JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)
23 March 2022 (*) (1)
(Civil service – Members of the temporary staff – Staff of eu-LISA – Disciplinary proceedings – Disciplinary penalty – Reprimand – Implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries – Plea of illegality – Article 110 of the Staff Regulations – Failure to consult the Staff Committee – Rights of the defence and right to be heard – Articles 12, 12a, 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations – Error of assessment – Principle of good administration – Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations – Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials – Liability – Non-material damage )
In Case T‑661/20,
NV, represented by S. Rodrigues and A. Champetier, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), represented by M. Chiodi, acting as Agent, and by D. Waelbroeck and A. Duron, lawyers
defendant,
APPLICATION under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of eu-LISA of 3 February 2020 to impose on the applicant the penalty of a reprimand and, secondly, compensation for the non-material harm allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of that decision,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),
composed of S. Gervasoni, President, L. Madise and J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
gives the following
Judgment
I.      Background to the dispute
1        The applicant, NV, was recruited on 16 October 2012 by the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) as a member of the temporary staff (grade AD 7, step 2) within the meaning of Article 2(a) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union. He held the post of Application Administrator which, from 1 September 2019, became the post of Information Technology Officer (grade AD 7, step 5).
2        On 19 October 2018, the applicant reported, by an email sent to several recipients, an incident in which A, another member of staff of eu-LISA and a work colleague, threatened him verbally and physically. More specifically, that member of staff took a chair and threatened to hit the applicant with it, before being stopped by another colleague.
3        On the same day, the applicant was placed on sick leave and informed the police that he feared for his safety and that of his family.
4        On 21 October 2018, following the incident referred to in paragraph 2 above, the applicant submitted a request for assistance in respect of A, on the basis of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).
5        By decision of the Executive Director of eu-LISA of 15 February 2019, of which the applicant was informed the following day, an administrative inquiry was opened in order to establish all the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the allegations of psychological harassment made by the applicant against A. By that decision, a retired official of the European Commission was appointed to direct the inquiry (‘the investigator’).
6        On 4 March 2019, the applicant was interviewed by the investigator in the context of the inquiry. During that interview, the applicant had the opportunity to present the facts which led him to submit a request for assistance and provided examples of the alleged acts of harassment committed by A. The record of that interview was then sent to the applicant, who returned a signed copy of it to the investigator, stating that the record did not represent a full or complete transcript of his interview and his questions
7        On 22 May 2019, the applicant was informed that a decision of eu-LISA’s Executive Director extended the scope of the administrative inquiry to include breaches of obligations under the Staff Regulations committed both by the applicant and by A. It had come to light, in the course of the investigation, that the applicant had failed to fulfil his obligations under Articles 11, 12, 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations with respect to A, but also independently of his relationship with A. More specifically, the applicant’s conduct was likely to increase tensions with A, to impair A’s working conditions and to discredit him. Furthermore, the applicant’s conduct on several occasions was inappropriate with regard to two members of eu-LISA’s security staff. Lastly, the applicant infringed the obligation to seek prior authorisation before contacting the French police in order to report his conflictual relationship with A.
8        On 16 July 2019, the applicant was interviewed a second time by the investigator. During that second interview, the applicant had the opportunity to provide explanations in response to the allegations of breaches of the Staff Regulations made against him. The record of that second interview was then sent to him on 18 July 2019.
9        On 28 July 2019, the applicant received two additional documents, namely two reports which contained the allegations of two members of eu-LISA’s security staff criticising his conduct towards them.
10      On 21 August 2019, a preliminary version of the conclusions of the inquiry report was sent to the applicant.
11      On 30 August 2019, the applicant submitted his observations, together with annexes in support of those observations, on the record of the interview of 16 July 2019, the reports of the two members of eu-LISA’s security staff and the preliminary version of the conclusions of the inquiry report.
12      On the same day, the investigator sent the applicant, by email, a new version of the record of the interview of 16 July 2019 (‘the second version of the record of his interview’). In addition, he informed the applicant that that version included most of the applicant’s observations and invited him to submit any further observations.
13      The applicant states, in the application, that he informed the investigator that he would forward additional observations on the second version of the record of his interview after his holidays, namely after 7 October 2019.
14      On 10 September 2019, the investigator completed his report after, inter alia, hearing 27 witnesses and examining the applicant’s observations. In his final report, the investigator concluded that the applicant had committed a serious breach of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, occasional breaches of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations and breach of Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations.
15      On 20 October 2019, the applicant sent a second set of observations on the second version of the record of his interview (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above).
16      By letter of 18 November 2019, eu-LISA’s Executive Director informed the applicant that, in the light of the findings of the administrative inquiry, he intended to impose a reprimand on him pursuant to Article 11 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. The applicant was thus invited to exercise his right to be heard either by attending a hearing on 27 November 2019 or by submitting written observations. A redacted version of the final inquiry report was attached to the letter.
17      On 26 November 2019, the applicant submitted his observations in preparation for his hearing scheduled for 27 November 2019.
18      On 27 November 2019, the hearing took place in the presence of the applicant and eu-LISA’s Executive Director. The Senior Legal Officer, the Head of the Human Resources Unit and a legal officer attended the hearing by videoconference. At the hearing, the applicant had the opportunity to provide his comments and explanations concerning the reprimand measure envisaged by eu-LISA’s Executive Director.
19      On the same day, the Head of the Human Resources Unit acknowledged receipt of the observations submitted by the applicant and confirmed that they would be taken into consideration.
20      On 9 December 2019, the record of the hearing of 27 November 2019, referred to in paragraph 18 above, was sent to the applicant. The applicant had the opportunity to submit his observations within 11 working days, which he did on 3 January 2020.
21      By letter of 3 February 2020 (‘the contested decision’), eu-LISA’s Executive Director informed the applicant that:
‘Following a thorough examination of your file and, in particular, after having taken duly into account your concerns and your written comments with respect to the procedural aspect of the inquiry (and especially after having checked again whether any procedural error had been committed during the inquiry, and after having reached the conclusion that there were no mistakes on [eu-LISA’s] part) together with the comments made by you on 3 January 2020, I therefore regret to inform you that a reprimand is applied to you and will be part of your personal file.’
22      The applicant also received from eu-LISA’s Executive Director a document dated 16 March 2020 entitled ‘Closure of the inquiry opened on 15 February 2019 – Communication of the outcome of procedure to [applicant’s name]’. That document stated, inter alia, that, after checking the applicant’s complete file, the Executive Director had come to the conclusion that he had committed the breaches set out in the final inquiry report (see paragraph 14 above). According to the Executive Director, all the applicant’s rights had been respected during the investigation procedure. Thus, it had been decided that a reprimand should be imposed on him. As regards A, it was found that he had breached Articles 11 and 12 of the Staff Regulations. Similar proceedings had taken place against A, who had, as a consequence, been the subject of a disciplinary penalty and had also been reprimanded, as provided for in Article 9 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.
23      On 9 April 2020, the applicant lodged a complaint against the contested decision, pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.
24      By decision of 3 August 2020, signed by eu-LISA’s Executive Director, the applicant’s complaint was rejected in its entirety and the contested decision was therefore upheld (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).
II.    Procedure and forms of order sought
25      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 30 October 2020, the applicant brought the present action.
26      On 10 February 2021, eu-LISA lodged its defence at the Court Registry.
27      On 28 July 2021, the parties were requested, by way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, to reply to a number of written questions. The applicant and eu-LISA complied with that request on 24 and 30 September 2021, respectively.
28      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        annul, in so far as necessary, the decision rejecting the complaint;
–        order eu-LISA to pay an amount of EUR 5 000, fixed ex aequo et bono, as compensation for the non-material damage suffered;
–        order eu-LISA to pay the costs.
29      eu-LISA contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action in its entirety;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
III. Law
30      In his action, first, the applicant seeks annulment of the contested decision and of the decision rejecting the complaint. Secondly, he claims the amount of EUR 5 000, fixed ex aequo et bono, as compensation for the non-material damage which he claims to have suffered on account of the adoption of the contested decision.
A.      The claims for annulment
1.      The application for annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint
31      As regards the applicant’s request for annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, where such a decision lacks any independent content, the effect of claims formally directed against that decision is to bring before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 1989, Vainker v Parliament, 293/87, EU:C:1989:8, paragraph 8, and of 14 December 2017, RL v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑21/17, EU:T:2017:907, paragraph 26).
32      In the present case, it must be held that the decision rejecting the complaint lacks any independent content. It merely confirms, in essence, the contested decision.
33      Therefore, the action must be regarded as being directed against the contested decision, the legality of which must be examined also taking into account the statement of reasons in the decision rejecting the complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 2020, AD v ECHA, T‑25/19, not published, EU:T:2020:536, paragraph 34).
2.      The application for annulment of the contested decision
34      In support of his application for annulment of the contested decision, the applicant puts forward four pleas in law. The first plea alleges that the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries adopted by the Management Board of eu-LISA are unlawful. The second plea alleges infringement of the rights of the defence and of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and of the right to be heard. The third plea in law alleges infringement of Articles 12, 12a, 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations, breach of the principle of good administration and errors of assessment. The fourth plea alleges infringement of Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.
(a)    The first plea, alleging the illegality of the implementing provisions concerning inquiries
35      By his first plea, the applicant disputes the legality of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries, the adoption of which was finalised on 18 October 2014, without prior consultation of the Staff Committee (constituted on 5 November 2014). Those provisions, now contained in the decision of the Management Board of eu-LISA (2015-014) of 28 January 2015, on which the Executive Director’s decisions to open an administrative inquiry, and to extend that inquiry, dated 15 February and 22 May 2019, respectively, were based (see paragraphs 5 and 7 above), are unlawful.
36      More specifically, the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries were adopted in breach of Article 110(1) of the Staff Regulations, on the ground that, contrary to the provisions of that article, the Staff Committee of eu-LISA was not consulted before they were adopted.
37      eu-LISA disputes the applicant’s arguments.
38      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to Article 110(1) of the Staff Regulations, ‘the general provisions implementing these Staff Regulations shall be adopted by the appointing authority of each institution after consulting the Staff Committee and the Staff Regulations Committee’.
39      In the present case, it is not disputed that the Staff Committee was not consulted before the adoption of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries on the ground that the Staff Committee had not yet been constituted when those provisions were adopted on 18 October 2014. Furthermore, in the preamble to Commission Decision C(2014) 5392 final of 28 July 2014 on the agreement on the implementing rules for giving effect to the Staff Regulations adopted by eu-LISA, the following is stated:
‘Having regard to the fact that the Staff Committee of the eu-LISA, which is to be consulted pursuant to Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, has not yet been constituted and it is therefore impossible at the present to comply with the requirements of that provision. The Staff Committee will be invited to give its opinion on the relevant implementing rules when it has been constituted and due consideration will be given to its opinion. The Management Board is entitled in such circumstances to approve the rules forthwith.’
40      Before assessing whether the plea of illegality raised, namely eu-LISA’s failure to consult its Staff Committee at the time of the adoption of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries, is capable of leading to a finding that those implementing provisions are unlawful, it is necessary to examine the admissibility of the plea that those provisions are unlawful and of the plea itself.
41      In that regard, it should be recalled that, under Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.
42      Article 277 TFEU gives expression to a general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge incidentally, with a view to obtaining the annulment of a decision addressed to that party, the validity of acts of general application which form the legal basis of that decision (see judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others, C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).
43      Since the purpose of Article 277 TFEU is not to allow a party to contest the applicability of any act of general application in support of any action whatsoever, the act the legality of which is called in question must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned (see judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others, C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
44      Thus, in an action for annulment brought against individual decisions, the Court of Justice has accepted that the provisions of an act of general application that constitute the basis of those decisions or that have a direct legal connection with such decisions may legitimately form the subject matter of an objection of illegality (see judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others, C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).
45      By contrast, the Court of Justice has held that an objection of illegality covering an act of general application in respect of which the individual decision being challenged does not constitute an implementing measure is inadmissible (see judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others, C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
46      It is in the light of those considerations that it must be determined whether, in the present case, there is a direct legal connection between the contested decision and the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries.
47      In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant confines himself to maintaining that the formal condition, laid down in Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, that the Staff Committee is to be consulted before the adoption of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries was not satisfied. Such a claim was raised after the inquiry conducted against him had been closed and after that inquiry had decided, by the contested decision, to impose a reprimand on him.
48      More specifically, according to the applicant, the fact that eu-LISA did not wait for the constitution of a Staff Committee before adopting the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries means that those provisions were adopted in breach of an ‘essential procedural requirement’. The applicant concludes from this that the Executive Director’s decision of 15 February 2019 to open an administrative inquiry (see paragraph 5 above) and the Executive Director’s decision of 22 May 2019 to extend the scope of that inquiry (see paragraph 7 above), adopted pursuant to the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries, were in turn unlawful. Lastly, he submits that the contested decision, adopted following the inquiry carried out pursuant to the decision of 22 May 2019, must in turn be regarded as unlawful, on the ground that the unlawfulness of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries leads, on the basis of a ‘domino’ effect, to the unlawfulness of the contested decision.
49      However, contrary to what the applicant maintains in his reply to the measure of organisation of procedure, referring to a judgment of the Court partly annulled on appeal (judgment of 2 October 2001, Martinez and Others v Parliament, T‑222/99, T‑327/99 and T‑329/99, EU:T:2001:242, paragraph 135), the recent case-law (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above) does not extend the scope of Article 277 TFEU to any act of the institutions which, in general, is relevant for the adoption of the decision which is the subject of the action for annulment.
50      On the contrary, it is apparent from the case-law (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above) that, in order for a plea of illegality in respect of an act of general application to be held to be admissible, it is necessary to establish a ‘direct legal connection’ between the contested measure and the measure which is the subject of the plea of illegality.
51      In the present case, it must be stated that the contested decision is not in any way based on elements connected with the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries, but only on the infringement of provisions of the Staff Regulations, established in the final inquiry report (see paragraphs 14 and 22 above).
52      The contested decision does not constitute a measure implementing the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries. That decision, as eu-LISA rightly points out, was adopted on the basis of Article 9(1)(b) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and not on the basis of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries.
53      The finding that there is no direct legal connection between the contested decision and the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries is all the more evident if account is also taken of the fact that the Court has held that there must be a close connection between the reasoning of the contested decision and the plea of unlawfulness of the act of general application (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2017, PB v Commission, T‑609/16, EU:T:2017:910, paragraph 29).
54      No close connection can be found between, on the one hand, the grounds of the contested decision, based on a serious breach of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, occasional breaches of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations and breach of Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations (see paragraph 22 above) and, on the other hand, the plea alleging the unlawfulness of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries based on the failure to consult the Staff Committee before the adoption of those provisions.
55      Moreover, it is not apparent from the documents in the file that the failure to consult the Staff Committee before the adoption of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries had any effect on compliance with procedural safeguards during the inquiry, or on the actual content of the contested decision.
56      In that regard, it should be noted that, as will be stated in the analysis of the second plea, alleging infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence and right to be heard, the conduct of the administrative procedure does not reveal any evidence capable of infringing the applicant’s rights of defence (see paragraph 91 below). Moreover, the Executive Director, in the document dated 16 March 2020, states that he examined the applicant’s complete file and concluded that his rights had been respected during the inquiry procedure (see paragraph 22 above).
57      Moreover, Article 110 of the Staff Regulations lays down the requirement that the Staff Committee be consulted before the adoption of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries. However, it is clear from the case-law that the consultation of the Staff Committee, referred to in Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, does not imply that the opinion of that committee is followed (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Murariu v EIOPA, F‑116/14, EU:F:2015:89, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).
58      Thus, the existence of a direct or close legal connection between the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries and the contested decision has not been established.
59      In any event, the fact that the Staff Committee was not consulted is not sufficient to show that the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries could have been different and that the applicant was deprived of procedural safeguards.
60      In addition to the assessment made in paragraph 57 above, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries were ‘draft-reviewed’ by the administrator who was appointed Chair of eu-LISA’s Staff Committee when it was established, namely on 5 November 2014. Thus, to a certain extent, it may be considered that, at the very least, the future Chair of the Staff Committee was able to express his opinion on the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries before they were adopted.
61      In addition, it should be noted that, by letter of 16 June 2014, the Executive Director of eu-LISA made enquiries with the Commission’s Directorate-General for Human Resources concerning, inter alia, the status of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries. On that basis, by decision of 28 July 2014, the Commission authorised eu-LISA to submit those provisions to its Board of Directors so that it could adopt them.
62      Moreover, first, as was appositely pointed out by eu-LISA, the procedure for the adoption of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries ended on 18 October 2014 without any objections from the members of the Management Board composed of representatives of each Member State and of the Commission. Secondly, since its creation, the Staff Committee did not request, during the inquiry in question, that the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries be reviewed, nor did it raise any objections with regard to the wording of those provisions.
63      In the light of the circumstances of the present case, namely that the adoption of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries was authorised by the Commission, that the future Chair of the Staff Committee revised those provisions and that the Staff Committee never asked to review those provisions, the failure to consult the Staff Committee in advance cannot have had any effect on the procedural safeguards enjoyed by the applicant.
64      In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that, in the circumstances of the present case, the existence of a direct legal connection between the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries and the contested decision has not been established. Furthermore, the failure to consult the Staff Committee before the adoption of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries cannot, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 59 to 62 above, have had any impact on the content of those provisions or, consequently, on the lawfulness of the contested decision.
65      The first plea in law must therefore be rejected.
(b)    The second plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to be heard
66      By his second plea, the applicant submits that his rights of defence and his right to be heard were infringed during the administrative inquiry on the ground that the investigator did not wait for his contribution and provided him with crucial reports only after his hearing. Moreover, his observations were systematically ignored.
67      More specifically, with regard to his first interview, the applicant maintains that the record of interview does not represent the ‘extensive/comprehensive transposition’ of his interview and the investigator’s questions. Thus, according to the applicant, it is not certain that all the evidence which he provided was taken into account in the final report on which the contested decision was based.
68      As regards his second interview, first, new evidence against him was sent to him late, on 28 July 2019, by the investigator (see paragraph 9 above). According to the applicant, that information should have been sent to him, at the very least, before his second interview of 16 July 2019. Secondly, the investigator, while expressly informing the applicant of the possibility of submitting additional comments, did not wait for those comments, without any specific reason, and sent his final inquiry report on 10 September 2019 (see paragraph 14 above). In that regard, the applicant points out that he had informed the investigator of the possibility of contacting him in case of an emergency and that eu-LISA also had his contact details. Moreover, leave taken in accordance with the Staff Regulations, of which the investigator had been informed, cannot prejudice his rights. Having regard to the seriousness of the allegations made against him in the preliminary version of the conclusions of the inquiry report (see paragraph 10 above), the opportunity to make comments to rebut those allegations was crucial. However, no comment by the applicant was duly taken into account in the final inquiry report and thus in the contested decision. In that regard, the applicant refers to examples of comments not taken into account in the final inquiry report. Thirdly, a number of statements contained in the preliminary version of the conclusions of the inquiry report and in the final inquiry report were not discussed with the applicant during his second interview.
69      Concerning his hearing on 27 November 2019 (see paragraph 18 above), the applicant submits that it is apparent from his observations on the record thereof that, once again, his contribution was not taken into account. In addition, the applicant disputes the lack of confidentiality of the room in which the hearing took place, arguing that it had transparent glass and was without sound insulation. Lastly, he states that he does not understand the role played by those drafting the record of the hearing, who took part on several occasions during that hearing in order to ask him questions.
70      eu-LISA disputes the arguments raised by the applicant in support of the second plea.
71      It follows from the general principle of EU law of respect for the rights of the defence and, in particular, the right to be heard, enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, that the person concerned must be given the opportunity, before the drawing up of a decision adversely affecting him or her, to make known his or her views effectively on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances on the basis of which that decision was adopted. Furthermore, respect for the right to be heard is required even where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (judgment of 3 July 2014, Kamino International Logistics and Datema Hellmann Worldwide Logistics, C‑129/13 and C‑130/13, EU:C:2014:2041, paragraph 39).
72      In particular, respect for the rights of the defence, of which the inter partes principle is a corollary, requires that an official against whom an EU institution has opened an administrative procedure has been put in a position during that procedure to make known his or her views on the reality and the relevance of the facts, the alleged circumstances and the documents which that institution intends to use against him or her in support of its allegation that there has been an infringement of the provisions of the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2018, Brahma v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑603/16, EU:T:2018:820, not published, paragraphs 158 and 159 and the case-law cited).
73      In the present case, the evidence which, according to the applicant, demonstrates an infringement of his rights of defence are as follows:
–        the investigator did not await his comments on the second version of the record of his interview and therefore published his final inquiry report without taking those comments into account;
–        several matters referred to in the preliminary version of the conclusions of the inquiry report and in the final inquiry report were not mentioned to the applicant during his interviews;
–        the reports of the two members of the security staff were sent to him only at the end of the second interview, whereas an implicit reference to those reports was already contained in the decision of 22 May 2019 to extend the administrative inquiry. Moreover, it was not explained to him how those reports could be produced during the inquiry in compliance with the rules governing the processing and retention of data within the EU institutions and bodies (in particular Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39));
–        the investigator, then the administration systematically ignored his comments, even though they had not changed since the initial request for assistance was made.
74      In the first place, it is clear that, as is apparent from the record of the interview of 4 March 2019, during that first interview, the applicant was able to set out in detail the facts that led him to make a request for assistance and provided specific examples of the alleged acts of harassment committed by A. Furthermore, he was able to submit his comments on the record of his first interview and sign it. The fact that the record of his interview does not represent a comprehensive transcription of his comments does not mean that his rights of defence and right to be heard were infringed. Respect for the rights of the defence and the right to be heard does not mean that an interview is reproduced in full in the record of interview.
75      In the second place, the presence, in the final inquiry report, of information not notified to the applicant during his interviews, if proved, constitutes an infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence only if that alleged information was decisive for the purposes of adopting the contested decision. Not only does the applicant fail to specify what information was not notified to him, but he also does not claim that, if that information had been notified to him, the inquiry could have had a different outcome. In addition, the applicant was given an opportunity to submit comments on several occasions after the final inquiry report was drawn up, in particular at his hearing, and was able to challenge the content of that report before the adoption of the contested decision.
76      In the third place, it appears that the document containing the allegations of two members of the security staff against him was forwarded at the end of his second interview solely in order to inform the applicant of the existence of such a document. On the other hand, it is apparent from the record of the interview of 16 July 2019 that the content of the allegations of two members of the security staff had already been communicated to the applicant during his second interview and that he was able to make his own specific comments in that regard. Therefore, it must be held that, in the light of the circumstances of the present case, the late forwarding, according to the applicant, of the reports of the two members of the security staff did not affect the exercise of his rights of defence.
77      In the fourth place, the fact that the investigator did not wait for the applicant’s comments on the second version of the record of his interview and therefore forwarded his final inquiry report without obtaining those comments does not show, contrary to what the applicant claims, an infringement of his rights of defence.
78      First of all, it should be noted that the applicant was able to comment on the record of his second interview of 16 July 2019. The applicant’s comments gave rise to a new version of the record of that second interview, which was sent to the applicant on 30 August 2019 (see paragraph 12 above).
79      Next, as is rightly pointed out by eu-LISA, Article 4(2) of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries provides that the inquiry panel is to exercise its powers in relation to administrative inquiries in complete independence and that it is not to request or receive instructions. Article 3 of the decision of 15 February 2019 to open an administrative inquiry refers, in the same terms as Article 4(2) of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries, to the powers of the investigator designated for the investigation procedure concerning the applicant. In addition, Article 5 of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries provides as follows:
‘The record of the hearing shall be sent to the staff member concerned by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt for signature. The staff member concerned then forwards the signed letter and/or his/her comments and remarks within 15 calendar days of receipt. Failure to do so within the period shall, except in cases of force majeure, result in the record being considered approved.’
80      Thus, the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries do not require the investigator to wait for a second round of comments before drawing up a final interview record. Furthermore, in order to preserve the independence of the inquiry, eu-LISA was not required to contact the applicant during his leave in order to seek his comments. In addition, in accordance with Article 4(3) of the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries, the inquiry in question had to last for a period appropriate to the circumstances and complexity of the case. As the applicant forwarded his comments on the first version of the record of his interview of 16 July 2019 on 30 August 2019 (see paragraph 11 above), namely more than a month after that record had been sent to him, and having been absent for several weeks on annual leave, the investigator could reasonably consider that it was not necessary to wait for a possible second series of comments before submitting his final inquiry report.
81      Moreover, on 20 October 2019, the applicant nonetheless sent his comments on the second version of the record of his interview. It is true that those comments were made after the final inquiry report had been sent to the administration. However, those comments could be taken into account, on 27 November 2019, at the applicant’s hearing before eu-LISA’s Executive Director, in the presence, by videoconference, of the Senior Legal Officer, the Head of the Human Resources Unit and a legal officer (see paragraph 18 above). Thus, the applicant was able to express his views on that report before the adoption of the contested decision. Lastly, moreover, the applicant himself states that his comments ‘have been constantly the same since the introduction of the initial request for assistance’. Thus, it must be held that his comments on the preliminary version of the conclusions of the inquiry report enabled him to defend his rights.
82      It follows that the applicant was given the opportunity, during the administrative inquiry, that is to say, before the adoption of the decision adversely affecting him, to make his views effectively known as to the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances on the basis of which that decision was adopted.
83      As regards the question whether the rights of the defence were respected after the closure of the administrative inquiry with a view to the adoption of the contested decision, it is apparent from that decision that, by letter of 18 November 2019, the applicant was invited to exercise his right to be heard with regard to the proposed decision to impose a reprimand on him either by attending a hearing on 27 November 2019 or by submitting written comments.
84      On 26 November 2019, the applicant submitted his comments with a view to his hearing, which took place on 27 November 2019. At that hearing, the applicant had the opportunity to submit his comments and to explain the facts and circumstances on the basis of which the Executive Director of eu-LISA intended to impose a reprimand on him. On 9 December 2019, the record of the hearing of 27 November 2019 was sent to the applicant, who submitted his comments within the period of 11 working days, which had been granted to him, that is on 3 January 2020.
85      As is apparent from the contested decision, the Executive Director of eu-LISA expressly assured the applicant that his concerns, his written comments on the procedural aspects of the inquiry and his comments of 3 January 2020 had been taken into consideration. Furthermore, in that decision, the applicant was regularly reminded that the mere submission of comments did not mean that they were accurate, relevant or well founded or that they necessarily had to entail a modification of the administration’s conclusions.
86      As regards the applicant’s argument that the record of his hearing of 27 November 2019 does not correspond to what he stated at that hearing, it should be noted, first, that a record is not supposed to reproduce in full the content of a hearing, but merely to summarise or record what is noted at a meeting. Secondly, since the three agents of eu-LISA who participated at the hearing (see paragraph 18 above) each drafted a record of the meeting, it is clear that the content of the exchanges which took place at the hearing was properly summarised and sent to the applicant on 9 December 2019.
87      Lastly, as regards the lack of confidentiality, alleged by the applicant, of the room in which the hearing took place, first, it should be noted that, in the decision rejecting the complaint, it is stated, without this being disputed by the applicant, that the purpose of the meeting was not disclosed and that no third party could interfere or attend the meeting without having been invited to it.
88      Secondly, it must be stated that the applicant has not adduced evidence of a breach of the confidentiality of his interview. The mere fact that the hearing room was equipped with transparent glass and the assertion that there was no soundproofing cannot, in themselves, suffice to demonstrate that such an infringement was committed.
89      There is therefore no reason to doubt, as eu-LISA states, that no one was aware of the holding of that meeting with the exception of the staff present at the meeting and the secretary of eu-LISA’s Executive Director, or that the security unit which was duly informed, had ensured that the meeting was conducted confidentially.
90      Lastly, the presence of three members of staff, required by eu-LISA’s Executive Director to draft a record and clarify matters of procedure, cannot constitute a breach of the principle of confidentiality or an infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence. The applicant’s argument alleging a lack of confidentiality must therefore be rejected.
91      It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the conduct of the administrative procedure discloses no element which is such as to infringe the applicant’s rights of defence. Moreover, on several occasions, he had the opportunity effectively to make known his views, defend his rights and to be heard before the contested decision was adopted.
92      The second plea in law must therefore be rejected in its entirety.
(c)    Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 12, 12a, 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations, breach of the principle of good administration and ‘manifest errors of assessment’
93      In his third plea, the applicant makes a number of complaints. The first complaint alleges infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, breach of the principle of good administration and ‘manifest errors of assessment’. The second complaint alleges infringement of Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations. The third complaint alleges infringement of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations.
94      Before setting out the arguments put forward in support of the various complaints, the applicant points out that, as is apparent from the contested decision, the reprimand was imposed on him on the ground that he had ‘significantly breached Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, occasionally breached Article 12 of the Staff Regulations and breached Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations’. According to the applicant, those accusations are completely false and based on a misinterpretation of the provisions of the Staff Regulations.
95      eu-LISA disputes the applicant’s arguments.
(1)    The first complaint, alleging infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, breach of the principle of good administration and ‘manifest errors of assessment’
96      First, after recalling the case-law on harassment, in order, in particular, to draw attention to the difference between that type of conduct and a simple work conflict, the applicant submits that it is apparent from the documents which he submitted before the Court that all his communications with A were courteous and motivated by technical questions. According to the applicant, his relationship with A was characterised solely by a difference of opinion on technical issues which could not be regarded as constituting psychological harassment. Moreover, the fact that A was considered guilty of harassment justifies the fact that the applicant draws the administration’s attention to his abnormal conduct towards him.
97      Secondly, the applicant states that despite his repeated notifications, the administration did not act in time and therefore infringed the principle of good administration.
98      Thirdly, according to the applicant, the administration committed errors of assessment resulting from the fact that the concept of harassment meets objective criteria and from the fact that nothing in the final inquiry report proves that his comments against A were unfair accusations and that they bore no relation to objective facts and questions connected with the tasks assigned.
99      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that Article 12a of the Staff Regulations provides as follows:
‘1. Officials shall refrain from any form of psychological or sexual harassment.
2. An official who has been the victim of psychological or sexual harassment shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution. An official who has given evidence on psychological or sexual harassment shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution, provided the official has acted honestly.
3. “Psychological harassment” means any improper conduct that takes place over a period, is repetitive or systematic and involves physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts that are intentional and that may undermine the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of any person.
…’
100    Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the definition set out in Article 12a of the Staff Regulations is based on an objective concept which, even though it is based on a contextual classification of the actions and behaviour of officials and other staff, which is not always straightforward, does not, however, involve making complex assessments of the kind which may arise from economic, scientific or technical concepts which warrant a margin of discretion being afforded to the administrative body in applying the concept in question. Therefore, where it has been alleged that Article 12a of the Staff Regulations was misapplied, it is necessary to examine whether the administration erred in its assessment of the facts in the light of the definition of psychological harassment laid down in that provision, not whether that error is manifest (see judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
101    The concept of ‘psychological harassment’ is defined, in Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, as ‘improper conduct’, first, in the form of physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts, which takes place ‘over a period’ and is ‘repetitive or systematic’, suggesting that psychological harassment must be understood as a process that occurs over time and presupposes the existence of repetitive or continual behaviour which is ‘intentional’, as opposed to ‘accidental’. Secondly, in order to fall under that definition, such physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts must have the effect of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person (judgment of 13 December 2017, HQ v CPVO, T‑592/16, not published, EU:T:2017:897, paragraph 101).
102    It is not necessary to establish that the physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts in question were committed with the intention of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person. In other words, there can be psychological harassment without it being established that there has been any intention on the part of the harasser, by his conduct, to discredit the victim or deliberately impair the latter’s working conditions. It is sufficient that such conduct, provided that it was intentional, led objectively to such consequences (see judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
103    Moreover, as the conduct in question must, under Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, be improper, it follows that the classification of such conduct as ‘harassment’ is subject to the condition of its being sufficient, when viewed objectively, to be considered real, in the sense that an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same situation, would consider the behaviour or act in question to be excessive and open to criticism (see judgment of 9 December 2020, GV v Commission, T‑705/19, not published, EU:T:2020:590, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
104    Lastly, according to the case-law, the obligation to conduct administrative procedures within a reasonable time is a general principle of EU law the observance of which the EU judicature must ensure and which is laid down, as an element of the right to good administration, by Article 41(1) of the Charter (judgments of 11 April 2006, Angeletti v Commission, T‑394/03, EU:T:2006:111, paragraph 162, and of 6 December 2012, Füller-Tomlinson v Parliament, T‑390/10 P, EU:T:2012:652, paragraph 115). Moreover, where the institutions have to deal with an issue as serious as psychological harassment, they have an obligation to respond to an official who makes a request under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations with rapidity and solicitude (see judgment of 11 July 2013, Tzirani v Commission, F‑46/11, EU:F:2013:115, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited).
105    It is in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 100 to 104 above that it is necessary to examine whether the administration erred in its interpretation of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, infringed the principle of good administration and made errors of assessment of the facts in the light of the definition of psychological harassment within the meaning of that provision.
106    In the first place, it is apparent from the contested decision, which refers to the final inquiry report, that, according to several witnesses (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant and A had been involved in a dispute for several years. That situation began in 2013 or 2014 when they were in the former building of eu-LISA. Several instances of conflict were taken into account in that inquiry report.
107    First, the problems which arose in June, July and August 2015 led the investigator to conclude that, although the episodes of conflict between the applicant and A, taken individually, could appear to be of lesser importance, those episodes showed, overall, the excessive and unjustified ‘targeting’ of A during that period by the applicant. Those episodes consisting, in essence, in sending A various emails with several people in copy in order to criticise and highlight the errors made in the course of his work, had, according to the investigator, put pressure on A, adversely affecting his working conditions and affecting his psychological integrity. Combined with other similar episodes over a long period, those episodes may, according to the investigator, be regarded as psychological harassment against A.
108    Secondly, it is apparent from the final inquiry report that the problems which arose in March, April and May 2017 also show that the applicant’s conduct towards A was ‘obstructive’ and pursued the objective of ensuring that the work was carried out in accordance with the manner he had chosen. That attitude of the applicant towards A was also established with regard to other work colleagues. According to the investigator, the applicant’s actions, examined in the final inquiry report, were, irrespective of the intention behind them, ‘professionally and personally obstructive and also belittling, worrying and provocative’. The investigator considered that those actions had adversely affected A’s working conditions and affected his psychological and physical integrity, in the light of the latter’s health problems well known to the applicant. According to the investigator, all those episodes in addition to other similar acts committed by the applicant against A constitute psychological harassment within the meaning of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations.
109    Thirdly, the final inquiry report took into account other problematic episodes which took place in 2017 which show that the applicant continued to complain and call into question A’s work. By way of example, the investigator pointed out that, during a meeting with the Member States in which A carried out his duties as a manager, he was required, according to the applicant, to submit to him any question which was raised without being able to take any initiative. In September 2017, after receiving an email from A indicating the actions he proposed to take after some months of discussion with the Member States, the applicant replied at midnight, in an email highlighting the actions he proposed to take and gave instructions which appeared to exclude A from the procedure in his capacity as the person responsible for that procedure. According to the investigator, by bearing in mind that the applicant knew what had been discussed at length with the Member States and the time at which the applicant’s email had been sent, the applicant’s conduct could not be regarded as purely professional in nature. It is apparent from the final inquiry report that, on the contrary, according to the investigator, it was another way for the applicant to ‘attack’ A, forming part of their ongoing dispute and forming, together with the other episodes, psychological harassment within the meaning of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations.
110    Fourthly, the final inquiry report refers to an episode, dated June 2018, where the applicant who was dissatisfied with A’s participation in a meeting (in which the applicant himself had been unable to participate for personal reasons), did not validate his report and, on the other hand, had time to validate other reports. According to the investigator, the applicant’s conduct, directed against A, was obstructive and was not justified in professional terms.
111    Fifthly, the final inquiry report takes into account the exchanges between the applicant and A that took place in September and October 2018 concerning a request from the Member States to eu-LISA concerning the registration of names with an apostrophe. In that regard, the investigator considers that the answers submitted by the applicant, seeking to criticise and challenge the solutions proposed by A, represent additional provocations and difficulties, targeting A and affecting his working conditions. Those replies, in conjunction with the applicant’s other conduct towards A, infringed, according to the investigator, the duty to refrain from any conduct liable to constitute harassment within the meaning of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations.
112    It should be noted that it is apparent from the final inquiry report that, admittedly, the applicant drew the administration’s attention to A’s abnormal conduct towards him. However, during the inquiry, it was apparent that A had also complained about the applicant’s behaviour to the Human Resources Department. More specifically, A regarded as provocative and obstructive the applicant’s conduct of sending emails following his dispatch of work which contained criticisms and negative comments on that work without proposing any solutions.
113    The applicant has not put forward any arguments capable of showing that the investigator was wrong to consider that all the emails containing criticisms and objections, combined with other actions on the part of the applicant, over a long period, appeared to be aggression directed against A going beyond what was permissible in the context of professional relations. Nor has the applicant demonstrated that the conduct taken into account by the investigator could be objectively justified and, as such, was not liable to have an unacceptable effect on A’s psychological integrity and to constitute harassment. The fact that the exchanges between the applicant and A did not contain insults about him is not sufficient to rule out the possibility that they could, as a whole, constitute harassment.
114    Consideration of the inquiry report shows that the investigator did not misinterpret Article 12a of the Staff Regulations and correctly considered that he had sufficient evidence allowing him to take the view that the applicant had contributed to increasing tension with A.
115    The ‘courteous’ appearance of the emails sent by the applicant to A is not sufficient to refute the investigator’s finding that those emails were obstructing A’s work and could not be regarded as being merely linked to ‘purely technical issues’.
116    Similarly, the fact that the applicant does not understand the way in which his conduct was perceived by A, in other words, the fact that he does not acknowledge his intention to harm, criticise, target, in particular A, does not cast doubt, first, on the investigator’s assessments and, secondly, on those of the administration, according to which those exchanges between the applicant and A had the effect of discrediting A and impairing his working conditions (see paragraph 102 above).
117    Lastly, contrary to what the applicant appears to claim, the finding of harassment against him is not based on A’s subjective perception, but is objective in nature resulting from the assessment of an independent and impartial third party. That finding is the result of an inquiry which revealed, on the basis of witness accounts, the origins of the conflict between the applicant and A and the applicant’s attitude towards A. The examination of numerous episodes, described in the final inquiry report and briefly referred to in paragraphs 107 to 111 above, permits the inference that the investigator was entitled to take the view that the applicant’s conduct, committed intentionally, had led objectively to a deterioration in A’s working conditions and had discredited A. The fact that the applicant did not intend to discredit A or to impair his working conditions is not relevant for the purposes of excluding the existence of harassment (see paragraphs 102 and 116 above).
118    In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the applicant has not put forward any arguments capable of demonstrating that the administration erred in its assessment of the facts or misinterpreted Article 12a of the Staff Regulations when it considered that his conduct constituted harassment in respect of A within the meaning of that provision.
119    In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging infringement of the principle of good administration and based on the fact that, notwithstanding his numerous notifications, the administration did not intervene rapidly, it is important to note the following.
120    It has already been held that the fact that the administration did not reply with the promptness required to a request for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations cannot, of itself, affect the lawfulness of the decision adopted following that request for assistance. If such a decision were to be annulled solely on the ground that it was late, the fresh decision that would be required to replace it could not in any case be less late than the annulled decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013, Tzirani v Commission, F‑46/11, EU:F:2013:115, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited).
121    In any event, in view of the circumstances of the present case and the fact that, from 21 October 2018, the date on which the applicant made a request for assistance, to 15 February 2019, the date of the decision to open an administrative inquiry (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above), account must be taken of periods of end-of-year leave, the period of less than four months does not appear unreasonable.
122    The applicant’s argument alleging breach of the principle of good administration must therefore be rejected.
123    The first complaint of the third plea must therefore be rejected.
(2)    The second complaint, alleging infringement of Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations
124    The applicant maintains that he clearly did not infringe Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations and that the interpretation of those provisions in the decision rejecting the complaint is incorrect and must lead to its annulment.
125    As regards the alleged infringement of Article 17 of the Staff Regulations, the applicant submits that the scope of Article 17 of the Staff Regulations is strictly limited to the disclosure of information related to the performance of duties. He did not transmit to the police (see paragraph 3 above) any ‘information’ received in the line of duty. Furthermore, eu-LISA has not shown which information relating to the applicant’s performance of his duties was disclosed. The applicant has stated only that he feared for his physical integrity and that of his family, in the private sphere outside eu-LISA.
126    According to the applicant, he informed eu-LISA in advance of A’s reprehensible conduct, as is apparent from the various emails produced before the Court. It is in particular the case that he did not receive a reply from the administration, which led him, first, to lodge his request for assistance and, secondly, to inform the police of his situation, on the ground that he had a legitimate fear for his physical integrity and that of his family.
127    As regards the alleged infringement of Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, the applicant submits that making a declaration in a police incident log – a fortiori concerning a matter relating to the private sphere – cannot be regarded as being tantamount to ‘disclosing in any legal proceedings’ information brought to his knowledge in the performance of his duties. According to the applicant, a police officer or a person performing an administrative function at the reception of a police station cannot be regarded as a judicial authority. It follows that there is no obligation to submit an application to the Executive Director for permission to file a judicial complaint.
128    eu-LISA disputes the applicant’s arguments.
129    As a preliminary point, first, it should be recalled that Article 17 of the Staff Regulations is worded as follows:
‘1. An official shall refrain from any unauthorised disclosure of information received in the line of duty, unless that information has already been made public or is accessible to the public.
2. An official shall continue to be bound by this obligation after leaving the service.’
130    Article 19 of the Staff Regulations provides as follows:
‘An official shall not, without permission from the appointing authority, disclose on any grounds whatever, in any legal proceedings, information of which he has knowledge by reason of his duties. Permission shall be refused only where the interests of the Union so require and such refusal would not entail criminal consequences as far as the official is concerned. An official shall continue to be bound by this obligation after leaving the service.
The provisions of the first paragraph shall not apply to an official or former official giving evidence before the Court of Justice of the European Union or before the Disciplinary Board of an institution on a matter concerning a servant or former servant of the European Union.’
131    Secondly, it is apparent from the final inquiry report and the preliminary version of the conclusions of the investigator (see paragraph 10 above) as referred to by the applicant in his complaint of 9 April 2020:
‘Members of staff of the [European Union] cannot, in relation to matter[s] arising at work, just report the matter to an external legal authority such as the police, thus starting a form of external legal procedure. This kind of action in such circumstances requires the authorisation of the Appointing Authority under two provisions of the [Staff Regulations], Article 17 and Article 19. There was nothing to stop [the applicant] asking the Appointing Authority for permission, which he might have received, but he did not do so, contrary to his obligations.’
132    Thirdly, it is apparent from the decision rejecting the complaint that it was established that the applicant had contacted the French police and that the fact that that step had been taken on the ground that he feared for his physical integrity or that of his family did not call into question the fact that he had not previously informed eu-LISA or requested permission and that he had therefore infringed the Staff Regulations.
133    In the first place, it is necessary to assess whether Articles 17 and 19 cover situations where an official approaches the police to report a conflictual relationship with a colleague.
134    In that regard, it has been held that the authorisation scheme laid down in Article 17 of the Staff Regulations was intended to enable the administration to ensure that the disclosure of information, received by an official in the line of duty, would not harm the interests of the Union by affecting, inter alia, its functioning and reputation. The authorisation scheme established by Article 17 of the Staff Regulations is therefore intended to enable the administration to ensure, in good time, that officials regulate their conduct with due regard to the interests of the institutions and their obligations under Article 339 TFEU. That authorisation scheme therefore seeks, inter alia, to preserve the relationship of trust which should exist between the institutions and their staff. Its implementation requires a balancing of the various interests at stake in order to determine whether the Union’s interests or the public interest in receiving information should prevail (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 January 2011, Strack v Commission, F‑132/07, EU:F:2011:4, paragraphs 71 and 72). Thus, Article 17 of the Staff Regulations is intended to recall, inter alia, the obligation incumbent on an official to respect professional secrecy and imposes, in particular, the obligation to request permission to disclose information which is by its very nature covered by professional secrecy.
135    It follows that Article 17 of the Staff Regulations does not cover the situation where an official approaches the police in order to report a conflictual relationship with a colleague at his place of work. The reference to Article 17 of the Staff Regulations in the contested decision is therefore incorrect.
136    As regards the scope of Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, as defined in the first sentence of that article, it should be noted that, admittedly, the expression ‘faire état en justice’ in that provision gave rise to different language versions. The English version uses the general expression ‘disclos[e] in any legal proceeding’, whereas the Spanish, Italian and German versions use, respectively, the more specific expressions ‘revelar en un procedimiento judicial’ (disclose in court proceedings), ‘deporre in giudizio’ (to testify) and ‘vor Gericht vorbringen oder … aussagen’ (submit before the court or … testify).
137    However, first, it has been held that the scope of Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, as defined in the first sentence of that article, could not be interpreted restrictively so as to cover only the case of an official called upon to give evidence in legal proceedings. The scope of that article covers all situations in which an official is called upon to disclose in legal proceedings, ‘in whatever capacity’, information acquired by reason of that official’s duties, without making a distinction between the use of such information in the course of giving evidence or in the context of the bringing of legal proceedings before a national court, for example, the lodging of a criminal complaint (judgment of 13 June 2002, Ferrer de Moncada v Commission, T‑74/01, EU:T:2002:158, paragraph 48). The situation of an official called upon to give evidence in legal proceedings is therefore not the only situation covered by Article 19 of the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2002, Ferrer de Moncada v Commission, T‑74/01, EU:T:2002:158, paragraph 49).
138    Secondly, it must be observed that, in several Member States, the police may play a role of a judicial nature and, in particular, act at the request of a court. Moreover, contacting the police may prove necessary, or even indispensable, in order to bring legal proceedings. Lastly, a report made to the police may give rise to court proceedings or may be used in court proceedings.
139    Although it must be recognised that, to a certain extent, Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations both pursue the objective of ensuring compliance with the duty of confidentiality and, thus, of involving the institution concerned in the event of external disclosure of information which the official is privy to on account of his duties, it is nevertheless necessary to distinguish between the respective scope of those articles. Article 17 of the Staff Regulations is intended to avoid affecting the functioning and reputation of an institution and is applicable to cases in which an official wishes to disclose information which, by its very nature, is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.
140    On the other hand, Article 19 of the Staff Regulations covers the situation in which an official wishes to disclose in legal proceedings facts related to a conflictual relationship in the workplace which are not, by their nature, covered by professional secrecy, but which could affect the functioning and reputation of an institution.
141    It should be noted that Article 19 of the Staff Regulations expressly provides for a single exception to the rule that prior authorisation must be given in order to be able to disclose in legal proceedings information acquired by an official on account of that official’s duties, namely where the official or former official is called upon to give evidence before the Court of Justice of the European Union or before the Disciplinary Board of an institution, in a case concerning a member of staff or former member of staff of the European Union.
142    Furthermore, it is apparent from the restrictive wording of the second sentence of Article 19 of the Staff Regulations (see paragraph 130 above) that the ‘interests of the Union’ which, under that article, may justify a refusal of permission to disclose in legal proceedings work-related information must necessarily be interests of considerable importance which are vital to the European Union (see judgment of 13 June 2002, Ferrer de Moncada v Commission, T‑74/01, EU:T:2002:158, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). Thus, the situations in which authorisation may be refused are strictly limited.
143    Finally, it also follows from those restrictive references to Article 19 of the Staff Regulations and from the lack of formal requirements to request permission to disclose information which the official has knowledge by reason of that official’s duties that the official or other member of staff cannot be required to obtain prior permission in situations where there is certain degree of seriousness and urgency, in particular in cases where there is an imminent danger to the official or staff member concerned.
144    In the second place, as regards whether, in the present case, the applicant infringed Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, first, it must be stated that he cannot maintain that the incident which took place with a colleague following a discussion conducted in a way which was indeed questionable, must be regarded as detached from the performance of his duties within eu-LISA and as not satisfying the criterion that it was received in the line of duty.
145    In that regard, it is apparent from the description of the incident given by the applicant himself that A returned to his office in order to discuss work matters with another colleague and that the applicant, without having been requested by A, intervened in the discussion and was thus the instigator of A’s reaction, which consisted of expressing his disagreement with the applicant’s intervention and brandishing a chair in front of him.
146    Secondly, it must be observed that the facts reported by the applicant to the police were not already in the public domain. Thus, the applicant was required to refrain from any disclosure of the situation which had arisen in the offices of eu-LISA in the performance of his duties, where he had not been given prior authorisation.
147    Thirdly, as regards the applicant’s argument that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, in an email of 16 June 2017, he had warned eu-LISA of the wrongful acts committed by A, it should be noted that the acts which the applicant reported to the police took place on 19 October 2018. Thus, that email cannot be regarded either as prior notice to eu-LISA or as a request for authorisation relating to events which occurred on that date.
148    Moreover, the applicant’s email of 19 October 2018 reporting the incident which occurred on that day with A does not inform eu-LISA that he intended to report the incident to the police, nor does it contain a request for authorisation in that regard.
149    Fourthly, it should be noted that, contrary to what the applicant claims, specific information was given to the French police, who, as eu-LISA states, called the applicant’s office and asked to speak to him about the facts which he had reported concerning A’s aggressive behaviour threatening him by brandishing a chair.
150    Fifthly, as was rightly stated in the final inquiry report, there were no obstacles to the applicant requesting prior authorisation from eu-LISA and to receiving such authorisation. It is clear, first, that the applicant was not faced with imminent danger and, secondly, that the possibilities, referred to in Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, of refusing him that permission were very limited (see paragraph 142 above).
151    It follows that, even if it is accepted that, in certain circumstances and, in particular, in order to approach the police to report facts occurring in the workplace, it may be legitimate to derogate from the scheme of prior authorisation referred to in Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, that was not the case here, in particular because there was no imminent danger to the applicant.
152    It must therefore be held that, in so far as the applicant, without seeking prior authorisation from eu-LISA, disclosed, outside that organisation, events which took place during the performance of his duties within eu-LISA, the administration was entitled to take the view that he had infringed Article 19 of the Staff Regulations.
153    In the light of all the foregoing, the second complaint of the third plea is well founded in part, namely in so far as it alleges an error of interpretation and application of Article 17 of the Staff Regulations. However, that error, contained in the contested decision, has no effect on the lawfulness of that decision and cannot, in itself, lead to its annulment. The finding of an infringement against the applicant, consisting of not having requested permission before contacting the police, is correctly based on Article 19 of the Staff Regulations.
(3)    The third complaint, alleging infringement of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations
154    The applicant submits that he did not infringe Article 12 of the Staff Regulations and that the interpretation of that provision in the contested decision is incorrect and must lead to the annulment of the contested decision.
155    More specifically, as regards the alleged incidents with security staff in front of the gates to eu-LISA, the applicant claims that he explained, during his second interview and in his written comments on the draft record of the interview and the preliminary version of the conclusions of the inquiry report, that those allegations were incorrect. The reports of those security staff do not mention any insults. Thus, according to the applicant, no tangible evidence of insults addressed to the security staff was produced during the inquiry and the decision rejecting the complaint does not provide any new information on that issue.
156    In addition, the applicant submits that he made a polite request to the security staff to open the gates so that he could leave in his car. Next, he himself reported at the counter to which the security staff were assigned that he had had to wait for longer in front of the gates than would be considered normal. Thus, had he been aggressive and disrespectful towards the security staff, he would not have reported the problem concerning the opening of the gate himself.
157    In addition, the applicant points out that, although the inquiry report mentions that incidents with the security staff were sufficiently significant for his Head of Unit to be informed of them, he was never informed by the Head of Unit of an incident with the security staff. In addition, the applicant complains that he had to wait after his second interview on 16 July 2019 in order to be sent the reports of the security staff. Thus, the applicant questions what was reported to the Head of Unit and the reason why he was never asked previously to provide his explanations and his own version of the facts.
158    The applicant also questions why the alleged ‘sufficiently significant incidents’ referred to in the inquiry report were not dealt with immediately. That would have enabled the CCTV recording to be viewed. Moreover, the fact that the two members of the security staff in question no longer work for eu-LISA makes it even more difficult to assess the veracity of their allegations.
159    Lastly, the applicant questions how it came to be that those reports were included among the issues addressed in the extension of the mandate for the inquiry of 22 May 2019. They are far removed from questions linked to A. Furthermore, the use and retention of those reports raise questions as to compliance with the rules governing data protection within the EU institutions.
160    eu-LISA disputes the applicant’s arguments.
161    As a preliminary point, first, it should be borne in mind that, according to Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, ‘an official shall refrain from any action or behaviour which might reflect adversely upon his position’.
162    Secondly, it should be noted that it is apparent from the final inquiry report that the applicant infringed Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, on the ground that he engaged in inappropriate conduct not only with regard to A, but also in respect of two members of eu-LISA’s security staff when there was a delay in the opening of eu-LISA’s entrance gates.
163    In the first place, it must be observed that the evidence used by the investigator, namely the testimony of the applicant’s Head of Unit and the statements of the security staff, shows that, despite the fact that the applicant considers that he did not insult the security staff, his conduct was not acceptable. In addition, the decision rejecting the complaint rightly states that, during the applicant’s first interview, the investigator noted that, in his request for assistance, several important details were missing and that those matters were relevant to the ongoing inquiry. That was the reason for extending the inquiry, carried out in May 2019, of which the applicant was duly informed.
164    In the second place, as is apparent from the final inquiry report, violent disputes between the applicant and A had already taken place in 2013 and 2014 when they worked in the former building of eu-LISA. In the final inquiry report, it is stated that the applicant called into question the exact dates of events and not their existence. That report also states that, at the time, the applicant requested a change of office and his request was granted. In the final inquiry report, it is stated, moreover, that the quarrels between the applicant and A, which were sufficiently angry, serious and annoying, constituted an infringement, albeit minor, of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations.
165    In the third place, as regards the events concerning the security staff, the final inquiry report states that the applicant shouted or behaved inappropriately towards them on two separate occasions. According to that report, even assuming that, as the applicant claims, it was possible to control how wide the entrance gates were opened and therefore that the gates were not opened wide enough for his car to enter, that does not justify the applicant’s conduct towards the security staff. The inquiry report concludes on this point that there were no grounds for not believing that the applicant had shouted at the security staff and that such conduct with regard to persons outside eu-LISA affected its image and did not comply with the conditions laid down in Article 12 of the Staff Regulations.
166    Under Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, the conduct of a staff member of an international public service must be irreproachable in relation to persons outside that service and must not affect the reputation of the European Union. In other words, that behaviour must correspond to an image of dignity consistent with the particularly correct and respectable behaviour which may be expected of members of the international civil service.
167    In the present case, the existence of the applicant’s blameworthy conduct cannot be ruled out, as the applicant claims, on the basis of the provisions on data protection. On the contrary, in the context of an inquiry, it may be legitimate to protect witnesses and not to reveal the identity of witnesses.
168    First, both the decision rejecting the complaint and the final inquiry report state that the applicant had been aggressive and had behaved inappropriately on two occasions towards security staff at eu-LISA’s main entrance, in breach of his obligations under Article 12 of the Staff Regulations. Those documents also show that the applicant’s conduct was reported by the staff members in question to the administration at the material time.
169    Secondly, the reasons given by the applicant both at the inquiry stage and at the time of his complaint were taken into account and were not considered sufficiently convincing to lead the administration to question the accuracy of the reports. On the contrary, the administration maintained that the applicant’s attitude towards third parties, which undermined eu-LISA’s image, infringed Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, which provides that international civil servants must ensure that their conduct is beyond reproach.
170    The applicant’s arguments that he was polite and did not insult the security staff when he asked them to open the gates in order to leave and that he himself reported at the counter to which the security staff were assigned that he had to wait in front of the gates for a longer period are not capable of rebutting the allegations of the two members of staff and also the fact that those two members of staff reported the events in question to the applicant’s Head of Unit at the material time.
171    The fact that the applicant was not informed of those allegations before his second interview, however regrettable that may be, is irrelevant. That lack of information is due to the fact that, during his first interview, the applicant was heard as a victim whereas, during his second interview, he was heard as an alleged harasser on account of new evidence gathered during the course of the inquiry.
172    As is apparent from the applicant’s comments on the reports of the two members of the security staff, he was able to submit his comments on those reports and on the record of his second interview, thus fully exercising his rights of defence. However, the applicant’s evidence and comments do not refute the allegations which led both the investigator and the administration to consider that he had infringed Article 12 of the Staff Regulations.
173    Lastly, as regards the applicant’s argument that the events concerning the security staff are not relevant for the purpose of assessing his relationship with A, it must be observed that it was considered that he had infringed Article 12 of the Staff Regulations not only because of the past disputes with A, which he had omitted to mention during his first interview, but also on account of incidents with the security staff, namely his inappropriate or offensive behaviour towards those staff members due to a delay in opening the entrance gates, which showed his public attitude not to be in conformity with the requirements referred to in that provision.
174    It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not shown that eu-LISA was wrong to consider that he had infringed Article 12 of the Staff Regulations.
175    The third complaint of the third plea must therefore be rejected, as must the plea in law in its entirety.
(d)    The fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials
176    By his fourth plea, the applicant claims that the investigator turned back against him the harassment committed by A in the performance of his duties. He objects particularly to the fact that, as a victim, he has become an alleged perpetrator.
177    The area in which A interfered in the applicant’s work was that of professional objectives set by his management According to the applicant, it is possible to question the reasons for that conduct, which the investigator did not do. However, the applicant recalls that, in June 2017, A told him, in front of several witnesses, that, ‘this time you were lucky’. The applicant adds that that may also lead to questioning A’s real motivation and reasons for always reporting, in messages to Human Resources, their technical communication that he considered unsatisfactory, without providing any information on the reasons for the applicant’s reaction to his messages.
178    The applicant submits, in essence, that when the contested decision was adopted the mitigating circumstances were not duly taken into consideration.
179    According to the applicant, there is no doubt that A is actually guilty of the acts which the applicant reported in his request for assistance, as stated in the decision closing the inquiry. Since the applicant never acted in a reprehensible manner and always confined himself to protecting himself against A’s wrongful conduct, it is unfair that he should be penalised. More specifically, the fact of having been penalised, when he was originally the victim in the present case, is contrary to Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and constitutes a flagrant breach by the administration of its duty to have regard for the welfare of officials. The hierarchy of eu-LISA, first, deliberately ignored the warning email which the applicant sent to it in June 2017 and, secondly, adopted a strategy of avoidance leading to the occurrence of the October 2018 incident.
180    Lastly, the fact that A was promoted at the end of 2017 and became a member of the temporary staff at grade AD 8 blatantly illustrates the breach of the duty to have regard to the applicant’s welfare.
181    eu-LISA disputes the applicant’s arguments.
182    As a preliminary point, first, it should be recalled that Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations provides as follows:
‘The severity of the disciplinary penalties imposed shall be commensurate with the seriousness of the misconduct. To determine the seriousness of the misconduct and to decide upon the disciplinary penalty to be imposed, account shall be taken in particular of:
(a)      the nature of the misconduct and the circumstances in which it occurred …’
183    Secondly, it should be noted that, in the decision closing the inquiry, the following is stated:
‘With regard to [A], he was found to have breached Articles 11 and 12 of the [Staff Regulations]. A similar procedure took place and [A] was also disciplined: a measure of reprimand was also applied to him as foreseen in Article 11 of Annex IX to the [Staff Regulations].’
184    Thirdly, while not mentioned in the Staff Regulations, the administration’s duty to have regard to the welfare of its staff reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations established by the Staff Regulations in the relationship between a public authority and its staff. That duty, together with the principle of good administration implies in particular that when it takes a decision concerning the position of a staff member, it should take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and that when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the staff member concerned (see judgment of 6 May 2019, Mauritsch v INEA, T‑271/18, not published, EU:T:2019:286, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
185    Primarily, in the first place, it should be noted that A, like the applicant, was given a reprimand. By imposing a disciplinary penalty on A following the applicant’s request for assistance, eu-LISA did acknowledge that the applicant was also a victim.
186    Nevertheless, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, the investigator did not turn the inquiry against him. As has already been explained, during the inquiry, it became apparent that the applicant could have failed to fulfil his duties under Articles 11, 12, 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations, which justified the adoption of a decision to extend the original subject matter of the inquiry (see paragraph 7 above).
187    Furthermore, the administrative inquiry conducted against A does not fall within the scope of the present action for annulment of the contested decision.
188    The applicant’s assertion that it would be unfair to impose a disciplinary penalty on him in so far as he always conducted himself appropriately and merely protected himself against reprehensible conduct on the part of A cannot be accepted. Therefore, as is apparent from the reply to the first complaint of the third plea (see paragraphs 106 to 118 above), the applicant’s conduct in relation to A was not beyond reproach and was, rightly, regarded as psychological harassment.
189    The applicant claims that eu-LISA infringed the principle of care by failing to take into account, in the contested decision, the general context of the case, including alleged extenuating circumstances.
190    Although the Staff Regulations do not lay down any fixed relationship between the disciplinary measures stated and the various types of misconduct on the part of officials and do not state the extent to which aggravating or mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in the choice of penalty, compliance with Article 47 of the Charter presupposes that a ‘penalty’ imposed by an administrative authority which does not itself satisfy the conditions laid down in that article must be subject to the subsequent review of a judicial body which has the power to assess fully the proportionality between the misconduct and the penalty (see judgment of 15 May 2012, Nijs v Court of Auditors, T‑184/11 P, EU:T:2012:236, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2010, Andreasen v Commission, T‑17/08 P, EU:T:2010:374, paragraphs 146 and 147; ECtHR, 31 March 2015, Andreasen v. the United Kingdom and 26 other Member States of the European Union, CE:ECHR:2015:0331DEC002882711, § 73). In that regard, the EU judicature ascertains, inter alia, whether the disciplinary authority weighed up aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a proportionate manner (judgment of 16 March 2004, Afari v ECB, T‑11/03, EU:T:2004:77, paragraph 203).
191    Article 9 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations lists the penalties which may be imposed on staff by the appointing authority. It is apparent from that list that the penalty chosen, namely a reprimand, corresponds to the second level on the scale of gravity of penalties.
192    In the present case, the penalty of a reprimand does not seem disproportionate, in view of the fact that the applicant’s conduct has, inter alia, harmed the reputation and dignity of eu-LISA.
193    Lastly, the fact that, for reasons which are not, moreover, specified by the applicant, A was promoted to grade AD 8 at the end of 2017 does not show that the administration did not take into account and did not grant the applicant’s request for assistance made approximately one year later, that is to say, on 19 October 2018, in breach of the duty by which it was bound to have regard for the welfare of officials.
194    It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not shown that the imposition on him of the penalty of a reprimand was an infringement of Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.
195    In the light of the foregoing considerations, the fourth plea in law must be rejected, as must the claim for annulment of the contested decision in its entirety.
B.      The claim for damages
196    The applicant considers that he suffered significant non-material harm due to a feeling of grave injustice, discouragement and anxiety caused by the contested decision since he was unlawfully penalised by a disciplinary reprimand and his professional reputation was seriously tarnished.
197    The applicant produced a medical certificate before the Court to show that he suffered significant harm as a result of the 19 October 2018 incident, since his doctor placed him on sick leave from 22 to 26 October 2018 on account of an anxiety disorder.
198    The applicant claims that the compensation for the non-material damage which he claims to have suffered should be fixed, ex aequo et bono, at EUR 5 000.
199    eu-LISA disputes the merits of that claim.
200    Suffice it to note that, according to settled case-law, claims for compensation for damage must be dismissed where they are closely linked to claims for annulment, which have themselves been dismissed as unfounded or inadmissible (see judgment of 24 March 2021, BK v EASO, T‑277/19, not published, EU:T:2021:161, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited).
201    Since all the pleas in law relied on by the applicant in support of his action for annulment have been rejected, his claim for compensation, which is closely linked to the claim for annulment, must also be dismissed as unfounded.
202    In any event, the European Union can be held liable for damages only if a number of conditions are satisfied as regards the illegality of the allegedly wrongful act committed by the institution, the actual harm suffered and the existence of a causal link between the act and the damage alleged to have been suffered. Those three conditions are cumulative, which means that if one of them is not satisfied the European Union cannot be held non-contractually liable (see judgment of 8 November 2018, QB v ECB, T‑827/16, EU:T:2018:756, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited).
203    In the present case, as regards the first condition, it follows from the Court’s response to the claim for annulment of the contested decision that the applicant has not demonstrated misconduct on the part of eu-LISA. The plea alleging that the implementing provisions concerning administrative inquiries were unlawful was rejected (see paragraphs 41 to 65 above). It was found that the applicant’s rights of defence were respected throughout the proceedings (see paragraphs 74 to 92 above). Moreover, in paragraph 118 above, it was found that eu-LISA had not misinterpreted and misapplied Article 12a of the Staff Regulations and had not committed an error of assessment. In paragraph 122 above, it was held that eu-LISA had not breached the principle of good administration. In paragraphs 152 and 174 above, it was held that eu-LISA had not misinterpreted and misapplied, first, Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations and, secondly, Article 12 of the Staff Regulations. Finally, as stated in paragraph 194 above, the applicant has not shown that eu-LISA infringed Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.
204    Since the applicant has not therefore shown that the conduct of eu-LISA was unlawful, the first condition for the administration to incur liability is not satisfied. Since the three conditions to be satisfied in order for eu-LISA to incur liability are cumulative, the claim for compensation for the non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant must be dismissed.
205    In the light of the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
IV.    Costs
206    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must, having regard to the form of order sought by eu-LISA, be ordered to pay the costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders NV to pay the costs.
Gervasoni
Madise
Martín y Pérez de Nanclares
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 March 2022.
E. Coulon
Registrar
President
Table of contents
I. Background to the dispute
II. Procedure and forms of order sought
III. Law
A. The claims for annulment
1. The application for annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint;
2. The application for annulment of the contested decision
(a) The first plea, alleging the illegality of the implementing provisions concerning inquiries
(b) The second plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to be heard
(c) Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 12, 12a, 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations, breach of the principle of good administration and ‘manifest errors of assessment’
(1) The first complaint, alleging infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, breach of the principle of good administration and ‘manifest errors of assessment’
(2) The second complaint, alleging infringement of Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations
(3) The third complaint, alleging infringement of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations
(d) The fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials
B. The claim for damages
IV. Costs
*      Language of the case: English.
1      This judgment is published by extracts.