ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
22 October 2025 (*)
( Interim relief – Public service contracts – Tendering procedure – Banking and information technology services, consulting, software development, Internet and support – Application for interim measures – Balancing of competing interests )
In Case T‑526/25 R,
equensWorldline SE Germany, established in Frankfurt am Main (Germany), represented by R. Martens and P. Darras, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Central Bank (ECB), represented by I. Köpfer and J. Krumrey, acting as Agents, and by P. Friton, lawyer,
defendant,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
having regard to the order of 21 August 2025, equensWorldline v ECB (T‑526/25 R, not published),
makes the following
Order
1        By its application based on Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, equensWorldline SE Germany, seeks, first, the suspension of operation of the decision of the Procurement Review Body of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 22 July 2025 dismissing its appeal against the ECB decision of 13 June 2025 awarding contract PRO-009486 (‘the public contract at issue’) and of that decision (together, ‘the contested decisions’) and, second, the adoption of any other interim measure for the protection of its rights, including the suspension of operation of the potentially signed agreement between the ECB and the successful tenderer.
Background to the dispute and forms of order sought by the parties
2        The applicant, who is part of the Worldline SA group, provides advanced payment technologies and transactional solutions worldwide.
3        On 3 January 2024, by a public contract notice published in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ S 4400/2024), the ECB launched the call for tenders for a public service contract entitled ‘Digital euro – Secure Exchange of Payment Information’, to be awarded through a negotiated procedure with prior publication of a call for competition/competitive procedure with negotiation.
4        That procurement procedure is one of the five tenders that the ECB launched and conducted in parallel relating to the digital euro.
5        The tender was conducted in two stages.
6        In the first stage, the application stage, tenderers submitted their application, which was assessed against the formal, eligibility and selection criteria.
7        Thirty-three applications were received by the ECB within the deadline for submission of applications by 21 February 2024, including the applicant’s. The ECB selected the seven most suitable candidates, including the applicant, and invited them to tender.
8        In the second stage, the award stage, the invitation to tender encouraged tenderers to submit questions to the ECB on any aspect of the tender procedure, the business case or the tender documentation, by 10 September 2024.
9        The four initial offers were assessed against the formal and award criteria in order to award the public contract at issue to the tenderers offering the most economically advantageous tenders.
10      Pursuant to Chapter IV, Section 1.4 of the invitation to tender, following the evaluation of the written tenders, the ECB may award the contracts without negotiations or invite tenderers for a presentation and negotiations.
11      The current negotiations were conducted from 2 to 6 December 2024. A first virtual negotiation meeting with the applicant took place on 6 December 2024.
12      After a first negotiations round, tenderers were invited, inter alia, to submit a revised, indicative, non-binding offer by 21 January 2025 at the latest.
13      The revised offers were again assessed against the formal and award criteria.
14      The procurement committee decided to invite once again all four tenderers to a second round of parallel negotiations, this time to be conducted as written negotiations, that is to say, with observations being provided to the tenderers only in writing for their consideration and eventual inclusion in a revised offer. An invitation to submit a revised binding offer was sent to the tenderers on 7 April 2025.
15      All four tenderers, including the applicant, submitted a revised binding offer within the deadline expiring on 28 April 2025.
16      The procurement committee concluded its evaluation with the finding that a tenderer other than the applicant had submitted the most economically advantageous tender and was therefore to be awarded a framework agreement with the first ranking position, whereas the applicant had submitted the second most economically advantageous tender and was to be awarded a framework agreement with the second ranking position.
17      On 13 June 2025, the ECB sent to the applicant a first outcome letter, awarding it the second framework contract. The applicant was thus ranked second.
18      On 16 June 2025, the applicant requested further information from the ECB about the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender.
19      On 18 June 2025, the ECB responded to that request.
20      On 23 June 2025, the applicant submitted an appeal to the ECB’s Procurement Review Body against the letter of 13 June 2025.
21      On 22 July 2025, the ECB’s Procurement Review Body communicated its decision to the applicant, in which that body found that the decision of the procurement committee to award a contract to the applicant as second ranked tenderer complied with the procedural rules and the duty to give reasons, and relied on correct facts and valid substantive reasons, and that there were no indications of serious or manifest errors in the procurement committee’s assessment or a misuse of powers.
22      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 31 July 2025, the applicant brought an action seeking the annulment of the contested decisions.
23      By a separate document, lodged at the Court Registry on the same date, the applicant brought the present application for interim measures, in which it claims that the President of the Court should:
–        order the suspension of operation of the contested decisions;
–        adopt any further necessary interim measures for the protection of its rights, including the suspension of operation of the potentially signed agreement between the ECB and the successful tenderer;
–        order the ECB to pay all the costs.
24      In its observations on the application for interim measures, which were lodged at the Court Registry on 15 August 2025, the ECB contends that the President of the Court should:
–        dismiss the application for interim measures as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded;
–        order the applicant to pay all the costs.
Law
General considerations
25      It is apparent from Articles 278 and 279 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, pursuant to Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. However, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since measures adopted by the institutions of the European Union enjoy a presumption of legality. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the Court or prescribe any interim measures (order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12).
26      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.
27      Thus, the suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures may be ordered by the judge hearing the application if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached on the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. Where appropriate, the judge hearing such an application must also weigh the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
28      In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application has a wide discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
29      Having regard to the material in the case file, the President of the Court considers that he has all the information needed to rule on the present application for interim measures without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties.
The specific features of proceedings relating to public procurement
30      Having regard to the requirements which follow from the effective protection which must be guaranteed in public procurement matters, the view must be taken that, when an unsuccessful tenderer is able to show that there is a particularly serious prima facie case, it cannot be required to establish that the rejection of its application for interim measures risks causing it irreparable damage, otherwise the effective legal protection which it enjoys pursuant to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union would be undermined in a manner that is both excessive and unjustified (order of 1 December 2021, Inivos and Inivos v Commission, C‑471/21 P(R), EU:C:2021:984, paragraph 65).
31      Nevertheless, that easing of the conditions applicable in the assessment of whether there is urgency, which is justified by the right to an effective judicial remedy and which applies, as a rule, only during the pre-contractual phase (see, to that effect, order of 23 April 2015, Commission v Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275, paragraphs 34 and 42), does not exempt the applicant from the obligation to establish the seriousness of the harm that would be caused by dismissal of its application for interim measures (order of 26 September 2017, Wall Street Systems UK v ECB, T‑579/17 R, not published, EU:T:2017:668, paragraph 19).
32      In the present case, it must be noted that the applicant brought the application for interim measures after the closure of the call for tenders and before the contract was signed, that is to say during the pre-contractual phase.
33      Assuming that the applicant has demonstrated the existence of a particularly serious prima facie case and the requisite urgency, it is necessary, in the circumstances of the present case, to examine the condition relating to the balance of interests.
Balance of interests
34      It is settled case-law that, in weighing up the different interests involved, the judge hearing the application for interim relief has to determine, in particular, whether or not the interest of the party seeking suspension of operation of the contested measure in securing that suspension outweighs the interest in the immediate application of the measure, by examining, more specifically, whether the possible annulment of the measure by the Court when ruling on the main application would allow the situation that would be brought about by its immediate implementation to be reversed and, conversely, whether suspension of operation of the measure would prevent it from being fully effective in the event of the main action being dismissed (see order of 11 March 2013, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑110/12 R, EU:T:2013:118, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
35      It must therefore be examined whether the applicant’s interests in obtaining the immediate suspension of the contested decisions outweigh the interests pursued by the ECB in adopting those measures.
36      As regards the interests pursued by the applicant, the latter submits, in the first place, that through the award of the public contract at issue with a total value amounting up to EUR 58 million to another tenderer, following an award procedure vitiated by several irregularities, it would be deprived of the significant revenue and important references it could have obtained if the public contract at issue had been awarded to it, in the absence of suspension. Additionally, the award of the contract to another tenderer would substantially modify the current market conditions and the market share. The suspension, followed by the annulment of the contested decisions, warrants a repeat of the procurement procedure on the basis of amended conditions, allowing it to compete in a context of equal treatment, non-discrimination and fair competition.
37      In the second place, according to the applicant, suspension of operation of the contested decisions would also not be able to prevent the contested decisions from being fully effective in the event of the action for annulment being dismissed. Moreover, the EU’s financial interests would be better protected by a suspension of the contested decisions than by its annulment in the main proceedings. An annulment in the main proceedings would require the ECB to compensate it for the damage caused by the irregularities in the award procedure, on top of the costs of the signed contract. The public contract at issue, since it is being awarded for a period of 10 years, which is required for the roll-out of the digital euro, demonstrates the context of a lack of urgency in which the digital euro is to be established. No EU citizen, consumer or company will be affected by the possibly later implementation of a secure exchange of payment information component of the digital euro. A digital euro as such does not exist yet, and is a mere electronic equivalent to the already existing ‘cash’, complementing banknotes and coins giving people an additional choice on how to pay. Bearing in mind the existence of several other electronic alternatives to pay, no urgency arises in the establishment of the digital euro. Furthermore, no interests will be harmed by temporarily suspending the award of the public contract at issue.
38      As regards the ECB’s interests, the latter submits, in the first place, that the establishment of the digital euro is a measure that is necessary to ensure the use of the euro as a single currency in the digital age. The objective of this proposal is to ensure that central bank money with the status of legal tender remains available to the general public, while offering a state-of-the-art and cost-efficient payment means, ensuring a high level of privacy in digital payments, maintaining financial stability and promoting accessibility and financial inclusion.
39      The ECB adds that the development and adoption of the digital euro service platform would serve an important public interest, namely the public interest in the issuance by the Eurosystem of digital public money and ultimately in strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty of the euro area.
40      According to the ECB, since the European Union currently has no domestic digital payment option and most euro area countries rely on card systems provided by international providers, the introduction of the digital euro is essential to strengthen the euro area and support Europe’s strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty.
41      The ECB states that the currently ongoing first stage of the digital euro preparation phase will end on 1 November 2025. The next stage that would ensue, in case of a positive decision of the ECB Governing Council, would involve the start of the development of the digital euro service platform and therefore presuppose that contracts with relevant providers are in place. It is with the view to such an upcoming decision of the ECB Governing Council that the timeline of the digital euro project foresaw the selection of service providers by the end of the second quarter of 2025.
42      In addition, the ECB submits that a significant delay in the award of the contracts in one procurement procedure would risk substantially upsetting the delivery plan, slowing the progress of the entire project, and creating additional costs, due to fees being incurred with other providers while the interested parties wait for the development of the missing component.
43      The ECB concludes that a swift conclusion of the procurement procedure is therefore required to enable the advancement of the digital euro project. Given the importance of the objectives pursued therewith, there is a strong public interest in concluding the procurement procedure and awarding the contracts without delay.
44      In the second place, the ECB submits that the European Union’s financial interests are not interests that may be invoked by the applicant as part of the balancing of interests. Only the applicant’s private commercial interests may be validly invoked by the applicant.
45      In the third place, the ECB submits that Article 2d(3) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 33) gives specific expression to the general principle of EU law that overriding reasons relating to a general interest can override the interests of a bidder, even if the contract would have been awarded in breach of the procurement rules. That provision is in line with the case-law where the EU Courts have regularly refused to suspend public procurement contracts, even in cases of manifest infringements of EU law, when there is an overriding public policy interest at stake.
46      In the present case, it must be held that the balance of interests weighs in favour of the ECB for the following reasons.
47      First, as regards the interests invoked by the applicant, it must be observed that the agreement covered by the public contract at issue has a certain financial interest and is part of an important and prestigious project. It is therefore understandable that the applicant should make use of the rights of action conferred on it by Articles 263 and 278 TFEU in order to ensure that it can still participate in that procurement procedure.
48      The fact remains that this is a private interest of a financial nature. Moreover, that interest refers to hypothetical events. Even if the Court were to follow the applicant’s reasoning by annulling the contested decisions, the reopening of the public procurement procedure at issue does not mean that the public contract at issue would be awarded to the applicant. Like any economic operator, the applicant must always take account of the possibility of that contract being awarded to another tenderer, since the possible rejection of its tender in such a procedure is, in principle, part of the normal commercial risk.
49      Second, the applicant’s entirely legitimate financial and commercial interest must be weighed against the public interest put forward by the ECB. That interest concerns the realisation of the digital euro project.
50      The ECB states, in that regard, that the public contract at issue is not an isolated public contract, but is part of an overall plan for the launch of the digital euro which requires the creation of a technical platform for the issuance and redemption of the digital euro. That project requires the mobilisation of several external providers selected for their different components. The delay in awarding one of the contracts thus affects the timeline for the project as a whole and the related delivery plan. The suspension of the contested decisions in the present case would thus risk disrupting the progress of the entire project.
51      The applicant’s argument that the introduction of the digital euro is not particularly urgent, in particular for consumers and businesses in the European Union, cannot succeed. The ECB Governing Council initiated the project in 2023 on the basis of a tight timeline for a decision on the next stage at the end of 2025. That project involves a large number of stakeholders, including the central banks of the Member States. The suspension of the contested decisions would therefore risk affecting a large number of actors.
52      In addition, it must be pointed out, as did the ECB, that the introduction of the digital euro and the related public contracts serve a public interest which has grown considerably in the current geopolitical context in which electronic payment transactions in the euro area depend on the services provided by international actors. The digital euro project thus contributes to strengthening the strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty of the euro area.
53      In the light of those factors, it must therefore be concluded that the balance of competing interests leans in favour of not granting the interim measures sought.
54      It follows from all the foregoing that the application for interim measures must be dismissed.
55      In accordance with Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved.
On those grounds,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
hereby orders:
1.      The application for interim measures is dismissed.
2.      The costs are reserved.
Luxembourg, 22 October 2025.
V. Di Bucci
M. van der Woude
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.