ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)
21 January 2026 (*)
( Action for annulment – Taxation – Value added tax (VAT) rules for the digital age – VAT obligations in the short-term accommodation rental sector – Concept of ‘deemed supplier’ – Online platforms facilitating the supply of short-term accommodation rental services – Legislative act – Act of general application – Lack of direct concern – Lack of individual concern – Inadmissibility )
In Case T‑394/25,
Nomad Stays Co, established in Yenne (France), represented by A. de Moncuit de Boiscuillé and C. Worms, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by O. Segnana and S. Santoro, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),
composed of S.L. Kalėda, President, M. Jaeger (Rapporteur) and H. Kanninen, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
makes the following
Order
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Nomad Stays Co, seeks, first, the partial annulment of Article 3(1) of Council Directive (EU) 2025/516 of 11 March 2025 amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules for the digital age (OJ L, 2025/516; ‘the contested directive’), secondly, the annulment of Article 3(3)(a) of that directive and, thirdly, the partial annulment of Article 1(8) of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/518 of 11 March 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards information requirements for certain VAT schemes (OJ L, 2025/518; ‘the contested implementing regulation’).
Background to the dispute
2        The applicant operates a digital platform through which independent property owners offer short-term accommodation rental, inter alia, to users who work remotely using digital technologies, known as ‘digital nomads’. That platform enables users to search for, compare and book such accommodation across several Member States. In essence, the applicant acts as a facilitator of the transaction between the owner of the property rented out as short-term accommodation and the end-user of that accommodation, typically in return for a commission or fee.
3        The contested directive, which amends Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1; ‘the VAT Directive’), forms part of a set of legislative acts adopted by the Council of the European Union on 11 March 2025 and designed to adapt EU rules on value added tax (VAT) to the digital age. That legislative package also includes the contested implementing regulation and a regulation containing new rules on the VAT administrative cooperation arrangements.
4        The contested directive seeks, in essence, to require online platforms to pay VAT on short-term accommodation rental services and passenger transport services by road in most cases where individual service providers do not charge VAT. Furthermore, in order to adapt the VAT reporting obligations, it introduces amendments to reduce the need for multiple VAT registrations in the European Union.
5        In recitals 26 and 27 of the contested directive, it is stated that the platform economy has led to an unjustified distortion of competition between supplies performed through online platforms that escape VAT taxation and supplies performed in the traditional economy that are subject to VAT. It is also stated that the distortion has been most acute in the two largest sectors of the platform economy behind e-commerce, namely the short-term accommodation rental sector and the sector of passenger transport by road. In order to address that distortion of competition, it is proposed to change the role that platforms play in the collection of VAT, by becoming the ‘deemed supplier’, which is a legal fiction according to which platforms would be required to charge VAT where underlying suppliers do not charge VAT because they are, for example, non-taxable persons or taxable persons availing themselves of the special scheme for small enterprises. That system is referred to as the ‘Deemed-supplier model’ in the acts forming part of the legislative package described in paragraph 3 above.
6        Specifically, as regards short-term accommodation rental services, Article 3(1) of the contested directive inserts Article 28a into the VAT Directive. That article provides that a taxable person who facilitates, through the use of an electronic interface, such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, the supply, within the European Union, of short-term accommodation rental services, namely the uninterrupted rental of accommodation to the same person for a maximum of 30 nights, is to be deemed to have received and supplied those services themselves unless the person providing those services has provided to the taxable person their identification number for VAT purposes and declared that they will charge any VAT due on that supply.
7        Under Article 28a(5) of the VAT Directive, Member States may exclude from the scope of Article 28a(1) of that directive, inter alia, supplies of short-term accommodation rental services made within their territory under the special scheme provided for in Title XII, Chapter 1, Section 2 of that directive, which concerns the special scheme for small enterprises.
8        Furthermore, Article 3(3)(a) of the contested directive introduces a new subparagraph into Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive, which provides that the uninterrupted rental of accommodation to the same person for a maximum of 30 nights is to be regarded as having a similar function to the hotel sector subject to criteria, conditions and limitations to be laid down by Member States.
9        In addition, Article 3(3)(b) of the contested directive adds a new paragraph to Article 135 of the VAT Directive, under which, inter alia, Member States are required, before 1 July 2028, to communicate to the VAT Committee the text of the main provisions of national law in which they set out the criteria, conditions and limitations referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive.
10      Moreover, Article 3(2) of the contested directive inserts Article 46a into the VAT Directive, which provides that the place of supply of the facilitation service provided to a non-taxable person through the use of an electronic interface, such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, is to be the place where the underlying transaction is supplied in accordance with the VAT Directive.
11      The contested implementing regulation was adopted, as part of the same legislative package as the contested directive, with a view to clarifying certain elements for the proper functioning of the deemed-supplier model, for electronic interfaces such as marketplaces, platforms, portals or similar means that facilitate inter alia the supply of short-term accommodation rental services.
12      Recital 2 of the contested implementing regulation states that it is necessary to define the term ‘facilitate’ in order to provide taxable persons who facilitate, through the use of an electronic interface such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, inter alia the supply of short-term accommodation rental services with legal certainty as to whether the deemed-supplier rule applies to those taxable persons.
13      Accordingly, Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation amends, in essence, Article 30 of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for the VAT Directive (OJ 2011 L 71, p. 1; ‘the VAT Implementing Regulation’) by inserting a second paragraph according to which, for the purposes of Article 46a of the VAT Directive, the term ‘facilitation service’ means a service supplied by a taxable person to either a customer or a supplier, or to both, through the use of an electronic interface such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, thereby allowing the customer and the supplier to enter into contact which results in a supply of goods or services through that electronic interface. That paragraph further states, in the second subparagraph, that such a facilitation service is to be regarded as distinct and independent from the goods or services that the taxable person is deemed to supply.
Forms of order sought
14      In the application, the applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the following provisions:
–        Article 3(1) of the contested directive, in so far as it inserts Article 28a(1) into the VAT Directive,
–        Article 3(3)(a) of the contested directive, in so far as it amends Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive by inserting a new subparagraph,
–        Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation, in so far as it amends Article 30 of the VAT Implementing Regulation, by inserting a new paragraph (together, ‘the contested provisions’);
–        order the Council to pay the costs.
15      In the plea of inadmissibility raised by separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 1 September 2025, the Council contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action as inadmissible;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
16      In its observations on the plea of inadmissibility lodged at the Court Registry on 15 October 2025, the applicant claims that the Court should:
–        reject the plea of inadmissibility;
–        in the alternative, join the examination of the plea of inadmissibility to the substance of the case;
–        order the Council to pay the costs.
Law
17      Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, on application by the defendant, the Court may decide on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case.
18      In the present case, since the Council has requested a ruling on the inadmissibility of the action, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file, has decided to rule on that application without taking further steps in the proceedings.
19      In the plea of inadmissibility, the Council contends that the applicant does not have standing to bring proceedings, within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU, for the purposes of the annulment of the contested provisions, in so far as it is neither individually nor directly concerned by those provisions.
The applicant’s standing to bring proceedings
20      Under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs of that article, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.
21      In the present case, it is not disputed that the applicant is not the addressee of either the contested directive or the contested implementing regulation. Consequently, it cannot establish the admissibility of its action on the basis of the first situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
22      Furthermore, first, as regards the contested directive, it is apparent from the first citation in the preamble to that directive that it was adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 113 TFEU. That article provides for a special legislative procedure, within the meaning of Article 289(2) TFEU, for the adoption of provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning indirect taxes, such as VAT. In that regard, it should be noted that Article 289(3) TFEU provides that legal acts adopted by legislative procedure are to constitute legislative acts. The contested directive is therefore a legislative act within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU.
23      However, according to the case-law, the expression ‘regulatory act’, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, refers to acts of general application other than legislative acts (see judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
24      Accordingly, the contested directive cannot be regarded as a ‘regulatory act’ within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which the applicant does not dispute.
25      Thus, in order to establish its standing to bring proceedings in the present action, in so far as it seeks the partial annulment of the contested directive, the applicant must demonstrate that it is in the second situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263, namely that it is directly and individually concerned by the provisions of the contested directive which it seeks to have annulled.
26      Secondly, as regards the contested implementing regulation, it is also necessary to examine, in the first place, whether the applicant is directly and individually concerned by Article 1(8) of that implementing regulation.
Direct concern
27      The applicant claims that the contested provisions affect its legal and economic situation, in so far as they impose on it a new legal obligation, namely the obligation to collect and pay VAT on behalf of the short-term accommodation service providers using its platform. It maintains that that obligation will entail substantial additional operational and administrative costs for it and will increase the final price paid by users, thereby reducing its competitiveness as a platform.
28      It is appropriate to recall that, according to settled case-law, the condition that a natural or legal person must be directly concerned by the measure that forms the subject matter of its action for annulment requires two cumulative criteria to be met, namely, first, the contested measure must directly affect the legal situation of that person and, secondly, it must leave no discretion to its addressees who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules (see judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C‑348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
29      First, the applicant seeks the annulment of Article 3(1) of the contested directive in so far as it inserts Article 28a(1) into the VAT Directive, which provides that a taxable person who facilitates, through the use of an electronic interface, such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, the supply of inter alia short-term accommodation rental services is to be deemed to have received and supplied those services themselves unless the person providing those services has a VAT number and declares that they will charge any VAT due on those services.
30      In that regard, it should be noted that, under Article 28a(5) of the VAT Directive, inserted by Article 3(1) of the contested directive, Member States may exclude from the scope of Article 28a(1) of the VAT Directive, inter alia, supplies of short-term accommodation rental services made within their territory under the special scheme provided for in Title XII, Chapter 1, Section 2 of that directive, which concerns the special scheme for small enterprises. Furthermore, it is apparent from Article 6(3) of the contested directive that the Member States are to adopt and publish, by 30 June 2028, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Article 3 of that directive.
31      It follows that the Member States, as addressees of the contested directive, were granted a broad discretion as to whether or not to apply the scheme provided for in Article 28a(1) of the VAT Directive.
32      Consequently, the second of the cumulative criteria required by the case-law cited in paragraph 28 above is not satisfied as regards whether the applicant is directly concerned.
33      Secondly, the applicant seeks the annulment of Article 3(3)(a) of the contested directive. That provision introduces a new subparagraph into Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive, which provides that the uninterrupted rental of accommodation to the same person for a maximum of 30 nights is to be regarded as having a similar function to the hotel sector subject to criteria, conditions and limitations to be laid down by Member States.
34      However, it must be stated, as the Council has done, that such a measure which provides, in a general and abstract manner, that those services are to be treated as being similar cannot in itself produce direct legal effects, but, contrary to what the applicant submits, requires the adoption of legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions in order to be implemented.
35      Even assuming that the new subparagraph introduced into Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive is capable of affecting the legal situation of the applicant, it would do so only indirectly, in so far as, under that subparagraph, the services to be treated as being similar to hotel services are short-term accommodation rental services, and not services provided through the use of a digital platform such as that operated by the applicant. Furthermore, and in any event, it should be noted that that subparagraph makes such treatment subject to criteria, conditions and limitations to be laid down by Member States, without providing any further clarification or restrictions limiting their discretion.
36      Accordingly, the new subparagraph introduced into Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive cannot be regarded as being capable of directly affecting the legal situation of the applicant, since other measures adopted by Member States must lay down the applicable criteria, conditions and limitations.
37      Thus, neither of the two cumulative criteria required by the case-law cited in paragraph 28 above is satisfied as regards whether the applicant is directly concerned by Article 3(3)(a) of the contested directive.
38      Thirdly, the applicant seeks the annulment of Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation in so far as it inserts Article 30(2) into the VAT Implementing Regulation. According to the applicant, the latter provision defines the concept of ‘facilitation service’, for the purposes of the application of Article 46a of the VAT Directive concerning the place of supply, as a service supplied by a taxable person to either a customer or a supplier, or to both, through the use of an electronic interface such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, thereby allowing the customer and the supplier to enter into contact which results in a supply of services through that electronic interface.
39      In that regard, it should be noted that Article 30(2) of the VAT Implementing Regulation merely contains a definition relating to facilitation services, which is meaningful only for the purposes of applying Article 46a of the VAT Directive. The latter article itself defines the concept of ‘place of supply’ in the context of facilitation services provided through the use of an electronic interface.
40      Accordingly, even if the definition in Article 30(2) of the VAT Implementing Regulation could affect the applicant’s legal situation, it would be able do so only indirectly, by means of truly binding provisions referring to that definition, adopted, where appropriate, by the Member States.
41      Thus, in the context of the contested directive, the definition in Article 46a of the VAT Directive is intended to allow the application of the deemed-supplier model, in particular in the context of the provision of short-term accommodation rental services through an electronic interface. However, as is apparent from paragraphs 31 and 35 above, the Member States have a broad discretion as to whether or not to apply that model.
42      Since the definition in Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation is relevant only where the deemed-supplier model is applied, and since the Member States decide whether or not to apply that model, that article cannot be regarded as capable of directly affecting the applicant’s legal situation.
43      Therefore, neither of the two cumulative criteria required by the case-law cited in paragraph 28 above is satisfied as regards whether the applicant is directly concerned by Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation.
44      It follows from the foregoing considerations that the condition of direct concern, laid down in the second and third situations in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, for the admissibility of an action for annulment is not satisfied in the present case.
45      It must be borne in mind, as regards the second situation in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, that the conditions of direct concern, on the one hand, and individual concern, on the other, are cumulative (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraphs 75 and 76 and the case-law cited). It is thus sufficient that one of those conditions is not satisfied, as in the present case, for the action to be held to be inadmissible. Furthermore, as regards the third situation in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, irrespective of whether the contested implementing regulation constitutes a regulatory act and whether it entails implementing measures, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, it must be held that the condition of direct concern is not satisfied in the present case.
46      However, the Court considers it appropriate, in the circumstances of the present case, also to analyse the condition of individual concern.
Individual concern
47      The applicant submits that it is individually concerned by the contested provisions because it is the only platform specifically designed to serve digital nomads: a category of users with recurring, medium-length accommodation needs that fall consistently within the scope of the contested directive. It submits that its business model is structurally different from that of traditional platforms, which typically facilitate shorter tourist bookings, and that of long-term rental providers, which fall outside the scope of the contested directive. It considers that it is therefore uniquely exposed to the consequences of applying the deemed-supplier model due to the duration and recurrence of the bookings it facilitates, its small size and the fact that its users are highly price-sensitive.
48      It should be borne in mind that, although, in principle, measures of general application may be challenged only by the privileged applicants referred to in the second and third paragraphs of Article 263 TFEU, such measures may nevertheless, in certain circumstances, be of individual concern to certain natural or legal persons and are thus in the nature of a decision in their regard. That is so where the measure in question affects specific natural or legal persons by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and thereby distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee (judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v Commission, 25/62, EU:C:1963:17, p. 107; see, also, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, C‑50/00 P, EU:C:2002:462, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited).
49      In the present case, both the contested directive and the contested implementing regulation are acts of general application, in so far as they are essentially intended to adapt the VAT rules to the supply of short-term accommodation rental services and passenger transport services by road through the use of an electronic interface.
50      As stated in paragraphs 3 to 13 above, under Article 3(1) of the contested directive, where a taxable person facilitates, through the use of an electronic interface, the supply of short-term accommodation rental services or of passenger transport services by road, that taxable person is to be deemed, for the purposes of the application of the VAT rules, to have received and supplied those services themselves, unless the person providing those services charges any VAT due on that supply. Under Article 3(3)(a) of that directive, short-term accommodation rental is to be regarded as having a similar function to the hotel sector. Furthermore, under Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation, the term ‘facilitation service’ means a service supplied by a taxable person to either a customer or a supplier, or to both, through the use of an electronic interface.
51      It follows that the contested provisions, where appropriate following any implementing measures adopted by Member States, are liable to affect, albeit indirectly, all operators which provide, through the use of an electronic interface, services in the sectors of short-term accommodation rental or passenger transport by road. Those provisions constitute rules which apply to objectively determined situations, namely the situation of taxable persons who facilitate, through the use of an electronic interface, the interaction between the suppliers and customers of, inter alia, short-term accommodation rental services, and the situation of the suppliers of those services themselves, in that those services are to be regarded as being similar to hotel services.
52      Consequently, the contested provisions are liable to affect the general interests of all taxable persons operating, inter alia, in the short-term accommodation rental services sector, whether as providers of the electronic interface allowing the suppliers and customers of those rental services to enter into contact, or as the suppliers of those services themselves.
53      Accordingly, since the applicant is a company operating a digital platform facilitating the interaction between the suppliers and customers of short-term accommodation rental services, it cannot be regarded as being affected by the contested provisions by reason of certain attributes peculiar to it or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates it from all other operators in the short-term accommodation rental sector, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above.
54      The applicant’s arguments consist of describing its own business model, which is aimed at a certain type of users of its platform, namely digital nomads. Those arguments cannot, therefore, distinguish it from all other players which operate platforms allowing suppliers and customers of short-term accommodation rental services or passenger transport services by road to enter into contact. The individual business model adopted by each player in the sectors concerned is irrelevant for the purposes of applying the contested provisions, which refer to the operators in those sectors, identified in a general and objective manner, and make no distinction as to the type of users on which those provisions focus. Accordingly, the fact that the applicant’s business model refers to digital nomads as end-users of short-term accommodation rental services clearly does not constitute a relevant circumstance, in the context of the adoption of those provisions, such as to distinguish the applicant individually from all the other operators in the sectors concerned, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above.
55      Furthermore, the fact that certain operators are more affected economically by a measure of general application than others is not sufficient to distinguish them individually from those other operators, since the application of that measure takes effect by virtue of an objectively determined situation (see judgment of 2 March 2010, Arcelor v Parliament and Council, T‑16/04, EU:T:2010:54, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited).
56      Accordingly, the applicant’s claim that, by making it subject to VAT, the contested provisions will affect its economic viability as a platform cannot constitute, in the present case, a circumstance which distinguishes it individually from other digital platform operators. Even if those provisions affected the applicant’s business, such effects would, in any event, be comparable to the effects on other digital platform operators in the short-term accommodation rental sector and the sector of passenger transport by road. Thus, even if the number of short-term accommodation reservations facilitated by the applicant could be affected by its becoming subject to VAT under those provisions, such effects would be comparable to the effects suffered by all other operators in the sectors concerned under those provisions.
57      In those circumstances, the applicant cannot be regarded as being individually concerned by the contested provisions.
58      It follows from all of the foregoing that the applicant does not have standing to bring proceedings under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
59      The applicant submits, however, that such a conclusion infringes its right to effective judicial protection recognised by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
60      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, although the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in that Treaty (see judgment of 25 March 2021, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑565/19 P, not published, EU:C:2021:252, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
61      Furthermore, according to the case-law, to recognise that any person has standing to bring proceedings purely on the basis of a breach of his or her fundamental rights by acts of general application, such as the contested provisions, would amount to rendering the requirements of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU meaningless (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 September 2024, ATPN v Commission, C‑340/23 P, not published, EU:C:2024:806, paragraph 60). Accordingly, the applicant’s claim that its fundamental rights are being infringed cannot preclude the application of those requirements.
62      It follows that, according to the approach taken in the case-law of the Court of Justice, the argument put forward by the applicant alleging breach of its right to effective judicial protection is not in itself sufficient to justify the admissibility of its action.
63      Moreover, the applicant’s argument that it is appropriate to adopt a non-formalistic position with regard to legislative acts and to relax the conditions for the admissibility of actions established by the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above cannot succeed.
64      Unlike the circumstances referred to by the applicant, the contested provisions in the present case are not of a decision-making nature, but form part of the legislative package described in paragraph 3 above, by means of which the EU legislature made use of its policymaking powers to regulate, in a general and abstract manner, through indirect taxation such as VAT, an economic activity, namely short-term accommodation rentals and passenger transport by road through an electronic interface.
65      It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the present action must be declared inadmissible on the ground that the applicant lacks standing to bring proceedings under Article 263 TFEU.
The application to intervene
66      By document lodged at the Court Registry on 9 September 2025, the European Commission sought leave to intervene in support of the Council.
67      Pursuant to Article 144(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where the defendant has lodged a plea of inadmissibility or of lack of competence as provided for in Article 130(1) of those rules, a decision on the application to intervene is not to be given until after the plea has been rejected or the decision on the plea reserved. Under Article 142(2) of those rules, the intervention becomes devoid of purpose if, inter alia, the application is declared inadmissible.
68      In the present case, since the action has been dismissed as inadmissible, there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application to intervene.
Costs
69      In the first place, under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.
70      In the second place, pursuant to Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission must be ordered to bear its own costs relating to its application to intervene.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.      The action is dismissed as inadmissible.
2.      There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application to intervene submitted by the European Commission.
3.      Nomad Stays Co shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.
4.      The Commission shall bear its own costs relating to its application to intervene.
Done at Luxembourg, on 21 January 2026.
V. Di Bucci
S.L. Kalėda
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.