Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
SZPUNAR
delivered on 12 February 2026 (1)
Case C‑14/25
Thüringer Aufbaubank
v
LN
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims – Refusal of enforcement – Exclusion of review as to the substance – Authentic instruments – Enforceable notarial instrument drawn up before the entry into force of a regulation )
I.      Introduction
1.        Prior to the adoption, in 2012, of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (2), which abolished the intermediate exequatur procedure in the general area of civil and commercial matters, the free circulation of judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments between Member States was achieved in that area in several stages.
2.        Following the simplification of exequatur formalities in the common system, (3) the complete exemption from such formalities resulted in the establishment of mechanisms for free circulation in specific areas, laid down in particular by Regulation (EC) No 805/2004. (4)
3.        Under that regulation, where a national order on an uncontested claim is certified in the Member State of origin as a European Enforcement Order (‘EEO’), it is to be treated, for enforcement purposes, as a national enforceable instrument in the other Member States and cannot be subject to review in the Member State of enforcement. In that regard, it should be noted that Regulation No 805/2004 is exceptional in that it does not contain a public policy clause. (5)
4.        What, however, is the situation where Regulation No 805/2004 has been applied incorrectly in the Member State of origin? It is for the Court, in the present case, to clarify the power of review of the Member State of enforcement in such a situation, under that regulation, by answering the question whether the Member State of enforcement may refuse enforcement where the certification as an EEO was carried out in breach of the temporal scope of that regulation.
5.        At the outset, I note that, in the present case, it might be tempting to analyse, in addition to the question of the consequences of infringement, in the Member State of origin, of the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004, other scenarios involving the infringement of higher-ranking rules, in particular the infringement of fundamental rights. In so far as that regulation does not contain a public policy clause, such a situation would certainly require an in-depth analysis in the light of the division of powers between the Member State of origin and the Member State in which enforcement is sought as regards the enforcement of an EEO issued in breach of such higher-raking rules. Nevertheless, the question referred for a preliminary ruling in the present case is clearly circumscribed. The Court is therefore called upon to answer only the question of whether Regulation No 805/2004 allows the Member State of enforcement to review compliance with the temporal scope of that regulation. My analysis will therefore be limited to that aspect, without prejudice to the answer to be given in the case of such an infringement.
II.    Legal framework
A.      European Union law
6.        Recitals 7 to 10 and 18 of Regulation No 805/2004 state:
‘(7)      This Regulation should apply to judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments on uncontested claims and to decisions delivered following challenges to judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments certified as [EEOs].
(8)      In its Tampere [Finland] conclusions, the European Council considered that access to enforcement in a Member State other than that in which the judgment has been given should be accelerated and simplified by dispensing with any intermediate measures to be taken prior to enforcement in the Member State in which enforcement is sought. A judgment that has been certified as [an EEO] by the court of origin should, for enforcement purposes, be treated as if it had been delivered in the Member State in which enforcement is sought. In the United Kingdom, for example, the registration of a certified foreign judgment will therefore follow the same rules as the registration of a judgment from another part of the United Kingdom and is not to imply a review as to the substance of the foreign judgment. Arrangements for the enforcement of judgments should continue to be governed by national law.
(9)      Such a procedure should offer significant advantages as compared with the exequatur procedure provided for in [the Brussels
I Regulation], in that there is no need for approval by the judiciary in a second Member State with the delays and expenses that this entails.
(10)      Where a court in a Member State has given judgment on an uncontested claim in the absence of participation of the debtor in the proceedings, the abolition of any checks in the Member State of enforcement is inextricably linked to and dependent upon the existence of a sufficient guarantee of observance of the rights of the defence.
…
(18)      Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Member States justifies the assessment by the court of one Member State that all conditions for certification as [an EEO] are fulfilled to enable a judgment to be enforced in all other Member States without judicial review of the proper application of the minimum procedural standards in the Member State where the judgment is to be enforced.’
7.        Article 1 of that regulation, entitled ‘Subject matter’, provides:
‘The purpose of this Regulation is to create [an EEO] for uncontested claims to permit, by laying down minimum standards, the free circulation of judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments throughout all Member States without any intermediate proceedings needing to be brought in the Member State of enforcement prior to recognition and enforcement.’
8.        Article 2(1) of that regulation provides:
‘This Regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters or to the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority (“acta jure imperii”).’
9.        Article 3 of that regulation, entitled ‘Enforcement titles to be certified as a European Enforcement Order’, provides, in paragraph 1:
‘This Regulation shall apply to judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments on uncontested claims.
A claim shall be regarded as uncontested if:
…
(d)      the debtor has expressly agreed to it in an authentic instrument.’
10.      Article 4 of Regulation No 805/2004 defines the concept of ‘claim’ as ‘a claim for payment of a specific sum of money that has fallen due or for which the due date is indicated in the judgment, court settlement or authentic instrument’.
11.      Article 5 of that regulation, entitled ‘Abolition of exequatur’, provides:
‘A judgment which has been certified as [an EEO] in the Member State of origin shall be recognised and enforced in the other Member States without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition.’
12.      Article 10 of that regulation, entitled ‘Rectification or withdrawal of the European Enforcement Order certificate’, is worded as follows:
‘1.      The [EEO] certificate shall, upon application to the court of origin, be
(a)      rectified where, due to a material error, there is a discrepancy between the judgment and the certificate;
(b)      withdrawn where it was clearly wrongly granted, having regard to the requirements laid down in this Regulation.
2.      The law of the Member State of origin shall apply to the rectification or withdrawal of the [EEO] certificate.
3.      An application for the rectification or withdrawal of [an EEO] certificate may be made using the standard form in Annex VI.
4.      No appeal shall lie against the issuing of [an EEO] certificate.’
13.      Article 20 of that regulation, entitled ‘Enforcement procedure’, provides, in paragraph 1:
‘1.      Without prejudice to the provisions of this Chapter, the enforcement procedures shall be governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement.
A judgment certified as [an EEO] shall be enforced under the same conditions as a judgment handed down in the Member State of enforcement.’
14.      Article 21 of Regulation No 805/2004, entitled ‘Refusal of enforcement’, provides:
‘1.      Enforcement shall, upon application by the debtor, be refused by the competent court in the Member State of enforcement if the judgment certified as [an EEO] is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in any Member State or in a third country, provided that:
(a)      the earlier judgment involved the same cause of action and was between the same parties; and
(b)      the earlier judgment was given in the Member State of enforcement or fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State of enforcement; and
(c)      the irreconcilability was not and could not have been raised as an objection in the court proceedings in the Member State of origin.
2.      Under no circumstances may the judgment or its certification as [an EEO] be reviewed as to their substance in the Member State of enforcement.’
15.      Article 23 of that regulation, entitled ‘Stay or limitation of enforcement’, provides:
‘Where the debtor has
–        challenged a judgment certified as [an EEO], including an application for review within the meaning of Article 19, or
–        applied for the rectification or withdrawal of [an EEO] certificate in accordance with Article 10,
the competent court or authority in the Member State of enforcement may, upon application by the debtor:
(a)      limit the enforcement proceedings to protective measures; or
(b)      make enforcement conditional on the provision of such security as it shall determine; or
(c)      under exceptional circumstances, stay the enforcement proceedings.’
16.      In accordance with Article 25 of that regulation, entitled ‘Authentic instruments’:
‘1.      An authentic instrument concerning a claim within the meaning of Article 4(2) which is enforceable in one Member State shall, upon application to the authority designated by the Member State of origin, be certified as [an EEO], using the standard form in Annex III.
2.      An authentic instrument which has been certified as [an EEO] in the Member State of origin shall be enforced in the other Member States without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its enforceability.
3.      The provisions of Chapter
II, with the exception of Articles 5, 6(1) and 9(1), and of Chapter
IV, with the exception of Articles 21(1) and 22, shall apply as appropriate.’
17.      Article 26 of that regulation, entitled ‘Transitional provision’, provides:
‘This Regulation shall apply only to judgments given, to court settlements approved or concluded and to documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments after the entry into force of this Regulation.’
18.      Under Article 33 of Regulation No 805/2004, entitled ‘Entry into force’:
‘This Regulation shall enter into force on 21 January 2005.
It shall apply from 21 October 2005, with the exception of Articles 30, 31 and 32, which shall apply from 21 January 2005.’
B.      Austrian law
19.      Paragraph 54b of the Exekutionsordnung (Austrian Enforcement Procedures Code) provides that the enforcement of certain pecuniary claims is authorised by simplified procedure where the applicant relies on an Austrian enforceable title or a foreign enforceable title that is treated as equivalent to an Austrian enforceable title, in particular by virtue of an act of EU law, or a foreign enforceable title which has been the subject of an exequatur procedure.
20.      Paragraph 54c of that code provides that the obligated party is entitled to object to the authorisation of enforcement issued under the simplified authorisation procedure on the ground that an enforceable title covering the enforcement authorised, together with certification of enforceability, is lacking or that the enforceable title does not correspond to the information relating to that title contained in the application for enforcement.
III. The dispute in the main proceedings, the question referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court
21.      On 14 February 2022, Thüringer Aufbaubank, a company established in Erfurt (Germany), brought an action before the Bezirksgericht Judenburg (District Court, Judenburg, Austria) seeking enforcement against LN, a natural person, of an enforceable partial debt of EUR 25 000, plus interest, on the basis of a notarial instrument drawn up in Germany on 28 May 1999 concerning the creation of a land charge (Grundschuldbestellung). That instrument, which concerned a total amount of 6 488 600 German marks (DEM) (approximately EUR 3 317 568), became enforceable on 1 June 1999.
22.      In support of its application, Thüringer Aufbaubank produced the notarial instrument in question and the EEO certificate issued on 19 January 2021 by the competent German authorities using the standard form in Annex III to Regulation No 805/2004.
23.      On 24 March 2022, LN lodged an objection to the authorisation of enforcement. (6)
24.      By judgment of the same date, the Bezirksgericht Judenburg (District Court, Judenburg) dismissed the objection and allowed the application for enforcement under the simplified procedure provided for in Paragraph 54b of the Austrian Enforcement Code, which was held to be applicable.
25.      Hearing an appeal by LN, the Landesgericht Leoben (Regional Court, Leoben, Austria) varied that decision and ordered the suspension of enforcement and the annulment of the enforcement measures already taken. That court considered that the notarial instrument of 28 May 1999 did not fall within the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004, since that regulation applied only to enforceable titles which arose after 21 January 2005. The recognition and enforcement in Austria of that notarial instrument drawn up in Germany is therefore governed not by that regulation but by the Convention on jurisdiction of judgments and enforcement in civil and commercial matters, signed in Brussels on 27 September 1968, (7) which requires a prior exequatur procedure. In the present case, however, that German notarial instrument has not been the subject of an exequatur procedure in Austria.
26.      The Landesgericht Leoben (Regional Court, Leoben) considered that the issuing of an EEO certificate by the competent German authorities cannot alter that conclusion, since it was possible to verify the manifest non-compliance of that certificate with the scope of Regulation No 805/2004 in the Member State of enforcement.
27.      Thüringer Aufbaubank brought an appeal on a point of law against that judgment before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria), the referring court.
28.      That court considers that, in order to rule on that appeal, it must determine, in essence, whether compliance with the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004 may be reviewed in the Member State of enforcement, with the result that the latter is not bound by the certification as an EEO in the Member State of origin.
29.      In that regard, that court observes that it follows from the general scheme of Regulation No 805/2004 that the requirements for certification as an EEO may be examined exclusively in the Member State of origin, without that creating a lack of legal protection for the debtor, since any errors in the issue of the certificate may be challenged in that State by means of the remedies provided for in accordance with Article 10 of that regulation.
30.      The referring court refers, however, to a line of legal literature according to which the non-reviewability of the EEO certificate in the Member State of enforcement is too restrictive and it should be possible to challenge or raise ex officio in that Member State a manifest failure to comply with the material or temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004.
31.      As regards the notarial instrument of 28 May 1999, the referring court considers that it does not fall within the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004, which concerns, as is apparent from Article 26 thereof, enforceable titles issued after the entry into force of that regulation, namely 21 January 2005.
32.      It was in those circumstances that the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
‘Is Article 21(2) [of Regulation No 805/2004] read together with Article 25 [thereof] to be interpreted as meaning that certification of an enforceable authentic instrument (in this case, an enforceable notarial instrument drawn up by a German notary) as [an EEO], issued by the competent authority in the Member State of origin using the standard form in Annex III to that regulation, may not be reviewed in the Member State of enforcement even where – having regard to the date on which the authentic instrument was drawn up – the temporal scope of that regulation has manifestly not been respected?’
33.      Written observations were submitted by the European Commission. Thüringer Aufbaubank, the German Government and the Commission participated in the hearing held on 12 November 2025.
IV.    Analysis
34.      By its single question referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 21(2) of Regulation No 805/2004, read together with Article 25 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that certification as an EEO of an enforceable authentic instrument, issued by the competent authority in the Member State of origin using the standard form in Annex III to that regulation, may not be reviewed in the Member State of enforcement where, having regard to the date on which the authentic instrument was drawn up, the temporal scope of that regulation has manifestly not been respected. (8)
35.      Both in their written observations and at the hearing, the parties presented radically opposing arguments.
36.      On the one hand, the Commission and Thüringer Aufbaubank consider that Article 21(2) of Regulation No 805/2004, read together with Article 25 thereof, must be interpreted as prohibiting any review as to the substance in the Member State of enforcement, without exception, with the result that verification of compliance with the temporal scope of that regulation and, therefore, of the validity of the certification of the authentic instrument as an EEO is excluded.
37.      On the other hand, the German Government argues that Regulation No 805/2004 does not apply to the entirety of the situation at issue in the main proceedings, since the date on which the authentic instrument at issue was drawn up predates that of the entry into force of that regulation. The answer to the question whether the Member State of enforcement may review the certification of that authentic instrument as an EEO cannot therefore come from the provisions of that regulation, since none of them is applicable.
38.      In those circumstances, it seems to me necessary, in order to answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling, to begin my analysis by examining the applicability of Regulation No 805/2004 in the light, in particular, of its temporal scope (A), in order to draw conclusions regarding the powers of the Member State of enforcement relating to the review of an authentic instrument drawn up before the entry into force of that regulation but still certified as an EEO on the basis of the provisions of that regulation (B).
A.      Preliminary observations on the applicability of Regulation No 805/2004
39.      I consider it necessary to determine the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004, given the debate between the parties as to whether that regulation is applicable where the authentic instrument certified as an EEO was drawn up before its entry into force. This is all the more necessary since the courts of the Member States have adopted divergent approaches. (9)
40.      Under Article 26 thereof, Regulation No 805/2004 is to apply only to judgments given, to court settlements approved or concluded and to documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments after its entry into force, namely 21 January 2005. (10) However, as is apparent from the second paragraph of Article 33 thereof, the application of that regulation was postponed until 21 October 2005. Accordingly, certification as an EEO was possible only from that second date. (11)
41.      As the referring court rightly observes, it follows from that transitional regime that the decisive criterion for establishing whether an authentic instrument falls within the scope of Regulation No 805/2004 is not the date on which an EEO certificate is issued, but the date on which it is drawn up or registered. (12) The wording of Article 26 of that regulation is unequivocal in that regard.
42.      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the authentic instrument in question was drawn up in 1999: it therefore does not fall within the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004, as limited by Article 26 thereof.
43.      However, I believe that that conclusion needs to be qualified.
44.      In my view, the provisions of Article 26 of Regulation No 805/2004 which limit its temporal scope to documents drawn up after the date of its entry into force are particularly relevant for the authorities or courts of the Member State of origin. Those provisions make it possible to ensure that only authentic instruments and decisions falling within the scope of that regulation can be certified as EEOs and be subject to the regime laid down therein. The limitation of the temporal scope of that regulation is therefore, in my view, a precondition for the certification of an authentic instrument as an EEO.
45.      In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the date on which the authentic instrument in question was drawn up should therefore have meant that the authority of the Member State of origin could not certify that instrument as an EEO, since it clearly did not fall within the temporal scope of that regulation.
46.      In the present case, despite the date on which it was drawn up, the authentic instrument in question was certified as an EEO, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Regulation No 805/2004, using the standard form set out in Annex III thereto. In other words, the authority designated by the Member State of origin applied the provisions of that regulation, albeit erroneously. As a corollary, the creditor in the main proceedings now has an EEO on the basis of that regulation.
47.      As the Commission points out, the certification of an authentic instrument as an EEO presupposes that the authority which carried out that certification considered that Regulation No 805/2004 was applicable and that that instrument should be subject to the rules laid down by the provisions of that regulation. That authority has therefore assessed the applicability of that regulation, even if that assessment proves to be incorrect.
48.      According to the German Government, since the authentic instrument certified as an EEO was drawn up before the date of entry into force of Regulation No 805/2004, no provision of that regulation applies.
49.      However, for the reasons I have set out, I am of the view that the certification of an authentic instrument as an EEO by a competent authority or a court of a Member State implies that the mechanism established by Regulation No 805/2004 with a view to its free circulation is applicable.
50.      That is all the more so since any other interpretation would undermine the effectiveness of the mechanism established by Regulation No 805/2004, which seeks the free circulation of judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments relating to uncontested claims. (13) This would lead to the courts or competent authorities of the Member State of enforcement systematically verifying whether the authentic instrument or judgment in question and its certification as an EEO fall within the temporal scope of that regulation, even where, unlike in the present case, it is not obvious that that regulation has been infringed. For the reasons which I shall set out below, I am of the opinion that review of the temporal scope falls within the scope of the prohibition in the Member State of enforcement of any review as to the substance of the judgment or authentic instrument and its certification as an EEO. It is therefore not possible to envisage permitting the Member State of enforcement to systematically verify, where it receives an application on the basis of an EEO, that the same regulation has been correctly applied in the Member State of origin.
B.      The scope of the prohibition in the Member State of enforcement of a review as to the substance of a judgment or authentic instrument and its certification as an EEO
51.      The prohibition of any review as to the substance in the Member State of enforcement of an authentic instrument and its certification as an EEO follows from Article 21(2) of Regulation No 805/2004 read together with Article 25 thereof.
52.      In order to determine whether such a prohibition extends to review of the temporal scope, the relevant provisions must be interpreted taking into account not only their wording, but also the context in which they are set and the objectives pursued by the measure of which they form part. (14)
1.      Literal interpretation
53.      As regards the wording of Article 21(2) of Regulation No 805/2004, it is apparent from several language versions of that provision that it expressly provides that ‘under no circumstances’ may a review as to the substance take place. (15) It should be pointed out that, although that clarification does not appear in the German language version, it was already included – at least in the English language version – in the Commission’s initial proposal. (16) What is more, that clarification corresponds to the usual wording of the prohibition on review as to substance, as established in the field of cooperation in civil matters since the Brussels Convention. (17)
54.      Similarly, I note that, in the field of cooperation in civil matters, the prohibition of a review as to the substance prevents the court of the Member State of enforcement from reviewing the accuracy of the findings of law or fact made by the court of the Member State of origin. (18)
55.      As regards, more specifically, Regulation No 805/2004, the Court has held that no objection to the judgment given in the Member State of origin or to its certification as an EEO may be submitted to those courts or authorities for their assessment. (19) Unlike other provisions of secondary law prohibiting review as to the substance in the field of cooperation in civil matters of the European Union, Article 21(2) of that regulation provides for that prohibition not only with regard to the judgment (or the court settlement or authentic instrument, depending on the particular case), but also with regard to its certification as an EEO.
56.      In other words, the prohibition of any review as to the substance also applies to the analysis that led the competent authority to certify the authentic instrument in question as an EEO. The point at which a judgment is to be regarded as having been given and an authentic instrument drawn up or registered, within the meaning of Article 26 of Regulation No 805/2004, must be determined by the competent authority in the Member State of origin, in accordance with its national law. Thus, the question of whether an instrument falls within the temporal scope of that regulation is precisely a matter of legal classification by the court or competent authority of the Member State of origin which cannot be reviewed in the Member State of enforcement.
57.      It follows, in my view, that the examination of the temporal scope by the competent authority or court of a Member State falls within the scope of the prohibition on reviewing the certification as an EEO as to its substance.
58.      That conclusion is supported, in my view, by the systemic and teleological interpretation of those provisions.
2.      Systemic interpretation
59.      As regards the context of Article 21(2) of Regulation No 805/2004, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s case-law, the abolition of exequatur, provided for in Article 5 of that regulation, is based on a clear division of jurisdiction between the courts and authorities of the Member State of origin and those of the Member State of enforcement. (20)
60.      In so doing, the EU legislature has, by limiting the powers of the Member State of enforcement as regards the possibility of reviewing the judgment or authentic instrument certified as an EEO, provided for as a corollary, in the Member State of origin, mechanisms to enable the debtor to challenge that certification.
61.      As the Commission points out, Article 10(1) of Regulation No 805/2004 provides that the EEO certificate must, upon application to the court of origin, be rectified or withdrawn, depending on the case. Moreover, Article 25(3) of that regulation provides that that procedure is to apply mutatis mutandis to the certification of authentic instruments as an EEO.
62.      In particular, I note that Article 10(1) of Regulation No 805/2004 expressly provides that the certificate may be withdrawn in the Member State of origin where it was wrongly granted, having regard to the requirements laid down in that regulation. First, there is no limitation in that regulation on the grounds for concluding that the certificate has been wrongly granted. Second, as I have pointed out, the analysis of the temporal scope falls within the conditions which the competent authority or the competent court must examine when issuing the certification as an EEO. In those circumstances, I am of the opinion that failure to comply with the temporal scope of that regulation is one of the grounds for finding that certification as an EEO has been wrongly granted.
63.      In other words, only the courts or competent authorities of the Member State of origin may review the certification decision in order to decide whether, for any reason, the certificate must be withdrawn.
64.      In that regard, I would point out that Article 10(1) of Regulation No 805/2004 is the only means available to a debtor to claim that an authentic instrument or judgment has been wrongly certified as an EEO. As is apparent from recital 10 of that regulation, the abolition of any checks in the Member State of enforcement is inextricably linked to and dependent upon the existence of a sufficient guarantee of observance of the rights of the defence. In those circumstances, the concept of being ‘wrongly granted’, enabling the court of the Member State of origin to withdraw certification, must, in my view, be interpreted flexibly.
65.      That possibility of withdrawal is supplemented by another mechanism in the Member State of enforcement which aims to ensure that, where the withdrawal of the certificate has been requested, the debtor may request the limitation or stay of enforcement, in accordance with Article 23 of Regulation No 805/2004.
66.      In that regard, the possibility for the debtor to obtain a stay of the enforcement proceedings is subject to restrictive conditions. It is, first, linked to the debtor bringing legal proceedings in the Member State of origin concerning either the judgment or authentic instrument which is the subject of certification, or the withdrawal or rectification of the EEO. Second, it presupposes the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’, it being understood that that condition must be interpreted strictly, according to the case-law. (21) In that regard, I would point out, however, that a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which it is clear, for the court of the Member State of enforcement, that the scope of Regulation No 805/2004 has not been complied with, should be able to fall within the concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’ and benefit from a certain relaxation of the Court’s restrictive case-law relating to that concept.
67.      As the Commission submits, the study of those provisions shows that, in adopting Regulation No 805/2004, the EU legislature took account of the fact that the certification may have been issued incorrectly and chose to remedy that by providing for the possibility, for the applicant, to request the withdrawal of the certificate in the Member State of origin and, at the same time, to request a stay of enforcement in the Member State of enforcement.
68.      Thus, in my view, it is clear from the general scheme of Regulation No 805/2004 that the assessment of the temporal scope of that regulation can be reviewed only in the Member State of origin, according to the options available to the debtor to claim that the certificate was wrongly granted. Consequently, and in view of the strict division of powers established by that provision, the general scheme of that regulation does not allow for such a review in the Member State of enforcement.
3.      Teleological interpretation
69.      With regard to the objective of Regulation No 805/2004, I would point out that the background to that regulation is the programme adopted in 2000 by the Council following the meeting in Tampere to implement the principle of mutual recognition, in particular by dispensing with intermediate measures preceding enforcement in the Member State in which it is sought. (22) The aim was to confer a tangible advantage on creditors by enabling them to obtain rapid and efficient enforcement abroad without the involvement of the judiciary in the Member State in which enforcement is required with the delays and expenses that this entails. (23)
70.      The purpose of Regulation No 805/2004 is thus to create an EEO for uncontested claims, by laying down minimum standards, to permit the free circulation of judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments throughout all Member States. (24) Where a national judgment has been certified as an EEO by the court of origin, it is treated, for enforcement purposes, as if it had been delivered in the Member State of enforcement, and therefore without the need for an exequatur procedure to establish its enforceability in that Member State. (25) The same applies to court settlements (26) and authentic instruments. (27)
71.      The Court has thus held that it is apparent from a combined reading of Articles 1 and 5 of Regulation No 805/2004, read in the light of recitals 8, 10, 11 and 18 thereof, that, with due regard for the mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Member States on which the division of jurisdiction between, on the one hand, the courts and authorities of the Member State of origin and, on the other, those of the Member State of enforcement is based, that regulation seeks to ensure the free circulation, inter alia, of judgments on uncontested claims, and to accelerate and simplify their enforcement, by abolishing the procedure for making those judgments enforceable, while ensuring the respect for the rights of the defence. (28)
72.      In my view, to allow a review of compliance with the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004 in the Member State of enforcement would therefore clearly run counter to that objective, in that it would lead to the reintroduction of a systematic review, in that Member State, of the certification as an EEO carried out in the Member State of origin, in addition to the procedures laid down by that regulation and notwithstanding the express prohibition of a review as to the substance contained therein.
73.      That is all the more so since the establishment of such a system of free circulation of judgments relating to uncontested claims is based on mutual trust between the Member States that EU law will be implemented. More specifically, as stated in recital 18 of Regulation No 805/2004, mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Member States justifies the assessment by the court of one Member State that all conditions for certification as an EEO are fulfilled to enable a judgment to be enforced in all other Member States.
74.      Moreover, as demonstrated by the absence of a public policy clause allowing the Member State of enforcement not to enforce the judgment, the court settlement or the authentic instrument certified as an EEO, that free circulation is, in my view, based on a particularly high level of mutual trust between the Member States.
75.      In other words, it is indeed the principle of mutual trust which justifies, on the one hand, the exclusive competence of the Member State of origin to rectify or withdraw an EEO and, on the other, that the court of the Member State of enforcement is required to consider an EEO certificate as valid and is prohibited from reviewing its lawfulness, even if, as a result of a manifest infringement of the temporal scope of Regulation No 805/2004, the certification should not have been issued.
76.      It follows from the foregoing that both the wording of Article 21(2) and Article 25 of Regulation No 805/2004 and the context of those provisions and the objectives pursued by the act of which they form part indicate that those provisions preclude the certification of an authentic instrument as an EEO from being subject to review in the Member State of enforcement where, having regard to the date on which the authentic instrument was drawn up, the temporal scope of that regulation has manifestly not been respected.
V.      Conclusion
77.      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice should answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria) as follows:
Article 21(2) of Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, read in conjunction with Article 25 thereof,
must be interpreted as meaning that
certification of an enforceable authentic instrument as an EEO, issued by the competent authority in the Member State of origin using the standard form in Annex III to that regulation, may not be reviewed in the Member State of enforcement where, having regard to the date on which the authentic instrument was drawn up, the temporal scope of that regulation has manifestly not been respected.
1      Original language: French.
2      Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1; ‘the Brussels Ia Regulation’).
3      Established in Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1; ‘the Brussels I Regulation’).
4      Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (OJ 2004 L 143, p. 15).
5      The only ground for refusal of a certified judgment, provided for in Article 21(1) of Regulation No 805/2004, is irreconcilability with an earlier judgment, which, moreover, does not apply to authentic instruments; see Article 25(3) of that regulation.
6      In accordance with Paragraph 54c(1) of the Austrian Enforcement Procedures Code.
7      OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36; ‘the Brussels Convention’.
8      In that regard, I would point out that, in the present case, pursuant to Article 33 thereof, Regulation No 805/2004 was in force at the time of certification of the authentic instrument at issue as an EEO. Compliance with that provision is therefore not at issue here. By contrast, Article 26 of that regulation provides that it is to apply only to authentic instruments drawn up or issued after the entry into force of that regulation. Thus, it is that provision, which seeks to impose a time limit for instruments which may be the subject of certification as an EEO, which is at issue here.
9      See, inter alia, Yessiou-Faltsi, P., ‘The European Enforcement Order after Five Years of Experience in Greece’, Revue Hellénique de Droit International, 2008, Vol. 61, pp. 735, 742 and 743 (Greek judgments certified as EEOs before 21 October 2005); tribunal d’arrondissement (Luxembourg) (civil), IIIe chambre (District Court, Luxembourg, civil matters, Third Chamber), jugement saisie-arrêt spéciale (special judgment for recovery of debt by attachment), No 37/2015, available at https://justice.public.lu/fr/jurisprudence/juridictions-judiciaires.html (EEO issued in France in 2012 on the basis of an interim order given in 2003); and Oberlandesgericht München (Higher Regional Court, Munich, Germany), order of 30 April 2007, 6 W 687/07, NJW-RR, 2007, pp. 1582 and 1583 (inapplicability of the regulation to an order on taxation of costs delivered on 2 March 2005).
10      Article 33 of Regulation No 805/2004.
11      See also Huet, A., ‘Titre exécutoire européen’, Répertoire de droit européen, Dalloz, August 2006, point 7.
12      See, by analogy, as regards the delimitation ratione temporis of the Brussels I and Brussels Ia Regulations, judgment of 6 June 2019, Weil (C‑361/18, EU:C:2019:473, paragraph 24).
13      Article 1 of Regulation No 805/2004.
14      Judgments of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey (C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraph 33), and of 27 November 2025, Manuel Costa Filhos (C‑643/24, EU:C:2025:923, paragraph 37).
15      See, inter alia, the Greek- (‘Σε καμία περίπτωση’), Spanish- (‘en ningún caso’), French- (‘en aucun cas’), Italian- (‘in nessun caso’), Dutch- (‘in geen geval’), Polish- (‘w żadnych okolicznościach’), Portuguese- (‘em caso algum’), Romanian- (‘în niciun caz’) and English- (‘under no circumstances’) language versions.
16      See Article 22(2) of the Proposal for a Council Regulation creating a European enforcement order for uncontested claims (COM(2002) 159 final), p. 3.
17      See, inter alia, Article 29 of the Brussels Convention and Article 52 of the Brussels Ia Regulation.
18      See, inter alia, judgments of 28 March 2000, Krombach (C‑7/98, EU:C:2000:164, paragraph 36), and, most recently, of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
19      Judgment of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey (C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraph 41).
20      Judgments of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey (C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraph 41), and of 27 November 2025, Manuel Costa Filhos (C‑643/24, EU:C:2025:923, paragraph 40).
21      See, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey (C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraphs 34 and 35).
22      See recital 8 of Regulation No 805/2004 and Council communication (2001/C 12/01), ‘Draft programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters’ (OJ 2001 C 12, pp. 1 and 5).
23      See recitals 8 and 9 of Regulation No 805/2004.
24      Article 1 of Regulation No 805/2004.
25      See Article 5 of Regulation No 805/2004.
26      Article 24(2) of Regulation No 805/2004.
27      Article 25(2) of Regulation No 805/2004.
28      Judgment of 27 November 2025, Manuel Costa Filhos (C‑643/24, EU:C:2025:923, paragraph 53). See, also, judgment of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey (C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraph 45).