OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
ĆAPETA
delivered on 13 November 2025 (1)
Case C‑773/23 P
European Crop Care Association (ECCA)
v
Ascenza Agro, SA,
Industrias Afrasa, SA,
European Commission
( Appeal – Non-privileged intervener – Representative association – Admissibility – Second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Plant protection products – Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 – Non-renewal of the approval of the active substance chlorpyrifos-methyl – Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/17 – Action for annulment )
I.      Introduction
1.        An association representing the European plant protection industry intervened before the General Court in support of an action to annul a Commission regulation not renewing the approval of a certain substance under the applicable EU legislation.
The action was rejected.
2.        Now the association seeks to lodge an appeal against the General Court’s judgment.
Is that association directly affected by that judgment, as required by the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Statute’), so that its appeal is admissible?
3.        That is one of the key issues arising in the present case.
II.    Background to the proceedings
4.        The European Crop Care Association (ECCA) is an association based in Brussels (Belgium)
which represents European manufacturers of plant protection products. (2)
5.        Plant protection products are regulated by EU legislation including Regulation No 1107/2009, (3) which establishes harmonised rules for the approval of active substances and the placing of such products on the market. (4) That regulation sets out a dual system, whereby active substances are approved at EU level by the European Commission, while the plant protection products which contain the EU-approved active substances are authorised at national level by the Member States. (5)
6.        Relevant for the present case, the approval of active substances is limited in time, so their continued use requires renewal of that approval by the Commission according to the requirements of Regulation No 1107/2009. (6) Specific provisions on the renewal procedure for active substances were also set down
in Implementing Regulation No 844/2012, (7) involving the Commission, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the Member States.
A.      Events leading to the proceedings before the General Court
7.        The active substance at issue in the present case is chlorpyrifos-methyl
(‘CHP-methyl’), which is used in plant protection products to control pests and to treat stored cereal grain and empty warehouses.
8.        CHP-methyl was first approved for the European Union in 2006, (8) and
its approval was set to expire in 2016. (9)
9.        In 2013, two companies which produced CHP-methyl – Ascenza Agro, SA (‘Ascenza’) and Dow AgroSciences Ltd – each submitted an application for renewal of the approval of CHP-methyl.
10.      The procedure for renewal of CHP-methyl ensued. (10)
11.      Ultimately, by Implementing Regulation 2020/17, (11) the Commission decided not to renew the approval of CHP-methyl.
According to that regulation, there were concerns about the genotoxicity and developmental neurotoxicity of CHP-methyl, as set out in two statements issued by EFSA, which could not be ruled out. Thus, the Commission considered that it could not be established that
the approval criteria related to the effects on human health in Article 4
of Regulation No 1107/2009 were satisfied.
B.      Proceedings before the General Court
12.      On 10 February 2020, Ascenza, one of the applicants for renewal of CHP-methyl, together with Industrias Afrasa, SA, a company
active in the plant protection market
(together, ‘the applicants’), brought an action for annulment of
Implementing Regulation 2020/17, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, before the General Court.
They alleged
procedural and substantive errors in the Commission’s decision not to renew the approval of CHP-methyl, rendering that regulation unlawful.
13.      ECCA
applied to intervene in support of the applicants with a view to having that regulation annulled.
The General Court granted
ECCA’s
application, finding that the latter
had established an interest in the outcome of the case, as required by EU law. (12) ECCA’s interest was based on the fact that it represented the European crop protection industry and the outcome of the proceedings was liable to affect its collective interests, as Implementing Regulation 2020/17 was claimed to set precedents that would have an impact on that industry.
14.      The Commission claimed that the application for annulment lodged by the applicants should be dismissed in its entirety.
15.      The Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic and the Health and Environmental Alliance (HEAL),
an environmental protection organisation, sought leave to intervene in support of the Commission with a view to having the action dismissed. The General Court granted those applications. (13)
16.      By the judgment under appeal, (14) the General Court rejected all the complaints as unfounded. That included the eight pleas in law raised by the applicants, (15) along with three further pleas
in law put forward by ECCA. (16) The General Court therefore dismissed the action.
III. Procedure before the Court of Justice
17.      By its appeal lodged on 14 December 2023, ECCA requests that the Court set aside the judgment under appeal and
annul Implementing Regulation 2020/17. It also requests that the Court order the Commission to pay the costs.
18.      In its response lodged on 20 March 2024, Ascenza supports the form of order sought by ECCA and submits that the appeal should be allowed in its entirety.
19.      In its response lodged on 22 March 2024, the Commission requests that the Court dismiss the appeal and order ECCA to pay the costs.
20.      In its response lodged on 23 March 2024, HEAL requests that the Court dismiss the appeal and order ECCA to pay the costs.
21.      In its response lodged on 8 April 2024, the French Republic requests that the Court dismiss the appeal.
22.      ECCA lodged a reply on 22 July 2024, and Ascenza and the Commission lodged a rejoinder on 30 August 2024 and 2 October 2024, respectively.
23.      The Court decided, pursuant to Article 76(2) of its Rules of Procedure, to give a ruling without a hearing.
IV.    Analysis
24.      One of the questions that arises in the present appeal (17) concerns the conditions under which an association which participated in the first-instance proceedings as a non-privileged intervener may bring an appeal against the judgment of the General Court.
25.      At the request of the Court, the present Opinion will focus only on that question.
26.      The Court has already dealt with the admissibility of appeals brought by non-privileged interveners, but not when such an intervener is an association. The present appeal, therefore, gives the Court the opportunity to clarify the requirement set out in the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute – that a non-privileged intervener must be directly affected by the General Court judgment – where that intervener is a representative association.
27.      The Commission, supported by HEAL, challenges the admissibility of the appeal because ECCA is not directly affected by the judgment under appeal within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute.
28.      ECCA
argues that its appeal is admissible based on two grounds. First,
ECCA,
supported by Ascenza, claims that it meets the requirement to be directly affected by the judgment under appeal for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute because that judgment has a significant and immediate impact on its interests.
Second, ECCA submits that, as an association, it represents
the interests of its member Ascenza, which itself would have had standing to bring an appeal. In that respect, ECCA contends that the admissibility requirements for associations to bring an action for annulment on behalf of their members under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU should be applied by analogy to the admissibility requirements for appeals brought by associations under the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute.
29.      The Commission, supported by HEAL, retorts that ECCA’s arguments based on the admissibility requirements under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU
cannot be accepted.
30.      My assessment is structured as follows.
First, I will discuss the right to intervene before the EU Courts and the intervention interest of representative associations (A). Second, I will
examine the relationship between the intervention interest of non-privileged interveners and the right to bring an appeal (B). Third, I will address the
arguments raised by ECCA relating to the potential relevance of the admissibility requirements under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU for its right to appeal as a non-privileged intervener (C). Fourth and last, I will apply my analysis to find that ECCA has the right to bring an appeal in the present case (D).
A.      Intervention interest of representative associations
31.      To begin with, intervention is a specific procedural mechanism in direct actions before the EU Courts, which allows Member States, EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and
all sorts of natural and legal persons,
including associations, to join voluntarily in the proceedings on the side of one of the main parties to the dispute before those Courts.
As the case may affect them, intervention
allows the EU Courts to take into account their views in deciding the case. (18)
32.      In effect, the main idea is that an intervener can support one of the parties, but intervention is not a ‘back
door’ for it to enter the proceedings as a party itself. (19)
33.      That is reflected in the
EU procedural rules, for example, that the submissions of the intervener are limited to supporting, in whole or in part, the form of order sought by one of the parties, that the intervention is ancillary to the main proceedings, and that the intervener must ‘accept the case as he [or she] finds it’ at the time of the intervention. (20)
34.      The EU procedural rules also distinguish between privileged and non-privileged interveners.
On the one hand, Member States and Union institutions are privileged interveners, meaning that they can intervene in any case without having to demonstrate an interest in the outcome of the case. (21) On the other hand, Union bodies, offices and agencies as well as natural and legal persons, including associations,
are regarded as non-privileged interveners, which means that they are required to demonstrate an interest in the outcome of the case, in accordance with Article 40 of the Statute,
so as to be permitted to intervene in a case. (22) I will refer to this requirement as ‘intervention interest’.
35.      The Court has given a broader interpretation of
intervention interest when it comes to
representative associations, as compared to
natural and legal persons acting on their own behalf.
36.      When it comes to natural or legal persons, the Court has consistently
held
that
the concept of an ‘interest in the result of a case’, within the meaning of Article 40 of the Statute, must ‘be understood as meaning a direct, existing interest in the ruling on the form of order sought, and not as an interest in relation to the pleas in law or arguments raised. The words “result of a case” refer to the final decision sought, as set out in the operative part of the future judgment’.
In that regard, the Court ruled that
‘it must, in particular, be ascertained, whether the applicant for leave to intervene is directly affected by the contested measure and whether its interest in the result of the case is established.
In principle, an interest in the result of the case can be considered to be sufficiently direct only to the extent to which that result is likely to alter the legal position of the person seeking leave to intervene’. (23)
37.      However, that case-law is nuanced when it comes to representative associations. According to settled case-law,
‘a representative professional association, whose objective is to protect the interests of its members, may be granted leave to intervene where the case raises questions of principle which are liable to affect those interests … Therefore, the requirement that such an association has a direct, existing interest in the result of a case must be found to be fulfilled where that association establishes that it is in such a situation, irrespective of whether the result of the case is likely to alter the legal position of the association as such.’ (24)
38.      Therefore, the intervention interest of a representative association is not necessarily linked to the outcome of a particular case, but may also be linked to the reasoning which led the Court to that outcome.
39.      The Court has explained its reasons for a broader understanding of the intervention interest of representative associations in the following way: ‘Indeed, such a broad interpretation of the right to intervene in favour of representative professional associations is intended to facilitate assessment of the context of such cases submitted to the EU Courts while avoiding multiple individual interventions which would compromise the efficiency and the proper course of the procedure
… However, unlike natural and legal persons acting on their own behalf, representative professional associations are likely to apply for leave to intervene in a case before the Court not in order to defend individual interests but rather to defend the collective interests of their members. Intervention by such an association offers an overall perspective of those collective interests, which are affected by a question of principle on which the result of the case depends, and is, accordingly, of such a nature as to enable the Court better to assess the context in which a case is submitted to it …’ (25)
B.      Right of non-privileged interveners to bring an appeal
40.      According to the EU procedural rules, (26) an appeal of a General Court judgment to the Court of Justice affords a means by which parties may challenge the judgment based on alleged errors of law committed by the General Court in reaching its decision, with a view to setting that judgment aside in whole or in part. (27)
41.      There are two requirements imposed by Article 56 of the Statute, which non-privileged interveners must fulfil to bring an appeal.
The first generally pertains to any appeal, while the second specifically concerns non-privileged interveners.
42.      The first requirement is that the person seeking to bring an appeal must be unsuccessful in the case before the General Court. That follows from the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute, according to which ‘an appeal may be brought by any party which has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions’. (28) The concept of ‘any party’, as the Court has recognised, includes not only the main parties (applicants and defendants), but also interveners before the General Court. (29)
43.      Therefore, non-privileged interveners can bring an appeal only if they intervened at first instance in support of the party that later lost the case in whole or in part. That requirement is not in dispute in the present case, as the applicants, on whose side ECCA intervened, lost the case in its entirety.
44.      The second requirement is an additional one which applies only to non-privileged interveners. They must be directly affected by the General Court judgment. That follows from the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute, according to which ‘interveners other than the Member States and the institutions of the Union may bring such an appeal only where the decision of the General Court directly affects them’. (30)
45.      The crux of the present case is indeed how the wording ‘directly affects’ should be understood in the case of representative associations.
46.      In that respect, the case-law of the Court on the admissibility of appeals brought by non-privileged interveners has so far involved only a handful of cases over the years, and,
as already mentioned, none of them concerned representative associations. Those appeals were brought in the fields of State aid, (31) competition law (32) and anti-dumping, (33) and in all of them,
the Court of Justice considered that the appeals were admissible because the judgment of the General Court directly affected the intervener concerned.
47.      However,
all of those cases generally involved appeals brought by natural and legal persons that had intervened in the proceedings before the General Court and in relation to whom the judgment of that Court was liable to bring about a detrimental change in their own legal position or adversely affect
their own economic or moral interests. (34) Thus, they did not address the situation of an appeal brought by an intervener-association, whose own legal position would not be changed by the judgment under appeal.
48.      Nevertheless, that case-law seems to suggest that in order to decide whether such a non-privileged intervener could bring an appeal, the Court looked into their intervention interest at first instance. That would, in turn, suggest that to be directly affected under Article 56 of the Statute coincides with the intervention interest.
49.      That does not necessarily mean that the Court must automatically grant the right to appeal to a non-privileged intervener before the General Court. That is so, since once there is a judgment, the intervention interest can now be assessed in a more concrete way as compared to when it was assessed at first instance. That is a view taken by a number of scholars. (35) In other words, the Court may, in a certain way, reassess whether the intervention interest existed, and if it finds that it did not, reject the appeal. However, in principle, the non-privileged intervener that was granted the right to intervene should, for the same reasons, also be granted the right to appeal.
50.      That interpretation also seems to be implied by the fact that, as seen above (point 36 of this Opinion), the wording ‘directly affected’ is used in the Court’s case-law in the context of ascertaining whether an intervention interest exists.
51.      Inasmuch as the right to appeal of non-privileged interveners is conditioned by their intervention interest, the notion of being directly affected by the General Court judgment in the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute could be understood differently in relation to natural and legal persons intervening on their own behalf and representative associations intervening to defend the collective interests of their members.
52.      If understood in that way, then it would seem to follow that the Court’s broader interpretation of the intervention interest for representative associations in comparison to the intervention interest of natural and legal persons acting on their own behalf (see points 37 and 39 of this Opinion) would result in a broader interpretation of the requirement to be directly affected in relation to such associations. Even if, for natural and legal persons acting on their own behalf, being directly affected is connected to the outcome of the case only, representative associations may bring an appeal if they challenge part of the reasoning of the General Court even if the outcome does not directly change their legal position.
53.      That would seem to be of particular relevance in areas of EU law such as that relating to plant protection products, potentially involving all kinds of representative associations which play an important role in justifying their interest in intervening and which should not be deprived of the opportunity to bring an appeal when that interest is affected by the judgment of the General Court.
54.      It could, therefore, be concluded that representative associations, which were granted leave to intervene in support of the party that has subsequently lost the case before the General Court, satisfy the requirement to be directly affected in order to bring an appeal, even if the General Court judgment does not directly alter the legal position of such associations.
C.      Relevance of the admissibility requirements under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU
55.      ECCA also claims that standing to bring an action directly under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU is relevant for meeting the requirement to be directly affected by a General Court judgment under Article 56 of the Statute in order to bring an appeal as a non-privileged intervener.
56.      It is true that a person that would fulfil the conditions of being directly and individually concerned to bring an action for annulment would also be allowed to intervene, instead of bringing such an action, in a case brought by someone else.
57.      However, if such a person did not bring the annulment action, even if it could, and did not intervene in the action brought by someone else, that person would not be able to bring an appeal, as it was neither the party nor the intervener at first instance.
58.      Therefore, the right to bring an appeal can only be assessed on the basis of the status that a person had in the first-instance proceedings. If that person decided to participate as an intervener, and not to bring the action, the possibility that it could bring such an action is not relevant.
59.      Consequently, to my mind, and contrary to the arguments put forward by ECCA, the admissibility requirements for actions for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU are not relevant for assessing the requirement for appeals brought by representative associations under the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute.
D.      The present case
60.      It follows from my analysis that ECCA’s appeal in the present case is admissible, since ECCA is directly affected by the judgment under appeal within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute.
61.      The judgment under appeal, if not set aside by the Court of Justice, establishes precedents regarding the correct application of Regulation No 1107/2009 and the procedure for the renewal of the approval of active substances, which are liable to affect the interests of ECCA’s members.
62.      Indeed, the case before the General Court raised such issues of principle, which was the reason why ECCA intervened.
63.      As I have explained, in principle, a non-privileged intervener that was granted the right to intervene should, for the same reasons, also be granted the right to appeal.
64.      ECCA was granted the right to intervene and should, for the same reasons, be granted the right to appeal.
65.      There is no basis to question that ECCA’s intervention interest at first instance existed.
66.      Therefore, ECCA should be considered to be directly affected by the judgment under appeal. That is so,
irrespective of whether that judgment is liable to alter its legal position.
V.      Conclusion
67.      In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court find that the appeal of the European Crop Care Association is admissible.
1      Original language: English.
2      See ECCA’s website, available at: https://www.ecca-org.eu/.
3      Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).
4      See, in particular, Article 1(1) and recital 9 of Regulation No 1107/2009. For a detailed discussion, see, for example, Bozzini, E., Pesticide Policy and Politics in the European Union – Regulatory Assessment, Implementation and Enforcement, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017, Ch. 2; Morvillo, M., ‘From contestation to accountability in EU pesticides regulation? The case of glyphosate’, in Arcuri, A. and Coman-Kund, F. (eds), Technocracy and the Law: Accountability, Governance and Expertise, Routledge, London, 2021, pp. 196-222, in particular pp. 198-203.
5      See Chapters II and III, along with
recitals 10 and 23, of Regulation No 1107/2009.
6      See Articles 14 to 20 and recital 15 of Regulation No 1107/2009.
7      Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 844/2012 of 18 September 2012 setting out the provisions necessary for the implementation of the renewal procedure for active substances, as provided for in Regulation No 1107/2009 (OJ 2012 L 252, p. 26). That regulation has been repealed by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1740 of 20 November 2020 setting out the provisions necessary for the implementation of the renewal procedure for active substances, as provided for in Regulation No 1107/2009, and repealing Implementing Regulation No 844/2012 (OJ 2020 L 392, p. 20).
8      Commission Directive 2005/72/EC of 21 October 2005 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC to include chlorpyrifos, chlorpyrifos-methyl, mancozeb, maneb, and metiram as active substances (OJ 2005 L 279, p. 63), which, according to Article 4 thereof, entered into force on 1 July 2006. It was adopted under Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ 1991 L 230, p. 1), which was subsequently replaced by Regulation No 1107/2009. Under Article 78(3) of Regulation No 1107/2009, the active substances included in Annex I to Directive 91/414 were deemed to have been approved and listed in Part A of the annex to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 of 25 May 2011 implementing Regulation No 1107/2009 (OJ 2011 L 153, p. 1) (entry 112 of that annex listed the expiration of the approval of CHP-methyl on 30 June 2016).
9      However, due to the duration of the renewal procedure, the Commission granted three extensions of the expiration of the approval of CHP-methyl until 2020.
10      That procedure is described in paragraphs 15 to 56 of the judgment of 4 October 2023, Ascenza Agro and Industrias Afrasa v Commission (T-77/20, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2023:602).
11      Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/17 of 10 January 2020 concerning the non-renewal of the approval of the active substance chlorpyrifos-methyl, in accordance with Regulation No 1107/2009, and amending the Annex to Implementing Regulation No 540/2011 (OJ 2020 L 7, p. 11).
12      See order of the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court of 26 November 2020, Ascenza Agro and Industrias Afrasa v Commission (T‑77/20, not published, in particular paragraphs 3, 4 and 6).
13      See orders of the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court of 26 November 2020, Ascenza Agro and Industrias Afrasa v Commission (T‑77/20, not published).
14      See footnote 10 to this Opinion.
15      As indicated in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, the applicants’ pleas in law alleged: (i) infringement of essential procedural requirements; (ii) infringement of the transparency obligation; (iii) infringement of the right to be heard; (iv) infringement of the precautionary principle; (v) breach of the obligation to take into account all relevant factors and circumstances of the situation which the contested regulation was intended to regulate; (vi) infringement of the principle of sound administration; (vii) a manifest error of assessment with regard to the risk assessment adopted by EFSA and subsequently by the Commission; and (viii) a manifest error of assessment and infringement of the principle of proportionality.
16      As indicated in paragraph 87, read in conjunction with headings E and K, of the judgment under appeal, ECCA’s further pleas in law alleged: (ix) breach of the obligation to state reasons in so far as it concerns the adoption by the Commission of a regulation based on a scientific assessment that differs from that contained in the draft assessment report adopted by the rapporteur Member State; (x) breach of the obligation to state reasons for the application of the read-across approach; and (xi) infringement of Article 14 of Implementing Regulation No 844/2012. The General Court rejected each of those pleas as unfounded, finding it unnecessary to rule on their admissibility (see paragraphs 181, 288 and 654 of the judgment under appeal).
17      ECCA raises four grounds of appeal. In essence, the first ground
is based on infringement of Regulation No 1107/2009 relating to the seventh plea in law of the applicants; the second ground is based on infringement of Article 296 TFEU  relating to the tenth plea in law of ECCA; the third ground is based on infringement of essential procedural requirements relating to the first plea in law of the applicants; and
the fourth ground
is based on infringement of the read-across method and contradictory reasoning relating to the seventh plea in law of the applicants.
18      In that respect, the rules governing intervention are set out in
Article 40 of the Statute and Chapter 4 of Title IV of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice devoted to direct actions (Articles 129 to 132).
There are comparable provisions in Chapter 14 of Title III of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (Articles 142 to 145).
19      See
Lenaerts, K., Gutman, K. and Nowak, J.T., EU Procedural Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2023,
p. 733.
20      See, in that regard, Article 129(1) to (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
21      See the first paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute.
22      See the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute.
23      Order of the President of the Court of 10 March 2023, Illumina v Commission (C‑611/22 P, EU:C:2023:205, paragraphs 6 and 7) (emphasis added). See also, for example, order of the President of the Court of 4 February 2025, Medel and Others v Council (C‑555/24 P, EU:C:2025:73, paragraphs 6 to 8).
24      Order of the President of the Court of 10 March 2023, Illumina v Commission (C‑611/22 P, EU:C:2023:205, paragraph 8) (emphasis added). See also, for example, order of the President of the Court of 4 February 2025, Medel and Others v Council (C‑555/24 P, EU:C:2025:73, paragraph 9). Thus, such an association may be granted leave to intervene in a case if, first, it represents a significant number of undertakings active in the sector concerned, second, its objects include the protection of the interests of its members, third, the case may raise questions of principle affecting the functioning of the sector concerned and, therefore, fourth, the interests of its members may be affected significantly by the forthcoming judgment. See, for example, orders of the President of the Court of 10 March 2023, Illumina v Commission (C‑611/22 P, EU:C:2023:205, paragraph 10), and of 1 August 2025, Ordre néerlandais des avocats du barreau de Bruxelles and Others v Council (C‑865/24 P, EU:C:2025:639, paragraph 10).
.
25      Order of the President of the Court of 10 March 2023, Illumina v Commission (C‑611/22 P, EU:C:2023:205, paragraph 9) (emphasis added). See also, for example, order of the President of the Court of 1 August 2025, Ordre néerlandais des avocats du barreau de Bruxelles and Others v Council (C‑865/24 P, EU:C:2025:639, paragraph 9).
26      In that respect, the
rules governing appeals (as well as cross-appeals) are set out in
Articles 56 to 61 of the Statute and Title V of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice devoted to appeals against decisions of the General Court (Articles 167 to 190).
27      See, in that regard, Article 169(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
28      Emphasis added.
29      See, for example, judgments of 22 December 1993, Pincherle v Commission (C‑244/91 P, EU:C:1993:950, paragraph 16), and of 11 February 1999, Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission (C‑390/95 P, EU:C:1999:66, paragraph 20).
30      Emphasis added.
31      See judgments of 24 September 2002, Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission (C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P, EU:C:2002:524, paragraphs 57 and 58) (the company concerned was directly affected because it would be likely to have to repay sums paid as aid pursuant to the General Court judgment in an action for recovery); of 26 October 2016, DEI and Commission v Alouminion tis Ellados (C‑590/14 P, EU:C:2016:797, paragraphs 23 to 26) (the company concerned was directly affected because it would be bound to reimburse the sum it recovered in order to comply with the General Court judgment); of 2 February 2023, Spain and Others v Commission (C‑649/20 P, C‑658/20 P and C‑662/20 P, EU:C:2023:60, paragraphs 25 and 26) (the entities concerned were directly affected because they may have had to repay the aid they received in order to comply with the General Court judgment); and of 14 September 2023, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa (C‑466/21 P, EU:C:2023:666, paragraphs 37 to 40) (the Land concerned was directly affected because it was obliged to recover the instalments of aid at issue and was prohibited from paying out new instalments of that aid in the future as a result of the General Court judgment).
32      See judgment of 2 October 2003, International Power and Others v NALOO (C‑172/01 P, C‑175/01 P, C‑176/01 P and C‑180/01 P, EU:C:2003:534, paragraphs 52 and 53) (the companies concerned were directly affected because, in order to comply with the General Court judgment, the Commission would be obliged to conduct a fresh examination that might result in a measure disadvantageous to those companies, which would run the risk of being exposed to an action for damages before the national courts).
33      See judgment of 3 December 2020, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others (C‑461/18 P, EU:C:2020:979, paragraphs 122 to 129) (the company concerned was directly affected because there was a risk that measures taken by the Commission to comply with the General Court judgment would expose it to actions for payment of much higher duties).
34      See, in that respect, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Joined Cases Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and Commission v Fresh Del Monte Produce (C‑293/13 P and C‑294/13 P, EU:C:2014:2439, in particular point 57).
35      See, for example, Lasok, K.P.E., Lasok’s European Court Practice and Procedure, 4th ed., Bloomsbury Professional, London, 2022, pp. 1192-1193: ‘It is unclear to what extent the requirement that the decision appealed against must affect the appellant intervener directly differs from the usual test for determining whether or not the intervener was entitled to intervene in the first instance proceedings in the first place. When an application to intervene is considered in order to determine whether or not it is to be admitted, the intervener’s interest in the result of the case is assessed ex ante; when an appeal by an intervener is considered, the intervener’s interest can be assessed ex post and it may then become clear whether or not the intervener had in truth a direct and concrete interest in the result of the case. Hence, even if the test for allowing an appeal by an intervener is in principle the same as that for allowing the application to intervene at first instance, it does not necessarily follow that an intervener in the proceedings at first instance would have capacity to appeal’ (emphasis added). See also Lenaerts, Gutman and Nowak, EU Procedural Law, cited in footnote 19 to this Opinion, pp. 653-654: ‘The interest which such an intervener – including Union bodies, offices, and agencies, as well as any other person – must establish in order to be able to bring an appeal is in principle the same as it had to establish in order to obtain leave to intervene at first instance (Statute, Art. 40, second para.), but the Court of Justice has, in the decision of the General Court, a more concrete basis for testing that interest than the General Court has when appraising the interest of a would-be intervener before any decision on the substance has been taken. It is therefore possible that the intervener at first instance may be refused leave to appeal’ (emphasis added).