62023CC0790
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
RICHARD DE LA TOUR
delivered on 30 April 2025 (
1
)
Case C‑790/23 [Qassioun] (
i
)
X
v
Maahanmuuttovirasto
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court, Finland))
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Asylum policy – Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 – Criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection – Article 18 – Obligations of the Member State responsible – Obligations to take back an applicant for international protection whose ‘application has been rejected’ – Application lodged in a Member State which is subject to Regulation No 604/2013, but which is not bound by Directives 2011/95/EU and 2013/32/EU – Third-country national in respect of whom the Kingdom of Denmark has withdrawn the temporary protection granted in accordance with national law – Concept of an ‘application [for international protection which] has been rejected’)
I. Introduction
1.
This request for a preliminary ruling offers the Court a further opportunity to rule on the scope of the consequences associated with the Kingdom of Denmark’s varying degree of participation in the rules making up the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). (
2
)
2.
As regards Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty, which covers, inter alia, policies relating to border controls, asylum and immigration, that Member State enjoys, under Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the EU Treaty and to the FEU Treaty, a special status which distinguishes it from the other Member States. While, pursuant to an international agreement with the European Union, (
3
) that Member State undertook to apply Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, (
4
) it is not, however, bound by Directives 2011/95/EU (
5
) and 2013/32/EU, (
6
) which are associated with that regulation. The decisions handed down by the Kingdom of Denmark in the context of the examination of the applications for international protection made to it in accordance with the provisions of its domestic law are therefore adopted in the light of substantive conditions and according to procedural rules specific to that Member State.
3.
The request for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceedings between a Syrian national and the Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Immigration Service), with which that third-country national lodged an application for international protection, whereas the temporary protection which had been granted to her by the Kingdom of Denmark had just been withdrawn. The Finnish Immigration Service rejected her application as inadmissible on the ground that the Kingdom of Denmark is the Member State responsible for examining that application, and that Member State had, moreover, agreed to take back the applicant on the basis of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation. The Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court, Finland), the referring court, challenges the legal basis upon which that take back is based, because that provision applies in respect of third-country nationals ‘whose application has been rejected and who made an application in another Member State’, which is not the situation as far as concerns the third-country national in question.
4.
The Court has already had occasion to hold that a Member State in which a person has lodged a further application for international protection may, if the conditions referred to in point (d) of Article 18(1) of the Dublin III Regulation are satisfied, request the Kingdom of Denmark to take back that person. (
7
) Here, the Court is asked to determine whether such conditions are actually satisfied in a situation in which the Kingdom of Denmark has not rejected the applicant’s previous application for international protection stricto sensu, but has withdrawn the temporary protection which it had previously granted to that person under its domestic law.
5.
For the reasons which I will now set out, it is my view that the Kingdom of Denmark cannot be regarded as the Member State responsible, which is subject to the take-back obligation laid down in Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation. It is true that, if that regulation is to be applied effectively in respect of the Kingdom of Denmark, then a broad interpretation of the conditions for application of that provision is arguably warranted. However, as I will explain, such an interpretation is, in my opinion, at odds with the meaning and the scope of the rules and concepts harmonised by the EU legislature in Directives 2011/95 and 2013/32, upon which the Dublin III Regulation and, more broadly, the CEAS are founded.
II. Legal framework
A.
European Union law
1. The Agreement between the European Union and Denmark
6.
By the Agreement between the European Union and Denmark, which was approved on behalf of the European Union by Decision 2006/188/EC, (
8
) the European Union and the Kingdom of Denmark agreed, inter alia, to extend, ‘under international law’, the application of Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (
9
) to the relations between them. Subsequently, in accordance with Article 3(2) of that agreement, that Member State notified the European Commission of its decision to implement the ‘amendment’ to that regulation, in the form of the Dublin III Regulation.
7.
The eleventh recital of the Agreement between the European Union and Denmark states that ‘the Court of Justice of the [European Union] should have jurisdiction in order to secure the uniform application and implementation of [that agreement] including the provisions of the Regulations and any implementing [EU] measures forming part of [the] Agreement’.
8.
Article 1 of that agreement, entitled ‘Aim’, provides:
‘1.   The aim of this Agreement is to apply the provisions of [the Dublin III Regulation] … and [its] implementing measures to the relation between the [European Union] and Denmark, in accordance with Article 2(1) and 2(2).
2.   It is the objective of the Contracting Parties to arrive at a uniform application and interpretation of the provisions of [that regulation] and [its] implementing measures in all Member States.
…’
9.
Article 2(1) of that agreement provides:
‘The provisions of the [Dublin II Regulation] … shall under international law apply to the relations between the [European Union] and Denmark.’
2. The Dublin III Regulation
10.
Points (b) and (d) of Article 2 of the Dublin III Regulation provide:
‘For the purposes of this Regulation:
…
(b)
“application for international protection” means an application for international protection as defined in Article 2(h) of Directive [2011/95 (
10
)];
…
(d)
“examination of an application for international protection” means any examination of, or decision or ruling concerning, an application for international protection by the competent authorities in accordance with Directive [2013/32] and Directive [2011/95], except for procedures for determining the Member State responsible in accordance with this Regulation’.
11.
Article 3 of that regulation, entitled ‘Access to the procedure for examining an application for international protection’, provides:
‘1.   Member States shall examine any application for international protection by a third-country national or a stateless person who applies on the territory of any one of them, including at the border or in the transit zones. The application shall be examined by a single Member State, which shall be the one which the criteria set out in Chapter III indicate is responsible.
2.   Where no Member State responsible can be designated on the basis of the criteria listed in this Regulation, the first Member State in which the application for international protection was lodged shall be responsible for examining it.
…’
12.
Article 18 of the Dublin III Regulation sets out the ‘obligations of the Member State responsible’ as follows:
‘1.   The Member State responsible under this Regulation shall be obliged to:
…
(d)
take back … a third-country national or a stateless person whose application has been rejected and who made an application in another Member State or who is on the territory of another Member State without a residence document.
2.   …
In the cases falling within the scope of paragraph 1(d), where the application has been rejected at first instance only, the Member State responsible shall ensure that the person concerned has or has had the opportunity to seek an effective remedy …’
B.
Finnish law
13.
Under Paragraph 103(2) of the ulkomaalaislaki (301/2004) (Law on foreign nationals (301/2004)) of 30 April 2004, an application for international protection may be rejected as inadmissible if the applicant can be transferred to another Member State which is responsible for examining that application under the Dublin III Regulation.
C.
Danish law
14.
Paragraph 7(1) to (3) of the udlændingeloven (Law on Foreign Nationals), in the version thereof applicable to the facts in the main proceedings, (
11
) provides:
‘1.   A foreign national shall be issued a temporary residence document upon application if he or she falls under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. [ (
12
)]
2.   A foreign national shall be issued a temporary residence document upon application if he or she is threatened with the death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to his or her home country. An application pursuant to the first sentence shall also be deemed to be an application for a temporary residence document pursuant to subparagraph 1.
3.   In the cases referred to in subparagraph 2, in which the threat of the death penalty or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is based on a particularly serious situation in the home country characterised by arbitrary violence and attacks on the civilian population, a temporary residence document shall be issued upon application. An application pursuant to the first sentence shall also be deemed to be an application for a residence document pursuant to subparagraphs 1 and 2.’
15.
Paragraph 11(2) of the Danish Law on Foreign Nationals provides:
‘A fixed-term residence document issued with the possibility of permanent residence shall be extended upon application unless there are grounds for revoking the residence document … The Udlændingestyrelsen [(Immigration Office, Denmark) (
13
)] shall take a decision of its own motion to extend a temporary residence document pursuant to Paragraph 7 … if the grounds on which it was initially granted still exist.
…’
III. Facts of the dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling
16.
The applicant, a Syrian national, lodged an application for international protection on 1 July 2016 with the Danish authorities.
17.
On 29 August 2016, a residence document was issued to her on the basis of the grant of temporary protection provided for in Paragraph 7(3) of the Danish Law on Foreign Nationals. That residence document, which took effect on the day it was issued, was initially valid for a period of one year. It was subsequently extended several times for the same duration by the Danish Immigration Office of its own motion. However, on 17 November 2020, that office decided, again of its own motion, not to renew that document, pursuant to Paragraph 11(2) of that law, on the ground that the reasons which justified it being issued no longer existed. The Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board, Denmark) upheld that decision on 2 July 2021 and ordered the applicant to leave Denmark within one month.
18.
On 27 July 2021, the applicant applied for international protection in Finland.
19.
On 29 July 2021, the Finnish Immigration Service, the Finnish authority competent to examine that application, submitted a take-back request in respect of the applicant to the Kingdom of Denmark pursuant to Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation. The Kingdom of Denmark accepted that request on 5 August 2021.
20.
On 12 November 2021, the Finnish Immigration Service rejected the applicant’s application for international protection as inadmissible on the ground that the Kingdom of Denmark was responsible for examining that application, thus providing for her transfer to that Member State and banning her from entering Finland for a period of two years.
21.
The applicant appealed against that decision before the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court, Helsinki, Finland), which dismissed that appeal. She subsequently sought leave to lodge an appeal before the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court).
22.
In support of that application, she claimed, inter alia, that the decision by which the Finnish Immigration Service rejected her application for international protection as inadmissible is contrary to EU law.
23.
The referring court asks, in essence, whether the conditions triggering the take-back obligation provided for in Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation are satisfied and, more specifically, whether the first application for international protection made by the applicant in Denmark can be regarded as an ‘application [for international protection which] has been rejected’ by the competent Danish authority, within the meaning of that provision.
24.
In that regard, the referring court observes, in the first place, that the application in question initially met with a series of partially favourable decisions, in that the Danish Immigration Office issued the applicant with a temporary residence document which it subsequently extended several times. That court adds that it was only later, of that authority’s own motion, that a decision not to renew that temporary residence document was made. The court asks whether a rejection of an application for international protection, within the meaning of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation, can be held to exist in such circumstances.
25.
In the second place, the referring court considers, given the special legal status of the Kingdom of Denmark, that the national procedures applied in that Member State for examining applications for international protection differ from those applied in other Member States, and asks, therefore, how the concept of an ‘application’ should be defined.
26.
In those circumstances, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Must Article 18(1)(d) of [the Dublin III Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that the rejection of an application, within the meaning of that provision, covers a situation in which a temporary residence document based on the need for protection previously granted to the person concerned in Denmark on his or her application was not renewed, where the decision not to renew was not taken on the application of that person but by the authority concerned of its own motion?’
27.
The Finnish Immigration Service, the Finnish, Danish, German, Netherlands and Swiss Governments and the Commission submitted written observations. Those parties and interested persons (with the exception of the Netherlands and Swiss Governments), plus the applicant, participated at the hearing held on 29 January 2025, during which they also replied to the questions put by the Court for an oral answer.
IV. Analysis
28.
By its question referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring court asks the Court, in essence, whether Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation must be interpreted as applying to a situation in which the temporary protection granted to a third-country national or a stateless person by the Kingdom of Denmark, further to him or her lodging an application for international protection, has been withdrawn from him or her in accordance with the domestic provisions of that Member State, and who, following that withdrawal, made an application in another Member State.
A.
Preliminary observations
29.
First of all, it is necessary to clarify the nature of the protection granted by the Kingdom of Denmark to the applicant for over four years on the basis of Paragraph 7(3) of the Danish Law on Foreign Nationals. The Finnish Government bases its observations on the premiss that the grant of such protection must be regarded as equivalent to the grant of international protection.
30.
However, I am of the view that that premiss must be rejected, because the temporary protection granted to the applicant cannot be regarded as ‘international protection’ within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 2011/95. It is established that she did not obtain refugee status within the meaning of Article 2(e) of that directive or subsidiary protection status within the meaning of Article 2(g) thereof.
31.
It is true that that temporary protection is granted on the basis of conditions which are quite similar to those governing the grant of subsidiary protection set out in Article 15 of Directive 2011/95. After all, the protection provided for in Paragraph 7(3) of the Danish Law on Foreign Nationals is intended for third-country nationals who may be subject to the death penalty, to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on account of the general situation in his or her home country, as a result of war, for example. (
14
)
32.
However, it differs from subsidiary protection in two respects. First, the temporary protection provided for in Paragraph 7(3) of the Danish Law on Foreign Nationals is granted in the light of substantive conditions and according to procedural rules particular to Danish law. Second, the rights granted to the beneficiary of such temporary protection differ, in both their nature and their scope, from the rights attaching to the subsidiary protection status set out in Chapter VII of Directive 2011/95.
33.
I will therefore examine the question put by the referring court from the starting point that the temporary protection under Paragraph 7(3) of the Danish Law on Foreign Nationals is a different type of protection, falling outside the scope of Directives 2011/95 and 2013/32, which is provided for and granted on the basis of provisions of Danish law only.
B.
Substance
34.
Article 18 of the Dublin III Regulation lays down the general and specific obligations on the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection, such examination being requested for the purpose of taking charge of, or taking back, an applicant for such protection.
35.
The obligations to take charge of, or to take back, that applicant and to process his or her application for international protection are determined according to the stage reached in the procedure to examine that application in that Member State. Article 18(1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides an exhaustive list of four situations. First, taking charge of an applicant who has lodged an application in a different Member State (point (a)). Second, taking back an applicant whose application is under examination in the Member State responsible and who made an application in another Member State (point (b)). Third, taking back a third-country national or a stateless person who has withdrawn the application under examination in the Member State responsible and made an application in another Member State (point (c)). Fourth, taking back a third-country national or a stateless person whose ‘application [for international protection] has been rejected and who made an application in another Member State’ (point (d)). It is the interpretation of that fourth situation which is sought. According to the Court, Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation covers, inter alia, cases in which an application for international protection has been rejected by a decision of the competent authority which has not yet become final. (
15
)
36.
The question put by the referring court seeks to determine to what extent the Kingdom of Denmark can be regarded as having rejected the applicant’s application for international protection, within the meaning of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation, by withdrawing from her the temporary protection which it had granted to her under its domestic law.
37.
I am not insensitive to the arguments put forward by certain Member States which, given the Kingdom of Denmark’s special legal status, propose adopting a sufficiently broad interpretation of the wording of that provision to ensure that that Member State does indeed participate in the Dublin III Regulation, thereby guaranteeing the effectiveness of Article 2 of the Agreement between the European Union and Denmark. The German Government thus maintains that a strict interpretation of the provisions set out in Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation would render their application impossible in respect of the Kingdom of Denmark, thereby disregarding the option afforded to that Member State to participate voluntarily and selectively in the area of freedom, security and justice.
38.
However, in my view, such arguments go beyond a broad interpretation of the wording of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation. Even though that interpretation would be limited to the take-charge or take-back obligations on the Kingdom of Denmark, they do, nevertheless, introduce a risk of confusion between the terms and concepts harmonised by Directives 2011/95 and 2013/32, and upon which the Dublin III Regulation is based.
39.
Thus, the Danish and Swiss Governments essentially advance the idea that the application for international protection lodged by the applicant on 1 July 2016 was ‘temporarily’ rejected by the Kingdom of Denmark when that Member State granted and renewed the temporary protection provided for under its domestic law, and then ‘definitively’ rejected the application, within the meaning of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation, when it confirmed the withdrawal of that temporary protection on 2 July 2021. Under that interpretation, the application for international protection, on the basis of which the successive decisions to renew and, subsequently, the decision not to renew the temporary residence document were adopted, was therefore pending from 29 August 2016 to 2 July 2021, the date on which it was definitively rejected. The German Government also argues in that vein, relying, for its part, on the definition of the concept of ‘withdrawal of [the] application for international protection’, set out in Article 2(e) of the Dublin III Regulation. In that government’s view, since the applicant did not withdraw her application, it is possible to view that application as having in fact continued to exist for as long as it was not the subject of a final decision, for example, because it gave rise only to a series of decisions issuing or extending a temporary residence document. Furthermore, the Danish Government adds that, in that context, a decision rejecting an application for international protection and a decision withdrawing temporary protection have the same legal effect.
40.
The Finnish Immigration Service disagrees with that interpretation, arguing, primarily, that only the decision of 29 August 2016, by which a temporary residence document was issued to the applicant, can be viewed as a decision rejecting the application for international protection, since that decision did not grant the applicant international protection. In its view, the decision withdrawing temporary protection has no legal scope for the purpose of applying Article 18 of the Dublin III Regulation.
41.
For its part, the Netherlands Government argues that the concept of an ‘application [which] has been rejected’ is a generic expression covering the various scenarios in which the applicant is not or no longer eligible for international protection.
42.
In my view, such interpretations risk creating more problems than they resolve given the legal contortions which they entail.
43.
First, they have the effect of extending the scope of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation to a situation not referred to by the EU legislature in that provision, but which is specifically governed by the EU legislature in Article 12 thereof. Inserted into Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation, Article 12(4) of that regulation expressly sets out the conditions under which a Member State which has issued a residence document to an applicant for international protection can be regarded as responsible for examining his or her application.
44.
Second, those interpretations disregard the ‘combined application’ of Directives 2011/95 and 2013/32 and of the Dublin III Regulation to which the Court made reference in its judgment of 10 December 2020, Minister for Justice and Equality (Application for international protection in Ireland). (
16
) By going far beyond the meaning and the scope of fundamental concepts defined in the context of those directives, they run the risk of introducing a condition of variable geometry (‘the application [which] has been rejected’) into the very place where the EU legislature sought to establish a clear and effective method for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection, (
17
) and one which is based on objective, fair criteria both for the Member States and for the persons concerned in accordance with recitals 4 and 5 of that regulation.
45.
It is true that, under Article 2 of the Agreement between the European Union and Denmark, the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation apply to that Member State. However, it also follows from Article 1(2) of that agreement that it is the objective of the Contracting Parties to arrive at a uniform application and interpretation of the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation and its implementing measures in all Member States. Pursuant to the eleventh recital in the preamble to that agreement, the Court must have jurisdiction to secure such uniformity.
46.
Since the conditions for application of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation are based on rules harmonised by Directives 2011/95 and 2013/32, accepting that, in circumstances such as those at issue here, the Kingdom of Denmark has rejected an application for international protection, whereas it has merely terminated national protection which it had granted under its domestic law, undermines that objective in my view.
47.
The concept of an ‘application for international protection’ or an ‘application’, as referred to in Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation, is defined in Article 2(b) thereof, which refers to Article 2(h) of Directive 2011/95. Although the Court has observed that an application for international protection made to the competent authorities of the Kingdom of Denmark in accordance with that Member State’s domestic provisions is unquestionably an ‘application’ made to a Member State, it has nevertheless held that such an application does not constitute an ‘application for international protection’ within the meaning of that directive, that is, an application ‘seeking refugee status or subsidiary protection status’, since, in accordance with Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the EU Treaty and to the FEU Treaty, that directive does not apply to the Kingdom of Denmark, as is stated in recital 51 of that directive. (
18
)
48.
I infer from the above that, absent an ‘application for international protection’ within the meaning of Directive 2011/95 made to Denmark, there could not have been a decision rejecting such an application within the meaning of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation.
49.
I would add that I do not share the Netherlands Government’s view that that regulation does not specify what is to be understood by the words ‘application [which] has been rejected’. Article 2(d) of the Dublin III Regulation defines the concept of ‘examination of an application for international protection’ as covering ‘any examination of, or decision or ruling concerning, an application for international protection by the competent authorities in accordance with Directive [2013/32] and Directive [2011/95], except for procedures for determining the Member State responsible in accordance with this Regulation’. (
19
) Thus, where a decision regarding refugee status and/or subsidiary protection status rejects an application, within the meaning of Article 18(1)(d) of that same regulation, that decision must be adopted in accordance with the procedural rules and arrangements set out in Directive 2013/32, and in particular Article 11(2) thereof. (
20
)
50.
In that context, I do not consider that, in the case at issue in the main proceedings, it is possible to accept that an application for international protection has remained pending for four consecutive years in the course of which it was rejected temporarily and then definitively.
51.
It follows from the foregoing that the decision made by the Danish authorities to withdraw from the applicant the temporary protection and the residence document which had been granted to her on 29 August 2016 in accordance with the provisions of domestic law cannot be regarded as a ‘rejection decision’ for the purpose of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation since, first, it does not follow from that decision that the applicant does not satisfy the conditions required to be granted refugee status within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95 or subsidiary protection status within the meaning of Article 2(f) thereof and, second, the decision was not adopted on the basis of the procedural provisions laid down in Directive 2013/32.
52.
In those circumstances, I disagree with the Netherlands Government’s argument that the objective of the Dublin III Regulation would be undermined if the second Member State (here: the Republic of Finland) were to become responsible for examining that application, even though the first Member State (here: the Kingdom of Denmark) has already examined whether the applicant is (or is no longer) eligible for international protection. In such a situation, the Finnish authorities would not have to re-examine the conclusion reached by the Danish authorities, as the examination procedure would be governed by different rules, rules set out in Directives 2011/95 and 2013/32 and interpreted by the case-law of the Court, by which the Kingdom of Denmark is not bound.
53.
In view of those considerations, it is impossible, in my view, to accept that the Kingdom of Denmark rejected the applicant’s application for international protection within the meaning of Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation.
54.
That conclusion is consistent with the findings of the Court in the judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Application for asylum rejected by Denmark), which concerned the implementation of Directive 2013/32.
55.
The Court held that a decision taken by the Kingdom of Denmark in respect of an application for international protection cannot be regarded as a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Directive 2013/32, (
21
) that is, a decision establishing whether the third-country national or stateless person is granted refugee status or subsidiary protection status pursuant to Directive 2011/95 and against which an appeal under Chapter V of Directive 2013/32 can no longer be brought.
56.
The Court therefore concluded that the existence of a previous decision rejecting an application for international protection made to that Member State does not make it possible for an application for international protection, within the meaning of Directive 2011/95, made by the person concerned to another Member State after the adoption of that previous decision to be characterised as a ‘subsequent application’ within the meaning of Article 2(q) and Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32. (
22
) In that regard, the Court added that neither the Agreement between the European Union and Denmark nor the possibility that Danish legislation may lay down, for the grant of international protection, conditions identical to those laid down in Directive 2011/95, or similar, can result in a different conclusion. (
23
)
57.
It is in the light of those factors that I propose that the Court rule that Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation must be interpreted as not applying to a situation in which national protection granted to a third-country national or a stateless person by the Kingdom of Denmark further to him or her lodging an application for international protection is withdrawn in accordance with the domestic provisions of that Member State, and where that national or person has, after that withdrawal, made an application in another Member State.
58.
It will therefore fall to the competent Finnish authorities to determine the Member State which the criteria set out in Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation designate as responsible for examining the applicant’s application for international protection. (
24
) Specifically, those authorities should, in my view, assess whether the Kingdom of Denmark can be held to be responsible on the basis of Article 12(4) of that regulation, on the ground that that Member State has, in the past, issued a residence document to the applicant, or whether, on the contrary, there are reasons based on the applicant’s personal or family circumstances which justify the Republic of Finland declaring that it is responsible for examining that application.
V. Conclusion
59.
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court, Finland) as follows:
Article 18(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person
must be interpreted as not applying to a situation in which national protection granted to a third-country national or a stateless person by the Kingdom of Denmark further to him or her lodging an application for international protection is withdrawn in accordance with the domestic provisions of that Member State, and where that national or person has, after that withdrawal, made an application in another Member State.
(
1
)	Original language: French.
(
i
)	The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.
(
2
)	See, in that regard, judgment of 22 September 2022, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Application for asylum rejected by Denmark) (C‑497/21, ‘the judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Application for asylum rejected by Denmark)’, EU:C:2022:721).
(
3
)	Agreement between the European [Union] and the Kingdom of Denmark on the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in Denmark or any other Member State of the European Union and ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention (OJ 2006 L 66, p. 38; ‘the Agreement between the European Union and Denmark’).
(
4
)	Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31; ‘the Dublin III Regulation’).
(
5
)	Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).
(
6
)	Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).
(
7
)	See the judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Application for asylum rejected by Denmark) (paragraph 49).
(
8
)	Council Decision of 21 February 2006 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European [Union] and the Kingdom of Denmark extending to Denmark the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national and Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention (OJ 2006 L 66, p. 37).
(
9
)	Council Regulation of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (OJ 2003 L 50, p. 1). That regulation was repealed by the Dublin II Regulation.
(
10
)	Article 2(h) of Directive 2011/95 defines an ‘application for international protection’ as ‘a request made by a third-country national or a stateless person for protection from a Member State, who can be understood to seek refugee status or subsidiary protection status, and who does not explicitly request another kind of protection, outside the scope of [that directive], that can be called for separately’.
(
11
)	Law as consolidated by lovbekendtgørelse nr. 1079 (Codifying Decree No 1079) of 10 August 2023; ‘the Danish Law on Foreign Nationals’.
(
12
)	Signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 150, No 2545 (1954)), which entered into force on 22 April 1954 and is supplemented by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which was concluded in New York on 31 January 1967 and entered into force on 4 October 1967.
(
13
)	‘The Danish Immigration Office’.
(
14
)	For a summary of the scope of the temporary protection provided for in Paragraph 7(3) of the Danish Law on Foreign Nationals, see, in particular, judgment of the Højesteret (Supreme Court, Denmark) of 6 November 2017, No 107/2017.
(
15
)	See judgment of 5 July 2018, X (C‑213/17, EU:C:2018:538, paragraphs 31 and 32).
(
16
)	C‑616/19, EU:C:2020:1010, paragraph 47.
(
17
)	See judgment of 19 December 2024, Tudmur (C‑185/24 and C‑189/24, EU:C:2024:1036, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
(
18
)	See judgment of 19 December 2024, Khan Yunis and Baabda (C‑123/23 and C‑202/23, EU:C:2024:1042, paragraph 60), which refers to the judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Application for asylum rejected by Denmark) (paragraphs 35 and 43). The latter judgment reproduces the guidance provided in the judgment of 20 May 2021, L.R. (Application for asylum rejected by Norway) (C‑8/20, EU:C:2021:404), since the Kingdom of Norway is a third State which applies the Dublin III Regulation pursuant to the Agreement between the European [Union] and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Iceland or Norway – Declarations (OJ 2001 L 93, p. 40), approved on behalf of the European Union by Council Decision 2001/258/EC of 15 March 2001 (OJ 2001 L 93, p. 38).
(
19
)	Emphasis added.
(
20
)	That article provides that ‘Member States shall … ensure that, where an application is rejected with regard to refugee status and/or subsidiary protection status, the reasons in fact and in law are stated in the decision and information on how to challenge a negative decision is given in writing. Member States need not provide information on how to challenge a negative decision in writing in conjunction with a decision where the applicant has been provided with such information at an earlier stage either in writing or by electronic means accessible to the applicant.’
(
21
)	See the judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Application for asylum rejected by Denmark) (paragraph 45).
(
22
)	See the judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Application for asylum rejected by Denmark) (paragraph 47).
(
23
)	See the judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Application for asylum rejected by Denmark) (paragraph 48).
(
24
)	See Article 3(1) of the Dublin III Regulation and judgment of 16 February 2017, C. K. and Others (C‑578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, paragraph 56).