Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
ĆAPETA
delivered on 30 April 2026 (1)
Case C‑906/24 [Sirto] (i)
A,
B,
C,
D,
E,
F,
G
joined party:
Maahanmuuttovirasto
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court, Finland))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Citizenship of the Union – Right to freedom of movement and residence within the territory of the Member States – Respect for private and family life – Removal of a Union citizen on grounds of public policy or public security – Consequences for the derived right of residence of the children attending school and a day-care centre in the host Member State and of the spouse who has actual custody of them )
I.      Introduction
1.        On the basis of the Citizenship Directive, (2) the family members of a mobile EU worker enjoy a derived
right of residence in the host Member State, based on that worker’s right of residence.
2.        But what happens if that worker is expelled from the host Member State on grounds of public policy or public security? Can his or her family members remain in that State, especially if some of them are children attending school there? Furthermore, in the event that those children enjoy an independent right of residence, how does their decision to remain in the host Member State
in order to finish their schooling
affect a decision to expel their parent?
3.        Those are, in a nutshell,
the questions that arose before the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court, Finland), the referring court in the present case, which
seeks guidance from
the Court of Justice as to the correct interpretation of both the Citizenship Directive and the Workers Regulation. (3)
II.    Facts in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court
4.        A, a Romanian national, moved to Finland
where he was employed and earned an income from at least 2017 to 2019. His right of residence in that Member State was registered on 1 March 2018 on the basis of his employment. From 2020 to 2021, he received no income from employment and,
according to the income register, his last wage
dates from
September 2023.
5.        A is married to B,
a Moldovan national, with whom he has five children (C, D, E, F and G).
6.        B entered Finland on 15 July 2018. On 24 May 2019, B,
together with her children C, D and E, received a residence card as
family members of an EU citizen for the period from 24 May 2019 to 24 May 2024.
7.        C, D and E – born in 2011, 2013 and 2015, respectively – are Moldovan nationals and attend school in Finland.
8.        F was born in 2019 and is a Romanian national. An application to register F’s right of residence as an
EU citizen was filed on 10 May 2021. G was born in 2022 and is a Moldovan national. Both F and G attend a day-care centre.
9.        Between 2019 and 2022, A was sentenced in Finland to a suspended prison sentence of seven months for aggravated theft and to a suspended prison sentence of three months for theft, and
received several fines for theft, two counts of attempted theft, negligently receiving stolen goods, endangering road safety, and possessing an object or substance capable of causing harm to others. He is also suspected of having committed theft in 2020, of attempted theft in 2022, and of unlawful threatening behaviour in 2022.
10.      On 22 November 2022, the Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Immigration Service) ordered A’s expulsion to Romania and banned him from entering Finland for three years. According to that decision, his expulsion was ordered on grounds of public policy and public security given the nature and repetition of his criminal activities, enumerated in the previous point.
11.      By decision of 24 November 2022,
the Finnish Immigration Service decided to expel B, together with her children C, D, E and G,
to their country of origin, Moldova, on the ground that
their sponsor, A, no longer fulfilled the conditions for a right of residence.
On the same day and for similar reasons,
the Finnish Immigration Service
announced that it would not register F’s right of residence and ordered his expulsion
to his country of origin, Romania.
12.      By decisions of 29 September 2023, the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court, Helsinki, Finland) dismissed the appeals brought by A, B and their children against the decisions of the
Finnish Immigration Service.
13.      The appellants in the main proceedings sought leave to appeal against the decisions of that court before the referring court, claiming that the decisions of the Finnish Immigration Service and the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court, Helsinki) should be set aside and the cases referred back to the former body for reconsideration. The appellants further claimed that the the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court)
should prohibit the execution of the expulsion orders.
14.      By interim orders of 21 February 2024, that court
prohibited the execution of the expulsion
orders pending its decision on the application for leave to appeal or the decision on appeal.
15.      The Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court) considers, at the outset,
that
the assessments of both the Finnish Immigration Service and the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court, Helsinki)
are consistent with national law to the extent that they concluded that A posed a threat to public policy and public security due to the serious nature and repetition of his offences. The referring court also deemed it reasonable to assume that the overall assessment had not identified any circumstances that take precedence over the grounds for expulsion in the present case. However, the same court considers
that the grounds for A’s expulsion, particularly with regard to his family situation, may require re-examination if the Court of Justice rules that A’s wife and children have an independent right to reside in Finland even if A is expelled.
16.      The referring court first wonders whether Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive and/or
Article 10 of the Workers Regulation should be interpreted as entitling the children, who either attend primary school or go to a
day-care centre in Finland, and their mother, who has custody of them, to retain their
right of residence in Finland. Additionally, that court wishes to know whether and to what extent the fact that their father, from whose status as a mobile worker they originally derived their right of residence, has been ordered to leave the host Member State on the grounds that he poses a threat to public policy and public security influences the potential
independent right of residence of his children.
17.      In the event that A’s
family members retain their right of residence,
a further question arises as to whether that might trigger the need to
review
the expulsion decision. According to the referring court, that
last question requires an interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Citizenship Directive, read together with Article 7 and Article 24(2) and (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), protecting private and family life and the rights of the child.
18.      In the light of those considerations, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)      Must Article 12(3) of [the Citizenship Directive] be interpreted as meaning that the children of a Union citizen who are enrolled at a primary school in the host Member State and the parent who has actual custody of those children do not lose their right of residence until the children complete their studies, if the Union citizen concerned has been the subject of an expulsion
order issued on the ground that he or she poses a threat to public policy and public security, but the expulsion order is not final, the expulsion has not been executed and the Union citizen continues to reside in the host Member State?
If the first question is answered in the negative:
(2)      Must Article 10 of [the Workers Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a Union citizen who has previously had the status of worker and has children enrolled at a primary school in the host Member State, those children and the parent who has actual custody of them do not lose their right of residence until the children complete their studies, if the parent who is a Union citizen and previously had the status of worker has been the subject of an order by the immigration authority for his or her expulsion from the host Member State on the ground that he or she poses a threat to public policy or public security?
If the first or the second question is answered in the affirmative:
(3)      Must Article 28(1) of [the Citizenship Directive], which lays down the circumstances which the host Member State must take into account before issuing an expulsion order on grounds of public policy or public security, be interpreted as meaning that the conditions for the expulsion of a Union citizen who has been the subject of an expulsion order must be re-examined if his or her children and spouse are recognised as having an independent right of residence in the host Member State after the issue of the expulsion order and those family members wish to remain in that Member State? If so, what circumstances must be examined, in particular, in a situation such as that at issue in the present proceedings, regard being had to the family and economic situation referred to in Article 28(1) of [the Citizenship Directive], read together with Article 7 of the [Charter] on respect for private and family life and Article 24(2) and (3) of the Charter on the rights of the child?’
19.      Written observations were submitted to the Court by the Finnish Government and the European Commission.
20.      A hearing was held on 4 February 2026 at which the applicants in the main proceedings, the Finnish
Government and the Commission presented
oral
argument.
III. Analysis
21.      In order to apply correctly EU citizenship law, judges must possess a certain degree of skill in combinatorics. The present case is a vivid demonstration of that.
22.      The referring court is essentially faced with two different yet related questions. The first is whether, and on what basis, different categories of family members (such as spouses who are third-country nationals (TCNs) and children, some of whom are EU citizens and some are TCNs) can retain a right of residence in a host Member State when that right is derived from the right of a worker who is an EU citizen to reside in that State, even though the competent authorities have in the meantime issued an expulsion order against that person for posing a threat to public order and public security (even if that expulsion order has not yet been executed). The second is how, if those family members indeed retain their right of residence, that affects the (still unimplemented) decision to expel that person.
23.      The first two questions of the referring court concern the first issue described above; I will deal with them under Section A. I will then turn to the third question referred, which concerns the second issue described above, in Section B.
A.      The first and second questions
24.      In principle, TCN spouses and dependent children enjoy, by virtue of the combined application of Article 2(2) and
Article 7(1)(d) and (2) of the Citizenship Directive, a derived right of residence in a Member State in which a Union citizen has an
independent right of residence on the basis of that same directive.
25.      After five years of legally residing in a host Member State as a family member, irrespective of their nationality, those persons gain an independent right of permanent residence (Article 16(1) and (2) of the Citizenship Directive). However, it seems that, in the present case, the Union citizen, from whom the family members derive their right of residence, had resided in Finland for less than five years before a decision to expel him was adopted. (4) They, therefore, do not enjoy a right of permanent residence – however, this is a matter for the referring court to verify.
26.      It is, therefore, necessary to assess whether those family members can claim a right of residence on a different legal basis.
27.      In that respect, the referring court considers that there are two possible legal bases on which the right of residence of at least some of the children in question may be established, which may then trigger a derived right for their mother and other siblings: Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive and Article 10 of the Workers Regulation.
28.      Since there is already case-law confirming that Article 10 of the Workers Regulation grants a right of residence to a child who intends to continue schooling in the host Member State, I will start my analysis with that provision as applied to the present situation (1).
29.      In contrast, Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive has not yet been interpreted by the Court. Under subsection 2 of the present Opinion, I will propose that the Court interpret that provision as also being potentially relevant in the present case.
1.      Right of residence based on Article 10 of the Workers Regulation
30.      By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 10 of the Workers Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the children of a Union citizen who are enrolled at primary school in the host Member State, their parent who has actual custody of those children, as well as their siblings attending a day-care centre,
still enjoy
a right of residence until the children complete their studies, even if the Union citizen from whom their right of residence was originally derived is subject to an expulsion order from the host Member State.
31.      When minors are concerned, the Court has found that Article 10 of the Workers Regulation might confer an independent right of residence on the children of a former EU mobile worker. (5)
32.      In the judgment in
Jobcenter Krefeld,  the Court held that the children of a former migrant worker who is an EU
citizen who have commenced their schooling in the host Member State enjoy, on the basis of the right to equal treatment as regards access to education, an independent right of residence should
they wish to pursue
general education in the host Member State. (6)
33.      What does that mean for the purposes of the present case?
34.      It follows from the order for reference that C, D and E attend primary school in Finland.
35.      As their father initially moved to Finland as a worker, they are entitled, on the basis of Article 10 of the Workers Regulation as interpreted by the Court, to remain in Finland for as long as they are enrolled in general education. Their right of residence is independent of their father’s status as a worker or his continued residence in Finland. (7)
36.      Their mother, B, as the guardian and primary carer of C, D and E, derives a right of residence from their independent right to reside in Finland. (8)
37.      That leaves F and G, who are of pre-school age.
38.      The English-language version of the judgment in
Jobcenter Krefeld  states that a right of residence exists on the basis of Article 10 of the Workers Regulation ‘where that child wishes to attend general education courses in that Member State’. (9) However, the French-language version, and some other language versions, use the term ‘to continue education’. (10) The situation in that case was indeed that the children at issue were already attending general education courses
in the host Member State and wished to continue to do so.
39.      Nevertheless, in the present case, the Commission considers that F and G have an independent right of residence because they attend a day-care centre. According to that institution, children who are still in day-care facilities, or are even younger,
may
attend school in the future, meaning that
their right to receive education in the future necessarily entails
a right to remain in the host Member State, thereby consisting of a present right of residence.
40.      On the contrary, the Finnish Government takes the view that Article 10 of the Workers Regulation does not entail a right to future education from which a right of residence could be
derived for every child residing in the territory of a Member State.
41.      To ascertain whether Article 10 of the Workers Regulation is to be construed as granting independent
rights of residence to F and G even though they had not yet started to attend school
in Finland, it is worth keeping in mind that the existence of an independent right of minors to continue to reside in the host Member State seems to follow from the consideration that children of mobile workers should be able to successfully complete the education that they have commenced. (11)
42.      I therefore agree with the Finnish Government that Article 10 of the Workers Regulation cannot be read as granting a right to education;
it merely entitles children who have already started schooling in the host Member State to continue to do so even if their parent loses the independent right of residence which he or she previously enjoyed as a worker who is a Union
citizen.
43.      Thus, as F and G are pre-schoolers, they do not appear to enjoy an independent right of residence in Finland on the basis of Article 10 of the Workers Regulation. Incidentally, it should be borne in mind that
it is for each Member State to decide when obligatory general education begins. (12) In that respect, it is for the referring court to ascertain, on the basis of Finnish law, whether attending a day-care centre
is understood as the beginning of formal education, and therefore whether F and G are entitled to a right of residence on that basis.
44.      Even if F and G do not enjoy a right of residence on the basis of Article 10 of the Workers Regulation, that does not mean that they cannot derive a right of residence on some other basis, independent of their original sponsor.
45.      In that respect, I can agree with the Commission that if F and G were compelled to leave Finland, B would also have to leave which, as a domino effect, would result in C, D and E having to leave. Therefore, the right of F and G to remain in Finland might be derived from the right, enshrined in EU law, of C, D and E to remain in that Member State.
46.      Any evaluation of the rights of children that stem from EU law must rely on a comprehensive, case-by-case assessment of the children’s
level of dependency on their
parent who enjoys a right of residence in a Member State on the basis of EU law. (13) That evaluation must prioritise the child’s best interests and his or her right to family life (Articles 24 and 7 of the Charter respectively), with particular regard given to the child’s age, development and emotional ties to that parent, as well as the psychological risks of separation. (14)
47.      In that respect, a
parallel may be drawn from the judgment in Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo (Residence of a family member – Insufficient resources). (15)
48.      That case similarly concerned a TCN parent with an EU minor child and another TCN child. In that judgment, the Court acknowledged that refusing to grant a residence permit to a TCN minor would likely compel that child’s mother to leave, and would consequently compel her other child, who is a Union citizen, to relocate as well.
49.      In the main proceedings, such considerations are similarly true for G (who is a TCN), F (who is an
EU citizen) and their mother B
(who is also a TCN).
50.      Furthermore, it should be recalled that the Court has consistently affirmed that the rights
flowing directly from Article 10 of the Workers Regulation exist independently of the conditions and limitations set out in the Citizenship Directive. (16) That is, in my view, equally true for the derived rights flowing directly or indirectly from that same provision, read in conjunction with the Charter.
51.      Thus, to conclude, C, D and E enjoy an independent right of residence based on Article 10 of the Workers Regulation grounded in their enrolment in an educational facility in the host Member State. As their primary carer, B is entitled to a derived right of residence for the duration of their schooling. F and G must equally enjoy a derived right of residence in order to enable C, D and E to enjoy their right of residence.
2.      Right of residence based on Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive
52.      By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the right of residence of children and their mother could be based on Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive. Given that I have already established that such rights might be founded directly or indirectly on Article 10 of the Workers Regulation, it is not necessary to answer this question to enable the referring court to solve the case pending before it. Nevertheless, as the question was asked, I will offer to the Court my point of view.
53.      As a reminder, Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive provides:
‘The Union citizen’s departure from the host Member State or his/her death shall not entail loss of the right of residence of his/her children or of the parent who has actual custody of the children, irrespective of nationality, if the children reside in the host Member State and are enrolled at an educational establishment, for the purpose of studying there, until the completion of their studies.’
54.      A and others contend that Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive applies in a situation such as that in the main proceedings. The Commission is of the view that since A has not departed Finland, that provision is not applicable.
The Finnish Government, however, considers that such a circumstance does not impede the application of Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive
in the present case.
55.      Article 12 of the Citizenship Directive concerns the retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of the death or departure of the Union citizen from whom their right of residence is derived. Like Article 10 of the Workers Regulation, Article 12(3)
of the Citizenship Directive provides for the continuation of the right of residence of children who have already started their education in the host Member State in order to enable them to complete those studies. That provision applies to children irrespective of their nationality.
56.      However, unlike Article 10 of the Workers Regulation, which applies regardless of whether the former worker has left the host Member State or not, Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive becomes applicable only when the person who was the original source of the children’s right of residence departs from the host Member State or dies.
57.      To recall, the decision to remove A is neither final nor enforced. Rather, it is the subject of an ongoing appeal in the course of which the referring court suspended the enforcement of that decision
pending the preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice.
58.      To my mind, the wording of Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive does not necessarily mean that the expulsion
order has to be executed in order for the autonomous right of children to receive education to arise. Nevertheless, the departure of the parent – whether it has already taken place or is yet to come – must be certain.
Thus, in my view, that provision applies when an expulsion order has become final, even if it has not yet been enforced, otherwise its effet utile
would be lost.
59.      However, that is not the case in the main proceedings, because the expulsion decision has been appealed, and no certainty of departure exists.
60.      In that sense, the first question referred must be answered to the effect that Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive is to be interpreted as applying only when the decision to expel the sponsor has either been executed or is at least final.
61.      Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present case and in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the third question of the referring court, it is necessary to consider a situation in which the sponsor is in fact obliged to leave the host Member State but where his or her children, who are enrolled in an educational programme, would
nonetheless retain their right to reside
in that State.
62.      Even though the legislative history behind Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive is not wholly useful, its wording suggests that its aim is to protect children’s right to receive education in the environment in which they have already started it. (17) Thus, the objective of that provision should be understood in the same way as that of Article 10 of the Workers Regulation, as interpreted by the Court.
63.      To summarise, the children of a former migrant worker may acquire an independent right of residence in the host Member State if they are enrolled in an educational programme and
for as long as they pursue their education. If the original sponsor of their right of residence was a migrant worker who was a
Union citizen, the children can derive an independent right of residence in the host Member State on the basis of either Article 10 of the Workers Regulation or Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive.
64.      The remaining question asked by the referring court is whether the fact that the original sponsor of a right of residence is ordered to leave the host Member State, because he or she is deemed to pose a threat to public policy or public security, affects
the family members’ right to remain in that State.
3.      Effect on family members of restricting the sponsor’s right to reside on grounds of public policy or public security
65.      EU law rules relating to
the limitations of the rights of EU citizens and their family members to enter and remain in the territory of a Member State on grounds of public policy or public safety are based on the individualisation of such restrictive measures.
66.      That principle originated in Directive
64/221/EEC, (18) and in particular Article 3(1) thereof, which provided that ‘measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned.’ (19) Such a principled position had previously been confirmed by the Court. (20)
67.      Directive
64/221
was replaced by the Citizenship Directive and a similar provision is contained in Article 27(2) thereof. The Court’s interpretation of that provision has not changed. (21)
68.      The requirement to base a measure restricting a person’s right of residence on that person’s individual behaviour implies that, in principle, the family members’ right of residence cannot be affected by the personal conduct of their father and/or spouse.
69.      It follows from the above that children attending school, their mother providing primary care, as well as their siblings attending a day-care centre,
still enjoy a right of residence in Finland (whether it be independent or derived) on the basis of Article 10 of the Workers Regulation, read together with Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter, even if the sponsor has been the subject of an expulsion order on grounds of public policy or public security, since the personal conduct of those family members is not subject to concerns similar to the conduct of their original sponsor.
B.      Third question
70.      By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether
a
father’s expulsion
must be reviewed, pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Citizenship Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter, in order to take account of the fact that his spouse and children wish to remain in the host Member State on the basis of their independent or derived
rights of residence, which have become independent of the father’s original sponsorship for their right to remain in that State.
71.      Under Article 28(1) and (2) of the Citizenship Directive, before taking an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or public security, the competent authorities of the host Member State must evaluate the personal situation of the person at issue (such as his or her health, family or financial situation)
and his or her ties with, and level of integration
in, the society of the host Member State, as well as his or her links with his or her country of origin.
72.      Any
decision to expel
an individual
must be proportionate; (22) this involves weighing, on the one hand, the threat posed by the personal conduct of the citizen at issue to the fundamental interests of the host society against, on the other hand, the protection of the rights of Union citizens and their family members under the Workers Regulation, the Citizenship Directive and the Charter.
73.      As the Finnish Government agreed at the hearing, any measure restricting freedom of movement must respect the fundamental right to private and family life under Article 7 of the Charter
as well as the best interests of the child, as protected by Article 24(2) thereof. (23) Excluding an individual from a Member State in which their family resides constitutes a direct interference with those rights. In addition, the Court has already acknowledged that the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. (24)
74.      To my mind, that means that the immigration authority had an obligation to take into consideration the residence rights of both the children and the spouse,
as well as Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter, when making the original decision to expel A.
75.      However, if that authority failed to make such an assessment, its decision must be reassessed once it becomes clear that the family members of the person against whom an expulsion order was adopted have a right to remain in Finland and wish to exercise that right.
76.      That answers the first part of the referring court’s third question: Article 28(1) of the Citizenship Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the conditions for the expulsion order issued against a Union citizen must be re-examined if his or her children and spouse are recognised as having an independent
right of residence in the host Member State after the issuing of that order and where those family members wish to remain in that Member State.
77.      The referring court further asks which particular circumstances must be examined in a situation such as the one in the main proceedings.
78.      First, it is settled case-law that, when assessing the degree of dependency of the individual concerned, national decision-making authorities must comprehensively evaluate all specific circumstances in each individual case. (25) When considering the best interests of the child as an element in a decision to expel one of their parents, the
authorities must
take into consideration the child’s age, his or her
physical and emotional development, the extent of the child’s
emotional ties to a parent and the risks which separation
of the child from that parent might entail for their equilibrium. (26)
79.      In order to conduct that
assessment, the authorities must consider
the impact of the discontinuation of family unity and the children’s ability to maintain contact with both parents. In that respect, consideration may be given to the possibility for
the whole family to move to another (Member)
State, in which case the deciding authorities must take into account the children’s level of integration in Finland.
80.      Before the national court, A and others contend that, in order to maintain family unity, they might have to move to Moldova since not all of them hold Romanian nationality. (27)
81.      In that regard, the Ruiz Zambrano line of case-law
might be relevant. (28) Even if the judgment in that case
itself concerned a static minor who is an EU citizen, that line of case-law generally opposes the removal of EU citizens from the territory of the Member States. Given that F is an EU citizen, compelling the family to move to Moldova would result in consequences contrary to the Ruiz Zambrano
case-law.
82.      The national authorities in the main proceedings must therefore assess whether it is possible for the family to continue living together in Romania. This assessment must not be based on a mere theoretical assumption, but must result from a concrete examination of the situation of all family members. (29)
83.      A factor that the authorities should take into account, on the other side of the balance, is the gravity of the offences committed by the person concerned by the expulsion order. As stated by the Finnish Government at the hearing, in assessing the proportionality of the measure to remove the father, the serious nature of the offence(s) underlying the contested expulsion order is
a significant factor. Where the offence or conduct is less serious, greater weight may be given to preserving family unity, which may even, in certain cases,
take precedence over the need for removal.
84.      In that respect, the Citizenship Directive provides for two different standards which Member States must respect when deciding whether to adopt measures to limit the right of persons to enter or remain in the territory. If a person has resided in the host Member State for less than five years, such a measure may be adopted because of behaviour that is contrary to public policy, public security or public health (Article 27(1) of the Citizenship Directive). However, the expulsion of long-term residents can be decided only on serious grounds of public policy or public security (Article 28(2) of the Citizenship Directive). It is for the referring court to verify whether the first applicant in the main proceedings falls within the first or the second category.
85.      To be exhaustive, as discussed at the hearing, it must be pointed out that Article 33(2) of the Citizenship Directive states that if an expulsion order
is enforced more than two years after it was issued, the Member State must
check that the individual concerned is currently and genuinely posing a threat to public policy or public security and must
assess whether there has been any material change in the circumstances since the expulsion order was issued.
86.      Therefore, even if,
in the proceedings on the appeal, the original decision of the Finnish Immigration Service were to be upheld by the referring court, Article 33(2) of the Citizenship Directive might require a new assessment on the basis of the prevailing circumstances.
87.      It follows that before taking a decision to expel a person from a Member State, the deciding authorities must assess, in a proportionate and balanced manner, the interests of the family concerned as a whole and the best interests of the children, on the one hand, and the interests of the host society, on the other hand. In relation to the former, the authorities must assess that person’s
family circumstances, the reasons for maintaining family unity, the possibility of maintaining family unity in another country, the best interests of the children,
including, where applicable, the wishes of the
spouse and children to remain in the host Member State in which they enjoy a right of residence
independent of the person at issue. In relation to the latter, the authorities must take into account the gravity of the offences, the length of the person’s residence
in the host Member State and his or her cultural and social ties with that State in comparison to the links that person has with his or her country of origin.
IV.    Conclusion
88.      In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court, Finland) as follows:
(1)      Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC
must be interpreted as meaning that it applies only when the decision to remove the sponsor has been executed or is final. Nevertheless, when deciding whether or not to expel an individual, the deciding authorities should take into account the fact that the children, who are enrolled in an educational programme in the host Member State, will acquire an independent right of residence in that State on the basis of that provision once the expulsion order becomes final.
(2)      Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union,
read together with Articles 7
and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
must be interpreted as meaning that,
in the case of a Union citizen who has previously had the status of a worker and has children enrolled at a primary school in the host Member State, those children attending school, their parent who has actual custody of them, as well as their siblings attending a day-care centre
still enjoy their right of residence until the children complete their studies, even if the parent who is a Union citizen and previously had the status of worker has been the subject of an order by the immigration authority for his or her expulsion from the host Member State on the ground that he or she represents a threat to public policy or public security.
(3)      Article 28(1) of
Directive 2004/38, read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
must be interpreted as meaning that the conditions for the expulsion of a Union citizen must be re-examined if his or her children and his or her spouse are recognised as having an independent right of residence in the host Member State after the issuing of the expulsion order and where those family members wish to remain in that Member State.
When re-examining a decision, the deciding authorities or the national court must take into account, in a proportionate and balanced manner, the interests of the family concerned as a whole as well as the best interests of the children, on the one hand, and the interests of the host society, on the other hand. In relation to the former, the authorities must assess that person’s family circumstances, the reasons for maintaining family unity, the possibility of maintaining family unity in another country, the best interests of the children,
including, where applicable, the wishes of
the spouse and children to remain in the host Member State in which they enjoy a right of residence independent of the person at issue. In relation to the latter, the authorities must take into account the gravity of the offences, the length of the person’s residence
in the host Member State and his or her cultural and social ties with that State in comparison to the links that person has with his or her country of origin.
1      Original language: English.
i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.
2      Directive
2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34, and OJ 2007 L 204, p. 28; ‘the
Citizenship Directive’).
3      Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (OJ 2011 L 141, p. 1;
‘the Workers Regulation’).
4      In that regard, it seems that when the decision of 22 November 2022 was adopted, A had been living in Finland
for a period of four and a half years, so did not qualify for the permanent residence status, and nor did his family members who joined him later.
5      See, to that effect, judgments of 17 September 2002, Baumbast and R (C‑413/99, EU:C:2002:493, paragraph 63), and of 6 October 2020, Jobcenter Krefeld (C‑181/19, ‘the judgment in Jobcenter Krefeld’, EU:C:2020:794, paragraph 35).
6      See, to that effect, the judgment in Jobcenter Krefeld, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited.
7      See, to that effect, the judgment in Jobcenter Krefeld, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited.
8      See, to that effect, the judgment in Jobcenter Krefeld,
paragraph 35 and the case-law cited.
9      The judgment in Jobcenter Krefeld,  paragraph 35 and the case-law cited; emphasis added.
10      In French: ‘lorsqu’il souhaite poursuivre des cours d’enseignement général dans cet État membre’; in German: ‘wenn es weiter am allgemeinen Unterricht in diesem Mitgliedstaat teilnehmen möchte’; in Croatian: ‘kada ono želi nastaviti s općim obrazovanjem u toj državi članici’; and in Italian: ‘qualora intenda proseguire corsi di insegnamento generale in tale Stato membro’.
11      See, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2002, Baumbast and
R (C‑413/99, EU:C:2002:493, paragraph 53). For a similar reasoning, see Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Baumbast and R (C‑413/99, EU:C:2001:385, point 62). Incidentally, this echoes the wording of Article 12(3) of the Citizenship Directive and the hypothesis that provision aims to protect.
12      On the split of competences between Member States and the European Union in the field of education, see my Opinions in Commission v Hungary (Values of the European Union) (C‑769/22, EU:C:2025:408, point 56) and in Commission v Slovakia (Ethnic discrimination in the area of education) (C‑799/23, EU:C:2025:621, point 67), highlighting that the European Union only has supportive competences in that field. For a confirmation of such stance, see judgment of 21 April 2026, Commission v Hungary (Values of the European Union) (C‑769/22, EU:C:2026:326, paragraph 272 and the case-law cited).
13      Ristuccia, F.,
‘Ties that bind and ties that compel: Dependency and the Ruiz Zambrano doctrine’, Common Market Law Review, 2023, 5, pp. 1227-1268, in particular p. 1252.
14      See, in that regard, my Opinion in Safi (C‑147/24, EU:C:2025:650, points 97 to 99 and the case-law cited).
15      Judgment of 5 May 2022 (C‑451/19 and C‑532/19, EU:C:2022:354).
16      See, to that effect, the judgment in Jobcenter Krefeld, paragraph 38. That means that B, C, D, E, F and G do not all have to fulfil the conditions set out by the Workers Regulation and the Citizenship Directive.
17      However, it can be discerned from the Commission’s
Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal for the Citizenship Directive that this provision was motivated by the care for children who have already adapted to the education system in the host Member State and might have problems adapting to a new system;
therefore, that provision aims to avoid
penalising such children because their parent, a Union citizen,
leaves the territory of the host Member State for professional or other reasons. See, to that effect, European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum  to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (COM(2001) 257 final) (OJ 2001 C 270 E, p. 150);
available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52001PC0257.
18      Council Directive of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health (OJ, English Special Edition 1963-1964, p. 117).
19      Emphasis added.
20      See, for instance, judgments of 28 October 1975, Rutili (36/75, EU:C:1975:137, paragraph 19), and of 27 October 1977, Bouchereau (30/77, EU:C:1977:172, paragraph 28).
21      See, recently, for example, judgment of 13 June 2024, Pedro Francisco (C‑62/23, EU:C:2024:502, paragraph 32).
22      The obligation to respect the principle of proportionality is clearly stated in Article 27(2) of the Citizenship Directive, even though such an obligation already flows from Article 52(1) of the Charter, which requires that any limitation
on the right to free movement must comply with the principle of proportionality.
23      See, to that effect, judgments of 23 November 2010, Tsakouridis (C‑145/09, EU:C:2010:708, paragraph 52), and of 25 November 2025, Wojewoda Mazowiecki (C‑713/23, EU:C:2025:917, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
24      See, for instance, judgment of 21 December 2023, GN (Ground for refusal based on the best interests of the child) (C‑261/22, EU:C:2023:1017, paragraph 41).
25      See, to that effect, judgments of 13 September 2016, Rendón Marín (C‑165/14, EU:C:2016:675, paragraph 85); of 5 May 2022, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo (Residence of a family member – Insufficient resources) (C‑451/19 and C‑532/19, EU:C:2022:354, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited); and of 25 April 2024, NW and PQ (Classified information) (C‑420/22 and C‑528/22, EU:C:2024:344,  paragraph 77).
26      See, to that effect, judgment of 10 May 2017, Chavez-Vilchez and Others (C‑133/15, EU:C:2017:354, paragraph 71). See also, inter alia,  judgments of 8 May 2018, K.A. and
Others (Family reunification in Belgium) (C‑82/16, EU:C:2018:308, paragraph 72); of 7 September 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Nature of the right of residence under Article 20 TFEU) (C‑624/20, EU:C:2022:639, paragraphs 38 and 39); and of 22 June 2023, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Thai mother of a Dutch minor child)
(C‑459/20, EU:C:2023:499,
paragraph 48).
27      In that respect, to the best of my knowledge, if, for historical reasons, Moldovan nationals receive special treatment in terms of naturalisation in Romania, they have no privilege when it comes to residence permits. See Article 11(1) of Legea nr. 21/1991 a cetăţeniei române (Law No 21/1991 on Romanian citizenship), last amended by Lege nr. 14/2025 (Law No 14/2025) of 12 March 2025.
28      Judgment of 8 March 2011, Ruiz Zambrano (C‑34/09, EU:C:2011:124).
29      See, to that effect, my Opinion in Safi (C‑147/24, EU:C:2025:650, points 81 to 84).