62024TJ0368
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
11 June 2025 (
*1
)
(Civil service – Members of the temporary staff – Contract of indefinite duration – Article 2(c) of the CEOS – Termination of the contract – Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS – Breakdown in the relationship of trust – Obligation to state reasons – Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations – Misuse of power or abuse of process – Presumption of innocence – Right to be heard – Manifest error of assessment – Principle of proportionality – Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials – Liability – Material and non-material harm)
In Case T‑368/24,
EO, represented by L. Levi and P. Baudoux, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Parliament, represented by S. Seyr, I. Lázaro Betancor and K. Zejdová, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),
composed of J. Svenningsen (Rapporteur), President, C. Mac Eochaidh and M. Stancu, Judges,
Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 4 March 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1
By his action based on Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, EO, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of 15 September 2023 by which the European Parliament terminated his contract as a member of the temporary staff (‘the contested decision’) and, second, compensation for the material and non-material harm he claims to have suffered as a result of that decision.
Background to the dispute
2
The applicant is a former member of the temporary staff, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’), of the political group Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (‘the S&D Group’).
3
In the performance of his duties as a political adviser to the S&D Group, he was involved, inter alia, in the drafting of the European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (OJ 2023 C 167, p. 99; ‘the resolution of 24 November 2022’).
4
In the days following the adoption of the resolution of 24 November 2022, an accredited parliamentary assistant to a Member of the S&D Group invited the applicant to see a World Cup football match in Qatar. The gift included two tickets to attend the quarter-final match between Argentina and the Netherlands and travel and accommodation expenses for two people.
5
The applicant travelled to Qatar with his partner from 8 to 11 December 2022.
6
On 9 December 2022, the Belgian authorities opened an investigation into possible illicit lobbying activities by Qatar. In particular, they searched the offices of the Parliament and arrested several individuals, including the accredited parliamentary assistant referred to in paragraph 4 above.
7
On 16 December 2022, the applicant informed his head of unit of his trip to Qatar. Together, they informed the Secretary General of the S&D Group.
8
On 20 December 2022, after hearing the applicant, the President of the S&D Group, in her capacity as the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (‘the AECE’), suspended him for an indefinite period and withheld his remuneration pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).
9
On the same day, the Bureau of the S&D Group published a press release entitled ‘Zero tolerance for corruption’ in which it stated that it ‘fully supports the suspension of [its] staff member following serious misconduct related to the ongoing judicial investigation’ (‘the press release of 20 December 2022’).
10
On 4 January 2023, the AECE informed the applicant that it had decided to open an investigation concerning him to determine whether he failed to comply with the obligations set out in Article 11 of the Staff Regulations.
11
On 30 January 2023, the administrative investigation report was sent to the AECE and to the Secretary General of the S&D Group with the recommendation that the applicant should be invited to a hearing in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.
12
On 6 March 2023, the applicant was heard by the AECE in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, in the presence of the Secretary General of the S&D Group, a member of the Parliament’s Legal Service and members of staff who had drafted the administrative investigation report.
13
On 31 May 2023, the AECE informed the applicant of its intention to terminate his contract on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS and to dispense him from service for the duration of his 10-month notice period, citing a breakdown in the relationship of trust between him and the S&D Group. It invited him to an interview scheduled for 7 June 2023 so that he could be heard before any decision was taken. The applicant was invited to submit his observations in writing if he did not wish to attend the interview.
14
On 2 June 2023, the applicant’s lawyer requested that that interview be postponed on the ground that she was unavailable on the proposed date. She also asked the AECE to send her all the documents on which the intention to terminate the applicant’s contract was based.
15
On 15 June 2023, the applicant was invited to an interview scheduled for 29 June 2023. On the following day, the applicant’s lawyer replied that she was unavailable on that day. She requested that the interview be postponed and also repeated her request for access to the documents on which the AECE’s intention to terminate the applicant’s contract was based.
16
On 10 July 2023, the AECE set out the grounds on which it intended to terminate the applicant’s contract and invited him to an interview scheduled for 18 July 2023. If he was unavailable on that date, he was asked to submit his observations in writing by 24 July 2023 at the latest.
17
On 13 July 2023, the applicant’s lawyer replied that she was unavailable on 18 July 2023. While stating that the applicant would submit his written observations by 24 July 2023 at the latest, she proposed that the interview be postponed until her return from holiday and she, again, repeated her request for access to the documents on which the AECE’s intention to terminate the applicant’s contract was based.
18
On 20 July 2023, the applicant submitted his written observations on the AECE’s intention to terminate his contract.
19
On 7 September 2023, the AECE lifted the applicant’s suspension and informed him that a decision pursuant to Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations had not yet been made owing to the existence of an ongoing criminal investigation, the overall complexity of the situation and its duty to consider all elements relevant to his file.
20
On 15 September 2023, the AECE adopted the contested decision on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS on account of the breakdown in the relationship of trust between the S&D Group and the applicant.
21
On 8 December 2023, the applicant lodged a complaint against the contested decision pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.
22
On 15 March 2024, in a letter concerning the ‘follow up to the administrative investigation and the hearing of March 2023’ and the ‘intention to address a warning pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations’, the AECE informed the applicant that it had ultimately decided to suspend the adoption of a decision under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and that a final decision would be taken only after the decision of the national court hearing the case had become final in order to be able to take account of the findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities.
23
In the absence of a reply to the complaint of 8 December 2023 within the four-month period provided for in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, the complaint was first rejected by implied decision on 8 April 2024. However, by decision of 17 April 2024, the Bureau of the S&D Group rejected that complaint by express decision within the three-month period referred to in the second indent of Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations.
Forms of order sought
24
The applicant claims that the Court should:
–
annul the contested decision and, in so far as necessary, the express decision rejecting the complaint;
–
order the Parliament to pay compensation for the material and non-material harm suffered;
–
order the Parliament to pay the costs even if the action is dismissed.
25
The Parliament contends that the Court should:
–
dismiss the claim for annulment as unfounded;
–
dismiss the claim for compensation as partially inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded;
–
order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The claim for annulment
26
Since the express decision rejecting the complaint lacks any independent content, in that it merely confirms the contested decision, it must be held that the present claim for annulment seeks only the annulment of the contested decision, the legality of which will be assessed by taking into account the statement of reasons contained in that decision rejecting the complaint (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 1989, Vainker v Parliament, 293/87, EU:C:1989:8, paragraph 8, and of 6 July 2022, MZ v Commission, T‑631/20, EU:T:2022:426, paragraph 21).
The fifth plea, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons
27
The applicant claims that the contested decision did not contain a statement of reasons, since the AECE did not explain why it had decided to terminate his contract at that time and why it did not impose a less severe sanction. It also failed to justify the refusal to grant access to all the documents that were used in order to adopt the contested decision.
28
The Parliament disputes that line of argument.
29
In that regard, where the breakdown in the relationship of trust leads to the termination of the contract of a member of the temporary staff, it is for the AECE to specify the factual circumstances demonstrating or justifying that breakdown in order to enable the person concerned to assess whether the termination of his or her contract is well founded and for the Court to exercise its review of legality (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 November 2019, WN v Parliament, T‑431/18, not published, EU:T:2019:781, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
30
In the present case, it is apparent from the contested decision that the AECE terminated the applicant’s contract with notice after finding that there had been an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship of trust between the applicant and the S&D Group as a whole. In the AECE’s view, that breakdown in the relationship of trust results from the conduct of the applicant who accepted the gift referred to in paragraph 4 above and travelled to Qatar, conduct which, in the context of the Belgian authorities’ investigation into possible illegal lobbying activities by Qatar, harmed the reputation of that political group.
31
In the express decision rejecting the complaint, the Bureau of the S&D Group added that the breakdown in the relationship of trust was also due to the fact that the applicant had delayed informing his superiors of his trip to Qatar, which he did only one week after the publication of articles in the press concerning the investigation carried out by the Belgian authorities and the arrest of the accredited parliamentary assistant who had offered him tickets for the football match in question and had paid his travel and accommodation expenses.
32
In so doing, the AECE specified to the requisite legal standard the factual circumstances justifying the breakdown in the relationship of trust which gave rise to the termination of the applicant’s contract. Accordingly, the statement of reasons for the contested decision is sufficient to enable him to ascertain the reasons given by the AECE for terminating his contract at that time and for not adopting a less severe measure.
33
That finding is not called into question by the claim that the AECE did not justify its refusal to grant access to the documents on which it relied in order to adopt the contested decision.
34
The obligation to state reasons for a decision to terminate a contract of indefinite duration merely requires the AECE to provide reasons justifying that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2009, ETF v Landgren, T‑404/06 P, EU:T:2009:313, paragraph 156), which it did in the present case. Accordingly, even if it were established that the AECE had failed to justify its refusal to grant access to all the relevant documents, that fact would have no bearing on whether the statement of reasons for the contested decision is sufficient.
35
The fifth plea, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons, must therefore be rejected.
The first plea, alleging infringement of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and a misuse of power or abuse of process
36
The applicant claims that the AECE infringed Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and, therefore, committed a misuse of power or abuse of process by adopting the contested decision. In that regard, he argues that Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations would be rendered redundant if the administration were authorised to terminate his contract without seeing through the administrative investigation opened against him and the hearing before the AECE provided for in that article. In the absence of a decision by the AECE pursuant to that article, the contested decision therefore amounted to a disguised disciplinary penalty.
37
The Parliament disputes that line of argument.
38
In the present case, the AECE decided to terminate the applicant’s contract with notice pursuant to Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS and not to apply Article 49 of the CEOS, which provides that after the disciplinary procedure provided for in Annex IX to the Staff Regulations has been followed, employment may be terminated without notice on disciplinary grounds in serious cases of failure by a staff member to comply with his or her obligations. Moreover, in the contested decision, the AECE did not accuse the applicant of failing to fulfil his obligations under Article 11 of the Staff Regulations.
39
In that context, the arguments put forward by the applicant in support of the first plea can succeed only if the AECE had been required to adopt a decision under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations before examining the possibility of terminating his contract under the conditions laid down in Article 47 of the CEOS.
40
The Courts of the European Union have repeatedly held that, even where there is wrongful conduct capable of justifying the dismissal of a member of the temporary staff on disciplinary grounds, there is no obligation on the AECE to initiate disciplinary proceedings against that person rather than using the option of unilaterally terminating the contract provided for in Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 July 2011, Longinidis v Cedefop, T‑283/08 P, EU:T:2011:338, paragraph 100, and of 8 May 2024, UF v Commission, T‑24/23, EU:T:2024:293, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
41
It is true that, after receiving the report drawn up at the end of an investigation opened pursuant to Article 2 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, the AECE is required to follow one of the three courses of action described in Article 3 of that annex (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA, C‑587/21 P, EU:C:2024:1017, paragraph 40). In the present case, it is apparent from the AECE’s letters of 7 September 2023 and 15 March 2024, referred to in paragraphs 19 and 22 above, that it does intend to follow up on the investigation report, in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, when the findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities become final.
42
However, the existence of a decision to be taken under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations does not prevent the AECE from terminating the staff member’s contract of indefinite duration with notice, pursuant to Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS, where it finds that the information brought to its attention provides evidence of a breakdown in the relationship of trust preventing it from continuing the working relationship, irrespective of whether that information is also likely to reveal that the staff member failed to fulfil his or her obligations under the Staff Regulations.
43
Accordingly, the fact that the applicant’s contract was terminated on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS does not constitute an infringement of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.
44
Furthermore, the applicant conceded at the hearing that the file before the Court does not contain objective, relevant and consistent evidence capable of demonstrating that the contested decision was adopted with the exclusive purpose – or, at the very least, the main purpose – of achieving ends other than those stated, with the result that no misuse of powers or abuse of process can be found (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 January 2023, NS v Parliament, T‑805/21, not published, EU:T:2023:22, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited).
45
Contrary to what the applicant claims, that conclusion does not render Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations redundant.
46
The fact that the staff member’s contract has been terminated does not prevent the AECE from choosing between the three options laid down in Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, a choice which it is obliged to make, at the latest, when the findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities become final.
47
At most, if the AECE considers that the applicant’s alleged misconduct is sufficiently serious to justify the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, with or without consultation of the Disciplinary Board, in accordance with Article 3(1)(c) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, the only consequence of terminating his contract before disciplinary proceedings can be initiated is to limit the choice of sanctions that the AECE may impose on him (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, OU v Commission, T‑569/16, EU:T:2017:285, paragraph 35).
48
In the light of the foregoing, the first plea, alleging infringement of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and a misuse of power or abuse of process, must be rejected.
The fourth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence
49
The applicant’s argument consists, in essence, of two parts in which he criticises the Parliament, first, for failing to observe the presumption of innocence and, second, for not having heard him before adopting the contested decision.
– The first part of the fourth plea, alleging breach of the right to respect for the presumption of innocence
50
The applicant claims that the termination of his contract, the press release of 20 December 2022 and the removal of his profile from the organisation chart published on the S&D Group website infringe his presumption of innocence.
51
The Parliament disputes that line of argument.
52
At the outset, as regards the illegality of the publication of the press release of 20 December 2022 and the removal of the applicant’s profile from the organisation chart on the S&D Group website, it is sufficient to point out that those acts were not intended to prepare for the termination of his contract and that they are therefore, as such, unconnected with the subject matter of the present action. Consequently, even if those acts were illegal, they could not result in the annulment of the contested decision.
53
That line of argument is therefore ineffective.
54
As to whether the contested decision disregards the presumption of the applicant’s innocence, it must be borne in mind that an infringement of the presumption of innocence may result from statements or decisions by the public authorities which reflect the sentiment that the person is guilty, which encourage the public to believe in his or her guilt or which prejudge the assessment of the facts in criminal terms (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2021, DI v ECB, T‑514/19, EU:T:2021:332, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited). As the applicant points out in the application, the case-law has emphasised in that regard the importance of the choice of words used by public authorities. It is important, in that regard, to take into account the true meaning of the statements in question, not their literal form, and the particular circumstances in which they were formulated (see judgment of 30 November 2022, KN v Parliament, T‑401/21, EU:T:2022:736, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
55
In the present case, the termination of the applicant’s contract resulted from undisputed facts which he himself brought to the AECE’s attention. Furthermore, the contested decision merely finds that the relationship of trust which is essential to the continuation of the working relationship has ceased to exist, without ruling on the separate question whether the applicant has failed to fulfil his obligations under Article 11 of the Staff Regulations. Accordingly, that decision does not prejudge the outcome of any disciplinary proceedings and does not, in itself, infringe his right to respect for the presumption of innocence.
56
It is still necessary to check that the terms used by the AECE to justify the termination of the applicant’s contract do not reflect the sentiment that he is guilty, do not encourage the public to believe in his guilt and do not prejudge the assessment of the facts in criminal terms.
57
When questioned at the hearing as to the terms used in the contested decision which, in his view, infringed his presumption of innocence, the applicant merely relied on a paragraph of the contested decision which refers to the press release of 20 December 2022 and referred to the wording used in that press release, according to which a staff member of that group was suspended ‘following serious misconduct related to the ongoing judicial investigation’.
58
In that passage of the contested decision, the AECE merely mentions the press release of 20 December 2022 when summarising the arguments on which the applicant had relied in his written observations of 20 July 2023, referred to in paragraph 18 above. In addition, the AECE did not endorse the terms used by the Bureau of the S&D Group in that press release.
59
Therefore, that passage of the contested decision does not reveal any breach of the presumption of the applicant’s innocence.
60
Consequently, the first part of the fourth plea, alleging breach of the right to respect for the presumption of innocence, must be rejected.
– The second part of the fourth plea, alleging breach of the right to be heard
61
The applicant maintains that, first, the AECE infringed his right to be heard by refusing to send him, despite his repeated requests, the relevant documents on which the contested decision is based; second, the AECE refused him the right to be heard through an interview; and third, he was not given sufficient time to prepare his written observations, given that he was able to access his emails only between 11 and 17 July 2023 and that he encountered a connection problem for the whole day of 14 July 2023.
62
The Parliament disputes that line of argument.
63
First, the applicant’s argument based on the AECE’s alleged refusal to send him all the documents supporting the contested decision cannot be accepted.
64
First of all, in the letter of 31 May 2023, the AECE disclosed to the applicant that its intention to terminate his contract was based on the information which he had himself sent to the S&D Group on 16 December 2022. Next, in the letter of 10 July 2023, the AECE responded to the applicant’s request for access to all the relevant documents, confirming that its intention to dismiss him was based on the facts brought to the attention of the Secretary General of the S&D Group on 16 December 2022. Lastly, in order to substantiate the existence of harm to the reputation of the S&D Group, the AECE annexed to that letter articles which had appeared in the Italian press naming the applicant as one of the persons involved in the activities under investigation by the Belgian authorities.
65
In the contested decision, the AECE confirmed that the termination of the applicant’s contract was based solely on the fact that it was impossible to maintain a relationship of mutual trust, in view of facts which are not disputed by the applicant and the harm caused to the reputation of the S&D Group.
66
In those circumstances, it must be held that the applicant had all the relevant information at his disposal in order effectively to submit his observations on the AECE’s intention to terminate his contract.
67
Second, the fact that the applicant was not heard orally before the contested decision was adopted cannot constitute an infringement of his right to be heard.
68
It is apparent from the case-law that the right to be heard may be realised through an oral and/or written exchange initiated by the AECE, evidence of which that authority must provide (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 November 2023, MG v EIB, C‑173/22 P, EU:C:2023:932, paragraph 32, and of 3 June 2015, BP v FRA, T‑658/13 P, EU:T:2015:356, paragraph 54).
69
In the present case, the AECE asked the applicant to submit written observations if he was unable to attend an oral interview and, on 20 July 2023, the applicant submitted his written observations on the draft contested decision. Consequently, he cannot criticise the AECE for having adopted that decision without first having heard him.
70
That finding is not called into question by Article 19(2) of the General implementing provisions governing competitions and selection procedures, recruitment and the grading of officials and other servants of the Parliament, which requires the AECE to invite the staff member to an interview before terminating his or her contract.
71
The AECE did indeed invite the applicant to an interview prior to his dismissal on three occasions, 31 May, 15 June and 10 July 2023, invitations which he declined on account of his lawyer being unavailable.
72
Accordingly, the fact that there was no oral exchange, for reasons which are not attributable to the administration, cannot result in the annulment of the contested decision.
73
Third, contrary to what he claims, the applicant had sufficient time to make his views known before the contested decision was adopted.
74
Between 31 May 2023, the date on which the AECE informed him of its intention to terminate his contract, and 15 September 2023, the date on which the contested decision was adopted, the applicant was heard in the context of a written exchange initiated by the AECE and, over that period, had sufficient time to make his views on the draft dismissal decision known and to prepare his defence. That period appears all the more sufficient given that the applicant had specific knowledge of the factual circumstances which gave rise to the termination of the contract since he himself had brought them to the attention of his superiors.
75
The fact that he was able to access his emails only between 11 and 17 July 2023, and that he encountered a connection problem for the whole day of 14 July 2023, is not such as to invalidate that finding.
76
The six-day period during which the applicant was able to access his emails cannot be regarded as short. Furthermore, he does not argue that he requested that his access be extended for a longer period and that the Parliament refused that request.
77
In any event, it was for the applicant to explain what arguments and evidence he could have relied on if he had had a longer period of time and, as the case may be, to demonstrate that those arguments and evidence could have led in his case to a different result (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2019, PT v EIB, T‑573/16, EU:T:2019:481, paragraph 269 (not published) and the case-law cited), which he did not do.
78
The second part of the fourth plea, alleging breach of the right to be heard, must therefore be rejected. Consequently, the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, must be dismissed in its entirety.
The second plea, alleging manifest errors of assessment
79
The applicant claims that the contested decision is based on manifestly erroneous grounds. First of all, the AECE erred in finding that he accepted a gift from a source external to the Parliament, since that gift came from his colleague and he could not reasonably have known that there were allegations of corruption against that colleague. Accordingly, the fact that he received two tickets for a football match cannot be perceived by the public as constituting a conflict of interests or a lack of independence. Next, there is nothing to suggest that the trip to Qatar offered by his colleague was intended to reward his work within the Parliament, in particular in view of the fact that he did not have the power to influence the decision-making process. On the contrary, when he drafted the motion for a resolution on the situation of human rights in Qatar in the context of the football world cup, he expressed several critical remarks in that regard. Finally, there is a contradiction between the contested decision, which, according to the AECE, is based on established facts demonstrating a breakdown in the relationship of trust, and the decision to suspend the adoption of a decision under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations on the ground that the facts are not sufficiently established.
80
The Parliament disputes that line of argument.
81
In that regard, according to the case-law, the existence of a relationship of trust is not based on objective factors and by its very nature cannot be subject to judicial review, since the Court cannot substitute its assessment for that of the administration. However, in so far as an institution is required to explain the grounds that have resulted in the loss of trust by referring to specific material facts, the Courts of the European Union must check that the facts on which those grounds are based are substantively accurate (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 October 2022, CE v Committee of the Regions, C‑539/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:840, paragraph 110, and of 8 May 2024, UF v Commission, T‑24/23, EU:T:2024:293, paragraph 58).
82
In the present case, the applicant does not dispute that the facts on which the contested decision is based are substantively accurate.
83
In that regard, it is established that, a few days after the adoption of the resolution of 24 November 2022, the applicant accepted a gift from a colleague consisting of two tickets to see a World Cup football match and that he travelled with his partner to Qatar from 8 to 11 December 2022 to see that football match. In addition, travel and accommodation expenses were covered by that colleague. Similarly, it is common ground that the applicant did not inform his superiors of that journey until 16 December 2022, that is to say, one week after the investigation carried out by the Belgian authorities was made public.
84
In the light of the duties carried out by the applicant with the S&D Group, the AECE did not commit a manifest error of assessment in finding that his conduct was likely to create a perception in the mind of the public of a lack of independence from the influence of sources outside the S&D Group and, therefore, to harm the reputation of that political group. In such a political environment, a loss of trust may legitimately result from harm to the reputation of the political group in which the staff member performs his duties.
85
In addition, it is also important to point out that certain press articles mentioning the applicant’s name in connection with the ‘Qatargate’ scandal were published before 16 December 2022, that is to say, before he informed his superiors of his stay in Qatar and of the circumstances in which he had travelled to that country, with the result that, in addition, the Bureau of the S&D Group did not commit a manifest error of assessment by finding that the relationship of trust had been affected by the applicant’s delay in informing his superiors of the facts at issue.
86
In the light of those factors, it must be concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the AECE had committed a manifest error of assessment in determining that there had been an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship of trust.
87
That finding cannot be called in question by the applicant’s arguments.
88
First, the fact that the gift which the applicant accepted did not come from a ‘person outside’ the Parliament has no bearing on the legality of the contested decision, which does not accuse the applicant of infringing the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations. Moreover, even if the accredited parliamentary assistant who offered the gift at issue to the applicant is a member of staff of the Parliament, the fact remains that the applicant could not reasonably consider that the gift offered to him came from the institution itself as an employer.
89
Second, the fact that the gift he accepted was not intended to reward his work is also irrelevant. In addition, the AECE did not rely on that circumstance in reaching the finding of a breakdown in the relationship of trust.
90
Third, since the procedure for terminating the contract of a member of the temporary staff does not have the same purpose as disciplinary proceedings, there is no contradiction in the finding that the facts on which the contested decision is based are sufficiently established for a finding of a breakdown in the relationship of trust, while taking the view that it is necessary to suspend the adoption of a decision under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations in order to be able to take account of the findings of fact reached by the Belgian authorities before deciding what action to take in respect of the administrative investigation opened under Article 2 of that annex.
91
In the light of the foregoing, the second plea, alleging manifest errors of assessment, must be rejected.
The third plea, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality
92
The applicant maintains that the termination of his contract is a disproportionate measure given that he acted in good faith by quickly informing his superiors of the facts and by fully cooperating with the Belgian authorities.
93
The Parliament disputes that line of argument.
94
In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, where the examination of the conduct of a member of the temporary staff leads the AECE to consider that the relationship of trust which is essential to the continuation of the working relationship has broken down, that authority is entitled to terminate his or her contract in accordance with Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 April 2004, Parliament v Reynolds, C‑111/02 P, EU:C:2004:265, paragraph 56, and of 21 June 2023, UG v Commission, T‑571/17 RENV, EU:T:2023:351, paragraph 384 (not published)).
95
Since the AECE did not commit a manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers in taking the view that the relationship of trust had definitively broken down, it could terminate the applicant’s contract without breaching the principle of proportionality.
96
The third plea, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality, must therefore be rejected.
The sixth plea, alleging breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials
97
The applicant submits that the AECE did not take account of the impact that the contested decision would have on his employment prospects, health and reputation, and on his professional and financial situation.
98
The Parliament disputes that line of argument.
99
In the present case, although the interest of a member of staff in being maintained in post is not capable, in itself, of preventing the termination of his or her contract, the fact remains that the AECE’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff requires it to take into account the personal interests of the staff member (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 October 2014, EMA v BU, T‑444/13 P, EU:T:2014:865, paragraphs 35 and 36).
100
In that regard, it is apparent from the contested decision that the AECE even went beyond what is required by its duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, since it examined the proposal made by the applicant in his written observations to find an alternative solution to the termination of his contract by assessing whether reassignment to another post within the S&D Group would be capable of restoring the relationship of trust.
101
Such an examination is sufficient to show that the AECE took account of the applicant’s personal interest in being maintained in post. In so doing, the AECE weighed up the competing interests entailed by its duty to have regard for the welfare of the applicant.
102
The sixth plea, alleging breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, must therefore be rejected and, consequently, the claim for annulment must be rejected in its entirety.
The claim for compensation
103
The applicant seeks compensation for the material and non-material harm he has suffered as result of the contested decision.
104
The Parliament disputes that line of argument.
105
Since the examination of the claim for annulment has revealed no illegality on the part of the AECE in adopting the contested decision, the first condition for the Parliament to incur liability, relating to the illegality of its alleged conduct, is not satisfied. Accordingly, the claim for compensation must be rejected as unfounded, without there being any need to examine its admissibility (see paragraph 25 above) or the other conditions for the Parliament to incur liability relating to the existence of harm and a causal link between that harm and the alleged illegal conduct.
106
In the light of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
107
Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Furthermore, under Article 135(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order a party, even if successful, to pay some or all of the costs, if this appears justified by the conduct of that party, including before the proceedings were brought, especially if that party has made the opposite party incur costs which the Court holds to be unreasonable or vexatious.
108
In the present case, the applicant has been unsuccessful and has not specified the ‘conduct’ of the Parliament which obliged him to bring the present action. He must therefore be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Parliament.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
hereby:
1.
Dismisses the action;
2.
Orders EO to pay the costs.
Svenningsen
Mac Eochaidh
Stancu
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 11 June 2025.
V. Di Bucci
Registrar
S. Papasavvas
President
(
*1
)	Language of the case: English.