Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
NORKUS
delivered on 12 February 2026 (1)
Case C‑67/25
Staatsanwaltschaft Saarbrücken
Criminal proceedings
against
R,
N,
K
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Saarbrücken (Regional Court, Saarbrücken, Germany))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 – Article 2f(1) – Prohibition on broadcasting content originating from certain legal persons, entities or bodies – Broadcasting of that content by natural persons on a website generating income only in the form of voluntary contributions )
I.      Introduction
1.        The present request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Saarbrücken (Regional Court, Saarbrücken, Germany) under Article 267 TFEU concerns the interpretation of Article 2f(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, (2) as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 (3) (‘Regulation No 833/2014’). That provision prohibits any operator from broadcasting, enabling, facilitating or otherwise contributing to broadcast, any content by the entities or bodies listed in Annex XV to that regulation, inter alia by means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers or online video-sharing platforms and applications.
2.        The request was made in criminal proceedings against several persons suspected of forming an organised criminal group and of broadcasting, via a public blog, various content, including videos deriving from a media channel subject to that prohibition. Although access to the site was free of charge, its operators solicited donations, which provided them with an amount totalling over EUR 60 000. In that context, the referring court raises the question of the scope of the concept of ‘operator’ set out in that provision and, more specifically, whether it also covers natural persons who operate a website without deriving from it any income other than voluntary contributions.
3.        The point at issue will be to determine the scope of the concept of ‘operator’ within the meaning of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, in a context characterised by the need to strengthen the effectiveness of EU measures to counter disinformation (4) and propaganda from State sources. It will be for the Court to clarify whether that concept can apply to natural persons who operate a website without carrying out an economic activity but while broadcasting prohibited content, and, in so doing, to define the scope of the liability of online actors in the implementation of European sanctions. The objective will therefore be to guarantee the consistent and operational application of restrictive measures in the digital space, while ensuring compliance with the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty, in order to avoid an overly narrow or unforeseeable interpretation which would undermine their effectiveness.
II.    Legal framework
A.      European Union law
1.      Regulation No 833/2014
4.        Under Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014:
‘It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed.’
5.        Article 8(1) of that regulation provides:
‘Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties, including as appropriate criminal penalties, applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. …’
6.        Article 12 of that regulation provides:
‘It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent prohibitions in this Regulation …’
7.        Annex XV to that regulation, entitled ‘List of legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2f’, includes, inter alia, the name ‘RT – Russia Today Germany’.
2.      Regulation 2022/350
8.        Recitals 4 to 10 of Regulation 2022/350 state:
‘(4)      In its conclusions of 24 February 2022, the European Council condemned in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. … The European Council called on Russia and Russia-backed armed formations to stop their disinformation campaign.
(5)      In its conclusions of 10 May 2021, the Council [of the European Union] underlined the need to further strengthen the Union’s and Member States’ resilience as well as their ability to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, ensuring the coordinated and integrated use of existing and possible new tools for countering hybrid threats at Union and Member States’ level, and possible responses in the field of hybrid threats including, inter alia, to foreign interference and influence operations, which may cover preventive measures as well as the imposition of costs on hostile state and non-state actors.
(6)      The Russian Federation has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilisation of its neighbouring countries and of the Union and its Member States. In particular, the propaganda has repeatedly and consistently targeted European political parties, especially during election periods, as well as targeting civil society, asylum seekers, Russian ethnic minorities, gender minorities, and the functioning of democratic institutions in the Union and its Member States.
(7)      In order to justify and support its aggression against Ukraine, the Russian Federation has engaged in continuous and concerted propaganda actions targeted at civil society in the Union and neighbouring countries, gravely distorting and manipulating facts.
(8)      Those propaganda actions have been channelled through a number of media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation. Such actions constitute a significant and direct threat to the Union’s public order and security.
(9)      Those media outlets are essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the aggression against Ukraine, and for the destabilisation of its neighbouring countries.
(10)      In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, it is necessary, consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information as recognised in Article 11 thereof, to introduce further restrictive measures to urgently suspend the broadcasting activities of such media outlets in the Union, or directed at the Union. These measures should be maintained until the aggression against Ukraine is put to an end, and until the Russian Federation, and its associated media outlets, cease to conduct propaganda actions against the Union and its Member States.’
B.      German law
9.        Under Paragraph 18(1)(1)(b) of the Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on foreign trade) of 6 June 2013, (5) in the version applicable to the facts in the main proceedings, anyone who infringes a prohibition on broadcast, transmission, dissemination or provision of services laid down in a directly applicable legal act of the European Communities or of the European Union, which is published in the Official Journal of the European Communities or the Official Journal of the European Union and serves to implement an economic sanction adopted by the Council in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, is to be liable to a custodial sentence of three months to five years.
10.      Pursuant to the first situation provided for in
Paragraph 18(7)(2) of that law, a custodial sentence of not less than one year is to be imposed on anyone who acts in a professional capacity in the cases set out in point 1 of that paragraph.
III. The facts giving rise to the proceedings before the referring court, the proceedings before the referring court and the question referred for a preliminary ruling
11.      The main proceedings arose in the context of a criminal investigation against three natural persons,
R, N and K, who, on four occasions during 2023, broadcast videos from the RT Deutschland channel via the ‘Live-Ticker’ blog, which is publicly accessible on the www.traugott-ickeroth.com website (‘the traugott-ickeroth website’). Since the broadcasts of that channel are subject to the prohibition on broadcasting provided for in Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, the fact that they were made available to the public constitutes, under the applicable national legislation, an offence subject to criminal penalties.
12.      R, who publishes inter alia books under the pseudonym ‘Traugott Ickeroth’, which are sold via the online trading platform Amazon, acknowledged, during the investigation procedure, that he was responsible for the editorial design of the traugott-ickeroth website.
13.      The content published on that website was freely accessible. However, users were invited to support the operation of that site financially through an appeal for donations. In the period between 1 April 2022 and 3 August 2023, the defendants
R and N received, into their respective accounts, numerous payments made by users who responded to that appeal, mostly in amounts ranging from one to three figures and totalling EUR 60 038.65.
14.      The referring court states that the interpretation of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and that the Court has not yet ruled on that point. It adds that the interpretation of the concept of ‘operator’ within the meaning of that provision is not obvious enough to rule out all reasonable doubt.
15.      In that regard, the referring court refers to the document prepared by the Commission, entitled ‘Consolidated FAQs on the implementation of Council Regulation No 833/2014 and Council Regulation No 269/2014’ (‘the Commission guidelines’), according to which the concept of ‘operator’ refers to any person or entity or body exercising a commercial or professional activity that broadcasts or enables, facilitates or otherwise contributes to broadcast unauthorised content.
16.      In the opinion of that court, the private collection of donations, which constitute donations under civil law, may also be classified as a ‘professional activity’, where it is carried out, as in the present case, to such an extent that the beneficiaries receive significant sums enabling them to finance, at least in part, their means of subsistence. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that the appeal for donations was intended to generate financial resources for the continued operation of the traugott-ickeroth website and, therefore, to constitute a sustainable source of income, which is characteristic of a professional activity.
17.      However, that court observes, on the one hand, that access to that website was, in principle, free of charge, that is to say not subject to the provision of financial consideration by its users, and, on the other hand, that its operation was not financed by resources independent of voluntary contributions from users, such as advertising income, which is nevertheless customary in the industry. Consequently, the activity of the defendant,
R,
could also be classified as purely private.
18.      It was in those circumstances that the Landgericht Saarbrücken (Regional Court, Saarbrücken) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Must Article 2f(1) of [Regulation No 833/2014] be interpreted as meaning that ‘operators’, within the meaning of that provision, also include natural persons who, through a website operated by them, only generate income in the form of voluntary contributions from third parties (donations or gifts)?’
IV.    Procedure before the Court
19.      The order for reference dated 20 December 2024 was received at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 31 January 2025.
20.      K and R, as defendants in the main proceedings, the Staatsanwaltschaft Saarbrücken (Public Prosecutor’s Office, Saarbrücken, Germany), the French, Estonian and Latvian Governments and the European Commission lodged written observations within the period prescribed in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
21.      The Court decided to proceed without a hearing, in accordance with Article 76(2) of its Rules of Procedure.
V.      Legal analysis
A.      Preliminary remarks
22.      The European Union, which is founded on the values set out in Article 2 TEU – in particular freedom, democracy and pluralism – accords fundamental importance to respect for freedom of expression and information. EU law enshrines that concept by recognising, in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), the protection of those freedoms as a fundamental element of the EU legal order. However, open and democratic societies remain vulnerable to the dissemination of disinformation, in particular where it is intentionally used to manipulate public opinion and influence the democratic process. (6)
23.      The war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of international law has confronted the European Union with unprecedented challenges. (7) With a view to increasing the costs of Russia’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and to promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis, (8) the European Union adopted a package of restrictive measures against certain natural and legal persons. (9) It also implemented instruments to strengthen its resilience to hybrid threats, including disinformation and information manipulation campaigns orchestrated by the Russian Federation.
24.      Those instruments include, in particular, the measures provided for by Regulation No 833/2014
which suspend the broadcasting activities of certain media outlets acting on behalf of the Russian Federation and pursuing, through disinformation campaigns, a strategy of destabilising the European Union and its Member States; those media outlets include the channel RT Deutschland. (10) The justification for those measures, which restrict, inter alia, the right to freedom of expression and information, lies in the significant and direct threat to the European Union’s public order and security represented by such propaganda activities. (11) Article 52(1) of the Charter authorises such restrictions. (12)
25.      The present case falls within the broader context of EU measures to combat disinformation campaigns linked to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in that the Court is called upon to rule on whether Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘operator’, within the meaning of that provision, also includes natural persons who, through a website operated by them, only generate income in the form of voluntary contributions from third parties (donations or gifts).
26.      As I noted in my introduction, (13) the effectiveness of the restrictive measures is being put to the test, as are the fundamental principles of the rule of law, since it is necessary, in accordance with the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege certa, to define specifically the types of conduct which may result in a criminal penalty. That principle, enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter, requires the legislature to define with sufficient precision the conduct constituting an offence and the penalties applicable to it, in order to ensure that the determination of acts which are punishable is a matter for the legislative authority, without, however, precluding interpretation by the courts, provided that that interpretation remains foreseeable and strictly framed by the legal provision. (14)
27.      As the Court has pointed out, the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law, which requires criminal law to be clear and predictable, precludes bringing criminal proceedings in respect of conduct the illegal nature of which is not set out under law in a sufficiently clear and unequivocal manner. (15) That principle also aims to ensure predictability and legal certainty for citizens, enabling them to know, when they act, the criminal consequences which may result from their conduct. This is particularly important in a context such as that of the present case, in which Article 8 of Regulation No 833/2014 requires Member States to lay down the rules on penalties, including as appropriate criminal penalties, applicable to infringements of the provisions of that regulation. This Opinion seeks to clarify the scope of Article 2f(1) of that regulation.
28.      I shall examine that question after addressing the reservations expressed by the Staatsanwaltschaft Saarbrücken (Public Prosecutor’s Office, Saarbrücken) as to the admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling.
B.      Admissibility
29.      Without formally pleading the inadmissibility of the question referred for a preliminary ruling, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Saarbrücken nevertheless challenges the necessity of it. It argues, first, that the decision to open the trial stage before the competent chamber of the referring court could still be open to national judicial review, with the result that it would not be a final decision. Secondly, it considers that it is not necessary to refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the concept of ‘operator’, within the meaning of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, since it considers that the traditional methods of interpreting EU law make it possible to determine the meaning of that term, which also appears to be obvious.
30.      In that regard, it should, in the first place, be recalled that in the context of a preliminary ruling procedure, it is not for the Court, in view of the distribution of functions between itself and the national courts, to determine whether the order for reference was made in accordance with the rules of national law governing the organisation of the courts and their procedure. The Court is bound by an order for reference made by a court or tribunal of a Member State, in so far as that order has not been rescinded on the basis of a means of redress provided for by national law. (16)
31.      There is nothing in the file before the Court to suggest that, in the present case, the order for reference has been rescinded.
32.      In the second place, if the
Public Prosecutor’s Office, Saarbrücken intended to argue that a request for a preliminary ruling can be made only after domestic remedies have been exhausted, such an argument cannot be accepted. The possibility of challenging national decisions in accordance with the rules of national law cannot limit the jurisdiction of the national court to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling where it considers that the dispute before it raises questions on the interpretation of EU law necessitating a ruling by the Court. (17) In the light of the functioning of the system of cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU between the Court of Justice and the national courts, it is necessary, by contrast, to recognise the national court’s power to refer to the Court, at whatever stage of the proceedings it considers appropriate, any question it considers necessary for the resolution of the dispute before it. (18)
33.      In that context, it is important to point out that that power lies with the national court, irrespective of the parties’ assessment of the appropriateness of such a step. It follows that a national court is in no way prevented from referring a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, the answer to which, in the submission of one of the parties to the main proceedings, is not subject to any reasonable doubt. Even if there were no difficulty in terms of its interpretation, such a question nonetheless cannot be declared inadmissible. (19)
34.      In the third place, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, where a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court concerns the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give an answer. The Court may refuse to rule on such a question only where it appears that the interpretation sought or the assessment of the validity of a provision of EU law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the question submitted to it. (20)
35.      However, that is not the case here, since the referring court has sufficiently explained the relevance of the question referred for the purposes of the assessment of the defendants’ criminal liability.
36.      As is apparent from its request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court expresses uncertainty as to whether the defendants can be regarded as ‘operators’ within the meaning of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014. Given that the Commission’s guidelines presuppose the existence of a ‘commercial or professional activity’, it is not, in the view of that court, clear that that question should be answered in the affirmative. On the one hand, use of the website is, in principle, free of charge; on the other hand, its operation is financed by voluntary contributions. Although that court is inclined to consider that the defendants’ conduct falls within the material scope of that provision, it refers the matter to the Court in order to obtain definitive clarification.
37.      Consequently, the request for a preliminary ruling must, in my view, be considered admissible.
C.      Substance
1.      The interpretation of the concept of ‘operator’ within the meaning of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014
38.      By its single question, the referring court asks the Court to determine the scope of the term ‘operator’ in Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014. It should be noted at the outset that that term is defined neither in that regulation nor by reference to any definitions in the law of the Member States. Similarly, that term has not, to date, been interpreted by the Court in its case-law.
39.      According to settled case-law, the need for the uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union. That interpretation must take into account not only the wording of that provision, but also its context and the purposes of the legislation of which it forms part. (21) In the remainder of this Opinion, I shall therefore rely, for the interpretation of the term ‘operator’, on the methods of interpretation recognised by the case-law of the Court.
(a)    Literal interpretation
40.      As regards the literal method of interpretation, it should be recalled that the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part. (22)
41.      The term ‘operator’, according to the accepted meaning of that word, refers to any natural or legal person who operates, manages or ensures the functioning of a given service or activity, implying a certain degree of functional control or active involvement in its implementation. Applied to the field of communication and the broadcasting of content, it refers to any actor participating, directly or indirectly, in the provision or transmission of that content to the public. As several interested parties stated in their written observations, that term is primarily technical and functional in nature. The sources consulted for the purposes of this analysis converge on a functional rather than a strictly legal understanding of that concept, encompassing any actor who, through his or her technical activity, such as the operation of equipment, or organisational activity, makes the broadcasting of content a practical possibility, irrespective of his or her status or structure or the purpose of his or her activity. (23)
42.      On the basis of that interpretation, it appears that the term is not associated with economic activity, nor, a fortiori, with profit seeking, but refers rather to the exercise of a function of control, direction or management of the broadcasting process. That reading is, in my view, supported by the use, in Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, of the term ‘operator’ in the context of a broadcasting activity, used without the adjective ‘economic’. (24) That choice of terminology suggests that the EU legislature intended to give that concept a broader scope than that limited to actors pursuing an economic objective, so as also to include natural persons or entities which practically participate in the broadcasting of content, irrespective of whether or not their activity is commercial in nature.
43.      Moreover, it should be noted that the prohibition on broadcasting expressly extends to online video-sharing platforms and applications, that is to say contemporary methods of broadcasting frequently used by individuals in the context of activities which are not necessarily remunerated, including those of online content creators, such as video content creators or influencers. In my view, that extension confirms the intention of the EU legislature to adopt both a functional and technologically neutral approach to the term ‘operator’.
44.      A literal reading of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 thus leads to the conclusion that the concept of ‘operator’ must also be understood to include a natural person broadcasting the content referred to in that provision in the context of an unremunerated activity, such as the operation of a website financed by voluntary contributions from third parties.
45.      That assessment cannot be called into question by the fact that the Commission guidelines, to which the referring court refers in its order for reference, (25) appear to indicate the contrary. Those guidelines state that ‘the prohibition applies to any person or entity or body
exercising a commercial or professional activity’ (emphasis added), which could suggest that they introduce a requirement not provided for by the wording of the abovementioned provision and seek to restrict unduly its scope ratione personae.
46.      The fact remains that, on the one hand, those guidelines do not originate from the Council, which is the author of Regulation No 833/2014 and has sole competence to adopt restrictive measures pursuant to the legal basis provided for in Article 215(2) TFEU, (26) and, on the other hand, as is apparent from their actual content, those guidelines are merely a ‘working document’ drawn up by the Commission’s services with the aim of providing guidance to national authorities, EU operators and citizens on the implementation and interpretation of that regulation.
47.      The Commission expressly acknowledges therein that only the Court has jurisdiction to interpret EU law. (27) Lastly, it should be noted, as the Commission did in its written observations, that the guidelines also state that the regulation sets out a broad and comprehensive prohibition, in that it prohibits broadcasting (lato sensu), while also prohibiting operators from enabling, facilitating or otherwise contributing to broadcasting. (28)
48.      Accordingly, the
Commission guidelines cannot have the effect of altering the legislative scope of the restrictive measures provided for by Regulation No 833/2014, and nor can they be decisive for the purposes of the interpretation at issue in the present case.
(b)    Contextual interpretation
49.      The interpretation of the term ‘operator’ proposed herein is also supported by a contextual interpretation. In that regard, it should be noted that Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 prohibits operators from engaging in certain forms of conduct, namely the broadcasting of the content concerned or the act of enabling, facilitating or otherwise contributing to its broadcast, in particular through transmission or dissemination by means of various means of communication which are specifically referred to. The wording of that provision thus refers to an activity of a technical or organisational nature.
50.      By contrast, that article does not require that that activity pursue a profit-making objective, or that the operator broadcast the content concerned in the context of a professional activity in the public communication sphere. It follows that the concept of ‘operator’ may also include natural persons broadcasting information in the context of a leisure activity or wishing, for idealistic reasons or reasons of personal conviction, to contribute to the shaping of public opinion.
51.      It is important to note that the material scope of that provision is particularly broad, in that it prohibits – as already indicated – a wide range of methods of broadcasting the content concerned, whether the broadcasting is carried out directly by the operator or through third parties. The degree of precision in its wording, and the use of several verbs to describe the prohibited conduct, demonstrate the intention of the EU legislature to prevent that content from being broadcast or being made accessible on the territory of the European Union. That provision must therefore be understood as a prohibition of general application, which is preventive in nature and intended to avert any form of broadcasting, whether by technical means or through the intervention of third parties.
52.      Its effectiveness would therefore be undermined if it were accepted that its scope could be restricted by additional conditions not expressly provided for in Regulation No 833/2014, such as the requirement that content be broadcast for profit or in the course of a professional activity. The existence of an economic or professional dimension is in no way apparent from any element of that provision, since the prohibition which it lays down relates exclusively to the function of broadcasting, irrespective of the legal or economic status of the person concerned. The concept of ‘operator’ must therefore be interpreted in a functional and technologically neutral manner, in accordance with the purpose of the provision. In other words, the classification adopted depends exclusively on the function performed by the person concerned in the broadcasting process, and that interpretation must be applied uniformly, irrespective of the technical means employed or the method of funding used.
53.      Moreover, it should be noted that Article 2f(1) differs from other provisions of Regulation No 833/2014, which, within the framework of the restrictive measures which they establish, expressly refer to activities of an economic nature, or even directly to economic operators. This is, in particular, the case with Article 3r(4) of that regulation, (29) which refers to the country of registration of the economic operators involved in the context of the adoption of national due diligence rules relating to the application of the prohibition on the transhipment of liquefied natural gas originating in or exported from Russia. (30) That difference in wording shows that, where the EU legislature intended to limit a restrictive measure to a specific economic scope, it expressly did so. This is clearly not the case, however, with Article 2f(1) of that regulation, the general application of which expresses the intention to adopt a functional and technologically neutral approach to the term ‘operator’, irrespective of any economic or professional considerations.
54.      That interpretation is consistent with the system and internal coherence of EU law. In other EU legal instruments, the legislature adopts a functional rather than an economic or institutional approach in order to determine the scope of similar concepts. This is the case, in particular, with Directive 2010/13/EU on audiovisual media services, (31) Article 1(1)(d) of which defines ‘media service provider’ as ‘the natural or legal person who has editorial responsibility for the choice of the audiovisual content of the audiovisual media service and determines the manner in which it is organised’. That definition draws no distinction according to the legal status or according to the economic objective of the activity of the person concerned, but is based solely on the exercise of effective control over the selection and broadcasting of content.
55.      That comparison with Directive 2010/13 is justified, from a systematic point of view, by the fact that those two instruments share the same functional purpose, in so far as they are intended to govern actors exercising control over the broadcasting of content to the public. Whilst Directive 2010/13 determines the editorial responsibilities of ‘media service providers’, Article 2f of Regulation No 833/2014 identifies ‘operators’ whose broadcasting activities may be subject to restrictions where they serve propaganda purposes contrary to the European Union’s security and public order. In both cases, the decisive criterion is not the economic nature of the activity, but actual control over the broadcasting process. (32)
56.      Even taking into account the legislative context in which Regulation No 833/2014 was adopted, it seems clear that, in order to determine whether a person can be classified as an ‘operator’, no account can be taken of whether or not that person carries out an economic or professional activity. As the Estonian Government rightly noted in its written observations, the purpose of that regulation is not to regulate the internal market, that is to say, relations between economic operators and consumers, which might justify the imposition on professionals of a prohibition on broadcasting content from certain propaganda channels. On the contrary, as I have already explained in my preliminary remarks, Regulation No 833/2014 forms part of a set of restrictive measures based on Article 215 TFEU, aimed, for reasons of public order and security, at obtaining the immediate cessation of the broadcasting activities of media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation. (33)
(c)    Teleological interpretation
57.      That leads me to an interpretation in the light of the objectives pursued by the EU legislature. In that context, it should be recalled that Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 was introduced by Regulation 2022/350, which was adopted on 1 March 2022, as an immediate response to the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression launched a week earlier by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. In order to implement the prohibition laid down by that provision, the Council relied on the declaration made by the European Council on 24 February 2022 calling on Russia to cease its disinformation campaign and on its own conclusions of 10 May 2021, according to which it is necessary to strengthen the European Union’s and Member States’ resilience as well as their ability to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation and to strengthen possible responses in the field of hybrid threats, including foreign interference and influence operations.
58.      The prohibition of general application set out in Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 reflects the intention of the EU legislature to put an end to Russia’s disinformation campaign by excluding the broadcasting of certain content throughout the territory of the European Union. However, the effective protection of public order and security requires that the prohibition should not be limited to State-controlled media, but that account should also be taken of ‘alternative’ media, the operators of which are becoming – whether consciously or not – disseminators of that disinformation campaign. Disregarding that aspect would be tantamount to allowing the broadcasting of prohibited content to gradually shift to those alternative channels, thereby ultimately escaping any form of State control or supervision. (34)
59.      It should also be noted that the fact that Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 refers to internet service providers and online video-sharing platforms and applications demonstrates the EU legislature’s desire to take into account the growing importance which digital media have today in the broadcasting of information and news. The use of those media nevertheless carries the risk that users’ opinions may be influenced without their having the means to critically assess the veracity of the information communicated to them. Certain categories of persons, such as adolescents (35) or elderly persons, appear to be particularly vulnerable to manipulation in that regard. The existence of such a risk, the full extent of which must be taken into account, therefore makes it necessary to consider that websites such as that at issue in the main proceedings fall within the scope of that provision.
60.      Even though, for the purposes of classification as an ‘operator’, no economic activity or income generation is necessary, the context of an appeal for donations enabling such sums to be collected warrants some comment. The fact that some websites are financed by donations rather than by a registered commercial activity justifies increased vigilance as to their possible use as a tool for propaganda purposes, in particular in the case of State-sponsored disinformation campaigns. That method of funding is characterised by the absence of a clearly defined legal or institutional framework, since it is not accompanied by financial transparency obligations or supervisory mechanisms comparable to those to which professional media operators are subject. That lack of clarity makes it more difficult to identify financial flows and, therefore, the actors likely to influence editorial policy or content. It thus creates an environment conducive to interference by external interests, including by third countries, which may intervene directly or indirectly in the production or broadcasting of content.
61.      Moreover, the presentation of those platforms as ‘independent’ or ‘alternative’ reinforces their credibility with a particular sector of the public, which is often distrustful of traditional media or public institutions. That apparent authenticity confers greater persuasive power on their messages, making them all the more difficult to challenge when they convey partially manipulated or misleading narratives. (36) From that perspective, the claim of independence, far from being a guarantee of neutrality, may paradoxically become an effective tool for disinformation strategies.
62.      In that context, the non-commercial nature of the funding cannot be regarded as a merely neutral factor, but should be regarded rather as a determining factor in assessing the risk of information manipulation. (37) It is an indicator of structural vulnerability which, combined with an absence of supervision and the search for ‘alternative’ legitimacy, favours the broadcasting of content aligned with foreign propaganda objectives. That situation makes it possible, in particular, to circumvent the restrictive measures imposed on State-controlled media by exploiting channels which are presented as independent but are functionally integrated into the disinformation strategy.
63.      The introduction, by way of interpretation, of a requirement to pursue an economic or even profit-making objective might significantly weaken the scope of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014. Such a requirement, which is unrelated to the wording and functional logic adopted by the EU legislature, would exclude from the scope of the measure a significant proportion of online media outlets which, although they do not pursue an economic objective, actively participate in the broadcasting of the content concerned. It would also create a risk of circumvention, in that some operators could rely on the absence of an economic objective to continue disseminating disinformation messages. Such an interpretation would therefore undermine the effectiveness and preventive purpose of the provision, which aims to prevent the broadcasting of propaganda content on the territory of the European Union, irrespective of the economic status or method of funding of the broadcasters of such content.
64.      A criterion based on the pursuit of an economic objective would, in any event, lack clarity and predictability and would therefore be difficult to reconcile with the requirements of legal certainty. In practice, it would be particularly complex to determine the financial threshold above which a broadcasting activity could be classified as ‘economic’. There are many different, and often hybrid, forms of online media funding, since some platforms are based exclusively on private donations, while others combine advertising revenue, subscriptions, ad hoc partnerships or crowdfunding campaigns. (38) In those circumstances, the distinction between an ‘economic’ activity and a ‘non-economic’ activity would necessarily become arbitrary and subject to interpretation.
65.      Such uncertainty would undermine the uniform application of the provision and pave the way for frequent challenges, as each operator could rely on the uncertain, marginal or irregular nature of his or her resources to escape the prohibition. Nor would the introduction of a quantitative or proportional threshold – based, for example, on the total amount of donations or on the relationship between income and operating costs – guarantee greater legal certainty, since the economic situations of operators vary considerably depending on their size, structure and target public.
66.      Moreover, the introduction of such a criterion would create an obvious risk of circumvention. The operators concerned could adjust their funding model in order to remain below the threshold or rely on indirect funding mechanisms, in particular by using third parties or foreign platforms. Such a development would render the measure meaningless and undermine its preventive effectiveness, by allowing the continued broadcasting of the content concerned under cover of an apparent absence of an economic objective. Accordingly, the adoption of such an uncertain and easy to manipulate criterion would run counter to the objective of consistency, transparency and effectiveness pursued by Regulation No 833/2014.
67.      It should be considered that operators of websites broadcasting prohibited content fall within the scope of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, including where their activity is financed exclusively or primarily by voluntary contributions. Such funding is likely to play a decisive role in the continued existence and functioning of those websites and, therefore, to undermine the effectiveness of the restrictive measures adopted against Russian propaganda media.
68.       It is also important to avert the risk that citizens acting in good faith may be encouraged, through targeted disinformation campaigns, to make such contributions, thereby, without their knowledge, infringing the European Union’s sanctions regime and, consequently, possibly infringing national law. Lastly, the deliberate exploitation of appeals for private donations as part of a propaganda narrative based on supposed victimhood would not only effectively neutralise the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union, but also strengthen the scope and credibility of Russian State media disinformation, by exploiting public support as a vector for information influence.
69.      Although the pursuit of an economic objective does not, in my view, constitute a condition for the application of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, I consider that the volume of donations received by an operator may nevertheless be taken into consideration in the specific assessment of its activity. A significant amount – as is the situation in the present case, in which more than EUR 60 000 was collected over a year – is likely to reveal a structured organisation and regular broadcasting activity, falling outside the scope of mere self-expression or voluntary expression.
70.      Such a level of funding may also indicate economic dependence on the public or on certain contributors capable of influencing the broadcast content or of increasing the media outlet’s sensitivity to external pressures. Without calling into question the neutrality of the functional criterion, that factor can thus be considered a relevant contextual indicator for assessing the scale of the activity carried out and, where appropriate, the risk of information manipulation or of circumvention of the restrictive measures imposed on media under State control.
71.      The factors referred to above may be particularly relevant when considering the possible application of Article 12 of Regulation No 833/2014, which prohibits any activity the object or effect of which is to circumvent the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union. A lack of financial transparency, dependence on crowdfunding sources or claims of editorial independence may, in that context, constitute relevant indicia for assessing whether the conduct in question is objectively capable of neutralising the effects of the measures provided for in Article 2f of that regulation and whether that conduct subjectively forms part of a systematic aim of circumventing the sanctions imposed on media outlets acting on behalf of the Russian Federation.
72.      On the other hand, it seems difficult to accept an interpretation, as proposed by the defendant
R, according to which the concept of ‘operator’ within the meaning of Article 2f of Regulation No 833/2014 should be made subject to the duration, scope or intensity of the activity carried out. The wording of that regulation contains no reference to such criteria, which excludes any distinction between natural and legal persons carrying out a regular activity and those whose participation in broadcasting is occasional. On the contrary, the interpretation of that concept must be based on an exclusively functional criterion, linked to the role actually played in the process of broadcasting or providing the content concerned.
73.      The objective pursued by the EU legislature justifies such an approach. Article 2f of Regulation No 833/2014 aims to prevent and prohibit any form of broadcasting of the content concerned, irrespective of the scale or frequency of the activity carried out by the operator. In the current digital environment, isolated or small-scale broadcasting can reach a wide public and have the same effects as consistent broadcasting. Making the application of the measure subject to a certain level of intensity would render the prohibition ineffective and create areas of impunity which could be exploited to circumvent the legislation.
74.      Lastly, the introduction of such a quantitative criterion would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty, creating uncertainty as to the scope of the measure and undermining its uniform application within the European Union. Such an approach could also encourage behaviour aimed at concealing or artificially fragmenting broadcasting activities, which would be incompatible with the preventive purpose and effectiveness sought by the regulation. It is therefore appropriate to include within the meaning of an ‘operator’ any natural or legal person who participates, even on an ad hoc basis, in the broadcasting, transmission or provision of the content concerned, irrespective of the technical means used and the scope of the intervention. It is irrelevant, for the purposes of that classification, whether or not such a person derives income in any form from that participation.
75.      A teleological interpretation of Article 2f of Regulation No 833/2014 therefore also appears to me to support a broad interpretation of the prohibition which it lays down.
D.      Additional considerations concerning the legislative scope of the prohibition referred to in Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014
76.      The above examination, carried out in light of the wording, (39) context (40) and objectives (41) of Article 2(f) of Regulation No 833/2014, leads to the conclusion that the concept of ‘operator’ in the field of telecommunications must be interpreted broadly. It refers to any natural or legal person ensuring the technical and operational management of communication networks or services, or exercising effective control over their operation or provision.
77.      Moreover, classification as an ‘operator’ under that provision cannot be made conditional on the pursuit of an economic objective, the exercise of a professional activity or the duration of that activity. It also includes natural persons who operate a website or broadcast content online, irrespective of whether the income generated is limited to voluntary contributions from third parties, such as gifts or donations.
78.      It is true that the broad interpretation of Article 2f of Regulation No 833/2014 adopted in the present analysis necessarily implies an interference with the exercise of the freedom of expression and information guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter. (42) The resulting prohibition on broadcasting restricts, to a certain extent, the ability for the operators concerned to communicate information and for the public to receive it. In that regard, it is necessary to acknowledge the relevance of the objections raised by the two defendants regarding the scope of such a prohibition.
79.      However, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, such interference may be accepted if it fulfils the conditions laid down by that provision, namely that it is provided for by law, respects the essence of the right in question and meets objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union, consistent with the principle of proportionality. In this case, the interference stems directly from Regulation No 833/2014, adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU to implement Decision 2014/512/CFSP. (43) It is therefore ‘provided for by law’, within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter, and is part of a clear, accessible and foreseeable legal framework. (44)
80.      The objective pursued is, for its part, legitimate and in the general interest, since that objective is to safeguard the public order and security of the European Union against disinformation campaigns which seek to destabilise the European institutions and Member States through the manipulation of information. (45) Finally, the measure in question is consistent with the principle of proportionality, (46) in that it is limited to temporarily prohibiting the broadcasting of content specifically identified as propaganda and disinformation, without restricting the free movement of other information or opinions. (47) It therefore does not undermine the essence of the right guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter, but is aimed solely at preventing serious and direct breaches of the European Union’s security and public order. (48)
81.      Consequently, I agree with the position of the French Government, according to which the broad interpretation proposed herein falls within the framework established by EU law. That interpretation remains consistent with the requirements of both Regulation No 833/2014 itself and the general principles of EU law, in particular those of legality, legal certainty and proportionality. It also strikes an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, the need to safeguard the public order and security of the European Union in the light of the disinformation campaigns orchestrated on behalf of the Russian Federation and, on the other hand, the protection of freedom of expression and information enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter.
VI.    Conclusion
82.      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Landgericht Saarbrücken (Regional Court of Saarbrücken, Germany) as follows:
Article 2f(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022,
must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘operator’ under that provision also includes natural persons operating a website. It is irrelevant, for the purposes of that classification, whether or not such persons derive income in any form from that operation.
1      Original language: French.
2      OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1.
3      OJ 2022 L 65, p. 1.
4      The term ‘disinformation’ is a translation of the Russian word ‘дезинформация’ (dezinformatsiya), coined in the early 1920s by the Soviet intelligence services. Joseph Stalin is credited as being the originator of that term, deliberately making it sound French in order to make it seem Western in origin and thereby enhance its credibility. It identified a strategic propaganda tactic used by the KGB and other Soviet agencies to spread false or misleading information with the aim of manipulating public opinion. Unlike simple lies, disinformation often mixes truth and falsehood to sow confusion, undermine confidence and destabilise opponents (Barela, S. and Duberry, J., ‘Understanding Disinformation Operations in the Twenty-First Century’, Defending Democracies: Combating Foreign Election Interference in a Digital Age, Oxford 2021, p. 41).
5      BGBl. 2013
I, p. 1482.
6      As the General Court noted in its judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council
(T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 56), and of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council (T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraph 53), propaganda and disinformation campaigns are capable of undermining the foundations of democratic societies and are an integral part of the arsenal of modern warfare.
7      See judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council (T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 86 et seq.).
8      See recital 2 of Regulation No 833/2014. See also judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 123).
9      See my Opinion in Čiekuri-Shishki (C‑480/24, EU:C:2025:672, point 26 et seq.).
10      Regulation 2022/350 was adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, pursuant to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/351 of 1 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine
(OJ 2022 L 65, p. 5), adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU.
11      See recitals 8, 10 and 11 of Regulation 2022/350.
12      See judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council
(T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 161 et seq.), and of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council (T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraph 140).
13      See point 1 of this Opinion.
14      Wabnitz, H.-B., Janovsky, T., and Schmitt, L., Handbuch des Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrechts, Munich, 2025, chapter
2, paragraph 288.
15      See judgments of 12 December 1996, X (C‑74/95 and C‑129/95, EU:C:1996:491, paragraph 25), and of 26 June 2025, Makeleio and Zougla
(C‑555/23 and C‑556/23, EU:C:2025:484, paragraph 89).
16      Judgments of 7 November 2024, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów
(C‑326/23, EU:C:2024:940, paragraph 22), and of 10 July 2025, Farmacija (C‑715/23, EU:C:2025:548, paragraph 39).
17      See, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008, Cartesio (C‑210/06, EU:C:2008:723, paragraph 93).
18      See, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, Adusbef and Others (C‑686/18, EU:C:2020:567, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
19      See judgments of 24 February 2022, Viva Telecom Bulgaria (C‑257/20, EU:C:2022:125, paragraph 42), and of 22 December 2022, Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări (Acquisition of spectacles by a worker) (C‑392/21, EU:C:2022:1020, paragraph 26).
20      See judgments of 14 October 2021, Viesgo Infraestructuras Energéticas
(C‑683/19, EU:C:2021:847, paragraph 23), and of 14 May 2024, Stachev (C‑15/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:399, paragraph 82).
21      See judgments of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai (C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 37), and of 13 March 2025, APS Beta Bulgaria and Agentsia za kontrol na prosrocheni zadalzhenia (C‑337/23, EU:C:2025:183, paragraph 49).
22      See judgments of 22 April 2021, Austrian Airlines
(C‑826/19, EU:C:2021:318, paragraph 22), and of 16 February 2023, Zamestnik izpalnitelen direktor na Darzhaven fond ‘Zemedelie’
(C‑343/21, EU:C:2023:111, paragraph 35).
23      The Larousse dictionary defines the term ‘operator’ as an ‘undertaking which operates a telecommunications network’. Similarly, the Duden dictionary describes the term ‘Betreiber’ as an ‘undertaking which operates technical facilities, economic enterprises or other similar activities’. The Diccionario panhispánico del español jurídico states that the term ‘operador’ refers to a ‘natural or legal person who operates public telecommunications networks or provides telecommunications services accessible to the public’. For its part, the Cambridge Dictionary defines ‘operator’ as ‘someone whose job is to use and control a machine or vehicle’. Finally, the Treccani dictionary defines the term ‘operatóre’ as a ‘person who performs certain actions or operations, usually on a regular basis. In the classification of occupations, this generally refers to a person responsible for the operation and control of certain types of machines, apparatus or installations, such as a radio operator, television operator or telephone network operator’.
24      It should be noted that the Lithuanian version of Article 2f(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 uses the term ‘ūkio subjektas’, which refers to the entity or person engaged in the economic activity. However, that reference is not supported by other language versions. The Polish version of that regulation in no way specifies to whom the prohibition laid down in that provision applies, since it does not use any object complement: ‘Zakazuje się nadawania lub umożliwiania, ułatwiania lub w inny sposób przyczyniania się do nadawania jakichkolwiek treści przez osoby prawne, podmioty lub organy wymienione w załączniku XV …’ (‘It shall be prohibited to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV’), which implies a general prohibition unconnected with its addressee.
25      See point 15 of this Opinion.
26      See judgment of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council (T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraphs 61 and 62).
27      That fact was also noted by Advocate General Medina in her Opinion in Jemerak (C‑109/23, EU:C:2024:307, point 69).
28      See the answer to the sixth question in section ‘G. Sector specific questions – 1.
Media’, on page 311 of the guidelines.
29      That provision was introduced by Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/1745).
30      It should be noted that that argument is based on a literal interpretation which, although it appears consistent in some language versions, does not apply to all language versions of EU law.
31      Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ 2010 L 95, p. 1).
32      It is true that Directive 2010/13, according to recital 21 thereof, covers activities of an economic nature for the purposes of Articles 56 and 57 TFEU. However, its definition of ‘media service provider’ is based on a functional criterion – editorial responsibility and effective control of broadcasting – which remains relevant, by analogy, for the interpretation of the term ‘operator’ in Article 2f of Regulation No 833/2014.
33      Ferreau, F., ‘Das EU-Verbot russischer Staatsmedien aus der Perspektive des Medienrechts’, Verfassungsblog (10 March 2022), points out that the provision of audiovisual media services may indeed constitute an economic activity. However, the author rightly observes that the measures in question – unlike the economic and financial sanctions recently adopted – are not intended to discipline Russia. Their true purpose is, on the contrary, ‘inward-looking’: they aim to prevent the destabilisation of the European Union through the broadcasting of disinformation.
34      Spahn, S., ‘Russia’s Narratives and Disinformation in the War on Ukraine’, Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine, Baden-Baden, 2023, p. 40, explains that, despite the sanctions imposed on Russian propaganda media, they remain accessible on the internet. RT Deutschland has created a whole series of websites under new domain names, on which the television programme can also be viewed live using a virtual private network (VPN). Moreover, RT’s videos are available on several online platforms.
35      Garner, I., ‘Putin’s youth and the TikTok war – Creating the militarized self in Russian adolescents’, The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict and War Crimes, chapter
6, London, 2024, p. 99, explains how the Russian authorities are seeking to militarise society by preparing young people for war, particularly through the socialisation mechanisms described in his analysis of patriotic young TikTok users.
36      Boberg, S., Quandt, T., Schatto-Eckrodt, T., and Frischlich, L., ‘Pandemic Populism: Facebook Pages of Alternative News Media and the Corona Crisis’, New Media & Society, Vol. 23, No 11, 2021, p. 2945.
37      Wright, K., Scott, M., and Bunce, M., ‘Foundation-funded Journalism, Philanthrocapitalism and Tainted Donors’, Journalism Studies, Vol. 20, No 5, 2019, p. 690, examine the funding of non-profit media outlets by foundations and highlight several ethical risks, including dependence on donors and a possible convergence between the editorial priorities of media outlets and the agendas of foundations.
38      Vara-Miguel, A., Sánchez-Blanco, C., Sádaba Chalezquer, C. and Negredo, S., ‘Funding Sustainable Online News: Sources of Revenue in Digital-Native and Traditional Media in Spain’, Sustainability, No 20, 2021, p. 2, explain the different forms of online media funding currently in use.
39      See point 40 et seq. of this Opinion.
40      See point 49 et seq. of this Opinion.
41      See point 57 et seq. of this Opinion.
42      See judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council (T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 143), and of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council (T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraph 111).
43      Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ
2014 L 229, p. 13).
44      See judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council
(T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 152), and of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council
(T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraph 112).
45      See judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council (T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 162), and of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council (T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraphs 52 and 53).
46      See judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council
(T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 213), and of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council
(T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraphs 135 and 140).
47      See, to that effect, Baade, B., ‘The EU’s “Ban” of RT and Sputnik: A Lawful Measure Against Propaganda for War’, Verfassungsblog (8 March 2022), who emphasises that, under Regulation 2022/350, the operation of websites is not prohibited, provided that they do not broadcast prohibited content and do not allow, facilitate or otherwise contribute to its broadcast.
48      See judgments of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council (T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 159), and of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council (T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraph 121).