62022CJ0602_RES
Case C‑602/22 P
ABLV Bank AS, in liquidation
v
Single Resolution Board
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 December 2025
(Appeal – Economic and monetary policy – Banking union – Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 – Single Resolution Mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms – Article 7 – Division of tasks within the Single Resolution Mechanism – Article 18 – Resolution procedure – Conditions – Decision of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) not to adopt a resolution scheme – Competence of the SRB)
Economic and monetary policy – Economic policy – Single Resolution Mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms – Decision not to adopt a resolution scheme – Exclusive competence of the Single Resolution Board – Condition – Cumulative conditions for entry into a resolution procedure not satisfied
(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 806/2014, Art. 18(1) to (6))
(see paragraphs 71-84)
EU institutions – Exercise of powers – Delegation – Conditions – Delegation of decision-making powers to agencies – Types of delegation and effects – Delegation of implementing powers clearly defined – Powers concerned not appreciably altered – Delegation of a discretionary power implying a wide margin of discretion on the fundamental issues of the policy area concerned – Potential transfer of responsibility
(Art. 290 TFEU)
(see paragraphs 87-90)
EU institutions – Exercise of powers – Delegation – Conditions – Delegation of decision-making powers to the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – Adoption of a resolution scheme by the SRB – Wide margin of discretion – Legislative provisions avoiding a transfer of responsibility from the Commission to the SRB
(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 806/2014, Art. 18(1) to (7))
(see paragraphs 91, 92, 97-99)
Action for annulment – Actionable measures – Concept – Measures producing binding legal effects – Preparatory measures – Decision to adopt a resolution scheme by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – Entry into force – No binding legal effects produced – Exclusion – Endorsement decision from the Commission, or the Council of the European Union, definitively laying down the content of that scheme – Included
(Art. 263 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 806/2014, Arts 18(1) to (8), and 30(1) and (2))
(see paragraphs 94, 96)
EU law – Principles – Right to effective judicial protection – Guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Judicial review of decisions adopted by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – Review confined to ascertaining that the facts have been accurately stated and that there has been no manifest error of assessment – Infringement – None
(Art. 263 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47)
(see paragraphs 129-132)
Economic and monetary policy – Economic policy – Single Resolution Mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms – Adoption of a resolution scheme – Conditions – Taking into account the circumstances which lead to an entity failing or being likely to fail – Precluded
(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 806/2014, recital 58 and Art. 18(1) and (4))
(see paragraph 156)
Résumé
Hearing an appeal against the judgment of the General Court of 6 July 2022, ABLV Bank v SRB (T‑280/18, EU:T:2022:429), which it dismisses, the Court of Justice, sitting as the Grand Chamber, rules for the first time on the competence of the Single Resolution Board (‘the SRB’) to take a decision not to adopt a resolution scheme.
The appellant, ABLV Bank AS, is a credit institution established in Latvia and the parent company of the ABLV group. ABLV Bank Luxembourg SA is a credit institution established in Luxembourg and is one of the subsidiaries of the ABLV group; the appellant is the sole shareholder of ABLV Luxembourg. Those two institutions were categorised as ‘significant entities’ and as such were subject to supervision by the European Central Bank (ECB) under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). (
1
)
On 13 February 2018, the United States Department of the Treasury announced a proposed measure to designate the appellant as an institution of primary money laundering concern. Following that announcement, the appellant was no longer able to make payments in US dollars. The ECB invited the Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Financial and Capital Markets Commission, Latvia) and the Commission de surveillance du secteur financier (Financial Sector Supervisory Commission, Luxembourg) to suspend payments of the financial obligations of the appellant and ABLV Bank Luxembourg respectively. On 23 February 2018, the ECB concluded that the appellant and ABLV Bank Luxembourg were failing or likely to fail. By two decisions of 23 February 2018, concerning the appellant and ABLV Bank Luxembourg, respectively, the Single Resolution Board (SRB), endorsing the ECB’s conclusion that the latter credit institutions were failing or likely to fail, nevertheless took the view that resolution action in respect of them was not necessary in the public interest. (
2
)
Findings of the Court
As regards the error of law alleged by the appellant concerning the interpretation of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 adopted by the General Court, which rejected the plea alleging that the SRB had no power to take a formal decision not to adopt a resolution scheme within the meaning of that provision, the Court recalls, as a first consideration, that, according to its settled case-law relating to the interpretation of a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. (
3
)
First of all, the wording of Article 18 of that regulation states (
4
) that the SRB is to adopt a resolution scheme in respect of, inter alia, financial institutions and groups that are regarded as significant only if it takes the view that the conditions of that regulation (
5
) are met, that is to say (i) whether the entity or group concerned is failing or is likely to fail, (ii) the absence of alternative measures with regard to resolution, and (iii) whether a resolution action is necessary in the public interest.
In that regard, as regards the first of those conditions, it is apparent from Regulation No 806/2014 (
6
) that the ECB is to carry out the assessment of whether the entity or group concerned is failing or is likely to fail (‘the assessment’) after consulting the SRB and that the SRB may make such an assessment only if, after it has informed the ECB of its intention, the ECB does not make the assessment within three calendar days of receipt of that information. Such an assessment by the ECB results in the procedure provided for in Article 18 of that regulation being initiated and, consequently, in an examination of the conditions provided for in that regulation by the SRB. (
7
) Therefore, that provision provides for the SRB to have the power to examine those conditions in all cases where the resolution procedure has been initiated on the basis of the assessment of the ECB or, as the case may be, carried out by the SRB itself, even though that article does not contain express instructions regarding the follow-up steps that must be taken vis-à-vis that procedure where the SRB takes the view that those conditions are not satisfied. In addition, although the provisions of Regulation No 806/2014 (
8
) make the entry into force of the resolution scheme subject to the European Commission’s endorsement, in the absence of objections on the part of the Commission or the European Council, provision for such involvement by the latter is not made in the event that a resolution scheme is not adopted, which in such circumstances constitutes the final step of the resolution procedure provided for in that regulation.
Next, as regards the context, the Court notes, first, that Article 7(2) of Regulation No 806/2014 is not such as to rule out the possibility of the SRB having the power to take a decision not to adopt a resolution scheme. Although there is disparity between the language versions of that provision, the Court recalls that, according to settled case-law, a purely literal interpretation of one or more language versions of a text of EU law, to the exclusion of the others, cannot prevail since the uniform application of EU rules requires that they be interpreted, inter alia, in the light of the versions drawn up in all the languages. By contrast, recital 33 of Regulation No 806/2014 specifies that the SRB should prepare all ‘decisions concerning resolution procedure’ and, to the fullest extent possible, adopt those decisions, which indicates that the EU legislature intended that the range of types of decision that the SRB is tasked with adopting in the context of the Single Resolution Mechanism be broad.
Lastly, as regards the objectives pursued by Regulation No 806/2014, it is clear from its recitals (
9
) that, by putting in place a uniform and centralised decision-making process with regard to resolution, the purpose of that regulation is to establish a swift and effective decision-making process in resolution in the banking union with a view, inter alia, to ensuring greater predictability regarding the outcome of bank failure, to maintaining financial stability, to ensuring the continuity of essential financial services and to protecting depositors. An assessment by the ECB that the entity concerned is failing or is likely to fail (
10
) results in the procedure provided for in Article 18 of that regulation being initiated and, consequently, in an examination of the conditions provided for in that provision by the SRB.
Therefore, the Court finds that an interpretation of Article 18 to the effect that the SRB does not have the power to take a decision not to adopt a resolution scheme where it takes the view that the conditions are not met would not make it possible to ensure sufficient transparency as regards the outcome of the resolution procedure carried out by the SRB following a finding that an entity is failing or is likely to fail and, accordingly, to ensure a certain level of predictability as regards the consequences of that failure, in particular concerning the measures that will be taken following that finding. In that regard, the Court recalls that, in the situation where the SRB takes the view that those conditions are not satisfied, that conclusion constitutes the final step of the resolution procedure. (
11
) For reasons of transparency, it is important that national competent authorities be informed of the outcome of the resolution procedure led by the SRB.
Consequently, the Court finds that the General Court did not err in law when it found that Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 must be interpreted as meaning that the SRB does have the power to take a decision not to adopt a resolution scheme when it takes the view that the conditions provided for in paragraph 1 of that article are not met.
As a second consideration, the Court finds that that conclusion is not called into question by the case-law arising from the judgments of 13 June 1958, Meroni v High Authority (9/56, EU:C:1958:7), and of 18 June 2024, Commission v SRB (C‑551/22 P, EU:C:2024:520).
In that regard, the Court recalls that the regime put in place by Regulation No 806/2014 is based on the finding (
12
) that the exercise of the resolution powers falls within the resolution policy of the European Union, which only EU institutions may establish, and that a margin of discretion remains in the adoption of each specific resolution scheme, given their considerable impact on the financial stability and fiscal sovereignty of the Member States and on the European Union itself. For those reasons, the EU legislature considered it necessary to provide for the adequate involvement of the Council and the Commission, thereby strengthening the necessary operational independence of the SRB while respecting the principles of delegation of powers to agencies which arise from the Court’s case-law. (
13
)
Specifically, with regard to the provisions of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014, the Court found that they are such as to avoid a transfer of responsibility. (
14
) While conferring on the SRB the power to assess whether the conditions for the adoption of a resolution scheme are met and the power to determine the tools necessary for the purposes of such a scheme, those provisions confer on the Commission, or, as the case may be, on the Council, the responsibility for the final assessment of the discretionary aspects of the scheme which fall within the scope of EU policy for the resolution of credit institutions The latter aspects involve a specific balancing of various objectives and interests, relating to the safeguarding of the financial stability of the European Union and the integrity of the internal market, the taking into account of the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States and the protection of the interests of shareholders and creditors.
Furthermore, the Court notes that, although a wide margin of discretion is granted to the SRB as regards the appropriateness of implementing a resolution procedure, it is subject to objective criteria and conditions delimiting the SRB’s scope of action, which relate to both the resolution tools and conditions. In addition, Regulation No 806/2014 provides for the participation of the Commission and of the Council in the procedure leading to the adoption of a resolution scheme, which, in order to enter into force, must be endorsed by the Commission and, where relevant, the Council. (
15
)
Accordingly, the Court found that, while Regulation No 806/2014 (
16
) provides that the SRB is responsible for drawing up and adopting a resolution scheme, the SRB does not however have the power to adopt an act producing independent legal effects and specified that, in such a procedure, endorsement by the Commission is an essential element both for the entry into force and for the determination of the content of that scheme. However, the Court points out that it cannot be inferred from the above that it found that the SRB does not in any circumstances have the power to adopt an act producing independent legal effects. The purpose of the findings in the judgment of 18 June 2024, Commission v SRB (C‑551/22 P, EU:C:2024:520), is to provide reasons for the assessment that a resolution scheme cannot produce binding legal effects irrespective of the Commission’s endorsement decision. Those findings relate only to the case of resolution schemes.
In addition, although the Court has held that adequate involvement by the Commission and the Council was required in the context of the adoption of a resolution scheme in order to avoid a transfer of responsibility, the Court acted on the basis of a combination of factors characterising the adoption by the SRB of such a scheme. However, not all those factors are present where the SRB decides not to adopt a resolution scheme.
First, the Court inferred from Article 18(6) of Regulation No 806/2014 that, in order to adopt a resolution scheme, the SRB must assess, on a discretional basis, two separate aspects of the situation at issue, the first of which concerns whether the conditions justifying the adoption of such a scheme are met (
17
) and the second of which concerns the determination of the resolution tools necessary (
18
) for that purpose and, where appropriate, the use of the SRF. In order for the SRB to adopt a decision not to adopt a resolution scheme, it need only conclude that the cumulative conditions justifying the adoption of such a scheme are not met, sparing it from having to determine the tools that would have been necessary for the resolution, recourse to which requires a specific balancing of various objectives and interests, as referred to previously.
Therefore, the scope of the discretionary assessments which must be made by the SRB in order to decide not to adopt a resolution scheme is necessarily more restricted than the scope of the assessments that must be carried out when adopting such a scheme. The SRB’s power to assess whether the conditions laid down in Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 are met is circumscribed by objective criteria and conditions delimiting the SRB’s scope of action. (
19
)
Second, unlike a resolution scheme, a decision not to adopt a resolution scheme cannot, in itself, have the effect of imposing concrete measures or committing funds, its sole effect being to bring to an end the resolution procedure led by the SRB.
Consequently, in the light of all of those findings, the Court of Justice rejects the appellant’s unfounded line of argument to the effect that the interpretation of Article 18(1) of that regulation adopted by the General Court in the judgment under appeal has no basis in the wording of that provision or in the regulation itself and misconstrues the limits of the powers of the SRB defined in that provision as they result from the case-law of the Court of Justice resulting from the judgments of 13 June 1958, Meroni v High Authority (9/56, EU:C:1958:7), and of 18 June 2024, Commission v SRB (C‑551/22 P, EU:C:2024:520).
Taking the view, moreover, that the other arguments and grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant must be rejected, the Court of Justice dismisses the appeal.
(
1
)	Under Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63).
(
2
)	Within the meaning of Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1; ‘the SRM Regulation’).
(
3
)	See judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck (292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12), and of 25 February 2025, BSH Hausgeräte (C‑339/22, EU:C:2025:108, paragraph 27).
(
4
)	Article 18(1) and (6).
(
5
)	Article 18(1)(a) to (c) of Regulation No 806/2014.
(
6
)	Second subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014.
(
7
)	To that effect, judgment of 6 May 2021, ABVL Bank and Others v ECB (C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369, paragraph 67).
(
8
)	Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014.
(
9
)	Recitals 2, 10 to 12, 31, 58 and 122.
(
10
)	Within the meaning of Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation No 806/2014.
(
11
)	Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014.
(
12
)	In essence, in recitals 24 and 26 of Regulation No 806/2014.
(
13
)	Judgment of 13 June 1958, Meroni v High Authority (9/56, EU:C:1958:7). See also, to that effect, judgments of 22 January 2014, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (C‑270/12, EU:C:2014:18), and of 18 June 2024, Commission v SRB (C‑551/22 P, EU:C:2024:520, paragraph 69).
(
14
)	Within the meaning of the case-law resulting from the judgment of 13 June 1958, Meroni v High Authority (9/56, EU:C:1958:7).
(
15
)	Judgment of 18 June 2024, Commission v SRB (C‑551/22 P, EU:C:2024:520, paragraph 77).
(
16
)	Articles 7 and 18.
(
17
)	Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014.
(
18
)	Article 22(2) of Regulation No 806/2014.
(
19
)	Article 18(1), (4) and (5) of Regulation No 806/2014.