JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
25 November 2020(*)
(Institutional law – European Parliament – Decision declaring certain expenses of a political party ineligible for a grant for the year 2017 – Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 – Prohibition of the funding of a national political party – Contribution or donation by a national political party – Principle of sound administration – Legal certainty – Equal treatment – Decision granting a contribution to a political party for 2019 and making pre-funding of 100% of the maximum amount of the contribution subject to certain prior repayments – Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 – Rights of defence)
In Case T‑107/19,
Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE), established in Brussels (Belgium), represented by E. Plasschaert and É. Montens, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Parliament, represented by C. Burgos and S. Alves, acting as Agents,
defendant,
supported by
Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations, represented by
M. Adam and
A. Cilea, acting as Agents,
intervener,
APPLICATION pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking, first, partial annulment of the decision of the Parliament of 10 December 2018 declaring certain expenditure ineligible for the purposes of a grant for 2017 and ordering repayment of a donation and, secondly, of Parliament Decision FINS-2019-5, notified to the applicant on 14 January 2019, concerning the award of a contribution to the applicant for 2019, in so far as that decision makes pre-funding equivalent to 100% of the maximum amount of the contribution subject to certain prior repayments,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),
composed of A.M. Collins (Rapporteur), President, V. Kreuschitz and G. De Baere, Judges,
Registrar: B. Lefebvre, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 25 June 2020,
gives the following
Judgment
Background to the dispute
1        Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE), the applicant, is registered as a European political party within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the regulations governing European political parties and the rules regarding their funding (OJ 2014 L 317, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 May 2018 (OJ 2018 L 114I, p. 1), with the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations. Although it has had that name since 7 July 2017, it was founded on 1 October 2009 as the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists as a political party at European level within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding (OJ 2003 L 297, p. 1).
2        On 28 September 2016, the applicant submitted an application for funding from the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2017. By Decision FINS-2017-9a, it was awarded a grant of up to EUR 2 468 649.38, which was equivalent to 79.51% of the total estimated expenditure eligible for funding.
3        At the end of the 2017 financial year, the European Parliament appointed an external auditor to carry out a verification of the applicant’s financial statements. The auditor issued an unqualified opinion on 28 May 2018.
4        Following that opinion, the Parliament’s Directorate General (DG) Finance carried out additional checks and controls.
5        By letter of 25 October 2018 addressed to the applicant, DG Finance described the expenditure which did not satisfy the conditions necessary to qualify for funding in accordance with Regulation No 2004/2003 and the Decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 29 March 2004 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation No 2004/2003 (OJ 2014 C 63, p. 1) (‘the Bureau Decision of 29 March 2004’).
6        The applicant submitted its observations on 5 November 2018.
7        On 30 November 2018, the Secretary General of the Parliament addressed a note to the Members of the Bureau of the Parliament (‘the Bureau’) proposing to approve the 2017 Final Reports for five beneficiaries of Union funds, including the applicant, taking into account the proposed adjustments, to determine the amount of the final grants and to order the payment or recovery of the sums due and to take the additional measures relating thereto (‘the Note of 30 November 2018 concerning the 2017 Final Reports’).
8        By decision of 10 December 2018, notified to the applicant on 12 December 2018, the Bureau calculated the applicant’s final grant for the year 2017 (‘the first contested decision’). It reclassified the following expenditure as ineligible for funding:
–        the amount of EUR 108 985.58 relating to the study on the attitudes of minority groups in the United Kingdom in the Union (‘the minority group attitudes survey’);
–        the amount of EUR 122 295.10 relating to the ‘UK Trade Partnerships Conference, Pakistan as a Digital Powerhouse’ held in London (United Kingdom) on 8 March 2017 (‘the London conference’);
–        the amount of EUR 249 589.17 relating to the conference entitled ‘Conservatives International – Miami conference of 26-27 May 2017’ (‘the Miami conference’);
–        the amount of
EUR 91 546.58 relating to the conference ‘Conservatives International – Kampala conference of 13-15 July 2017’ (‘the Kampala conference’).
It also considered that the payment to the applicant by the Prosperous Armenia Party (‘the PAP’) of a membership fee
of EUR 133 043.80 was subject to the ceiling of EUR 12 000 applicable to donations and that the applicant should return the amount exceeding EUR 12 000 to that member, namely the sum of EUR 121 043.80.
9        In the meantime, the applicant had submitted an application to the Parliament for funding for the year 2019.
10      In that regard, on 30 November 2018, the Secretary General of the Parliament provided a signed note to the members of the Bureau proposing to approve the granting of contributions to 10 European political parties for the year 2019 (‘the Note of 30 November 2018 on the granting of contributions for the year 2019’). The Secretary General of the Parliament proposed to limit the pre-funding of the applicant in order to guarantee the reimbursement of the sums due for the financial year 2017.
11      At its meeting on 10 December 2018, the Bureau adopted Decision FINS-2019-5 granting funding of up to EUR 4 422 345.38 to the applicant for the financial year 2019 (‘the second contested decision’). Pursuant to the measures laid down in Article I.5.1 of that decision (‘the measures at issue’), the payment of pre-funding equivalent to the entire maximum amount was subject, first, to the prior reimbursement to the Parliament of the sum of EUR 535 609.48 due for the financial year 2017 and, secondly, to the prior reimbursement to the PAP of the sums unduly received by the applicant from that entity, namely EUR 121 043.80. According to Article I.5.1, the repayments were to be made before 15 January 2019. In the event of non-compliance with that condition, the pre-funding instalment was limited to an amount of EUR 3 758 993.66, representing 85% of the maximum amount of funding. The second contested decision was signed by the President of the Parliament on 11 January 2019. It was notified to the applicant by letter dated 14 January 2019.
12      In January 2019, the applicant paid EUR 535 609.48 to the Parliament and EUR 121 043.80 to the PAP. Those payments were made without prejudice to the present action.
Procedure and forms of order sought
13      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 20 February
2019, the applicant brought the present action.
14      By act lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 5 June 2019, the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations applied for leave to intervene in this case in support of the form of order sought by the Parliament.
15      By order of 16 September
2019, the President of the Eighth Chamber of the General Court granted the application for leave to intervene.
16      As a result of changes in the composition of the chambers of the General Court pursuant to Article 27(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the Judge-Rapporteur was assigned to the Third Chamber, to which the present case was accordingly allocated.
17      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the first contested decision in so far as it declares the following expenditure ineligible for funding:
–        the amount of EUR 108 985.58 for the minority group attitudes survey;
–        the amount of EUR 122 295.10 relating to the London conference;
–        the amount of EUR 249 589.17 relating to the Miami conference (United States);
–        the amount of EUR 91 546.58 relating to the Kampala conference (Uganda);
–        annul the first contested decision in so far as it finds that the payment by the PAP of a contribution in the amount of EUR 133 043.80 was subject to the EUR 12 000 ceiling applicable to donations and that the applicant had to return the amount exceeding the sum of EUR 12 000 to that member, namely the sum of EUR 121 043.80;
–        annul the second contested decision in so far as it makes the payment of pre-funding equivalent to the entire maximum amount of the applicant’s contribution subject to the reimbursement, before 15 January
2019, of the sum of EUR 535 609.48 to the Parliament and of any undue payment received from the PAP and, consequently, annul Article I.5.1 of that decision;
–        order the Parliament to pay the costs.
18      The Parliament and the intervener contend that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action as unfounded;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The application for partial annulment of the first contested decision
19      In support of the application for partial annulment of the first contested decision, the applicant puts forward 13 pleas in law.
The first plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of sound administration and equal treatment
20      The applicant submits that the Parliament, in adopting the first contested decision, infringed the principle of sound administration, Article 7 of the Bureau decision of 29 March 2004, Article II.14 of Decision FINS-2017-9a and its rights of defence.
21      The Parliament and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
22      The applicant’s plea in law is subdivided into three parts, which must be examined in turn. The allegations that the applicant was discriminated against will be examined in the fifth, seventh, tenth and thirteenth pleas in law relating to the first contested decision, since those allegations have been substantiated by reference to concrete examples raised in the context of those pleas.
23      By the first part of the present plea in law, the applicant complains, in substance, that it was not given the opportunity to make known its views on the content of Annex 5a to the Note of 30 November 2018 concerning the 2017 Final Reports, entitled ‘Note to the file concerning the ACRE party’, in which DG Finance invoked new elements and arguments in relation to its letter of 25 October 2018. It notes the following four examples of new information:
–        the independent audit company essentially gives, in the case of an unqualified opinion, formal and reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the beneficiary have been drawn up in accordance with national accounting provisions;
–        the rules for donations or contributions to European political foundations are more flexible than those for European political parties;
–        the legal pursuit of political objectives in the Member States corresponds to participation in local, regional or national elections in the Member States;
–        activities carried out by other beneficiaries in 2017 have also been reclassified as ineligible expenditure for funding, resulting in a reduction in the amount of their final grant.
24      It should be noted that the applicant’s argument relating to the first examplehas no factual basis
. The information that the independent audit company gives formal and reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the beneficiary were drawn up in accordance with the national accounting provisions is not new, but was already apparent from the audit report itself, which states, on the first page, under the heading ‘Unqualified opinion’, that the financial statements were drawn up in accordance with the accounting rules applicable in Belgium. The fact that the report also mentions Regulation No 2004/2003 and the ‘International Standards on Auditing’ does not affect that finding.
25      In addition, it should be recalled that Article 7(1) of the Bureau decision of 29 March 2004 and Article II.14.1 of the FINS-2017-9a decision stipulate, in essence, that the Bureau is to decide the amount of the final grant to be awarded to the beneficiary of Union funds only after hearing the representatives of the beneficiary concerned who so request. Furthermore, under Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), everyone has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union. Under paragraph 2(a) of that article, the right to good administration includes the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would adversely affect him or her is taken in his or her regard. Lastly, respect for the rights of the defence is a general principle of Union law which applies whenever the administration proposes to adopt an act adversely affecting a person. By virtue of that principle, the addressees of decisions which significantly affect their interests must be given the opportunity to make known their point of view regarding the elements on which the administration intends to base its decision. To that end, they must be given sufficient time (see judgment of 18 December 2008, Sopropé, C‑349/07, EU:C:2008:746, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited).
26      The allegedly new information listed in paragraph 23 above is not information on which the administration intended to base its decision within the meaning of the aforementioned case-law. In the present case, it is an internal note to the members of the Bureau explaining why the position of DG Finance, already set out in its letter of 25 October 2018, should prevail despite the arguments set out in the applicant’s observations. That approach is consistent with respect for the right to be heard, which implies that the administration should pay due attention to the observations submitted by the applicant by examining, with care and impartiality, all the relevant elements of the case (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 December 2008, Sopropé, C‑349/07, EU:C:2008:746, paragraph 50).
27      Therefore, the Parliament cannot be held liable for an infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence in that respect.
28      By the second part of the present plea in law, the applicant claims that DG Finance erroneously failed to communicate to the members of the Bureau the documents attached to the applicant’s letter of 5 November 2018, which would have been essential to its understanding.
29      It should be noted, as observed by the Parliament, that the applicant’s letter of 5 November 2018 and its annex were communicated under cover of the Note of 30 November 2018 concerning the 2017 Final Reports, intended for the Bureau. The attachments referred to by the applicant, which were not communicated under cover of that note, consisted of a printed version of online pages and hyperlinks mentioned in the footnotes to the applicant’s observations of 5 November 2018. It should be noted that, even if that information was essential to the understanding of the observations, the applicant does not deny that the members of the Bureau could consult the online pages on the internet. They were therefore sufficiently informed of the applicant’s position and, therefore, its right to be heard was respected.
30      By the third part of the present plea in law, the applicant claims that the deadline expiring on 5 November 2018 for replying to the letter from DG Finance of 25 October 2018, a period including only four working days, was not sufficient. Moreover, at that stage, DG Finance had not yet drawn any final conclusions which it could have communicated to the applicant.
31      It should be noted that the deadline granted by the Parliament to provide observations in response to a letter must take into account the complexity as well as the volume of the allegations and factual elements raised (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 February 2018, Institute for Direct Democracy in Europe v Parliament, T‑118/17, not published, EU:T:2018:76, paragraph 39). That assessment must also take into account the factual context in which the request for observations is made.
32      In the present case, the letter of 25 October 2018 raised objections to a prohibited donation and four expenses that were ineligible for funding. The facts regarding that donation and those expenses were already known to the applicant. As the applicant acknowledged, the Parliament had, prior to the letter of 25 October 2018, addressed questions to it about the donation and expenses, suggesting that it had objections to them. In those circumstances, the applicant’s deadline for replying was not too short. The fact that DG Finance had not come to any final conclusions
has no bearing on that finding since the rule that the addressee of a decision adversely affecting him or her must be given the opportunity to submit his or her observations before the decision is taken is intended to enable him or her to correct an error or to submit such information relating to his or her personal circumstances as will argue in favour of the decision being adopted or not, or in favour of its having a specific content (judgment of 18 December 2008, Sopropé, C‑349/07, EU: C:2008:746, paragraph 49).
33      It follows that the first plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.
The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the second subparagraph of Article 9(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003
34      The applicant points out that the external auditor’s task was to verify that it had complied with its obligations under Regulation No 2004/2003 and that the reason why the external auditor did not make any observations regarding the donation exceeding EUR 12 000 and the ineligible expenditure was the latter’s compliance with that regulation. Pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 9(3) of that regulation, the Parliament should not only have examined the applicant’s expenditure objectively and assessed the arguments in its favour, which might derive from the external audit report, but should also have indicated in the first contested decision the reasons why that report was erroneous.
35      According to the applicant, the fact that the Parliament underestimated the importance of the external audit report can be seen from the ‘Note to the file concerning the ACRE party’, in which DG Finance wrongly stated that the report provided above all a formal and reasonable assurance, in the event of an unqualified opinion, that the financial statements of the beneficiary had been drawn up in accordance with national accounting provisions. On the contrary, according to the applicant, that report was primarily concerned with the conformity of the financial statements with Regulation No 2004/2003.
36      The Parliament and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
37      It should be noted that Article 9(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003 provides that the control of funding granted to the applicant under that regulation is to be exercised in accordance with the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules. Furthermore, control is exercised on the basis of an annual certification by an external and independent auditor.
38      Under Article 6(3) of the Bureau decision of 29 March 2004, the beneficiary of a grant is obliged to submit a final report consisting of a report on the implementation of the work programme, a financial statement of eligible expenditure, a summary statement of income and expenditure, a list specifying donors and their donations, a list of contracts and an external audit report.
39      It follows from Article 6(4)(a) and (e) of the Bureau decision of 29 March 2004 that the role of the external audit report is, in particular, to certify that, first, the financial statements have been drawn up in accordance with the national law applicable to the beneficiary and, secondly, that the obligations arising from Regulation No 2004/2003 have been complied with.
40      It should be noted that the applicant does not dispute that the control of the funding granted to it was carried out, inter alia, on the basis of the external audit report. It has to be noted that the external audit report is only one element to be taken into account in the evaluation of the final amount of the grant to be awarded to the beneficiary.
41      Therefore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Parliament did not underestimate the importance of the external audit report.
42      Furthermore, as can be seen from the Note to the file concerning the ACRE party, in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Bureau decision of 29 March 2004, the Bureau decides on the amount of the final grant to be awarded to the beneficiary on the basis of the documents referred to in Article 6(3) of that decision, without prejudice to information obtained subsequently in the course of controls and audits.
43      Furthermore, it should be noted that the external audit report does not contain any explicit reasoning concerning the amount paid by the PAP and, contrary to what the applicant claims, no conclusion can therefore be drawn from that report as to the conformity of the amount paid by the PAP to the applicant. It follows that the Parliament was not obliged to state explicitly in the first contested decision the reasons why it departed from the conclusions of that report.
44      Finally, the applicant has not shown that the Parliament did not examine its expenses objectively.
45      The second plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
The third, fourth and fifth pleas in law, concerning the minority group attitudes survey
46      These pleas in law concern the reclassification as an ineligible expense of the amount relating to the minority group attitudes survey. By the third plea in law, the applicant claims that the first contested decision infringes Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 and is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. By the fourth and fifth pleas in law, it claims that that decision infringes the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment.
–       The third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 and a manifest error of assessment
47      The applicant submits, first, that the Parliament was wrong to consider that the minority group attitudes survey infringed Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 on the ground that it constituted indirect funding of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and, secondly, that it committed a manifest error of assessment in that regard. It raises three complaints in support of the present plea.
48      First, the applicant notes that the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom did not receive the results of the survey in question and therefore could not benefit from it. A ‘wall’ was allegedly erected in July 2016 to ensure that no individual or party could derive political advantage from the applicant’s activities.
49      Secondly, the applicant submits that the survey in question is of great value to it, but not to the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Parliament was wrong to consider that the participants were selected on the basis of their intention to vote for the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. The fact that the survey was conducted solely in the United Kingdom cannot be considered to give rise to a ‘strong suggestion’ that the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom had obtained an indirect advantage.
50      Thirdly, the applicant claims that the Parliament erred in law by considering in this case that an expense was ineligible for funding when there was only a ‘strong suggestion’ of indirect funding of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. It should have relied on actual evidence of an advantage in favour of the national political party in question.
51      The Parliament and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
52      It should be recalled that Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 provides that the funds of political parties at European level from the general budget of the European Union or from any other source may not be used to finance, directly or indirectly, other political parties, and in particular national parties or candidates. Those remain subject to the application of their national regulations.
53      According to the case-law, indirect funding exists where a national political party derives a financial advantage, inter alia by avoiding expenditure which it would have had to incur, even where no funds are directly transferred (judgment of 27 November 2018, Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et des libertés v Parliament, T‑829/16, EU:T:2018:840, paragraph 82; see also judgment of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament, T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
54      In the present case, the Bureau decided that the amount for the minority group attitudes survey was not an eligible expense for funding on the basis of a body of evidence. First, that survey was carried out in only one Member State. Secondly, participants were filtered according to their interest in the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. Thirdly, the vast majority of the questions concerned domestic policy concerns in the United Kingdom. Therefore, that survey was of little interest to the applicant, but was of interest to the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in order to influence the national debate and to prepare an election campaign for the parliamentary elections envisaged at the time. Moreover, while the Parliament does not dispute that the applicant had informed it of the existence of a ‘wall’, it states that its services were never provided with any evidence that the applicant had adopted the practice of not transmitting documentation or that this practice was being followed.
55      First of all, it should be noted that, if the applicant wished to rely on the existence of any internal practice of withholding information to show that the results of the survey in question had not been communicated to the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, it was incumbent on it to provide the Parliament, in good time with all the facts and evidence in support of that assertion. However, the applicant does not dispute that a mere assertion of the existence of a ‘wall’ was not sufficient to establish its existence or application, that evidence was therefore required, and that it had had the opportunity to provide such evidence. In the present case, therefore, the Parliament cannot be criticised for not having requested it.
56      Next, it should be noted that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Parliament was not wrong to consider that the participants in the survey were selected on the basis of their intention to vote for the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. It is apparent from the methodology of the survey that it was based on the holding of focus groups in Birmingham (United Kingdom), Harrow (United Kingdom), Leeds (United Kingdom) and London, bringing together United Kingdom nationals of Indian origin, United Kingdom nationals of Pakistani origin, Afro-Caribbeans, Chinese and Poles. The groups had eight to nine participants. First, each group included no more than three participants who voted for the Conservative Party in 2015. Secondly, there were at least three participants in each group who had considered voting for that party, but ultimately decided not to do so. Thirdly, all the participants would consider voting for that party in future elections. It cannot therefore be excluded that some participants were indeed not entitled to vote in the parliamentary elections. However, the fact remains that the methodology shows that the participants were filtered according to their propensity to vote for the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, which runs counter to the applicant’s argument that the survey was of no value to that party.
57      Furthermore, it should be noted that, contrary to the applicant’s contention, the Parliament could validly consider that the questions concerned essentially domestic policy concerns in the United Kingdom. They can be categorised as follows: first, questions on life in the United Kingdom related to the themes ‘Opportunities’, ‘Challenges’, ‘Equitable Society’, ‘Immigration’; secondly, questions on the United Kingdom National Health Service (NHS) and the school system in the United Kingdom; thirdly, questions on the Brexit referendum related to the motives, risks, consequences and negotiation of an agreement; fourthly, questions on ‘British Values’ such as identity, the importance of religion and race, the role of political parties. The only issues that could possibly be of interest from the point of view of a political party at the European level concerned the referendum on Brexit. However, most of those issues concerned the consequences of Brexit for the United Kingdom. It follows that the survey in question could only be of limited interest to the applicant. On the other hand, it could be of obvious use to the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom.
58      Moreover, in the present case, the scope of the survey and its relevance to the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom was indeed determined by, first, the choice of participants, who were all in the United Kingdom and had been filtered according to their propensity to vote for the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, and, secondly, the questions put to them, most of which concerned aspects of domestic national policy in the United Kingdom. The Parliament was therefore able to take valid account of the fact that the survey was conducted solely in the United Kingdom.
59      Finally, the applicant claims that the Parliament erred in interpreting Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 by considering that an expense was not eligible for funding where there was only a ‘strong suggestion’ of indirect funding of a national political party. The applicant submits, in substance, that the standard of proof used by the Parliament was too low to provide an adequate basis for the conclusions reached in the present case.
60      It should be noted that the intervener rightly emphasised the importance of Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003, which originates in the Declaration on Article 191 of the EC Treaty, according to which the funding of political parties at European level from the European Union budget may not be used for the direct or indirect funding of political parties at national level. That declaration is also quoted in recital 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003. It is clear from the very wording of that provision that that is an absolute prohibition of indirect funding.
61      It must be observed that the application of Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 cannot be made excessively difficult so that its usefulness would be compromised. Accordingly, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Parliament is entitled to rely on a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence, such as that in the present case, set out in paragraph 54 above, to be able to prove to the requisite legal standard the existence of an infringement of Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 November 2018,
Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et des libertés v Parliament, T‑829/16, EU: T:2018:840, paragraph 83, and of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament, T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
62      It follows that the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.
–       The fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty
63      In the context of the third plea in law, the applicant claimed that the Parliament had erroneously interpreted Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 by considering that expenditure was not eligible for funding when there was only a ‘strong suggestion’ of prohibited indirect funding. In the context of the present plea, it submits that that interpretation, even if correct, is unforeseeable and infringes the principle of legal certainty.
64      The Parliament contests the applicant’s arguments.
65      It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations must be respected by the institutions of the Union (see judgment of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). It follows, in particular, that Union legislation must be certain and its application foreseeable for those subject to it, and that requirement for legal certainty is particularly stringent in the case of rules liable to entail financial consequences, so that the persons concerned may know precisely the extent of the obligations it imposes on them (judgments of 15 December 1987, Ireland v
Commission, 325/85, EU: C:1987:546, paragraph 18, and of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 31).
66      The principle of legal certainty, which is one of the general principles of Union law, requires that the rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, so that interested parties can ascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by EU law (see judgment of 7 June 2007, Britannia Alloys & Chemicals v Commission, C‑76/06 P, EU:C:2007:326, paragraph 79
and the case-law cited).
67      In the present case, the applicant does not dispute that the provision in question is clear and precise. It merely disputes the foreseeability of its application.
68      In that regard, it should be noted that the scope of the notion of foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text at issue, the field it covers and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. A law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. In addition, as the Parliament contends, the principle of legal certainty does not preclude Union law from conferring discretion on the competent authority or using undetermined legal concepts which must be interpreted and applied to the case concerned by that authority, without prejudice to review by the EU Courts (see judgment of 27 November 2018, Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et des libertés v Parlement, T‑829/16, EU:T:2018:84, paragraphs 69 and 70 and the case-law cited).
69      In the present case, the question arises whether the applicant could have foreseen, with the aid of expert advice, to a degree reasonable in the circumstances of the case, that the Parliament would interpret Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 as allowing it to establish the existence of direct or indirect funding of a national party on the basis of a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent set of indicia.
70      It should be noted that two factors indicate the predictability of the interpretation adopted by the Parliament, namely, in the first place, the application of that provision in 2016 and, in the second place, the wording and context of the provision in question.
71      The Parliament correctly noted that a poll aimed at a similar target group as the survey at issue had been funded by the applicant through the grant for the 2016 financial year and that the related expenses had been reclassified as ineligible for funding. It appears from the file, in particular from the call for tenders for the minority group attitudes survey, that that survey was intended to explore the topics of that poll.
72      In light of the similarity and connection between the poll and the survey, it must be concluded that the applicant was in a position to foresee that the expenses relating to the survey, like those relating to the poll, would be reclassified as expenses ineligible for funding.
73      Moreover, as already noted in the context of the third plea in law, the intervener rightly emphasised the importance of Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003. There is therefore no doubt that recourse to expert advice would have led to an assessment that the application of Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 could not be made excessively difficult, so that its usefulness would be compromised, and that would be the case if a breach of that provision could only be established by means of actual or direct evidence of an advantage in favour of a national political party.
74      The fourth plea in law should therefore be rejected.
–       The fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment
75      By its fifth plea in law, the applicant claims that the reclassification of the amount relating to the minority group attitudes survey as ineligible expenditure for funding infringes the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. The Parliament applied Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 in a discriminatory manner in that it did not condemn several studies or activities, in particular those of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (‘the FEPS’) and the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (‘the Martens Centre’), which concerned only one Member State and which, in reality, had been organised in cooperation or jointly with a national political party. In the reply, it added, first, that the Parliament did not treat it in the same way as other parties or foundations at European level and, secondly, that the judgment of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament (T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780), indicates that the impartiality of the Bureau is in doubt.
76      The Parliament and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
77      It should be noted that the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of Union law, of which the principle of non-discrimination is a particular expression. That principle requires comparable situations not to be treated differently and different situations not to be treated alike, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 5 July 2017, Fries, C‑190/16, EU:C:2017:513, paragraphs 29 and 30 and the case-law cited).
78      As regards the complaint that the Parliament did not treat the applicant in the same way as the other political parties or foundations at European level during the procedure for the verification of the final reports, it should be noted that that complaint consists merely of a simple assertion unsupported by concrete evidence capable of demonstrating that the Parliament infringed the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. Since that complaint therefore does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, it must be declared inadmissible.
79      As regards the two examples given by the applicant concerning a FEPS study and poll, it should be noted that it does not dispute that they were carried out in 2018 and that the final amount of the grant had not yet been decided at the time the Parliament submitted its defence. It must be held that the applicant cannot rely on hypothetical or future situations to provide a valid basis for an allegation that it was the victim of a breach of the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination.
80      With regard to the Martens Centre study, it should be noted that the Parliament rightly observed that it was not comparable to that of the applicant. Indeed, first, the Martens Centre study was aimed at a better understanding of public opinion in anticipation of European integration, whereas the applicant’s survey of minority attitudes was primarily concerned with domestic policy concerns in the United Kingdom. Secondly, unlike the latter survey, the participants in the Martens Centre study were not selected on the basis of their propensity to vote for a specific political party. Thirdly, the Martens Centre study focused on participants’ attitudes towards the Union, the Euro and the European elections.
81      In the light of those differences, the mere fact that the studies in question both focused on a single Member State does not give rise to comparable situations that cannot be treated differently.
82      It follows that the reclassification of the amount relating to the minority group attitudes survey as an expenditure ineligible for funding does not infringe the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination.
83      As to the argument that it follows from the case giving rise to the judgment of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament (T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780), that the impartiality of the Bureau was in doubt, it suffices to observe that the decision of the Court in that case was specific to the facts of the case, in particular the statements of one of the members of the Bureau.
84      It follows that the fifth plea in law must be rejected as in part unfounded and in part inadmissible.
The sixth and seventh pleas in law, concerning the London conference
85      These pleas concern the reclassification of the amount relating to the London conference as an expenditure not eligible for funding. By its sixth plea in law, the applicant claims that the first contested decision infringes Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 and that it is, in any event, vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. By the seventh plea in law, that reclassification infringes the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination.
–       The sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7of Regulation No 2004/2003 and a manifest error of assessment
86      The applicant maintains that the Parliament infringed Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 and that, at the very least, the first contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment in that the Parliament wrongly considered that the London conference constituted indirect funding of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom.
87      The Parliament and the intervener contest the applicant’s arguments. The Parliament also challenges the admissibility of the complaint alleging the existence of a manifest error of assessment in that it does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.
88      It should be noted that the Parliament’s position on the London conference was based on the following indices: first, the conference was devoted to the promotion of bilateral trade between the United Kingdom and Pakistan, a subject of importance to the party in power in the United Kingdom at the time, the Conservative Party; secondly, the conference did not have a European dimension, since its focus was solely on the interest of a single Member State and that of a third country; thirdly, several members of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom were prominently mentioned in the conference brochure; fourthly, the applicant’s visibility in the brochure was limited; fifthly, it was stated on the first page of the brochure that ‘after Brexit, the United Kingdom, under leadership of the Conservative Party, will look to foster new and diverse trade agreements from all over the world’. Furthermore, the Parliament considered that the presence and speech of the applicant’s chairman at the conference and the reference to the applicant as organiser in the conference brochure could not affect the conclusion that the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom had benefited financially by saving the expenses it would have incurred if it had organised the conference in question.
89      It should be noted that the Parliament was right to rely on a set of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent indicia for the purposes of its examination of the existence of an indirect financial advantage to the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom within the meaning of Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003. The applicant’s arguments do not call that finding into question.
90      Contrary to what the applicant claims, the Parliament did not consider that the London conference constituted indirect funding of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in that it was an event perceived by the public as being organised, at least in part, by the national party, even though that party had not duly contributed to the funding. That complaint is based on an erroneous interpretation of the last paragraph of the part of the first contested decision dealing with the conference. That paragraph deals with the hypothetical scenario that both the Conservative Party and the applicant had an interest in the holding of the event (‘If it would be considered … they should have …’). It has to be noted that that is an observation for the sake of completeness, the possibly erroneous nature of which cannot lead to the annulment of the contested decision. To that extent, the sixth plea in law is inoperative.
91      For the same reason, namely the fact that in that part of the first contested decision the Parliament refers to a hypothetical scenario, that decision is not vitiated by any inconsistency. Contrary to what the applicant claims, the Parliament did not consider, first, that it was the organiser of the conference and, secondly, that the conference was perceived by the public as being organised in part by the national party. That complaint is also based on an erroneous reading of the first contested decision.
92      The applicant claims that the Parliament recognised that the London conference had also been of interest to it. However, that is not apparent from the first contested decision and the applicant has failed to provide any specific reference in that regard.
93      Moreover, the argument that no member of the United Kingdom Government spoke at the conference is irrelevant since the position of the Parliament in the first contested decision is not based on that point (see paragraph 88 above). In any event, the conference brochure contains messages of support from a member of the government who is also a member of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and from the Chairman of that party. In addition, the brochure mentions two other members of that party as keynote speakers.
94      The present plea in law should therefore be rejected as partly inoperative and, for the rest, unfounded, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the complaint alleging a manifest error of assessment.
–       The seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment
95      The applicant submits that the reclassification of the amount relating to the London Conference as ineligible expenditure for funding infringes the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. The Parliament applied Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 in a discriminatory manner in that it did not condemn several conferences which did not meet the criteria used in the present case. It cites several examples in that regard.
96      It should be noted that the Parliament states, without being contradicted on that point by the applicant, that two of the conferences cited by the applicant were co-financed by the FEPS and the Fabian Society. According to its website, the Fabian Society is an English centre-left think tank and political club. The partial funding of an event by that organisation legitimises the representation, in proportion to its contribution, of its field of interest at that event. By contrast, the London conference was entirely organised and financed by the applicant while it benefited the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and had no European dimension. Those are therefore not comparable situations. It follows that the principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations should not be treated differently, has not been infringed.
97      As regards the other examples on which the applicant bases the present plea, namely the conference co-financed by the Martens Centre and the organisation Maison du Futur and the monthly FEPS dossier entitled ‘India & South Asia Dossier’ of 2017, it should be noted that their financing is not comparable to that of the London conference. The Parliament rightly notes that the applicant has not explained how the funding of that conference and publication constituted indirect funding of a national political party, which is the relevant issue to be raised in order to establish the existence of discrimination under Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003. Contrary to the applicant’s contention, the mere fact that that conference and publication, like the London conference, did not have a European dimension is not sufficient to establish that those are comparable situations which cannot be treated differently.
98      The present plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
The eighth, ninth and tenth pleas in law, concerning the Miami and Kampala conferences
99      The eighth, ninth and tenth pleas in law concern the Miami and Kampala conferences.
–       The eighth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003, Article 10(4) TEU, Article 204a of the Financial Regulation as well as of Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter and a manifest error of assessment
100    The applicant claims that the Parliament, by reclassifying the amounts relating to the Miami and Kampala conferences as expenditure ineligible for funding, infringed Article 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003, Article 10(4) TEU and Article 204a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L 298, p. 1), as amended with regard to the financing of European political parties by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1142/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 (OJ 2014 L 317, p. 28) (‘the Financial Regulation’), and Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter and, at the very least, committed a manifest error of assessment.
101    In the first place, the applicant points out that the first paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003 provides that appropriations from the general budget of the European Union may be used only for expenditure directly linked to the objectives set out in the political programme of the European political party in question. However, in the present case, the Parliament did not maintain that the Miami and Kampala conferences were not directly linked to the objectives defined in the applicant’s political programme.
102    In the second place, the applicant claims that the Parliament added criteria to those for determining whether expenditure is ineligible for funding, and which, according to the applicant, are listed, exhaustively, in Regulation No 2004/2003. In particular, it erred in considering that the objectives set out in the applicant’s political programme had to be interpreted in conjunction with the purpose of political parties at European level as defined in Article 10(4) TEU, namely that of contributing to European integration, to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of the citizens of the Union. The applicant submits that, by organising the conferences at issue, it contributed to the formation and integration of Europe and that it is not for the Parliament to try to limit its actions or to define its rights.
103    In the third place, the applicant submits that Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter enshrine the rights of citizens to freedom of opinion and freedom to receive or impart information or ideas without interference by the public authorities. Those rights are infringed when a European political party cannot obtain funding for its objectives.
104    In the fourth place, and in the alternative, the applicant submits that the Miami and Kampala conferences fulfil the criteria which the Parliament erroneously added to those exhaustively listed in Regulation No 2004/2003.
105    In the fifth place, the applicant submits that the fact that the conferences took place outside the territory of the European Union is an irrelevant criterion.
106    In the sixth place, the applicant claims that it did not use a separate entity called Conservatives International to achieve the objectives set out in its work programme. This name, or trade mark, is said to be part of the applicant’s ‘family of initiatives’ such as ‘Project Maja’ and ‘The Conservative’ and is its exclusive property. It adds that a trade mark cannot organise an event.
107    In the seventh place, the applicant submits that, in any event, there can be no doubt that it was the organiser of the Miami and Kampala conferences.
108    The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments. It submits that it correctly applied Article 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003, Article 10(4) TEU and Article 204a of the Financial Regulation and that the complaint concerning the alleged infringement of Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter is also unfounded. In addition, it submits that the complaint alleging a manifest error of assessment is inadmissible in that it does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.
109    According to the Parliament, it would be obvious that the objectives set out in a party’s political programme must be interpreted in the light of the aims of political parties at European level within the meaning of Article 10(4) TEU and Article 204a of the Financial Regulation, namely integration within the Union, the formation of European awareness or the expression of the political will of the citizens of the Union. According to the Parliament, the Miami and Kampala conferences did not pursue these aims.
110    The Parliament notes that the expenses relating to the Miami and Kampala conferences were reclassified as ineligible expenses because the owner and author of those conferences were not the applicant, but a different entity, namely Conservatives International. It considers that the fact that Conservatives International is a trade mark of the applicant, without legal personality, does not affect the conclusion that the impression was created that the two conferences were organised by Conservatives International and not by the applicant.
111    As regards the Kampala conference, the Parliament admits that the applicant is mentioned in the programme, which states that Conservatives International is an ‘initiative’. However, the documents provided by the applicant allegedly show Conservatives International as the sole organiser of the two conferences and its logo does not appear in the photos provided. Therefore, neither conference could be attributed to the applicant.
112    As to the argument that the two conferences were devoted to topics of importance to the Union, the Parliament argues that it is not at the heart of the debate, the main question being whether the applicant was entitled to finance activities organised by Conservatives International. In the Parliament’s view, it was not.
113    The inadmissibility of the complaint alleging a manifest error of assessment, raised under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure by the Parliament, must be rejected. It should be borne in mind that, under that provision, the application must state the subject matter of the dispute and a summary of the pleas in law relied on. Those particulars must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary, without further supporting information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, for an action to be admissible, the essential elements of fact and law on which it is based must be apparent, at least summarily, but in a coherent and comprehensible manner, from the text of the application itself (order of 11 January 2013, Charron Inox and Almet v Commission and Council, T‑445/11 and T‑88/12, not published, EU:T:2013:4, paragraph 57). In the present case, it should be noted that the complaint alleging the existence of a manifest error of assessment was presented by the applicant in a sufficiently comprehensible manner in the application, enabling the Parliament to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the case.
114    As regards the complaint alleging infringement of the applicant’s rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association, enshrined in Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter, it is sufficient to note that, assuming that the applicant is a holder of the rights recognised in those articles, those provisions do not confer on it a pecuniary right in its capacity as a European political party. The reclassification of expenditure as ineligible for funding does not amount to a prohibition on political parties or associations. The aspects of the first contested decision contested in this plea cannot, therefore, be regarded as unjustified restrictions on freedom of expression or freedom of association, guaranteed by Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2018, APF v Parliament, T‑16/17, not published, EU:T:2018:427, paragraph 109).
–       The Miami conference
115    As regards the Miami conference, it should be noted that, in the first contested decision, the Parliament observed that the vast majority of speakers and participants came from the Americas, which the applicant does not dispute. Furthermore, the Parliament considered that the impression had been created that the owner and author of the event was an entity other than the applicant in that, first, in the conference brochure and on the photos, the applicant’s name went almost unnoticed, secondly, the purpose of the conference was to launch a global organisation that shared the applicant’s political ideas, and thirdly, the event was organised in the name and with the logo of Conservatives International, a platform created by the applicant to promote conservative ideas on a global scale.
116    That assessment led the Parliament to raise two closely related objections. In the first place, contrary to the requirements of Article 10(4) TEU and Article 204a of the Financial Regulation, the conference in question was not designed to contribute to the activities of a European political party, namely the formation of European awareness or the expression of the political will of the citizens of the Union. In the second place, contrary to the requirements of the first paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003, the expenditure relating to the conference could not be expenditure directly linked to the objectives set out in the applicant’s political programme, since the creation and financing of a new entity could not be a legitimate objective of a European political party, given that its role was to contribute to forming a European awareness or expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union. The objectives of a political party at European level should be achieved by the presence of that party in those activities and not by a third party. That conclusion is supported by the fact that Article II.11.5 of Annex 2 A to the Bureau decision of 29 March 2004 allows the funding of third parties only in very limited circumstances.
117    It should be noted that the Parliament could validly consider that the applicant’s name passed almost unnoticed in the brochure of the Miami conference. Indeed, the applicant’s logo appears in very small print at the bottom of the first page, among a series of approximately 20 other logos. Those logos can be found, in a larger version, on the subsequent pages. If there is any indication of the link with the applicant, namely the fact that Conservatives International is a ‘flagship initiative’, it is hardly legible. The only exception is the page entitled ‘The Network’ on which the version of the applicant’s logo appears with the statement ‘Conservatives International is a flagship initiative of’. It is also indicated that the applicant has a stand in the convention centre.
118    By contrast, the name Conservatives International appears on almost every page of the brochure. Reference is there made to the link ‘www.conservativesinternational.org’ in order to register for the conference. The ‘Conservatives International reception desk’ is at the top on the floor plan of the convention centre where the conference is held. The programme includes the ‘Conservatives International Launch’ and three other sessions led by Conservatives International.
119    It should be noted that, in light of that evidence, the Parliament could validly consider that the impression was given that the Miami conference was organised by Conservatives International. Moreover, although it is common ground between the applicant and the Parliament that Conservatives International was not, in fact, an organisation, in the present case the evidence suggests that that is indeed the impression that was created. That is apparent from the name, the logo (which differs from that of the applicant), the internet address of its online site (‘conservativesinternational.org’), the contact details (which do not mention the fact that it is the same address and telephone number as those of the applicant), the description on the online site (Conservatives International is the only organisation of its kind), and the fact that Conservatives International presents itself as the organiser of the Miami conference. Furthermore, it should be recalled that the applicant does not dispute that the purpose of the Miami conference was to launch an organisation to create a platform to promote conservative ideas on a global scale, which is also apparent from the conference brochure.
120    It follows that the applicant has not shown that the Parliament erred with regard to the identity of the organiser of the Miami conference.
121    In addition, it must be examined whether the Parliament was entitled to consider that the objectives set out in a party’s political programme should be interpreted in the light of the aims of political parties at European level within the meaning of Article 10(4) TEU and Article 204a of the Financial Regulation.
122    First of all, it should be recalled that the first paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003 provides that appropriations received from the general budget of the European Union in accordance with the present regulation may be used only to meet expenditure directly linked to the objectives set out in the programme of the political party at European level.
123    According to the first subparagraph of Article 9(3) of that regulation, control of funding granted under it is to be exercised in accordance with the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules. Article 204a(2) of the Financial Regulation provides that direct financial contributions from the Union budget may be granted to European political parties in view of their contribution to forming European political awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.
124    Secondly, Article 10(4) TEU states that political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of the citizens of the Union.
125    Furthermore, recital 1 of Regulation No 2004/2003 sets out that Article 191 of the EC Treaty states that political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union and that they contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.
126    Finally, the first recital of the FINS-2017-9a decision itself explicitly refers to Article 10(4) TEU.
127    In the light of those explicit references to provisions according to which the role of political parties is to contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union, there is no doubt that the Parliament correctly considered that the objectives set out in the applicant’s political programme, to which reference is made in the first paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003, must be interpreted in conjunction with the purpose of political parties at European level as defined in Article 10(4) TEU and Article 204a of the Financial Regulation.
128    It should be noted, next, that it was without committing a manifest error of assessment that the Parliament considered that the Miami conference, organised on behalf of Conservatives International, aimed at launching a world organisation under that name, with speakers and participants who came, for the most part, from the Americas, was not linked to a legitimate objective of the applicant as a political party at European level. Therefore, it was without error that the Parliament reclassified the expenses relating to that conference as ineligible for funding. Contrary to the applicant’s claim, it is incumbent on the Parliament, by virtue of its role in the application of Regulation No 2004/2003, to examine whether the organisation of the conferences in question contributed to the formation and integration of Europe.
129    The applicant’s other arguments cannot call that conclusion into question. As regards the irrelevance of the fact that the Miami conference took place outside the territory of the Union, it is sufficient to note that the Parliament did not rely on that fact in the first contested decision. The same applies to the fact that the expenditure of the Miami conference must be directly linked to objectives defined in its political programme since, as the applicant admits, the Bureau did not rely on that fact.
–       The Kampala conference
130    As regards the Kampala conference, it should be noted that, in the first contested decision, the Parliament considered that, although the applicant’s name appeared on the conference programme and brochure, the impression was given that the owner and author of the event was Conservatives International. It also noted that of the 150 participants, only a limited number came from the Member States of the Union, mostly from the United Kingdom, which is not disputed by the applicant.
131    With regard to Parliament’s assessment of the facts, it should be noted that the main page of the Kampala conference is on the Conservatives International website. As already noted in paragraph 119 above, it is apparent from the ‘About’ page of that online site that Conservatives International is presented there as an organisation.
132    However, it appears from the evidence consisting of pages of the online website concerning the Kampala conference that the conference is an initiative of the applicant in that it is clearly stated, on the second page, that ‘This conference is an initiative of the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE)’. While Conservatives International appears in large print on each page of the online site, the applicant’s logo appears in the foreground and is larger than that of the partners. The president of the applicant is one of the speakers. As for the subject of the conference, two of the five sessions concern trade between Africa and Europe and the external policy of the Union.
133    With regard to the brochure for the Kampala conference, it should be noted that the conference is entitled ‘Great Lakes Trade Summit’. The logos of the applicant and Conservatives International appear on the cover page, as does the indication ‘conservativesinternational.org’. The introduction is signed by the president of the applicant and two Members of Parliament are cited. Further references to the applicant and to the fact that the conference ‘The Great Lakes Trade Summit, Conservatives International’ is organised at its initiative should be noted. In that regard, under the heading ‘Partners’, it is stated that the conference is organised, inter alia, by the applicant.
134    As regards the photos of the conference, while it is true that the Conservatives International logo appears in the middle of the banner and is larger than the applicant’s logo, the latter is however clearly visible under the conference title.
135    Accordingly, the overall assessment of the evidence undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that the Kampala conference was organised by the applicant. That circumstance, together with the fact that that conference concerned the Union’s external policy and that the participants were nationals of the Member States, indicates that the conference was linked to a legitimate objective of the applicant as a political party at European level.
136    It follows that the Parliament committed a manifest error of assessment in holding that that conference was not organised by the applicant. The present part of the eighth plea in law should therefore be upheld and the first contested decision annulled in so far as the Parliament decided to reclassify the expenditure relating to the Kampala conference, namely EUR 91 546.58, as expenditure not eligible for funding.
–       The ninth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty
137    The applicant notes that DG Finance, in its letter of 25 October 2018, applied to the Miami and Kampala conferences certain criteria applicable to international conferences, namely that they must be transparent and clearly identifiable as activities of the European political party in question and must be ancillary to the main activities of the party. According to DG Finance, the Miami and Kampala
conferences did not meet those criteria. The applicant claims that those criteria are novel and do not derive from any legal text. The Parliament therefore imposed new rules on it and, therefore, the reclassification of the expenses relating to the Miami and Kampala conferences on account of their alleged non-compliance with Article 8 of Regulation No 2004/2003 infringed the general principle of the Union of legal certainty.
138    The Parliament contests the applicant’s arguments.
139    In the first place, it should be noted that the Parliament rightly observes that the allegedly novel criteria raised by the applicant do not form part of the statement of reasons for the first contested decision. It must be held that the complaint alleging infringement of the general principle of the Union of legal certainty is inoperative.
140    In the second place, the argument, raised by the applicant in the reply, that its rights of defence had been infringed must be rejected as unfounded. Indeed, the letter of 25 October
2018 from DG Finance, entitled ‘Conservatives International, Americas, Miami/USA, 26-27 May 2017’, set out, clearly and exhaustively, all the criteria on which the Parliament intended to base the first contested decision, in particular the third and fourteenth paragraphs of that letter of 25 October 2018.
141    It follows that the present plea in law must be rejected.
–       The tenth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination
142    The applicant claims that the Parliament, by reclassifying the amounts relating to the Miami and Kampala conferences as ineligible expenses for funding, infringed the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. It submits that other political parties and their affiliated foundations organised events for which the identity of the organiser was unclear and that in 2017 many events were organised by other foundations and political parties at European level which addressed similar topics to the Miami and Kampala conferences.
143    Since the eighth plea in law has been upheld in so far as it concerns the Kampala conference, the present plea should be examined only in the context of the Parliament’s decision to reclassify as ineligible expenditure for funding that relating to the Miami conference.
144    It should be recalled, in that regard, that the impression was created that that conference had been organised by Conservatives International and that, in the present case, the applicant therefore did not appear to be the organiser of the event being funded. It should therefore be examined, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 77 above, whether the situations to which the applicant refers are comparable to those concerning the Miami conference in that the impression was created that the beneficiary of the funding did not appear to be the organiser of the funded event.
145    The first allegedly comparable situation referred to by the applicant concerns the ‘Economic Ideas Forum’ held in Brussels (Belgium) on 7 November 2017. In that regard, it should be noted that, while it is true that the programme of the event did not mention the Martens Centre, the fact that that programme was available on the online website of that foundation, that participants could register through that online website and that the event was opened and closed by representatives of that foundation gives the impression that it was organised by the latter. Furthermore, the event was clearly identifiable as one of those organised by the Martens Centre, since, first, it was mentioned on the online site of the foundation under the heading ‘Events’ and, secondly, it was described as follows:
‘Now in its eight year, the Economic Ideas Forum (EIF), the Martens Centre’s high-level conference on economy will be held on 7 November 2017 in Brussels.’
146    In should be noted that there is no doubt that the ‘Economic Ideas Forum’ event held in Brussels on 7 November 2017 was organised by the Martens Centre.
147    The second situation referred to by the applicant concerns the event entitled ‘TransatlanticLab’ held in Washington (United States) from 16 to 20 July 2017. It should be noted that there is no doubt that that event was organised by the European Liberal Forum since, first, it is mentioned on the European Liberal Forum’s website under the heading ‘Events’, secondly, the logo of the European Liberal Forum appears on the first page of the event’s programme and, thirdly, the event was opened by the Vice-President of the European Liberal Forum.
148    As regards the applicant’s argument that numerous events were organised in 2017 by other foundations and political parties at European level which dealt with subjects similar to that of the Miami conference, it should be noted that the applicant has not demonstrated that those were comparable situations, since, among the examples cited, no situation has been established in which the beneficiary of the funding does not appear to be the organiser.
149    It follows that the present plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.
The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth pleas in law, concerning the amount paid by the PAP
150    The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth pleas in law concern the payment by the PAP of a contribution of EUR 133 043.80, which was considered by the Parliament to be subject to the EUR 12 000 ceiling applicable to donations.
–       The eleventh plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 2 and 6 of Regulation No 2004/2003, and a manifest error of assessment
151    The applicant claims that the Parliament could not, first, reclassify the contribution paid by the PAP as a donation and, secondly, consider that that donation was contrary to Article 6(2) of Regulation No 2004/2003 in so far as it exceeded the amount of EUR 12 000. In so doing, it based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2004/2003. At the very least, it committed a manifest error of assessment.
152    The applicant submits that different rules apply to donations, on the one hand, and to contributions, on the other hand. It claims that the Parliament does not dispute that the PAP could be one of its members. In that case, the PAP could have been required to pay a membership fee or contribution. The payment of such a membership fee or contribution would therefore not constitute a donation and would be in conformity with Article 6(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003 in so far as it did not exceed 40% of the annual budget of the party.
153    According to the applicant, the Parliament wrongly considered that the PAP was not a ‘national political party which is a member of a political party at European level’. On the contrary, the PAP fulfilled the conditions laid down in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2004/2003 according to which a political party is an association of citizens which pursues political objectives and is recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State. The PAP, first, has legal personality, secondly, is duly registered under Armenian law, thirdly, could legitimately take legal action in all the Member States, including purchasing goods and services and being a party to legal proceedings, and is therefore necessarily recognised by their legal orders as a legal person. The Parliament’s interpretation that the PAP ‘is not recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State’ on the ground that that condition requires a Member State to recognise it as a political party is, according to the applicant, devoid of any legal basis and contrary to the wording of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2004/2003, Article 6(3) of that regulation and Article 20(7) of Regulation No 1141/2014.
154    The Parliament and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. The Parliament also submits that the complaint alleging a manifest error of assessment is inadmissible in so far as it does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.
155    It should be recalled that, as regards the payment received from the PAP, the first contested decision was based on the following grounds. First, the Bureau noted the conditions of Article 6 of Regulation No 2004/2003 and the definition of a political party within the meaning of Article 2(1). Secondly, the Bureau considered that a political party established in a third country was not a political party within the meaning of Article 6(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003. Thirdly, it refuted the applicant’s contention that the condition of being ‘recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State’ was met where a political party could legitimately undertake legal acts in a Member State and was therefore recognised by its legal order as a legal person.
156    It should be examined whether the Parliament correctly considered that the PAP was not a ‘political party’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2004/2003 and that, therefore, the payment received from the PAP could not constitute an eligible contribution from a ‘national political party’ within the meaning of Article 6(3) of that regulation.
157    Article 6 of Regulation No 2004/2003 provides, in substance, that a political party at European level may not accept donations exceeding an amount of EUR 12 000 per year and per donor from any natural or legal person. However, contributions to a political party at European level from national member political parties are eligible provided that they do not exceed 40% of the annual budget of that political party at European level.
158    Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2004/2003 defines ‘a political party’ as an association of citizens which pursues political objectives and is recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State.
159    Contrary to what the applicant claims, there is no doubt that the ‘citizens’ mentioned in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2004/2003 are ‘citizens of the Union’. That is apparent, inter alia, from the fact that recital 1 of that regulation uses the expression ‘citizens of the Union’. In that regard, Article 20 TFEU confers the status of citizen of the Union on any person who is a national of a Member State.
160    Next, it follows from the very wording of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2004/2003 that, in order to be classified as a ‘political party’, an association of citizens of the Union pursuing political objectives must, as such, be recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State. It follows that the Bureau rightly considered that the PAP was not a ‘political party’ within the meaning of that article.
161    The applicant is therefore wrong to assert that the PAP fulfils that condition simply because it is recognised as a legal person in the legal orders of the Member States.
162    It should therefore be noted that the Parliament correctly applied Article 6(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003 by considering that, ipso facto, the PAP was not a ‘national political party’ within the meaning of that provision and that the payment of the PAP did not constitute an eligible contribution.
163    As regards the applicant’s claim that the Parliament cannot base the first contested decision on a new ground, namely that the ‘citizens’ referred to in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2004/2003 are ‘citizens of the Union’, it should be noted that that is not a ‘new ground’, but only the Parliament’s interpretation of the term ‘citizen’ in the abovementioned provision, that interpretation being correct, although it was not contained in the reasoning of the first contested decision.
164    Moreover, the applicant’s arguments based on Regulation No 1141/2014 are not operative in the present case, since the first contested decision was based on Regulation No 2004/2003.
165    It follows that the present plea in law should be rejected, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the alleged manifest error of assessment raised by the applicant.
–       The twelfth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty
166    The applicant claims that the Parliament, by its misapplication of Article 2(1) and Article 6(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003, in particular the imposition of a condition that a political party be recognised as such by a Member State, arbitrarily created a new rule, which it applied retroactively in the first contested decision. The decision to classify the contribution paid by the PAP as a donation and, consequently, to compel the applicant to return to the PAP the amount of the payment exceeding EUR 12 000 therefore constitutes an infringement of the principle of legal certainty.
167    At the hearing, the applicant stated that it was relying on the fact that in 2016 the Parliament had not reclassified as a donation a contribution of EUR 22 500 that it had received from the PAP. In that respect, the Parliament explained that not all third-party payments to political parties at European level are systematically checked and that it is therefore possible that some payments may not be correctly identified as ineligible under Article 6(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003.
168    It should be noted that the Parliament rightly argues that it did not introduce a new rule. On the contrary, it merely interpreted, in a predictable manner, Regulation No 2004/2003, from which it follows directly and clearly that only associations of citizens which pursue political objectives and which are recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State may have the status of national political parties which are members of a political party at European level. It follows that, pursuant to the case-law cited in paragraphs 65 and 66 above, the principle of legal certainty has not been infringed and the present complaint must be rejected as unfounded.
169    In so far as the applicant relies on the fact that, in 2016, the Parliament had not reclassified as a donation a contribution of EUR 22 500 which it had received from the PAP, it should be noted that such an argument amounts to invoking the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. It follows from the case-law that any person is entitled to rely on that principle when he or she finds himself or herself in a situation from which it appears that the administration of the Union, by providing him or her with precise assurances, has raised well-founded expectations in his or her regard. Precise, unconditional and consistent information constitutes such assurances, in whatever form it is given. The assurances given must, moreover, comply with the applicable standards (see judgment of 22 November
2018, Portugal v Commission, T‑31/17, EU:T:2018:830, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited). As the applicant itself admitted at the hearing, none of the conditions for the application of that principle, set out in the case-law, are fulfilled.
–       The thirteenth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination
170    By the thirteenth plea in law, the applicant claims that the Parliament, by its misapplication of Article 2(1) and Article 6(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003, infringed the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination in that it did not reclassify as a donation, on the same basis, certain contributions to the Martens Centre which also exceeded the amount of EUR 12 000 and which came from organisations such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Skopje Office, the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence and the International Republican Institute of the United States of America.
171    The applicant also questions the justification provided by the Parliament in the ‘Note to the file concerning the ACRE party’, according to which the rules applicable to donations or contributions to foundations are more permissive than those applicable to parties, which are more restrictive, and, consequently, the administration monitors political parties at European level to a greater extent in so far as the latter are at the forefront of the political activities carried out within the Member States from the moment they put forward candidates for election, whereas the political foundations affiliated to them support and complement the parties’ objectives through related activities.
172    The Parliament and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
173    It follows from well-established case-law that compliance with the principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which no one may rely, for his or her own benefit, on an unlawful act committed in favour of another (see judgment of 11 December 2003, Adriatica di Navigazione v Commission, T‑61/99, EU:T:2003:335, paragraph 157 and the case-law cited).
174    It follows that the applicant’s arguments cannot be accepted since it was found, in the context of the eleventh plea in law, that the Parliament correctly applied Article 2(1) and Article 6(3) of Regulation No 2004/2003 in respect of the amount paid by the PAP to the applicant and that the applicant cannot rely in its favour on an alleged error of application of those provisions in favour of the Martens Centre.
175    The present plea should therefore be rejected as unfounded, without there being any need to determine whether foundations and political parties at European level are in comparable situations.
176    In the light of all the foregoing, as regards the application for partial annulment of the first contested decision, it is appropriate only to allow the eighth plea in law in so far as it alleges a manifest error of assessment made by the Parliament in relation to the Kampala conference and to annul that decision accordingly in so far as the Parliament decided to reclassify the expenditure relating to that conference, namely EUR 91 546.58, as expenditure ineligible for funding.
The application for partial annulment of the second contested decision
177    In support of its application for partial annulment of the second contested decision, the applicant puts forward two pleas in law concerning the measures at issue, namely the conditions laid down in Article I.5.1 of that decision according to which the payment of pre-funding equivalent to the entire maximum amount is subject, first, to prior reimbursement to the Parliament of the sum due in respect of the financial year 2017 and, secondly, to prior reimbursement to the PAP of the sums wrongly received by the applicant from that entity.
178    The applicant submits that the second contested decision was adopted in breach of its rights of defence and the principle of sound administration and, consequently, in breach of Article 19 of Regulation No 1141/2014 and Article 8 of the Bureau decision of 28 May 2018 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation No 1141/2014 (OJ 2018 C 225, p. 4) (‘the Bureau decision of 28 May 2018’), in so far as it did not have the opportunity to make known its views on the evidence used in support of the measures at issue, namely a note of 30 November 2018 relating to the granting of contributions for the year 2019, a recommendation of the Evaluation Committee and a risk assessment. That evidence was not communicated to it in good time and it was not able to comment on it.
179    The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments. As regards, first, the alleged infringement of Article 19 of Regulation No 1141/2014 and Article 8 of the Bureau decision of 28 May 2018, it submits that the arguments submitted by the applicant are inadmissible in so far as the applicant has not substantiated their infringement in concrete terms. As regards, next, the alleged infringement of the principle of sound administration and the applicant’s rights of defence, the Parliament states that the second contested decision cannot be regarded as a measure adversely affecting the applicant inasmuch as it is, in any event, a positive decision. Furthermore, no right to be heard prior to the enactment of such a decision is envisaged either by Regulation No 1141/2014 or by the Bureau decision of 28 May 2018. Moreover,
Article 6 of the Bureau decision of 28 May 2018 grants the Bureau a margin of discretion to decide on the level of pre-funding and, where appropriate, the conditions for its payment. Finally, the Parliament considers that the obligation, provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1141/2014, to derogate from the principle of 100% pre-funding in justified cases has been observed in so far as it gave sufficient reasons for the second contested decision.
180    It is necessary to examine the complaint concerning the breach of the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard.
181    The Parliament rightly states that neither the Bureau decision of 28 May 2018 nor Regulation No 1141/2014 explicitly grants political parties a right to be heard before the Bureau adopts its decision on their applications for funding.
182    However, it is clear from the case-law that respect for the rights of the defence, which includes the right to be heard in advance of any decision adversely affecting the interests of a party, is a fundamental principle of Union law, which must be ensured even where the applicable rules do not expressly provide for such a formality (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 November 2012, M, C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraph 86, and of 7 November 2019 ADDE v Parliament, T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited). The right to be heard is also a component of the right to good administration, as derived from Article 41 of the Charter.
183    It also emerges from the case-law that, in principle, when a person submits an application to an EU institution, including an application for funding, the right to be heard must be regarded as having been respected when the institution adopts its decision at the end of the procedure on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant, without giving him or her an additional opportunity to be heard beyond the arguments that he or she may have put forward when submitting his or her application (see judgment of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament, T-48/17, EU: T:2019:780, paragraph 90 and the case law cited).
184    Moreover, it should be pointed out that, in proceedings relating to the payment of customs duties, it has been held that there was an infringement of the rights of the defence where the applicant had not been in a position to make known his or her views effectively on the relevance of the facts or documents in the contested act (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 November 1991, Technische Universität München, C‑269/90, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 25; of 19 February 1998, Eyckeler & Malt v Commission, T‑42/96, EU:T:1998:40, paragraphs 86 to 88; and of 17 September 1998, Primex Produkte Import-Export and Others v Commission, T‑50/96, EU:T:1998:223, paragraphs 63 to 71).
185    It is in the light of those considerations that the present action must be examined.
186    It should be noted that, contrary to the Parliament’s contention, the measures at issue affect the applicant adversely, within the meaning of the case-law and Article 41 of the Charter, since they impose a not insignificant burden on it in that they limit the pre-funding to 85% of the maximum amount of funding in the absence of repayment of sums due under the first contested decision within the prescribed period (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 November 2019, ADDE v
Parliament, T‑48/17, EU: T:2019:780, paragraph 94
and the case-law cited).
187    It appears from the second contested decision that the Parliament carried out, pursuant to Article 6 of the Bureau decision of 28 May 2018 and on the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee, a risk assessment on the basis of the applicant’s financial situation for the year 2017. The review by the Evaluation Committee took place in October and November 2018. According to the Parliament, that assessment revealed a risk of non-payment of the sums due for the financial year 2017, the repayment of which had been proposed. That risk was based on the size of those sums and on the fact that a repayment of funds was neither foreseen as a provision nor covered by the applicant’s own resources and, finally, that its net assets were negative.
188    It should be noted that the Parliament does not dispute that the applicant did not have access, in good time, to the documents on which the measures at issue were based, namely the note of 30 November 2018 relating to the grant of contributions for the year 2019, addressed to the members of the Bureau, a recommendation of the Evaluation Committee and a risk assessment. In the present case, the applicant was therefore unable to make known its point of view on the relevance of the facts or documents retained in the context of the measures at issue. The question therefore arises whether such an irregularity is capable of leading to the annulment of that decision.
189    According to the case-law, an infringement of the rights of the defence may lead to the annulment of an act adopted by the institutions only where there is a possibility that, as a result of that irregularity, the outcome of the administrative procedure might have been different and thus in fact adversely affected the applicant’s rights of defence (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2012, Council and Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 79).
190    In the present case, since the provisions at issue confer a wide margin of appreciation on the Parliament, it cannot be excluded, as the applicant observed moreover in its submissions and at the hearing in response to a question from the Court, that the proceedings could have led to a different result if the applicant’s right to be heard had been respected in that it could have provided an updated statement of its finances (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission, T‑270/16 P, not published, EU: T:2017:74, paragraph 82).
191    It follows from the foregoing that the present complaint should be upheld and, accordingly, the second contested decision annulled in so far as Article I.5.1 thereof makes the payment of pre-funding equivalent to the entire maximum amount of the applicant’s contribution subject to repayment of the sum of EUR 535 609.48 to the Parliament and of any undue payment received from the PAP. It follows that it is not necessary to rule, first, on the remaining complaints raised by the applicant in the context of this plea and, secondly, on the second plea, alleging infringement of Article 6 of the Bureau decision of 28 May 2018.
Costs
192    Under Article 134(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where there is more than one unsuccessful party, the Court is to decide how the costs are to be shared.
193    As the Parliament has been partly unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay a third of those incurred by the applicant.
194    In accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, read in conjunction with Article 1(2)(f) of those rules, the bodies, offices and agencies of the Union which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The intervener will therefore bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Annuls the decision of the Parliament of 10 December 2018 declaring certain expenses ineligible for a grant for the year 2017 and ordering the return of a donation in so far as it reclassifies the expenses relating to the conference held in Kampala (Uganda) from 13 to 15 July 2017, namely, EUR 91 546.58, as ineligible for funding;
2.      Annuls Decision FINS-2019-5 of the Parliament of 14 January 2019 on the granting of a contribution to the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE) for the year 2019 in so far as Article I.5.1 thereof makes the payment of pre-funding equivalent to 100% of the maximum amount of the contribution subject to certain prior reimbursements;
3.      Dismisses the action as to the remainder;
4.      Orders the European Parliament, in addition to bearing its own costs, to pay one third of those incurred by ACRE. ACRE is to bear two thirds of its own costs;
5.      Orders the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations to pay its own costs.
Collins
Kreuschitz
De Baere
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 25 November 2020.
E. Coulon
M. van der Woude
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.