JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
6 May 2026 (*)
( EU trade mark – Opposition Proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark alma FARMACIE – International registration of the earlier word mark ALMA HYBRID – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )
In Case T‑480/25,
Pharma Green Holding SpA SB, established in Milan (Italy), represented by V. Franchini and D. Petraz, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by M. Eberl, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Alma Lasers Ltd, established in Caesarea (Israel), represented by K. Neefs, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),
composed of S. Kingston, President, P. Zilgalvis (Rapporteur) and J. Hettne, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Pharma Green Holding SpA SB, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 14 May 2025 (Case R 188/2025-2) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2        On 21 June 2022, the applicant filed an application with EUIPO, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1) for registration of an EU trade mark in respect of the following figurative sign:
3        The mark applied for covers goods and services in Classes 3, 5 and 44 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 3: ‘Essential oils and aromatic extracts; toiletries; ethereal oils; aromatic essential oils; oils for perfumes and scents; sun blocking preparations [cosmetics]; facial preparations; make-up; cosmetic preparations for skin care; cosmetic preparations for bath and shower; synthetic perfumery; natural perfumery; perfumery; perfumery and fragrances’;
–        Class 5: ‘Dietary supplements and dietetic preparations; sanitary preparations and articles; pharmaceuticals and natural remedies; diagnostic preparations and materials; mineral dietary supplements; dietary and nutritional supplements; anti-oxidant food supplements; medicated food supplements; food supplements in liquid form; nutritional supplements; feed supplements for veterinary use; dietary supplements with a cosmetic effect; food supplements for non-medical purposes; pharmaceuticals; homeopathic pharmaceuticals; antibacterial pharmaceuticals; chemico-pharmaceutical preparations; pharmaceutical preparations for veterinary use’;
–        Class 44: ‘Pharmaceutical advice; medical services; provision of medical services; pharmaceutical services; information services relating to veterinary pharmaceuticals; advisory services relating to pharmaceuticals; consultancy and information services relating to pharmaceutical products; consultancy and information services provided via the Internet relating to pharmaceutical products; dispensing of pharmaceuticals; provision of pharmaceutical information; health advice and information services; nutrition consultancy; professional consultancy relating to health; professional consultancy relating to health care; provision of health information; providing information relating to dietary and nutritional supplements; managed health care services; consulting services relating to health care’.
4        On 19 September 2022, the intervener, Alma Lasers Ltd, filed a notice of opposition to the registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5        The opposition was based on, inter alia, the international registration in respect of the European Union of the earlier word mark ALMA HYBRID, filed and registered on 27 January 2021 under No 1 600 940, covering goods and services in Classes 10 and 44 and corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 10: ‘Lasers for medical purposes; lasers for surgical use; medical ultrasound apparatus’;
–        Class 44: ‘Medical services; human hygiene and beauty care’.
6        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
7        On 27 November 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.
8        On 27 January 2025, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal and found, in essence, that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 for all the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above for the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public of the European Union. That conclusion was based on the findings that, first, the goods and services at issue targeted the general public, mainly the general public or both the general public and the professional public, and that the relevant public demonstrates, as the case may be, an average to high level of attention, secondly, those goods and services were, in part, identical and, in part, similar to an average degree, thirdly, the element ‘alma’, which is common to the marks at issue, was the dominant and most distinctive element of those marks, fourthly, the signs were visually and phonetically similar to an above-average degree, or even phonetically identical, and were conceptually identical, and, fifthly, the earlier mark enjoyed an average degree of inherent distinctiveness.
Forms of order sought
10      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        allow the application for registration of the mark applied for;
–        in the alternative, allow the application for registration of the mark applied for at least in respect of the following services: ‘Pharmaceutical advice; pharmaceutical services; information services relating to veterinary pharmaceuticals; advisory services relating to pharmaceuticals; consultancy and information services relating to pharmaceutical products; dispensing of pharmaceuticals; provision of pharmaceutical information’ in Class 44;
–        annul all the orders as to costs and order EUIPO to pay the costs.
11      EUIPO contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.
12      The intervener contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action in its entirety;
–        in the alternative, refer the case back to the Board of Appeal;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The applicant’s second and third heads of claim
13      EUIPO and the intervener submit, in essence, that the applicant’s second and third heads of claim must be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
14      In that respect, it must be found that the second and third heads of claim, by which the applicant requests that the Court allow the application for registration of the mark applied for in respect of some or all of the goods and services referred to may be understood as requesting that the Court alter the contested decision within the meaning of Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 by adopting the decision that the Board of Appeal should have taken, in accordance with the provisions of that regulation. The competent bodies of EUIPO do not, however, adopt formal decisions recording the registration of an EU trade mark which could be the subject of an appeal. Consequently, the Board of Appeal does not have power to take cognisance of a claim that it should register an EU trade mark. Nor, in those circumstances, is it for the Court to take cognisance of a claim for alteration requesting that it amend the decision of a Board of Appeal to that effect (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 April 2011, Euro-Information v OHIM (EURO AUTOMATIC PAYMENT), T‑28/10, EU:T:2011:158, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).
15      It follows that the second and third heads of claim must be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Substance
16      In support of its action, the applicant raises a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. It submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal erred in law and made a manifest error of assessment as regards comparing the goods and services, finding similarities between them and finding similarities between the marks.
17      Under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for is not to be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. Furthermore, under Article 8(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation 2017/1001, ‘earlier trade marks’ means trade marks registered under international arrangements which have effect in the European Union with a date of application for registration which is earlier than the date of application for registration of the EU trade mark.
18      The risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).
19      For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
20      Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the whole of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the trade marks at issue by the consumer of the goods or services in question on that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
21      It is in the light of the principles referred to above that the single plea in law must be examined.
The relevant public and territory
22      The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal made a manifest error in identifying the relevant public when it decided that it was appropriate to focus on the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public. In addition, in the applicant’s view, no reason was given for that decision. The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal should not have limited itself to Spanish and Portuguese, which are not the most common languages within the European Union. At most, the relevant language should be English, the most widely spoken language in the European Union.
23      Furthermore, the applicant submits that the public targeted by the goods and services at issue was also identified incorrectly because, in the present case, the average consumers of those goods and services are both the general public and health professionals who display a very high level of attention since those goods and services relate to health. That is especially true for services in Class 44.
24      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
25      In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR), T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
26      In addition, it is apparent from the case-law that only the public common to the goods or services at issue is to be taken into consideration in the context of the comparison of those goods or services. According to the case-law, the relevant public is composed of consumers likely to use both the goods or services covered by the earlier mark and those covered by the mark applied for (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 July 2016, Alpha Calcit v EUIPO – Materis Paints Italia (CALCILITE), T‑742/14, EU:T:2016:418, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
27      In the present case, first, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant territory was that of the European Union since the international registration concerned that territory. However, in accordance with the case-law under which it is sufficient that the likelihood of confusion exists in part of the European Union, the Board of Appeal decided, as did the Opposition Division, to focus on the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public.
28      Secondly, as regards the relevant public and its level of attention, the Board of Appeal took the view that, in relation to ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services, as covered by the earlier registration and included in Class 44, they mainly targeted the general public, which displays an average degree of attention, and, to a lesser extent, professionals. As for the goods in Class 3, the Board of Appeal found that they included everyday consumer goods which target the general public, which displays an average level of attention. By contrast, in its view, the medical services covered by the earlier mark, the goods in Class 5 and the services in Class 44 covered by the mark applied for target both the general public and professionals, both of which display a high degree of attention since those services relate to health or might affect the state of people’s health.
29      Thirdly, the Board of Appeal recalled that it is the public common to the goods and services at issue which had to be taken into consideration. Accordingly, it found that the public common to the goods in Class 3 and the ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services was the general public which displays an average level of attention. The level of attention for the other goods and services was, in its view, high.
30      As regards, in the first place, the Board of Appeal’s choice to take into account the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public, as is recalled in paragraph 20 above, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union.
31      As a consequence, since, in the present case, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion, it was able, without erring in law, for reasons of procedural economy, to rely on the perception of the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public of the European Union. In those circumstances and assuming that the conclusion of the Board of Appeal relating to the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public is correct, that fact that there might be no likelihood of confusion for another part of the relevant public, for example, the English-speaking public, is irrelevant.
32      As regards the applicant’s claim that no reason was given for Board of Appeal’s choice, it is unfounded. As is apparent from paragraph 18 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal clearly stated that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 20 above, it was sufficient that the relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union. In addition, the Board of Appeal, in particular in paragraphs 58 to 60, 66 and 71 of the contested decision, explicitly states the reasons for which it took into account the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public of the European Union.
33      As regards, in the second place, the public targeted by the goods and services at issue and its level of attention, it must be found, as the Board of Appeal did without the parties challenging that finding, that, on the one hand, the goods in Class 5 and the services in Class 44 covered by the mark applied for and, on the other, the medical services covered by the earlier mark relate to health and that, for that reason, both the general public and the professional public will demonstrate a high level of attention in respect of those goods and services.
34      That assessment is supported by the case-law from which it is apparent that dietary supplements and pharmaceutical preparations for human and veterinary use clearly concern human and animal health, which is why purchasers of those goods will choose them carefully. Indeed, such goods may be intended both for professionals and for final consumers who will show a high level of attention with regard to products and services related to their state of health (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2021, St. Hippolyt v EUIPO – Elephant (Strong like nature), T‑352/20, not published, EU:T:2021:720, paragraphs 24 and 25 and the case-law cited). That is precisely the case of the goods in Class 5, services in Class 44 covered by the mark applied for and medical services covered by the earlier mark.
35      However, in respect of the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for and the ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services in Class 44 covered by the earlier mark, the targeted public, which may include the general public and the professional public, will display an average level of attention, as the Board of Appeal found. Neither those services, nor the various beauty products in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for have features comparable to those of the goods in Class 5 or the medical services which suggest that the level of attention demonstrated in respect of them will be high.
36      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, even if some of the goods in Class 3, including perfumery or cosmetics, were intended to be applied to the human body, those goods were not used for the treatment of diseases and thus constituted everyday goods addressed to the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (judgment of 13 May 2016, Market Watch v EUIPO – El Corte Inglés (MITOCHRON), T‑62/15, not published, EU:T:2016:304, paragraph 22). The same reasoning applies to ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services in Class 44.
37      It follows that the applicant’s claim that all the goods and services at issue target both the general public and health professionals, which display a very high level of attention since those goods and services relate to health, cannot succeed.
The comparison of the goods and services
38      In assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken), T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
39      Complementary goods or services are those between which there is a close connection, in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other with the result that consumers may think that the same undertaking is responsible for manufacturing those goods or for providing those services (see judgment of 22 January 2009, easyHotel, T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
–       The goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for
40      The applicant submits that the reasoning of the Board of Appeal is incorrect since the latter relied on judgment of 26 February 2015, Costa Crociere v OHIM – Guerlain (SAMSARA) (T‑388/13, not published, EU:T:2015:118), in order to find that the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for were similar to an average degree to human hygiene and beauty care covered by the earlier mark. In the applicant’s view, in contrast to the facts of the case which gave rise to that judgment, in the present case the purpose of ‘medical services; human hygiene and beauty care’ is not purely aesthetic, but rather concerns a medical treatment, whereas cosmetic goods, perfumes and other goods in Class 3 are mainly intended for cleaning, perfuming and altering one’s appearance. In addition, the applicant submits that their distribution channels are different and do not overlap since medical services do not include beauty care and treatments requiring the use of cosmetics, make-up and perfumes, and the establishments where medical services are provided do not offer such goods for sale. Lastly, according to the applicant, the goods and services at issue are different in nature: one being tangible and the other intangible.
41      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
42      In the present case, the Board of Appeal compared the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for and the ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services in Class 44 covered by the earlier mark and found that they were similar to an average degree. While acknowledging that they differed in nature, the Board of Appeal took the view that, in so far as they targeted the same consumers, those goods and services could be complementary with the result that the public might believe that they came from the same undertaking.
43      In particular, according to the Board of Appeal, the goods and services at issue share the same general purpose, which is the hygiene and beauty care of humans. Accordingly, it stated, inter alia, that cosmetics, toiletries and other goods in Class 3 are intended to be applied to human skin for the purpose of cleaning it, making it smell pleasant, altering its appearance, protecting it or keeping it in good condition. It added that it cannot reasonably be disputed that the purpose of ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services which are provided in establishments operating as health spas, beauty salons, hairdressing salons, manicuring salons, and spas is also to wash, purify and beautify the human body. In addition, the abovementioned establishments often include, in the Board of Appeal’s view, beauty and hygiene treatments requiring the use of cosmetics, toiletries, beauty products and haircare products. Those establishments might also offer for sale such products bearing their trade mark or, as the case may be, goods from an outside supplier. Consequently, the distribution channels may overlap and the public targeted might be the same.
44      Moreover, the Board of Appeal also found that there was some complementarity between those goods and services since, in the abovementioned establishments, ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services were usually followed by the application of body and haircare lotions and moisturising creams and the public might expect treatment with those products when in those establishments.
45      At the outset, as regards the argument that the goods and services differed in nature, it must be found that, admittedly, on account of their very nature, goods are generally different from services. It nevertheless remains the case that they can be complementary or that the services may have the same purpose or use as the goods, and thus compete with each other. It follows that, in certain circumstances, goods and services may be found to be similar (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 April 2024, Coinbase v EUIPO – Coinbase Global (coinbase), T‑126/22, not published, EU:T:2024:252, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). Similarly, it is apparent from the case-law that the mere difference in nature between the goods and services is not sufficient to rule out, from the outset, any similarity between them (see judgment of 15 February 2017, Morgese and Others v EUIPO – All Star (2 STAR), T‑568/15, not published, EU:T:2017:78, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2021, Intis v EUIPO – Televes (TELEVEND), T‑112/20, not published, EU:T:2021:710, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
46      As is apparent from paragraph 43 above, the Board of Appeal found that the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for and the ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services in Class 44 covered by the earlier mark share the same general purpose since they are intended for, inter alia, cleaning and protecting human skin and beautifying the human body. In its view, those goods and services are also complementary in so far as the establishments which offer ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services use, for treatments, the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for. Lastly, those establishments might offer goods in Class 3 for sale, with the result that their distribution channels would also overlap. Those assessments do not contain any error of assessment and are not seriously disputed by the applicant.
47      In addition, as the intervener submits, the Board of Appeal’s view is supported by the case-law. It has already been held that ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services constitute a broad category intended to wash and purify the human body and to make it more attractive, or to provide advice in that regard. Similarly, it is apparent from the same case-law that ‘scented body lotions and creams’, ‘perfumes’ and ‘perfumed soaps’, which are on the whole equivalent to the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for in the present case, are intended to be applied to the human body for the purpose of cleaning it, making it smell nice, protecting it, making it more attractive or keeping it in good condition. Furthermore, the wording used to identify the ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services is very broad and includes, inter alia, the types of care for which the goods in Class 3 can be used (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2024, Azalee Cosmetics v EUIPO – L’Oréal (UK) (LA CREME LIBRE), T‑765/22, not published, EU:T:2024:106, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
48      As for the applicant’s argument disputing the relevance of the judgment of 26 February 2015, SAMSARA (T‑388/13, not published, EU:T:2015:118), to which the Board of Appeal referred, it is clear that it stems from an incorrect reading of the contested decision. The applicant submits that, in the present case, unlike the case which gave rise to that judgment, the purpose of ‘medical services; human hygiene and beauty care’ is not purely aesthetic. However, in the present case, it must be found that, in order to find similarity between the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for and the services covered by the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal took into account, in paragraphs 37 to 45 of the contested decision, only ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services and not medical services, which were, for their part, compared to goods in Class 5 covered by the mark applied for. Consequently, any argument concerning the difference between medical services and goods in Class 3 is ineffective.
49      It follows that the applicant’s arguments relating to the comparison of the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for and the services covered by the earlier mark must be rejected.
–       The goods in Class 5 covered by the mark applied for
50      The applicant submits that the goods in Class 5, mainly pharmaceutical products, dietary supplements and sanitary goods, are not indispensable for the services in Class 44 covered by the earlier mark. In its view, they are different. In that regard, it refers to the 2020 EUIPO guidelines and to earlier Board of Appeal decisions, from which it follows, inter alia, that, while it is true that pharmaceutical products are generally used when a medical service is provided, the fact remains that the relevant public does not expect a doctor or veterinarian to develop and market medicinal products. Consequently, the differences relating to the nature of those goods and services and, in particular, their usual origin clearly outweigh any similarity. The applicant states that the manufacturer of a pharmaceutical product sold under a particular trade mark does not usually provide ‘medical services’ under the same name. In addition, medical services are not provided in a chemist or pharmacy. Lastly, the goods at issue are tangible whereas the services are intangible, with the result that they differ in nature.
51      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
52      In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that the goods in Class 5, covered by the mark applied for, might be the subject of the medical services in Class 44, covered by the earlier mark, to the extent that those services are important, even indispensable, for the use of those goods. In addition, the Board of Appeal stated that those goods and services might target the same public, pursue the same aim, share the same distribution channels and be complementary. It also referred to the case-law from which it is apparent that medical services were complementary to pharmaceutical products.
53      It must be noted, as a preliminary point, that the applicant’s argument relating to the different nature of the goods and services has already been rejected in paragraph 45 above.
54      As regards goods in Class 5 covered by the mark applied for and consisting of various dietary and nutritional supplements and pharmaceutical preparations, it must be found that they may be connected with the medical services in Class 44.
55      In that regard, it has been held, in particular, that pharmaceutical products and services in Class 44, including medical services, target the same public, pursue the same aim, can share the same distribution channels and are complementary (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2018, Emcur v EUIPO – Emcure Pharmaceuticals (EMCURE), T‑165/17, not published, EU:T:2018:346, paragraph 61). Similarly, it is apparent from the case-law that ‘pharmaceutical and veterinary preparations; sanitary preparations for medical purposes; dietetic substances adapted for medical use’ in Class 5 and ‘medical and veterinary services’ in Class 44 are similar. Furthermore, it has previously been held that medical services in Class 44 were complementary to pharmaceutical products in Class 5. They are therefore connected to those goods by a certain degree of similarity (see judgment of 14 June 2018, EMCURE, T‑165/17, not published, EU:T:2018:346, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
56      Accordingly, the applicant’s arguments that the goods in Class 5 covered by the mark applied for and the medical services covered by the earlier mark are different cannot succeed.
57      That finding is not invalidated by the applicant’s reference to the EUIPO guidelines and to the decision-making practice of EUIPO. It must be borne in mind that the EUIPO guidelines are not binding legal acts for the purpose of interpreting provisions of EU law (judgment of 19 December 2012, Leno Merken, C‑149/11, EU:C:2012:816, paragraph 48). In any event, it must be found, as EUIPO did, that the version of those guidelines in force when the contested decision was adopted, which refers to the case-law cited in paragraph 55 above, acknowledges that goods in Class 5 and services in Class 44 are similar.
58      Moreover, it must be recalled that the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the EU judicature (see judgment of 6 September 2018, Bundesverband Souvenir – Geschenke – Ehrenpreise v EUIPO, C‑488/16 P, EU:C:2018:673, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). In addition, contrary to what the applicant submits, the EUIPO decisions it cited were not issued by the Boards of Appeal, but by the Opposition Divisions. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the Boards of Appeal are not bound by the decisions of lower-ranking adjudicating bodies of EUIPO (see judgment of 14 January 2026, Kimpton Hotel & Restaurant Group v EUIPO – Kamstar (Kimkom and Kimsum), T‑619/24 and T‑621/24, not published, EU:T:2026:4, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
59      It follows that the applicant’s arguments are not capable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the goods in Class 5 covered by the mark applied for and the medical services in Class 44 were similar.
–       The services in Class 44 covered by the mark applied for
60      The applicant claims that the services in Class 44 covered by the mark applied for are similar, at the very most, to a low degree to ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services, since the fields of activity and the publics targeted are completely different. In order to dispute the assessments of the Board of Appeal, first, the applicant submits that the goods and services cannot be regarded as being identical or similar to each other on the ground that they appear in the same class. Secondly, it argues that the very broad specification of ‘medical services’ covered by the earlier mark requires that particular attention be paid to the specific field of activity of the proprietor of the trade mark. Accordingly, in its view, the medical services covered by the earlier mark are those connected with laser treatment, whereas the medical services covered by the mark applied for are connected with the pharmaceutical and medical field and, in particular, consultancy and advisory services within pharmacies.
61      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
62      The Board of Appeal found that the marks at issue covered ‘medical services’ in an identical manner. In its view, the ‘broad specification’ of medical services covered by the earlier mark includes other services in Class 44 covered by the mark applied for, with the result that they are also identical.
63      In the present case, it must be found that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Board of Appeal did not find that the services covered by the marks at issue were identical on the ground that they appear in the same class, but because, first, both marks covered the services listed in an identical manner, namely medical services, and, secondly, the medical services covered by the earlier mark included other services in Class 44 covered by the mark applied for.
64      Those findings do not contain any error of assessment. Goods and services can be regarded as identical when the goods and services designated by the earlier mark are included in a more general category covered by the later mark (see judgments of 7 September 2006, Meric v OHIM – Arbora & Ausonia (PAM-PIM’S BABY-PROP), T‑133/05, EU:T:2006:247, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited, and of 21 July 2016, Ogrodnik v EUIPO – Aviário Tropical (Tropical), T‑804/14, not published, EU:T:2016:431, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). Conversely, where the goods and services covered by the earlier mark include the goods and services covered by the mark applied for, those goods and services are considered to be identical (see judgment of 24 November 2005, Sadas v OHIM – LTJ Diffusion (ARTHUR ET FELICIE), T‑346/04, EU:T:2005:420, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the various services connected with the pharmaceutical field that are covered by the mark applied for are included in the medical services covered by the earlier mark.
65      As regards the applicant’s argument that the fields of activity of the two proprietors are different, first, it must be borne in mind that, in opposition proceedings, EUIPO may only take account of the list of goods and services in respect of which an application is made as it appears in the trade mark application, subject to any amendments thereto. Secondly, the comparison of the goods and services, as required under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be based on the description, as it appears in the registration document, of the goods and services designated by the earlier mark relied on in opposition and not the goods and services for which the trade mark is actually used, unless, following a request for proof of genuine use of the earlier mark, in accordance with Article 47(2) of that regulation, such proof is furnished only in respect of part of the goods or services for which the earlier mark is registered (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 February 2019, Giove Gas v EUIPO – Primagaz (KALON AL CENTRO DELLA FAMIGLIA), T‑34/18, not published, EU:T:2019:94, paragraphs 28 and 30 and the case-law cited). However, the list of services covered by the marks at issue does not include the specifications referred to by the applicant.
66      It follows that the applicant’s arguments are not capable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the services in Class 44 covered by both marks are identical.
The comparison of the signs
67      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
–       The dominant and distinctive elements of the marks at issue
68      The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal was incorrect in finding that the dominant element of the earlier mark was the element ‘alma’ in the initial position. The error made by the Board of Appeal in identifying the relevant public undermined the entire subsequent assessment since, from a phonetic and conceptual point of view, it gave relevance to the fact that the word ‘alma’ would be understood by the Spanish and Portuguese as meaning ‘soul’ and that the other components of the marks at issue would not be particularly distinctive because they are similar to the equivalent terms in Spanish and Portuguese. In the applicant’s opinion, the Board of Appeal should have had reference to the English-speaking public which will not understand the word ‘alma’ and would probably understand the word ‘hybrid’ as simply meaning ‘mixing two or more different things’, which is far from meaning ‘indicating that the earlier goods or the earlier services relate to goods that are dependent on or take advantage of two modalities’.
69      The applicant also criticises the Board of Appeal for not taking into account the fact that the figurative element of the mark applied for constituted a visible feature within the overall impression created by the sign. It argues that the figurative part of the mark applied for is clearly dominant and is placed at the beginning of the sign, on which consumers tend to focus their attention.
70      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
71      It must be borne in mind that the assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which the relevant public retains, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression conveyed by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).
72      For the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of an element forming part of a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (judgment of 13 December 2007, Cabrera Sánchez v OHIM – Industrias Cárnicas Valle (el charcutero artesano), T‑242/06, not published, EU:T:2007:391, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
73      With regard to the assessment of the dominant character of one or more given components of a complex trade mark, account must be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of each of those components by comparing them with those of other components. In addition and accessorily, account may be taken of the relative position of the various components within the arrangement of the complex mark (judgment of 23 October 2002, Matratzen Concord v OHIM – Hukla Germany (MATRATZEN), T‑6/01, EU:T:2002:261, paragraph 35).
74      In the present case, first of all, the Board of Appeal found that the word element common to the marks at issue, namely ‘alma’ which Spanish and Portuguese consumers will understand as meaning ‘soul’, was not descriptive or devoid of distinctive character for the goods and services covered by those marks.
75      Next, as regards the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal took the view, in essence, that it was the element ‘alma’ which was the most distinctive and dominant element. As for the element ‘hybrid’, it stated that, taking into account its proximity to the equivalent term in Spanish and Portuguese, it could be understood as indicating that the goods or services covered by the earlier mark ‘relate to goods that are dependent on or take advantage of two modalities’, with the result that it is not particularly distinctive.
76      Lastly, as regards the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal found that the element ‘alma’ was the dominant and most distinctive element. The element ‘farmacie’, which would be understood by Spanish-speakers and Portuguese-speakers on account of its proximity to the equivalents in those languages, is not distinctive for the services and goods covered by the mark applied for. The goods in Classes 3 and 5 are, in its view, generally available in pharmacies, whereas, as regards services in Class 44, pharmacies might be located on premises where those services are provided. In addition, the Board of Appeal observed that the element ‘farmacie’ was less visible on account of the thinness of the font used.
77      As regards, in the first place, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal was incorrect to take into account the perception by the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public of the elements included in the marks at issue and should have taken account of the English-speaking public, it has already been found in paragraph 31 above that, in the present case, the Board of Appeal could rely on the perception of the marks at issue by the Spanish-speaking public and the Portuguese-speaking public.
78      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment by finding that the word elements which make up the marks at issue, namely ‘alma’, ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ will be understood by the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public. The term ‘alma’ means ‘soul’ in both Spanish and Portuguese, whereas, the terms ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ are close to the Spanish and Portuguese terms which have the same meaning, ‘farmacia’ and ‘híbrido’ in Spanish and ‘farmácia’ and ‘híbrido’ in Portuguese respectively. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, if terms in a foreign language have an equivalent in the language of the relevant public and a link may be established by that public between those terms and their translation into the language concerned, then that public must be held to understand their meaning (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2024, Naturgy Energy Group v EUIPO – Global Power Service (gps global power service), T‑312/23, not published, EU:T:2024:399, paragraphs 36 and 38 and the case-law cited).
79      As regards, in the second place, the mark applied for, made up of the elements ‘alma’ and ‘farmacie’ both written in a dark green colour with the first being in a slightly stylised font, it must be found that the element ‘alma’ is the most distinctive. As the Board of Appeal found, the term ‘alma’, which means ‘soul’ in Spanish and Portuguese and is not descriptive of the goods and services covered by that mark, enjoys average distinctiveness in respect of those goods and services, whereas the term ‘farmacie’, which is close to the terms ‘farmacia’ et ‘farmácia’ in those languages (see paragraph 78 above), refers to the place where those goods can be dispensed and those services can be provided, with the result that it is devoid of distinctive character.
80      In addition, the element ‘alma’, written in a slightly stylised font and in bold letters, is slightly more dominant than the element ‘farmacie’, written in standard font, as the Board of Appeal, in essence, found.
81      As regards the applicant’s argument that the ‘figurative part’ of the mark applied for had to be regarded as dominant, it is sufficient to note that the figurative aspects of that mark, namely the colour and font used, cannot, on their own, be considered dominant, since they form part of the inherent characteristics of the word elements in question and cannot be separated from them.
82      As regards, in the third place, the earlier mark, which is made up of two word elements, ‘alma’ and ‘hybrid’, it must be found that, while the element ‘alma’ enjoys average distinctiveness in respect of the services covered by that mark, that is not the case for the element ‘hybrid’. As the Board of Appeal found, the latter element will be understood by the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public as meaning that the services covered by the earlier mark are dependent on or take advantage of two elements or factors (‘modalities’ according to the Board of Appeal), with the result that it is weakly distinctive. It follows that the distinctive element of the earlier mark is the word element ‘alma’.
83      By contrast and contrary to the findings of the Board of Appeal, the element ‘alma’ cannot be regarded as dominant in the earlier mark despite its initial position. That element, made up of four letters, is not longer than the element ‘hybrid’, which is made up of six letters. Also, since that mark is a word mark, there cannot be any difference in the size of the elements of which it is comprised. The protection which results from registration of a word mark concerns the word mentioned in the application for registration and not the specific graphic or stylistic elements accompanying that mark (see judgment of 3 July 2013, Airbus v OHIM (NEO), T‑236/12, EU:T:2013:343, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). It follows that none of the elements which make up the earlier mark is dominant in the present case.
84      In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal made errors of assessment by finding that the element ‘alma’ was the distinctive element of both of the marks at issue. However, as is apparent from paragraph 83 above, the Board of Appeal did make an error of assessment by classifying the element ‘alma’ of the earlier mark as dominant.
–       The visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison
85      In the present case, the Board of Appeal found, first, that the signs at issue were visually similar to an above-average degree since they coincided in their most distinctive and dominant element – ‘alma’ – and the various elements were devoid of distinctive character. Secondly, concerning the phonetic comparison of the signs, the Board of Appeal took the view that, in the event that the elements ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ were not pronounced on account of their position or lack of distinctiveness, the signs at issue were phonetically identical. Even if the elements ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ were pronounced, their impact on the phonetic difference is reduced, with the result that the signs at issue are phonetically similar to an above-average degree. Thirdly and lastly, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were conceptually identical since Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking consumers will understand the element ‘alma’ as meaning ‘soul’, whereas the elements ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ will have only a very weak impact on the overall impression produced by the signs at issue.
86      In the first place, as regards the visual comparison of the signs, the applicant submits that the differences resulting from the figurative elements, the word element ‘hybrid’ in the earlier mark and the element ‘farmacie’ in the mark applied for contribute, to a not inconsiderable extent, to distinguishing those signs. Consequently, they are visually dissimilar.
87      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
88      In that regard, it must be found that the marks at issue coincide in their distinctive element ‘alma’ (see paragraph 84 above), but differ as regards the additional elements ‘farmacie’ in the mark applied for and ‘hybrid’ in the earlier mark. However, it must be recalled that the latter elements have weak distinctive character in respect of the goods and services covered by the marks at issue or are devoid of distinctive character (see paragraphs 79 and 82 above). Similarly, both marks have a similar structure in so far as the distinctive element ‘alma’ is followed by another, non-distinctive element. In addition, the fonts used in the mark applied for are close to the standard font. It follows that the marks at issue are visually similar to an above-average degree as the Board of Appeal found.
89      In the second place, as regards the phonetic comparison of the signs, the applicant submits that the signs at issue are dissimilar. In its view, the pronunciation of those signs coincides in respect of the word ‘alma’, but clearly differs in respect of the additional words – ‘hybrid’ and ‘farmacie’ respectively – which creates a clear difference in rhythm and intonation.
90      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
91      In the present case, as is apparent from paragraph 88 above, the marks at issue coincide in their distinctive element ‘alma’, placed in the initial position in each of the marks, but differ on account of their additional elements, namely ‘farmacie’, which is devoid of distinctive character, and ‘hybrid’, which has weak distinctive character.
92      In that regard, it must be born in mind that consumers naturally have the tendency to abbreviate longs signs and not to pronounce all the word elements which make them up, especially where those elements are devoid of distinctive character (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 February 2022, Canisius v EUIPO – Beiersdorf (CCLABELLE VIENNA), T‑694/20, not published, EU:T:2022:45, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the word elements ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ might not be pronounced and that, in such a case, the signs would be phonetically identical.
93      The Board of Appeal also provided for the situation in which the elements ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ were pronounced (see paragraph 85 above). In such a case, the signs would be similar to an above-average degree. That finding also does not contain any error of assessment.
94      It follows that the Board of appeal was entitled to find that the signs at issue were, at the very least, phonetically similar to an above-average degree.
95      In the third place, as regards the conceptual comparison of the signs, the applicant submits that they are dissimilar. It submits that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment by relying on the perception of Spanish and Portuguese public which is not the relevant public. In its view, the Board of Appeal should have had reference to the English-speaking public which does not understand the word ‘alma’ and does not attribute to the word ‘hybrid’ the meaning which the Spanish and Portuguese public does. In addition, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal did not take into account the fact that the element ‘farmacie’ in the mark applied for was a noun and not an adjective like the element ‘hybrid’ which is present in the earlier mark. The element ‘farmacie’, it argues, does not add a description to the word element ‘alma’ but rather contributes to expressing a single concept in conjunction with it. The element ‘hybrid’, however, has a mere descriptive function. In the applicant’s view, the different concepts associated with the elements ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ are important for the comparison and significantly impact the overall impression produced by the signs.
96      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
97      In the present case, as has already been found in paragraph 88 above, the marks at issue coincide in their distinctive element – ‘alma’ – but differ in their additional elements, namely ‘farmacie’, which is devoid of distinctive character, and ‘hybrid’, which has weak distinctive character for the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public in respect of the goods and services covered by the marks at issue.
98      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that conceptual differences attributable solely to elements that are weakly distinctive attract consumers’ attention only in a limited manner (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2025, Certinvest v EUIPO – Regal Ventures (Premium Quality REGAL Bakery), T‑431/24, not published, EU:T:2025:636, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited). This is the case as regards the element ‘hybrid’. That applies a fortiori for elements which are devoid of distinctive character, such as the element ‘farmacie’.
99      The fact remains that the signs at issue cannot be classified as conceptually identical, as the Board of Appeal did in the present case. Despite their lack of distinctiveness, the elements ‘farmacie’ and ‘hybrid’ are not negligible either. Accordingly, it must be found that the signs at issue are conceptually similar to a high degree, without, however, being identical.
100    As regards the applicant’s argument that, when comparing the signs, the Board of Appeal should not have taken account of the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public, that argument has already been rejected (see paragraphs 31 and 77 above).
The distinctiveness of the earlier mark
101    In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that, since the earlier mark as a whole was not meaningful in relation to the services which it covered, it enjoyed an average degree of inherent distinctiveness. That finding is not called into question by the applicant which merely submits that the average inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark contributes to reducing the likelihood of confusion in the present case.
The overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion
102    A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and in particular between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
103    The applicant claims that the signs at issue are dissimilar overall, with the result that, even for those goods and services that might be found to be similar, the dissimilarity of the signs would never lead consumers to believe that they originate from the same or linked commercial undertakings. Given that the similarity or identity of the signs is a necessary condition for the application of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, there can be, in its view, no likelihood of confusion. The applicant adds that it is also necessary to take into account the fact that the consumers targeted by the goods and services covered by the mark applied for are highly specialist.
104    In addition, the applicant submits that its activity differs from that of the intervener. Accordingly, it explains that it is a chain of pharmacies in Italy and that it does not market the services or goods offered by the intervener. It adds that pharmacies in Italy are required by law to have a green cross affixed to their establishments and that competing services cannot do so.
105    EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
106    The Board of Appeal concluded, in essence, that there was a likelihood of confusion. It found that the relevant Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking public might be misled into thinking that the goods and services that are identical or similar to varying degrees, bearing the mark applied for which reproduced in its dominant and most distinctive element the dominant and most distinctive element of the earlier mark in the initial position, came from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings. The Board of Appeal added that the likelihood of confusion could not be ruled out even where the level of attention of the relevant public was considered to be high or higher for some of the goods and services in question.
107    In the present case, the goods and services in question are, in part, similar, and, in part, identical (see paragraphs 49, 59 and 66 above), whereas the signs are visually similar to an above-average degree (see paragraph 88 above), at the very least, phonetically similar to an above-average degree (see paragraph 94 above) and conceptually similar to a high degree (see paragraph 99). In the light of all those elements and of the average inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal was able to conclude that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 in the present case.
108    That conclusion cannot be called into question by the fact that the public’s level of attention concerning the goods in Class 5 and the services in Class 44, with the exception of ‘human hygiene and beauty care’ services, is high. In accordance with the case-law, even with regard to a public displaying a high level of attention, the fact remains that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to compare the various marks directly and must therefore rely on his or her imperfect recollection of them (see judgment of 23 March 2022, Vetpharma Animal Health v EUIPO – Deltavit (DELTATIC), T‑146/21, not published, EU:T:2022:159, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited).
109    Similarly, the finding that there was a likelihood of confusion in the present case cannot be called into question by the fact, relied on by the applicant, that it and the intervener operate in different fields of activity. Since particular marketing strategies for the goods and services covered by marks may vary over time and depend on the wishes of the proprietors of those marks, the prospective assessment of the likelihood of confusion between two marks cannot be dependent on the marketing intentions of the proprietors of the marks, whether implemented or not, which are by their very nature subjective (see judgment of 9 September 2008, Honda Motor Europe v OHIM – Seat (MAGIC SEAT), T‑363/06, EU:T:2008:319, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
110    As regards the argument that the mark applied for must be accompanied by a green cross in order to meet the requirements deriving from Italian law, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the comparison must be made between the signs as they were registered or as they appear in the application for registration regardless of whether they are used alone or together with other marks or indications (see judgment of 28 April 2021, Asolo v EUIPO – Red Bull (FLÜGEL), T‑509/19, not published, EU:T:2021:225, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).
111    In the light of all of the foregoing, the applicant’s single plea in law must be rejected and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
112    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
113    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.
114    By contrast, since EUIPO has requested that the applicant be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, in the absence of a hearing, be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders Pharma Green Holding SpA SB to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Alma Lasers Ltd;
3.      Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.
Kingston
Zilgalvis
Hettne
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 6 May 2026.
V. Di Bucci
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.