main reasons. First, it disregards the fact that acts adopted by the EU institutions within the scope of their competences do not require recognition in the national legal order. Instead, they form an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and cannot therefore be ignored in the context of national proceedings. Second, that approach could ultimately result in a national court declining to take into account an EU act that
is lawful and valid in accordance with established case law, the findings contained in that act having moreover been confirmed by the Court of Justice in the judgment in HSBC Holdings and Others.
37.      It follows that, even though Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003 cannot be regarded as applicable in the main proceedings, as pointed out above, one of the principles to which that provision gives expression – namely that a finding that is established under the EU legal order may not be disregarded – leads, in essence, to an outcome with similar legal consequences. A national court must take into account the factual and legal findings made in EU proceedings when they are relevant to national disputes, even when they are to be decided outside the specific framework
of EU law.
38.      In the present instance, in the context
of an action brought by a party seeking a declaration that a clause is invalid under national law, the Commission’s finding in the EIRDs decisions relating to the Euribor’s manipulation must be considered to be definitively established and should be properly taken into account, subject, of course, as has been explained in point 33 of the present Opinion, to the concrete terms set out in those decisions.
39.      In the light of the foregoing considerations, I conclude that Article 101(2) TFEU and Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that a finding by the Commission, in a decision establishing an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, that an interest rate benchmark has been manipulated does not render void a clause contained in a loan agreement which refers to that benchmark, where that clause does not form part of the restrictive agreement referred to in the Commission’s decision and has not, as such, been found to be contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. However, and even though Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003 does not formally apply, the finding of manipulation established in the Commission’s decision may not be disregarded by a national court in the context of proceedings concerning the validity of a clause under national law, subject to the concrete terms set out in that decision.
IV.    Conclusion
40.      On the basis of the analysis set out above, I propose that the Court answer the question referred by the Corte d’appello di Cagliari (Court of Appeal, Cagliari,
Italy) as follows:
Article 101(2) TFEU
and Article 16(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101] and [102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1)
must be interpreted as meaning that
a finding by the European Commission, in a decision establishing an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, that an interest rate benchmark has been manipulated does not render void a clause contained in a loan agreement which refers to that benchmark, where that clause does not form part of the restrictive agreement referred to in the Commission’s decision and has not, as such, been found to be contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. However, and even though Article 16 of Regulation No 1/2003 does not formally apply,
the finding of manipulation established in the Commission’s decision may not be disregarded by a national court in the context of proceedings concerning the validity of a clause under national law, subject to the concrete terms set out in that decision.
1      Original language: English.
i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.
2      Council Regulation of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101] and [102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).
3      Commission Decision C(2013) 8512 final, relating to a proceeding under Article 101 [TFEU] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39914 – Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (EIRD)
(Settlement)) (‘the 2013 decision’). This decision was addressed to banks belonging to the Barclays, Deutsche Bank, Société Générale and Royal Bank of Scotland groups.
4      Commission Decision C(2016) 8530 final, relating to a proceeding under Article 101 [TFEU] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39914 – Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (EIRD)) (‘the 2016 decision’). This decision was addressed to banks belonging to the Crédit Agricole, HSBC and JPMorgan Chase groups.
5      The adoption of two separate decisions is attributable to the fact that certain of the banks concerned, listed in recital 2 of the 2013 decision, agreed to participate in a settlement procedure pursuant to Article 10a of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles [101] and [102 TFEU] (OJ 2004 L 123, p. 18). By contrast, other banks, referred to in recitals 52 to 64 of the 2016 decision, decided not to enter into that procedure and a decision was therefore taken in respect of those banks in accordance with the standard procedure laid down in Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003.
6      See, inter alia, recital 67 of the 2013 decision and Article 1 thereof. See also recital 357 of the 2016 decision, and Article 1 thereof.
7      Judgment of 24 September 2019, HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission (T‑105/17, EU:T:2019:675).
8      Judgment of 12 January 2023, HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission (C‑883/19 P, ‘the judgment in HSBC Holdings and Others’, EU:C:2023:11).
9      The judgments of the General Court and of the Court of Justice concerned the 2016 decision exclusively, and did not address the 2013 decision, which had become final. As a result of both judgments, the 2016 decision was partially annulled, particularly with regard to the determination of the fine imposed by the Commission on the applicants in that case. The General Court reached a similar conclusion in its judgments of 20 December 2023, JPMorgan Chase and Others v Commission (T‑106/17, EU:T:2023:832), and of 20 December 2023, Crédit agricole and Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank v Commission (T‑113/17, EU:T:2023:847). The appeals against those judgments are currently pending before the Court of Justice in Cases C‑160/24 P and C‑191/24 P, respectively. Moreover, following the partial annulment of the 2016 decision concerning the fine imposed, the Commission adopted Decision C(2021) 4600 final of 28 June 2021. That decision led to the judgment of 27 November 2024, HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission (T‑561/21, EU:T:2024:869), and has now become final.
10      Judgment of 25 November 1971, Béguelin Import (22/71, EU:C:1971:113, paragraph 26).
11      Judgment of 6 February 1973, Brasserie de Haecht (48/72, EU:C:1973:11, paragraph 26).
12      Judgment of 25 November 1971, Béguelin Import (22/71, EU:C:1971:113, paragraph 29).
13      See, inter alia, Jones, A., Sufrin, B. and Dunne, N., EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press, 2023, p. 228; Van Bael, I. and Bellis, J.-F., Competition Law of the European Union, Wolters Kluwer, 2021, pp. 77 and 78; Argenton, C., Geradin, D. and Stephan, A., EU Cartel Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 69 and 70; and Meeßen, G., ‘Article 101 TFEU’, in Kellerbauer, M., Klamert, M. and Tomkin, J. (eds), The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 1034 and 1035.
14      All those rulings remain relevant to this day, as evidenced, for instance, by the
judgment of 20 April 2023, Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos (C‑25/21, EU:C:2023:298, paragraphs 70 to 73), and by the judgment of 25 January 2024, Em akaunt BG (C‑438/22, EU:C:2024:71, paragraphs 57 and 58), which expressly refer to them.
15      See, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage and Crehan (C‑453/99, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 22).
16      See, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 1991, Delimitis (C‑234/89, EU:C:1991:91, paragraph 40).
17      Judgment of 14 December 1983, Société de vente de ciments et bétons de l’est (319/82, EU:C:1983:374, paragraph 11 and 12).
18      Judgment of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others (C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 31).
19      Judgment of 14 March 2013, Allianz Hungária Biztosító and Others (C‑32/11, ‘the judgment in Allianz Hungária’, EU:C:2013:160).
20      Ibid., paragraph 50.
21      In addition, a party who considers that he or she has been adversely affected by the manipulation of an interest rate benchmark may indeed bring an action for damages under the national law transposing Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (OJ 2014 L 349, p. 1). For its part, the national court seised of that action is required to safeguard the rights which are derived directly from Article 101(1) TFEU, including where the applicant is a third party to the agreement found by the Commission to be unlawful. See, inter alia, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others (C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 37), and judgment of 20 April 2023, Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos (C‑25/21, EU:C:2023:298, paragraphs 50 to 52 and the case-law cited).
22      See, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 1983, Société de vente de ciments et bétons de l’est (319/82, EU:C:1983:374, paragraph 12), and judgment of 30 November 2006, Brünsteiner and Autohaus Hilgert (C‑376/05 and C‑377/05, EU:C:2006:753, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
23      The order for reference and the parties’ written observations mention, in that regard, Article 1346 and Article 1418 of the Italian civil code.
24      See also judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 74).
25      See recital 22 of Regulation No 1/2003, and judgment of 14 December 2000, Masterfoods and HB (C‑344/98, ‘the judgment in Masterfoods’, EU:C:2000:689, paragraph 60).
26      Pachev, A., ‘Jurisdiction of the Courts of the European Union Member States to apply European Union antitrust law in private disputes’, in La justice en transition:
vers une union européenne solidaire et durable – Justice in transition: towards a united and sustainable European Union – Mélanges en l’honneur d’Alexander Arabadjiev, Bruylant, 2025, p. 573.
27      That said, the national court must still assess the existence of loss and the direct causal link between the loss and the agreement or practice in question.
Even where the precise effects of the infringement have been determined by the Commission in its decision, it still falls to the national court to determine individually the loss caused to each person who has brought an action for damages. See, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2012, Otis and Others (C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraphs 65 and 66).
28      Judgment of 16 December 2015, British Airways v Commission (T‑48/11, EU:T:2015:988, paragraph 40). See also Joncheray, N., ‘Article 16: Uniform application of Community competition law – Commentary’, in Prete, L., Dekeyser, K., et al. (eds), Regulation 1/2003 and EU Antitrust Enforcement – A Systematic Guide, Wolters Kluwer, 2002, p. 399.
29      See also Carovano, G., ‘Boosting the coherent application of EU competition law in private litigations while augmenting national courts’ independence’, European Law Journal, Vol. 31, No 3, 2025, p. 272 and 273.
30      See footnote 6 to the present Opinion.
31      See, inter alia, recital 32 of the 2013 decision and recitals 113 to 115, 358 and 359 of the 2016 decision. See also the judgment in HSBC Holdings and Others, paragraphs 18 and 19.
32      See recital 1 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (OJ 2016 L 171, p. 1), and recital 5 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1368 of 11 August 2016 establishing a list of critical benchmarks used in financial markets pursuant to Regulation 2016/1011 (OJ 2016 L 217, p. 1).
33      See recitals 5 to 9 of the 2013 decision and recitals 20 to 26 of the 2016 decision. See also Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou in HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission (C‑883/19 P, EU:C:2022:384, point 1).
34      See, inter alia, recital 388 and recital 392(a) and (e) of the 2016 decision.
35      See, inter alia, recitals 397 and 404 to 408 of the 2016 decision.
36      See footnotes 7 and 8 to the present Opinion.
37      See, inter alia, the judgment in HSBC Holdings and Others, paragraphs 125, 191, 206 and 208.