ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
20 May 2026 (*)
( Action for annulment – Economic and monetary policy – Request to initiate an investigation – Refusal by EIOPA – Decision of the Board of Appeal to dismiss the appeal as inadmissible – Manifest lack of jurisdiction in part – Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law )
In Case T‑247/24,
Evroins inshurans grup AD, established in Sofia (Bulgaria), represented by A. Morogai, H. Drăghici and F. Giurgea, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), represented by S. Rosenbaum, A. Terstegen-Verhaag and S. Dispiter, acting as Agents, and by H.-G. Kamann, Z. Mzee and F. Boos, lawyers,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed of E. Buttigieg, President, J. Schwarcz and F. Bestagno (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular the measure of organisation of procedure of 4 December 2025 inviting the parties to submit their observations on the consequences to be drawn, for the present case, from the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), and the response by the applicant and by EIOPA lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 22 and 15 December 2025 respectively,
makes the following
Order
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Evroins inshurans grup AD, seeks the annulment of Decision BoA-D-2024-02 of the Board of Appeal of the European Supervisory Authorities of 11 March 2024 dismissing as inadmissible the appeal that it brought under Article 60 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC (OJ 2010 L 331, p. 48) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2        The applicant is a Bulgarian joint stock company with its registered office in Sofia (Bulgaria). It owns almost all the shares in Euroins Romania Asigurare – Reasigurare SA (‘Euroins Romania’), an insurance undertaking domiciled in Romania.
3        For the purposes of the supervision of a group which includes the applicant, a college of supervisors, within the meaning of Article 212(1)(e) of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ 2009 L 335, p. 1) (‘the Solvency II Directive’), composed of the Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiară (Financial Supervisory Authority, Romania) (‘the Romanian supervisory authority’) and the Komisiya za finansov nadzor (Financial Supervision Commission, Bulgaria) was put in place.
4        On 17 March 2023, the Romanian supervisory authority adopted a decision withdrawing Euroins Romania’s operating licence (‘the withdrawal decision’) and, after verifying that that undertaking was insolvent, applied for a declaration of insolvency.
5        By several letters which it sent to the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) during the period between March and August 2023, the applicant raised its concerns regarding a potential infringement of EU law by the Romanian supervisory authority when adopting the withdrawal decision. In that context, it requested EIOPA to initiate an investigation.
6        On 11 April 2023, Euroins Romania challenged the withdrawal decision before the Curtea de Apel București (Court of Appeal, Bucharest, Romania).
7        By letter of 19 September 2023, the chairperson of EIOPA decided that an investigation in respect of an infringement of EU law against the Romanian supervisory authority would not be appropriate and closed the applicant’s request without initiating an investigation (‘the letter of 19 September 2023’).
8        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 20 November 2023, the applicant brought an action, registered as Case T‑1094/23, seeking the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023. By order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), the Court dismissed that action as inadmissible.
9        On 20 November 2023, the applicant brought an appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 before the Board of Appeal, pursuant to Article 60 of Regulation No 1094/2010. On 11 March 2024, by the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed that appeal as inadmissible.
Forms of order sought
10      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        and, consequently, annul the letter of 19 September 2023;
–        or, in the alternative, order the Board of Appeal to re-assess its appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023;
–        order the ‘European supervisory authorities’ and EIOPA to pay the costs.
11      EIOPA contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action as inadmissible;
–        in the alternative, dismiss the action as manifestly lacking any foundation in law;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
12      Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
13      In the present case, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information available to it from the material in the file, has decided to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.
The jurisdiction of the Court to rule on the applicant’s third head of claim
14      EIOPA contends, in essence, that the third head of claim of the action is inadmissible and that the Court has no jurisdiction to order the Board of Appeal to re-assess the appeal lodged by the applicant against the letter of 19 September 2023.
15      The applicant submits, in essence, that, by its third head of claim, raised in the alternative, it is not asking the Court to substitute itself for the Board of Appeal, but only to give legal effect to any annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal.
16      In the present case, it should be noted that, by its third head of claim, the applicant requests that the Court order the Board of Appeal to re-assess the applicant’s appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023. Accordingly, that head of claim amounts, in essence, to a request for the Court to issue a direction to the Board of Appeal.
17      It is settled case-law that, when exercising judicial review of legality under Article 263 TFEU, the EU judicature has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see judgment of 14 March 2024, D & A Pharma v Commission and EMA, C‑291/22 P, EU:C:2024:228, paragraph 160 and the case-law cited). It is however for the institution, body, office or agency concerned, under Article 266 TFEU, to adopt the measures required to give effect to a judgment delivered in an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 September 2018, Sweden v Commission, T‑260/16, EU:T:2018:597, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).
18      In those circumstances, the third head of claim requesting that the Board of Appeal be ordered to re-assess the appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 must be rejected on the ground of manifest lack of jurisdiction.
Admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim
19      EIOPA initially submitted, in its defence, that the applicant’s second head of claim, seeking annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023, was destined to fail, because the Board of Appeal had correctly dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that letter as inadmissible. In the alternative, EIOPA also disputed the admissibility of that head of claim, on the grounds of lis pendens with the action for annulment brought against the letter of 19 September 2023 in the case which gave rise to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), cited in paragraph 8 above. Next, in its response to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the General Court, EIOPA stated that the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), resulted in the inadmissibility of the second head of claim in the present case, on the basis that it had become res judicata, since that head of claim and the action brought in the case giving rise to that order referred to the same act, were between the same parties and were based on similar arguments.
20      The applicant submits that there is no overlap between the present case and Case T‑1094/23 to enable a plea of lis pendens to be upheld in accordance with the case-law. The two actions seek the annulment of different decisions adopted on different legal bases and raise different pleas in law.
21      It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the fact that a judicial decision, namely a judgment or order, has become res judicata is such as to bar the admissibility of an action if the proceedings disposed of by the judgment or order in question were between the same parties, had the same purpose and had the same legal basis, those conditions necessarily being cumulative (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T‑66/01, EU:T:2010:255, paragraph 197, and of 25 February 2015, Walton v Commission, T‑261/14 P, EU:T:2015:110, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited, and order of 13 November 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA, T‑586/23, not published, EU:T:2025:1055, paragraph 23).
22      In the present case, it must be held that the action, as regards the second head of claim, is between the same parties, has the same purpose and has the same legal basis as the case which gave rise to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347). In that case, the applicant also sought, on the basis of essentially similar arguments, the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023.
23      In other words, by its second head of claim, the applicant seeks, for a second time before the EU judicature, the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023, which is the same application that was dismissed by the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347).
24      Therefore, to accept the admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim would be tantamount to conferring on that party the possibility of reviving, to its advantage, a right of appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 and to allowing it to call into question the res judicata status ascribed to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), by which its action for annulment against that letter had been dismissed as inadmissible.
25      On those grounds, the second head of claim must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.
The applicant’s first head of claim
26      As regards the plea of inadmissibility raised by EIOPA, alleging that the applicant’s first head of claim is inadmissible in so far as Article 61(1) of Regulation No 1094/2010 requires, as a prior condition for the admissibility of an action for annulment before the EU Courts, the existence of an appeal admissible by the Board of Appeal, it should be noted that, in the circumstances of the present case, the proper administration of justice justifies ruling on the merits of that head of claim in order to reject it, without first examining its admissibility (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2002, Council v Boehringer, C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraph 52).
27      In support of the first head of claim in the action, the applicant raises several complaints which can be grouped, in essence, into six pleas in law, alleging: first, infringement of Regulation No 1094/2010, of the Solvency II Directive and of the rules of procedure before the Board of Appeal; second, breach of the principle of equal treatment; third, breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations; fourth, breach of the principle of effective judicial protection; fifth, infringement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; and sixth, errors committed by the Board of Appeal in not finding that EIOPA had incorrectly refused to initiate an investigation.
The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Regulation No 1094/2010, the Solvency II Directive and the rules of procedure before the Board of Appeal
28      The applicant claims that the contested decision incorrectly classified the letter of 19 September 2023, since the Board of Appeal found that that letter was not a challengeable act for the purposes of Article 60(1) of Regulation No 1094/2010.
29      First, the applicant submits that, since Article 60(1) of Regulation No 1094/2010 expressly lists the acts which may be subject to an appeal, the Board of Appeal should, first of all, have identified the legal basis of the letter of 19 September 2023, in order to determine whether that letter constituted such an act.
30      Second, the applicant claims that, in order to determine whether the letter of 19 September 2023 constituted a challengeable act, the Board of Appeal should have reviewed the specific context and purpose of the proposed investigation and the content of that letter and its practical effects. Its analysis within the contested decision appears to be fully based on general prerequisites unrelated to the specificity of the situation under the request. The applicant is of the view that the Board of Appeal was, more specifically, required to examine carefully all of the matters of fact and law which it brought to EIOPA’s attention in order to determine the action that EIOPA should have taken in relation to its complaint. Similarly, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal or EIOPA must provide sufficient clarity and information in their reasoning if it is decided not to proceed with the investigation of a complaint so that the Court of Justice of the European Union can examine the exercise of discretion by those bodies in setting priorities. Furthermore, the applicant submits that EIOPA’s discretion to decide to initiate an investigation is not and should not be construed as unlimited. The EU judicature has found that the discretionary power of the EU authorities should be subject to two levels of review, on the one hand, by the boards of appeal which exercise a wide control having the same competences as the authority which issued the decision, and, on the other hand, by the EU instances whose control is limited to examining whether the exercise of the ‘entirely’ discretionary power is not affected by a manifest error or an abuse of power.
31      Third, as regards the case-law relied on by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision, the applicant claims that the latter applied it without taking into account the specific features of the present case. Contrary to the present case, the EU authorities did not rule, in any of the decisions relied on by the Board of Appeal, on whether EU law was infringed, either because those authorities were not provided with sufficient evidence in that regard or because the legislation allegedly infringed did not apply and was therefore irrelevant. In all those cases, those authorities rejected the various requests to initiate an investigation as part of the exercise of their discretionary power, which, according to the applicant, is not the case here.
32      Fourth, the applicant submits that, by not taking into account the particularity of the present case, the Board of Appeal infringed the principle of proportionality. According to the applicant, the particularity of the present case as compared to the cases on which the Board of Appeal relied – which was not taken into account by the Board of Appeal – is that, although EIOPA formally closed its request to initiate an investigation against the Romanian supervisory authority to assess whether that authority had infringed EU law, EIOPA proceeded in fact to an investigation, in breach of Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010 and the Rules of Procedure on Investigations Regarding Breach of Union Law for applying Article 17. Consequently, the letter of 19 September 2023 is not a mere decision to refuse to open an investigation rendered by EIOPA in the exercise of the discretion conferred on it by Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010, as the Board of Appeal found, but an act by which EIOPA, following a review process, expresses its view that the Romanian supervisory authority did not infringe EU law, the effects of which are binding upon its addressee, and is therefore a challengeable ‘decision’ before the Board of Appeal.
33      Fifth, the applicant claims that, since the present case concerns a decision by which EIOPA found that the Romanian supervisory authority had not infringed EU law, it is not relevant that it was not one of the entities expressly referred to in Article 17(2) of Regulation No 1094/2010, as the Board of Appeal incorrectly alleged in the contested decision. According to the applicant, under that article, EIOPA can initiate an investigation on its own initiative, and this would be such a case. The applicant further submits that it is apparent from a combined reading of Article 60 and recital 58 of Regulation No 1094/2010, as well as the case-law, that in order for an action to be brought before the Board of Appeal against a decision of EIOPA, that decision must be either a decision referred to in Articles 17 to 19 of Regulation No 1094/2010 or a decision taken in accordance with the Union acts referred to in Article 1(2) of that regulation, addressed to the applicant or of direct and individual concern to it. No other condition is required. Consequently, the Board of Appeal should have analysed whether the refusal of EIOPA to initiate investigation proceedings constitutes one of those decisions or not. According to the applicant, the letter of 19 September 2023, in which EIOPA found that there was no infringement of EU law by the Romanian supervisory authority, is, pursuant to the case-law, a decision taken in accordance with the Union acts referred to in Article 1(2) of Regulation No 1094/2010.
34      EIOPA disputes the applicant’s arguments.
35      It should be noted, first of all, that, according to Article 8(2) of Regulation No 1094/2010, the types of acts which EIOPA may establish include guidelines, recommendations, opinions and individual decisions in the specific cases referred to in Articles 17, 18 and 19 of that regulation. In that context, it should be recalled that the fourth and fifth paragraphs of Article 288 TFEU state that a decision is binding in its entirety, whereas recommendations and opinions have no binding force.
36      Under Article 60(1) of Regulation No 1094/2010, ‘any natural or legal person, including competent authorities, may appeal against a decision of [EIOPA] referred to in Articles 17, 18 and 19 and any other decision taken by [EIOPA] in accordance with the Union acts referred to in Article 1(2) which is addressed to that person, or against a decision which, although in the form of a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to that person.’
37      Moreover, under Article 60(4) of Regulation No 1094/2010, ‘if the appeal is admissible, the Board of Appeal shall examine whether it is well-founded.’ Under Article 9(1) of its rules of procedure, the Board of Appeal is to determine whether or not an appeal is admissible before examining whether it is well founded, if the respondent contends that the appeal is not admissible.
38      In the present case, it is clear from the information in the file that EIOPA lodged a response dated 12 December 2023 before the Board of Appeal, which was limited to questions of admissibility. In that response EIOPA submitted that the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible.
39      By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible, on the ground, in essence, that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a decision within the meaning of Article 60(1) of Regulation No 1094/2010.
40      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated, in essence, in the first place, that EIOPA’s power to initiate an investigation was, in accordance with the General Court’s case-law, entirely discretionary and not open to review by the Court or by the Board of Appeal. In the second place, the Board of Appeal stated that its competence is limited by Article 60 of Regulation No 1094/2010; in particular, the refusal to initiate an investigation falls outside of its jurisdiction to the extent that, where it follows a request made by a legal person, it does not constitute a decision taken on the basis of the provisions of Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010. Lastly, the Board of Appeal found that the factual and legal circumstances of the present case do not differ from those at issue in previous relevant Board of Appeal decisions and relevant case-law and they do not therefore allow for a different conclusion on the admissibility of the appeal.
41      In that regard, it must be borne in mind, from the outset, that, by order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), the Court dismissed the action for annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023 as inadmissible. In particular, the Court stated that the applicant could not require EIOPA to initiate investigation proceedings under Article 17(2) of Regulation No 1094/2010. EIOPA’s refusal to initiate such proceedings on its own initiative was not capable of affecting the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position (order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA, T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347, paragraph 30). The Court therefore found that the letter of 19 September 2023 could not be categorised as a challengeable act for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU. It must also be held that that letter cannot be categorised as a decision within the meaning of Article 60(1) of Regulation No 1094/2010.
42      It follows from settled case-law that, where an EU institution, body, office or agency is not bound to initiate a procedure, but has a discretion which excludes the right for individuals to require it to adopt a specific position, it is not open to persons who have lodged a complaint to bring an action before the EU judicature against a decision to take no further action on their complaint. That possibility would arise only if those persons had procedural rights, comparable to those they might have in the case of a procedure under Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), enabling them to require that institution, body, office or agency to inform them and to grant them a hearing (see judgment of 9 September 2015, SV Capital v EBA, T‑660/14, EU:T:2015:608, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
43      Actions brought by natural or legal persons against the Commission’s refusal (i) to initiate a procedure for a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations under Article 258 TFEU (order of 17 July 1998, Sateba v Commission, C‑422/97 P, EU:C:1998:395, paragraph 42), (ii) to bring an action under Article 106(3) TFEU (judgment of 22 February 2005, Commission v max.mobil, C‑141/02 P, EU:C:2005:98, paragraphs 68 to 70) and (iii) to examine complaints put forward for failure to respect merger decisions (judgment of 9 October 2018, 1&1 Telecom v Commission, T‑43/16, EU:T:2018:660, paragraphs 37 to 49) have thus been declared inadmissible.
44      Similarly, the action brought against EIOPA’s refusal of a request for an investigation to be initiated under Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010 was declared inadmissible (order of 24 June 2016, Onix Asigurări v EIOPA, T‑590/15, EU:T:2016:374, paragraphs 50 to 57).
45      In the present case, as EIOPA correctly states, it is common ground that the applicant submitted a request to EIOPA pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2019/2175 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2019 (OJ 2019 L 334, p. 1). That provision provides EIOPA with a mechanism for dealing with infringements of EU law by the national authorities in their supervisory activities.
46      Article 17(2), (3) and (6) of Regulation No 1094/2010 sets out three stages to the mechanism enabling EIOPA to deal with infringements of EU law by the national authorities in their supervisory activities. In particular, Article 17(2) of that regulation provides that, ‘upon request from one or more competent authorities, the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the relevant Stakeholder Group, or on its own initiative, including when this is based on [well-substantiated] information from natural or legal persons, and after having informed the competent authority concerned, [EIOPA] shall outline how it intends to proceed with the case and, where appropriate, investigate the alleged breach or non-application of Union law.’
47      It is thus apparent from Article 17(2) of Regulation No 1094/2010 that EIOPA has discretion, as regards the initiation of an investigation under that provision, as evidenced by the use of the expression ‘outline how it intends to proceed with the case and, where appropriate, investigate’, both when it receives a request from one of the entities expressly mentioned in that provision and when it acts on its own initiative (see, by analogy, order of 10 August 2021, Jakeliūnas v ESMA, T‑760/20, not published, EU:T:2021:512, paragraph 29).
48      It follows that the Board of Appeal correctly held that EIOPA’s power to initiate an investigation under Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010 was entirely discretionary.
49      That interpretation is also consistent with EIOPA’s objectives and tasks as well as with the general scheme of the mechanism established by Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the Court has already held that the objective of that mechanism was not to provide individual protection or redress in disputes between a natural or legal person and a competent authority at the national level (see, to that effect, order of 24 June 2016, Onix Asigurări v EIOPA, T‑590/15, EU:T:2016:374, paragraph 55).
50      In the light of those factors, it must be noted that the lodging of a request, such as that made by the applicant in the present case, does not create any special legal relationship between the applicant and EIOPA and cannot require EIOPA to carry out an investigation under Article 17(2) of Regulation 1094/2010 (see, to that effect, order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA, T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347, paragraph 29).
51      In those circumstances, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal did in the contested decision, that the letter of 19 September 2023 does not produce binding legal effects. In particular, since the applicant could not require EIOPA to initiate investigation proceedings under Article 17(2) of Regulation No 1094/2010, EIOPA’s refusal to initiate such proceedings on its own initiative was not capable of affecting the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position.
52      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal correctly held, in essence, that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a decision within the meaning of Article 60(1) of Regulation No 1094/2010.
53      Furthermore, it must be stated that the Board of Appeal’s jurisdiction as regards any decision of EIOPA under Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010 is limited by Article 60 of that regulation. Thus, the Board of Appeal correctly stated in the contested decision that it did not have jurisdiction to decide on the applicant’s appeal against the refusal of EIOPA to initiate an investigation, in so far as it does not fall within the scope of Article 60 of that regulation. The applicant is not one of the entities expressly mentioned in Article 17(2) of Regulation No 1094/2010, which may request EIOPA to initiate an investigation into an alleged infringement of or failure to apply EU law, which are limited to the competent authorities, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Stakeholder Group (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 14 December 2016, SV Capital v EBA, C‑577/15 P, EU:C:2016:947, paragraphs 35, 36 and 40, and of 9 September 2015, SV Capital v EBA, T‑660/14, EU:T:2015:608, paragraphs 69 and 72).
54      That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal did not find that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a mere refusal to initiate an investigation, but a decision to close an investigation under Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010, by which EIOPA found that the Romanian supervisory authority had not infringed EU law.
55      In that regard, it must be stated that EIOPA, in the letter of 19 September 2023, pointed out several times that it was a letter refusing to initiate an investigation under Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010. The fact that EIOPA states in that letter to have ‘carefully and thoroughly’ assessed the application of the provisions of EU law in question in no way indicates that it had opened, carried out or closed an investigation under Article 17 of Regulation No 1094/2010, but simply that it had carefully assessed the material submitted to it and found, on the basis of that material, that an investigation under Article 17 was not appropriate.
56      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not, on any view, err in law in that regard.
57      In those circumstances, the first plea in law must be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law
58      By it second plea in law, concerning the principle of equal treatment, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal infringed that principle in so far as, in essence, it did not find that, by refusing its request to initiate a more detailed investigation, EIOPA acted in a discriminatory manner towards the applicant and Euroins Romania as compared with similar undertakings in Romania or in other EU Member States.
59      By its third plea in law, concerning the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal and EIOPA infringed that principle in so far as the Board of Appeal did not find that EIOPA had incorrectly refused to initiate an investigation.
60      By its fourth plea in law, concerning the principle of effective judicial protection, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal, by refusing to rule on the merits of the appeal, did not correctly assess the real nature of its request to initiate an investigation of the possible infringement of EU law and to assess the actual implications of such an infringement and therefore failed to have regard to that principle.
61      By its fifth plea in law, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in that its right to bring an appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 before the Board of Appeal was illusory and was not effective, since the Board of Appeal did not proceed to a judicious assessment of the facts and evidence which it provided.
62      By its sixth plea in law, the applicant claims that, by refusing to initiate an investigation, EIOPA acted contrary to its core fundamental mission, and exceeded its regulated competences under Regulation No 1094/2010. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal failed to observe that mission in the contested decision. The applicant reiterates that by not finding that EIOPA had failed to initiate an investigation of a potential infringement of EU law, including Regulation No 1094/2010 and certain provisions of Articles 7 and 8 TFEU, the Board of Appeal also infringed EU law and all of those provisions. Lastly, it submits that the contested decision did not thoroughly investigate all the factors triggering the need to initiate an investigation and did not find there was a failure to state reasons in the letter of 19 September 2023 in that regard.
63      In the present case, it should be noted at the outset that the arguments raised by the applicant in the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law seek, in essence, to challenge again the Board of Appeal’s dismissal, in the contested decision, of its appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 as inadmissible. However, it should be stated that, as set out in paragraph 52 above, the Board of Appeal was correct to dismiss the appeal as inadmissible by finding that that letter did not constitute a decision within the meaning of Article 60(1) of Regulation No 1094/2010.
64      In those circumstances, the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law must also be rejected.
65      The applicant’s first head of claim, seeking the annulment of the contested decision, must therefore be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
66      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed as brought in part before a court which manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
Costs
67      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by EIOPA.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.      The action is dismissed.
2.      Evroins inshurans grup AD shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
Luxembourg, 20 May 2026.
V. Di Bucci
E. Buttigieg
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.