62021CJ0110_RES
Case C‑110/21 P
Universität Bremen
v
European Research Executive Agency (REA)
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 14 July 2022
(Appeal – Action for annulment – Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Representation of non-privileged parties in a direct action before the Courts of the European Union – University teacher – University teacher teaching at the university represented in that action and performing duties as coordinator and head of the project that is the subject matter of the dispute – Condition of independence – Existence of a direct and personal interest in the outcome of the dispute)
Judicial proceedings – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements – Conditions relating to a signatory – Status of a third party in relation to the parties – University represented by a university teacher linked to that university by virtue of a public-law statutory relationship – Admissibility with regard to the requirement of independence – University teacher performing duties as coordinator and head of the project that is the subject matter of the dispute – Irrelevant
(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19)
(see paragraphs 55‑58, 61‑64, 66, 67)
Résumé
The University of Bremen was appointed coordinator of a research consortium comprising several European universities, carrying out interdisciplinary comparative law research in the field of tenancy law and housing policy throughout the European Union.
On 17 March 2019, following a call for proposals, the University of Bremen submitted a project proposal to the European Research Executive Agency (REA). That proposal obtained a score that put it in 10th place out of all applications submitted. By decision of 16 July 2019, (
1
) the REA rejected that proposal since, due to budgetary constraints, it could select only the projects ranked in the first three places. On 25 September 2019, the University of Bremen brought an action seeking annulment of that decision.
By order of 16 December 2020, (
2
) the General Court dismissed that action as manifestly inadmissible (
3
) on the ground that the professor representing the university concerned was not a third party in relation to that university and that, consequently, he did not satisfy the condition of independence laid down in the Statute of the Court of Justice. (
4
)
Ruling on the appeal brought by the University of Bremen, the Court of Justice sets aside that order of the General Court on the ground that the General Court erred in concluding that the action was manifestly inadmissible. In that context, it provides clarification concerning the condition of independence imposed on the representatives of non-privileged parties (
5
) in a direct action before the Courts of the European Union.
Findings of the Court
The Court of Justice points out, first of all, that, in applying the condition of independence imposed by EU law on the representatives of non-privileged parties, the Courts of the European Union carry out a restricted review which limits findings of inadmissibility in respect of actions to situations in which it is quite obvious that the representative concerned is not in a position to carry out the task of defending his or her client while acting in that client’s interests to the greatest possible extent, with the result that that representative must be removed in the interests of the client.
Next, the Court examines whether the condition of independence developed in the case-law with regard to lawyers applies also to university teachers authorised to represent a party in legal proceedings.
In that regard, it finds that the two professions are not comparable as regards the description of their tasks, since a lawyer is required to protect and defend his or her client’s interests, whereas a university teacher’s role is to teach and carry out research, in full independence having regard to the academic freedom governing that profession. However, where a university teacher represents a party before the Courts of the European Union, he or she is no longer acting as a teacher and researcher but carries out the same task as that which is the duty of a lawyer, namely representing non-privileged parties. Furthermore, university teachers accorded a right of audience under the law of their Member State have the same rights as are accorded to lawyers by the Statute of the Court of Justice. (
6
)
It follows, according to the Court, that, in accordance with the objective of the task of representation, which is above all to protect and defend the principal’s interests to the greatest possible extent, university teachers must meet the same criteria of independence as those applied to lawyers. Those criteria are determined, negatively, by the absence of an employment relationship between the representative and his or her client, and positively, by reference to ethical obligations entailing, inter alia, the absence of a connection which has a manifestly detrimental effect on the capacity of the lawyer to carry out the task of defending his or her client while acting in that client’s interests to the greatest possible extent, in line with the law and professional rules.
As regards the issue of the absence of an employment relationship between the representative and his or her client, the Court finds that, in the present case, the university professor concerned is linked to the university which he represents by virtue of a public-law statutory relationship. That status confers on him, according to the conditions and rules of national law, independence in his capacity not only as a teacher and researcher, but also as a representative of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the European Union. Since legal representation is not one of the tasks which that professor is called upon to perform within the university as a teacher or researcher, that representation is in no way connected to his academic duties and is therefore performed outside any relationship of subordination with that university, even where he is called upon to represent that university.
Furthermore, the Court finds that, in the light of its case-law, (
7
) the existence of a public-law statutory relationship between a university teacher and the university which he or she represents is insufficient for a finding that that university teacher is in a situation preventing him or her from defending that university’s interests.
Lastly, the Court adds that, given that the Statute of the Court of Justice confers on university teachers the same rights as are accorded to lawyers, (
8
) a university teacher accorded a right of audience under national law is presumed to satisfy, in principle, the condition of independence, even where that university teacher represents the university where he or she pursues his or her academic activities.
As regards the absence of a connection which has a detrimental effect on the representative’s capacity to carry out the task of defending his or her client, the Court of Justice rules that the General Court erred in finding that, since the representative of the university concerned was coordinator and head of the project and had been entrusted with ‘essential tasks and duties’ in the context of that project, his personal connection with the subject matter of the dispute compromised his capacity to provide the legal assistance needed by that university.
According to the Court of Justice, the duties performed by the representative concerned in the context of the project that is the subject matter of the dispute indeed meant that he shared common interests with the University of Bremen. Nevertheless, such interests cannot suffice to establish that that representative was not capable of duly carrying out the task of representation with which he was entrusted.
Since, moreover, no evidence has been put forward such as to indicate that those interests precluded legal representation of the University of Bremen by that representative, the General Court exceeded the limits of its review as set out in the case-law of the Court of Justice.
In those circumstances, the Court of Justice rules that the General Court erred in concluding that the action was inadmissible on the ground that the University of Bremen was not duly represented by the university professor concerned.
(
1
)	Decision Ares (2019) 4590599 of the REA of 16 July 2019.
(
2
)	Order of 16 December 2020, Universität Bremen v REA (T‑660/19, not published, EU:T:2020:633).
(
3
)	Within the meaning of Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
(
4
)	See Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Statute of the Court of Justice’).
(
5
)	The privileged parties are the parties referred to in the first and second paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, namely the Member States, the institutions of the European Union, the States, other than the Member States, which are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and the EFTA Surveillance Authority referred to in that Agreement.
(
6
)	Third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
(
7
)	Judgment of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA (C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraphs 66 and 67).
(
8
)	Within the meaning of the third and seventh paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.