61994TO0331_EN
Parties
Grounds
Operative part
Parties
In Case T-331/94 DEP,
IPK-München GmbH,
established in Munich (Germany), represented by H.‑J. Prieß, lawyer,
applicant,
v
Commission of the European Communities,
represented by J. Grunwald, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg,
defendant,
APPLICATION for taxation of costs made in response to the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-331/94 IPK-München
v Commission
[2001] ECR II‑779,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Third Chamber),
composed of M. Jaeger, President, J. Azizi and
E. Cremona, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Grounds
Facts and procedure
1. On 13 October 1994, the applicant started proceedings before the Court of First Instance for annulment of the Commission’s decision of 3 August 1994 refusing to pay EUR 212 000, the balance of financial assistance granted to the applicant in connection with its Ecodata project to create a databank on ecological tourism in Europe (‘the Ecodata project’ or ‘the project’).
2. By its judgment of 15 October 1997 in Case T-331/94 IPK v Commission [1997] ECR II-1665 (‘the judgment of 1997’), the Court of First Instance dismissed the application. On 22 December 1997, the applicant brought an appeal against the judgment of 1997. The Court of Justice, in its judgment in Case C‑433/97 P IPK-München v Commission [1999] ECR I-6795 (‘the judgment of 1999’), set aside the judgment of 1997, referred the case back to the Court of First Instance and reserved the costs.
3. By its judgment of 6 March 2001 in Case T-331/94 IPK-München
v Commission [2001] ECR II-779 (the ‘judgment of 2001’), the Court of First Instance granted the application and held that the Commission was to pay its own costs and also all the costs incurred by the applicant before the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice.
4. By judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004 in Joined Cases C‑199/01 P and C‑200/01 P IPK-München and Commission
[2004] ECR I-4627, the appeals brought by the applicant and the Commission against the judgment of 2001 were dismissed and the Court of Justice ordered each party to bear its own costs in the appeal.
5. By letter of 30 July 2004, the applicant informed the Commission that its recoverable costs pursuant to the operative part of the judgment of 2001 came to EUR 38 373.99.
6. By letter of 22 September 2004, the Commission rejected the applicant’s request for payment on the ground that the relevant points of law had already been discussed during the pre-litigation procedure. The Commission took the view that only the costs of legal advice, amounting to EUR 13 000, were recoverable.
7. By document lodged with the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 25 October 2004, the applicant made an application for taxation of costs pursuant to Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
Forms of order sought
8. The applicant claims that the Court should set the amount of recoverable costs at EUR 38 373.99 or, in the alternative, as it considers to be equitable.
9. The Commission claims that the Court should set the amount of recoverable costs at EUR 13 000 or, in the alternative, as it considers to be appropriate.
Law
1. Arguments of the parties
Arguments of the applicant
Details of the applicant’s costs
10. According to the applicant, the costs of EUR 38 373.99 which it is seeking for the cases leading to the judgments of 1997 and 2001 before the Court of First Instance and for that leading to the judgment of 1999 before the Court of Justice comprise the following.
– For the proceedings before
the Court of First Instance up to the judgment of 1997
11. The applicant states that it agreed with its lawyers to pay fixed fees of BEF 630 000, that is, EUR 15 617.29, plus expenses, for putting its case in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance up to delivery of the judgment of 1997. To that end, it attaches two invoices, for BEF 315 000 and DEM 15 000 respectively.
12. According to the applicant, the payment of BEF 630 000 was for the following: draft application (60 pages), draft reply (80 pages), preparing for the hearing (including the response to questions from the Court, verification of the report for the hearing and the draft oral arguments), participation in the hearing and correspondence with the client and the Court.
13. The applicant also attaches two invoices detailing the expenses incurred for these proceedings. That of 26 October 1995 includes the following expenses: bank charges (BEF 745), postal charges (BEF 1 087), travel to Luxembourg (13 October 1994 and 18 April 1995 – BEF 9 074), expenses for searching databases (BEF 455) and telecommunications charges (BEF 9 094). The invoice of 14 July 1997 includes the following: copying (BEF 379), messenger expenses (BEF 661), fax charges (BEF 1 026) and travel (Mr H.‑J. Prieß, travel to Luxembourg on 24 and 25 June 1997 – BEF 33 032).
14. The applicant therefore considers that the total of expenses and fees incurred in putting its case in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance up to delivery of the judgment of 1997 is BEF 685 553, that is, EUR 16 994.41.
– For the proceedings before the Court of Justice up to the judgment of 1999
15. For putting its case before the Court of Justice in the appeal that led to the judgment of 1999, the applicant states that it agreed with its lawyers to pay fixed fees of BEF 307 500, that is, EUR 7 622.73, plus expenses.
16. According to the applicant, the payment of BEF 307 500 was to pay its lawyers for the draft appeal and for letters to it and to the Court.
17. In addition, in an invoice of 31 December 1999, the applicant details the expenses incurred for these proceedings. The invoice lists the following: bank charges (BEF 560), copying (BEF 5 140), postal charges (BEF 81), telecommunications charges (BEF 2 441), taxi expenses (BEF 440) and travel (Mr Andrade, travel to Luxembourg on 22 December 1997 – BEF 3 399). In its application, the applicant states that Mr Andrade’s travel expenses were incurred when lodging the appeal at the Court.
18. In all, the applicant considers that, for the first appeal to the Court of Justice leading to the judgment of 1999, it paid out BEF 319 561, that is, EUR 7 921.71, by way of fees and expenses.
– For the proceedings before the Court of First Instance up to the judgment of 2001
19. For putting its case in bringing proceedings before the Court of First Instance up to the judgment of 2001, the applicant states that the lawyers’ fees were calculated on an hourly basis and that three lawyers worked on these proceedings. According to the applicant, the fees for these three lawyers were EUR 10 535; they are detailed below.
20. The fees for Mr Prieß total EUR 9 360, that is, 20.8 hours at an hourly rate of EUR 450. This total consists of: 0.5 hours in inspection of documents and telephone conversation; 0.5 hours in inspection of documents, legal examination and internal discussions, 9.5 hours in business travel from Berlin to Luxembourg and preparation of hearing, 10 hours in hearings before the Court and business travel from Luxembourg to Berlin and 0.3 hours in inspection of documents, legal examination and telephone conversation.
21. The fees for Mr C. Pitschas total EUR 650, that is, two hours at an hourly rate of EUR 325. Of these two hours, one was devoted to drafting a note on whether it was admissible to submit new facts during a reference back to this Court and one to an internal meeting with Mr Prieß, relating in particular to the hearing in this Court.
22. The fees for Mr A.C. Muner total EUR 525, that is, five hours at an hourly rate of EUR 105. That working time comprises 2.5 hours for a note on the submission of new facts and 2.5 hours of case-law research regarding the submission of new facts during the written procedure in the event of a reference back to the Court of First Instance.
23. The applicant states that the hourly rates used are in accordance with the customary commercial conditions applied by partner and employee lawyers specialising in Community law matters and that the lawyers’ fees exactly match the workload from the judgment of 1999 to that of 2001.
24. To the sum of EUR 10 535 in fees have been added EUR 1 066.61 by way of travel expenses and also value added tax (VAT). The total of expenses for conducting the proceedings before this Court up to the judgment of 2001 was therefore EUR 13 457.87.
Substantiation of the applicant’s expenses
25. The applicant takes the view that the sum of EUR 38 373.99 is fully recoverable, in the light of the case-law on taxation of costs (order of the Court of Justice in Case C‑77/99 DEP Commission
v Oder-Plan Architektur and Others
[2004] ECR I-1267, paragraph 18).
26. The applicant claims, firstly, that these proceedings raised very important matters of Community law: whether the Commission may refuse to pay a promised instalment of a subsidy on the ground that the project concerned was not carried out satisfactorily, when the delay in execution was attributable to interference by the Commission’s officials, and the question as to who bears the burden of proving that there is (or is not) interference by a Community institution in such a case. According to the applicant, the judgments of the Court of Justice and of the Court of First Instance afforded important information to clarify these matters.
27. The applicant considers, secondly, that the proceedings in question, having lasted at least seven years, created a substantial burden of work, because the numerous and extremely complex matters of fact and of law brought before the Community Courts rendered the proceedings extremely difficult.
28. The applicant notes, in this regard, that it had to undertake a detailed interpretation of the conditions for award and payment of the subsidy and, furthermore, points out that it had to demonstrate in fine detail the specific conduct of several officers of the Directorate-General (the DG) for Enterprise Policy, Trade, Tourism and Social Economics of the Commission and also to describe and assess that conduct accurately within the context of the general principles of Community law and, from those principles, to identify the relevant rules of the burden of proof.
29. The applicant also disputes the Commission’s view that it had learned of the essential factors in the dispute as early as the pre-litigation administrative procedure. According to the applicant, the matters of substance that were raised during the judicial proceedings were not the subject of the pre-litigation discussion between itself and the Commission: in particular, referring to its letter of 28 December 1993, it argues that this letter shows it did not raise the matters which led to the Commission’s refusal to pay the second instalment of the subsidy and that it was that refusal which was the subject‑matter of the action for annulment (judgment of 2001, paragraph 35 et seq.). That, the applicant states, is acknowledged by the Commission, which, as the ground for an application to extend the time for submitting the defence of 28 October 1994, cited the scale of the annexes to be studied and the need to consult the relevant services. The applicant thus considers that its lawyers’ workload was in no way lessened by the administrative procedure.
30. The applicant likewise disputes the possibility of inferring, because it invoiced the Commission for legal advice expenses of DEM 41 832 as a cost in the project, that its lawyers were given complete information on the chief points of the dispute. The applicant considers that, as was mentioned previously, in its application of 13 October 1994, those expenses were incurred for advice received during the negotiations with the three contract partners imposed by the Commission within the Ecodata project, and to overcome the unlawful attempts by certain officers of the DG concerned to interfere in the project and in the composition of the consortium. According to the applicant, there is no link between those consultations and the actions before the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice, because they did not relate to the refusal to pay the second instalment of the subsidy.
31. The applicant considers, thirdly, that the actual workload which resulted from the complex points raised by the dispute required, even if only for the sake of efficiency, that at times several legal partners of the practice which it instructed were engaged in separate aspects of the dispute. It refers to established case-law that account should be taken essentially of the total number of hours requiring to be worked for the proceedings before the Community Court, regardless of the number of lawyers among whom the services supplied were shared (see the orders in Case T‑115/94 DEP Opel Austria
v Council
[1998] ECR II-2739, paragraph 29, and in Case T‑80/97 DEP Starway
v Council
[2002] ECR II-1, paragraph 31).
32. Fourthly, the applicant considers that the sum sought is justified by the dispute’s economic importance to it. It considers that the second instalment of the subsidy represents more than 20% of the total financing of the project, of which it had to fund 47% itself. Had the action for annulment been dismissed, therefore, it would have had serious financial consequences for the applicant, as this Court noted in paragraph 51 of its judgment of 1997.
33. In further substantiation of the economic importance which this dispute has for it, the applicant refers to the impact of this case on its commercial activity, claiming that the dispute related in particular to the quality of its work and to (unfounded) complaints of collusion. That, the applicant said, was likely to harm its commercial activity significantly.
Arguments of the defendant
34. The defendant considers that the arguments used in the application cannot support a request for repayment of EUR 38 373.99 which meets the criteria laid down in the case-law.
35. Firstly, as regards the significance of the proceedings in terms of Community law, the defendant considers that the present case relates to a subsidy scheme that was not implemented in the proper manner, which is a category of cases chiefly turning upon the facts in each instance, a category which has long comprised a large number of cases.
36. Secondly, on the high degree of difficulty of this case, the defendant considers that, at most, that related to the pre-litigation administrative procedure where, according to the pleadings, the defendant’s lawyers had already participated decisively and during which they had obtained information which only required to be dealt with during the proceedings. The defendant considers that even those pre-litigation difficulties were less legal than factual since, firstly, the applicant did not wish to prejudice its good relations with Mr Tzoanos, the Head of Unit responsible, who was subsequently identified as corrupt and dismissed and, secondly, it was seeking to give the impression of accepting the influence allegedly exerted by the Head of Unit’s Director-General. According to the defendant, the full explanation and analysis of the true attitude of the Commission’s officers during the project, advanced by the applicant, did not arise only at the time of the action but also well before that and DEM 41 832 of expenses for legal advice were invoiced to the Commission for that reason.
37. Thirdly, on the considerable workload claimed by the applicant, the defendant considers that this was also substantially reduced by the pre-litigation procedure as well as by the fact that the applicant illegally received Commission internal documents from Mr Tzoanos and/or a journalist.
38. Next, the defendant believes that, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, all the essential details of the action which ensued had already been stated, examined by the applicant’s lawyers and taken into account during the pre-litigation procedure. The defendant notes the applicant’s belief that the full explanation and analysis of the true attitude of the Commission’s officers during the project were central to the difficulty with the questions of fact and law that had to be resolved and its recognition that the alleged expenses for legal advice were connected with the rejection of illicit endeavours by certain officers of the DG concerned to influence the project.
39. Lastly, the defendant takes the view that the applicant is making a wholly untrue and deceptive assertion in claiming that this consultation of lawyers during the pre-litigation procedure had no connection with the disputes before the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice, for it has indeed itself argued that the alleged influence and its rejection lay at the heart of the proceedings. That was the only point upon which the application could be accepted notwithstanding the manifestly defective implementation of the project.
40. The defendant considers that the lawyers’ expenses arising from the pre-litigation procedure are not recoverable in terms of Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure and that those expenses cannot be the subject of two requests for repayment. It accordingly takes the view that, in this respect, that portion of the costs which the applicant is seeking to recover must be refused.
41. Having regard to all the other factors of the case and of other, essentially comparable, cases, the defendant believes that, in this instance, the appropriate amount of recoverable costs may be set at EUR 8 000 for the actions before this Court and at EUR 5 000 for that before the Court of Justice, thus making a total of EUR 13 000.
2. Findings of the Court
General
42. Under Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure, ‘expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the purpose of the proceedings, in particular the travel and subsistence expenses and the remuneration of agents, advisers or lawyers’ are regarded as recoverable costs. It follows from that provision that recoverable costs are limited, first, to those incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before a Community Court and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose (orders in Opel Austria
v Council, cited in paragraph 31 above, paragraph 26, and in Case T‑64/99 DEP UK Coal
v Commission
[2001] ECR II-2547, paragraph 25).
43. Next, it should be noted that the term ‘proceedings’ in Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure refers only to those before a Community Court and excludes any prior stage. This is shown clearly in Article 90 of the rules, referring to the ‘proceedings before the Court’ (see, by analogy, the orders of the Court of Justice in Case 75/69 Hake v Commission
[1970] ECR 901, 902, and in Case C‑294/90 DEP British Aerospace v Commission
[1994] ECR I-5423, paragraphs 11 and 12).
44. Concerning the costs of proceedings before the Court of First Instance, it should be noted also that it is settled case-law that the Community judicature is not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers but it may determine the amount of those fees which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. In ruling on the application for taxation of costs, the Court is not obliged to take account of any national scales of lawyers’ fees or any agreement in relation to fees concluded between the party concerned and his agents or advisers (orders in Case T‑120/89 DEP Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter v Commission [1996] ECR II-1547, paragraph 27; in Opel Austria v Council, cited in paragraph 31 above, paragraph 27; and in UK Coal v Commission, cited in paragraph 42 above, paragraph 26).
45. It has also consistently been held that, in the absence of Community provisions laying down fee-scales, the Court must make an unfettered assessment of the facts of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of Community law, as well as the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the proceedings for the agents and advisers involved and the financial interests which the parties had in the proceedings (order of the President of the Third Chamber of the Court of Justice in Case 318/82 DEP Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 3727, paragraphs 2 and 3; orders of the Court of First Instance in Case T‑2/93 DEP Air France
v Commission
[1995] ECR II‑533, paragraph 16; in Opel Austria
v Council, cited in paragraph 31 above, paragraph 28; and in UK Coal v Commission, cited in paragraph 42 above, paragraph 27).
46. In that regard, the ability of the Community Courts to assess the value of work carried out is dependent on the accuracy of the information provided (order of the Court of Justice of 9 November 1995 in Case C‑89/85 DEP Ahlström and Others v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 20; orders in Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter v Commission, cited in paragraph 44 above, paragraph 31, and in Case T‑342/99 DEP Airtours
v Commission
[2004] ECR II-1785, paragraph 30).
47. The amount of the costs recoverable in this instance must be assessed in the light of these criteria.
The purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of Community law and the difficulties of the case
Summary of the background to the dispute
48. The main actions relate to financial assistance in support of a project to create a databank on ecological tourism in Europe.
49. Both prior to the award of that financial assistance and after it was awarded to the applicant, the Commission interfered with the applicant by attempting to impose Studienkreis für Tourismus eV (Tourism Studies Group), an undertaking not included in the applicant’s proposal, to effect the Ecodata project.
50. Furthermore, during the execution of the Ecodata project, Mr Tzoanos, one of the officers in charge of the project, interfered in the management of the project by proposing to grant the bulk of the funds to one of the applicant’s partners.
51. Lastly, following the applicant’s execution of the project, the Commission made a decision refusing to pay it the balance of the financial assistance on the ground that it had failed fully to meet, within the time‑limits, its obligations under the decision awarding the subsidy.
52. Following these events, the applicant referred its dispute with the Commission, as to whether the refusal to pay the balance of the financial assistance was justified, to the Court of First Instance and then to the Court of Justice.
Assessment of the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of Community law and of the difficulties presented by the case
53. In so far as this action concerns the non-performance of conditions relating to the grant of financial assistance, it is not in any particular respect different from other actions on financial assistance: interpretation of the conditions in the decision to grant the subsidy does not require particularly complex analysis; furthermore, assessment of the performance of the conditions relating to the grant of financial assistance, such as that awarded here, presents no specific legal difficulties nor is it of particular significance from the point of view of Community law.
54. None the less, this dispute is also concerned with interference by the Commission prior to and during the applicant’s performance of the subsidised project. The need to establish the precise circumstances of that interference, and to examine fully the consequences of this in resolving the dispute, does to some extent create specific difficulties which set this case apart from other cases regarding non-performance of conditions for the grant of financial assistance.
55. In the course of this dispute, the Court of Justice gave a ruling on apportioning the burden of proof between the parties where the Commission has interfered in a subsidised project. The Court of Justice ruled that, since the applicant did provide some evidence of the Commission officials’ interference in the management of the project and that this interference was likely to have had an impact on the smooth running of the project, it was for the Commission to show that, notwithstanding the interference in question, the applicant continued to be able to manage the project in a satisfactory manner. In that respect, the dispute does have some significance from the point of view of Community law, in that it has clarified the division of the burden of proof between the parties to the dispute where the Commission interferes in the execution of a subsidised project in respect of which, moreover, the Commission pleads there has been culpable non-performance.
56. It follows that there is some degree of novelty in this dispute and, hence, it is of some significance from the point of view of Community law.
Extent of the work generated by the proceedings before the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice
Introductory observations
57. So far as concerns the extent of the work involved in the proceedings before the Community Courts, it follows from the foregoing considerations that the dispute may indeed have required a significant amount of work by the applicant’s lawyers.
58. However, in order to evaluate fully the extent of the work which the judicial proceedings may have caused, account must also be taken of the lawyers’ prior knowledge and of the accuracy of the information provided on the costs and fees claimed.
Lawyers’ prior knowledge
59. In assessing the extent of the work generated by the judicial proceedings, it must be noted that it is for the Community Courts to take into account the work objectively required for the whole of the judicial proceedings. However, where the applicant’s lawyers have already assisted the applicant during proceedings or procedures prior to the relevant action, one must also consider the point that they are aware of matters relevant to the action, which is likely to have facilitated their work and reduced the preparation time required for the judicial proceedings (on this, see the orders in Case T‑65/96 DEP Kish Glass v Commission [2001] ECR II-3261, paragraph 25; in Joined Cases T‑226/00 DEP and T‑227/00 DEP Nan Ya Plastics and Far Eastern Textiles
v Council
[2003] ECR II‑685, paragraph 43; and in Case T‑251/00 DEP Lagardère and Canal+
v Commission
[2004] ECR II-4217, paragraph 30).
60. It follows that, in assessing the recoverable costs, the assistance of lawyers during the pre-litigation stage is not to be taken into account where it is shown that such assistance is not relevant to the litigation stage.
61. It is not disputed here that it was the same lawyers who acted for the applicant during both the pre-litigation and the litigation stages of the project.
62. The applicant, however, takes the view that the essential matters of fact and law that arose during the proceedings before the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance were not the subject of the pre-litigation discussion between itself and the Commission (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above). On this, the applicant refers to the letter of 28 December 1993, in which it proposed a consensual solution, following the Commission’s refusal to pay the balance of the subsidy.
63. This Court takes the view, however, that to propose a consensual solution in the course of the pre-litigation stage of the project does not in this case establish that the applicant’s lawyers had no knowledge of matters of fact and law that might facilitate their work during the litigation stages regarding the Ecodata project.
64. To be in a position to propose a consensual solution, following the Commission’s refusal to pay the balance of a subsidy on the ground of culpable non-performance of the subsidised project, requires at the very least some knowledge of the factual background to the refusal and an initial assessment as to whether the ground for the refusal is well founded.
65. That observation is not affected by the Commission’s having given the scale of the annexes to be studied, and the need to consult the relevant services, as the reasons for seeking to extend the time for submitting its defence. That request is no evidence that the applicant’s lawyers did not have knowledge of relevant matters of fact and law during the pre-litigation stage.
66. The applicant also argues that one cannot infer from the fact that it invoiced the Commission for legal advice expenses, as part of the cost of the project, that its lawyers were given full information on the chief points of the dispute during the pre-litigation stage.
67. On this point, the Court notes that the applicant itself considers, in these proceedings, that those expenses were incurred in particular to counter the unlawful attempts by certain Commission officers to interfere in the project and in the composition of the consortium.
68. Next, the Court points out that, during the judicial proceedings leading to the judgment of 1997, the applicant took the view that the delays which occurred in the performance of the project had been caused by acts of interference by officers of the Commission, in particular those with the purpose of awarding the much greater part of the funds to one of the applicant’s partners and to impose acceptance of Studienkreis für Tourismus eV as a partner. The applicant therefore considered that this fact alone removed the justification for penalising it by refusing it payment, specifically on account of delayed performance of the project (judgment of 1997, paragraph 34).
69. It appears that, during the pre-litigation stage of the project, the applicant’s lawyers gave an opinion on the Commission’s unwarranted interference in management of the project and that the applicant alleged such interference during the litigation stage of the project, in justification of its own delayed performance of the project. The advice which was obtained by the applicant during the pre-litigation stage of the project, and was invoiced as part o f the cost of the project, thus enabled the applicant’s lawyers to learn of certain matters of fact and of law which were relevant to the litigation stage of the project.
70. It is true that this advice regarding the Commission’s interference in management of the project was not given in respect of the Commission’s refusal to pay the balance of the subsidy, as it was given before the Commission refused to pay. It did, however, enable the applicant’s lawyers to consider the truth of the interference and certain legal consequences which might ensue. The advice must therefore have facilitated the work of the applicant’s lawyers and have reduced the time needed to prepare, in particular, for the first litigation proceedings. None the less, the implications of that observation must be considered in the light of the fees as set in the case.
Expenses and fees
71. Regarding the expenses and fees submitted by the applicant, it is necessary to uphold its approach that it may engage a number of lawyers to defend its interests but that it is for the Court to take account primarily of the number of hours of work which may appear to be objectively necessary for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court, irrespective of the number of lawyers who may have provided the services in question (orders in Nan Ya Plastics and Far Eastern Textiles
v Council, cited in paragraph 59 above, paragraph 44; in Airtours v Commission, cited in paragraph 46 above, paragraph 30; and of 29 October 2004 in Case T‑77/02 DEP Schneider Electric v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 58).
72. It must be recalled, however, that the ability of the Community Courts to assess the value of work carried out is dependent on the accuracy of the information provided (see paragraph 46 above, and the case-law cited).
73. As regards the fees relating to the proceedings which led to the judgments of 1997 and 1999, the applicant states that its lawyers worked on a fixed-fee basis and lists the services covered by those fixed fees. The applicant’s invoices relating to those fixed fees do not, however, give any details of the services provided or of the number of hours worked, which makes it difficult to verify the costs incurred for those proceedings.
74. However, irrespective of the considerations relating to the lawyers’ prior knowledge as set out in paragraphs 59 to 70 above, the amounts claimed may be regarded as proportionate to the workload created by those proceedings. Those expenses therefore may reasonably be regarded as essential for the purpose of these proceedings.
75. As regards the fees relating to the proceedings which led to the judgment of 2001, the Court also takes the view that, irrespective of the considerations relating to the lawyers’ prior knowledge as set out in paragraphs 59 to 70 above, these fees may be regarded as proportionate to the workload created by those proceedings. Those expenses therefore may reasonably be regarded as essential for the purpose of these proceedings.
76. As regards the other expenses in connection with these three proceedings, the applicant is seeking, in particular, repayment of bank charges and of expenses for travel to Luxembourg.
77. So far as concerns the bank charges shown in the invoices of 26 October 1995 and of 31 December 1999, the Court considers that these cannot be repaid: the applicant has not been able to show how these charges should be regarded as essential for the purposes of the proceedings before the Community Courts.
78. On the travel expenses, the Court notes that the applicant is seeking, in particular, repayment of the expenses incurred for the journeys to Luxembourg on 13 October 1994 and 18 April 1995 to lodge statements. These dates are indeed those of lodging of the application and of the reply in the proceedings that led to the judgment of 1997. Similarly, for the case resulting in the judgment of 1999, the applicant is seeking repayment of the expenses for travel to Luxembourg on 22 December 1997 although, as the applicant itself admits, those expenses were for Mr Andrade to lodge the appeal with the Court of Justice.
79. On the one hand, in Article 102(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Community legislature has provided for the time-limit for that purpose to be extended on account of distance but, on the other hand, there are other reliable and clearly less onerous means of transmitting documents to a Community Court (on this, see the order in Joined Cases T‑7/98 DEP, T‑208/98 DEP and T‑109/99 DEP De Nicola
v EIB
[2004] ECR-SC I-A-219, paragraph 40).
80. This Court therefore considers that these travel expenses cannot be regarded as essential.
81. The other expenses in respect of which the applicant is seeking repayment are not disputed by the Commission and it appears that they may reasonably be regarded as essential.
The financial interest which the parties have in the dispute
82. On the financial interests at stake, and in the light of the applicant’s statements, which are not disputed by the Commission nor contradicted by the documents in the file, it must be held that the outcome of such a dispute is of great importance to the applicant.
Overall assessment
83. In the light of all of the foregoing, the Court considers that a fair assessment of all of the applicant’s costs recoverable from the Commission in the cases at issue will be made by fixing them at a total of EUR 34 260.
84. As no application has been made by the parties for recovery of the expenses incurred for the present proceedings on taxation of costs, there is no need to adjudicate on these.
Operative part
On those grounds,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber)
hereby orders:
The total amount of costs to be paid by the Commission to IPK-München is set at EUR 34 260.
Luxembourg, 13 January 2006.