62022TO0729
ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
17 October 2024 (
*1
)
(Action for annulment – Agriculture – Common agricultural policy (CAP) strategic plan – Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 – Rules on support for strategic plans drawn up by Member States under the CAP – Approval by the Commission – Composite or complex administrative procedure – Jurisdiction of the General Court – Admissibility – Observance of the period prescribed for instituting proceedings – Date on which the contested act came to the knowledge of the applicant – Locus standi)
In Case T‑729/22,
Complejo Agrícola Las Lomas, SL, established in Madrid (Spain), represented by J. Sedano Lorenzo, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Commission, represented by A.‑C. Becker and F. Castilla Contreras, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),
composed of L. Truchot, President, H. Kanninen (Rapporteur) and T. Perišin, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
makes the following
Order
1
By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Complejo Agrícola Las Lomas, SL, seeks the annulment of Commission Implementing Decision C(2022) 6017 final of 31 August 2022 approving the 2023-2027 CAP Strategic Plan of Spain for Union support financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (‘the contested decision’), in so far as it approved point 3.4 of the Spanish common agricultural policy (CAP) Strategic Plan, according to which the maximum amount of the basic income support for sustainability to be granted to a farmer under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 (OJ 2021 L 435, p. 1), may not exceed the sum of EUR 200000 (‘the measure at issue’).
Background to the dispute
2
The applicant is a Spanish company established in Madrid (Spain) whose object includes the acquisition and use of agricultural land for agricultural, forestry and livestock activities.
3
On 29 December 2021, the Kingdom of Spain, under Article 118(1) of Regulation 2021/2115, submitted to the European Commission a proposal for a CAP Strategic Plan for the period 2023 to 2027.
4
On 31 March 2022, in accordance with Article 118(2) of Regulation 2021/2115, the Commission, having assessed the proposal for a CAP Strategic Plan drawn up by the Kingdom of Spain (‘the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan’), submitted observations and requested additional information.
5
On 27 July 2022, the Kingdom of Spain sent the Commission information following on from its observations and submitted a revised version of its proposal for a CAP Strategic Plan.
6
On 31 August 2022, the Commission adopted the contested decision, approving the proposed Spanish CAP Strategic Plan, under Article 118(4) of Regulation 2021/2115.
Procedure and forms of order sought
7
The applicant claims that the Court should:
–
annul the contested decision, in so far as the Commission approved the measure at issue;
–
order the Commission to pay the costs.
8
The applicant also claims that the Commission should produce the report in its possession on the procedure for drafting the proposal for a Spanish CAP Strategic Plan.
9
By a separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 16 February 2023, the Commission raised, under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, an objection of inadmissibility in which it contends that the Court should:
–
dismiss the action as inadmissible;
–
order the applicant to pay the costs.
10
By document lodged at the Court Registry on 27 February 2023, the Kingdom of Spain sought leave to intervene in the present proceedings in support of the form of order sought by the Commission.
11
On 17 April 2023, the applicant submitted its observations on the Commission’s objection of inadmissibility. It claims that the Court should reject that objection.
Law
12
Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure, if the defendant applies for it by a separate document, the Court may give a decision on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case.
13
In the present case, since the Commission has applied for a decision on the objection of inadmissibility, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file, has decided to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.
14
In support of the objection of inadmissibility, the Commission alleges, first, failure to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure, second, that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the measure at issue and, third, that the applicant lacks standing.
15
When asked by the Court, in the context of the measures of organisation of procedure adopted under Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure, about observance of the period prescribed for instituting proceedings against the contested decision, the Commission also contended that the application was lodged out of time.
Observance of the period prescribed for instituting proceedings
16
The Commission contends that the starting point of the period prescribed for instituting the present proceedings was the date on which the contested decision was adopted, 31 August 2022, or at the very latest the date on which the decision was made public on the Commission website, which was 8 September 2022. According to the Commission, the applicant became aware of the existence of that decision from the latter date at the very latest. The applicant failed to fulfil its duty of diligence by requesting access to the full text of that decision within a reasonable period. Thus, the time limit of two months and 10 days expired on 21 November 2022 and the action was brought the next day.
17
The applicant argues that, in the absence of publication in the Official Journal of the European Union or notification of the contested decision, it is necessary to apply the criterion of the day on which the measure came to the applicant’s knowledge, within the meaning of the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. It states that it became aware of the contested decision only towards the middle of October 2022 when it looked on the website of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
18
According to the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, proceedings for annulment must be instituted within two months of publication of the contested measure, or of its notification to the applicant, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be. It is clear simply from the wording of that provision that the criterion of the day on which a measure came to the knowledge of an applicant, as the starting point of the period prescribed for instituting proceedings, is subsidiary to the criteria of publication or notification of the measure (judgment of 10 March 1998, Germany v Council, C‑122/95, EU:C:1998:94, paragraph 35).
19
Furthermore, according to Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure, that time limit must in addition be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days.
20
In the first place, it is not disputed that the contested decision was not notified to the applicant, since the decision was not addressed to the latter.
21
In the second place, according to case-law, in order for publication of the contested measure to be the starting point of the period prescribed for instituting proceedings for the purposes of the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, such publication must either be required by a provision of primary or secondary EU law, or, at the very least, result from consistent practice which the applicant could legitimately expect (see, to that effect, order of 15 May 2019, Metrans v Commission and INEA, T‑262/17, EU:T:2019:341, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
22
In the present case, first, it is common ground that the contested decision was not published in the Official Journal.
23
Second, neither Article 118 of Regulation 2021/2115 nor any other provision of that regulation lays down a specific method for publishing decisions approving CAP Strategic Plans.
24
Third, it should be noted that, as the Commission states in its answer to a question from the Court, that institution has no consistent practice in publishing decisions such as the contested decision that the applicant could legitimately expect.
25
Therefore, since the contested decision had neither been published nor notified to the applicant, the time limit for instituting proceedings against that act began to run, as provided by the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, when it came to the applicant’s knowledge.
26
It is settled case-law that in the absence of publication or notification, the time limit for bringing an action runs only from the moment when the party concerned acquires precise knowledge of the content of the act in question and of the reasons on which it is based, provided that that party requests the full text of that act within a reasonable period from becoming aware of the existence of the act (see, to that effect, order of 19 November 2018, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg v SRB, T‑14/17, not published, EU:T:2018:812, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
27
Thus, the case-law imposes on the third party concerned the obligation diligently to request the full text of the act that concerns it, in order that the time limit does not begin to run, in that party’s case, until it is aware of all the material relevant for instituting the proceedings (see order of 8 December 2021, Alessio and Others v ECB, T‑620/20, not published, EU:T:2021:877, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
28
It is clear from the case-law that awareness of the existence of an act may be inferred from various circumstances, such as, first, oral or written statements by the third party concerned, second, publication in the Official Journal of a brief communication concerning the contested act, third, publication in the official journal of a Member State of a national measure referring, however imprecisely, to the contested act or, fourth, situations in which those circumstances are combined, for example, where the contested act has been broadcast in the media and statements coming from the third party concerned imply that it knew that an act had been adopted, in a context in which it was clear that it followed closely developments in the case (see, to that effect, order of 8 December 2021, Alessio and Others v ECB, T‑620/20, not published, EU:T:2021:877, paragraphs 47 to 49 and the case-law cited).
29
In that context, it should be recalled that the two-month period under the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which, unless the measure amenable to an action for annulment has been published or notified, runs from the date on which it came to the knowledge of the applicant, is therefore different from the reasonable period in which that party can request a copy of the full text of that measure in order to acquire precise knowledge of it (see order of 19 November 2018, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg v SRB, T‑14/17, not published, EU:T:2018:812, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
30
The criterion of a reasonable period in which to request that the act be communicated after becoming aware of its existence is therefore not a predetermined period that can automatically be inferred from the period for bringing an action for annulment, but one that depends on the circumstances of the particular case (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2013, Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraphs 32 to 34).
31
In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has held in certain cases that request for communication of the full text of a measure made two months (see, to that effect, order of 5 March 1993, Ferriere Acciaierie Sarde v Commission, C‑102/92, EU:C:1993:86, paragraph 19), more than four months (see, to that effect, orders of 10 November 2011, Agapiou Joséphidès v Commision and EACEA, C‑626/10 P, not published, EU:C:2011:726, paragraphs 130 to 132; of 15 July 1998, LPN and GEOTA v Commission, T‑155/95, EU:T:1998:167, paragraph 44, and of 19 November 2018, VR-Bank Rhein-Sieg v SRB, T‑42/17, not published, EU:T:2018:813, paragraphs 44 to 49) or more than six months (see, to that effect, order of 18 May 2010, Abertis Infraestructuras v Commission, T‑200/09, not published, EU:T:2010:200, paragraph 63) after the applicant had become aware of its existence exceeded a reasonable period.
32
Furthermore, in different circumstances, it was held that a period of two weeks (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 1995, Socurte and Others v Commission, T‑432/93 to T‑434/93, EU:T:1995:43, paragraph 50) or one month did constitute a reasonable period (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 May 1994, Consorzio gruppo di azione locale Murgia Messapica v Commission, T‑465/93, EU:T:1994:56, paragraph 32).
33
In the present case, on the one hand, the adoption of the contested decision was announced in press releases of 31 August 2022 issued by the Commission’s Representation in Spain and by the Spanish Government and, on the other, the contested decision was posted on the Commission’s website on 8 September 2022 and on the website of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food on 19 September 2022.
34
The applicant states that it became aware of the contested decision towards the middle of October 2022 when it looked on the website of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, but is unable to identify the precise date.
35
In any event, even if the applicant did become aware of the existence of the contested decision on 31 August or 8 September 2022 as the Commission states, its alleged inactivity between those dates and mid-October 2022 lasted at most approximately one and a half months. Such a period cannot be regarded in the circumstances of the present case as exceeding a reasonable period.
36
It must also be borne in mind in the present case that the action for annulment was brought on 22 November 2022 and can therefore be considered to be out of time only if the applicant had become aware of the content of the contested decision before 12 September 2022.
37
In that regard, it should be noted that it is the responsibility of the party alleging that an action is out of time, in view of the time limit fixed inter alia by the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, to provide evidence of the date on which the event causing time to begin to run occurred (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 December 2012, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, T‑167/10, not published, EU:T:2012:651, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
38
In the present case, the Commission has not provided evidence to show that the applicant had become aware of the content of the contested decision before 12 September 2022, but merely contended that the applicant had become aware of its existence by 8 September 2022 at the latest.
39
Consequently, the present action cannot be deemed to have been brought out of time.
Compliance with the formal requirements
40
The Commission contends that the action is inadmissible on the ground that the application does not comply with the conditions laid down in Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure. According to the Commission, even though the application states that it is an action seeking partial annulment of the contested decision, the subject matter of the proceedings is in fact the lawfulness of the measure at issue. Thus, the form of order sought by the applicant is not the annulment of that decision but the annulment of that measure. Last, the pleas seeking annulment do not identify any error or unlawful act committed during the adoption of that decision but refer to failures on the part of the Spanish authorities. In addition, the pleas raised in the application are insufficiently clear and merely make abstract and generalised references to case-law without applying it to the present case.
41
The applicant maintains that the subject matter of the proceedings is clearly identified and consists in challenging the lawfulness of the contested decision in so far as it approves the proposal for a Spanish CAP Strategic Plan. It submits that the measure at issue forms part of that decision and that the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan is not an autonomous measure separate from that decision. In that regard, it refers to the Commission’s competences under Article 118 of Regulation 2021/2115.
42
Under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to proceedings before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute, and under Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain the subject matter of the dispute, the pleas and arguments put forward and a brief statement of those pleas and the form of order sought by the applicant.
43
Those particulars must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare the defence, and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without other supporting information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and sound administration of justice, it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic matters of law and fact relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see judgment of 4 July 2019, Italy v Commission, T‑598/17, not published, EU:T:2019:482, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited, and order of 9 July 2019, Scaloni and Figini v Commission, T‑158/18, not published, EU:T:2019:491, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
44
With regard, in particular, to the forms of order sought by the parties, it should be recalled that they define the subject matter of proceedings brought before the Courts of the European Union and that therefore those forms of order must be set out unambiguously so that the EU judicature does not rule ultra petita (see judgment of 14 September 2017, Università del Salento v Commission, T‑393/15, not published, EU:T:2017:604, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited; order of 19 November 2020, Comune di Stintino v Commission, T‑174/20, not published, EU:T:2020:551, paragraph 45). In particular, in an action for annulment, the act whose annulment is sought must be clearly specified (see, to that effect, order of 6 November 2018, Chioreanu v ERCEA, T‑717/17, EU:T:2018:765, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
45
In the present case, it is true that in the application the applicant seeks, first, the partial annulment of the contested decision and, second, a ruling that the measure at issue is unlawful. However, it follows from a reading of the application as a whole that, in its action, the applicant is seeking the annulment of that decision in so far as the latter approves that measure in breach of EU law.
46
Furthermore, that is also the way in which the Commission understood the applicant’s form of order in the objection of inadmissibility. Although it alleges that the applicant confuses the contested decision and the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan, when in reality they are two separate measures, the fact remains that it is a question of whether the Commission is answerable for the applicant’s complaints and not whether the application is clear and precise. That question of whether the Commission is answerable relates to the ground of inadmissibility alleging that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the measure at issue (see paragraph 14 above).
47
The pleas and essential elements of fact and law on which the action for annulment is based are made sufficiently clear in the application. The application comprises four pleas, alleging, first, infringement of Article 17 of Regulation 2021/2115, second, failure to assess the effects of the measure at issue as regards its compatibility with the objectives of the CAP, third, distortion of the internal market that is detrimental to Spanish farmers, causing fragmentation of the CAP and, fourth, infringement of the principle of proportionality. In addition, the applicant refers to judgments of the General Court and of the Court of Justice, which it connects with the facts of the present case.
48
It follows from the foregoing that the action is not inadmissible on the ground that it infringes the requirements laid down in Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure.
49
Accordingly, the plea of inadmissibility alleging that the application fails to comply with the formal requirements must be rejected.
The Court’s jurisdiction to review the measure at issue and whether the Commission is answerable for the complaints made
50
The Commission contends that the action is inadmissible in that the genuine subject matter of the dispute is a review of the lawfulness of the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan, which is a legal act adopted by a Member State the review of which does not lie within the jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of the measure at issue. The Commission contends that its approval of that CAP Strategic Plan as a whole has no effect on the originator or the nature of that document, since the latter remains an act adopted by the Spanish authorities. A CAP Strategic Plan is a national measure producing legal effects in the legal order of the Member State concerned and not an act of the EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU. It is for the national courts to review the lawfulness of CAP Strategic Plans and the measures they contain in the light of EU law, in particular Regulation 2021/2115, and where appropriate to make a request to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU.
51
The applicant submits that the Court has jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of Commission decisions, including those approving proposals for CAP Strategic Plans. According to the applicant, the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan and the contested decision form a single act that falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission since the Kingdom of Spain only collaborated in drafting it. In addition, approval of proposals for a CAP Strategic Plan is a procedure governed by EU law and the only act open to review is the Commission decision approving them. The distinction drawn by the Commission between the contested decision and the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan would render the examination conducted by the Commission meaningless and remove CAP Strategic Plans from any judicial review, which would conflict with the right to an effective judicial remedy. Furthermore, the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan could not be challenged before the Spanish courts either, since it is a preparatory act drawn up in the context of a procedure under EU law.
52
In the present case, the claim for annulment is formally directed against the contested decision, which is an implementing decision. Such Commission decisions are acts in respect of which the review of their legality falls, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, within the jurisdiction of the EU judicature, in this case, the General Court. That is not moreover disputed by the Commission.
53
The Commission’s argument, challenging the Court’s jurisdiction in the present case, is that the measure at issue relates to the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan and not to the contested decision and cannot therefore be imputed to the Commission. Approval of the proposal for a Spanish CAP Strategic Plan by that decision did not alter the nature of that act, which remains a national measure and review of its lawfulness is a matter for the national court alone.
54
It should be borne in mind that the Commission’s arguments are based on factors relating, first, to whether the Commission is answerable for the applicant’s complaints, which is a question relating to the admissibility of the action and, second, to whether the Court has jurisdiction to examine those complaints and, consequently, the measure at issue.
55
In the present case, it must be noted that the drafting and approval of the proposal for a Spanish CAP Strategic Plan involved the Spanish authorities and the Commission. It must therefore be examined whether it is the EU judicature or the national court that has jurisdiction in such a procedure to rule on the lawfulness, with regard to EU law, of the measure at issue.
56
In that regard, it must, first of all, be recalled that any involvement of the national authorities in the course of the procedure leading to the adoption of acts adopted by the EU institutions cannot affect their classification as EU acts where the acts of the national authorities constitute a stage of a procedure in which an EU institution exercises, alone, the final decision-making power without being bound by the preparatory acts or the proposals of the national authorities (judgment of 19 December 2018, Berlusconi and Fininvest, C‑219/17, EU:C:2018:1023, paragraph 43).
57
In such a situation, where EU law does not aim to establish a division between two powers – one national and the other of the European Union – with separate purposes, but, on the contrary, lays down that an EU institution is to have an exclusive decision-making power, it falls to the EU Courts, by virtue of their exclusive jurisdiction to review the legality of EU acts on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, to rule on the legality of the final decision adopted by the EU institution at issue and to examine, in order to ensure effective judicial protection of the persons concerned, any defects vitiating the preparatory acts or the proposals of the national authorities that would be such as to affect the validity of that final decision (judgment of 19 December 2018, Berlusconi and Fininvest, C‑219/17, EU:C:2018:1023, paragraph 44).
58
Nonetheless, an act of a national authority that is part of a decision-making process of the European Union does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU Courts where it is apparent from the division of powers in the field in question between the national authorities and the EU institutions that the act adopted by the national authority is a necessary stage of a procedure for adopting an EU act in which the EU institutions have only a limited or no discretion, so that the national act is binding on the EU institution (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 1992, Oleificio Borelli v Commission, C‑97/91, EU:C:1992:491, paragraphs 9 and 10).
59
It then falls to the national courts to rule on any irregularities that may vitiate such a national act – making a request to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling where appropriate – on the same terms as those on which they review any definitive act adopted by the same national authority which is capable of adversely affecting third parties and moreover, in the light of the principle of effective judicial protection, to regard an action brought for that purpose as admissible even if the national rules of procedure do not so provide (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 December 1992, Oleificio Borelli v Commission, C‑97/91, EU:C:1992:491, paragraphs 11 to 13; of 6 December 2001, Carl Kühne and Others, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 58, and of 2 July 2009, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraph 57).
60
It should also be recalled that Commission approval of a national measure does not in any way have the effect of conferring on that measure the nature of an act of EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2002, Huber, C‑336/00, EU:C:2002:509, paragraph 40, and of 4 June 2009, JK Otsa Talu, C‑241/07, EU:C:2009:337, paragraph 37).
61
It is in the light of those considerations that the procedure that led to the adoption of the contested decision must be examined for the purpose of determining which court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the present dispute concerning the compatibility with EU law of the measure at issue provided for in the proposal for a Spanish CAP Strategic Plan as approved by the contested decision.
The drafting and approval of the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan
62
The contested decision is the act by which the Commission approved the proposal for a Spanish CAP Strategic Plan in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 118 of Regulation 2021/2115.
63
In the first place, it is necessary to analyse the respective roles of the Commission and the Member States in implementing the CAP, as they are set out in Regulation 2021/2115.
64
In that regard, it should, first of all, be recalled that, according to Article 4(2) TFEU, shared competence between the European Union and the Member States applies inter alia in the area of agriculture.
65
Reform of the legal framework of the CAP was carried out by Regulation 2021/2115. As recalled in recital 36 thereof, it was decided to provide for one single regulation.
66
According to Article 1(2) of Regulation 2021/2115, that regulation applies to Union support financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) for interventions specified in a CAP Strategic Plan drawn up by a Member State and approved by the Commission, covering the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2027. It is clear from recital 36 of that regulation that the latter replaces the arrangements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the EAFRD and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 487), and Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the CAP and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 608).
67
Next, regarding the method for managing the CAP as a result of that reform, according to recital 3 of Regulation 2021/2115, the new approach being followed is based on the idea that the European Union should set the basic parameters of the policy, while Member States should bear greater responsibility as to how they meet those objectives and achieve targets. As a result, enhanced subsidiarity makes it possible better to take into account local conditions and needs and the particular nature of agricultural activity.
68
In addition, it is clear from recital 27 of Regulation 2021/2115 that the sharing of competence within that new model for implementing the CAP provides that the objectives, types of intervention and common requirements are to be set at Union level in order to ensure the common nature of the CAP while leaving Member States in charge of translating them into support arrangements applicable to beneficiaries.
69
Last, as regards the method for implementing the budget of the CAP, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the CAP and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (OJ 2021 L 435, p. 187), provides that the EAGF is to be implemented either under shared management between the Member States and the European Union or under direct management. Article 6 of that regulation provides that the EAFRD is to be implemented under shared management between the Member States and the European Union.
70
Therefore, it follows from the provisions referred to in paragraphs 67 to 69 above that the new method of managing the CAP put in place by the EU legislature is based on a system of collaboration which gives Member States discretion to adapt interventions to the demands and specific needs of their national agriculture while providing for review by the European Union to ensure they are compatible with the CAP.
71
In the second place, it is necessary to examine the rules applicable to CAP Strategic Plans which translate the objectives of that new system of management.
72
As regards the drafting of CAP Strategic Plans, first, it is clear from Article 104(1) of Regulation 2021/2115 that Member States are to establish CAP Strategic Plans to implement the Union support financed by the EAGF and the EAFRD.
73
In that regard, Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 2021/2115 set out the objectives of the European Union and Article 7 lays down the indicators that will be used to assess their achievement. In addition, Article 9 provides inter alia that Member States are to design the interventions of their CAP Strategic Plans in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and the general principles of EU law. Furthermore, Articles 8 to 84 determine the types of intervention and the common requirements to be applied by Member States in order to ensure the common nature of the CAP.
74
Second, Article 106(1) of Regulation 2021/2115 states that Member States are to draw up the CAP Strategic Plans in accordance with their institutional and legal framework.
75
Third, Articles 107 to 115 of Regulation 2021/2115 lay down the requirements as to the content and presentation of CAP Strategic Plans. These constitute guidance documents on the strategy to be adopted by each Member State in order to implement the CAP.
76
As regards approval of CAP Strategic Plans by the Commission, recital 110 of Regulation 2021/2115 states that this is a crucial step in order to ensure that the CAP is implemented in accordance with the common objectives.
77
To that end, Article 118 of Regulation 2021/2115 organises the procedure for assessing and approving each proposal for a CAP Strategic Plan. Paragraph 1 thereof provides that each Member State is to submit to the Commission a proposal for a CAP Strategic Plan.
78
Next, Article 118(2) of Regulation 2021/2115 provides that the Commission is to carry out an assessment of a CAP Strategic Plan which is submitted to it as regards its completeness, its consistency and coherence with the general principles of EU law, with that regulation and the delegated and implementing acts adopted pursuant to it and with Regulation 2021/2116, its effective contribution to the achievement of the specific objectives set out in Article 6(1) and (2) of Regulation 2021/2115, and its impact on the proper functioning of the internal market and distortion of competition and on the level of administrative burden on beneficiaries and administration.
79
Article 118(3) of Regulation 2021/2115 allows the Commission to make observations in the event that the assessment of the proposed CAP Strategic Plan has highlighted any issues. In return, the Member State is required to provide the Commission with all necessary additional information and, where appropriate, revise its proposed plan.
80
Article 118(4) of Regulation 2021/2115 sets out the criteria for the approval of CAP Strategic Plans: first, the necessary information referred to in Article 118(3) of that regulation must have been submitted to the Commission and, second, the plan must be compatible with Article 9 and the other requirements set out in that regulation and in Regulation 2021/2116 as well as the delegated and implementing acts adopted pursuant to them.
81
In accordance with Article 118(5) and (6) of Regulation 2021/2115, each CAP Strategic Plan must be approved by means of an implementing decision no later than six months following the plan’s submission by the Member State concerned.
82
In addition, Article 118(7) of Regulation 2021/2115 provides that CAP Strategic Plans will have legal effects only after their approval by the Commission.
83
Last, Articles 119 and 120 of Regulation 2021/2115 lay down two procedures similar to that laid down in Article 118 thereof in the event of amendment or review of CAP Strategic Plans.
84
It follows from all the provisions referred to in paragraphs 72 to 83 above that, first, the Commission cannot directly amend a proposal for a CAP Strategic Plan drawn up by a Member State, second, it is to monitor whether the proposal complies with certain rules of EU law, third, it may submit observations by which it makes approval conditional on the CAP Strategic Plan being amended by the Member State, fourth, it must withhold approval of a proposed CAP Strategic Plan only if that plan does not meet the exhaustively listed requirements stemming from EU law and, fifth, a CAP Strategic Plan will have no legal effects until it has been approved by the Commission.
85
Therefore, the Commission has its own decision-making power in the procedure for the approval of a CAP Strategic Plan, the exercise of which necessarily involves examining the content of that plan.
86
However, the Commission decision approving a CAP Strategic Plan must be distinguished from the proposal for a CAP Strategic Plan submitted by a Member State, which remains a national act in connection with which the latter exercises its competence, in particular in the choice of interventions to be included in that proposal. The link between those two acts is established through the mechanism laid down in Article 118 of Regulation 2021/2115.
The consequences to be drawn from the legal framework in the present case
87
Bearing in mind the separate competences of the Commission and the national authorities, the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan as approved by the Commission does not constitute a preparatory act for the contested decision or an act otherwise forming part of the latter within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraphs 56 and 57 above. Regulation 2021/2115 introduced a system of shared competence between the Member State and the Commission.
88
Similarly, it follows from the procedure for the approval of a CAP Strategic Plan laid down in Article 118 of Regulation 2021/2115 that, although the act adopted by a national authority is a necessary stage in a procedure leading to the adoption of an EU act, the Commission is not bound by the national act, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 58 and 59 above.
89
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of the decision approving a CAP Strategic Plan as an EU act under Article 263 TFEU even if that review necessarily involves examining, inter alia, the compatibility of the content of the proposed CAP Strategic Plan – which remains a national act – with EU law, in accordance with Article 118(4) of Regulation 2021/2115.
90
In the application, the applicant claims that the contested decision is unlawful on the ground that the Commission approved the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan even though that plan infringes several rules of EU law, including inter alia the provisions of Regulation 2021/2115 and general principles of EU law, as well as national legislation relating to environmental assessment.
91
It should be noted that, unlike the national legislation, the provisions of Regulation 2021/2115 and the general principles of EU law form part of the rules the observance of which by proposed CAP Strategic Plans is monitored by the Commission in the approval procedure laid down in Article 118(4) of Regulation 2021/2115 (see paragraph 47 above).
92
It follows that, in reviewing the lawfulness of the contested decision, it may be determined whether, as the applicant claims, the Commission should not have approved the proposed Spanish CAP Strategic Plan on the ground that the latter does not fulfil all the conditions laid down in Article 118(4) of Regulation 2021/2115.
93
Consequently, the plea of inadmissibility submitted in the objection of inadmissibility, alleging that the irregularities relied on against the contested decision can be attributed solely to the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan, that is to say to the Spanish authorities, must be rejected as regards the irregularities the examination of which falls within the review of compatibility provided for in Article 118(4) of Regulation 2021/2115, as recalled in paragraph 91 above. Thus, the action does not have to be dismissed on the basis of that plea of inadmissibility, although the arguments alleging failure to comply with the national legislation must be rejected.
Standing
94
The Commission maintains that the action is inadmissible because the applicant lacks standing. The applicant is neither directly nor individually concerned by the contested decision, contrary to what is required by the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, and, moreover, the contested decision is addressed only to the Kingdom of Spain.
95
The applicant claims that it does meet the conditions relating to direct and individual concern.
96
Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, any natural or legal person may institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.
97
In the present case, it is the Kingdom of Spain and not the applicant to which the contested decision is addressed. In those circumstances, the first situation in which a natural or legal person has standing under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be rejected.
98
It is therefore necessary to examine whether the second or the third situation in which, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, a natural or legal person is accorded standing to institute proceedings against an act not addressed to them may correspond to the present situation. In the second situation, proceedings may be instituted if the act is of direct and individual concern to the natural or legal person bringing the proceedings. In the third situation, such persons may bring proceedings against a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures if that act is of direct concern to them (judgments of 19 December 2013, Telefónica v Commission, C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 19; of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, C‑132/12 P, EU:C:2014:100, paragraph 44; and of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, C‑133/12 P, EU:C:2014:105, paragraph 31).
99
In the present case, the Court considers it appropriate to examine the third situation before analysing the second, if necessary.
The existence of a regulatory act that does not entail implementing measures
100
The Commission contends that the contested decision, even in the event that it might be classified as a regulatory act, requires implementing measures on the part of the Spanish authorities consisting in the adoption of the regulations required to implement the CAP Strategic Plan of which the measure at issue forms part.
101
The applicant denies that if the contested decision were to be considered to be a regulatory act, it would entail implementing measures within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
102
Irrespective of whether the contested decision is by nature a regulatory act, it is sufficient in the present case to examine whether it entails implementing measures.
103
As the Court of Justice has already held, whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures should be assessed by reference to the position of the person pleading the right to bring proceedings under the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. It is therefore irrelevant whether the act in question entails implementing measures with regard to other persons (see judgment of 13 March 2018, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, C‑384/16 P, EU:C:2018:176, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
104
Moreover, it is entirely irrelevant, in that regard, whether those measures are of a mechanical nature (see judgment of 13 March 2018, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, C‑384/16 P, EU:C:2018:176, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
105
In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 9 of Regulation 2021/2115, Member States are to establish the legal framework governing the granting of Union support to farmers and other beneficiaries in accordance with the CAP Strategic Plans as approved by the Commission in accordance with Article 118 of that regulation They are to implement those CAP Strategic Plans as approved by the Commission.
106
Thus, the CAP Strategic Plan constitutes a document on the basis of which each Member State implements the CAP for the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2027.
107
In that context, the implementation of the measure at issue, which may have legal effects on the applicant’s economic activity, entails national implementing measures. Moreover, the existence of such implementing measures is confirmed by the draft Real Decreto sobre la aplicación, a partir de 2023, de las intervenciones en forma de pagos directos y el establecimiento de requisitos comunes en el marco del Plan Estratégico de la Política Agrícola Común, y la regulación de la solicitud única del sistema integrado de gestión y control (Royal Decree on the implementation, from 2023, of interventions in the form of direct payments and the establishment of common requirements in the context of the CAP Strategic Plan, and on rules for a single application in respect of the integrated administration and control system), prepared by the Kingdom of Spain in order to implement the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan and submitted by the applicant as an annex to its observations on the objection of inadmissibility.
108
Thus, since the contested decision merely approves the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan containing the measure at issue, and since it is for the Kingdom of Spain to implement it together with the entirety of that CAP Strategic Plan, that decision can produce any legal effects with regard to the applicant only by means of national implementing measures.
109
It follows from the foregoing that the contested decision entails implementing measures with regard to the applicant within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
110
Therefore, the applicant cannot rely on the third situation envisaged in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU to challenge the contested decision.
111
It is necessary to examine next whether the applicant’s standing may be based on the second situation set out in paragraph 98 above, which requires that the contested decision be of direct and individual concern to the applicant. To that end, it is necessary first to examine the second of those two conditions.
Individual concern
112
According to settled case-law, natural or legal persons other than those to whom a measure is addressed may claim to be individually concerned, for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, only if the measure in question affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed (judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v Commission, 25/62, EU:C:1963:17, p. 107; see, also, judgment of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, C‑133/12 P, EU:C:2014:105, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
113
The Commission contends that if the contested decision is of concern to the applicant, it is only in the latter’s objective capacity as a farmer, in the same way as any other trader that is currently or potentially in a similar situation. Moreover, according to the Commission, the group most affected by the contested decision was not identifiable when it was adopted since there were no applications for basic income support for sustainability submitted on the basis of the national legal framework governing the granting of such support under the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan.
114
The applicant claims that it satisfies the individual concern condition since it belongs to a limited class of traders that was easily identifiable when the contested decision was adopted, by reason, first, of its status as an agricultural undertaking engaged in extensive agricultural activities over a large number of hectares and, second, its status as a beneficiary of basic income support for sustainability exceeding EUR 200000 if the measure at issue did not exist. Thus, since the adoption of the contested decision, the applicant could no longer benefit from that support in a sum exceeding EUR 200000.
115
In that regard, according to settled case-law, where the measure affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that measure was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of the group, those persons may be individually concerned by that measure inasmuch as they form part of a limited class of traders and that that can be the case particularly when the measure alters rights acquired by the individual prior to its adoption (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, C‑133/12 P, EU:C:2014:105, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
116
However, the possibility of determining more or less precisely the number, or even the identity, of the persons to whom a measure applies by no means implies that it must be regarded as being of individual concern to them as long as that measure is applied by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by it (judgment of 19 December 2013, Telefónica v Commission, C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 47).
117
In the present case, the applicant is an agricultural undertaking engaged in an activity that falls within the scope of the contested decision, since that decision is of concern to farmers and other potential beneficiaries of EU financial contributions provided for in the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan under Regulation 2021/2115.
118
However, the mere fact that the applicant is an agricultural undertaking that is a potential beneficiary of EU financial contributions under the CAP is not sufficient to distinguish it individually and differentiate it from any other agricultural undertaking since the ceiling provided for in the measure at issue does not designate a limited group of agricultural undertakings but is addressed to them by reason of their objective status as farmers in the same way as any other trader that is currently or potentially in the same situation.
119
Likewise, the mere fact that the applicant was eligible to receive an amount of basic income support for sustainability above the ceiling fixed by the measure at issue is not capable of distinguishing it individually since that entitlement to receive support is granted, under a general and abstract rule, to a multitude of objectively determined traders.
120
Moreover, such a finding is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that it claims to possess an acquired entitlement to receive basic income support for sustainability exceeding EUR 200000 on the basis of the conversion scheme, introduced by Article 23 of Regulation 2021/2115, of the entitlement to the basic payment it received in the context of CAP 2015-2022.
121
It must be stated, first, that the contested decision does not alter the applicant’s acquired entitlement to receive support since it introduces a new CAP entitlement for the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2027. The fact that the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan opted to grant basic income support for sustainability on the basis of the method of payment entitlement where the unit value is determined by means of a convergence mechanism adjusting its value proportionally to that established by Regulation No 1307/2013 in the context of CAP 2015-2022 does not permit the conclusion that the applicant possesses an acquired entitlement to basic income support for sustainability as provided for in Regulation 2021/2115. For that reason, the mechanism proposed by Articles 23 and 24 of the latter regulation does not confer entitlement for every farmer to receive that support.
122
Second, on the date on which the contested decision was adopted, the farmers to whom that ceiling was to apply were by no means identifiable since in any event application of the measure at issue presupposed that the farmers concerned would submit applications to obtain the basic income support for sustainability on the basis of the national legal framework, established by the Kingdom of Spain in accordance with its CAP Strategic Plan, under Article 9 of Regulation 2021/2115.
123
Therefore, the applicant is concerned by the contested decision only by reason of its objective status as an agricultural undertaking, in the same way as any other trader currently or potentially in the same situation.
124
It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has no grounds for claiming that it is individually concerned by the contested decision.
125
Since the conditions for direct concern and individual concern by the act of which annulment is sought are cumulative, it follows that, without there being any need to examine whether it is directly concerned by the contested decision, the applicant has not demonstrated that it has standing to bring proceedings against that decision.
126
That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that the right to effective judicial protection, enshrined in particular in Article 47 of the Charter, requires that the action against the contested decision before the Court be deemed admissible. According to the applicant, the lawfulness of the Spanish CAP Strategic Plan could not be challenged before the national court, since the proposal of a CAP Strategic Plan to the Commission does not constitute an administrative act open to challenge.
127
As regards the principle of effective judicial protection, the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter states that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the European Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article.
128
In that regard, it should be borne in mind that although the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in that Treaty (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited, and order of 28 February 2017, NF v European Council, T‑192/16, EU:T:2017:128, paragraph 74).
129
The Court of Justice has recalled that the protection conferred by Article 47 of the Charter does not require that an individual should have an unconditional entitlement to bring an action for annulment of EU acts directly before the Courts of the European Union (judgment of 28 October 2020, Associazione GranoSalus v Commission, C‑313/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:869, paragraph 62).
130
It should be added that effective judicial protection must be assessed bearing in mind also the protection offered by national courts. It is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (see judgment of 13 March 2018, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, C‑384/16 P, EU:C:2018:176, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).
131
In the present case, it should be noted that the measure at issue requires national implementing measures (see paragraph 107 above).
132
As is clear from the information set out in paragraphs 105 to 109 above, the CAP Strategic Plan is merely a document on the basis of which each Member State implements the CAP for the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2027 through the adoption of the national legal framework. The existence of such implementing measures is moreover confirmed by the draft royal decree referred to in paragraph 107 above.
133
It follows that the applicant’s argument alleging a lack of effective judicial protection does not, on its own, make it possible to establish that the present action is admissible.
134
Consequently, the Commission’s objection of inadmissibility must be upheld and the present action must be declared inadmissible, without there being any need to adjudicate on the request for production of a document (see paragraph 8 above).
135
Under Article 142(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the intervention becomes devoid of purpose if, inter alia, the action is declared inadmissible. In the present case, there is therefore no longer any need to adjudicate on the application to intervene submitted by the Kingdom of Spain.
Costs
136
Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
137
Since the applicant has been unsuccessful in its action, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.
The action is dismissed as inadmissible.
2.
There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application to intervene submitted by the Kingdom of Spain.
3.
Complejo Agrícola Las Lomas, SL shall pay the costs.
4.
The Kingdom of Spain shall bear its costs relating to the application to intervene.
Luxembourg, 17 October 2024.
V. Di Bucci
Registrar
L. Truchot
President
(
*1
)	Language of the case: Spanish.