JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
21 January 2026 (*)
( Arbitration clause – Common foreign and security policy – International civilian staff of EU international missions – Consecutive fixed-term contracts – Termination of the applicant’s contract – Right to be heard – Obligation to state reasons – Principle of sound administration – Duty to have regard for the welfare of staff – Misuse of powers – Equal treatment – Legitimate expectations )
In Case T‑218/24,
DT, represented by A. Kunst, lawyer,
applicant,
v
Eulex Kosovo, represented by E. Raoult, lawyer,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of J. Svenningsen, President, C. Mac Eochaidh and J. Laitenberger (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator,
having regard to the written procedure,
further to the hearing on 30 September 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By his action, the applicant, DT, seeks, principally, on the basis of Article 272 TFEU, first, a declaration that the letter of 13 November 2023 (‘the letter of 13 November 2023’) and the letter of 20 February 2024 (‘the letter of 20 February 2024’) from Eulex Kosovo, by which Eulex Kosovo terminated his contract and rejected his internal appeal against that termination (together, ‘the acts at issue’), were unlawful, and secondly, compensation for the damage he claims to have suffered as a result of the acts at issue and other acts. In the alternative, he seeks, first, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the annulment of the acts at issue and, secondly, on the basis of Article 268 TFEU, compensation for the damage he claims to have suffered as a result of those acts.
I.      Background to the dispute
2        The Eulex Kosovo Mission was created by Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO (OJ 2008 L 42, p. 92). That action has been extended several times, most recently by Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1161 of 5 June 2025 amending Joint Action 2008/124 (OJ L
2025/1161), until 14 June 2027.
3        The applicant is a former member of the international contract staff of Eulex Kosovo. He was employed by Eulex Kosovo, as a member of the international contract staff, initially under a fixed-term contract for the period from 15 June to 14 December 2018, and subsequently, as a ‘Knowledge Management Officer’, under five successive fixed-term contracts covering the period from 1 July 2019 to 14 June 2025. The final contract between the applicant and Eulex Kosovo was concluded for the period from 15 June 2023 to 14 June 2025.
4        The applicant’s employment contracts provided, in Article 21, that any disputes relating to them were to be ‘referred to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 272 [TFEU]’. Article 21.2 of the final employment contract stated, inter alia, that the internal procedures referred to in Articles 19 and 20 of that contract were required to be exhausted before proceedings could be instituted before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
5        In accordance with Article 1.1 of the applicant’s final employment contract, by signing that contract ‘the [e]mployee hereby confirms acceptance of and compliance with the terms and principles set out in this contract and its annexes, the relevant Standard Operating Procedures (“SOP”) and the Code of Conduct and Discipline for EU Civilian [Common Security and Defence Policy Missions]’.
6        Article 17.1 of the applicant’s final employment contract provides that that contract ‘may be terminated by either the [e]mployer or the [e]mployee giving [one] month’s advance notice of intent in writing, including the reason for termination’ and that ‘the [e]mployee shall be given the opportunity to be heard by the Deputy Head of the Mission/Head of Mission before such decision is taken’.
7        In accordance with Article 17.2 of the applicant’s final employment contract, that contract ‘may in particular be terminated before its term in case the Council of the European Union decides to close the mission or to downsize the mission, if such downsizing affects the position of the [e]mployee’, and ‘the [e]mployer shall endeavour to give advance notice of such termination’.
8        Article 20.1 of the applicant’s final employment contract provides that ‘the [e]mployee may submit an appeal against an act adversely affecting him/her to the [e]mployer within one month of the date of the act, unless it is stated otherwise in the contract’.
9        According to Article 20.2 of the applicant’s final employment contract, ‘the [e]mployer shall notify the staff member of his/her reasoned decision within [one] month of the date on which the appeal was lodged[,] unless new facts have emerged which were unknown at the time of the initial appeal and are likely to have a bearing on the final decision.’
10      On 23 August 2023, the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo submitted a proposal for a revised deployment plan to the Civilian Operations Commander of the European External Action Service (EEAS) for approval. The revised deployment plan proposed amending the existing plan, in particular by abolishing several posts, including that of Knowledge Management Officer, which the applicant held, and by creating other posts, including the post of ‘Knowledge and Information Management Officer’.
11      On 18 September 2023, a call for contributions was published on the EEAS’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability recruitment platform, Goalkeeper, for the newly created post of Knowledge and Information Management Officer, which was open for recruitment with a starting date of 15 December 2023.
12      On 2 October 2023, the head of Eulex Kosovo’s human resources division held a meeting with the staff members whose posts were likely to be abolished under the revised deployment plan.
13      On 23 October 2023, the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander adopted the revised deployment plan.
14      On 7 November 2023, a meeting took place between the applicant and the head of Eulex Kosovo’s human resources division, concerning the proposed termination of the applicant’s employment contract.
15      By letter of 13 November 2023, Eulex Kosovo informed the applicant that his employment contract would be terminated on 14 December 2023, on the ground that, under its new mandate, the post of Knowledge Management Officer which he held no longer formed part of the mission structure.
16      On 24 November 2023, the applicant submitted an internal appeal against the letter
of 13 November 2023.
17      Eulex Kosovo informed the applicant, by letter of 20 February 2024, that his internal appeal had been rejected.
II.    Forms of order sought
18      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        principally, declare the letter of 13 November 2023 unlawful and, in the alternative, annul it;
–        principally, declare the letter of 20 February 2024 unlawful and, in the alternative, annul it;
–        principally, order Eulex Kosovo to pay him, in respect of the material damage suffered, a sum corresponding to 19 months of unpaid gross salary, with the addition of a daily subsistence allowance, salary increase, home travel expenses and other entitlements, and, in respect of the non-material damage suffered, a sum estimated provisionally ex aequo et bono at EUR 45 000, on the basis of contractual liability, and, in the alternative, order Eulex Kosovo to compensate him for that damage on the basis of non-contractual liability;
–        order Eulex Kosovo to pay the costs, plus interest of 8%.
19      Eulex Kosovo contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
III. Law
20      The present action consists, principally, of applications based on Article 272 TFEU and, in the alternative, of an application for annulment based on Article 263 TFEU together with a claim for damages based on Article 268 TFEU.
A.      The jurisdiction of the Court
21      Article 272 TFEU is a specific provision allowing the Courts of the European Union to be seised under an arbitration clause agreed by the parties for contracts governed by either public or private law, and without restriction as regards the nature of the action to be brought before the Courts of the European Union (see judgment of 25 June 2020, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑730/18 P, EU:C:2020:505, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
22      In the present case, it is important to note that the action concerns the termination of the contract at issue and the rejection of the internal appeal against that termination, which are contractual in nature (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraphs 31 to 40).
23      Consequently, in view of the terms of the arbitration clause referred to in paragraph
4 above, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on the applicant’s principal claims, which, moreover, Eulex Kosovo does not dispute.
B.      The principal heads of claim
24      The applicant relies, in support of his claims based on Article 272 TFEU, on infringements of contractual provisions and of EU law, in particular infringements of the general principles of EU law and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
1.      The applicable law
25      It should be recalled that, according to the first paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, the European Union’s contractual liability is governed by the law applicable to the contract concerned.
26      Disputes arising from the performance of a contract must be resolved, in general, on the basis of the contractual provisions (see judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited). However, that principle cannot lead to the application of the terms of a contract allowing the parties to override mandatory provisions of the applicable national law from which there can be no derogation and in accordance with which the obligations arising from that contract must be or were performed (judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraph 53).
27      Moreover, when the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union perform a contract, they remain subject to their obligations under the Charter and the general principles of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission, C‑584/17 P, EU:C:2020:576, paragraph 86). Thus, if the parties decide, in their contract, by means of an arbitration clause, to confer jurisdiction on the Courts of the European Union to hear disputes relating to that contract, those Courts will have jurisdiction, irrespective of the applicable law stipulated in that contract, to examine possible infringements of the Charter and of the general principles of EU law (judgment of 16 July 2020, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission, C‑378/16 P, EU:C:2020:575, paragraph 81).
28      If the contract is silent, the Courts of the European Union must, where appropriate, determine the applicable law using the rules provided for by Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2008 L 177, p. 6) (see judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
29      In the present case, the contract at issue does not specify the law that is applicable to it, except as regards questions of social security, taxation and pensions, which are irrelevant to the present dispute.
30      However, in support of his principal claims under Article 272 TFEU, the applicant relies exclusively on pleas in law alleging infringements of the contractual provisions and of EU law, in particular the general principles of that law and the Charter. Furthermore, it does not appear that, in order to resolve the present dispute, it is necessary to apply mandatory provisions of national law.
31      In those circumstances, it is not necessary to determine the national law which is applicable to the present dispute, which can be resolved on the basis of the contract at issue and the Eulex Kosovo standard operating procedures (‘SOPs’) to which it refers, as well as the Charter and the general principles of EU law.
2.      The abolition, in the revised deployment plan, of the post held by the applicant
32      In the application, the applicant challenges the letters of 13 November 2023 and 20 February 2024. In the reply, the applicant also challenges the legality of the revised deployment plan, on the basis of a breach of Eulex Kosovo’s Operation Plan (‘the OPLAN’). He submits that the OPLAN, which was a ‘superior’ document by comparison with the revised deployment plan, provided for the post he held and did not provide for the mission’s operational needs to be revised or for the post he held to be abolished.
33      The applicant asks the Court to adopt measures of organisation of procedure, in accordance with Article 88 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, and to order Eulex Kosovo to submit to the Court a declassified version of the relevant parts of the OPLAN.
34      Eulex Kosovo disputes the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the argument alleging that the decision to abolish the post held by the applicant was unlawful and the admissibility of that argument.
35      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in the present action, the applicant challenges the letter of 13 November 2023 informing him of the termination of his contract and the letter of 20 February 2024 rejecting his internal appeal against the termination of his contract.
36      The applicant does not challenge, in the application, the revised deployment plan which provided for the abolition of the post he held. As is apparent from paragraphs
10 and
13 above, moreover, that revised deployment plan was not adopted by Eulex Kosovo, but by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, on a proposal from Eulex Kosovo.
37      As regards the argument raised by the applicant in the reply, that the revised deployment plan is unlawful by reason of a breach of the OPLAN, which, he submits, provided for his position, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not, in principle, have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) or with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions. Those provisions introduce a derogation from the rule of the general jurisdiction which Article 19 TEU confers on that institution to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, and they must, therefore, be interpreted narrowly (see judgment of 10 April 2025, Tartisai, C‑238/24, EU:C:2025:258, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
38      More specifically, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not have jurisdiction to assess the legality of, or interpret, acts or omissions directly related to the conduct, definition or implementation of the CFSP, and especially the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), that is to say, in particular the identification of the European Union’s strategic interests and the definition of both the actions to be taken and the positions to be adopted by the European Union as well as of the general guidelines of the CFSP, within the meaning of Articles 24 to 26, 28, 29, 37, 38, 42 and 43 TEU (judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraph 118).
39      It is true that Eulex Kosovo’s capacity to employ staff, which is apparent from the wording of Article 15a of Joint Action 2008/124, as amended by Council Decision 2014/349/CFSP of 12 June 2014 (OJ 2014 L 174, p. 42), constitutes an act of day-to-day management forming part of the performance of that mission’s mandate and that the decisions taken by the mission as to the choice of personnel it employs are not directly linked to the political or strategic choices it makes in the framework of the CFSP (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraphs 127 and 128).
40      However, the resources made available to a CFSP mission, and in particular a CSDP mission, on the basis of the first subparagraph of Article 28(1) TEU, are directly related to the political or strategic choices made within the framework of the CFSP (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraph 126).
41      It follows that a reconfiguration of the Eulex Kosovo mission by means of an amendment to the deployment plan involving the abolition of posts and the addition of new posts is directly linked to the strategic choices made within the framework of the CFSP.
42      That finding is confirmed by the fact that the revised deployment plan was adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, who is Eulex Kosovo’s strategic commander, in accordance with Article 7(2) and Article 11(3) of Joint Action 2008/124, as amended by Council Decision 2010/322/CFSP of 8 June 2010 (OJ 2010 L 145, p. 13).
43      Consequently, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review and assess the legality of the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, including the decision to abolish the post held by the applicant.
44      In any event, it must be stated that, in accordance with Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the introduction of new pleas in the course of the proceedings is prohibited, unless the plea is based on matters of law or of fact which have come to light in the course of the procedure or constitutes an amplification of a plea made previously, whether directly or by implication, in the original application, and which is closely connected therewith (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2020, HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement v Commission, T‑380/17, EU:T:2020:471, paragraph 87 (not published) and the case-law cited).
45      In the present case, the applicant raised the argument alleging that the revised deployment plan was unlawful only in the reply. Moreover, that argument does not constitute an amplification of the pleas already set out in the application.
46      In response to a question put by the Court at the hearing, the applicant stated that he did not know, at the time the application was lodged, that the OPLAN provided for his post, and thus developed that argument in the reply in response to the arguments put forward by Eulex Kosovo in the defence. However, he also acknowledged that Eulex Kosovo staff had access to the OPLAN. Thus, the new argument is not based on matters of law or of fact which have come to light in the course of the procedure.
47      Consequently, the argument alleging that the revised deployment plan is unlawful must be rejected as inadmissible, and there is no need to adopt the measure of organisation of procedure sought by the applicant in the reply and in his submissions on whether a hearing should be held.
3.      The first and second principal heads of claim, by which the Court is asked to declare the acts at issue unlawful
48      In support of his first and second heads of claim, the applicant puts forward four pleas in law. The first plea alleges infringement of the right to be heard, the second, infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the third, infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the fourth, infringements of the SOP on the Principles and Process of Reconfiguration (‘the SOP relating to reconfiguration’), infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and of the principle of sound administration, and misuse of powers.
49      Eulex Kosovo contends that the first and second heads of claim should be dismissed.
(a)    First plea: infringement of the right to be heard
50      The applicant submits that Eulex Kosovo did not comply with his right to be heard in accordance with the requirements arising from Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter and Article 17 of his employment contract before adopting the decision to terminate that contract.
51      The applicant maintains that, if he had been heard before the decision to abolish his post and terminate his employment contract was taken, he would have been able to persuade the Head of Mission to adopt a different decision and, for example, to retain his post, or alternatively to assign him to a different post. The applicant submits that he would have been able to explain that the three previous calls for contributions concerning his post had been unsuccessful and would have been able to draw attention to the difficulties between the section in which he was working and the Chief of Staff.
52      He argues that the fact that he had a meeting with the head of Eulex Kosovo’s human resources division to discuss the abolition of his post on 7 November 2023, when the decision to abolish that post had been taken two months earlier, and the meeting took place only one week before the sending of the letter of 13 November 2023, informing him that his employment contract was to be terminated, is irrelevant.
53      With regard to the meeting of 2 October 2023 mentioned in paragraph
12 above, the applicant states that the Chief of Staff, the head of the Head of Mission’s office and the head of Eulex Kosovo’s human resources division also took part, when he had requested a bilateral meeting with the Head of Mission in order to ‘complain about the Chief of Staff’s bias’ against him – which, he submits, had affected the decision to abolish his post. As to what was discussed at that meeting, the applicant disputes the admissibility of the minutes produced by Eulex Kosovo as Annex B.5 to the defence. Those minutes are not signed, do not list the participants or set out the arguments he raised, are drafted in the same font as the defence, refer to matters which were not mentioned at the meeting, and do not spell his name correctly. Moreover, the applicant never received those minutes.
54      As regards the interview of 2 October 2023 and that of 7 November 2023, the applicant disputes that they served any purpose, in particular on the ground that they took place after the revised deployment plan, entailing the abolition of the post which he occupied, had been proposed, on 23 August 2023, and after that plan had been adopted, on 23 October 2023.
55      Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
56      For the purposes of examining the first plea, it is necessary to refer, first of all, to the contractual terms, and then to Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter.
57      In that regard, first, it follows from Article 17 of the applicant’s employment contract that he was to be heard before a decision was taken on the termination of that contract.
58      Secondly, Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, which has, since 1 December 2009, the same legal value as the Treaties, recognises ‘the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken’ in respect of him or her.
59      The right to be heard must be observed, irrespective of the nature of the administrative procedure leading to the adoption of an individual measure, where, in respect of a person, the administration proposes to take, according to the wording of that provision, ‘a decision which would affect him or her adversely’. The right to be heard, which must be safeguarded even where there are no applicable rules, requires that the person concerned must have been afforded beforehand the opportunity effectively to make known his or her views on any information against him or her which might have been taken into account in the act to be adopted (see judgment of 23 September 2020, UE v Commission, T‑338/19, EU:T:2020:430, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
60      More specifically, observance of the right to be heard involves the person concerned being put in a position, prior to the adoption of the decision adversely affecting him or her, effectively to make known his or her views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances on the basis of which that decision will be adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2013, L v Parliament, T‑317/10 P, EU:T:2013:413, paragraphs 80 and 81, and order of 17 June 2019, BS v Parliament, T‑593/18, not published, EU:T:2019:425, paragraphs 76 and 77).
61      The termination of the applicant’s contract constitutes an individual measure adversely affecting him. Consequently, it also follows from Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter that the applicant had
to be heard before a decision was taken on the termination of his contract.
62      It is common ground between the parties that two meetings took place between, inter alia, the applicant and the head of Eulex Kosovo’s human resources division concerning the reconfiguration and the termination of the applicant’s employment contract, on 2 October and 7 November 2023 respectively, which was before the termination of the applicant’s contract on 13 November 2023. It is also common ground that the applicant was not heard before 23 August 2023, the date on which Eulex Kosovo proposed the revised deployment plan, containing, inter alia, the proposal to abolish the post held by the applicant, to the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander.
63      Thus, the applicant disputes that the meetings of 2 October and 7 November 2023 served any purpose.
64      In that regard, it should be recalled that the right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his interests adversely (see judgment of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).
65      In order to ensure that the person concerned is in fact protected, the purpose of the right to be heard is, inter alia, to enable that person to correct an error or submit such information relating to his or her personal circumstances as will argue in favour of the adoption or non-adoption of the decision, or in favour of its having a specific content (judgment of 11 December 2014, Boudjlida, C‑249/13, EU:C:2014:2431, paragraph 37).
66      The right to be heard also requires the administration
to pay due attention to the observations thus submitted by the person concerned, examining carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see judgment of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited).
67      The right to be heard must therefore enable the administration to investigate the matter in such a way as to be able to adopt a decision in full knowledge of the facts and to state reasons for that decision adequately, so that, where appropriate, the person concerned can duly exercise his right to bring legal proceedings (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 December 2014, Boudjlida, C‑249/13, EU:C:2014:2431, paragraph 59).
68      It must be borne in mind that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review and assess the legality of the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, including the decision to abolish the post held by the applicant. Furthermore, in the present action, the applicant’s admissible challenges relate to the letter of 13 November 2023 and the letter of 20 February 2024, and not the revision of the deployment plan (see paragraph
35 et seq. above). Consequently, the applicant’s argument that he should have been heard before the abolition of the post he held was proposed in the revised deployment plan is ineffective.
69      In any event, neither Article 17 of the applicant’s employment contract nor any other provision of that employment contract or of the SOP relating to reconfiguration provides that a staff member has the right to be heard before a revision of the deployment plan is proposed.
70      Similarly, Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter does not provide any basis for an alleged right of the applicant to be heard individually before a revision of the deployment plan is proposed. The proposal to revise the deployment plan cannot be equated with an ‘individual’ measure adversely affecting the applicant.
71      In that regard, the third paragraph of Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration provides, in the event of a reconfiguration, for the staff representatives to be consulted on the process of organisational changes and the possible impact on the staff, and not for an obligation to hear, prior to any restructuring decision, every member of staff potentially affected by the subsequent implementation of that restructuring.
72      It follows that the fact that Eulex Kosovo did not hear the applicant before the proposed revision of the deployment plan does not render the letters of 13 November 2023 and 20 February 2024 unlawful.
73      As to whether the applicant was heard sufficiently in law at the meeting of 7 November 2023, the applicant’s argument that that meeting was ineffective must be rejected. First, contrary to what the applicant suggests, the mere fact that the head of Eulex Kosovo’s human resources division stated that she was unable to take any decisions or make any promises at that meeting does not mean that the meeting was ineffective. On the contrary, as the applicant himself acknowledges, the head of the human resources division also stated that her role at that meeting was to present the facts and the decision, to listen to the applicant’s views and to report them to the Head of Mission. Furthermore, it is apparent from the minutes of that meeting, provided by the applicant as Annex A.20 to the application, that the purpose of the meeting was also to give the applicant the opportunity to propose alternative solutions.
74      It follows that the meeting of 7 November 2023 enabled the applicant to make his point of view known effectively and that Eulex Kosovo paid due attention to his observations before the decision on the termination of his employment contract was taken.
75      As regards the meeting of 2 October 2023, it should be recalled that the effectiveness of a plea or complaint relates, in essence, to its ability, in the event that it is well founded, to support the claim advanced by the applicant, and that the Courts of the European Union may reject as ineffective a plea or complaint where they find that it is not capable, in the event that it is well founded, of supporting the claim advanced (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 30 September 2003, Eurocoton and Others v Council, C‑76/01 P, EU:C:2003:511, paragraph 52, and of 1 March 2023, Hengshi Egypt Fiberglass Fabrics and Jushi Egypt for Fiberglass Industry v Commission, T‑301/20, EU:T:2023:93, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited), which, in the present case, is that the acts at issue should be declared unlawful.
76      The applicant’s arguments relating to the meeting of 2 October 2023 are ineffective, in so far as neither Article 17 of his contract of employment nor Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter required that he be heard at two meetings before the adoption of the letter of 13 November 2023.
77      Consequently, the first plea must be rejected.
(b)    Second plea: infringement of the obligation to state reasons
78      The applicant submits that the acts at issue are vitiated by an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, as flows from the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, from Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter, and from Articles 17 and 20 of his employment contract. In particular, he submits that Eulex Kosovo did not inform him of the criteria which had been used to reconfigure the post he held.
79      The letter of 13 November 2023 merely states that the decision was taken on the basis of the future needs of the mission. It does not mention the fact that the applicant had been assigned to the post in question for four and a half years, his particular abilities, his experience, the observations he had made at the meeting of 7 November 2023, or the assurances that the post would continue to exist which, he states, he had obtained in the months preceding the sending of that letter.
80      Equally, at the meeting of 7 November 2023, the applicant was not informed of the criteria that had been used, or of the other solutions considered by Eulex Kosovo.
81      The letter of 20 February 2024 also failed to respond to the arguments raised by the applicant, such as those relating to the failure to comply with several provisions of the SOP relating to reconfiguration or the assurances that his job would continue to exist.
82      Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
83      As a preliminary point, it must be stated that Article 20.2 of the applicant’s final employment contract, the terms of which are reproduced in paragraph
9 above, required Eulex Kosovo to state reasons for its response to the internal appeal that had been lodged by the applicant on the basis of paragraph 1 of that article, that response being the letter of 20 February 2024.
84      In addition, it should be noted that the obligation on the EU administration to state the reasons for its decisions is laid down, inter alia, in Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter, and is therefore binding on that administration, even where it acts within a contractual framework (see judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraphs 102 and the case-law cited).
85      That obligation applies to Eulex Kosovo both in relation to the letter of 13 November 2023, notifying the termination of the contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2022, JC v EUCAP Somalia, T‑165/20, EU:T:2022:453, paragraph 89 (not published)), and in relation to the letter of 20 February 2024 containing the response to the applicant’s internal appeal.
86      As regards the scope of the obligation to state reasons, while the statement of reasons must set out clearly and unequivocally the administration’s reasoning, it must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the act, the nature of the reasons given and the interest that the addressee may have in receiving explanations (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2022, JC v EUCAP Somalia, T‑165/20, EU:T:2022:453, paragraph 90 (not published)). Furthermore, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording, but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 16 October 2024, Silex v Eismea, T‑654/20, not published, EU:T:2024:702, paragraphs 86 and 274).
87      It follows that a statement of reasons does not need to be exhaustive, but, on the contrary, must be considered sufficient if the act in question sets out the facts and the legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2017, CJ v ECDC, T‑692/16, not published, EU:T:2017:894, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited). Thus, the administration is not required to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on before it (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 December 2014, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, T‑643/11, EU:T:2014:1076, paragraph 130 (not published) and the case-law cited).
88      In the present case, it is apparent from the letter of 13 November 2023 that Eulex Kosovo terminated the applicant’s employment contract on the ground that the post he then held was no longer provided for in the mission structure, following the approval of the revised deployment plan by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander on 23 October 2023.
89      The reason referred to in paragraph
88 above is restated in the letter of 20 February 2024. Furthermore, the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo replied, in that letter, to a number of the applicant’s arguments. In that regard, it is apparent from that letter that the newly created post differs significantly from the post held by the applicant, in particular as regards the engagement regime and the qualifications and experience required. It is also apparent from that letter that the Head of Mission did not identify any justified concerns relating to the procedure surrounding the adoption of the decision terminating the applicant’s employment contract.
90      The statement of reasons referred to above – which may be brief, but is clear and unequivocal – enables the applicant to know the justification for the measure taken so as to be able to defend his rights, while also enabling the Courts of the European Union to exercise their power of review.
91      It is true that, in the acts at issue, Eulex Kosovo does not respond to all the arguments which had been raised by the applicant at the meeting of 7 November 2023 and in his internal appeal of 24 November 2023, respectively. However, it follows from the case-law cited in paragraphs
86 and
87 above that the administration is not required to adopt a position on all the arguments raised before it.
92      Consequently, the second plea must be dismissed as unfounded.
(c)    Fourth plea: infringement of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of sound administration and misuse of powers
93      The fourth plea is divided, in essence, into nine parts.
94      By the first part, the applicant alleges a lack of transparency in the process of abolishing the post he held and terminating his contract.
95      The second part alleges infringement of the principle of sound administration, on the basis that the abolition of the post held by the applicant was announced ‘at the last minute’.
96      The third part alleges infringement of Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, in that Eulex Kosovo did not consult the Staff Representatives.
97      By the fourth part, the applicant submits that Eulex Kosovo infringed the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of sound administration, on the basis that the abolished post and the newly created post are not significantly different.
98      The fifth part alleges infringement of the ‘competence and experience principles’ established by the SOP relating to reconfiguration.
99      The sixth part alleges an infringement of the principle of sound administration and an ‘abuse of authority’ resulting from the lack of any objective reason for abolishing the post held by the applicant.
100    By the seventh part, the applicant claims that Eulex Kosovo’s failure to offer him another post within the mission infringes the principle of sound administration and the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and demonstrates a misuse of powers.
101    The eighth part alleges, in essence, an infringement of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of sound administration resulting from the fact that the applicant and other members of staff whose posts were abolished were treated differently.
102    Lastly, the ninth part alleges an ‘abuse of authority’ and a ‘substantial mistake of fact’ under Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, in that the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo wished to ‘get rid’ of the applicant.
103    Eulex Kosovo contends that the fourth plea should be rejected.
104    The parts which are of a procedural nature, namely the first, second and third parts of the fourth plea, will be examined first.
105    It will then be necessary, secondly, to examine the parts concerning the reasons which led the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander to abolish the post held by the applicant and Eulex Kosovo to terminate his employment contract, and the reasons which, according to the applicant, should have prevented Eulex Kosovo from doing so, namely the fourth and sixth parts, which will be examined together, and then the ninth, fifth and seventh parts.
106    Lastly, the eighth part, alleging an infringement of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of sound administration, will be examined.
(1)    The first part of the fourth plea, alleging a lack of transparency
107    The applicant submits that the process that led to the termination of his employment contract took place in circumstances that lacked transparency.
108    In that regard, it should be recalled that pursuant to Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain the subject matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law. In that regard, according to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union are not required to respond to the arguments of a party which are not sufficiently clear and precise, in that they have not been expanded upon or accompanied by a specific line of argument intended to support them (see judgment of 12 October 2022, Paesen v EEAS, T‑88/21, EU:T:2022:631, paragraph 205 (not published) and the case-law cited). It must be stated that the applicant confines himself, as regards the first part of the fourth plea, to making a general claim which is not clearly developed, and that he does not explain, in particular, which elements of law and fact could provide a basis for that claim.
109    In those circumstances, the first part of the fourth plea does not comply with the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure and must be rejected as inadmissible.
(2)    The second part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration on the basis that the abolition of the post held by the applicant was announced ‘at the last minute’
110    The applicant claims that Eulex Kosovo infringed the principle of sound administration by publishing a call for contributions for the post of Knowledge and Information Management Officer on the Goalkeeper recruitment platform, intended for thousands of staff working for CSDP missions and possible external candidates, on 18 September 2023, only a few hours after informing him of the abolition of the post he held.
111    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
112    As stated in paragraph
75 above, the Courts of the European Union may reject as ineffective a plea or complaint where they find that it is not capable, in the event that it is well founded, of supporting the claim advanced, in this case that the acts at issue should be declared unlawful.
113    In the present case, even supposing that Eulex Kosovo was obliged to inform the applicant earlier of the publication of a call for contributions for the newly created post, a failure to comply with that obligation would not, as such, vitiate the legality of the acts at issue, which concern the termination of the applicant’s employment contract.
114    In any event, Article 17.1 of the applicant’s final employment contract expressly provided for one month’s notice of termination. The applicant does not rely on any other provision of or applicable to his employment contract or on any provision of the SOP relating to reconfiguration providing for him to be informed before the publication of a call for contributions for a specific post, even if, as in the present case, that post includes certain tasks which he was performing on the date of publication. Given that the applicant’s employment contract contains an express provision concerning notice, the applicant cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, rely on the principle of sound administration as giving rise to an obligation on Eulex Kosovo to provide information on a date prior to that laid down in that contract. Furthermore, the applicant has not even stated the date on which, according to him, he should have been informed of the publication of a call for contributions for the newly created post, or the extent to which his situation would have changed if he had been informed earlier. The publication in question did not, as such and automatically, entail the termination of his employment contract.
115    Consequently, the second part of the fourth plea must be dismissed as ineffective and in any event unfounded.
(3)    The third part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration in that Eulex Kosovo did not consult the Staff Committee
116    The applicant submits, referring to the judgment of 16 July 2015, Murariu v EIOPA (F‑116/14, EU:F:2015:89), that Eulex Kosovo infringed Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration by not consulting the Staff Committee before proposing the abolition of his post. That article does not provide for an exception on account of the confidentiality of the procedure. The applicant submits that Eulex Kosovo cannot argue that consulting the Staff Committee would have had no impact on the deployment plan, as such a line of argument would deprive the obligation laid down by the SOP and the case-law of any purpose.
117    According to the applicant, that fact constitutes a ‘substantial mistake’ as to the applicable regulations, within the meaning of Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration.
118    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
119    In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review and assess the legality of the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, including the decision to abolish the post held by the applicant. In any event, in the present action, the applicant’s admissible challenges relate only to the acts at issue, by which Eulex Kosovo terminated his contract and rejected his internal appeal against that termination (see paragraph
35 et seq. above).
120    In any event, according to Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, during a reconfiguration procedure, ‘whenever applicable, and in line with limitations arising from operational requirements, data protection and security concerns, the Staff Representatives and National Contingent Leaders/National Points of Contact, within their [respective mandates], will be consulted by the [m]ission on the process of organisational changes and the possible impact on the staff’ and ‘this consultation should include but not be limited to an explanation on the substantial changes to job descriptions and the consequences of such changes’.
121    It follows from the words ‘whenever applicable’ that, contrary to what the applicant claims, Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration does not lay down any obligation to consult the Staff Committee during a reorganisation procedure. Furthermore, Eulex Kosovo submits that it was not possible to consult that committee in the present case, given the confidentiality surrounding that procedure.
122    In addition, the applicant’s argument based on the judgment of 16 July 2015, Murariu v EIOPA (F‑116/14, EU:F:2015:89, paragraph 86), must be rejected, since the regulations applicable in the case which gave rise to that judgment provided for an obligation to consult the Staff Committee, which is not the case here.
123    Consequently, the third part of the fourth plea is unfounded.
(4)    The fourth part of the fourth plea, alleging an infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of sound administration, on the basis that the abolished post and the newly created post are not significantly different, and the sixth part of the fourth plea, alleging an infringement of the principle of sound administration and an ‘abuse of authority’ resulting from the lack of any objective reason for abolishing the post in question
124    By the fourth part of the fourth plea, the applicant submits that Eulex Kosovo had no valid reason to abolish the post he held. He states that the newly created post is not significantly different from the former post. No substantial change was made to the job description, within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration. The change to the job title was minor and the tasks and responsibilities, as well as the qualifications and experience required, were essentially the same as for the post he held. The applicant adds that the requirements concerning qualifications and experience for the former post were stricter.
125    The abolition of the post held by the applicant was not based on an operational needs assessment or on external factors.
126    The applicant submits that the decision to abolish the post he held and then to announce the creation of a new post with a slightly amended job title constitutes a breach of the principle of sound administration. The applicant states that the message informing him that his post was no longer provided for as part of the mission structure was misleading, and that this constitutes an infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of sound administration, and is evidence of the arbitrariness of the decision.
127    It also constitutes a ‘case of substantial mistake of fact’ pursuant to Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration.
128    By the sixth part of the fourth plea, the applicant submits that the reconfiguration of the post he held was not based on objective criteria. The new Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo was not in a position to objectively assess or make the case for the importance of knowledge management. Those circumstances demonstrate a breach of the principle of sound administration and a misuse of powers.
129    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
130    In the first place, as regards the argument that the newly created post was not significantly different from the post held by the applicant, it should be stated that the post held by the applicant was that of Knowledge Management Officer. The engagement regime applicable to that post was ‘seconded/contractual’. The professional experience required was five years.
131    By contrast, the engagement regime for the newly created post was that of ‘seconded’ staff only. As Eulex Kosovo pointed out at the hearing, that difference is important for two reasons. First, limiting the engagement regime to seconded staff reflects the desire of the Member States to increase the proportion of seconded staff within the mission. Secondly, that difference has a significant impact on the mission’s budget.
132    It follows that the difference referred to in paragraph
131 above is, in itself, sufficient to reject the applicant’s argument that the newly created post is not substantially different from the post he held.
133    In any event, it should be stated that there are other substantial differences between the two posts.
134    First, the newly created post is a Knowledge and Information Management post. Contrary to what the applicant suggests, that is not just a change of job title. It is apparent in particular from a comparison of the two job descriptions provided as Annexes A.6 and A.19 to the application that the newly created post includes substantial additional tasks relating to information management, such as developing an information strategy and contributing to the development of information management in the mission as a whole.
135    According to Eulex Kosovo, information management focuses on the organisation and storage of information, which requires, in particular, skills relating to archiving, indexing and record keeping. Knowledge management focuses on the analysis of data and of the information that is gleaned from that data and needs to be communicated to staff, which requires, in particular, analytical and advisory skills.
136    The arguments raised by the applicant in the reply, where he submits that information management is inherent in knowledge management and that, during the currency of his employment contract, he had also been responsible for information management, cannot succeed.
137    The applicant does not provide any evidence in support of his assertion that he carried out tasks relating to information management.
138    Furthermore, the applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate that the way in which the concepts of ‘information management’ and ‘knowledge management’ are understood by Eulex Kosovo – which is responsible for defining and specifying the responsibilities of its staff in accordance with the mission entrusted to it – is incorrect.
139    Secondly, the professional experience required for the newly created post is four years and is thus lower than that required for the post which the applicant held.
140    It follows that the newly created post has characteristics that differ significantly from those of the post held by the applicant in terms of responsibilities, experience required and engagement regime.
141    Consequently, the line of argument by which the applicant claims that the newly created post is not significantly different from the post he held must be rejected as factually incorrect.
142    In the second place, the arguments based on a breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of sound administration must, consequently and in any event, also be rejected, as they are based on the false premiss that the two posts were not substantially different.
143    In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument based on Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, it is sufficient to observe that that article relates to ‘substantial change[s] to [the] [j]ob [d]escription’ – that is, changes to an existing post which is not being abolished. In the present case, the post held by the applicant was not retained. By contrast, Article 4.1 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, which is headed ‘Elimination of a [s]pecific [p]ost from the [d]eployment [p]lan’, concerns the situation in which a post is abolished, as arose in the present case.
144    Consequently, the line of argument advanced by the applicant on the basis of Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration must be rejected, on the ground that that article is not applicable in the present case.
145    In any event, even if Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration were applicable in the present case, it must be observed that that article allows the termination of a contract if there is a substantial change to the job description. According to that article, that procedure for terminating a contract applies even if the current holder of the post matches the new profile.
146    It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs
130 to 140 above that the differences between the newly created post and the post held by the applicant, particularly when taken together, are significant, such that they constitute a substantial change to the job description.
147    In the fourth place, as regards the applicant’s argument that there was no objective reason to abolish the post he occupied, it has already been held in paragraph
37 et seq. above that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review and assess the legality of the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, including the decision to abolish the post held by the applicant.
148    In any event, in the present action, the applicant’s admissible challenges relate only to the acts at issue, and not to the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, which provided for the abolition of the post he held (see paragraph
35 et seq. above).
149    Consequently, the applicant’s argument must be rejected.
150    Furthermore, even supposing that the lack of an objective reason for the changes to the deployment plan, as proposed by Eulex Kosovo and adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, could call into question the legality of the acts at issue, it must be stated that the very nature of Eulex Kosovo – inasmuch as its ultimate fate is to cease to exist – necessarily determines the temporary nature of the conditions of employment of its staff (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2021, Jenkinson v Council and Others, T‑602/15 RENV, EU:T:2021:764, paragraph 181). Thus, as the applicant seems to acknowledge explicitly, the Council, the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander and Eulex Kosovo have the right to reorganise the mission, as is also apparent from Article 17 of the applicant’s final employment contract. According to that article, the contract may be terminated on one month’s notice. The cases of termination mentioned in Article 17.2 of that contract, in which the Council decides to close or downsize the mission, are only examples. Moreover, the existence of the SOP relating to reconfiguration demonstrates the need for restructuring.
151    Furthermore, the arguments raised by the applicant cannot call into question the objective nature of the reasons put forward by Eulex Kosovo for abolishing the post he held.
152    First, and contrary to what the applicant seems to suggest, Eulex Kosovo’s explanation that it had been decided that his tasks no longer justified a full-time position is neither new nor inadmissible. Even if Eulex Kosovo had not established that that explanation had been given at the interview of 2 October 2023, it is inherent in the fact that the newly created post combines the tasks associated with the post which the applicant held with other tasks.
153    Secondly, the applicant’s argument that the percentage of seconded staff at Eulex Kosovo has always fluctuated and has never reached the target of 80% does not call into question the reason put forward by Eulex Kosovo in that regard. In a situation in which that percentage is not reached, every post that is assigned to a seconded staff member rather than a contracted staff member contributes to achieving the 80% target. Consequently, that argument is ineffective. The same is true of the applicant’s arguments that that objective is impossible to achieve, that such objectives have never been achieved, that Eulex Kosovo continues to recruit contracted staff, and that certain posts held by seconded staff have also been abolished. Such circumstances, even if established, would not call into question the objective nature of the efforts made to achieve the target rate of 80%.
154    Thirdly, the applicant’s arguments relating to the identified need for information management have all been rejected in paragraph
134 et seq. above.
155    In the fifth place, the arguments alleging misuse of powers will be dealt with in addressing the ninth part of the fourth plea.
156    Consequently, the fourth and sixth parts of the fourth
plea must be rejected.
(5)    The ninth part of the fourth plea, alleging ‘abuse of authority’ and a ‘substantial mistake of fact’ under Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, in that the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo wished to ‘get rid’ of the applicant
157    The applicant submits that the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo’s proposal to abolish the post he held constitutes either a ‘substantial mistake of fact’ or an ‘abuse of authority’ under Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration.
158    He states that the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo wanted to ‘get rid’ of him. First, the applicant had witnessed and been closely involved in a major conflict between the Chief of Staff and the section in which the applicant worked, which had had humiliating consequences for the Chief of Staff. Secondly, the applicant had assisted the Chair of the Staff Committee and shared ideas on how the employment conditions of contracted staff could be improved. Thirdly, according to the applicant, the Chief of Staff had little awareness of the importance of knowledge management or of the applicant’s past record in that field.
159    The applicant also states that it is difficult to fill the extremely specialised post he held. It was foreseeable that no qualified member of the seconded staff would be found who met the requirements. Furthermore, the applicant had acquired institutional knowledge over a period of more than five and a half years which is now lost to Eulex Kosovo.
160    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
161    In that regard, it should be recalled that the concept of misuse of powers has a very precise meaning and encompasses the use by an administrative authority of its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred upon it. An act is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent factors, to have been adopted with the purpose of achieving ends other than those stated. In that regard, it is not sufficient to refer to certain facts in support of claims; evidence of a sufficiently specific, objective and consistent nature must also be adduced to support their truth or, at the very least, their probability, failing which the material accuracy of the statements of the institution concerned cannot be challenged. Thus, the overall assessment of evidence of misuse of powers cannot be based on mere assertions or on evidence that is insufficiently clear or is neither objective nor relevant (judgment of 7 June 2018, OW v EASA, T‑597/16, not published, EU:T:2018:338, paragraph 98).
162    In the present case, the applicant simply presumes that the Chief of Staff wanted to ‘get rid’ of him on account, in particular, of the fact that he had perceived a situation which had arisen at work as humiliating for the Chief of Staff and on account of the applicant’s cooperation with the Staff Committee. However, the applicant does not put forward any objective element or indeed any evidence to support that presumption. Moreover, he does not even refer to a situation in which the Chief of Staff treated him with hostility. The assertion that the Chief of Staff had little awareness of the importance of knowledge management or of the applicant’s record is also unsubstantiated.
163    In those circumstances, the applicant’s mere assertions cannot call into question the accuracy of those of Eulex Kosovo that the revised deployment plan including the abolition of the post which the applicant held was based on operational needs and not on personal considerations.
164    As regards the arguments relating to the alleged difficulties in finding a member of seconded staff for the newly created post, it is sufficient to note that such difficulties, even if established, would not call into question the legality of the acts at issue, by which the applicant’s contract was terminated and the internal appeal against that termination was rejected. The issue of whether Eulex Kosovo is able to fill the newly created post has no legal connection with the issue of whether the termination of the applicant’s employment contract was unlawful.
165    Consequently, the ninth part of the fourth plea must be rejected.
(6)    The fifth part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principles of competence and experience
166    The applicant submits that in abolishing the post he held, Eulex Kosovo failed to comply with the principle, laid down in Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, that selections must be based on relevant competence and experience, respecting the principle of non-discrimination. He states in particular that Eulex Kosovo disregarded the ‘institutional memory’ that he had accumulated in a highly specialised position, his skills, expertise and professional experience. The Chief of Staff did not explain why he had identified the applicant’s post as redundant.
167    In the reply, the applicant submits that he intended to allege an infringement of the introductory wording of Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, and not an infringement of Article 4.2 of that SOP.
168    The applicant argues that that circumstance constitutes a ‘substantial mistake of fact’ within the meaning of Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration.
169    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
170    In so far as the applicant challenges, in the fifth part of the fourth plea, the decision to abolish the post he held, that part must be rejected on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction and that it is ineffective in the context of the present action (see paragraph
32 et seq. above).
171    If the applicant’s arguments are to be understood as relating to the termination of his employment contract, the following must be stated.
172    In the first place, the argument concerning Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration must be rejected. That article is not applicable to the present case, which concerns the abolition – not the modification – of a post, as stated in paragraphs
142 and 144 above.
173    In the second place, the introductory wording of Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration states that, in a reconfiguration, Eulex Kosovo must comply with the principle that ‘selections should be based on relevant competence and experience’.
174    It may be necessary to make a choice between several candidates where, in particular, there has been a substantial change to the job description, within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, a reconfiguration of several posts with the same job description, within the meaning of Article 4.3 of that SOP, a merger of several posts, within the meaning of Article 4.4 of that SOP, or the creation of a new post, within the meaning of Article 4.6 of that SOP.
175    Where, as in the present case, a specific post has been abolished, there is no selection
between several candidates in the context of which Eulex Kosovo could be required to comply with the principle that selections must be based on relevant competence and experience.
176    Consequently, the fifth part of the fourth plea must be dismissed.
(7)    The seventh part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration and of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and misuse of powers, in that Eulex Kosovo should have offered the applicant another post within the mission
177    The applicant submits that Eulex Kosovo should have used reasonable efforts to reassign him, particularly in view of the fact that he had been in post for an uninterrupted period of four and a half years. Its failure to do so constitutes an infringement of the principle of sound administration and the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff, and is evidence of a misuse of powers.
178    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
179    In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant’s employment contract does not impose any obligation on Eulex Kosovo to avoid termination by finding other posts for him.
180    Article 4.1 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration indicates in that regard that, in the event of a specific post being removed from the deployment plan, as occurred in the present case, the employment of a contracted member of staff may be terminated before the expiry of the contract provided that prior notice is given in accordance with the OPLAN and the employment contract. Neither that provision, nor any other provision of that SOP, nor any other contractual provision imposes an obligation on Eulex Kosovo to avoid termination by finding other posts for the staff member concerned within the mission. Nor does such an obligation arise from the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff, since such an approach would amount to giving the applicant a right of priority which is not provided for and which would undermine the interests of other members of staff wishing to see their own employment contracts renewed or hoping to be successful in selection procedures opened for vacant posts (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282, paragraph 135). Furthermore, to recognise such an obligation would run counter to the very nature of Eulex Kosovo, inasmuch as its ultimate fate is to cease to exist, and to the temporary nature of the conditions of employment of its staff, referred to in paragraph
150 above.
181    Thus, a failure ‘to use efforts’ on the part of Eulex Kosovo in that regard, if it were established, would not constitute a breach of the principle of sound administration, a breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff, or a misuse of powers.
(8)    The eighth part of the fourth plea, alleging an infringement of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of sound administration, on the basis that other members of staff whose posts were abolished were treated differently
182    The applicant submits that the process of terminating his employment contract was unfair, as the majority of the other international posts affected by the 2023 reconfiguration of Eulex Kosovo were not terminated until six months later, namely on 15 June 2024. The members of staff concerned were informed of that termination in advance.
183    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
184    As a preliminary point, it should be stated that, in this eighth part of the fourth plea, the applicant is alleging, in essence, an infringement of the principle of equal treatment.
185    In that regard, it must be stated that the implementation of the two-stage reconfiguration is a direct result of the revised deployment plan. As has been stated in paragraph
37 et seq. above, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review and assess the legality of the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander.
186    In any event, it must be borne in mind that the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, of which the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter is a particular expression (see judgment of 29 October 2020, Veselības ministrija, C‑243/19, EU:C:2020:872, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
187    According to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, whether the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment (see judgment of 29 October 2020, Veselības ministrija, C‑243/19, EU:C:2020:872, C‑243/19, EU:C:2020:872, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
188    The requirement that situations must be comparable, for the purpose of determining whether there is a breach of the principle of equal treatment, must be assessed in the light of all the elements that characterise them and, in particular, in the light of the subject matter and purpose of the act that makes the distinction in question. To that end, the principles and objectives of the field to which the act relates must be taken into account. If the situations are not comparable, a difference in the treatment of the situations concerned is not in breach of equality before the law as enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter (judgment of 2 September 2021, État belge (Right of residence in the event of domestic violence), C‑930/19, EU:C:2021:657, paragraph 58).
189    In the present case, it must be stated that the other posts which were abolished have a different profile from that held by the applicant. The post held by the applicant was the only Knowledge Management Officer post. Thus, the situation in which the applicant found himself was not comparable to that of the members of staff who occupied the other posts, in particular as regards operational needs. Eulex Kosovo submits, without demur from the applicant on this point, that the other posts related to security, which is why it was decided to abolish them six months later in order to avoid deficiencies in the safety and security arrangements of Eulex Kosovo.
190    Consequently, the eighth part of the fourth plea must be rejected, and with it the fourth plea in its entirety.
(d)    Third plea: infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations
191    The applicant claims that, by terminating his contract, Eulex Kosovo infringed the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. He submits that he relied on various precise, unconditional and consistent assurances, given to him between June 2023 and August 2023, that his job was not at risk.
192    First, at a barbecue on 12 June 2023, the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo assured the applicant that the rumours that his contract would be terminated at the end of the year were only rumours and that his position was safe.
193    Secondly, on 15 June 2023, Eulex Kosovo extended the applicant’s contract for two additional years until 14 June 2025. That was the first time that the applicant had obtained an employment contract for a period of two years.
194    Thirdly, the applicant, relying on Annex A.12 to the application, claims that, on 23 June 2023, at a meeting between the section in which he worked and the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo, the Chief of Staff assured him that his position was safe and informed him that the new Head of Mission ‘[put] a lot of importance’ on knowledge management.
195    Fourthly, on 27 June 2023, the new Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo addressed all members of staff at an open meeting. The applicant submits that the new Head of Mission stated on that occasion that Eulex Kosovo had no budget problems, that it was only infrastructure costs that were to be optimised, that there would be no impact on staff, that the strength of the mission would remain the same, that there would be no impact on the various forms of employment and that the adjustment to the mission was driven by the CSDP Compact.
196    Fifthly, on 13 and 14 July 2023, the applicant was designated as Eulex Kosovo’s point of contact for the ‘Knowledge Management Network’ set up by the EEAS Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability.
197    Sixthly, in August 2023, the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo asked the applicant to set up a meeting with the new Head of Mission about the role of knowledge management and the future Knowledge Management Network to be hosted by the EEAS Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. According to the applicant, that was a sign that the Chief of Staff had realised how important the topic of knowledge management and his post were. The applicant, relying on Annex A.12 to the application, states that, during that meeting, which took place on 21 August 2023, the Head of Mission emphasised the importance of knowledge management for Eulex Kosovo. He asked the applicant to keep him informed of further steps. The Head of Mission also said that it was necessary to ensure that the section in which the applicant worked had at least one local staff member at its disposal so that the applicant could accomplish his tasks.
198    In reliance on those assurances that he would remain employed by the Eulex Kosovo mission until at least June 2025, the applicant renewed the lease of his accommodation, purchased a vehicle in September 2023 and did not look for another job.
199    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
200    In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is among the fundamental principles of the European Union (judgment of 5 May 1981, Dürbeck, 112/80, EU:C:1981:94, paragraph 48). The right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations presupposes, first, that precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised, reliable sources have been given to the person concerned by the competent authorities of the European Union. By contrast, a person may not plead breach of that principle unless he or she has been given those assurances (see judgment of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission, C‑584/17 P, EU:C:2020:576, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). Secondly, those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom they are addressed. Thirdly, the assurances given must comply with the applicable rules (see judgment of 7 November 2019, WN v Parliament, T‑431/18, not published, EU:T:2019:781, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).
201    The first of the conditions referred to in paragraph
200 above is not met in the present case.
202    In the first place, the applicant’s employment contract provided, without any ambiguity, for the possibility of terminating that contract by giving one month’s written notice stating the reason for the termination (see paragraphs
6 and 7 above).
203    In the second place, it is apparent from the file that the then Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo informed all mission staff, by email of 2 June 2023, of the ‘new mandate and contracts’, and of the fact that new two-year employment contracts would be offered to all contracted staff, with the caveat
that, if the new deployment plan that was to be drawn up led to the abolition of a post, the contract of the staff member concerned would be terminated with a notice period.
204    In the third place, and having regard, in particular, to what has been stated in paragraphs
202 and 203 above, the fact that the applicant’s employment contract was extended in June 2023 for a period of two years cannot be equated with a precise, unconditional and consistent assurance that his employment contract would not be terminated.
205    In the fourth place, neither the fact that tasks were assigned to the applicant during the currency of his employment contract (see paragraph
196 above), nor the fact that, according to the applicant, the Head of Mission or Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo regarded knowledge management as important (see paragraphs
194 and 197 above), nor the fact that, according to the applicant, the Head of Mission stated that at least one local staff member should be provided for those tasks, nor the fact that, according to the applicant, the Chief of Staff dismissed rumours about the termination of the applicant’s employment contract (see paragraph
192 above) can be equated with precise, unconditional and consistent assurances, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph
200 above, that the applicant’s employment contract would not be terminated.
206    In the fifth place, the statements made by the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo on 27 June 2023, reproduced in Annex A.20 to the application, also cannot be treated as a precise, unconditional and consistent assurance that the applicant’s employment contract would not be terminated. Those statements are general and vague and it is apparent from that annex that the Head of Mission observed that there would be no impact on the overall manpower of Eulex Kosovo, that the total number of staff in the mission would be the same as under the previous mandate, and that there was no reason ‘for the time being’ for there to be an impact on the different forms of employment. It is apparent from the same annex that the Head of Mission also stated that it would be presumptuous of him to say that he was in a position, only one day after his appointment, to answer all the questions of the members of staff, and that he could only read and understand the OPLAN and announce, first of all, that Eulex Kosovo’s two-year mandate had been renewed.
207    That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s assertion, disputed by Eulex Kosovo, that the head of the mission’s human resources division stated that she had considered the ‘promises [made by the Head of Mission] shortly after his arrival [to be] problematic’. First, that statement does not specify what was ‘promised’. Secondly, the mere fact that the alleged ‘promise’ was described as ‘problematic’ does not mean that it amounted to a precise, unconditional and consistent assurance within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph
200 above. Thirdly, and in any event, an interpretation of the Head of Mission’s statements by the head of the human resources division does not amount to an unconditional assurance.
208    In the sixth place, with regard to the evidence from the applicant’s former colleague, provided as Annex A.12 to the application, according to which the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo assured the applicant that his position was safe (see paragraph 194 above), the following must be stated. First, that fact, which is disputed by Eulex Kosovo, would, if proved, be isolated. It is the only matter relied on by the applicant that directly and explicitly concerns the continued existence of his post. Secondly, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Chief of Staff cannot be regarded as a competent authority in that regard. The fact that the Chief of Staff was his line manager does not alter the fact that the decision to abolish his post was adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander. Moreover, the email from the Head of Mission referred to in paragraph 203 above expressly stated that, if the new deployment plan that was to be drawn up led to the abolition of a post, the staff member concerned would be informed of termination with prior notice. The new deployment plan had not been adopted when the Chief of Staff allegedly assured the applicant that the post he held would continue to exist.
209    In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument based on the evidence of his former colleague must be rejected, and there is no need to determine whether the Chief of Staff assured the applicant that his position was safe.
210    It follows from all of the foregoing that the third plea, and consequently the first two principal heads of claim, must be rejected.
4.      The third principal head of claim, seeking compensation for the material and non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant
211    The applicant seeks compensation for the material damage suffered, comprising loss of income resulting from the allegedly unlawful termination of his employment contract, up to the expiry of that contract, which represents 19 months of salary and emoluments. He states that he was unable to find alternative employment, despite applying to numerous EU and United Nations missions. He states that he did not receive any unemployment benefit.
212    As regards the non-material damage allegedly caused, the applicant describes repercussions on his health and his psychological balance. First, he suffered migraine attacks and chronic insomnia. Secondly, intense stress also profoundly affected his wife. Thirdly, the applicant had strong feelings of injustice and anxiety.
213    The applicant also submits that his dignity, reputation and career prospects were affected. First, according to the applicant, if his employment contract had not been terminated, he would have had the opportunity to continue working for Eulex Kosovo or other missions. Secondly, he finds it humiliating that the newly created post remains vacant and that no suitable candidate has been found. Thirdly, he suffered separate damage as a result of having to undertake pre-litigation and litigation procedures to secure recognition of his rights.
214    The applicant submits that he is not obliged to produce evidence in order for his non-material damage to be recognised, arguing that this follows from an application by analogy of the principles established by the judgment of 18 November 2020, H v Council (T‑271/10 RENV II, EU:T:2020:548).
215    The applicant submits that the damage referred to above is the direct consequence of unlawful acts of Eulex Kosovo which vitiate the acts at issue, such as:
–        first, the abolition of the post he held and the termination of his employment contract despite the assurances he received;
–        secondly, the failure to consult the Staff Committee;
–        thirdly, the failure to hear the applicant;
–        fourthly, the fact that he was not informed
until after the post he held had been abolished, on the same day on which the newly created post was advertised;
–        fifthly, the failure to state adequate reasons for the abolition of the post he held;
–        sixthly, the pretence that the newly created post was significantly different from the abolished post;
–        seventhly, the fact that no attempt was made to reassign him to a different post;
–        eighthly, misuse of powers.
216    The applicant submits that the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and the requirement for a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on him are not applicable in the context of contractual liability.
217    The applicant assesses the non-material damage suffered, ex aequo et bono, at EUR 45 000.
218    Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments.
219    It must be stated that it is apparent from the assessment of the four pleas raised in support of the first and second principal heads of claim that the applicant is wrong in alleging that Eulex Kosovo breached contractual provisions and general principles of EU law and the Charter by the acts referred to in paragraph
215 above.
220    Accordingly, the applicant’s claim for compensation in respect of contractual loss, which is advanced as a principal claim under the third head of claim, must be dismissed as unfounded.
C.      The alternative heads of claim based on Articles 263 and 268 TFEU
221    In the first place, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, an action for annulment based on Article 263 TFEU is available in respect of all acts adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to produce binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of the applicant by bringing about a significant change in his or her legal position (see judgment of 25 June 2020, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑730/18 P, EU:C:2020:505, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
222    Nonetheless, where there is a contract between the applicant and one of the institutions, an action may be brought before the Courts of the European Union on the basis of Article 263 TFEU only if the contested act is intended to produce binding legal effects which are outside the contractual relationship between the parties and which involve the exercise of prerogatives of a public authority conferred on the contracting institution in its capacity as an administrative authority (see judgment of 25 June 2020, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑730/18 P, EU:C:2020:505, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
223    Therefore, where, as in the present case, the applicant and the defendant are bound by a contract, the court with jurisdiction in respect of the contract has jurisdiction in principle. The situation referred to in paragraph
222 above is therefore an exception to that principle, so that the conditions governing it must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraph 30).
224    As stated in paragraph
22 above, the present action concerns the termination of the contract at issue and the rejection of the internal appeal against that termination, which are contractual in nature. Such acts are therefore not intended to produce binding legal effects outside the contractual relationship between the applicant and Eulex Kosovo and involving the exercise by the latter of prerogatives of a public authority. Consequently, those acts cannot be regarded as subject to an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraph 40).
225    The application brought in the alternative under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of the acts at issue must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible.
226    In the second place, it must be stated that there is a genuine contractual context surrounding the applicant’s claim for compensation, having regard in particular to the contractual nature of the acts said to have caused the alleged damage and the nature of the alleged material and non-material damage, such that that claim falls within the scope of the European Union’s contractual liability. Consequently, the claim for damages which the applicant advances, in the alternative, on the basis of Article 268 TFEU, and which has as its object the non-contractual liability of the European Union for the actions of Eulex Kosovo, must be rejected as inadmissible.
D.      The application for measures of inquiry
227    The applicant requests, by way of measures of inquiry as referred to in Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure, first, that he appear in person and, second, that his colleague, who is able to give evidence of the assurances given by the Chief of Staff and the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo at the meetings of 23 June 2023 and 21 August 2023, be heard as a witness.
228    Eulex Kosovo opposes the hearing of the applicant as a witness.
229    In that regard, it must be recalled that the Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it concerning the cases before it (see judgment of 22 November 2007, Sniace v Commission, C‑260/05 P, EU:C:2007:700, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
230    It is therefore for the Court to assess first, whether a request for the appearance in person or for the examination of witnesses is relevant to the subject matter of the dispute and, second, whether it is necessary to order the appearance in person or to examine the witnesses named
(see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2007, Sniace v Commission, C‑260/05 P, EU:C:2007:700, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
231    In the present case, besides the fact that the applicant has not explained, in accordance with Article 88(2) of the Rules of Procedure, why his applications for measures of inquiry were not made until after the close of the written part of the procedure, it must be observed that the information in the file and the explanations given at the hearing are sufficient to enable the Court to adjudicate, given that it has been able to give a useful ruling on the basis of the forms of order sought and the pleas in law and arguments put forward during the proceedings, and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties.
232    There is therefore no need for the measures of inquiry sought by the applicant.
233    In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed.
IV.    Costs
234    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
235    However, according to Article 135(1) of the Rules of Procedure, if equity so requires, the Court may decide that an unsuccessful party is to pay only a proportion of the costs of the other party in addition to bearing his or her own, or even that he or she is not to be ordered to pay any.
236    It follows from the grounds set out above that the applicant is the unsuccessful party. Furthermore, Eulex Kosovo expressly claimed in its pleadings that the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs. However, as the circumstances of the present case justify the application of Article 135(1) of the Rules of Procedure, it is appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders DT and Eulex Kosovo each to bear their own costs.
Svenningsen
Mac Eochaidh
Laitenberger
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 January 2026.
V. Di Bucci
M. van der Woude
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.