ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT
20 December 2017 (*)
(Expedited procedure)
In Case C-661/17,
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the High Court (Ireland), made by decision of 21 November 2017, received at the Court on 27 November 2017, in the proceedings
M.A.,
S.A.,
A.Z.
v
International Protection Appeals Tribunal,
Minister for Justice and Equality,
Attorney General,
Ireland,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT,
after hearing the Judge-Rapporteur, C.G. Fernlund, and the Advocate General, E. Tanchev,
makes the following
Order
1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 6, 17 and 20(3) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31, ‘the Dublin III Regulation’).
2        The request has been made in the course of proceedings between M.A., S.A. and A.Z. and the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (Ireland), the Minister for Justice and Equality (Ireland), the Attorney General and Ireland, concerning the decision to transfer them, in the context of the Dublin III Regulation.
3        It is clear from the order for reference that S.A. entered the United Kingdom on a student visa in 2010 and that, the following year, M.A. joined her on foot of a dependent visa. A.Z., their child, was born in the United Kingdom in February 2014. The parents renewed their visas every year until the college where S.A. studied closed down, which resulted in the expiry of their visas.
4        S.A. and M.A. then went to Ireland where, on 12 January 2016, they lodged applications for asylum. The application concerning the child was included in that concerning his mother.
5        On 7 April 2016, the Refugee Application Commissioner (Ireland) sent a request to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take charge of the asylum applications.
6        On 1 May 2016, that Member State confirmed its agreement to do so.
7        The applicants raised issues with the Refugee Application Commissioner in relation to medical problems affecting M.A. as well as the fact that the child was under assessment by the Health Service Executive (Ireland) in relation to a health issue.
8        The Refugee Application Commissioner recommended transfer to the United Kingdom holding, in a decision adversely affecting the applicants, that it was not appropriate to apply Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation.
9        The applicants contested the decision to transfer before the International Protection Appeals Tribunal, relying primarily on Article 17.
10      On 10 January 2017, that court upheld the decision to transfer, pointing out that it had no jurisdiction to exercise the discretion referred to in the abovementioned Article 17. It also rejected arguments relating to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on the basis that the relevant situation for the purposes of assessing the legality of that decision was that which existed on the date when it was called upon to adjudicate.
11      The High Court (Ireland) points out that the wording used in the applicable Irish legislation and which reproduces the wording in the Dublin III Regulation must be given the same meaning as the latter. That court concludes from this that it is necessary to interpret that regulation in order to determine whether, under the Irish legislation, the Ministerfor Justice and Equality alone can exercise the discretionary power referred to in Article 17 of that regulation.
12      In those circumstances, the national court decided to stay the proceedings and to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Articles 6, 17 and 20(3) of the Dublin III Regulation.
13      The referring court has also requested the Court to determine the present case pursuant to the expedited procedure set out in Article 105(1) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure. In support of its request it argues, first, that the child’s health problems warrant that his fate be determined as quickly as possible. Second, it is argued, any request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the Dublin III Regulation calls for a swift response. Furthermore, as the question relating to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union is of general interest and has an inherent timescale subject to a specific timetable, it would be appropriate to obtain a response from the Court before that withdrawal, which is expected in the month of March 2019. Finally, in addition to the present case, a very large number of cases pending before the High Court are, it is argued, potentially concerned by the questions raised.
14      In that regard, in relation, in the first place, to the child’s health problems, it is apparent from the decision to refer that he needs a stable environment and that a transfer to the United Kingdom would give rise to delays in his treatment which would be harmful.
15      However, a rejection of the request that the present case be determined pursuant to the expedited procedure will have no impact on the child’s environment, in so far as it is not apparent from the evidence available to the Court that, in the present case, that child can no longer be monitored by the Health Service Executive during that examination by the Court of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling.
16      While it is true that such a rejection would have the effect of delaying the moment when the Court will adjudicate on those questions and, therefore, when the applicants in the main proceedings will have greater clarity on the probability of being transferred to the United Kingdom, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the legal uncertainty affecting the parties in the main proceedings and their legitimate interest in knowing as quickly as possible the meaning of the rights that they derive from EU law does not constitute an exceptional circumstance that could justify use of such a procedure (see, to that effect, order of the President of the Court of 29 November 2017, Bosworth and Hurley, C‑603/17, not published, EU:C:2017:933, paragraph 10).
17      In the second place, the argument that every request for a preliminary ruling concerning the Dublin III Regulation requires an expeditious answer cannot, in itself, be sufficient to justify that the present case be determined pursuant to the expedited procedure referred to in Article 105(1) of the Rules of Procedure, as that procedure is a procedural instrument intended to address matters of exceptional urgency (see, to that effect, order of the President of the Court of 10 January 2012, Arslan, C‑534/11, not published, EU:C:2012:4, paragraph 6). Accordingly, the words ‘the nature of the case’ set out in that provision refer not to a particular type of case, but to the individual circumstances of the case in question, with regard to which a request for expedited procedure is made.
18      It must be noted, therefore, that the view of the national court, according to which any request for a preliminary ruling relating to the Dublin III Regulation calls for an urgent response, runs counter to the case-law referred to in the previous paragraph, according to which the expedited procedure is triggered only where the individual circumstances of the case concerned establish the exceptional urgency of a ruling on the questions referred to the Court.
19      As regards, in the third place, the argument that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union justifies the application of the expedited procedure, it should be recalled that the Court is dealing with questions relating to the Dublin III Regulation, which should enable a determination as to which Member State is responsible for examining applications for international protection lodged by the applicants in the main proceedings. The fact that the United Kingdom may in the near future cease to be part of the Union and, as the case may be, cease to be bound by the provisions of that regulation, does not in itself create an urgent situation for the parties in the main proceedings. In any event, the national court does not indicate why the Court should hold otherwise.
20      Finally, in the fourth place, the large number of persons or legal situations potentially concerned by the questions referred in the present case is not capable, as such, of constituting an exceptional circumstance that could justify the application of an expedited procedure (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Court of 1 October 2010, NS, C‑411/10, not published, EU:C:2010:575, paragraph 7, and of 29 November 2017, Bosworth and Hurley, C‑603/17, not published, EU:C:2017:933, paragraph 11).
21      In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that none of the grounds put forward by the national court in support of its request that the present case be determined pursuant to the expedited procedure justifies, whether alone or in combination with the other grounds, that this request be granted. In those circumstances, that request must be rejected.
On those grounds, the President of the Court hereby orders:
The request by the High Court (Ireland) that Case C-661/17 be determined pursuant to the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice is rejected.
Luxembourg, 20 December 2017.
A. Calot Escobar
K. Lenaerts
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.