ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)
10 July 2020 (*)
(Action for annulment and for damages — Staff of SatCen — Members of the contract staff — Jurisdiction of the EU Courts — Common foreign and security policy — Decision to launch administrative investigations in respect of the applicant pursuant to a judgment of the General Court — Acts adversely affecting an official — Claim for interest on a sum awarded by the General Court as compensation for the harm suffered — Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure — Action manifestly inadmissible)
In Case T‑619/19,
KF, represented by A. Kunst, lawyer, and N. Macaulay, Barrister,
applicant,
v
European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen), represented by A. Guillerme, lawyer,
defendant,
APPLICATION, first, based on Article 263 TFEU for the annulment of the decision of the Director of SatCen of 3 July 2019 to launch investigations concerning the applicant and, second, based on Article 268 TFEU for compensation for the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant, in particular as a result of that decision,
THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber),
composed of R. da Silva Passos (Rapporteur), President, L. Truchot and M. Sampol Pucurull, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Background to the dispute
1        The applicant, KF, was recruited by the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) on 1 August 2009, as a member of the contract staff, to occupy the post of Head of the Administrative Division, by means of two successive fixed-term contracts, the second of which ran until 31 July 2016.
2        On 8 March 2013, the Director of SatCen decided to launch administrative investigations, which were entrusted to the Deputy Director of SatCen, into the applicant’s conduct. First, that decision followed a complaint addressed to the Director and Deputy Director of SatCen on 14 November 2012 by 12 members of staff, denouncing the applicant’s conduct which, according to the complainants, constituted psychological harassment. Second, the decision to launch investigations concerning the applicant was taken on the ground that it was apparent from the results of a survey on well-being at work carried out among SatCen staff that some staff members had stated that they had experienced psychological pressure from her and aggressive behaviour on her part over a long period.
3        Following the conclusions of the inquiry report, the Director of SatCen decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant before the Disciplinary Board. At the end of that procedure, by decision of 28 February 2014, the Director of SatCen dismissed the applicant on disciplinary grounds (‘the dismissal decision’).
4        By judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), the General Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the action and annulled the dismissal decision on the ground of the procedural irregularity in the administrative inquiry which had led to it. First, in paragraphs 189 to 207 of that judgment, the Court held that the arrangements for that inquiry, which consisted in sending SatCen staff a ‘questionnaire on harassment’ personally identifying the applicant, were contrary to the principle of sound administration and, in particular, to the requirement of impartiality and the duty of care. Second, in paragraphs 208 to 224 of that judgment, the Court held that SatCen had infringed the applicant’s right to be heard and the right of access to the applicant’s file by drawing conclusions from the administrative inquiry concerning the applicant without giving her the opportunity to put forward her point of view and to consult, in a timely manner, the documents relating to that inquiry.
5        Moreover, the Court ordered SatCen to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 10 000 as compensation for the non-material harm suffered by her as a result of the irregularities in the administrative inquiry. However, the Court dismissed as premature the applicant’s claims for compensation for material harm corresponding to the amount of the remuneration to which she could have been entitled if she had remained in service with SatCen between the date of her removal from office and the date of termination of her contract of employment. In particular, in paragraph 250 of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), the General Court stated that, if it were not to prejudge those implementing measures, the Court was not able to conclude that the annulment of the dismissal decision necessarily implied that the applicant was entitled to payment of the amounts that she claimed. The appeal brought against that judgment by SatCen was dismissed by the Court in the judgment of 25 June 2020, SatCen v KF (C‑14/19 P, EU:C:2020:492).
6        On 18 May 2019, the applicant received from SatCen payment of the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded by the General Court in its judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) by way of compensation for the non-material harm which she had suffered.
7        On 3 July 2019, the Director of SatCen notified the applicant of his decision, taken for the purpose of implementing the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), to launch new administrative investigations against her (‘the decision to launch investigations’). As stated in its grounds, the decision to launch investigations is based on the elements referred to in paragraph 2 above, which had also formed the basis of the first administrative investigations giving rise to the dismissal decision annulled by the General Court in that judgment on grounds of procedural irregularities.
8        On 17 July 2019, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Director of SatCen, on the basis of Article 28(2) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/824 of 15 May 2017 on SatCen Staff Regulations (OJ 2017 L 123, p. 7), against the decision to launch investigations. That complaint was the subject of an express decision rejecting it on 2 August 2019 (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’) on the ground, principally, that it was inadmissible in so far as it was directed against an act which did not adversely affect the applicant and, in the alternative, that it was unfounded.
Procedure and forms of order sought
9        By application lodged at the Court Registry on 17 September 2019, the applicant brought the present action.
10      By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on the same day and registered under as Case T‑619/19 R, the applicant brought an application for interim measures under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, in which, in essence, she requested the President of the General Court to suspend the operation of the decision to launch investigations.
11      On 17 September 2019, the applicant applied for anonymity, which was granted by decision of the General Court of 14 January 2020.
12      By order of 12 December 2019, KF v SatCen (T‑619/19 R, not published, EU:T:2019:859), the President of the General Court dismissed the application for interim measures and ordered that the costs be reserved.
13      By document lodged at the Court Registry on 16 January 2020, the Council of the European Union applied for leave to intervene in the present proceedings in support of the form of order sought by SatCen.
14      The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:
–        annul the decision to launch investigations and the decision rejecting the complaint;
–        order SatCen to grant her, pursuant to the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), ‘full and fair’ compensation for the material harm suffered;
–        order SatCen to pay the sum of EUR 30 000 in respect of the ‘material and non-material’ harm caused by the decision to launch investigations;
–        order SatCen to pay her ‘interest on the unjustified late payment’ of the amount of EUR 10 000 awarded by the General Court as compensation for non-material harm;
–        order SatCen to pay the costs, together with interest calculated at a rate of 8%.
15      SatCen contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the application;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The jurisdiction of the General Court
16      The applicant submits that the General Court has jurisdiction to rule on the present dispute, referring to the analysis already made by the Court in paragraphs 59 to 132 of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen
(T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) and raising, under Article 277 TFEU, a plea of illegality seeking a declaration that Article 28 of and Annex X to Decision 2017/824 should be declared inapplicable, in so far as that provision and that annex confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Appeals Board of SatCen to rule on disputes between SatCen and its staff members.
17      For its part, SatCen submits that the General Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the present action. In that regard, it points out that, although that Court held that it had jurisdiction to rule in actions between SatCen and its staff members in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen
(T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), that judgment is under an appeal brought by SatCen and registered under case number C‑14/19 P. In those circumstances, SatCen refers to the arguments which it has put forward to challenge the jurisdiction of the General Court in Cases T‑286/15 and C‑14/19 P. To that effect, first, it argues that the legislature conferred exclusive competence on the SatCen Appeals Board to rule on disputes between SatCen and its staff members. Second, SatCen argues that the decision to launch investigations does not fall within the budget of the European Union, while the Court, in its judgment of 12 November 2015, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo (C‑439/13 P, EU:C:2015:753), based its jurisdiction to review the legality of a decision falling within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the fact that that decision was chargeable to the budget of the European Union. Third, SatCen points out that the situation of EU officials and seconded experts differs fundamentally from that of SatCen staff. Thus, the principle of equal treatment is not capable of providing a basis for the jurisdiction of the General Court in the present case.
18      As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, the EU judicature does not, in principle, have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the CFSP or with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions (see judgment of 19 July 2016, H v Council and Others, C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
19      In the present case, SatCen is indeed an EU body governed by Decision 2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014 on SatCen and repealing Joint Action 2001/555 on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre (OJ 2014 L 188, p. 73), adopted on the basis, inter alia, of Article 28 TEU concerning the operational actions of the Union and falling within the scope of Chapter 2, Title V, of the EU Treaty on the CFSP.
20      Nonetheless, the fact that the present dispute is between a body operating in the field of the CFSP and one of its former staff members cannot, in itself, mean that the EU Courts lack jurisdiction to rule on this dispute (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 July 2016, H v Council and Others, C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraph 43, and of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen, T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718, paragraph 83).
21      First, the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU introduce a derogation from the rule of the general jurisdiction which Article 19 TEU confers on the Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure that in the interpretation of the Treaties the law is observed, and they must, therefore, be interpreted narrowly (see judgment of 19 July 2016, H v Council and Others, C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited). Second, while Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court of Justice of the European Union where the Treaties exclude it, the principle of effective judicial protection nonetheless implies that the exclusion of the EU Courts’ jurisdiction in the field of the CFSP should be interpreted narrowly (judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 74).
22      Moreover, as is apparent from both Article 2 TEU, which is included in the common provisions of that treaty, and Article 21 TEU, concerning the European Union’s external action, to which Article 23 TEU, relating to the CFSP, refers, the European Union is founded, in particular, on the values of equality and the rule of law. The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with provisions of EU law is inherent in the existence of the rule of law (see judgment of 19 July 2016, H v Council and Others, C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
23      In the present case, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision to launch investigations and the decision rejecting the complaint, which decisions form part of the context of accusations of psychological harassment to which the applicant had been subjected when she held the post of Head of the Administrative Division at SatCen and which gave rise to the dismissal decision, annulled by the General Court in its judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718). In addition, before the General Court, the applicant seeks compensation for the harm suffered by her in the same circumstances.
24      It follows that the present dispute has its origins in acts and conduct which are purely personnel management matters and which are not intended to contribute to the conduct, definition or implementation of the CFSP within the meaning of Article 24(2) TEU, nor to meet SatCen’s specific tasks which fall within the scope of the CFSP.
25      Such a fact means that, contrary to the submissions of SatCen, this dispute is comparable to disputes between an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union which are not covered by the CFSP and one of its officials or other staff members, which may be brought before the EU Courts by virtue of Article 270 TFEU (see judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen, T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).
26      However, it cannot be held that the derogation from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union provided for in the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, which must be interpreted restrictively, extends so far as to exclude the jurisdiction of the EU Courts to rule on the present dispute, between an EU body governed by the CFSP and one of its former staff members, even though the EU Courts have jurisdiction in similar disputes between any other body, institution or office of the European Union and one of its former officials or staff members (see judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen, T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).
27      It follows that, unless staff members of SatCen are excluded from the system of judicial protection offered to EU staff members, in breach of the principle of equal treatment, the General Court has jurisdiction to rule on the present dispute (see judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen, T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).
28      That jurisdiction stems, respectively, as regards the review of the legality of the contested decisions, from Article 263 TFEU and, as regards claims for the non-contractual liability of the European Union to be incurred, from Article 268 TFEU, read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, taking into account Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter (see judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen, T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
29      That conclusion is not called into question by the other arguments put forward by SatCen.
30      On the one hand, SatCen cannot usefully rely on Article 28 of Decision 2017/824, in order to argue that the EU legislature decided to confer on the SatCen Appeals Board exclusive competence to rule on disputes between SatCen and its staff members. The attribution of such exclusive competence, removing disputes involving the interpretation or application of EU law from the competence of both the Member States and the EU Courts is countered, first, by the completeness of all the legal remedies and procedures constituting the judicial system of the European Union and, second, the indispensable nature of the tasks attributed to the national courts and the Court respectively with a view to ensuring the preservation of the very nature of the law established by the Treaties.
31      On the other hand, the argument which SatCen bases on the judgment of 12 November 2015, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo (C‑439/13 P, EU:C:2015:753), alleging that the decision to launch investigations is not attributable to the EU budget, must also be rejected. In that case, the Court confirmed its jurisdiction in a specific situation, namely that of measures adopted concerning public procurement in a context falling within the CFSP, which gave rise to expenditure to be charged to the EU budget. The fact that the present case, which, moreover, is unrelated to any budgetary implementation decision, is unconnected with that situation does not preclude the jurisdiction of the General Court in the present case, since that jurisdiction stems from the considerations set out in paragraphs 23 to 28 above.
32      The General Court therefore has jurisdiction to rule on all the heads of claim submitted by the applicant, without it being necessary to rule on the applicant’s request that Article 28 of and Annex X to Decision 2017/824 be declared inapplicable.
Examination of the form of order sought by the applicant
33      Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where an action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the General Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
34      In the present case, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file, has decided to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.
The first head of claim
35      By her first head of claim, the applicant seeks annulment, on the one hand, of the decision to launch investigations and, on the other, of the decision rejecting the complaint.
36      As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, even if an action brought by an EU member of staff is formally directed against a decision rejecting that staff member’s complaint, it has the effect, where that decision lacks any independent content, of bringing before the General Court the act against which the complaint was submitted (see, by analogy, judgments of 17 January 1989, Vainker v Parliament, 293/87, EU:C:1989:8, paragraph 8, and of 21 September 2011, Adjemian and Others v Commission, T‑325/09 P, EU:T:2011:506, paragraph 32).
37      In the present case, in the decision rejecting the complaint, the Director of SatCen stated that the complaint lodged by the applicant was inadmissible, in that it was directed against an act not adversely affecting her and, in any event, unfounded, in so far as, contrary to the applicant’s allegations, compliance with the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) did not preclude the adoption of the decision to launch investigations.
38      Accordingly, the decision rejecting the complaint has no content independent of the decision to launch investigations. Thus, the applicant’s submissions seeking annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint are mingled with those directed against the decision to launch investigations.
39      In that regard, in accordance with established case-law, only acts or decisions producing binding legal consequences likely directly and immediately to affect the applicant’s interests by significantly changing her legal situation may be the subject of an action for annulment (see, by analogy, order of 13 September 2013, Conticchio v Commission, T‑358/12 P, EU:T:2013:525, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
40      In particular, as regards actions brought by EU staff, it is clear from the case-law that acts preparatory to a final decision do not adversely affect the applicant and can therefore be challenged only incidentally in an action against an annullable act. Although some purely preparatory measures may adversely affect a staff member inasmuch as they may influence the content of a subsequent challengeable act, those measures cannot be the subject of a separate action and must be challenged in support of an action brought against that act (see judgment of 14 February 2007, Simões Dos Santos v OHIM, T‑435/04, EU:T:2007:50, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
41      In the present case, in the decision to launch investigations, the Director of SatCen informed the applicant that he had decided, on the basis of Article 27 of Decision 2017/824, to launch administrative investigations concerning her, as a consequence of the annulment by the General Court, in its judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), of the dismissal decision on grounds of procedural irregularities.
42      In that regard, Article 27(2) of Decision 2017/824 provides that, ‘where the Director becomes aware of evidence of failure within the meaning of paragraph 1, he may launch administrative investigations to verify whether such failure has occurred’.
43      Furthermore, It is apparent from Articles 1 and 2 of Annex IX to Decision 2017/824 that the administrative investigations within SatCen are to conclude with a report containing conclusions, on the basis of which the Director of SatCen may decide on the course to be adopted, which may be that no case is to be made against the person concerned, that a warning is to be addressed to that person, or that disciplinary proceedings are to be initiated against him or her.
44      It follows that the purpose of the administrative investigations launched on the basis of Article 27(2) of Decision 2017/824 is to determine the facts alleged against the person concerned and the circumstances surrounding them and to enable the Director of SatCen to assess prima facie the accuracy and seriousness of those facts in order to form an opinion as to whether disciplinary proceedings should be initiated.
45      Consequently, the decision to launch investigations, taken in compliance with the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), does not contain any element of decision stipulating the position of the Director of SatCen at the end of those investigations which would prejudge his position as regards the applicant (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 July 1993, Camara Alloisio and Others v Commission, T‑17/90, T‑28/91 and T‑17/92, EU:T:1993:69, paragraphs 40 to 42, and order of 26 June 2018, Kerstens v Commission, T‑757/17, not published, EU:T:2018:391, paragraphs 32 and 33). Accordingly, the decision to open investigations must be regarded as a preparatory act, such that claims directed against such a decision are manifestly inadmissible (see, by analogy, order of 18 December 2003, Gómez-Reino v Commission, T‑215/02, EU:T:2003:352, paragraphs 50 and 54).
46      In those circumstances, the first head of claim must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.
The third head of claim
47      By her third head of claim, the applicant seeks an order that SatCen compensate her for the harm arising from the adoption of the decision to launch investigations.
48      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, claims seeking a finding of liability on the part of the European Union brought in the context of an action for annulment must be rejected where they are closely connected with the claims for annulment which have been rejected either as inadmissible or as unfounded (see, by analogy, orders of 17 May 2006, Marcuccio v Commission, T‑241/03, EU:T:2006:129, paragraphs 47 and 56; of 20 September 2018, RZ v EESC and Committee of the Regions, T‑192/17, not published, EU:T:2018:589, paragraph 61; and of 13 December 2018, Bowles v ECB, T‑447/17, not published, EU:T:2018:993, paragraphs 104 and 105).
49      In the present case, it is clear both from the wording of the third head of claim and from the developments relating thereto, set out in paragraphs 175 et seq. of the application, that the compensation sought by the applicant relates exclusively to the harm allegedly caused to her by the decision to initiate investigations, which is the subject, in the present case, of a claim for annulment which was found to be manifestly inadmissible in paragraph 46 above.
50      Accordingly, the third head of claim must also be rejected as inadmissible.
The second head of claim
51      By her second head of claim, the applicant asks the General Court to order SatCen to pay her, pursuant to the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), ‘full and fair’ compensation for the material harm suffered, specifying that such compensation could correspond, for example, to the amount of her salary, emoluments and entitlements between the date of her dismissal and the date of the end of her employment contract.
52      In that regard, it must be recalled that, pursuant to Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain the subject matter of the dispute, pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law. Those particulars must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the essential matters of law and fact relied on are stated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see, to that effect, order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
53      Accordingly, an application for compensation for harm allegedly caused by an institution must indicate with sufficient precision how all the conditions for compensation for the harm allegedly suffered are met (see order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). Such an application must contain the evidence making possible identification of, first, the conduct which the applicant alleges against the institution, second, the reasons for which the applicant considers that there is a causal link between that conduct and the harm which he or she claims to have suffered, and, third, the nature and extent of that harm (judgments of 10 July 1990, Automec v Commission, T‑64/89, EU:T:1990:42, paragraph 73; of 30 June 2009, CPEM v Commission, T‑444/07, EU:T:2009:227, paragraph 33; and order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 56).
54      In particular, with regard to the condition that the applicant must place the Court in a position to assess the nature and extent of the harm that he or she has suffered, it is for the applicant to specify, inter alia, the nature of the alleged harm, in the light of the conduct alleged against the institution concerned, then to quantify the whole of that injury, even if approximately (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 June 1999, Ismeri Europa v Court of Auditors, T‑277/97, EU:T:1999:124, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited; of 7 February 2007, Gordon v Commission, T‑175/04, EU:T:2007:38, paragraph 45, and order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 61). However, a claim for any unspecified form of damages is not sufficiently concrete and must therefore be regarded as inadmissible (see orders of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited, and of 28 February 2019, Gollnisch v Parliament, T‑375/18, not published, EU:T:2019:131, paragraph 46).
55      In the present case, it must be noted that, first, the second head of claim, the terms of which are set out in paragraph 51 above, seeks payment of ‘full and fair’ compensation for material harm suffered by the applicant, in compliance with the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718). Second, the second head of claim is not set out any more specifically or in more detail in the parts of the application which contain the legal argument. It is only in paragraphs 163 and 186 of the application that the applicant refers, without giving further details, to the existence of material harm for which compensation was ‘ordered’ by the General Court in that judgment.
56      Thus, on the one hand, it must be noted that the applicant relies on the Court to determine the amount of ‘full and fair’ compensation, without specifying to what that compensation corresponds or providing any information enabling its amount to be determined. At most, the applicant states that such an amount ‘could correspond’, ‘for example’, to the amount of her salary, emoluments and entitlements from the time of her dismissal until the end of her employment contract.
57      On the other hand, the applicant’s position appears contradictory in that she seeks compensation for material harm which, in her view, has already been ruled upon earlier by the General Court in its judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718).
58      In those circumstances, the second head of claim does not satisfy the requirements of clarity laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure and must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.
59      In any event, in so far as the applicant submits that compliance with the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) meant that SatCen should compensate her for material harm, the amount of which remains to be determined, such a premiss is based on a manifestly incorrect reading of that judgment.
60      In that regard, in paragraphs 250 to 254 of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), the General Court rejected as premature the form of order sought by the applicant seeking compensation for material harm corresponding to the amount of the remuneration which she would have received had she remained in service with SatCen between the effective date of the dismissal decision and the date of the end of her contract, on the ground that it was not in a position to conclude, without knowing the measures taken to implement that judgment, that the annulment of the dismissal decision necessarily entailed the applicant’s right to receive such a sum.
61      Although the General Court stated, in paragraph 253 of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), that, when compliance with a judgment annulling a measure poses special difficulties, the institution concerned may establish a dialogue with that person with a view to seeking to reach an agreement offering him or her fair compensation for the illegality of which he or she was a victim, it did not recognise that that was the case here.
62      Consequently, the second head of claim is also manifestly devoid of any basis in law.
Fourth head of claim
63      By her fourth head of claim, the applicant seeks the payment of interest on the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her by the General Court in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) as compensation for the non-material harm which she suffered.
64      In that regard, as in the case of the second head of claim, the fourth head of claim is not set out in any specific and detailed manner in the application. Nor is the legal basis thereof indicated. Although it appears to be of a compensatory nature, the only arguments put forward by the applicant in support of that claim fall within the scope of the second plea in law for annulment of the decision to launch investigations, alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU, of the right to sound administration and of the duty of care.
65      Indeed, it is only in the part of the application relating to the alleged unlawfulness of that decision that the applicant, first, deplores the fact that SatCen paid, out of time, the sum of EUR 10 000 7 months after delivery of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718); second, points out that SatCen made payment of that sum subject to an agreement on costs, which was ‘inappropriate and unlawful’ and, third, seeks payment of ‘interest’ on that sum for the period by which its payment was late.
66      Even were it possible for the fourth head of claim to be interpreted as a claim for damages based on Article 268 TFEU, the information provided in the application does not enable the General Court to rule on whether the conditions governing the non-contractual liability of the European Union have been satisfied.
67      First, the applicant does not specify on what basis or from which date she regards the payment of the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), made on 18 May 2019, as late.
68      Second, as regards the alleged harm, the applicant merely states that that harm consists of ‘interest’ on the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), without giving further details. In particular, the application does not quantify the amount to which that interest corresponds, nor does the applicant state the facts which would make it possible to assess the extent of that interest, such as the rate and the period over which it should be applied.
69      Admittedly, it is clear from the case-law that, in certain cases, particularly where it is difficult to express the alleged loss in figures, it is not absolutely necessary to particularise its exact extent in the application or to calculate the amount of the compensation claimed (see judgment of 14 December 2018, East West Consulting v Commission, T‑298/16, EU:C:2018:967, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited). However, it was also held that the applicant must establish, or at least indicate, the existence of special circumstances in the application (orders of 5 February 2007, Sinara Handel v Council and Commission, T‑91/05, EU:T:2007:31, paragraph 110, and of 9 July 2019, Scaloni and Figini v Commission, T‑158/18, not published, EU:T:2019:491, paragraph 34).
70      In the present case, the applicant does not set out the reasons which justify the failure to quantify the harm allegedly suffered. In addition, it must be pointed out that, at the time when the applicant brought the present action, the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) had already been paid by SatCen and was therefore no longer producing interest. Accordingly, the applicant was in a position to propose a calculation corresponding to the application, to the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her in that judgment, of an interest rate for the period between the time when, in her view, that sum should have been paid and the date on which such payment actually took place. In those circumstances, the absence of quantification of the alleged harm cannot be justified by the existence of special circumstances.
71      Third, it must be noted that the application does not contain any indication whatsoever as to the causal link between the conduct complained of and the harm alleged. In the absence of any indication from the applicant, it is not for the Court to make assumptions and ascertain whether there is a causal link between the conduct complained of and the injury alleged (see judgment of 30 June 2009, CPEM v Commission, T‑444/07, EU:T:2009:227, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
72      Consequently, the General Court is not in a position to rule on the fourth head of claim submitted by the applicant, which does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, as interpreted in the case-law as recalled in paragraphs 52 to 54 above. The fourth head of claim must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.
73      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, as regards the second head of claim, manifestly lacking any foundation in law. Moreover, pursuant to Article 142(2) of the Rules of Procedure, there is no need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene made by the Council.
Costs
74      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings, in accordance with the form of order sought by SatCen.
75      Furthermore, under Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, where the main proceedings are brought to an end before a ruling is given on the application for leave to intervene, the Council, the applicant and SatCen must each be ordered to bear their own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.      The action is dismissed.
2.      KF shall pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings.
3.      There is no need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene made by the Council of the European Union.
4.      Each party shall bear its own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene.
Luxembourg, 10 July 2020.
E. Coulon
R. da Silva Passos
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.