JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
4 June 2025 (*)
( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government – Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Action for annulment – Time limit for bringing proceedings – Partial inadmissibility – Plea of illegality – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Right to effective judicial protection – Right to be heard – Right to property – Freedom to conduct a business – Proportionality )
In Case T‑271/23,
Alfa-Bank JSC, established in Moscow (Russia), represented by B. Malmendier, lawyer,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by J. Rurarz and V. Piessevaux, acting as Agents, and by B. Maingain, lawyer,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed of M. Brkan (Rapporteur), acting as President, I. Gâlea and T. Tóth, Judges,
Registrar: M. Zwozdziak-Carbonne, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:
–        the application lodged at the Court Registry on 22 May 2023,
–        the first statement of modification lodged at the Court Registry on 2 November 2023,
–        the second statement of modification lodged at the Court Registry on 13 May 2024,
further to the hearing on 15 October 2024 and to the reopening of the oral part of the procedure pursuant to Article 113(2)(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Alfa-Bank JSC, seeks annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/432 of 25 February 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 59 I, p. 437) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/429 of 25 February 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 59 I, p. 278) (together, ‘the initial acts’); (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (together, ‘the acts of September 2023’); (iii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2024/847) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2024/849) (together, ‘the acts of March 2024’ and, together with the initial acts and the acts of September 2023, ‘the contested acts’), in so far as those acts include and maintain its name on the lists annexed to those acts; and (iv) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 of 5 June 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20) and of Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 of 5 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1).
Background to the dispute
2        The applicant is a private bank established in the Russian Federation.
3        The present case has been brought in the context of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
4        On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union, acting on the basis of Article 29 TEU, adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).
5        On the same date, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).
6        On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted, first, Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and, second, Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria pursuant to which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be subject to the restrictive measures at issue.
7        Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, provides as follows:
‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to …
…
(g) leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine,
… shall be frozen.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’
8        The detailed rules governing that freezing of funds are laid down in the subsequent paragraphs of Article 2 of Decision 2014/145, as amended.
9        Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, requires the adoption of measures to freeze funds and lays down the detailed rules governing that freezing of funds in terms essentially identical to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended.
10      On 25 February 2023, in view of the Russian Federation’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, the Council adopted the initial acts, by which it added the applicant’s name to the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures contained in the Annex to Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, (‘the lists at issue’).
11      The reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are as follows:
‘[The applicant] is the largest private bank in the Russian Federation. The Central Bank of Russia has included [the applicant] on the list of the systemically important credit institutions. [The applicant] operates in a banking sector that is the key component of the financial system of the Russian Federation. [The applicant] is therefore involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’
12      The Council published a notice for the attention of the persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures laid down by the initial acts in the Official Journal of the European Union of 27 February 2023 (OJ 2023 C 70 I, p. 5). That notice stated, inter alia, that the persons concerned could submit a request to the Council, together with supporting documentation, to reconsider the decision to include their names on the lists annexed to those acts.
13      By letter of 19 April 2023, the applicant asked the Council to provide a statement of reasons and the evidence supporting the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue.
14      By letter of 8 May 2023, the Council sent the applicant file WK 2601/2023 INIT (‘the first evidence file’), on which it had based its decision.
Facts subsequent to the bringing of the action
15      On 5 June 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20). By that decision, it amended Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 as follows:
‘1.      All funds and economic resources belonging to …
…
(g)      leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine …
…
… shall be frozen.’
16      Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 of 5 June 2023 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1) amended the provisions of Article 3(1)(g) of that latter regulation in the same way.
17      On 13 September 2023, the Council adopted the acts of September 2023. It is apparent from those acts that Decision 2014/145 was to apply until 15 March 2024 and that the individual restrictive measures applicable to the applicant were thus extended, the applicant’s name being maintained on the lists at issue for the same reasons as set out in paragraph 11 above.
18      By letter of 15 September 2023, the Council informed the applicant that its name had been maintained on the lists at issue and invited it to submit its observations by 2 November 2023 at the latest.
19      By letter of 21 December 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain its name on the lists at issue and sent it file WK 16852/2023 INIT (‘the second evidence file’).
20      On 12 March 2024, the Council adopted the acts of March 2024. It is apparent from those acts that Decision 2014/145 was to apply until 15 September 2024 and that the individual restrictive measures applicable to the applicant were thus extended, the applicant’s name being maintained on the lists at issue for the same reasons as set out in paragraph 11 above.
21      By letter of 13 March 2024, the Council informed the applicant that its name had been maintained on the lists at issue and invited it to submit its observations by 3 June 2024 at the latest.
Forms of order sought
22      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested acts in so far as they concern it;
–        annul Decision 2023/1094 and Regulation 2023/1089;
–        order the Council to pay the costs.
23      The Council claims that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        in the alternative, should the Court annul the restrictive measures adopted in respect of the applicant, order that the effects of Decision 2024/847 be maintained until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulation 2024/849 takes effect;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
24      By its action, the applicant seeks, first, annulment of the contested acts in so far as they concern it and, second, annulment of Decision 2023/1094 and of Regulation 2023/1089.
Claim for annulment of Decision 2023/1094
25      In its second statement of modification, the applicant seeks annulment of Decision 2023/1094.
26      In that regard, the Court should examine of its own motion whether the claim for annulment of Decision 2023/1094 has been brought before a court that has jurisdiction to hear it. Given that the question of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisdiction over an action is a matter of public policy, that question may be considered by the Court at any stage in the proceedings, even of its own motion (see judgment of 6 October 2020, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, C‑134/19 P, EU:C:2020:793, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
27      It should be noted that Decision 2023/1094 was adopted pursuant to Article 29 TEU, which is a provision relating to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) within the meaning of Article 275 TFEU.
28      In accordance with the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not, in principle, have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the CFSP or with respect to legal acts adopted on the basis of those provisions. Those provisions introduce a derogation from the rule of general jurisdiction which Article 19 TEU confers on the Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, and they must, therefore, be interpreted narrowly (judgments of 24 June 2014, Parliament v Council, C‑658/11, EU:C:2014:2025, paragraphs 69 and 70; of 19 July 2016, H v Council and Others, C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraphs 39 and 40; and of 6 October 2020, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, C‑134/19 P, EU:C:2020:793, paragraphs 26 and 32). Moreover, the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU expressly establish two exceptions to that principle, namely the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, first, to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU and, second, to review the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 60 and 81; see, to that effect, order of 3 June 2024, Uss v Council, T‑542/23, not published, EU:T:2024:369, paragraph 18).
29      It should also be recalled that, as regards measures adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP, it is the individual nature of those measures which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, permits access to the Courts of the European Union (judgment of 23 April 2013, Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 57; see also, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited; order of 3 June 2024, Uss v Council, T‑542/23, not published, EU:T:2024:369, paragraph 20).
30      Measures of general application do not constitute restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. That is so, for example, where provisions prescribe measures whose scope is determined by reference to objective criteria and which do not target identified natural or legal persons but are applicable generally (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 97 and 98, and order of 3 June 2024, Uss v Council, T‑542/23, not published, EU:T:2024:369, paragraph 21).
31      Decision 2023/1094 amends Article 1(1) of Decision 2014/145, on restrictions on admission to the territory of the European Union, and Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145, which lays down the criteria for inclusion on the list of natural or legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures annexed to Decision 2014/145 (see, to that effect, order of 3 June 2024, Uss v Council, T‑542/23, not published, EU:T:2024:369, paragraph 22).
32      In particular, Decision 2023/1094 modifies, inter alia, the definition of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 for inclusion on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures annexed to Decision 2014/145 (order of 3 June 2024, Uss v Council, T‑542/23, not published, EU:T:2024:369, paragraph 23).
33      Decision 2023/1094 is therefore confined to laying down measures of general application, which cannot be described as restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (order of 3 June 2024, Uss v Council, T‑542/23, not published, EU:T:2024:369, paragraph 24). In particular, it does not include the applicant’s name on the list of legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures annexed to Decision 2014/145.
34      The claim for annulment of Decision 2023/1094 must therefore be rejected as having been brought before a court that lacks jurisdiction to hear it.
Claim for annulment of Regulation 2023/1089
35      In its second statement of modification, the applicant also seeks annulment of Regulation 2023/1089.
36      The Council submits that the head of claim seeking annulment of Regulation 2023/1089 must be declared inadmissible, on the ground that such an application is out of time.
37      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, an action for annulment must be brought within two months of the publication of the contested measure, or of its notification to the applicant, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the applicant, as the case may be.
38      According to Article 59 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where the time limit for initiating proceedings against an act adopted by an institution begins to run from the publication of that act in the Official Journal of the European Union, that time limit is to be calculated from the end of the fourteenth day after such publication. In accordance with Article 60 of those rules, that time limit is, in addition, to be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days.
39      According to settled case-law, the time limit thus prescribed for bringing proceedings is a matter of public policy since it was established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain and to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice, and the Courts of the European Union must ascertain of their own motion whether that time limit has been observed (judgments of 23 January 1997, Coen, C‑246/95, EU:C:1997:33, paragraph 21, and of 18 September 1997, Mutual Aid Administration Services v Commission, T‑121/96 and T‑151/96, EU:T:1997:132, paragraphs 38 and 39).
40      In the present case, it should be noted that Regulation 2023/1089 was published in the Official Journal on 6 June 2023. The time limit for seeking annulment of that regulation had therefore expired on 31 August 2023. The second statement of modification, in which the applicant seeks annulment of Regulation 2023/1089, was lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 13 May 2024.
41      The claim for annulment of Regulation 2023/1089 must therefore be rejected as inadmissible on the ground that it is out of time.
Substance
42      In support of its action, the applicant raises, in essence, a plea in law alleging a manifest error of assessment and the insufficiency of the factual basis; a plea in law alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons; a plea in law alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection; a plea in law alleging the insufficiency of the factual basis to establish a link with the associated natural persons and legal entities; and a plea in law alleging infringement of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality. In its reply, the applicant also puts forward a plea in law alleging the illegality of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329 (‘the initial (g) criterion’), and of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1094 (‘the amended (g) criterion’).
The plea in law based on a plea of illegality
43      The applicant submits that the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion are unlawful.
44      According to the applicant, the initial (g) criterion infringes the principle of legal certainty according to which the rules of EU law must be clear and precise and their application must be foreseeable by those subject to them. In that regard, it argues that, in the initial (g) criterion, the word ‘leading’ was not limited only to natural persons, because the effect of such a limitation would have been to expose all legal persons, entities and bodies to restrictive measures regardless of their significance for the Russian economy and their contribution to it. Moreover, the applicant claims that the Council has implicitly acknowledged that the wording of the initial (g) criterion was not sufficiently precise, given that it was necessary to adopt the amended (g) criterion in order to dispel ambiguity as regards the applicability of the word ‘leading’, expressly limiting its application to natural persons so that the application of that criterion could be extended to all legal persons, entities and bodies, irrespective of whether they are ‘leading’, ‘the largest’, ‘influential’, or ‘important’.
45      The applicant claims that the initial (g) criterion, as interpreted by the Council, and the amended (g) criterion are discriminatory in so far as they allow the name of any legal person, entity or body to be included on the lists, regardless of the nature of its activities, its size, political stance, tax burden or connection with military operations or other parameters. According to the applicant, the lack of clarification as to the meaning of the expression ‘sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ has meant that its name was included on the lists at issue because it is a Russian legal entity and because it is involved in the Russian banking sector, which is allegedly a substantial source of revenue for the government.
46      In addition, the applicant argues that, because the condition relating to sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation is excessively broad, the Council has allowed itself to impose economic sanctions on any legal person established in Russia and has dispensed with the need to assess the role that an entity performs in government policies. According to the applicant, it follows that the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion infringe Article 18 TFEU, Article 21(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’) together with Article 1 of Protocol No 12 thereto.
47      The Council submits that the plea in law alleging illegality in respect of the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion, raised by way of a plea of illegality, is inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
–       Admissibility of the plea of illegality disputing the legality of the initial acts in so far as they concern the applicant
48      Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure provides that no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or fact which have come to light in the course of the procedure. However, a plea which constitutes an amplification of a plea previously made, either directly or by implication, in the application originating proceedings and is closely linked to it must be declared admissible. A similar solution applies to a complaint relied on in support of a plea in law. To be regarded as an amplification of a plea or of a complaint advanced previously, a new line of argument must present a sufficiently close connection with the pleas or complaints initially set out in the application for it to be considered to form part of the normal evolution of debate in proceedings before the Court (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 November 2011, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, T‑72/06, not published, EU:T:2011:671, paragraphs 23 and 27; of 22 April 2016, Italy and Eurallumina v Commission, T‑60/06 RENV II and T‑62/06 RENV II, EU:T:2016:233, paragraphs 45 and 46; and of 20 November 2017, Petrov and Others v Parliament, T‑452/15, EU:T:2017:822, paragraph 46).
49      In the present case, it should be noted that, in its application, by which it disputes the legality of the initial acts in so far as they concern it, the applicant did not put forward any arguments seeking to dispute the legality of the initial (g) criterion, on the basis of which its name was included on the lists at issue in the initial acts. It follows that the present plea, advanced for the first time at the stage of the reply, cannot constitute an amplification of a plea or complaint set out in the application.
50      Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the adoption of Decision 2023/1094 and Regulation 2023/1089, by which the initial (g) criterion was amended, cannot constitute a matter of law which has come to light in the course of the procedure within the meaning of the case-law set out in paragraph 48 above. The applicant’s name was initially included on the lists at issue on the basis of the initial (g) criterion. Accordingly, since that inclusion, by the initial acts, is not based on the amended (g) criterion, the adoption of Decision 2023/1094 and of Regulation 2023/1089 cannot constitute a new matter of law which came to light in the course of the procedure disputing the legality of the initial acts in so far as they concern the applicant.
51      The plea in law raised for the first time at the stage of the reply, based on a plea of illegality disputing the legality of the initial acts in so far as they concern the applicant, is therefore inadmissible.
–       Admissibility of the plea of illegality disputing the legality of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024 in so far as they concern the applicant
52      It should be noted that, in its statements of modification, the applicant indicated that it was relying mutatis mutandis on all the pleas and arguments set out in the application and in the reply. In that regard, it should be noted that, in the context of modification of the application, Article 86(4)(b) of the Rules of Procedure allows for the production of modified pleas in law and arguments.
53      The plea in law based on a plea of illegality is therefore admissible to the extent that it seeks to dispute the legality of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024 in so far as they concern the applicant.
–       Merits of the plea of illegality disputing the legality of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024 in so far as they concern the applicant
54      It should be recalled that Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge indirectly, in seeking annulment of a decision addressed to that party, the validity of acts of general application which form the basis of such a decision, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be annulled. The general measure claimed to be illegal must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned and there must be a direct legal connection between the contested individual decision and the general act in question (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
55      Furthermore, as regards the intensity of the judicial review, it is settled case-law that the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the legality of all Union acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the European Union legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down by the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
56      The fact remains, however, that the Council enjoys broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the legal criteria and procedures for adopting restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). Consequently, the rules of general application defining those criteria and procedures, such as the provisions of the acts at issue laying down the criteria to which the present plea relates, are subject to a limited judicial review, restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the stating of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, that there has been no error in law and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 July 2009, Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, EU:T:2009:266, paragraphs 44 and 45, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 149 (not published)).
57      In the present case, it should be noted that, as regards the acts of September 2023 and March 2024, the Council applied the amended (g) criterion to the applicant, in so far as that criterion covers legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation (‘the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies’).
58      The applicant claims that the amended (g) criterion infringes both the principle of legal certainty and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality enshrined in Article 21(2) of the Charter and in Article 18 TFEU.
59      In the first place, it should be recalled that the principle of legal certainty, which is a general principle of EU law, requires that EU legislation be clear and precise and that its application be foreseeable by those subject to it (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
60      It must be noted that the wording of the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies refers clearly and precisely to legal persons, entities and bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. In that regard, the amended (g) criterion does not require them to be ‘leading’ legal persons, entities or bodies (‘influentes’ in French, ‘führenden’ in German, ‘di spicco’ in Italian, ‘importanți’ in Romanian, ‘vodilni’ in Slovenian and ‘principales’ in Spanish).
61      In addition, the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies exists within a legal framework that is clearly circumscribed by the objectives pursued by the legislation governing the restrictive measures at issue, namely the need, in view of the gravity of the situation, to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine. From that perspective, the restrictive measures at issue are consistent with the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of The Charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco (United States) on 26 June 1945 (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 115 and 123; of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 59; and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
62      In view of those objectives pursued by the restrictive measures, the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies cannot cover all legal persons, entities and bodies involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
63      That criterion cannot cover all the economic operators involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. In the light of the objectives set out in paragraph 61 above, that criterion refers only to the legal persons, entities and bodies that pursue a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, in respect of whom the inclusion of their names on the lists at issue is therefore likely to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of its actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
64      There is therefore a rational connection between the targeting of legal persons, entities and bodies that pursue a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity in economic sectors providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government, on the one hand, and the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of its actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, on the other (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 139).
65      Accordingly, contrary to what the applicant is, in essence, claiming, the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies does not refer to all legal persons, entities and bodies irrespective of their significance for the Russian economy and of their contribution to it.
66      In addition, it should be recalled that the discretion conferred on the Council by the criteria to which this plea relates is counterbalanced by an obligation to state reasons and by strengthened procedural rights (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
67      It follows that the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies has the degree of foreseeability required by EU law.
68      The complaint alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty must therefore be rejected.
69      In the second place, as regards the alleged infringement of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, it should be noted that, according to Article 21(2) of the Charter, within the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited.
70      As regards the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and with Article 52(7) of the Charter, the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17) must be taken into consideration with a view to its interpretation.
71      According to those Explanations, Article 21(2) of the Charter ‘corresponds to the first paragraph of Article 18 [TFEU] and must be applied in compliance with that article’. Moreover, according to Article 52(2) of the Charter, the rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. It follows that Article 21(2) of the Charter must be construed as having the same scope as the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 236).
72      The first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU provides that, ‘within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’. It has been held that a legal person established in a third country does not fall within the scope of that provision and therefore cannot rely on an infringement thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2011, Francesco Guarnieri & Cie, C‑291/09, EU:C:2011:217, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
73      Consequently, the applicant, as a company established in a third country, cannot rely on an infringement of either Article 21(2) of the Charter or of Article 18 TFEU.
74      It must be noted that nor can the applicant rely on the provisions of the ECHR that it alleges have been infringed.
75      It should be recalled that the ECHR does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into EU law (judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 44, and of 20 March 2018, Menci, C‑524/15, EU:C:2018:197, paragraph 22). Consequently, the ECHR cannot be relied on directly as a benchmark for assessing the legality of acts of the EU institutions (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 47, and Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:190, point 66). Therefore, according to the case-law, where a provision of the ECHR is relied on as a criterion for assessing the legality of acts of the EU institutions, it must be assessed in the light of the corresponding provisions of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2017, Bay v Parliament, T‑302/16, not published, EU:T:2017:390, paragraph 55, and of 12 September 2019, XI v Commission, T‑528/18, not published, EU:T:2019:594, paragraph 56).
76      In view of the fact that a company established in a third country does not fall within the scope of application of Article 21(2) of the Charter, the applicant cannot rely independently on the provisions of the ECHR where there are no corresponding provisions of the Charter. Moreover, it should be noted that Article 14 ECHR has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the ECHR and its protocols (ECtHR, 22 January 2008, E.B. v. France, CE:ECHR:2008:0122JUD004354602, § 47, and ECtHR, 15 January 2013, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:2013:0115JUD004842010, § 85).
77      Furthermore, as the Council observed at the hearing, a number of EU Member States have not ratified Protocol No 12 to the ECHR.
78      The complaint alleging infringement of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality must therefore be rejected.
79      It follows from the foregoing that the plea in law based on a plea of illegality must also be rejected to the extent that it has been raised in order to dispute the legality of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024 in so far as they concern the applicant.
The plea in law alleging, in essence, infringement of the obligation to state reasons
80      The applicant claims that the Council has infringed Article 296 TFEU. It submits that, in the initial acts, the reasons for including its name on the lists at issue contain a contradiction in so far as they are not identical in content and do not reiterate the content of the initial (g) criterion. In addition, it considers that the justification provided by the Council is not sufficiently detailed. It also claims that the Council has not proved by means of evidence the existence of reasons justifying the adoption of restrictive measures against it.
81      The Council disputes those arguments.
82      It should be recalled that the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the EU judicature and, second, to enable that judicature to review the legality of that act (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 49).
83      The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU and by Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the act in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the act, or other parties to whom it is of concern within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU may have in obtaining explanations. In particular, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, or to provide a detailed answer to the considerations set out by the person concerned when consulted prior to the adoption of that same act, since the question of whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. Consequently, the reasons given for an act adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that act was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53; see, also, judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
84      In addition, the degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for an act must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for adopting the act (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).
85      Furthermore, it has been made clear in the case-law that the statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposed a restrictive measure had not only to identify the legal basis for that measure but also the actual and specific reasons why the Council considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure had to be adopted in respect of the person concerned (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).
86      In the present case, the initial acts, in common with the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024, specify the context, in their respective recitals, and their legal bases. In particular, it is clear from the recitals of the contested acts that the gravity of the situation in Ukraine and the continuing actions undermining or threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence justify the inclusion of the names of the designated persons on the lists at issue and their maintenance on those lists. The Council therefore correctly took the view that the contested acts were adopted in a context known to the applicant.
87      In addition, according to the reasons for inclusion contained in the initial acts, which are, moreover, identical to those in the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024, the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue on account of the fact that the Council considered it to be the largest private bank in the Russian Federation, appearing on the list of systemically important credit institutions drawn up by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The Council also took the view that the banking sector, in which the applicant operates, was a key component of the financial system of the Russian Federation. It therefore concluded that the applicant was ‘involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’.
88      Accordingly, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, since express justification was given for including and maintaining its name on the lists at issue on the basis of its involvement in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, the applicant was able to infer without difficulty that its name had been included on those lists by adoption of the initial acts on the basis of the initial (g) criterion in so far as it covers legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation (‘the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies’). Similarly, the applicant was also able to infer that its name had been maintained on the lists at issue on the basis of the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies. The mere fact that the grounds of the initial acts allegedly do not specify that the applicant is a ‘leading’ legal person cannot constitute a failure to state reasons, a fortiori since, as will be examined in paragraphs 152 to 155 below, no such attribute is required by the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies.
89      It is also clearly apparent from the reasons for inclusion contained in the contested acts that the Council indicated explicitly the reasons why the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name were based on the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and on the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies. The restrictive measures adopted in respect of the applicant were justified, first, because it is a large Russian bank, specifically the largest private bank in that country, which appears on the list of systemically important credit institutions and, second on the basis of the finding that the banking sector is a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
90      It follows that the statement of reasons of the contested acts is sufficient to enable the applicant to know the reasons why the Council considered that the inclusion and maintenance of its name on the lists at issue was justified and to contest the legality of those acts before the judicature, and to enable the General Court to exercise its power of review.
91      Furthermore, as the Council correctly notes, the arguments alleging that the evidence produced by the Council is insufficient to support the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, in so far as they seek to question the validity of the contested acts, are irrelevant when advanced in support of a plea alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons.
92      As regards the alleged infringement of the third paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, it should be noted that the applicant has not explained why the adoption of the contested acts failed to comply with that provision, which concerns the obligations of the Council and of the European Parliament when considering draft legislative acts. That unsubstantiated complaint must therefore be rejected.
93      In the light of the foregoing, the plea alleging, in essence, infringement of the obligation to state reasons, should be rejected.
The plea in law alleging, in essence, infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection
94      The applicant submits that the procedure laid down in Article 3(2) of Decision 2014/145 and in Article 14(2) of Regulation No 269/2014 was not complied with, on the ground that the Council failed to communicate the initial acts to it, despite being aware of its contact details. Since it was not until 8 May 2023 that the Council sent it the reasons and evidence on which the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue was based, the applicant claims that it was not in a position to submit its observations, which had the effect of shortening the period within which it could bring an action to challenge that inclusion.
95      The applicant also considers that the failure to comply with the procedure provided for in Article 3(1) of Decision 2014/145, in so far as it meant that the applicant was unable to make observations on the decision, entails an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter, namely, the right of every person to good administration, which includes the right to have one’s affair handled fairly within an appropriate time, the right of every person to be heard and the obligation to give reasons for decisions.
96      The Council disputes those arguments.
97      In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the principle of effective judicial protection means that the European Union authority which adopts an act imposing restrictive measures against a person or entity is bound to communicate the grounds on which it is based, so far as possible, either when that measure is adopted or, at the very least, as swiftly as possible after it has been adopted, in order to enable those persons or entities to exercise their right to bring an action (judgment of 16 November 2011, Bank Melli Iran v Council, C‑548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735, paragraph 47).
98      It should also be noted that, first, Article 3(2) of Decision 2014/145 and, second, Article 14(2) of Regulation No 269/2014 provide that the Council is to communicate its decision and the summary of reasons to the relevant person, entity or body subject to the restrictive measures ‘either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations’. In that regard, it has been held, in relation to similar provisions, that communication by way of a notice published in the Official Journal was merely an alternative method of communication, on which the Council can rely only if individual communication proves to be impossible (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2013, Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 61, and order of 20 February 2014, Jannatian v Council, T‑187/13, not published, EU:T:2014:134, paragraph 40). Accordingly, if the Council has the applicant’s address, it must individually notify the reasons for including its name on the lists at issue in order to allow it to defend itself effectively and as rapidly as possible (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraphs 49 and 50).
99      According to the case-law, the Council may be considered to be unable to communicate individually to a natural or legal person or to an entity an act incorporating restrictive measures relating to that person or entity either when the latter’s address is not published and has not been supplied to the Council or when the communication sent to the address which the Council has fails, in spite of the steps which it has taken, with all necessary diligence, in order to effect such communication (judgments of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 61, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 89).
100    In the present case, it should be noted that the identifying information given in the initial acts includes the applicant’s postal address in Russia.
101    When questioned at the hearing, the Council acknowledged that it had taken no steps to ensure that the initial acts were sent directly to the applicant’s address indicated in those acts. According to the Council, that address, indicated in the column relating to identifying information, was shown in the first evidence file and was based on the available information on the applicant, and the Council was therefore not certain that it was the correct address for sending the initial acts. The Council also submits that, as a general rule, the column containing the identifying information for the persons, entities and bodies whose names are included on the lists at issue includes information that is subject to change, such as passport and registration numbers.
102    It should be noted that the Council has neither adduced any evidence capable of establishing that the address indicated in the identifying information for the applicant was incorrect nor produced evidence to establish that it was impossible to post items to the Russian Federation at the time the initial acts were adopted. Nor did the Council, at the hearing, dispute the applicant’s statements relating to the normal functioning of postal deliveries between the Member States of the European Union and the Russian Federation.
103    Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, by failing to send the initial acts directly to the applicant’s address indicated in those acts, the Council infringed Article 3(2) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 14(2) of Regulation No 269/2014. The Council cannot, in order to challenge that finding, rely on the fact that the initial acts had been communicated in the Official Journal. If the direct communication of the individual reasons could be regarded as accomplished by publication of the initial acts in the Official Journal of the European Union, it is difficult to imagine why it is expressly provided that they must be sent directly to the address of the legal person concerned, as Article 3(2) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 14(2) of Regulation No 269/2014 make clear, since, having regard to the prescriptive nature of Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, those acts, and the acts amending them, must be published in any event in accordance with Article 297(2) TFEU (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 November 2011, Bank Melli Iran v Council, C‑548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735, paragraph 51). It follows that communication by means of a notice published in the Official Journal is merely an alternative method of communication where the Council does not have the address of the person concerned or where it has been established that direct communication was impossible. It is clear that the Council has not invoked any such impossibility.
104    However, while the absence of individual communication of the initial acts may have an impact as regards the moment at which time started to run for the purposes of bringing an action, it does not in itself justify the annulment of those acts if the applicant’s rights are protected (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 90, and of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited). Although the individual communication of that type of decision is, in principle, necessary, since mere publication in the Official Journal is not sufficient, the EU Courts must nevertheless examine, in each case, whether the fact that the statement of reasons for the contested decision was not individually brought to the attention of the applicant has had the effect of depriving the latter of an opportunity to ascertain, in due time, the reasons for that decision and to assess the validity of the measure freezing funds and economic resources adopted in respect of that person (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 88).
105    In the present case, it should be noted that, in the power of attorney granted by the applicant to its lawyer, of 14 April 2023, the applicant gave its lawyer power, inter alia, to take receipt of acts relating to restrictive measures adopted by the European Union. In the present case, therefore, it must be found that the initial acts were communicated to the applicant, at least via its lawyer, by the letter of 8 May 2023, of which that lawyer took receipt the same day. It is clear from that letter, written in response to a letter from the applicant’s lawyer of 19 April 2023, that the Council, first, confirmed the adoption of the initial acts in respect of the applicant and, second, sent the first evidence file to the applicant’s lawyer.
106    In addition, contrary to the Council’s assertion, the time limit for bringing an action against the initial acts pursuant to Article 263 TFEU began to run not from publication in the Official Journal of the European Union of the notice reporting the adoption of those acts, but from their communication to the applicant through its lawyer. It is apparent from paragraph 105 above that, in the circumstances of the present case, those acts must be found to have been duly communicated on 8 May 2023, the date on which the Council’s letter of the same date was received. Consequently, to the extent that it seeks annulment of the initial acts in so far as they concern the applicant, the present action had to be brought no later than midnight on 18 July 2023, including an extension on account of distance.
107    Moreover, it should be noted that, by the letter of which the applicant’s lawyer took receipt on 8 May 2023, the Council also complied with the request to communicate the first evidence file. Accordingly, it must be found that the Council also satisfied the requirement that, at the request of the party concerned, it must provide access to all non-confidential official documents within a reasonable period (judgment of 24 November 2021, Aman Dimashq v Council, T‑259/19, EU:T:2021:821, paragraph 73).
108    It must therefore be found that, in the circumstances of the present case, characterised by the fact that the Council communicated to the applicant’s lawyer (i) the initial acts and (ii) the first evidence file, the applicant was not deprived of an opportunity to ascertain, in due time, the reasons for the initial acts and to assess the validity of the measure for the freezing of funds adopted in relation to it.
109    That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the lack of direct communication of the initial acts had the effect of reducing the period in which to bring the present action to the extent that it seeks annulment of those acts in so far as they concern the applicant. Indeed, the applicant decided, on its own initiative, to lodge its application at the Registry of the Court on 22 May 2023, even though, as is apparent from paragraph 106 above, the time limit for bringing an action expired at midnight on 18 July 2023.
110    Therefore, in the present case, the absence of individual communication of the initial acts does not constitute a failure to comply with the applicant’s right to effective judicial protection.
111    In the second place, it is settled case-law that the right to be heard in all proceedings, laid down in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, which is inherent in respect for the rights of the defence, guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of a decision in relation to that person that is liable to affect his or her interests adversely (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). Article 52(1) of the Charter nevertheless allows limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter, on condition that the limitation concerned is provided for by law, respects the essence of the fundamental right in question and, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited). In that regard, the Court of Justice has held, repeatedly, that the rights of the defence could be subject to limitations or derogations, including in the sphere of the restrictive measures adopted in the context of the CFSP (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).
112    It should be recalled that, in proceedings relating to the adoption of a decision to include or maintain a person’s name on a list contained in the annex to an act imposing restrictive measures, respect for the rights of the defence requires that the competent EU authority communicates to the person concerned the reasons and the evidence against that person on which that authority proposes to base its decision. When that communication takes place, the competent EU authority must ensure that the views of the persons concerned on the reasons advanced against them can effectively be made known (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 111 and 112, and of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 76). In that regard, it is necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, the initial inclusion of a person’s name on the lists at issue and, on the other, the maintenance of that person’s name on those lists (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 2015, Al-Chihabi v Council, T‑593/11, EU:T:2015:249, paragraph 40).
113    In the case of a first act freezing the funds of a person or entity, the Council is not obliged to communicate to the person or entity concerned beforehand the reasons on which it intends to base the first inclusion of that party’s name on the list of persons and entities whose funds are frozen. In order not to jeopardise its effectiveness, such a measure must be able to take advantage of an element of surprise and to apply immediately. In such a case, it is as a rule sufficient if the institution communicates the reasons to the person or entity concerned and affords the latter the right to be heard concomitantly with or immediately after adoption of the decision to freeze funds (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 May 2022, Boshab v Council, C‑242/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:375, paragraph 59, and of 12 February 2020, Kande Mupompa v Council, T‑170/18, EU:T:2020:60, paragraph 62). Such a derogation from the fundamental right to be heard during a procedure preceding the adoption of restrictive measures is justified by the need to ensure that the freezing measures are effective and, in short, by overriding considerations relating to safety or the conduct of the international relations of the Union and of its Member States (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).
114    Accordingly, in the present case, the applicant cannot criticise the Council for failing to communicate the grounds of the initial acts to it before those acts were adopted in order to afford it an opportunity to make observations.
115    It should also be noted that the initial acts contain a sufficient statement of reasons (see paragraph 90 above) and that, even though the Council was wrong not to communicate the initial acts directly, concomitantly with or immediately after their adoption on 25 February 2023, the fact remains that, as is clear from paragraph 105 above, in the circumstances of the present case it must be found that the initial acts were communicated to the applicant, via its lawyer duly authorised for that purpose, by the Council’s letter of 8 May 2023 confirming the adoption of the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant on the basis of the reasons contained in those acts. Moreover, by that letter of 8 May 2023, the Council granted the request for access to the file by sending to the applicant’s lawyer the first evidence file containing the evidence against the applicant.
116    Accordingly, in view of the derogation from the right to be heard during a procedure preceding the adoption of restrictive measures that is necessary in the context of an entity’s first inclusion on the lists at issue in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures to freeze funds, and since the Council had sent all the evidence against the applicant on 8 May 2023, it must be found that the initial acts were adopted in a procedure during which the applicant’s rights of the defence, as regards its right to be heard and its right of access to the file, were not infringed.
117    It follows that the applicant cannot claim that the adoption of the initial acts was vitiated by an infringement of its rights of the defence.
118    The plea alleging, in essence, infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection must therefore be rejected.
The plea in law alleging, in essence, a manifest error of assessment and the insufficiency of the factual basis
119    The applicant claims, in essence, that the Council has not adduced concrete, precise and consistent evidence capable of constituting a solid factual basis to support the inclusion and maintenance of its name on the lists at issue.
120    The Council disputes those arguments.
–       Preliminary observations
121    It should be noted that the plea raised by the applicant must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment rather than a manifest error of assessment. While it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the legality of all European Union acts (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited).
122    The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires in particular that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, was taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122).
123    Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited; see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraphs 63 and 66).
124    It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of the latter to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. There is no requirement, for that purpose, that the Council produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act of which annulment is sought. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraphs 66 and 67; see, also, judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
125    In that scenario, the EU Courts must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124).
126    As regards, more specifically, the review of legality carried out with regard to the acts which maintain the name of the person concerned on the lists at issue, it should be pointed out that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the effects of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the lists at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
127    It follows that, in support of maintenance of a person’s name on a list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence as that which formed the basis of the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of that person’s name on that list, provided that (i) the reasons for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). In that regard, assessment of the changes in the context involves taking into consideration, first, the situation in the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established and the particular situation of the person concerned (judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78; see, also, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 101), and, second, all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, whether the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have been achieved (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 82 to 84 and the case-law cited).
128    It is in the light of those principles that it is necessary to ascertain whether the Council made an error of assessment in deciding to include and then to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
–       The evidence contained in the Council’s evidence files
129    In the present case, in support of the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council provided the first evidence file, which contains publicly accessible information. That information includes the following:
–        a press release from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation relating to approval of the list of systemically important credit institutions, published on that institution’s website on 3 October 2022 (exhibit No 1);
–        a presentation of the banking sector by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, published on that institution’s website on 1 August 2022 (exhibit No 2);
–        an article entitled ‘Alfa-Bank signed a cooperation agreement with the Government of the Moscow Region’ published on the Podolsk.ru website on 26 April 2022 (exhibit No 4);
–        an article entitled ‘Alfa-Bank improves conditions for loans with State support for small and medium-sized businesses’, published on the Vedomosti
website on 5 August 2022 (exhibit No 5);
–        an article entitled ‘Impact of Ukraine crisis on Russian banking system’, published on the Retailbankerinternational.com website on 7 April 2022 (exhibit No 7);
–        an article entitled ‘Japan freezes assets of Russia’s Sberbank and Alfa Bank over Ukraine’, published on the website of The Japan Times on 12 May 2022 (exhibit No 17);
–        an article entitled ‘UK sanctioned Alfa-Bank in March 2022’, published on the Reuters website on 24 March 2022 (exhibit No 18);
–        a press release from the US Department of the Treasury relating to the restrictive measures adopted in respect of a number of financial institutions and personalities close to the President of the Russian Federation, published on 6 April 2022 (exhibit No 20);
–        a presentation by the Black Sea & Trade Development Bank entitled ‘Overview of the financial sector in Russia’, published on the bstdb.rog website in March 2021 (exhibit No 1 of the additional evidence on the banking sector);
–        an article entitled ‘The Central Bank of the Russian Federation left the list of systemically important banks unchanged’, published on the Interfax website on 3 October 2022 (exhibit No 2 of the additional evidence on the banking sector);
–        an article on small and medium-sized enterprises (‘SMEs’), published on the Opora Russia website on 7 September 2022 (exhibit No 3 of the additional evidence on the banking sector).
130    Furthermore, in support of maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by the adoption of the acts of March 2024, the Council also relied on the evidence in the second evidence file, which also consists of publicly accessible information. That information includes the following:
–        an article entitled ‘Over 9 months, Alfa Bank received net profit under RAS of 85.8 billion roubles’, published on 13 November 2023, Interfax website (exhibit No 8 of the second evidence file);
–        an article entitled ‘Alfa Bank received 52.2 billion roubles in net profit in the first half of the year’, published on 11 August 2023 on the Vedomosti website (exhibit No 9 of the second evidence file).
131    Among the items in the evidence files that are relevant to supporting the inclusion and maintenance of its name on the lists at issue, the applicant disputes the reliability of exhibits Nos 1, 4, 7 and 17 in the first evidence file and of exhibits Nos 1 and 2 of the additional evidence on the banking sector, which are also contained in that file.
132    The Council disputes those arguments.
133    In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the EU Courts is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive for the assessment of its value. In that respect, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, the person from whom it originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 114).
134    In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment by the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 115).
135    Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing difficulty of investigation can thus be a factor hindering the provision of specific evidence and objective information (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116).
136    In relation to exhibit No 1 in the first evidence file, that is to say, certain information published on the website of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the fact that the evidence file contains a clerical error as regards the date on which that information was consulted does not call into question the reliability of that document. Moreover, it is unequivocally clear from that exhibit that the information was published on the official website of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on 3 October 2022, that is to say, before the date on which the initial acts were adopted.
137    In relation to the arguments disputing the reliability of exhibits Nos 4 and 17 in the first evidence file and exhibits No 1 and No  2 of the additional evidence on the banking sector, on the ground that they are not from official sources, the fact that this is not information from official sources clearly does not render that evidence completely unreliable. As noted in paragraph 134 above, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the Council may rely on publicly available sources of information. The applicant’s general assertions, which are not substantiated by any concrete evidence, cannot call into question the soundness and reliability of the information contained in exhibits No 4 and No 17 in the first evidence file or of additional exhibits No 1 and No 2 on the banking sector. The mere fact that the Podolsk.ru website (exhibit No 4) is a website belonging to a Russian municipality cannot render exhibit No 4 unreliable. Nor does the fact that the information on the website of The Japan Times originates in Japan call into question the reliability of exhibit No 17.
138    Admittedly, in the first evidence file, the Council incorrectly indicated that the source of exhibit No 1 of the additional exhibits on the banking sector was the ‘Bank of Russia’ instead of the ‘Black Sea & Trade Development Bank’. However, that inaccuracy cannot call into question the reliability of the information contained in the exhibit in question, with all the more reason since the information that it contains is based on data from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The applicant has not adduced any other evidence to dispute its reliability. As regards exhibit No 2 of the additional exhibits on the banking sector, in order to challenge the reliability of that exhibit, the applicant cannot merely submit that the Council should have relied on information supplied by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation instead of taking into consideration information on the Interfax website. Since the Council has no investigative powers in third countries, it is entitled to rely on publicly accessible sources.
139    As regards the argument alleging that exhibit No 7 in the first evidence file, namely certain information published on the Retailbankerinternational.com website, is unreliable merely because that information is no longer accessible, that argument cannot succeed since the evidence file contains screenshots of that article and the applicant is therefore able to apprise itself of its content.
140    In the light of the foregoing, having regard to the context of the situation of the Russian Federation and the fact that the Council has no investigative powers in third countries (see paragraphs 134 and 135 above), the applicant has not adduced evidence capable of calling into question the probative value of the exhibits in the evidence files.
–       Application to the applicant of the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and of the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies
141    First, in respect of the error of assessment consisting of its name being included on the lists at issue on the basis of the initial (g) criterion and on the basis of the amended (g) criterion, the applicant submits that, in the first place, the Council was wrong to apply the (g) criterion to it without finding it to be a ‘leading bank’. According to the applicant, only the best or the most important bank that economically outperforms other banks may be considered to be a ‘leading bank’. The applicant submits that the Council does not have sufficient evidence to find the applicant to be a ‘leading bank’ and that such a finding cannot be inferred from the fact that it is supposedly the largest private bank in the Russian Federation. The applicant also claims that it cannot be regarded as being ‘leading’ in the banking sector, given that its financial results showed a loss in 2022. Furthermore, the applicant criticises the Council for equating the adjective ‘leading’ with the expression ‘the largest’, especially since other financial institutions had been included on the lists at issue as being ‘the largest’ banks in Russia.
142    In the second place, the applicant claims that, to justify the inclusion of a person’s name on the lists on the basis of the (g) criterion, the Council must establish, first of all, that the person concerned is a leader in its sector of activity; next, the person must operate in the relevant sector of the economy; and, last, that sector of the economy must provide a significant source of revenue for the Russian Government. In the present case, the applicant submits that the fact that it appears on the list of systemically important credit institutions in Russia does not give it a leading role and that that classification does not demonstrate that the banking sector is a significant source of revenue for the Russian Government. In that regard, the applicant submits that the Council used data that was out of date because the list on which it relies was drawn up on 3 October 2022 on the basis of 2021 indicators. Furthermore, the applicant claims that having the status of a systemically important credit institution is irrelevant since that status does not imply any financial support for the Russian Government, but indicates instead that the bank offers deposit account services to a large number of individual consumers.
143    In its reply, the applicant criticises the Council, in essence, for not including on the lists at issue certain other banks that appear on the list of systemically important credit institutions.
144    In the third place, the applicant claims that the Council has not demonstrated that the banking sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
145    According to the applicant, in the context of implementing the (g) criterion, it is necessary to have regard only to revenue in the federal budget. With regard to corporate income tax, the applicant submits that, although the rate is 20%, levied on profits, only 3% is paid to the federal budget while 17% is paid to the regional budgets, with the effect that only the 3% share of profits payable to the federal budget can be taken into account. The applicant therefore considers that neither the amount of corporate income tax that it pays nor the amount paid by the largest Russian banks constitutes a significant source of revenue for the Russian Government. In its reply, the applicant produces a study prepared at its request, on which it relies in order to claim that its contribution to the revenue of the Russian Government is negligible, and that the share of the banking sector in the Government’s consolidated tax revenue has not exceeded 4.75% at any time in the last five years and has not been more than 3.48% at federal level.
146    In respect of value added tax (‘VAT’), the applicant submits that it has not paid that tax because the difference between the taxable amount for the VAT that it paid as a taxpayer and that for the VAT paid by its suppliers was zero. It also claims that it does not generate substantial revenue for the government at federal level through the personal income tax withheld from its employees and that social security contributions do not constitute revenue accruing to the federal budget because they are allocated to welfare benefits.
147    The applicant also disputes the finding that the banking sector is a key component of the financial system of the Russian Federation and is a significant source of revenue for the Russian Government, on the ground that a number of banks were unprofitable in 2022 and that the profits earned by the sector were negligible. In that regard, the applicant argues that the evidence provided by the Council is out of date because it relates to 2021 and does not reflect the actual situation at the time the contested acts were adopted. According to the applicant, it is apparent from a report of 14 February 2023 by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation that the indicators relating to the most profitable and important sectors of the Russian economy do not mention the banking sector and it therefore cannot constitute a significant source of revenue for the government. Similarly, the applicant notes that it is apparent from information from the Federal Tax Service that the principal sources of revenue for the federal budget are wholesale and retail trade, mining and the oil and gas trade. The applicant also argues that the finding that the banking sector is a key component of the financial system is based on a mistranslation of exhibit No 2 in the first evidence file.
148    Moreover, the applicant disputes that its participation in a programme to finance SMEs is relevant for the purposes of including its name on the lists on the basis of the (g) criterion.
149    Furthermore, in its reply, the applicant criticises the Council for failing to take its international activities into account, on the ground that the restrictive measures at issue prevent it from pursuing its international operations, and for failing to establish the existence of a direct link between it and the Russian Government relating to the financing of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine.
150    Second, the applicant submits that the first evidence file does not contain sufficient evidence to support the restrictive measures to which it is subject. According to the applicant, the evidence in the first evidence file is out of date and irrelevant.
151    The Council disputes those arguments.
152    In that regard, in relation to the initial (g) criterion, it should be noted that in the French, Italian and Romanian language versions it can be unambiguously understood from a literal reading of that criterion that the adjective ‘influent’ (leading) in French (‘di spicco’ in Italian and ‘importanți’ in Romanian) refers solely to natural persons who are ‘femmes ou d’hommes d’affaires’ (‘leading businesspersons’) (‘imprenditori’ in Italian and ‘oameni de afaceri’ in Romanian).
153    In addition, in the English, German and Slovenian versions of the initial (g) criterion, although the adjective ‘leading’ in English (‘führenden’ in German and ‘vodilni’ in Slovenian) is placed first, the use of the conjunction ‘or’ in English (‘oder’ in German and ‘ali’ in Slovenian) after the term ‘businesspersons’ in English (‘Gechäftsleuten’ in German and ‘poslovneži’ in Slovenian) indicates unequivocally that the adjective in question refers solely to natural persons and does not apply to ‘legal persons, entities or bodies’ in English (‘juristischen Personen, Organisationen oder Einrichtungen’ in German or to ‘pravne osebe, subjekti ali organi’ in Slovenian).
154    Admittedly, in Spanish, it cannot be determined from reading the initial (g) criterion in isolation whether the article ‘los’ and the adjective ‘principales’ refer solely to the word ‘empresarios’ (businesspersons) or also to the expression ‘personas jurídicas, entidades u organismos’ (legal persons, entities or bodies). However, if that criterion is read in the light of all the provisions of Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, it can be understood that the article ‘los’ and the adjective ‘principales’ refer solely to the word ‘empresarios’ and do not also refer to the expression ‘personas jurídicas, entidades u organismos’, given that, in the wording of the other criteria laid down by that article the expression ‘personas jurídicas, entidades u organismos’ is nowhere preceded by a definite article such as ‘los’. That interpretation is confirmed by the wording of Article 1 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, on restrictions on the admission of natural persons to the territory of the Member States, in which, in Article 1(1)(e), the expression ‘los principales empresarios’, which is used instead of the expression ‘personas físicas’ that appears in the other criteria laid down by Article 1(1) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is likewise the only expression preceded by a definite article. Indeed, in Article 1(1)(a) to (d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the expression ‘personas físicas’ is not preceded by a definite article. It follows that, in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the expression ‘los principales’ relates only to natural persons who can be described as ‘empresarios’.
155    Accordingly, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, it is not apparent from the wording of the initial (g) criterion that that criterion confined the ability to adopt measures to freeze funds solely to measures against legal persons, entities or bodies to which the adjective ‘leading’ could be applied. The Council was therefore not obliged to demonstrate that the applicant is a ‘leading’ bank or one in a ‘leading position’, and nor did it have to establish that it was a bank that could be described as having a leading role, as the most important bank in Russia or as economically outperforming the other banks.
156    Similarly, for the purposes of applying the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies, since the Council is not required to establish that such legal persons, entities or bodies involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation are ‘leading’, the applicant cannot take issue with it for supposedly equating the adjective ‘leading’ with the expression ‘the largest’ in order to designate the financial institutions whose names could be included on the lists at issue.
157    Accordingly, as regards legal persons, entities and bodies, the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion have the same scope, since each applies to the legal persons, entities or bodies that pursue a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
158    It should also be noted that, in the light of the wording of the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion, the expression ‘providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’, in those criteria, refers to revenue from the economic sectors in question, rather than only to the taxes paid by the legal persons, entities or bodies concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 May 2024, Vinokurov v Council, T‑302/22, not published, EU:T:2024:325, paragraph 111).
159    Furthermore, while, admittedly, neither Decision 2014/145, as amended, nor Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, defines the concept of ‘substantial source of revenue’, the fact remains that the use of the adjective ‘substantial’, which qualifies the nominal group ‘source of revenue’, implies that the source of revenue in question is necessarily significant and therefore not negligible (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 September 2023, Pumpyanskiy v Council, T‑291/22, not published, EU:T:2023:499, paragraph 63, and of 29 May 2024, Vinokurov v Council, T‑302/22, not published, EU:T:2024:325, paragraph 113).
160    In addition, the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies merely require that the legal persons, entities or bodies operate in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, and they neither impose any other condition relating to a link, whether direct or indirect, with Russian decision-makers or with the Government of the Russian Federation nor require proof of the existence of material or financial support for the actions and policy to destabilise Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 145). Consequently, the applicant is not justified in maintaining that restrictive measures can be adopted on the basis of that criterion only in respect of legal persons, entities or bodies which have clear links with the Russian Government or which are directly or indirectly involved in financing the annexation of Crimea or the Russian military operation in Ukraine more broadly.
161    In short, the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies must be interpreted as meaning, first, that they are intended to apply to legal persons, entities and bodies that pursue a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity in an economic sector and, second, that it is the economic sectors in which those legal persons, entities or bodies are involved which must provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
162    It is therefore in the light of that interpretation of the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and of the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies that it is necessary to determine whether the reasons relied on in the contested acts are well founded.
163    In the present case, since the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies have the same scope and since the reasons for including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue have remained unchanged, it is not necessary to draw a distinction between the initial acts, on the one hand, and the maintaining acts, on the other, given that verification of the information alleged in the summary of reasons and in the evidence, which is set out in the first and second evidence files, addresses, in essence, the same factual circumstances.
164    As regards the general context of the situation of Ukraine, it should be noted that, in relation to the threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, that context remained unchanged between the adoption of the initial acts and that of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024. Similarly, the restrictive measures are still justified in the light of the objective pursued, which is to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
165    As regards the applicant’s particular situation, in the first place, it is necessary to determine whether the Council could validly find that the applicant pursues a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity in the banking sector.
166    First, in the reasons for inclusion, the applicant is described as ‘the largest private bank in the Russian Federation’.
167    It should be noted that the exhibits in the first evidence file serve to support that statement. It is clear from that evidence file that the applicant was regarded as being the largest private bank in Russia (exhibits Nos 4, 17 and 20). In addition, it is apparent from the first evidence file that the applicant was also regarded as one of Russia’s leading banks (exhibit No 4), the fourth largest financial institution in Russia (exhibit No 20) and as being one of the top private lenders in Russia (exhibit No 18).
168    It should be noted that the applicant is not disputing the description of it, duly substantiated by evidence, as the Russian Federation’s foremost private bank. In that regard, since the evidence referred to in paragraph 167 above serves to substantiate the quantitative significance of the applicant’s activity in the banking sector, the applicant cannot argue that those exhibits are irrelevant for the purposes of justifying the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue. The applicant’s argument disputing that the Council can rely on exhibit No 20, solely because it is a press release from the US Department of the Treasury, must also fail, since the applicant is disputing neither the reliability of that document nor the information it contains which, moreover, confirms the information in other exhibits in the first evidence file.
169    In addition, the fact that, in 2022, the applicant’s financial results showed a loss is not such as to call into question the circumstance that it was the largest private bank in the Russian Federation, and nor can it call into question the resulting finding, that is to say, that its activity in the banking sector is quantitatively non-negligible. The mere fact that the applicant occasionally posted a loss is not, in itself, sufficient for it to claim that it was not a bank with a quantitatively non-negligible activity in the banking sector. It is in fact apparent from exhibits No 8 and No 9 in the second evidence file that, from the 2023 financial year, the applicant’s financial results showed a profit.
170    Second, in support of the premiss that the applicant’s activity in the banking sector is significant, the reasons for inclusion refer to the fact that it appears on the list of systemically important credit institutions.
171    In that regard, it is clear from the first evidence file that the applicant was on the list of systemically important credit institutions drawn up by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (exhibit No 1). According to exhibit No 2 of the additional evidence on the banking sector, the systemically important credit institutions account for 77% of the total assets of the Russian banking sector.
172    The applicant does not dispute that it appears on the list of systemically important credit institutions and acknowledges that that status indicates that it provides banking services to a large number of individual consumers.
173    In addition, since those systemically important credit institutions are subject to stricter supervision on account of the risks that their activities may pose to financial stability, the fact that the applicant’s name is on the list in question drawn up by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation bears out the finding that it is a bank whose activity in the banking sector is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively non-negligible.
174    The applicant cannot claim that the Council could not rely on exhibit No 1 in the first evidence file, on the ground that the list drawn up by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on 3 October 2022 had been prepared on the basis of financial information relating to 2021. The applicant acknowledges that the list of systemically important credit institutions in Russia prepared using financial data from 2022 was not drawn up until after 1 September 2023, that is to say, subsequently to adoption of the initial acts. This means that the list reproduced in exhibit No 1 in the first evidence file was the most up-to-date version at the time the initial acts were adopted. Furthermore, in relation to the maintaining acts of September 2023 and March 2024, the applicant has not invoked any argument or evidence capable of establishing that the Central Bank of the Russian Federation withdrew its name from the updated version of the list of systemically important credit institutions.
175    In addition, since the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies are not restricted to the legal person, entity or body considered to be ‘the most important’ or as ‘having a leading role’ in an economic sector (see paragraph 155 above), the argument that having the status of a systemically important credit institution does not imply a leading role in the banking sector cannot succeed.
176    Moreover, since the (g) criterion does not require proof of the existence of financial support to Russian decision-makers or to the Government of the Russian Federation (see paragraph 160 above), the line of argument that having the status of a systemically important credit institution is irrelevant on the grounds that it does not imply financial support for the Russian Government must also fail. For the same reasons, the argument that the Council must prove the existence of a direct link between the applicant and the government relating to the financing of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine cannot succeed.
177    Nor can the applicant criticise the Council, in essence, for not adopting restrictive measures in respect of all the systemically important credit institutions and in respect of all credit institutions that participated in the programme for SMEs referred to in exhibit No 5 in the first evidence file. Although the Council cannot include on the lists the names of persons not satisfying the designation criteria laid down in the applicable acts, it is not, on the other hand, bound to include on those lists the names of all persons satisfying those criteria. The Council has broad discretion enabling it, when appropriate, not to impose those measures on such a person or entity, where it considers that, in the light of the objectives of those measures, it would not be appropriate to do so (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 April 2015, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, T‑190/12, EU:T:2015:222, paragraph 243).
178    It follows from the foregoing that the Council had a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that the applicant’s activity in the banking sector was quantitatively and qualitatively non-negligible.
179    In the second place, it should be noted that it has been held that the banking sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 November 2023, Khan v Council, T‑333/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:758, paragraph 111).
180    In the present case, that finding is confirmed by the evidence in the case file.
181    First of all, it is apparent from exhibit No 4 in the first evidence file that at the end of the first half of 2021 the applicant’s net income amounted to 905 million United States dollars (USD) (approximately EUR 761 million). In view of the large amount of income generated by the applicant’s activity and, by extrapolation, by all the undertakings operating in the banking sector, the Council did not err in its assessment when it found that a significant amount of tax was paid by the banking sector.
182    That finding is borne out by the data provided by the applicant in Annex A.10, that is to say, a list of the taxes paid by it in 2021 and 2022. Accordingly, in respect of corporate income tax, the applicant paid 35.4 billion roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 389 million) in 2021 and RUB 5.392 billion (approximately EUR 75 million) in 2022. In addition, in respect of the tax on securities, which, as the applicant specified at the hearing, is levied on its customers’ earnings on their securities, the applicant paid RUB 2.223 billion (approximately EUR 24 million) in 2021 and RUB 3.592 billion (approximately EUR 50 million) in 2022. Similarly, according to those data, in respect of VAT, the applicant paid RUB 10.2 billion (approximately EUR 112 million) in 2021 and RUB 12.79 billion (approximately EUR 179 million) in 2022. The applicant also paid, in respect of the personal income tax withheld from its staff, RUB 11.786 billion (approximately EUR 129 million) in 2021 and RUB 16.597 billion (approximately EUR 232 million) in 2022, and, in respect of social security contributions, RUB 11.807 billion (approximately EUR 129 million) in 2021 and RUB 17.324 billion (approximately EUR 242 million) in 2022.
183    Admittedly, the data set out in paragraph 182 above are confined to the taxes and contributions paid to the public finances of the Russian Federation by the applicant rather than by the banking sector as a whole. However, in view of the large amount of those public levies, taken together, paid by a single bank, it could validly be inferred, by extrapolation, that the amount of taxes and contributions paid by all the undertakings operating in the banking sector together, was significant.
184    Next, it should be noted that it is apparent from the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists that the banking sector ‘is the key component of the financial system of the Russian Federation’. To that effect, it is clear from exhibit No 1 of the additional evidence on the banking sector that commercial banks play a major role in the Russian financial sector given that they represent approximately 87% of the total assets in the financial sector.
185    Last, as the Council argues, in view of the specific role of the banking sector in the functioning of the economy, in order to support the finding that that sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, the Council was also entitled to take into account the income generated indirectly by that sector in the other sectors of the economy.
186    It must be found that, according to the information from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation set out in exhibit No 2 in the first evidence file, credit institutions conduct settlements, ensure the safeguarding of customers’ funds in bank accounts and transform those funds into loans to the economy. According to that information, the ratio of bank assets to GDP in Russia is approximately 90%. Half the assets of credit institutions are accounted for by loans, of which two-thirds are corporate loans. In relation to that item of evidence, the argument that the Council mistranslated a Russian term, and that the evidence does not state that the banking sector is a ‘key’ component of the financial system but rather a ‘crucial’ component, cannot succeed. It should be noted that the applicant acknowledges that the banking sector is important for servicing and ensuring the normal functioning of business processes. Therefore, even assuming that the Council mistranslated a Russian term, that would nevertheless not give rise to an error of assessment as regards the significance of the banking sector in the financial system.
187    Moreover, according to the information in exhibit No 1 of the additional evidence on the banking sector, the banking sector is a significant source of corporate financing, in particular for the manufacturing sector, which represents the majority of the corporate loan portfolio, followed by the construction and real estate sector.
188    Furthermore, as the Council notes, the first evidence file also contains evidence showing the significance of the banking sector in financing SMEs. First, exhibit No 5 in the first evidence file contains information describing the applicant’s participation in a government programme to support SMEs by granting loans at preferential rates so that they can pay suppliers and employees, refinance existing loans or invest. At the same time, exhibit No 3 of the additional evidence on the banking sector refers to the significant contribution to supporting the Russian economy made by the banking sector, alongside the government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, in the context of a programme to restructure loans to SMEs totalling more than RUB 900 billion (approximately EUR 12.6 billion) between March and July 2022. In that regard, contrary to the applicant’s claim, exhibit No 5 in the evidence file and exhibit No 3 of the additional evidence on the banking sector are not intended to establish a link between the banking sector and the government since, as is clear from paragraph 160 above, it is not necessary to prove the existence of such a link in order to include the name of a legal person, entity or body on the lists on the basis of the initial or amended (g) criterion. Moreover, the fact that the loan programmes in question may receive government support does not mean that the government subsidises the banking sector, but rather that the SMEs benefit from bank loans on preferential terms in the context of government programmes, thereby confirming the significant contribution made by that sector to the functioning of the Russian economy.
189    It is clear from the foregoing that, besides the fact that the banking sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, the factual basis on which the Council relied also contained evidence showing that the banking sector, through its activity, contributes to financing economic activities in Russia, in particular the activities of other economic sectors which in turn provide revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. It follows that, given that specific role played by the banking sector, the Council could correctly also take into account the revenue generated indirectly by the banking sector, in order to support its finding that that sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
190    Consequently, the Council did not err in its assessment when it found that the banking sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
191    That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments.
192    First, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, the fact that the tax revenue relating to corporate income tax is allocated primarily to local authority budgets and not to the federal budget is irrelevant. In the light of the objectives of the restrictive measures, that is to say, to exert maximum pressure on the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of its actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, the concept of ‘revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ cannot be interpreted restrictively as referring only to the tax revenue allocated to the federal budget of that State (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council, T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraph 139). Even though that source of revenue is not intended for the federal budget or used directly by that government in order to sustain its military expenditure, the fact remains that, as a whole, without distinction as to whether it comes from the federal budget or the regional budgets, that revenue allows that government to mobilise even more resources for its actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
193    The applicant is also wrong to consider that the Council could not take indirect taxes into account, on the ground that they are paid by its customers or by consumers. It has been held that, even though indirect taxes, such as VAT, are collected from and paid by consumers, the fact remains that they can be a substantial source of revenue which should be taken into account as revenue that the Government of the Russian Federation derives from the activities of the sector concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2023, Shulgin v Council, T‑364/22, not published, EU:T:2023:503, paragraph 95). Even though the taxes are paid by consumers, it is the economic activity in a given sector that justifies the levying of those taxes, and the revenue from those taxes can therefore be taken into consideration when assessing whether a sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, in the present case, in order to assess the level of the revenue which that government derives from the activities of the banking sector, the Council was entitled to take account of both VAT and of the tax on securities.
194    It should be noted that the study produced by the applicant in Annex C.1 to its reply is based on the premiss that VAT revenue plays a negligible part in determining the level of the revenue generated by the banking sector, even though it is apparent from the data in Annex A.10 that the applicant’s business, alone, had generated VAT of over RUB 10 billion (approximately EUR 110 million) a year. Consequently, that study cannot call into question the finding that the banking sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, a fortiori since, because it was prepared at the applicant’s request, it is of limited probative value pursuant to the case-law cited in paragraph 133 above (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 February 2018, Klyuyev v Council, T‑731/15, EU:T:2018:90, paragraph 124).
195    Nor does the remaining evidence produced by the applicant call into question the finding that the banking sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
196    That is so as regards, inter alia, the tables presented by the applicant as being data from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on the positive and negative drivers of external demand-oriented industries (Annex A.16) and of public consumption-oriented industries (Annex A.17). Those data are taken out of context and merely indicate a change over a short period of time, that is to say, between October 2022 and January 2023, in relation to external demand-oriented and public consumption-oriented industries. The mere fact that the banking sector is not referred to in those tables therefore does not undermine the finding that that sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
197    The same finding must be made as regards the extract from a report submitted by the applicant as coming from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and showing the decreasing dependence of the microfinance field on the banking sector (Annex A.18). According to the applicant, that evidence shows that banks are tending to lose customers. Even assuming that the report shows that banks are losing customers in the field of microfinance, such a finding is confined to that portion of its customer base and cannot necessarily be transposed to other types of customer such as corporate customers. In that regard, the data provided by the applicant in Annex A.20, that is to say, data appearing on a page of the website of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, suggest that the banks have retained a sufficient customer base, since their assets and corporate lending have increased. Although admittedly, according to the data in that annex, banks’ net profit fell 91% in 2022 compared with the preceding year, the fact remains that, over the same period, bank assets increased by 14.8% and corporate loans by 14.3%.
198    As regards the data from the Federal Tax Service (Annex A.19), the fact that the principal sources of revenue for the federal budget are the wholesale and retail trade, mining and oil and gas trade sectors does not mean however that the direct contribution by the banking sector does not provide a substantial source of revenue within the meaning of the initial or of the amended (g) criterion. Those data provided by the applicant do not give a complete picture of the revenue from the various sectors of the economy. Accordingly, the fact that the banking sector is not mentioned is not proof that it does not provide a direct and substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Moreover, those data do not reflect revenue generated indirectly by the banking sector in other sectors, such as the manufacturing sector.
199    As regards the fact that the banking sector contributes around 4.8% to the gross domestic product whereas the shares of the mining, commercial and manufacturing sectors are higher, it should be noted that the fact that an economic sector represents a relatively less significant share in Russia’s GDP than others does not mean that it is not capable, in terms of absolute value rather than relative shares, of providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
200    Second, the fact that the banking sector was less profitable and that it returned lower profits in 2022 than in 2021 cannot, in itself, call into question the fact that the sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. It is clear from exhibit No 1 of the additional evidence on the banking sector that, over the period from 2011 to 2020, the profitability of the sector was generally good, despite the isolated drop in profitability seen in 2015. Accordingly, in the light of the fluctuations in the economy, the isolated drop in profitability in 2022 likewise was not such as to call into question the finding that the sector is generally profitable.
201    Third, the applicant submits that a number of items of evidence are out of date and do not substantiate the validity of the contested acts.
202    In that regard, it should be noted that exhibit No 2 in the first evidence file contains information from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation published on that institution’s website on 1 August 2022, describing the banking sector as being a ‘key’, or, according to the applicant, ‘crucial’, component of the financial system. As the applicant notes, the information in fact contains figures relating to 2021. However, the applicant acknowledges that, in the data from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on the indicators for the banking sector as at 1 January 2023, referred to in paragraphs 92 and 93 of the application, the sector is still presented as a ‘crucial’ component of the financial sector and that it is important for servicing and for ensuring the proper functioning of business processes. The applicant is therefore wrong to submit that the information in exhibit No 2 in the first evidence file was out of date.
203    As regards exhibit No 1 of the additional evidence on the banking sector, the applicant claims that the information in that exhibit, which relates to 2020, is out of date because adverse economic and political events have impaired the economic performance of the banking sector. It should be noted that that exhibit is intended to show, on the basis of trend data, the significant contribution of the banking sector to the operation of the Russian economy. It should be noted that the applicant has not produced any evidence to show that those data have become out of date. As is apparent from paragraph 197 above, despite the drop in profitability of the banking sector in 2022, over that same period bank assets and corporate lending continued to increase. In addition, the applicant has acknowledged that, despite the short-term factors in 2022, a number of Russian banks had remained profitable, and it has been found in paragraph 169 above that the applicant returned to profitability from the 2023 financial year. Consequently, the applicant is not justified in claiming that the information contained in exhibit No 1 of the additional evidence on the banking sector was out of date.
204    Fourth, in relation to the applicant’s argument criticising the Council for failing to take account of the applicant’s international activities, it must be noted that the applicant has nowhere explained in what way such a failure to take its international activities into account has reduced its income or that of the banking sector. In any event, those arguments do not establish that the Council erred in its assessment since, as is clear from the foregoing, it had sufficient evidence to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion.
205    In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the Council had a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to justify including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and of the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies.
206    Therefore, the plea alleging, in essence, a manifest error of assessment and the insufficiency of the factual basis must be rejected.
The plea in law alleging, in essence, the insufficiency of the factual basis to establish a link between the applicant and the associated natural persons and legal entities
207    The applicant claims that the Council has not produced reliable and relevant evidence to establish a link between the applicant and the persons and entities mentioned in the contested acts as being associated with it.
208    The Council disputes those arguments.
209    In that regard, it must be recalled that it is clear from reading the reasons for inclusion contained in the contested acts, that the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue solely on the basis of the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies, and was then maintained on those lists on the sole basis of the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies.
210    Consequently, the restrictive measures applied in respect of the applicant were not adopted on the basis of the associated person criterion laid down in Article 2(1) in fine of Decision 2014/145, as amended.
211    Moreover, it should be noted that, by its arguments, the applicant is not contesting the reasons for inclusion contained in the contested acts, but rather the identifying particulars in which the names of certain natural persons and entities are mentioned for the purposes of implementing the restrictive measures. Since that identifying information does not constitute the basis of the enacting terms of the contested acts, any error vitiating that information does not affect the legality of the contested acts.
212    It follows that the plea alleging, in essence, the insufficiency of the factual basis to establish a link between the applicant and the associated natural persons and legal entities must be rejected as ineffective.
The plea in law alleging, in essence, infringement of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality
213    The applicant claims that the Council infringed Article 215 TFEU, because the contested acts were adopted in the absence of grounds and were not notified to the applicant.
214    The applicant also claims that the contested acts infringe Articles 16, 17, 21, 36 and 41 of the Charter.
215    Moreover, the applicant argues that, since the CFSP pursues the objective of combating poverty in third countries, the contested acts are contrary to the CFSP since they involve the freezing of funds of the applicant that belong primarily to its customers in the Russian Federation, including individuals and SMEs. According to the applicant, the contested acts have imposed a freeze on the assets that the applicant holds on behalf of its customers rather than on its own assets. The applicant considers that, under Russian legislation, a distinction must be drawn between its assets and those belonging to its customers. Accordingly, the applicant claims that the Council ignored that distinction, and thereby caused loss to its customers even though they are not subject to restrictive measures. In that regard, the applicant criticises the Council for failing to take into account, when weighing the interests involved, the effect of the restrictive measures on its customers.
216    The applicant submits that the restrictive measures do not serve to achieve the objective pursued of encouraging businesses to put pressure on the government or of weakening Russia economically, since neither the applicant nor the banking sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government.
217    Furthermore, in its reply, the applicant submits that it is not seeking to rely on the procedural rights of third parties, but on the infringement, in many respects, of its own rights. In that context, the applicant considers that it can rely on a series of infringements of its rights and of its customers’ rights resulting from the adoption of the contested acts. As regards its customers’ assets, the applicant claims that those assets have been frozen without any degree of legal certainty as to whether and how those assets may be recovered by their owners. In that regard, the applicant considers that the multiple infringements are relevant to assessment of the proportionality of the restrictive measures.
218    The Council disputes those arguments.
219    As regards breaches of fundamental rights, the applicant submits that the contested acts infringe its rights and freedoms under Articles 16, 17, 21, 36 and 41 of the Charter.
220    In that regard, as a preliminary point, it should be noted that, besides the fact that in its arguments relating to the infringement of fundamental rights the applicant does not explain why the measures to which it is subject involve an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, it cannot, as a legal person established in a third country, rely on an infringement of that article (see paragraphs 70 to 73 above). It should also be noted that nor has the applicant set out why those measures infringe the right of access to services of general economic interest enshrined in Article 36 of the Charter, with the effect that that unsubstantiated line of argument must be rejected. As regards infringement of Article 41 of the Charter, the applicant merely submits that that provision is intended to ensure the legality and validity of acts of the European Union, but does not specify in what respects the contested acts infringe that article. Accordingly, in addition to the fact that such a line of argument must be rejected as being unsubstantiated, it must be recalled that the procedure for adopting the initial acts has been found not to have been vitiated by an infringement of the rights of the defence (see paragraphs 114 to 117 above). Similarly, assuming that the applicant is seeking to rely on a breach of the right to respect for reputation, it should be noted that the applicant has not shown in what respect the measures adopted against it infringed that right. Accordingly, assuming this to be an independent complaint, it must be rejected as being unsubstantiated.
221    As regards the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, it must be recalled that the freedom and the right in question are enshrined in Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter respectively.
222    It must also be recalled that the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property are not absolute, and that their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union, provided that such restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very essence of the rights guaranteed (judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 148, and of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 80).
223    In order to comply with EU law, a limitation on those fundamental rights must be provided for by law, must respect the essential content of those rights, must refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, and must not be disproportionate (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 222 and the case-law cited).
224    It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to determine whether the contested acts constitute a disproportionate limitation on the freedom to conduct a business and on the right to property.
225    In the first place, if the applicant is seeking to rely on its customers’ right to property, that line of argument would have to be rejected. According to the case-law, infringement of an individual right may, in principle, be relied on only by the person whose right has allegedly been infringed, and not by third parties. It follows that the applicant cannot rely on the infringement of a right to property that it does not hold (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 2022, Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ v ECB, T‑797/19, EU:T:2022:389, paragraph 285).
226    In the second place, as regards the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business and right to property, it is necessary to examine whether the conditions set out in paragraph 223 above are met.
227    First, it must be found that the restrictive measures at issue are provided for by law, since they are laid down in acts which are, inter alia, of general application and have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU respectively.
228    Second, it should be borne in mind that the restrictive measures adopted have the effect of freezing the own funds or economic resources belonging to the applicant on a precautionary basis. In addition, the contested acts are to apply for six months and are to be kept under constant review, as provided for in Article 6 of Decision 2014/145. Since those measures are temporary and reversible, it must be held that they do not undermine the essential content of the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business or its right to property.
229    Third, the restrictive measures at issue meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, capable of justifying negative consequences, including significant negative consequences, for certain operators (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150). They are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. From that perspective, those measures are consistent with the objective referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of The Charter of the United Nations (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 163).
230    Fourth, it is necessary to ascertain whether the limitation on the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business and on its right to property is proportionate to the objective pursued by the restrictive measures.
231    First of all, as regards whether the restrictive measures to which the applicant is subject are appropriate, it must be noted that, in the light of objectives of general interest as fundamental to the international community as maintaining peace and international security, those measures cannot, as such, be regarded as inappropriate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 2 December 2020, Kalai v Council, T‑178/19, not published, EU:T:2020:580, paragraph 171 and the case-law cited, and of 3 February 2021, Boshab v Council, T‑111/19, not published, EU:T:2021:54, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited). Since the objective of the contested acts is to reduce the revenue of the Russian State and to put pressure on the Russian Government, in order to limit the capacity of the latter to finance its actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, the approach of targeting economic operators that are, like the applicant, involved in a quantitatively or qualitatively non-negligible activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation is consistent with that objective and cannot, therefore, be considered to be inappropriate with respect to the objective pursued (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 147).
232    Next, as regards whether the restrictive measures are necessary, although the applicant argues that alternative and less restrictive measures could have achieved the objectives pursued, it is nevertheless clear that it has not put forward any less restrictive alternative measure or demonstrated that the Council could have envisaged the adoption of less restrictive measures that were equally appropriate as those provided for by the contested acts. As the Council notes, it has been held that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, were not as effective in achieving the objective pursued, having regard in particular to the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (judgments of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 182, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 136).
233    Last, a weighing up of the interests involved shows that the disadvantages of the restrictive measures for the applicant are not disproportionate, in view of the paramount importance of maintaining peace and international security.
234    As the Council has noted, the effects of the restrictive measures are limited to the territory of the European Union and they therefore concern at the very most only part of the assets held by the applicant (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 March 2017, Bank Tejarat v Council, T‑346/15, not published, EU:T:2017:164, paragraph 160) and do not prevent it from providing services and investing outside the European Union (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 4 December 2015, Emadi v Council, T‑274/13, not published, EU:T:2015:938, paragraph 200).
235    It must also be found that, while it is true that the restrictive measures prevent the applicant from using the funds or economic resources belonging to it, they do not, however, in accordance with Article 2(6)(a) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 7(2)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014, deprive it of the right to receive interest or other earnings on its frozen accounts on which those funds and those resources are deposited, provided that all such interest and other earnings are also frozen.
236    In addition, the contested acts establish derogations enabling the national authorities to authorise the release of certain funds or economic resources. Article 2(3) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 4(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide that the use of frozen funds or economic resources may be authorised to meet the basic needs of the legal persons, entities or bodies whose names are included on the lists at issue, for the reimbursement of expenses incurred for legal services, to pay fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or resources and to meet extraordinary expenses.
237    It should also be noted that, from the adoption of the initial acts, in accordance with Article 2(21) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and with Article 6b(2d) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, the national authorities were able to authorise the release of certain of the applicant’s funds or economic resources or the making available to the applicant of funds or economic resources, to enable it to terminate operations, contracts or other agreements, including correspondent banking relations, concluded with its customers before the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue. Similarly, as regards the applicant specifically, it is apparent from that provision that the national authorities could authorise the release of certain funds or economic resources belonging to it or the making available of funds, in order to complete transactions concerning the disbursement of funds by the Jewish Claims Conference to beneficiaries in the Russian Federation, even if those operations, contracts or other agreements had been concluded after the applicant’s name had been included on the lists at issue. Consequently, given that the Council had expressly established derogations so that the national authorities could be authorised to release funds or resources belonging to the applicant in order to enable it to return to its customers, whose names are not included on the lists at issue, assets belonging to those customers that were frozen as a result of implementation of the restrictive measures adopted in respect of the applicant, the applicant cannot argue that the Council failed to take account of the consequences of those measures for its customers.
238    It follows that the interference with the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business and its right to property cannot be found to be disproportionate.
239    In the third place, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures applied against it infringe the principle of proportionality because the applicant is not in a position to exert influence over the Russian Government and because those measures have led to an increase in poverty.
240    In that regard, it should be recalled that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgment of 13 March 2012, Melli Bank v Council, C‑380/09 P, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 52).
241    As is clear from paragraphs 61 and 229 above, the objective pursued by the restrictive measures is among those pursued in the context of the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, which include the preservation of peace, the prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of international security. In particular, the aim pursued by those measures is to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against that country. It follows that the fact that the applicant is not in a position to influence the political direction of the Russian Federation cannot call into question the appropriateness of those measures.
242    As regards the line of argument that the restrictive measures at issue are disproportionate because they have led to an increase in poverty in Russia, it is clear that it is not substantiated by any evidence. The applicant merely states that those measures apply to individuals and SMEs. However, it has not adduced any evidence establishing a causal link between, on the one hand, the freezing of its funds and economic resources or the freezing of its customers’ assets, and, on the other, any increase in poverty in Russia. The applicant’s unsubstantiated line of argument that the restrictive measures at issue have increased poverty in Russia must therefore be rejected.
243    Furthermore, assuming that the applicant is seeking to rely on an infringement of Article 21(2)(d) TEU, on the ground that the measures at issue are contrary to the CFSP objective of fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty, it must be found, in addition to the fact that the applicant has not shown that those measures have led to an increase in poverty in Russia, that the applicant has not shown that the Russian Federation is a ‘developing country’ covered by that provision.
244    In the fourth place, as regards the claim that the Council infringed Article 215 TFEU on account of an absence of grounds and because it infringed procedural provisions by failing to notify the initial acts, it must be noted that those arguments are irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether the restrictive measures are proportionate. In any event, examination of the other pleas in law raised in this action has served to reject complaints that are, in essence, similar.
245    It is apparent from the foregoing that the Council did not infringe the principle of proportionality when it adopted the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant.
246    The plea alleging, in essence, infringement of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality must therefore be rejected.
247    In the light of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
248    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders Alfa-Bank JSC to pay the costs.
Brkan
Gâlea
Tóth
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 June 2025.
V. Di Bucci
M. van der Woude
Registrar
President
Table of contents
Background to the dispute
Facts subsequent to the bringing of the action
Forms of order sought
Law
Claim for annulment of Decision 2023/1094
Claim for annulment of Regulation 2023/1089
Substance
The plea in law based on a plea of illegality
– Admissibility of the plea of illegality disputing the legality of the initial acts in so far as they concern the applicant
– Admissibility of the plea of illegality disputing the legality of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024 in so far as they concern the applicant
– Merits of the plea of illegality disputing the legality of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024 in so far as they concern the applicant
The plea in law alleging, in essence, infringement of the obligation to state reasons
The plea in law alleging, in essence, infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection
The plea in law alleging, in essence, a manifest error of assessment and the insufficiency of the factual basis
– Preliminary observations
– The evidence contained in the Council’s evidence files
– Application to the applicant of the initial (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies and of the amended (g) criterion covering legal persons, entities or bodies
The plea in law alleging, in essence, the insufficiency of the factual basis to establish a link between the applicant and the associated natural persons and legal entities
The plea in law alleging, in essence, infringement of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality
Costs
*      Language of the case: English.