62007TJ0133_EN
Parties
Grounds
Operative part
Parties
In Case T-133/07,
Mitsubishi Electric Corp.,
established in Tokyo (Japan), represented by R. Denton, Solicitor, and K. Haegeman, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Commission,
represented initially by F. Arbault and J. Samnadda, then by X. Lewis, and subsequently by P. Van Nuffel and J. Bourke, and finally by P. Van Nuffel and N. Khan, acting as Agents,
defendant,
APPLICATION, primarily, for the annulment of Commission Decision C (2006) 6762 final of 24 January 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas insulated switchgear) to the extent to which it concerns the applicant and TM T & D, in the alternative, for the annulment of Article 2(g) of that decision and Article 2(h) thereof, to the extent to which it concerns the applicant and, in the further alternative, amendment of Article 2 of that decision so as to cancel or, failing which, reduce the fine imposed on the applicant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),
composed of I. Pelikánová (Rapporteur), President, K. Jürimäe and S. Soldevila Fragoso, Judges,
Registrar: C. Kantza, Administrator,
having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 11 December 2009,
gives the following
Judgment
Grounds
Background to the dispute
1. Applicant
1. The applicant, Mitsubishi Electric Corp., is a Japanese company active in various sectors, in particular the sector for gas-insulated switchgear (‘GIS’). Between October 2002 and April 2005, its GIS business was carried on within a joint venture, TM T & D Corp., jointly owned in equal shares with Toshiba Corp. and dissolved in 2005.
2. Goods
2. GIS is used to control energy flow in electricity grids. It is heavy electrical equipment, used as a major component for power sub-stations. GIS is sold across the world either as part of turnkey power substations or as separate equipment which has to be integrated into a turnkey power substation.
3. Administrative procedure
3. On 3 March 2004, ABB Ltd informed the Commission of the European Communities (now ‘the European Commission’) of anti‑competitive practices in the GIS sector in connection with an oral application for immunity from fines pursuant to the Commission Notice of 19 February 2002 on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2002 C 45, p. 3) (‘the Leniency Notice’).
4. ABB’s request for immunity was supplemented by oral observations and documentary evidence. It gave rise, on 24 April 2004, to a Commission decision granting conditional immunity to ABB.
5. On the basis of ABB’s statements, the Commission initiated an investigation and, on 11 and 12 May 2004, it carried out inspections at the premises of various companies active in the GIS sector.
6. On 20 April 2006, the Commission adopted a statement of objections which was notified to 20 companies including the applicant. The Commission held hearings on 18 and 19 July 2006 for the companies to which the statement of objections had been sent.
4. Contested decision
7. On 24 January 2007, the Commission adopted Decision C(2006) 6762 final relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas-insulated switchgear) (‘the contested decision’).
8. In recitals 113 to 123 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the various undertakings which participated in the cartel had coordinated the allocation of GIS projects worldwide – except for specific markets – according to agreed rules in order to maintain quotas largely reflecting estimated historic market shares. It pointed out that the allocation of GIS projects had been carried out on the basis of a joint ‘Japanese’ quota and a joint ‘European’ quota, which the Japanese and European producers then had to distribute among themselves. An agreement signed in Vienna on 15 April 1988 (‘the GQ Agreement’) established rules allowing the allocation of GIS projects to either Japanese producers or to European producers and to set their value against the corresponding quota. In addition, in recitals 124 to 132 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the various undertakings which participated in the cartel had entered into an unwritten agreement (‘common understanding’), under which GIS projects in Japan, on the one hand, and in the countries of European members of the cartel, on the other – together described as the ‘home countries’ for GIS projects – were reserved to Japanese members and European members of the cartel respectively. GIS projects located in the ‘home countries’ were not the subject of information exchanges between the two groups and were not charged to their respective quotas.
9. The GQ Agreement also contained rules relating to the exchange of information necessary for operation of the cartel between the two groups of producers, carried out in particular by their respective secretaries, and to the manipulation of the bidding procedures concerned and the fixing of prices for GIS projects which could not be allocated. Under the terms of Annex 2 to the GQ Agreement, the agreement applied worldwide, except in the United States, Canada, Japan and 17 Western European countries. Furthermore, under the common understanding, GIS projects in European countries, other than the ‘home countries’, were also reserved for the European group, as the Japanese producers had undertaken not to submit bids for GIS projects in Europe.
10. According to the Commission, the sharing of GIS projects between the European producers was governed by an agreement also signed in Vienna on 15 April 1988, entitled ‘E-Group Operation Agreement for GQ Agreement’) (‘the EQ Agreement’). It indicated that the distribution of GIS projects in Europe followed the same rules and procedures as those governing the distribution of GIS projects in other countries. In particular, GIS projects in Europe also had to be notified, recorded, allocated, arranged or have received a minimum price.
11. On the basis of the findings of fact and legal assessments made in the contested decision, the Commission found that the undertakings implicated had infringed Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘EEA Agreement’) and imposed on them fines calculated in accordance with the methods set out in the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3) (‘the guidelines’), and in the Leniency Notice.
12. In Article 1 of the contested decision, the Commission found that the applicant had participated in the infringement from 15 April 1988 to 11 May 2004.
13. For the infringement found in Article 1 of the contested decision, the applicant was fined, in Article 2 of the contested decision, EUR 118 575 000, of which EUR 4 650 000, corresponding to the infringement committed by TM T & D, to be paid jointly and severally with Toshiba.
Procedure and forms of order sought
14. By application lodged at the Court Registry on 18 April 2007, the applicant brought the present action. On 6 June 2007, the applicant applied for the adoption of measures of organisation of procedure concerning the disclosure by the Commission of the turnover figures of the various addressees of the contested decision.
15. The defence was lodged on 21 August 2007.
16. By a document lodged at the Court Registry on 1 November 2007, the applicant requested that judgment should be given in its favour by default, under Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. It lodged a reply on 5 November 2007.
17. By decision of the Court (Second Chamber) of 29 January 2008, the request that judgment be given by default was rejected.
18. The written procedure closed with the lodging of the rejoinder on 18 March 2008.
19. Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur, the Court (Second Chamber) decided, on 22 September 2009, to open the oral procedure. By way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure, it invited the Commission to submit certain documents and requested the parties to express their views on the relevance of those documents in relation to the arguments alleging infringement of the right of access to the file. The Court also put questions to the parties in writing, inviting them to give their reply at the hearing.
20. In response to the Court’s request, the Commission forwarded the documents concerned on 26 October 2009. The applicant submitted its observations on those documents on 19 November 2009. On 2 December 2009, the Commission submitted an additional document and on 3 December 2009, it replied to the applicant’s observations.
21. The parties presented oral argument and submitted their replies to the Court’s written and oral questions at the hearing on 11 December 2009.
22. The applicant claims that the Court should:
– primarily, annul the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to it and to TM T & D;
– in the alternative, annul Article 2(g) and (h) of the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to it;
– in the further alternative, modify Article 2 of the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to it so as to annul or, failing that, reduce the fine imposed on it;
– in any event, order the Commission to pay the costs.
23. The Commission contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action as unfounded;
– order the applicant to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Law
24. First of all, the applicant disputes the admissibility of the defence and submits that it is incoherent and fails to respond to the pleas set out in the application.
25. In that regard, the Court points out that, pursuant to Article 46(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure, the defence must contain the arguments of fact and law relied on by the defendant.
26. The defence submitted in this case meets that requirement, irrespective of the separate issue as to whether the arguments relied on by the Commission are relevant or well founded. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument alleging that the defence is inadmissible must be rejected.
27. As regards the substance, the applicant puts forward fifteen pleas. By its first plea it alleges that the Commission did not establish that the applicant infringed Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement by participating in a cartel having as its object or effect the restriction of competition in the European Economic Area (‘the EEA’). By its second plea the applicant alleges that the Commission failed to establish the existence of an agreement infringing Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement to which the applicant was a party. By its third plea it argues that the Commission committed an error in disregarding the evidence explaining its lack of presence in, and proving its difficulty entering, the European market. By its fourth plea the applicant alleges that the Commission infringed the rules of evidence in reversing the burden of proof and infringed the principle of the presumption of innocence. By its fifth plea the applicant claims that the Commission infringed the principles of equal treatment and proportionality in calculating the starting amount of the fine imposed on it on the basis of its 2001 turnover. By its sixth plea the applicant submits that the Commission infringed its duty to state reasons in choosing to calculate the fine on the basis of its 2001 turnover. By its seventh plea the applicant alleges that the Commission erred in defining the worldwide GIS market and the applicant’s share of it, thereby infringing the principles of equal treatment and proportionality. By its eighth plea the applicant claims that the Commission infringed its duty to state reasons in finding that the applicant controlled between 15 and 20% of the worldwide market. By its ninth plea the applicant submits that the Commission infringed the principle of sound administration in estimating the worldwide market value. By its tenth plea the applicant claims that the Commission infringed the principles of equal treatment and proportionality in calculating the deterrent factor applicable to it. By its eleventh plea the applicant maintains that the Commission infringed the principle of proportionality in calculating its fine by the same method as that employed to calculate the fines imposed on the European producers. By its twelfth plea the applicant claims that the Commission failed to take account of relevant economic and technical evidence in calculating its fine. By its thirteenth plea the applicant argues that the Commission erred in determining the duration of the cartel. By its fourteenth plea the applicant maintains that the Commission infringed its rights of defence and its right to a fair hearing by not granting it access to incriminating and exculpatory evidence. By its fifteenth plea the applicant submits that the Commission infringed its rights of defence by not putting forward to it its conclusions on the theory of compensation inherent in the common understanding.
28. The Commission considers that the applicant’s pleas are unfounded.
29. It should be noted, at the outset, that the applicant has not specified which of its pleas support the various claims which it has made. In that regard, it should be considered, first of all, that pleas one to four and pleas thirteen to fifteen have been raised by the applicant in support of its main claim. If one of those pleas is upheld, it will be necessary to annul, at least in part, both Article 1 and Article 2 of the contested decision in so far as they concern the applicant. Next, it must be considered that pleas five to twelve concern the calculation of the fine imposed on the applicant and have thus been raised by the applicant in support of its application in the alternative seeking the annulment of Article 2(g) and (h) of the contested decision in so far as it applies to it. Finally, the Court notes that no autonomous plea has been raised by the applicant in support of its claim in the further alternative.
1. The main application, seeking the annulment of the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to the applicant and TM T & D
30. In so far as the annulment of the contested decision for infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence would render the examination of the substance of the decision devoid of purpose, the fourteenth and fifteenth pleas will be addressed first of all. Secondly, the first, third and fourth pleas will be addressed together as they are all related to proof of the common understanding. Thirdly, the second plea, concerning the classification of that understanding as an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, will be examined. Fourthly, the thirteenth plea, relating to the duration of the alleged cartel, will be examined.
The fourteenth plea, alleging that the Commission infringed the applicant’s right of defence and its right to a fair hearing by not granting it access to incriminating and exculpatory evidence
Arguments of the parties
31. The applicant considers that it did not have access to certain items of incriminating and exculpatory evidence in the Commission’s file, contrary to the principle of the respect for the rights of the defence and of the right to a fair hearing.
32. As regards incriminating evidence, the applicant maintains that the contested decision discloses evidence of which it had no knowledge and on which it was consequently unable to express its views. First, the applicant was unable to consult the evidence provided by Fuji on 21 November 2006, according to which the GQ Agreement could not have operated without the common understanding.
33. Second, the applicant claims that the evidence provided in November 2006, from which it results that Alstom and Areva did not contest the existence of the common understanding, was likewise not disclosed.
34. As regards exculpatory evidence, the applicant submits, first, that it provided the Commission on 8 November 2006 with exculpatory witness statements in respect of several other undertakings, but they were not disclosed to the other parties.
35. Second, Hitachi’s supplementary reply to the statement of objections, in which Hitachi challenged the Commission’s interpretation of certain statements in the initial reply relating to the notification and project loading mechanism, was not disclosed.
36. Third, the applicant complains that it did not have access to the evidence calling into question the existence of the common understanding and reaffirming the existence of obstacles to entry on to the GIS market in the EEA, submitted by Siemens, the undertaking belonging to the group of which VA TECH Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co KEG (‘VA TECH’) formed part, Hitachi and Toshiba, and in particular to statements and economic or technical reports submitted by Hitachi and Toshiba, to witness statements of employees of Siemens and Hitachi and VA TECH’s reply to the statement of objections. It affirms that, in finding in recital 130 of the contested decision that VA TECH did not openly dispute the existence of the common understanding, the Commission distorted VA TECH’s position.
37. Fourth, the applicant argues that it did not have access to Mr S’s statements, submitted on behalf of Alstom, concerning termination of the cartel in 1999.
38. The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.
Findings of the Court
39. Respect for the rights of the defence requires that the person concerned must have been afforded the opportunity, during the administrative procedure, to make known his views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an infringement of the Treaty (Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C 211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others
v Commission
[2004] ECR I‑123, paragraph 66).
40. A corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, the right of access to the file means that the Commission must give the undertaking concerned the opportunity to examine all the documents in the investigation file which may be relevant for its defence. Those documents include both incriminating and exculpatory evidence, save where the business secrets of other undertakings, the internal documents of the Commission or other confidential information are involved ( Aalborg Portland and Others
v Commission, paragraph 39 above, paragraph 68).
41. In this respect, it should be recalled that it is not until the beginning of the inter partes
administrative stage that the undertaking concerned is informed, by means of the notification of the statement of objections, of all the essential evidence on which the Commission relies at that stage of the procedure and that that undertaking has a right of access to the file in order to ensure that its rights of defence are effectively exercised. Consequently, the replies to the statement of objections of the other undertakings alleged to have participated in the cartel are not, in principle, included in the documents of the investigation file that the parties may consult (Case T‑161/05 Hoechst
v Commission
[2009] ECR II‑3555, paragraph 163).
42. However, if the Commission wishes to rely on a passage in a reply to a statement of objections or on a document annexed to such a reply in order to prove the existence of an infringement in a proceeding under Article 81(1) EC, the other undertakings involved in that proceeding must be placed in a position in which they can express their views on such evidence. In such circumstances the passage in question from a reply to the statement of objections or the document annexed thereto constitutes incriminating evidence against the various undertakings alleged to have participated in the infringement (see Hoechst
v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 164, and the case‑law cited). That case‑law is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
43. By analogy, if a passage in a reply to a statement of objections or in a document annexed to such a reply may be relevant for the defence of an undertaking in that it enables that company to invoke evidence which is not consistent with the inferences made at that stage by the Commission, it constitutes exculpatory evidence. In that case, the undertaking concerned must be authorised to examine the passage or the document concerned and to give its view thereon.
44. However, the mere fact that other undertakings put forward the same arguments as the undertaking concerned and that they may have used more resources for their defence is not sufficient for those arguments to be regarded as exculpatory evidence (see, to that effect, Case T‑43/02 Jungbunzlauer
v Commission
[2006] ECR II‑3435, paragraphs 353 and 355).
45. As regards the consequences of granting access to the file contrary to those rules, the failure to communicate a document on which the Commission based its decision to inculpate an undertaking constitutes a breach of the rights of the defence only if the undertaking concerned shows that the result at which the Commission arrived in its decision would have been different if the document which was not communicated had to be disallowed as incriminating evidence ( Aalborg Portland and Others
v Commission, paragraph 39 above, paragraphs 71 and 73).
46. Where an exculpatory document has not been communicated, the undertaking concerned must only establish that its non-disclosure was able to influence, to its disadvantage, the course of the proceedings and the content of the decision of the Commission. It is sufficient for the undertaking to show that it would have been able to use the exculpatory document for its defence, in the sense that, had it been able to rely on it during the administrative procedure, it would have been able to invoke evidence which was not consistent with the inferences made at that stage by the Commission and therefore could have had an influence, in any way at all, on the assessments made by the Commission in the decision, at least as regards the gravity and duration of the conduct in which the undertaking was found to have engaged and, accordingly, the level of the fine ( Aalborg Portland and Others
v Commission, paragraph 39 above, paragraphs 74 and 75).
47. The possibility that a document which was not disclosed might have influenced the course of the proceedings and the content of the Commission’s decision can be established only if a provisional examination of certain evidence shows that the documents not disclosed might – in the light of that evidence – have had a significance which ought not to have been disregarded ( Aalborg Portland and Others
v Commission, paragraph 39 above, paragraph 76).
48. In the present case, as regards the incriminating evidence, the Commission admits, firstly, that it was not able to rely on Fuji’s observations which were not disclosed to the applicant in support of the grounds of complaint raised against the latter in the contested decision, but disputes actually having used them as incriminating evidence. It must be noted, none the less, that, in recitals 125 and 255 of the contested decision, the Commission referred to Fuji’s supplementary observations, in particular those of 21 November 2006, to corroborate the existence of a common understanding.
49. Second, the Commission submits that it did not rely on the alleged neutral position of Alstom and Areva in concluding that the common understanding existed, but merely noted their position. Although that interpretation is confirmed by the wording of recital 125 of the contested decision, in which no corroborative value is accorded to the position of Alstom, Areva and VA TECH, unlike Fuji’s statements confirming the existence of the common understanding, it is called into question in recital 255 of that decision, in which the Commission refers to the implicit acknowledgement of the existence of the common understanding by certain European producers.
50. In any event, the neutral position of Alstom and Areva cannot be interpreted as evidence of the existence of the common understanding. Given that the burden of proof is on the Commission in proceedings under Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, an undertaking’s failure to challenge a fact does not mean that the fact in question is established. Consequently, irrespective of whether the rights of the defence were respected, the Commission was not able to rely on the position of Alstom and Areva as incriminating evidence.
51. Accordingly, the outcome of the applicant’s arguments concerning the incriminating evidence depends on the result of the examination of the first plea relating to proof of the existence of a common understanding. If the existence of such an understanding is established to the requisite legal standard even after disallowing Fuji’s observations and the alleged neutral position of Alstom and Areva as incriminating evidence, it will be necessary to reject this part of the plea. By contrast, if it is found that that evidence constitutes necessary evidence in support of the findings made in the contested decision in relation to the existence of a common understanding, it will be necessary to uphold the applicant’s argument and, consequently, to annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it.
52. As regards the exculpatory evidence, the applicant’s argument, alleging that some of the evidence submitted by it was not disclosed to the other addressees of the statement of objections, must be rejected from the outset. Even supposing that that evidence was not disclosed to the other addresses, that could affect the defence of those addressees at the most, but not that of the applicant.
53. Moreover, the Court requested the Commission to produce all the documents which the applicant identified with a modicum of precision.
54. First, it should be noted, that, contrary to the applicant’s claim, Hitachi’s supplementary reply to the statement of objections does not call into question the factual content of the latter’s statements concerning the notification and project loading mechanism. In that supplementary reply, Hitachi merely disputed the Commission’s interpretation of those statements, in particular in relation to their relevance as evidence of the common understanding and of the existence of a single infringement involving both the common understanding and the GQ Agreement. Hitachi had already raised those same arguments in the extract from its first reply to the statement of objections, which the Commission sent to the applicant. Consequently, Hitachi’s supplementary reply to the statement of objections cannot be regarded as exculpatory evidence whose communication could have influenced the course of the proceedings and the content of the contested decision.
55. Second, as the applicant claims, VA TECH explicitly contested the existence of the common understanding in its reply to the statement of objections. However, although that circumstance has to be taken into account during the examination of the first plea concerning proof of the existence of the common understanding, it does not show, in itself, that the applicant’s rights of defence were infringed, given that the applicant does not state the extent to which the misinterpretation of VA TECH’s position made its defence more difficult.
56. Moreover, in their statements, VA TECH, Hitachi, Toshiba and Siemens disputed the existence of a common understanding and described the existence of barriers to entry to the European market. Furthermore, Hitachi and Toshiba submitted expert reports to support their positions in that regard.
57. During the administrative procedure, the applicant itself disputed the existence of a common understanding and of discussions relating thereto, referred to the existence of ‘high’ barriers to entry on the European market, and submitted expert reports concerning the latter, similar to the reports submitted by Hitachi and Toshiba. Accordingly, the statements and reports from other addressees of the statement of objections cannot be regarded as exculpatory evidence.
58. In so far as concerns the witness statements of the employees of Hitachi and Siemens, those employees stated that the GQ Agreement did not apply to GIS projects in Europe, disputed the existence of a common understanding and of discussions relating thereto and referred to the existence of ‘high’ barriers to entry on the EEA market. In addition, Hitachi’s witnesses gave details of a proposal made by Alstom in July 2002 relating to an understanding between European and Japanese producers and of Hitachi’s rejection of that proposal.
59. In that regard, it should be noted, first, that the written witness statements of the employees of a company, drawn up under the supervision of that company and submitted by it in its defence in the administrative procedure carried out by the Commission cannot, in principle, be classed as evidence which is both different from, and independent of, the statements made by that same company. Generally speaking, the position of a company as to the truth of the facts set out against it by the Commission is based, primarily, on the knowledge and opinions of its employees and management.
60. Second, as noted in paragraph 57 above, during the administrative procedure, the applicant itself disputed the existence of a common understanding and of discussions relating thereto and referred to the existence of ‘high’ barriers to entry on the European market. It also asserted that the GQ Agreement did not concern EEA territory. Consequently, the fact that other undertakings raised those arguments cannot be regarded as exculpatory evidence.
61. Also, the details of Alstom’s proposal of July 2002 were disclosed in the statement of objections. Consequently, that evidence does not constitute exculpatory evidence.
62. Third, after gaining access to Mr S’s statements, the applicant did not identify within those statements any evidence which might have been useful for its defence. Therefore, the general claim that those statements constitute exculpatory evidence must be rejected as unsubstantiated.
63. In the light of all of the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments relating to access to the exculpatory evidence must be rejected. However, as is apparent from paragraph 51 above, the outcome of this plea depends on the result of the examination of the first plea.
The fifteenth plea, alleging that the Commission infringed the applicant’s rights of defence by not putting forward to it its conclusions on the theory of compensation inherent in the common understanding
Arguments of the parties
64. The applicant submits that the Commission did not indicate in the statement of objections that the compensation granted to the Japanese producers by the European producers under the common understanding, by means of the notification and project loading mechanism, constituted evidence of the existence of that understanding. In its view, that theory is mentioned for the first time in the contested decision. Therefore, the Commission infringed the obligation to give interested parties the opportunity to express their views on the evidence on which it based its decision.
65. The Com mission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.
Findings of the Court
66. According to the case‑law, the statement of objections must set forth clearly all the essential facts upon which the Commission is relying at that stage of the procedure. However, that may be done summarily and the decision is not necessarily required to be a replica of the Commission’s statement of objections, since the statement of objections is a preparatory document containing assessments of fact and of law which are purely provisional in nature ( Aalborg Portland and Others
v Commission, paragraph 39 above, paragraph 67). Thus, although the Commission cannot allege that the persons concerned have committed infringements other than those referred to in the statement of objections and may take into consideration only facts on which the persons concerned have had the opportunity of making known their views, it must however take into account the factors emerging from the administrative procedure in order either to abandon such complaints as have been shown to be unfounded or to supplement and redraft its arguments both in fact and in law in support of the complaints which it maintains (see, to that effect, Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma
v Commission
[1970] ECR 661, paragraphs 92 to 94).
67. In the present case, it must be conceded that, in the statement of objections, the Commission did not state explicitly that the notification and project loading mechanism constituted compensation offered by the European producers to the Japanese producers, which were viewed as potential credible competitors, in return for compliance with the common understanding.
68. However, first, the statement of objections describes the facts on which that theory is based. The common understanding and the project loading mechanism are summarised in paragraphs 100, 106 and 110 of the statement of objections and described in detail subsequently in that document. Similarly, it is apparent from paragraph 120 of the statement of objections that, in the Commission’s view, the Japanese producers were potential credible competitors in respect of GIS projects in the EEA.
69. Second, in point 59 of its reply to the statement of objections, the applicant noted that the Commission referred to the notification and project loading mechanism as evidence of the existence of the common understanding. It must therefore be found that the applicant had understood, on the basis of the statement of objections, the importance which the Commission gave to the notification and project loading mechanism as regards evidence of the alleged infringement. Similarly, in paragraphs 59 to 64 of its reply to the statement of objections, the applicant expressed its point of view in detail regarding the evidence of that mechanism and its relevance to the alleged common understanding.
70. Therefore, it must be found that the content of the statement of objections enabled the applicant to express its view on the facts on which the Commission based its complaint in that statement and in the contested decision.
71. Consequently, the fifteenth plea must be dismissed.
The first, third and fourth pleas, alleging that the Commission has not established that the applicant participated in the alleged cartel, that the Commission erred in dismissing the evidence explaining the applicant’s absence from the European market and the impossibility of entering that market, and that the Commission infringed the rules governing evidence by reversing the burden of proof, thereby infringing the presumption of innocence
72. According to the case‑law, the Commission must prove the infringements which it has found and adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of the facts constituting an infringement (see Joined Cases T-44/02 OP, T-54/02 OP, T 56/02 OP, T-60/02 OP and T-61/02 OP Dresdner Bank and Others
v Commission [2006] ECR II‑3567, paragraph 59, and the case‑law cited).
73. In that regard, any doubt in the mind of the Court must operate to the advantage of the undertaking to which the decision finding an infringement was addressed. The Court cannot therefore conclude that the Commission has established the infringement at issue to the requisite legal standard if it still entertains any doubts on that point, in particular in proceedings for annulment of a decision imposing a fine ( Dresdner Bank and Others
v Commission, paragraph 72 above, paragraph 60).
74. In the latter situation, it is necessary to take account of the principle of the presumption of innocence resulting in particular from Article 6(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, which is one of the fundamental rights which are general principles of Community law. Given the nature of the infringements in question and the nature and degree of gravity of the ensuing penalties, the principle of the presumption of innocence applies in particular to the procedures relating to infringements of the competition rules applicable to undertakings that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments (see, to that effect, Dresdner Bank and Others
v Commission, paragraph 72 above, paragraph 61, and the case-law cited).
75. Thus, the Commission must show precise and consistent evidence in order to establish the existence of the infringement. However, it is important to emphasise that it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (see Dresdner Bank and Others
v Commission, paragraph 72 above, paragraphs 62 and 63, and the case‑law cited).
76. In addition, as anti-competitive agreements are known to be prohibited, the Commission cannot be required to produce documents expressly attesting to contacts between the traders concerned. The fragmentary and sporadic items of evidence which may be available to the Commission should, in any event, be capable of being supplemented by inferences which allow the relevant circumstances to be reconstituted. The existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement may therefore be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, can, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules (see Dresdner Bank and Others
v Commission, paragraph 72 above, paragraphs 64 and 65, and the case‑law cited).
77. The applicant submits, in that regard, that there is no longer any justification for applying a more lenient evidential standard because of the difficulties faced by the Commission when trying to prove an infringement. In its view, first, fines imposed in cartel cases have constantly increased in recent years, which must affect the intensity with which the Commission’s decisions are reviewed. Second, given the existence of the Leniency Notice and the parties’ cooperation obtained pursuant thereto, it is no longer necessary to grant the Commission a broad discretion when assessing evidence. Third, in the present case, the Commission seeks to rely on a document attesting the existence of a cartel outside of the European Union, namely the GQ Agreement, to find an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.
78. However, those arguments of the applicant cannot be upheld. First, it is true that the increase in the amounts of fines may have more serious consequences for the parties on which such fines are imposed. However, since the Commission’s initiative in that regard is generally well known, the result is that, if undertakings make themselves liable for an infringement, they will make an even greater effort to limit as far as possible the number of items which may serve as evidence, thereby making the Commission’s task more difficult. Second, in order for the Commission to validly rely on it as evidence of an infringement, the evidence received from interested undertakings must, in any event, satisfy the applicable criteria in the case‑­law. Thus, the existence of the leniency programme per se does not simplify the Commission’s role. Third, the fact that the GQ Agreement did not concern the territory of the European Union is relevant in assessing the probative value of that element. By contrast, that fact cannot influence the assessment of the other evidence put forward by the Commission.
79. Moreover, where the Commission bases its decision solely on the conduct of the undertakings at issue on the market to conclude that there was an infringement, it is sufficient for those undertakings to prove the existence of circumstances which cast the facts established by the Commission in a different light and thus allow another, plausible explanation of those facts to be substituted for the one adopted by the Commission in concluding that the Community competition rules had been infringed (see, to that effect, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering and Others
v Commission
[2004] ECR II‑2501, paragraph 186, and the case‑law cited).
80. Contrary to what the applicant claims, that rule does not apply to all cases in which the infringement is established solely on the basis of non‑documentary evidence.
81. As regards the evidence which may be relied on to establish an infringement of Article 81 EC, the prevailing principle of Community law is the unfettered evaluation of evidence (Case T‑50/00 Dalmine
v Commission [2004] ECR II‑2395, paragraph 72). That case-law is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.
82. Consequently, even if the lack of documentary evidence may be relevant in the global assessment of the set of indicia relied on by the Commission, it does not, in itself, enable the undertaking concerned to call the Commission’s claims into question by submitting an alternative explanation of the facts. That is only the case where the evidence submitted by the Commission does not enable the existence of the infringement to be established unequivocally and without the need for interpretation (see, to that effect, the judgment of 12 September 2007 in Case T 36/05 Coats Holdings and Coats
v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 74).
83. In addition, no provision or any general principle of Community law prohibits the Commission from relying, as against an undertaking, on statements made by other undertakings accused of having participated in the cartel. If that were not the case, the burden of proving conduct contrary to Article 81 EC, which is borne by the Commission, would be unsustainable and incompatible with the task of supervising the proper application of those provisions ( JFE Engineering and Others
v Commission, paragraph 79 above, paragraph 192). That case-law is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.
84. However, a statement by one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the accuracy of which is contested by several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate proof of an infringement committed by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence, though the degree of corroboration required may be less in view of the reliability of the statements at issue ( JFE Engineering and Others
v Commission, paragraph 79 above, paragraphs 219 and 220).
85. As regards the probative value of the various items of evidence, the sole criterion relevant in evaluating the evidence adduced is its reliability ( Dalmine
v Commission, paragraph 81 above, paragraph 72).
86. According to the general rules regarding evidence, the reliability and, thus, the probative value of a document depends on its origin, the circumstances in which it was drawn up, the person to whom it is addressed and its content (Joined Cases T‑25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T‑37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T‑48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T‑57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T‑65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T‑104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others
v Commission
[2000] ECR II-491, paragraphs 1053 and 1838).
87. As regards statements, particularly high probative value may be attached to those which, first, are reliable, second, are made on behalf of an undertaking, third, are made by a person under a professional obligation to act in the interests of that undertaking, fourth, go against the interests of the person making the statement, fifth, are made by a direct witness of the circumstances to which they relate and, sixth, were provided in writing deliberately and after mature reflection (see, to that effect, JFE Engineering and Others
v Commission, paragraph 79 above, paragraphs 205 to 210).
88. In addition, even if some caution as to the evidence provided voluntarily by the main participants in an unlawful cartel is generally called for, considering the possibility, referred to by the applicant, that those participants have a tendency to provide most of the incriminating evidence in relation to the activity of their competitors, the fact remains that seeking to benefit from the application of the Leniency Notice in order to obtain immunity from, or a reduction of, the fine does not necessarily create an incentive to submit distorted evidence in relation to the participation of the other members of the cartel under investigation. Indeed, any attempt to mislead the Commission could call into question the sincerity and the completeness of the cooperation of the person seeking to benefit from the Leniency Notice, and thereby jeopardise its chances of benefiting fully under it (see, to that effect, Case T‑120/04 Peróxidos Orgánicos
v Commission
[2006] ECR II‑4441, paragraph 70).
89. It must also be noted, in that regard, that the potential consequences of the submission of distorted evidence are even more serious since, as is apparent from paragraph 84 above, a statement of an undertaking that is disputed must be corroborated by other evidence. That being so, the likelihood of the Commission and the other undertakings involved of detecting the inaccurate nature of those statements is increased.
90. As regards the application of those rules to the present case, it should be noted, at the outset, that, according to the findings made in the contested decision, the common understanding was an unwritten understanding which encompassed, first, the commitment of the Japanese undertakings not to enter the market for GIS projects in the EEA, second, the commitment of the European undertakings not to enter the Japanese market for GIS projects and, third, the commitment of the European undertakings to notify the Japanese undertakings of the GIS projects in the European countries other than the home countries and to load those projects in the joint ‘European’ quota laid down in the GQ Agreement. According to the Commission, the purpose of the notification and project loading mechanism was to offer compensation to the Japanese undertakings, viewed by the European undertakings as potential competitors on the EEA market.
91. Among the various components of the common understanding listed in paragraph 90 above, it is the alleged commitment of the Japanese undertakings not to enter the EEA market which constitutes the basis of the Commission’s complaint against the applicant. Consequently, it is the existence of that commitment which needs to be established to the requisite legal standard. However, the other components of the common understanding, if proven, may also serve as indirect evidence from which the existence of the corresponding commitment on the part of the Japanese undertakings may be inferred.
92. The applicant disputes, in the context of the first plea, the existence of a common understanding and its participation therein. It criticises the probative value of the various items of evidence relied on by the Commission in the contested decision and refers to other evidence which, in its view, suggests that there was no common understanding. The applicant infers from this that, in adopting the contested decision, the Commission went beyond the limits of its powers. It adds, in the context of the third plea, that, in those circumstances, the Commission was required to accept the alternative explanation for the absence of Japanese producers on the GIS market in the EEA, related to the existence of legal, technical and commercial barriers to entry on that market. In the context of the fourth plea, the applicant submits that, by failing to establish the existence of the common understanding to the requisite legal standard, the Commission reversed the burden of proof and infringed the principle of the presumption of innocence.
93. The Commission submits that the existence of a common understanding, and in particular the commitment of the Japanese undertakings not to enter the EEA market, is established to the requisite legal standard by a body of evidence comprising documentary evidence, statements from undertakings, witness statements and evidence relating to the actual operation of the cartel. Therefore, the Commission considers, first, that the alternative explanation proposed by the applicant is irrelevant and, second, that it bore the burden of proof incumbent upon it and, consequently, respected the principle of the presumption of innocence.
94. It is therefore necessary to assess the reliability and the content of the various items of evidence concerned in order to assess whether, taken as a whole, the evidence relied on by the Commission establishes a firm conviction that a common understanding existed which is not able to be called into question by the evidence adduced by the applicant.
95. The applicant’s complaint alleging that the Commission went beyond its powers and the third and fourth pleas are based on the premiss that the Commission did not prove that a common understanding existed and that the applicant participated therein. Consequently, if the applicant’s arguments relating to the evidence of the existence of the infringement and of the applicant’s participation therein must be rejected, that necessarily implies, first, that the Commission is competent to penalise the infringement found, second, that the alternative explanation provided by the applicant is irrelevant in the light of what has been set out in paragraphs 79 to 82 above and, finally, that the Commission bore the burden of proof incumbent upon it and thus respected the principle of the presumption of innocence. By contrast, if it is concluded that the applicant’s participation in the alleged infringement has not been shown in the contested decision, that finding would justify, in itself, the annulment of that decision in so far as it concerns the applicant.
The evidence furnished by ABB
– Arguments of the parties
96. The applicant submits that Mr M’s witness statement submitted on behalf of ABB is not reliable and does not make it possible to conclude that the common understanding existed.
97. First, as a beneficiary of conditional immunity, ABB would have had an incentive to furnish incriminating evidence. In addition, Mr M was aware of the fact that ABB had an interest in him not contesting the existence of the common understanding. By contrast, he was aware that he was not liable to civil proceedings as a result of his statements and was sure that his witness statement would not be subject to cross-examination. Similarly, it was evident that Mr M’s statements were not going to produce additional harmful effects for ABB, since that undertaking’s liability had been established by other evidence.
98. ABB’s wish to submit incriminating evidence was manifested at the interview with Mr M, by the interventions of ABB’s representative, who interjected to correct and clarify Mr M’s statements, and at one point even answered the Commission’s questions himself.
99. Second, Mr M’s witness statement was submitted more than 18 months after ABB applied for immunity from fines.
100. Third, Mr M’s witness statement is merely a witness statement from a former ABB employee, rather than a statement made on ABB’s behalf. According to the applicant, at the time of the interview concerned, Mr M had gone into retirement and was not required to act in ABB’s interests.
101. Fourth, the oral witness statement of Mr M does not result from studied reflection. Similarly, in so far as Mr M made several statements during the administrative procedure, the evidence provided should be regarded as a series of constantly changing statements, rather than as one single statement, revised upon reflection. In addition, the fact that the earlier statements made by that witness were not provided to the applicant implies that they contain no evidence of the common understanding, which detracts from the reliability of the later statements made by that witness.
102. Fifth, even if Mr M was a direct witness to certain aspects of the alleged cartel, he did not take part in any discussion concerning the common understanding and in particular was not present at its inception, which implies that he was not a direct witness in that regard.
103. Sixth, Mr M’s witness statement is vague regarding the formation, content and implementation of the common understanding and does not mention any meeting or discussion. In the applicant’s view, Mr M’s statements regarding that understanding amount to a personal feeling rather than a complete and coherent account of the facts concerning an agreement.
104. Seventh, Mr M’s witness statement is not corroborated by contemporaneous written evidence, but is contradicted both by the GQ and EQ Agreements and by other witness statements. Moreover, Mr M’s statements are inconsistent with other statements made by ABB and conflict with evidence furnished by other cartel participants.
105. In particular, the applicant submits that ABB’s immunity application of 11 March 2004 did not contain any description of the common understanding as presented in the contested decision, since ABB’s statements did not give the impression that the applicant had undertaken not to enter the European market. Similarly, Mr V.‑A., another ABB employee, stated that he had been informed by Mr M that Europe and North America were excluded from the scope of the cartel.
106. The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.
– Findings of the Court
107. First, it is apparent from paragraphs 88 and 89 above that it is not necessary to treat automatically with caution evidence furnished by an undertaking which has sought to benefit from immunity from fines. As regards the particular case of witness statements, it is indeed possible that the employees of such an undertaking, who are required to act in the interests of the undertaking, have a common desire to submit as much incriminating evidence as possible since their cooperation in the procedure may also have a positive impact on their future career. However, if that is the case, the employees at issue will also be aware of the possible negative consequences of submitting inaccurate evidence, which are more sensitive given the requirement for corroboration.
108. In addition, it cannot be considered that the evidence furnished by ABB was not capable of damaging that undertaking. Since that evidence was furnished before the statement of objections was sent, neither ABB, nor its employees nor its former employee could be certain of the extent and exact content of the objections which were going to be raised against ABB.
109. As regards Mr M, the applicant rightly submits that a former employee is no longer required, in principle, to act in the interests of his former employer when it comes to voluntary cooperation in administrative proceedings. However, that also implies that, in principle, he has no interest in providing inaccurate evidence in that respect, irrespective of whether he was liable to civil proceedings as a result and whether he knew that his statements were not going to be subject to cross‑examination.
110. It is also true that ABB’s outside counsel intervened at one point during Mr M’s interview in order to suggest to him that it could be beneficial for the Japanese producers to enter the European market, of which Mr M did not appear to be convinced. Consequently, it should be held that Mr M expressed doubts as to the commercial interest of such a step and account needs to be taken of that fact when assessing the content of his witness statement. However, the applicant does not explain how the intervention of ABB’s outside counsel affects the reliability of Mr M’s witness statement in other respects.
111. Second, the fact that a period of time elapsed between the submission of the application for immunity by ABB and Mr M’s interview does not call into question, as such, the probative value of that witness statement. It is justified for the Commission to obtain additional evidence during its investigation, in order to have at its disposal all the information necessary to assess whether there was an infringement, in particular in the light of the observations of the undertakings concerned. By contrast, the period of time which elapsed between the submission of the witness statement and the facts to which it relates may be relevant in the assessment of its reliability, given that witnesses may provide, as a general rule, more detailed and more reliable evidence in respect of recent events. However, in the present case, the period of three years and three months time which elapsed between the end of Mr M’s involvement in the cartel and the submission of his witness statement is not sufficiently long to influence its reliability.
112. Third, it is not apparent that Mr M made his statement as an official representative of ABB. First of all, that role appears to have been assumed, for the main part, by ABB’s outside counsel. Next, as noted in paragraph 109 above, when giving his witness statement Mr M was no longer required, a priori, to act in the interests of his former employer and there is also no indication that he systematically prepared for the interview by consulting other employees of ABB and documents held by that company. Finally, the questions put by the Commission at the interviews did not concern ABB’s official position on the subjects addressed, but rather the individual knowledge of Mr M.
113. Fourth, the applicant rightly submits that Mr M’s witness statement does not appear to result from studied reflection and that it was also not revised after reflection and additional verifications. The witness statement was made orally and there are no indications that written questions were put beforehand to Mr M by the Commission nor that the statements relating to the common understanding and the barriers to entry on the EEA market were subsequently verified and revised by Mr M.
114. By contrast, the fact that Mr M made several successive statements which were not all put forward by the Commission does not call the reliability of his witness statement into question. It is normal, first, for a witness to make subsequent comments on different aspects and details of a subject and, second, for some of those statements not to be relevant to the Commission’s investigation or to relate to facts which are established more convincingly by other evidence.
115. Fifth, the applicant’s claim that Mr M was not a direct witness of the events at issue must be dismissed. Mr M was one of ABB’s representatives in the cartel between 1988 and 2002, that is during almost its entire duration, at which time ABB itself was one of the main operators. Mr M was thus a direct and privileged witness of the facts which he disclosed.
116. In that regard, it must be conceded that, in his witness statement, Mr M confirmed that he was not present when the common understanding was concluded. Similarly, when asked whether the issue of the common understanding had been raised at meetings which he had attended, Mr M responded that it was not necessary to refer to it since the common understanding went without saying. However, this does not call into question the probative value of Mr M’s witness statement. First, a witness is perfectly able to furnish evidence of a long-standing phenomenon even if he was not present at its inception. Second, although Mr M stated that the issue of the common understanding had not been referred to explicitly at the meetings which he had attended, it is apparent from his witness statement that, in his view, this was so because the content of the common understanding was understood, accepted and implemented by the participants to the cartel without the need for an explicit discussion.
117. Sixth, as regards the content of his witness statement, Mr M stated that an understanding relating to the mutual protection of domestic markets, predating the GQ Agreement, existed between the Japanese and European producers, that that understanding was a prerequisite for the conclusion of agreements relating to other regions and that compliance with its rules implied that the Japanese producers were not to enter the domestic market of the European producers, even though they would have been able to do so at a technical level. Mr M also explained, in that context, the notification and project loading mechanism and the fact that the GIS projects in the home countries were not discussed between the two groups of producers and were not charged to the quotas set under the GQ Agreement.
118. Thus, the statements made by Mr M confirm the existence of the common understanding alleged by the Commission and cannot be regarded as a vague personal feeling since they provide information on the duration of that understanding, its content and its participants. The lack of information on the implementation of that understanding is hardly surprising given that the essential commitment of the parties was not to be active on certain markets. Moreover, Mr M described the part of the common understanding which required implementation measures, namely the notification and project loading mechanism.
119. Seventh, the question whether Mr M’s witness statement is corroborated, in accordance with the case‑law set out in paragraph 84 above, and whether it is called into question by evidence from other undertakings or by the GQ and EQ Agreements, will be addressed in paragraphs 129 to 195 below.
120. As regards the alleged incoherencies between Mr M’s witness statement and the other evidence furnished by ABB, the latter explicitly referred in its observations of 11 March 2004 to the existence of a common understanding, pursuant to which the two Japanese companies would not bid for European projects and the European companies would not bid for Japanese projects.
121. In that respect, it is normal that ABB referred to two Japanese companies, namely Japan AE Power Systems Corp. and TM T & D, since, at the time when it submitted its statements, the GIS activities of Fuji, Hitachi, the applicant and Toshiba were grouped within those joint ventures. None the less, the Commission was entitled to interpret that statement as indicating that those undertakings themselves participated in the common understanding. In its initial application for leniency for immunity from fines of 3 March 2004, ABB had already stated that, to its knowledge, the cartel had been in existence for over 10 years, which implies that it came into being well before Japan AE Power Systems and TM T & D were created.
122. As regards the witness statements of ABB’s employees, Mr Wi stated that the absence of Japanese undertakings on the European market was the result of a system in place to protect the Japanese and European markets, motivated by the fact that neither of the two groups of producers wanted the other group to enter its domestic market. Similarly, Mr P referred to a common understanding with the Japanese undertakings pursuant to which the latter undertook not to participate in the European market and the European undertakings undertook not to participate in the Japanese market. Thus, Mr Wi’s and Mr P’s witness statements confirm the existence of the common understanding.
123. The same finding is applicable to the witness statement provided by Mr V.-A. When asked whether there was any form of arrangement between Japanese and European producers, Mr V.-A referred to an understanding between Japanese and European producers pursuant to which the European undertakings agreed not to ‘attack’ the Japanese undertakings on the Japanese market and vice versa. Moreover, Mr V.‑A stated that he had participated in a discussion between the European undertakings and the representative of a Japanese undertaking specifically regarding compliance with that understanding which was brought about by attempts on the part of the Japanese undertakings to enter the European market.
124. As regards the alleged exclusion of certain territories from the scope of the worldwide cartel, Mr V.-A stated, first, that North America was excluded for a specific reason, namely the risk of the penalties if the cartel were to be discovered. Second, he explained that the exclusion of Western European countries meant that the GIS projects concerned were not discussed by the European producers at meetings at which he was present, that is to say the meetings of the worldwide cartel previously governed by the GQ and EQ Agreements, but on another occasion. Those statements are fully in line with Mr M’s witness statement.
125. It must be conceded, however, that, as noted in paragraph 110 above, Mr M was not convinced of the commercial interest for the Japanese undertakings in entering the European GIS market. None the less, the position of Mr M, which was shared by Mr P, does not affect the fact that, according to both ABB’s four witnesses and ABB itself, the Japanese undertakings were committed to not entering the EEA market even though they were capable of doing so at a technical level.
126. In conclusion, it must be found that the evidence furnished by ABB is capable of proving the existence of the common understanding. Similarly, that evidence is coherent in respect of the existence and fundamental content of the common understanding.
127. Furthermore, ABB’s statements were provided on behalf of an undertaking and it is apparent from their content that they are founded on internal research and on discussions with employees of that undertaking. Consequently, a certain degree of probative value must be attributed to them.
128. The statements made by the four witnesses concerned are credible since they were made by direct witnesses of the events to which they refer and it is not apparent from the circumstances of the case that those witnesses were encouraged to make inaccurate statements. Thus, they must be regarded as being of high probative value.
The corroboration of the evidence furnished by ABB
– Arguments of the parties
129. The applicant disputes that the evidence furnished by ABB has been sufficiently corroborated in the present case.
130. First, the statements made by Fuji in its reply to the statement of objections are not directly contrary to its interests, and can thus not serve to corroborate the existence of the common understanding. In addition, Fuji stated that its absence from the European GIS market was due to economic and technical obstacles. Similarly, since Fuji did not participate in all the meetings on the GQ Agreement, it could have a different perception from that of the other parties which consider that the common understanding did not exist.
131. Second, the rejection by Hitachi of the proposal made by Alstom in July 2002 to conclude an understanding covering GIS projects in Europe and covering Central and Eastern Europe does not constitute evidence of the existence of the common understanding. According to the applicant, the Commission failed to take account of Hitachi’s reference to commercial obstacles limiting the presence of Japanese producers on the European market. In addition, supposing that the common understanding was essential for the functioning of the GQ Agreement, the refusal to ring-fence the European market should have led to the collapse of the entire arrangement; but that did not happen.
132. Third, the fact that Areva and Alstom did not contest the existence of the common understanding is irrelevant in the present case.
133. The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.
– Findings of the Court
134. First, in its reply to the statement of objections, Fuji stated that it was aware of the common understanding, pursuant to which the Japanese producers would not attempt to enter the European market, while stating that the main reason for Fuji’s absence from the EEA market was that it was not a credible significant GIS supplier in Europe.
135. In so far as Fuji admitted, at least indirectly, that its absence from the European market was in part due to the common understanding, it acknowledged a fact which could have been held against it by the Commission. Consequently, contrary to what the applicant claims, Fuji’s statement goes against its interests given that it implicitly acknowledged that it participated in an infringement.
136. It is true that Fuji’s statement is relatively vague since that undertaking merely refers to the commitment of the Japanese producers not to enter the European market. However, in doing so, Fuji corroborated the key element resulting from the evidence submitted by ABB and imputed to the Japanese producers by the Commission. Thus, that statement is not irrelevant in this case.
137. The Court also notes that Fuji played a secondary role within the cartel, as the applicant essentially submits. In particular, as is apparent from recital 150 of the contested decision, Fuji was the only Japanese undertaking which was not a member of the committee of the group of Japanese producers responsible, in particular, for the coordination of the two groups of producers within the context of the GQ Agreement. However, in principle, an undertaking which plays a secondary role within a cartel is aware of the main content of the agreements encompassed by that cartel, even if that undertaking is not aware of its detailed operation and all the information exchanged within it.
138. In addition, it is true that, in its statement, Fuji referred to the existence of technical and commercial obstacles to entry to the EEA market. However, those obstacles were not referred to as being the sole reason for Fuji’s absence from that market, but merely as being the main reason. Furthermore, when Fuji listed the various obstacles at issue, it referred to its small share of the worldwide market which placed it at a disadvantage compared with its larger competitors, both European and Japanese. Therefore, it is not apparent that its arguments in that regard can be transposed to those of the other Japanese producers.
139. In the light of the above, it must be concluded that the statement made by Fuji in its reply to the statement of objections tends to corroborate the evidence furnished by ABB, although its probative value is limited.
140. It is apparent from recital 127 of the contested decision that, at the meeting of 10 July 2002 during which there was discussion of the development of the modes of operation of the cartel after Siemens and Hitachi had withdrawn from it, Alstom proposed that the European producers should stay in Europe and the Japanese producers should stay in Japan and not attempt to enter the European market. In addition, it is stated in that recital that, at the following meeting on 15 July 2002, Hitachi’s representative had stated that Hitachi rejected that proposal, that the European producers had reacted by stating that Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe, was their market and that they wanted to maintain the prices they were currently charging in Western Europe and had also said that the issue was to be raised again, even though that was not the case.
141. It must be admitted that, at first sight, that summary of the meetings of 10 and 15 July 2002, based on the evidence furnished by Hitachi, suggests that Alstom actually proposed that a new understanding be concluded, which was rejected by Hitachi and was not discussed subsequently, which implies that, at least as of July 2002, there was no understanding in existence relating to the conduct of the Japanese producers on the EEA market.
142. However, the summary of the meeting of 15 July 2002 shows, first, that Hitachi did not reject the very idea of allocating markets, but only Alstom’s concrete proposal. Second, it is stated in that summary that Hitachi had pointed out that the claims made by the European producers included Central and Eastern Europe, which suggests that its opposition was related to that specific aspect, but not to the situation in Western Europe.
143. It should also be noted that Alstom’s presentation of the proposal at issue calls into question the applicant’s and Hitachi’s arguments in relation to competition on the EEA market. If, as claimed by the applicant and Hitachi, the Japanese producers were not perceived as credible competitors on the EEA market because of the existence of insurmountable barriers to entry, an understanding relating to that very market would indeed not have served any purpose. In such a situation, the European producers, aware of that fact as a result of their privileged position in Europe, would have had no reason to propose such an understanding. However, it is apparent from the summary provided by Hitachi that Alstom’s proposal concerned the EEA market as well as the Central and Eastern European market.
144. Accordingly, it is necessary to uphold the interpretation that, at the meeting of 10 July 2002, Alstom proposed extending the common understanding, as alleged by the Commission, to include Central and Eastern European countries.
145. First, that interpretation implies that Alstom’s proposal constitutes proof that the common understanding existed at the time that it was made. Second, the rejection of that proposal by Hitachi does not amount to a rejection of the common understanding as such, but represents merely a refusal to extend it. Consequently, the applicant’s claim that the GQ Agreement should have ‘collapsed’ following the meeting of 15 July 2002 is based on a false premiss.
146. In the light of all of the above, it must be found that the proposal made by Alstom at the meeting of 10 July 2002 corroborates the evidence furnished by ABB.
147. Third, as has been noted in paragraph 50 above, the alleged neutral position of Alstom and Areva cannot be interpreted as proof of the existence of the common understanding. Consequently, that factor cannot corroborate the evidence furnished by ABB.
The notification and project loading mechanism
– Arguments of the parties
148. The applicant submits that the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism is implausible and has not been established.
149. First, the Japanese producers were not perceived to be a competitive threat on the European market, so that it would not have been necessary to offer them compensation via that mechanism. In the applicant’s view, if notifications had been made for the purpose of project loading, the European producers would not have had any incentive to notify.
150. Second, given the precise nature of the GQ Agreement, it is unrealistic that the agreement itself or subsequent documents would not mention the notification and project loading mechanism.
151. Third, the theory put forward by the Commission is based on mandatory and systematic notification, since only a mechanism covering at least a significant proportion of the GIS projects concerned could enable the Japanese producers to monitor and verify the loading procedure. In the present case, the Commission has not established to the requisite legal standard the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism nor the systematic nature of that mechanism.
152. In that regard, in their witness statements, Mr M and Mr P indicated that the lists of European GIS projects and the allocation of them were not discussed with the Japanese undertakings. Moreover, the lists at issue cannot establish the existence of systematic notification.
153. The statements made by Hitachi in its leniency application and in its reply to the statement of objections are merely an interpretation of the facts by that undertaking. In any event, such statements did not relate to the period subsequent to Hitachi’s withdrawal from the cartel in 1999. Moreover, Hitachi provided a supplementary reply to the statement of objections, which detracts from the value of the statements in question. Similarly, given the detail of Hitachi’s leniency application, the statements in question, which were submitted later, lack any credibility.
154. Furthermore, the Commission itself acknowledged, in recitals 148 and 162 of the contested decision, that notification could not have been carried out on a regular basis. Fuji confirmed this in its response to the statement of objections and Hitachi did not dispute it in its statements concerning notification and loading. As regards the content of the EQ Agreement, the applicant states, first, that it was unaware of the existence of that document and the latter is therefore not relevant so far as it is concerned. Second, according to Annex 2 to the said agreement, the notification of European GIS projects to Japanese producers was voluntary and not mandatory.
155. The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.
– Findings of the Court
156. The Court notes, first, that the Commission’s claims relating to the notification and project loading mechanism are not based exclusively on the assumption that the Japanese producers were perceived as credible competitors on the EEA market. The Commission considers that it gathered positive evidence of the existence of that mechanism. Accordingly, the probative value of the evidence put forward by the Commission must be examined in order to assess whether it establishes, to the requisite legal standard, the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism.
157. In that regard, the applicant’s argument that, if notification aimed to enable project loading, the European producers would not have had any incentive to notify is not substantiated. That argument is based solely on an assessment of the notification and project loading mechanism as an isolated element. However, that approach is not in line with the Commission’s position, as resumed in paragraph 90 above, that that mechanism formed part of the general context of the common understanding.
158. Second, although the notification and project loading mechanism required certain measures for its implementation, those measures were not particularly complicated, since they essentially consisted in the disclosure of certain information by the European group to the Japanese group, a disclosure which, in addition, took place in parallel with the information disclosed under the GQ Agreement concerning GIS projects outside of the EEA. Consequently, it is not apparent that those measures or the notification and project loading mechanism itself necessarily required written rules, also given the will of parties to the cartel, attested by the organisational and technical precautions referred to in recitals 170 to 176 of the contested decision, to reduce the risk of that agreement being discovered.
159. Third, in his witness statement, Mr M explicitly affirmed the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism. He also stated that that mechanism did not concern the GIS projects in the home countries, that is to say in Japan and in certain European countries.
160. The existence of a mechanism whereby the value of GIS projects in the EEA was charged to the worldwide quota laid down in the GQ Agreement was also confirmed in ABB’s statements.
161. By contrast, as the applicant submits, it is not apparent from the lists of projects provided by ABB that GIS projects in Europe were regularly notified to the Japanese producers. Therefore, those lists do not constitute evidence of the notification and project loading mechanism.
162. In so far as concerns the evidence furnished by Hitachi, it should be noted that, read in the context of the sentences which immediately precede it, the statement that Siemens would regularly circulate tables summarising a share of the GIS projects allocated to the various members of the cartel refers to GIS projects outside of the EEA. Consequently, that statement is also not relevant as evidence of the notification and project loading mechanism, as alleged by the Commission, concerning GIS projects in the EEA.
163. By contrast, in its reply to the statement of objections, Hitachi stated that, before it discontinued its participation in the cartel in 1999, the European producers disclosed to the Japanese producers details of GIS projects which they would be supplying in Europe, to ensure that those projects were taken into account when agreeing the quota of GIS projects outside of the EEA allocated to the two groups of producers under the GQ Agreement.
164. That statement expressly confirms the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism referred to by the Commission until 1999. In addition, it is of a high probative value for two reasons. First, that statement goes against Hitachi’s interests, since it implies the existence of a link between the collusive activities within the EEA and the Japanese producers and constitutes, as a result, incriminating evidence. Second, it is apparent from reading the relevant passage of the reply to the statement of objections that Hitachi was not aware of the inferences which could be made from that statement.
165. In addition, as noted in paragraph 54 above, Hitachi did not alter the factual content of its statements relating to the notification and project loading mechanism in its supplementary reply to the statement of objections.
166. Furthermore, the fact that the notification and project loading mechanism was not referred to in Hitachi’s leniency application, which predated the reply to the statement of objections, does not reduce the probative value of that undertaking’s statements relating to that mechanism. It is normal, during the procedure, for an undertaking to specify its position in relation to certain circumstances of the case, in particular following the communication of the statement of objections, which formalises the complaints and the evidence put forward by the Commission.
167. Fuji, for its part, stated in its reply to the statement of objections that the information concerning the allocation of GIS projects in the European countries excluded from the scope of the GQ Agreement was not systematically provided to the Japanese producers and that, consequently, Fuji did not know about the operation of the EQ Agreement.
168. It should be noted none the less that Fuji’s position is not contrary to its own interests since it seeks to call into question the existence of any infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. It is thus of a lower probative value than the relevant evidence furnished by ABB and Hitachi. Moreover, Fuji’s secondary role within the cartel, noted in paragraph 137 above, may explain the fact that Fuji was not privy to all the information exchanged by the group of European producers. That also calls into question the reliability of Fuji’s statements in that regard compared with that of the evidence furnished by ABB and Hitachi, which were members of the committees of their respective groups and were, for that reason, more closely associated with the detailed operation of the alleged cartel.
169. As regards the EQ Agreement, in accordance with point 4 of part ‘E (E‑Members)’ of Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement, the European producers ‘decide about notification of [E]uropean projects to [the group of Japanese producers]’. It is apparent from the context of Annex 2 that the information was to be communicated prior to the allocation of the GIS projects concerned.
170. By contrast, the provision referred to above did not relate to the monitoring of projects which had already been allocated. Consequently, although its content suggests that the Japanese producers were regarded as credible competitors for the provision of certain GIS projects in the EEA (see paragraphs 184 to 191 below), the measures which it provided for are not part of the notification and project loading mechanism as claimed by the Commission. Therefore, both Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement and the references to the content of that annex made in recitals 148 and 162 of the contested decision are of no use for proving that mechanism.
171. In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism has been established to the requisite legal standard by the evidence furnished by ABB, as corroborated by Hitachi’s statements in its reply to the statement of objections.
172. Contrary to what the applicant claims, it is not apparent from the evidence referred to in the preceding paragraph that the notification and project loading mechanism was implemented occasionally and in a discretionary manner. Although ABB’s and Hitachi’s statements and Mr M’s witness statement do not address that subject explicitly, it is clear from the wording used in the documents at issue that notification was carried out regularly and applied to all of the participants and projects concerned. As explained in paragraph 168 above, Fuji’s statements are less reliable in that respect than the evidence provided by ABB and Hitachi. In addition, it has been noted in paragraph 170 above that Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement is not relevant in that regard.
173. As regards the implementation period of the notification and project loading mechanism, ABB’s statements do not refer to a specific period and may therefore, a priori, be interpreted as referring to the entire duration of the infringement. As for Mr M’s statements, they refer to the period during which he was involved in the cartel, that is to say from 1988 to June 2002. However, in so far as it has been noted in paragraph 84 above that the evidence provided by ABB had to be corroborated by other evidence, it must be pointed out that Hitachi’s statements concern the period preceding the date when it discontinued its participation in the cartel in 1999. Therefore, it must be considered that the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism was established for that latter period.
174. As regards the relevance of that mechanism, it must be found that it constitutes a serious indicator that the Japanese producers were perceived by the European producers as potential credible competitors on the EEA market. If the European market was actually impenetrable for the Japanese producers because of the barriers to entry, the European producers would have no reason to notify the results of the allocation of certain GIS projects in the EEA and, a fortiori, to load those projects into the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ Agreement, since such loading would deprive them of a share of the GIS projects in the regions covered by the GQ Agreement. Consequently, the existence of such a notification and project loading mechanism implies that the Japanese undertakings could have entered the European market. If they did not do so it is because they committed themselves not to, in exchange for a larger share of the GIS projects outside of the EEA. Thus, the mechanism at issue constitutes a link between the collusive activities within the EEA and the Japanese producers and, as a result, indirect evidence of the existence of the common understanding.
175. In the light of all of the above, it must be held that the regular notification to the group of Japanese producers of certain GIS projects in the EEA after their allocation and the loading of those projects into the joint ‘European’ quota, provided for in the GQ Agreement, has been established in so far as concerns the period from 1988 to Hitachi’s withdrawal from the cartel in 1999 by ABB’s statements, those of Hitachi and Mr M’s witness statement. In addition, the mechanism at issue constitutes indirect evidence of the existence of the common understanding alleged by the Commission.
The evidence allegedly contradicting the existence of the common understanding
– Arguments of the parties
176. First, the applicant maintains that the contemporaneous documents do not refer to the common understanding. In its view, whilst the GQ and EQ Agreements lay down the detailed rules for the operation of the cartel, they exclude Europe from their scope. It is implausible that the agreements concerned failed to even mention one of the essential elements of the cartel. The applicant considers that, if the GIS producers had intended to create a global cartel by reserving the markets of the home countries to themselves, they would have included defence clauses in their written agreement, rather than excluding the territories in question from its scope and relying on an unwritten understanding.
177. Thus, the applicant claims that the GQ and EQ Agreements cannot be regarded as documentary evidence of the existence of the common understanding. That is all the more so since the Japanese producers did not participate in the EQ Agreement and were not aware of it.
178. Moreover, the EQ Agreement corroborates the fact that the Japanese producers did not represent a credible threat on the European market, since it provides that, with regard to European projects, only the European producers were to submit supporting bids. That implies that European customers would not have regarded a bid from a Japanese producer as credible.
179. Second, the applicant adds that its employees were unaware of the common understanding and that none of them participated in activities related thereto.
180. Similarly, the applicant states that the Commission did not take account of evidence, including witness statements, provided by the applicant, Hitachi, Siemens, Toshiba and VA TECH, which shows that the common understanding never existed.
181. In that context, the probative value of Siemens’s and VA TECH’s statements is all the more important because those two undertakings had no incentive to deny the existence of the common understanding, in so far as their participation in an infringement was established by other evidence.
182. The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.
– Findings of the Court
183. First, it is common ground between the parties that the GQ Agreement sets out the organisation of a cartel for worldwide GIS projects. However, first, as the applicant submits, that agreement does not refer to a common understanding and, second, according to Annex 2 to that agreement, Japan, the twelve Member States of the European Community at that time and five other Western European countries were excluded from its scope of application.
184. The EQ Agreement, for its part, is an agreement implementing the GQ Agreement, which concerns, inter alia, the distribution of the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ Agreement. The EQ Agreement was concluded solely by the European undertakings. The applicant was thus not a party to it. In addition, that agreement does not explicitly mention the common understanding.
185. Accordingly, the GQ and EQ Agreements cannot be regarded as constituting documentary evidence of the existence of a common understanding.
186. However, the lack of explicit reference to that understanding in the GQ and EQ Agreements does not imply that such an understanding did not exist. The commitment of a group of producers not to enter a market reserved to the other group, such as the commitment alleged by the Commission against the Japanese producers, is based on a simple concept which may be implemented easily. Also, its implementation does not require, in principle, interaction between the undertakings concerned. Consequently, such a commitment is perfectly capable of existing as an unwritten understanding, which also reduces the likelihood of its discovery.
187. Furthermore, in so far the Japanese producers did not participate in the EQ Agreement, the obligation to submit supporting bids, set out in Article 6(4) of that agreement, could not apply to them. Consequently, that provision does not imply that the Japanese producers were not perceived as potential competitors on the EEA market.
188. The Court also notes that, as pointed out in paragraph 169 above, in accordance with point 4 of part ‘E (E-Members)’ of Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement, the European producers could decide about notification of certain GIS projects in Europe to the group of Japanese producers, prior to allocating the GIS projects concerned.
189. This makes it possible to dismiss, to a certain extent, the applicant’s arguments, since it suggests that the European producers considered that the Japanese producers might have been interested, at the very least, in the allocation process of certain GIS projects in the EEA, and that they were therefore potential competitors for such projects.
190. However, nothing in the EQ Agreement or in the other evidence adduced by the Commission proves that the mechanism concerned was implemented by the European producers or that the Japanese producers were aware of its existence.
191. Therefore, the EQ Agreement constitutes merely an indication that the Japanese producers were regarded as credible competitors for the provision of certain GIS projects in the EEA, as claimed by the Commission.
192. Second, the Commission did not err in considering that the statements and witness statements of ABB, the statements of Fuji relating to the existence of the common understanding and the statements of Hitachi relating to notification and project loading had to be regarded as being of a higher probative value than the claims made by the applicant, Hitachi, Siemens, Toshiba and VA TECH and the evidence furnished by those undertakings that there was no common understanding.
193. Unlike the first group of evidence, the claims at issue are not contrary to the interests of the undertakings concerned, since they seek to call into question the existence of any infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. That finding also applies to the witness statements of the employees and former employees, since, as set out in paragraph 59 above, in principle they are not independent items of evidence. Moreover, as regards the common understanding, the witness statements do not contain any additional evidence to that furnished by the addressees of the statement of objections.
194. In addition, it cannot be considered that the European undertakings, including Siemens and VA TECH, had no interest in contesting the existence of the common understanding, since that understanding was interpreted by the Commission in the statement of objections as a collusive agreement between the European producers and the Japanese producers in relation to the EEA market and thus constituted an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. Indeed, such a finding was detrimental to the interests of the European producers, or at least could potentially have been, if the Commission had not been able to establish the other objections against them to the requisite legal standard.
195. In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the evidence furnished by the applicant does not call into question the value of the evidence furnished by the Commission to establish the existence of the common understanding.
The allocation of GIS products in the EEA
– Arguments of the parties
196. The applicant submits that the evidence relied on does not constitute proof that it participated in the allocation of GIS projects in the EEA.
197. The applicant admits that it attended meetings with the European producers, but maintains that those meetings concerned only the GQ Agreement and did not therefore constitute an infringement of Article 81 EC or Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.
198. The applicant also contests the allegation that Japanese producers sometimes envisaged responding to European invitations to tender for GIS projects in the EEA. It states that, with the exception of one instance, it never received any invitations to tender from a European company during the cartel period.
199. As regards the various items of evidence referred to in the contested decision, the applicant maintains that it never had any knowledge of the project lists from ABB and Fuji. It expressly denies ever having any knowledge of the Spanish ‘MSP via GC’ project dating back to 1997 in which, according to one of the lists of projects provided by ABB, it expressed an interest.
200. Similarly, the evidence from VA TECH referred to in recital 204 of the contested decision does not in any way link GIS projects in the EEA to the applicant or to any other Japanese producer.
201. The Commission considers that the applicant’s arguments are unfounded.
– Findings of the Court
202. The file does not contain any evidence which suggests that GIS projects in the EEA were discussed at GQ Agreement meetings in which the Japanese members of the cartel participated.
203. Similarly, it is not apparent from the lists of projects provided by ABB and Fuji that GIS projects in the EEA were discussed with the Japanese producers, with the exception of the applicant’s alleged interest in the ‘MSP via GC’ project in Spain. It cannot be ruled out that the reference to interest shown by the applicant in the list of projects provided by ABB is a mistake, given the length of the list of projects concerned and the fact that the Commission did not identify other cases in which a Japanese producer showed interest in a GIS project in the EEA. In any event, the content of the list of projects from ABB is not corroborated by other evidence, and in particular by Fuji’s list of projects, in respect of the ‘MSP via GC’ project and cannot therefore be taken into consideration in that regard.
204. In addition, when the Commission stated in recital 125 of the contested decision that the Japanese producers sometimes considered replying to European tenders, but normally declined them and mentioned the projects concerned to the European producers, it based its findings solely on ABB’s statements and on the witness statements given by its employees. Consequently, since that statement is not corroborated by other evidence, it cannot be taken into consideration.
205. Finally, the handwritten notes of a representative of VA TECH, referred to in recital 204 of the contested decision, contain a reference to a GIS project in the EEA and a reminder to discuss a package of GIS projects with the Japanese producers. However, the two passages concerned are separated by several pages containing notes relating to other subjects. In addition, the reference to the Japanese undertakings is immediately preceded by notes relating to a GIS project outside of the EEA. Accordingly, those notes do not enable conclusions to be drawn in respect of the interest of the Japanese undertakings in GIS projects in Europe.
206. In the light of all of the above, it must be found that it has not been established that the Japanese undertakings participated in the allocation of GIS projects in the EEA.
Global assessment
– Arguments of the parties
207. The applicant submits, at the outset, that, contrary to what the Commission claims, it was not necessary to protect the domestic markets from the two groups of producers. In its view, there was no risk or danger of the Japanese producers being able to compete on the European market, or vice versa. The applicant also adds that it was invited only exceptionally to submit a bid for a GIS project in the EEA during the alleged cartel period.
208. The applicant maintains that the purpose and the content of the common understanding have not been established. The evidence relied on by the Commission does not identify the members of the common understanding, the date on which it was concluded or what happened to it after Siemens and Hitachi withdrew from the cartel in 1999. Thus, the evidence furnished by ABB does not disclose the existence of a collusive agreement but represents a ‘subconscious expression’ that the Japanese producers were not in a position to penetrate the European market and vice versa.
209. In addition, the Commission failed to take account of the consequences of Siemens’s and Hitachi’s withdrawal from the cartel. According to the applicant, even if the parties were a credible competitive threat to each other’s home markets, the common understanding would have been called into question by the withdrawal of two key members of the GQ Agreement. Furthermore, during the two years Siemens and Hitachi were absent from the arrangement, Hitachi would have recorded sales in Europe and Siemens would have recorded sales in Japan.
210. Finally, the applicant submits that account should not be taken of the Commission’s claims relating to the ‘home countries’ and the relevance of the notification and project loading mechanism. In its view, those claims, in particular the claim that the Japanese undertakings were aware of the ‘home countries’, is not supported by any evidence other than Mr M’s witness statement. Moreover, the latter’s statements that the identity and ownership of the home countries were well established, did not need to be discussed and predated the GQ Agreement, are contradicted by other evidence referred to by the Commission, pursuant to which those circumstances changed over time. Consequently, Mr M’s witness statement is not credible in that regard.
211. The Commission argues that the applicant’s arguments are unfounded.
– Findings of the Court
212. It is apparent from the examination carried out in paragraphs 107 to 175 above, first, that ABB’s statements and the witness statements of its employees and of its former employee show that an understanding existed whereby the European and Japanese producers undertook mutually not to enter the domestic markets of the other group. Those items of evidence also make it possible to identify the parties to the understanding, among which the applicant, and to conclude that, although it was probably concluded prior to the GQ Agreement, it was concluded, at the latest, at the time the GQ Agreement was concluded.
213. Second, the existence of the mutual understanding referred to above is corroborated by the proposal made by Alstom at the meeting of 10 July 2002. The existence of the commitment of the Japanese undertakings not to enter the European market is also corroborated by Fuji’s statements.
214. Third, it is apparent from ABB’s statements and its witness statement, corroborated by Hitachi’s statements, that the Japanese producers accepted, at least in so far as concerns the period from 1988 to 1999, the regular notification of the results of the allocation of certain GIS projects in the EEA and their loading into the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ Agreement. Similarly, under Point 4 of Part ‘E (E (Members)’ of Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement, the European producers foresaw the possibility of providing the Japanese producers with the details of certain GIS projects in the EEA prior to their allocation. Those two factors suggest that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Japanese producers were regarded as credible competitors for the provision of certain GIS projects in the EEA, but that they had committed not to enter the European market in exchange for a larger share of the GIS projects in other regions. They thus constitute indirect evidence of the existence of the mutual understanding between the European producers and the Japanese producers.
215. Thus, the evidence produced by the Commission supports its assertions regarding the existence of the common understanding, as summarised in paragraph 90 above. By contrast, the evidence relied on by the applicant and evaluated in paragraphs 183 to 195 above is not capable of calling those statements into question.
216. In that regard, it has not been established that the Japanese undertakings participated, with the European producers, in the allocation of GIS projects in the EEA. However, it should be pointed out that, in the light of the nature of their alleged commitment under the common understanding, their participation in it would not have been necessary. The Japanese producers would have had no interest in intervening in the actual allocation of GIS projects in the EEA which they had committed themselves not to take. Their sole interest would have been to learn the valu e of the projects concerned and the identity of the undertakings to which they were awarded, in order to be able to monitor the loading into the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ Agreement. At least in so far as concerns the period from 1988 to 1999, that information was communicated to the Japanese producers via the notification mechanism.
217. As regards the consequences of Siemens’s and Hitachi’s withdrawal from the cartel, first, it is apparent from recital 187 of the contested decision and Mr M’s witness statement that that event had an appreciable repercussion on the effectiveness of the cartel, but the cartel did not ‘collapse’. Second, the period of absence of the two undertakings is insufficient for there to have been a significant entry on to the EEA market, given, first, the existence of certain technical and commercial obstacles, which is not disputed by the Commission, second, the fact that the privileged position of the various producers on their domestic markets was artificially strengthened as a result of the cartel between 1988 and 1999 and finally, the fact that the other producers thought of adopting retaliatory measures against Siemens and Hitachi, as is apparent from Mr M’s witness statement.
218. Finally, pursuant to the reasoning set out in paragraphs 174 and 214 above, it is not necessary to establish that the notification and project loading mechanism did not concern GIS projects in the European home countries or that Japan constituted a home country to be able to regard that mechanism as a relevant indication of the existence of the common understanding. Consequently, the fact that Mr M’s witness statement may not be corroborated in that regard is of no significance.
219. The Court also notes that there is no inconsistency between Mr M’s witness statement and the other evidence referred to by the Commission in so far as concerns the home countries concept. According to Mr M, the very concept of the common understanding, as a mutual commitment not to enter the domestic markets of the other group, was in fact well established, did not need to be discussed and predated the GQ Agreement. That being so, later in his witness statement, Mr M himself notes that, in certain cases, the ownership of a home country changed as a result of mergers between the various operators concerned.
220. In the light of all of the above, it must be found that the existence of the common understanding has been established to the requisite legal standard and that the Commission did not go beyond the limits of its powers in fining the applicant for its participation in that understanding.
221. Therefore, the first plea must be dismissed.
222. In addition, as explained in paragraph 95 above, since the Commission did not base its findings solely on the conduct of the undertakings at issue on the market in concluding that the alleged infringement had been committed, it is not sufficient for the applicant to substitute its own alternative plausible version of the facts for the version given by the Commission. Consequently, the third plea must be dismissed.
223. Similarly, the conclusion that the existence of the common understanding has been established to the requisite legal standard implies that the Commission discharged its burden of proof and thus respected the principle of the presumption of innocence. Therefore, the fourth plea must be dismissed.
224. Finally, it is apparent from the foregoing that the Commission was able to conclude that the common understanding existed without taking account of Fuji’s observations, which were not disclosed to the applicant, and the alleged neutral position of Alstom and Areva, as incriminating evidence. Consequently, in accordance with what has been stated in paragraph 51 above, ultimately it is necessary to dismiss the fourteenth plea, alleging an infringement of the right of access to the file.
The second plea, alleging that the Commission failed to establish the existence of an agreement infringing Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement
– Arguments of the parties
225. The applicant maintains that the Commission has not identified any agreement justifying the application of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. In its view, the Commission did not indicate the time at which the parties expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way and did not furnish evidence of contacts, discussions or agreements between them. However, without any evidence, the provisions referred to above cannot be used so as to prohibit persons from coming to the same conclusion on a certain issue.
226. The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.
– Findings of the Court
227. According to the case‑law, it is for the Commission to gather sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement constitutes an agreement or a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC (Joined Cases T‑185/96, T‑189/96 and T‑190/96 Riviera Auto Service and Others v Commission
[1999] ECR II‑93, paragraph 47). The case‑law cited is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
228. In the contested decision, the Commission did not comment expressly on the issue whether the conduct imputed to the Japanese undertakings constituted an agreement or a concerted practice. In recital 248 of the contested decision, it merely observed that the infringement consisted of several actions which may be classed as agreements or concerted practices.
229. Consequently, it should be assessed, first, whether the common understanding constitutes an agreement between undertakings within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
230. In that regard, in order for there to be an agreement within the meaning of those provisions, it is sufficient that the undertakings in question expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way (see, by analogy, Cimenteries CBR and Others
v Commission, paragraph 86 above, paragraph 958, and the case‑law cited). There is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement when it is apparent that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (see Cimenteries CBR and Others
v Commission, paragraph 86 above, paragraph 837, and the case‑law cited).
231. In the present case, it is apparent from the various items of evidence produced by the Commission, and in particular ABB’s and Fuji’s statements and the witness statements of Mr M and Mr V.-A, that, at the time of conclusion of the GQ Agreement at the latest, the European and Japanese producers mutually agreed not to enter the domestic markets of the other group. The existence of a mutual agreement necessarily implies the existence of a meeting of minds, even if there is no evidence which makes it possible to determine with precision the exact point in time that meeting of minds was manifested or which formalised its expression. In addition, it is apparent from paragraph 116 above that Mr M considered that it was not necessary to refer to the common understanding during the discussions in which he participated, since the content of that understanding was understood, accepted and implemented by all the participants to the cartel without the need for any specific discussion on it. Moreover, as set out in paragraph 123 above, Mr V.‑A stated that he participated in discussions between the European undertakings and the representative of a Japanese undertaking expressly concerning compliance with the common understanding.
232. Similarly, the acceptance over a number of years – confirmed by ABB’s statements and witness statement and by Hitachi’s statements – by the Japanese producers of the notification of the results of the allocation of certain GIS projects in the EEA and the monitoring of their loading into the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ Agreement is not consistent with the mere parallel conduct of competitors with no meeting of minds.
233. Furthermore, the object of the common understanding was to determine the conduct of the Japanese undertakings in relation to the EEA market, since those undertakings committed themselves not to enter that market. Thus, that understanding effectively amounted to reserving the EEA market for European producers.
234. Consequently, the Commission was right to find that the common understanding constituted an agreement between undertakings within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
235. Accordingly, it is not necessary to examine whether the common understanding constituted a concerted practice within the meaning of those provisions.
236. In the light of all the foregoing, the second plea must be dismissed.
The thirteenth plea, alleging that the Commission erred in determining the duration of the cartel
– Arguments of the parties
237. The applicant maintains, first, that following Siemens’s departure from the cartel in September 1999, the small group comprising the other undertakings developed into a loose discussion forum with no anti‑competitive object or effect with respect to the European Union.
238. Second, Siemens’s return to the cartel in 2002 did not lead to arrangements that had the object or effect of restricting competition in Europe, since Hitachi rejected Alstom’s proposal that the European and Japanese markets should be reserved, respectively, for European and Japanese producers.
239. Consequently, the applicant considers that it was wrong for it to be fined for the period from 1 September 1999 to 11 May 2004 or, at least, from 10 July 2002 to 11 May 2004.
240. The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.
– Findings of the Court
241. According to the case‑law, when there is a dispute concerning the existence of an infringement, the requirement of legal certainty, on which economic operators are entitled to rely, means that the Commission, which bears the burden of proving infringements which it finds, must adduce evidence which will sufficiently establish the existence of the facts constituting the infringement. With specific regard to the alleged duration of an infringement, the same principle of legal certainty requires that, if there is no evidence directly establishing the duration of an infringement, the Commission should adduce at least evidence of facts sufficiently proximate in time for it to be reasonable to accept that that infringement continued uninterruptedly between two specific dates (Case T‑43/92 Dunlop Slazenger
v Commission
[1994] ECR II‑441, paragraph 79; Case T‑62/98 Volkswagen
v Commission [2000] ECR II‑2707, paragraph 188; and Case T‑279/02 Degussa
v Commission
[2006] ECR II‑897, paragraphs 114 and 153).
242. In addition, the fact that the evidence of the existence of a continuous infringement was not adduced for certain specific periods does not preclude the infringement from being regarded as having been established during a more extensive overall period than those periods, provided that such a finding is based on objective and consistent indicia. In the context of an infringement extending over a number of years, the fact that a cartel reveals itself at different periods, which may be separated by more or less lengthy intervals, has no impact on the existence of that cartel, provided that the various actions which form part of the infringement pursue a single aim and come within the framework of a single and continuous infringement (Case C‑113/04 P Technische Unie
v Commission
[2006] ECR I‑8831, paragraph 169).
243. In the present case, it should be noted, at the outset, that, in so far as the commitment of the Japanese undertakings under the common understanding did not consist in a positive action, but in a failure to act, it is inherently difficult to prove that that understanding was respected continuously.
244. None the less, first, it is apparent from Mr M’s witness statement that, until the end of his involvement in the cartel in June 2002, both the GQ Agreement and the common understanding continued to be implemented together with the Japanese undertakings other than Hitachi, in spite of the fact that the latter’s absence and that of Siemens made its operation less effective. The other witness statements of ABB’s employees confirm that the common understanding continued between July 2002 and May 2004. The content of the witness statements concerned is also reflected in ABB’s statements.
245. Second, in its reply to the statement of objections, Fuji confirms that the Japanese undertakings participated in the infringement, including in the common understanding, until September 2000, the point at which it claims to have left the cartel.
246. Third, it has been concluded in paragraph 144 above that, at the meeting of 10 July 2002, Alstom proposed to extend the common understanding to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. That implies that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the understanding existed both at the time of the meeting and for a certain amount of time prior to and after the meeting.
247. Fourth, the continuous absence of the Japanese producers from the European GIS market during the period concerned also suggests that the common understanding continued to be implemented.
248. Fifth, in so far as, first, the applicant does not expressly criticise the fact that the Commission concluded that there was a single infringement encompassing inter alia the common understanding and the GQ Agreement and, second, the examination of pleas one to four has not led the Court to find that the Commission erred in that regard, it must be found that evidence of the continuous functioning of the GQ Agreement constitutes a relevant indication that the common understanding was also implemented during that period. Given the single nature of the infringement, it is plausible that the disappearance of the common understanding would have compromised the functioning of the GQ Agreement.
249. Indeed, the applicant does not dispute the findings in recitals 191 to 198 of the contested decision relating to the exchange of a series of faxes concerning the allocation of projects under the GQ Agreement in December 2000 and January 2001, to meetings of the GQ Agreement which were to be held in 2000 and 2001, and to agreements relating to certain GIS projects concluded in 1998 and 1999 and operative until October 2001.
250. Similarly, the applicant does not raise any arguments specifically calling into question the Commission’s findings in recitals 199 to 216 of the contested decision concerning the renewed participation of Hitachi, Siemens and VA TECH in the cartel and the continuation of the cartel from July 2002 to 2004.
251. In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s argument that, during the period concerned, the meetings on the GQ Agreement became a discussion forum without any anti‑competitive object or effect cannot be upheld. That is all the more true given that that argument is not corroborated by any evidence other than Toshiba’s unsubstantiated statements.
252. Therefore, it must be found that the evidence relied on by the Commission in respect of the implementation of the common understanding and the GQ Agreement between September 1999 and March 2004 relates to facts sufficiently proximate in time, which means that evidence of a continuous infringement was adduced in relation to the period concerned.
253. Consequently, the thirteenth plea must be dismissed.
254. Since none of the pleas raised in support of the main claim can succeed, that claim must be rejected.
2. The claim in the alternative, seeking the annulment of Article 2(g) of the contested decision and Article 2(h) thereof, to the extent to which it concerns the applicant
255. It is first necessary to address the fifth plea, alleging that the Commission infringed the principles of equal treatment and proportionality in calculating the starting amount of the fine imposed on the applicant on the basis of its 2001 turnover.
Arguments of the parties
256. The applicant maintains that, by calculating the starting amount of the fines of the Japanese producers on the basis of their worldwide sales of GIS for 2001, while using 2003 as the reference year for the European producers, the Commission infringed the principles of equal treatment and proportionality.
257. First, the Commission did not provide any objective justification for the unequal treatment of the Japanese producers. According to the applicant, the fact that it chose, as part of a legitimate commercial strategy, to carry on its GIS business through TM T & D, is irrelevant in that regard, since the market fluctuations that occurred as from 2003 would have affected its situation, even if its choice had been different. In this case, the Commission should have used, as a starting amount, a part of TM T & D’s turnover corresponding to the portion of its capital held by the applicant. In addition, that same methodology was applied to Schneider regarding its participation in a joint venture with VA TECH.
258. Second, according to the applicant, the result of the Commission’s approach was that the starting amount applied to it was calculated on the basis of a year during which the market situation was substantially different from that in the year used for the European undertakings, thereby overstating the extent of its participation in the infringement. The applicant submits, in that regard, that between 2001 and 2003, both the European and Japanese GIS markets in general and its turnover in that area suffered a substantial decline.
259. The Commission points out that it has discretion regarding the choice of factors to be taken into account in determining the amount of fines, which in turn influences the intensity of judicial review in that area. It infers that arguments based on general principles of law can only temper that discretion where it has been exercised in flagrant disregard of the facts of the case.
260. The Commission adds that where, as in this case, the infringement is found to be very serious, it is entitled to apply differential treatment in order to reflect the effective capacity of the undertakings concerned to cause significant damage to competition and to ensure proper deterrence.
261. In this case, the starting amount allocated to the applicant was determined on the basis of the abovementioned factors. 2001 was chosen because it was the last year before the transfer of the applicant’s GIS business to TM T & D. That difference of treatment is justified, according to the Commission, by the fact that for most of the duration of the cartel the applicant participated as an individual undertaking, which means that the 2003 sales do not faithfully reflect the applicant’s actual capacity to cause damage to competition.
262. Furthermore, according to the Commission, the mere fact that 2001 was a better year than 2003 for the applicant is not sufficient to argue that the starting amount is disproportionate.
263. Finally, the Commission emphasises that it did not set a separate starting amount for TM T & D so that the applicant did not have to bear an undue burden.
Findings of the Court
264. The Court notes, at the outset, that the Commission has a margin of discretion when fixing the amount of fines, in order that it may direct the conduct of undertakings towards compliance with the competition rules (see Joined Cases T‑236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T‑246/01, T‑251/01 and T-252/01 Tokai Carbon and Others
v Commission
[2004] ECR II‑1181, paragraph 216, and the case‑law cited).
265. The amount of the fine is set by the Commission according to the gravity of the infringement and, where appropriate, to its duration. The gravity of an infringement has to be determined by reference to criteria such as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of the fines. Objective factors such as the content and duration of the anti-competitive conduct, the number of incidents and their intensity, the extent of the market affected and the damage to the economic public order must be taken into account. The analysis must also take into consideration the relative importance and market share of the undertakings responsible and also any repeated infringements ( Aalborg Portland and Others
v Commission, paragraph 39 above, paragraphs 89 to 91).
266. However, each time the Commission decides to impose fines pursuant to competition law, it must observe general principles of law, which include the principle of equal treatment as interpreted by the Community Courts (Case T‑59/02 Archer Daniels Midland
v Commission
[2006] ECR II‑3627, paragraph 315).
267. According to settled case‑law, the principle of equal treatment or non‑discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see Case T‑311/94 BPB de Eendracht
v Commission
[1998] ECR II‑1129, paragraph 309, and the case‑law cited).
268. To the extent to which reliance is to be placed on the turnover of undertakings involved in the same infringement for the purpose of determining the proportions between the fines to be imposed, the period to be taken into consideration must be ascertained in such a way that the resulting turnovers are as comparable as possible (Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion française and Others
v Commission
[1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 122).
269. The principle of proportionality, for its part, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (Case C‑331/88 Fedesa and Others
[1990] ECR I‑4023, paragraph 13, and Case C‑180/96 United Kingdom
v Commission
[1998] ECR I‑2265, paragraph 96).
270. In the present case, it is apparent from recitals 480 to 490 of the contested decision that, when calculating the starting amounts, the Commission decided, in accordance with section 1 A of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines, to apply differential treatment to the cartel participants on the basis of their capacity to harm competition. To that end, it placed the various undertakings into five groups in accordance with the size of their worldwide turnovers obtained from GIS sales. In that regard, the Commission considered that the turnovers relating solely to the EEA market did not constitute a reliable criterion for assessment in so far the common understanding aimed to ensure that the Japanese producers did not enter that market.
271. In so far as concerns the reference year, it is apparent from recitals 481, 482 and 484 of the contested decision that, when determining the value of worldwide sales, the Commission used the figures for 2001 for the applicant, Fuji, Hitachi and Toshiba, while it used 2003, that is the last full year of infringement, as the reference year for the European producers. Similarly, the calculation of the starting amount of the fines for the applicant, Fuji, Hitachi and Toshiba for the period of their participation in the cartel as individual undertakings was made on the basis of their turnovers for 2001, whereas the calculation of the starting amount of the fines of the European producers was made on the basis of their turnovers for 2003.
272. Therefore, the Commission did not treat the Japanese producers, including the applicant, and the European producers equally in terms of its choice of reference year. Consequently, in accordance with the case‑law cited in paragraph 267 above, it needs to be assessed whether there was an objective justification for that difference in treatment.
273. In that regard, in recital 482 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the use of 2001 as the reference year for the applicant was justified by the fact that, for the most part of the period of infringement, the applicant participated in the cartel as an individual undertaking, and not through the joint venture TM T & D which took over the applicant’s and Toshiba’s GIS activities in 2002.
274. At the hearing, the Commission stated that its objective was to take account of the uneven competitive position of the two shareholders of TM T & D at the time the latter was created, due to the fact that the applicant held a considerably larger share of the worldwide GIS market than Toshiba. According to the Commission, by referring to the last full year of the applicant’s and Toshiba’s participation in the cartel as individual undertakings, that is to say 2001, it was able to reflect that disparity when calculating the fines, which would not have been possible with the method consisting in dividing TM T & D’s turnover for 2003 between the two shareholders in accordance with their respective shareholdings in the joint venture.
275. The objective referred to by the Commission is legitimate since it makes it possible to compare the capacity of the shareholders of a joint venture to harm competition during the period prior to the creation of the joint venture. In addition, it is apparent from recital 489 of the contested decision that the same objective was pursued in the case of Schneider, yet the lack of relevant turnover figures for that undertaking for 2001 or 2003 led the Commission to take Schneider’s shareholding in the share capital of the joint venture as the starting amount for its fine. By contrast, relevant turnover figures are available for both 2001 and 2003 in respect of the applicant.
276. However, it is evident that the Commission could have used other methods to achieve its objective without treating the Japanese producers and the European producers unequally in its choice of reference year. By way of example, when determining the fines for the applicant and Toshiba for the period prior to the creation of TM T & D, the Commission could have taken the starting amount of TM T & D’s fine, calculated on the basis of its turnover for 2003 and divided it between the applicant and Toshiba in accordance with the proportion of GIS sales made by them during the year prior to the creation of the joint venture, namely 2001.
277. Consequently, it must be found that, in the present case, the Commission’s wish, in calculating the fines, to faithfully reproduce the relative positions of the applicant and Toshiba does not justify the unequal treatment of the applicant.
278. In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that, in choosing 2001 as the reference year for the determination of the value of the worldwide sales of the Japanese producers and for the calculation of the fine imposed on the applicant for its individual participation in the cartel, the Commission infringed the principle of equal treatment.
279. That infringement directly invalidates the calculation of the fine imposed on the applicant in Article 2(g) of the contested decision for its participation in the cartel as an individual undertaking. Indirectly, through the determination of the value of worldwide sales and market shares, it affects the calculation of the fine imposed on the applicant in Article 2(h) of the contested decision, relating to the period of TM T & D’s existence.
280. Therefore, the fifth plea must be upheld and consequently, Article 2 (g) and (h) of the contested decision must be annulled.
281. In addition, there is no need to examine pleas six to twelve raised by the applicant. Even if those pleas were upheld, the contested decision could not be annulled to any further extent than in the preceding paragraph.
282. Finally, given that the applicant’s claim in the alternative has been upheld, it is no longer necessary to give judgment on either its claim in the further alternative or on its application for measures of organisation of procedure.
Costs
283. Under Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, the Court may order that the costs be shared or that each party bear its own costs.
284. In so far as the application seeking annulment of Article 1 of the contested decision has been rejected, the applicant has been unsuccessful in a significant part of its pleadings, even though it has been successful in respect of a part of them.
285. Accordingly, the applicant must be ordered to bear three quarters of the costs incurred by the parties before the Court and the Commission ordered to bear a quarter of those costs.
Operative part
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
hereby:
1. Annuls Article 2(g) and (h) of Commission Decision C (2006) 6762 final of 24 January 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas insulated switchgear) in so far as it concerns Mitsubishi Electric Corp;
2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;
3. Orders Mitsubishi Electric to bear three quarters of the costs incurred by the parties before the Court;
4. Orders the European Commission to bear a quarter of the costs incurred by the parties before the Court.