JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)
12 November 2025 (*)
( Commercial policy – Dumping – Imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran and Russia – Imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties – Article 11(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 – Manifest error of assessment )
In Case T‑110/24,
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, established in São Paulo (Brazil),
Lusosider-Aços Planos S. A., established in Seixal (Portugal),
represented by L. Catrain González, F. Pili and V. Ciudin, lawyers,
applicants,
v
European Commission, represented by J. Zieliński, L. Di Masi and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of R. da Silva Passos, President, N. Półtorak (Rapporteur) and T. Pynnä, Judges,
Registrar: M. Zwozdziak-Carbonne, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 15 May 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (‘CSN’) and Lusosider-Aços Planos S. A. (‘Lusosider’), seek the annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2758 of 12 December 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2023/2758; ‘the contested regulation’), in its entirety or in so far as it concerns the applicants.
Background to the dispute
2        CSN is the largest fully integrated steel producer in Brazil. In 2003, CSN acquired 50% of the shares in Lusosider, established in Portugal, and then, in 2005, the remaining 50%. CSN manufactures cold-rolled, hot-rolled, galvanised and tinplate steel products. Its exports of hot-rolled steel coils to the European Union are for Lusosider’s exclusive use.
3        On 7 July 2016, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports into the European Union of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine (‘the original investigation’) on the basis of Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21; ‘the basic regulation’).
4        On 5 October 2017, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine and terminating the investigation on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Serbia (OJ 2017 L 258, p. 24). That anti-dumping duty (‘the original measures’) was adopted on the basis of Article 9(4) of the basic regulation.
5        The original measures expired on 7 October 2022.
6        By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ 2019 L 31, p. 27), the Commission imposed a safeguard measure with regard to certain steel products (‘the safeguard measure’).
7        On 18 January 2021, following a request lodged by the European Steel Association (Eurofer), the Commission initiated a partial interim review limited in scope to an examination of dumping as far as one Russian producer, PAO Severstal, was concerned. However, on 18 March 2022, Eurofer withdrew its request and the review investigation was subsequently terminated by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/624 of 12 April 2022 terminating the partial interim review of anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Russia (OJ 2022 L 115, p. 185).
8        On 21 January 2022, the Commission published a notice relating to the impending expiry of the original measures and received a request for an expiry review of those measures pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic regulation.
9        On 4 July 2022, Eurofer submitted a request for an expiry review on the grounds that the expiry of the original measures would likely result in the recurrence and continuation of dumping and the recurrence of injury to the EU industry.
10      On 5 October 2022, having established that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review in relation to the original measures, the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports to the European Union of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic regulation.
11      The Commission selected a representative group of three EU producers that accounted for 25% of the estimated total production volumes and 26% of sales of the like product within the European Union. As regards importers, no unrelated importer replied to the request for information specified in the notice of initiation intended to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling was necessary. Concerning the Brazilian producers, following information provided by the producers that agreed to be in the sample, the Commission selected a sample of two groups of producers made up of three producers, covering 98% of the total export volume to the European Union from Brazil in the review investigation period (‘the RIP’).
12      The investigation into the continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the RIP, defined as the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022. The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2019 to the end of the RIP, namely 30 June 2022.
13      On 11 November 2022, the Brazilian Government and Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais S. A. submitted their observations, claiming in essence that the potential injurious effects of the Brazilian imports should not be assessed cumulatively with the effects of the imports of the other countries subject to investigation and that there was no likelihood of recurrence of injury stemming from Brazilian imports.
14      On 23 November 2022, Eurofer withdrew its request for an expiry review investigation as far as Ukraine was concerned. The Commission subsequently, on 16 February 2023, after prior disclosure to all interested parties, decided to terminate the expiry review investigation as far as imports from Ukraine were concerned, in accordance with Article 9(1) of the basic regulation, and to continue the review investigation regarding imports from Brazil, Iran and Russia.
15      On 25 October 2023, the Commission disclosed the facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping duties in force. The comments made by interested parties on that information were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate.
16      On 8 November 2023, CSN submitted its comments on the Commission’s general disclosure document.
17      On 12 December 2023, the Commission adopted the contested regulation whereby, on the basis of a finding of continuation of dumping and the likelihood of recurrence of injury, it extended the original measures.
18      The expiry review investigation also confirmed that the following met the definition of the like product: products that have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses, namely the product concerned when exported to the European Union; the product under review produced and sold on the domestic market of Brazil, Iran and Russia; the product under review produced and sold by the exporting producers to the rest of the world; and the product under review produced and sold in the European Union by the EU industry.
Forms of order sought
19      The applicants claim that the Court should:
–        annul the contested regulation in its entirety or in so far as it concerns the applicants;
–        order the Commission to pay the costs.
20      The Commission contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicants to pay the costs.
Law
21      In support of their action, the applicants put forward four pleas in law. The first plea alleges that the contested regulation was adopted on the wrong legal basis, disregarding the fundamental change of circumstances since the adoption of the original measures. The second plea alleges that the Commission’s assessment of the likelihood of recurrence of injury is based on manifest errors of assessment of the facts. The third plea alleges that the Commission’s asymmetric assessment of captive sales leads to an incorrect calculation of the market share of imports and fails to observe the principle of non-discrimination. Lastly, the fourth plea alleges a failure to state reasons for the contested regulation in so far as that regulation does not meet the requirements laid down in Article 296 TFEU.
22      It is appropriate to begin by examining the fourth plea.
The fourth plea, alleging a failure to state reasons for the contested regulation
23      The applicants argue that the contested regulation infringes the obligation to state reasons on at least four accounts.
24      In the first place, the applicants submit that the contested regulation does not adequately explain the reasons why the Commission concluded that it is ‘likely that the exporting producers from the countries concerned would increase their export sales to the [European] Union’, especially in relation to Brazil. At the same time, they maintain that the Commission also found that ‘both sampled producers in Brazil operated almost at full capacity during the [RIP]’, which therefore leaves almost no room for Brazilian exports of hot-rolled flat products to the European Union to increase.
25      In the second place, the applicants submit that the contested regulation provides extremely vague reasoning in relation to the EU industry’s ‘fragile’ situation.
26      In the third place, the applicants submit that the contested regulation does not adequately explain why the EU sanctions against Russia and the safeguard measure are not taken into account in the Commission’s forward-looking analysis on the likelihood of injury occurring.
27      In the fourth place, the applicants submit that the Commission, when considering the extension of the original measures, failed to take into account the interests of Lusosider, which imports CSN’s hot-rolled flat products for further processing.
28      The Commission disputes that line of argument.
29      It is clear from the case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the contested measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to defend their rights and the Court to exercise its power of review. However, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question as to whether it meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 2 October 2024, CCCME and Others v Commission, T‑263/22, EU:T:2024:663, paragraph 261 and the case-law cited).
30      In particular, the statement of the reasons on which anti-dumping regulations are based is not required to specify the often very numerous and complex matters of fact and law dealt with in the regulations, provided that they fall within the general scheme of the body of measures of which they form part. It is sufficient for the reasoning of the institutions in the regulations to appear clearly and unequivocally (judgment of 6 July 2022, Zhejiang Hangtong Machinery Manufacture and Ningbo Hi-Tech Zone Tongcheng Auto Parts v Commission, T‑278/20, EU:T:2022:417, paragraph 99).
31      The statement of the reasons on which regulations, which are measures of general application, are based does not have to specify the often very numerous and complex matters of fact or law dealt with in the regulations. Consequently, if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical choices made by that institution (judgment of 30 April 2015, VTZ and Others v Council, T‑432/12, not published, EU:T:2015:248, paragraph 191).
32      In that regard, in the first place, the applicants claim that the contested regulation does not adequately explain why the Commission concluded that it was likely that the exporting producers in Brazil would increase their export sales to the European Union should the measures be allowed to lapse.
33      It is apparent from the recitals of the contested regulation that the Commission first examined whether it was likely that Brazilian exports at dumped prices to the European Union would increase should measures be allowed to lapse, by comparing the domestic and export prices of Brazilian producers with the prices charged by the EU industry (recital 79 of the contested regulation). The investigation revealed that the domestic prices of Brazilian producers were generally higher than those of the EU industry, with the exception of those of one producer in 2020 (recital 80 of that regulation). By contrast, Brazilian exports to third countries were sold at prices that were on average 12% lower than those in the European Union, demonstrating a tendency to export at lower prices (recital 81 thereof). Furthermore, a comparison of export prices to those third countries with the Brazilian normal value revealed a difference of around 20%, indicating the likelihood of dumping in the absence of measures (see recital 82 of that regulation). Moreover, Brazilian producers have increased their exports to the European Union at dumped prices, suggesting that those imports would have continued to increase in the absence of measures (see recital 83 of the contested regulation). Although the majority of their sales are on the domestic market, Brazilian producers have increased their sales to the European Union, even though their domestic prices are higher (recital 85 of that regulation). The Commission then rejected the arguments of the Brazilian Government, which relied on focus in local markets, limited capacity, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (‘the CBAM’) and the existence of EU safeguard measures. Lastly, it noted that the EU market remained attractive and that the spare production capacity would not prevent an increase in Brazilian exports to the European Union (recitals 86 and 87 of the contested regulation).
34      The Commission therefore set out the reasons on which its assessment was based, indicating in particular the predominant role of the price difference between the EU market and other outlets, the history of Brazilian exports to the European Union, even at prices often close to dumping, and the link between the possible end of the original measures and the possibility for Brazilian exporters to gain or regain market share in the European Union.
35      In the second place, the applicants submit that the contested regulation provides too vague a statement of reasons as to the ‘fragile’ situation of the EU industry.
36      In that regard, it is apparent from the recitals of the contested regulation that modest price undercutting, combined with large volumes of imports of hot-rolled flat products, can rapidly cause material injury to the EU industry (recital 201 of the contested regulation). Moreover, it is stated that the EU industry, still fragile after the losses suffered as a result of the COVID‑19 pandemic, is likely to suffer material injury if imports at dumped prices from Brazil, Iran and Russia continue or recur (recital 202 of that regulation). Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais and CSN had challenged that assessment, relying on an improvement in profitability despite the increase in imports. However, the Commission rejected those claims, considering that, without a renewal of the original measures, Brazil would exert price pressure. According to the Commission, that situation therefore justifies the maintenance of the anti-dumping measures (recitals 203 and 204 of the contested regulation).
37      Thus, the Commission sufficiently specified the reasons why it considered the EU industry still vulnerable and potentially exposed to a risk of rapid injury should imports, if those imports were undervalued, be resumed.
38      In the third place, the applicants submit that the contested regulation does not adequately explain why the EU sanctions against Russia and the safeguard measure concerning hot-rolled flat products were not taken into account in the Commission’s forward-looking analysis on the likelihood of injury occurring.
39      In that regard, the Commission states, in recital 14 of the contested regulation, that the sanctions referred to did not entirely prevent imports from Russia during the RIP, since certain prohibitions did not apply to existing contracts and others entered into force after that period. Moreover, since the sanctions are unpredictable in terms of scope and duration, they do not preclude the initiation of a review investigation or have a bearing on the conclusions on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. According to the Commission, the Russian authorities did not provide evidence that the resumption of dumped imports from Russia would require a lot of time and effort.
40      Thus, since the Commission expressly explained why it had considered that the sanctions did not prevent the recurrence of dumping and injury, it cannot validly be maintained that the statement of reasons in the contested regulation is not sufficient in that regard.
41      Lastly, in the fourth place, the applicants criticise the Commission for failing to take into account, when assessing the interest of the European Union, the interests of Lusosider, which imports CSN’s hot-rolled flat products for further processing.
42      In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU is an essential procedural requirement that must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which goes to the substantive legality of the measure at issue (judgment of 11 September 2014, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v Council, T‑444/11, EU:T:2014:773, paragraph 343 and the case-law cited).
43      In so far as, by their line of argument, the applicants are in fact seeking to challenge the merits of the contested regulation, and not its statement of reasons, that line of argument will be dealt with in the analysis of the merits of the contested regulation.
44      Having regard to the foregoing, the fourth plea in law must be rejected.
The first plea, alleging that the contested regulation was adopted on the wrong legal basis, disregarding the fundamental change of circumstances since the adoption of the original measures
45      The applicants submit that Article 11(2) of the basic regulation does not constitute the appropriate legal basis for the extension of the original measures.
46      The applicants argue that there was a fundamental change of circumstances between the original investigation and the expiry review investigation. In particular, Russia and Ukraine, two of the four countries covered by the original measures, were seriously affected by the trade repercussions of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. During the RIP, imports of hot-rolled flat products from Russia and Ukraine accounted for 55% of total imports of those products from the countries concerned. Since 15 March 2022, all imports of hot-rolled flat products from Russia into the European Union are subject to an import ban, meaning that those imports cannot contribute to any alleged injury to the EU industry.
47      They maintain that the internal workings of Article 11 of the basic regulation – and in particular the dynamics between paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof – would require the Commission to consider such a fundamental change of circumstances as part of its review. In line with its previous practice in similar circumstances, the Commission should have self-initiated an interim review combined with the expiry review.
48      In the second place, the applicants submit that interim reviews and expiry reviews differ in terms of their outcomes. While an expiry review can result only in the repeal or the continuation of the duties in force, meaning that the Commission cannot modify the scope of the existing measures or change the level or form of the duties, interim reviews can modify the scope, form and level of the measures.
49      They argue, moreover, that the failure to conduct an interim review infringes the applicants’ right to good administration, which is protected by Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
50      The Commission disputes that line of argument.
51      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, although Article 11(2) of the basic regulation serves as the legal basis for the expiry review procedure, Article 11(3) of that regulation governs the interim review procedure to assess the need to maintain the measures still in force.
52      According to the first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the basic regulation, a definitive anti-dumping measure is to expire five years from its imposition or five years from the date of the conclusion of the most recent review which has covered both dumping and injury, unless it is determined in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. Such an expiry review is to be initiated on the initiative of the Commission, or upon a request made by or on behalf of EU producers, and the measure is to remain in force pending the outcome of that review.
53      The first subparagraph of Article 11(3) of the basic regulation provides that the need for the continued imposition of measures may also be reviewed, where warranted, on the initiative of the Commission or at the request of a Member State or, provided that a reasonable period of time of at least one year has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive measure, upon a request by any exporter or importer or by the EU producers which contains sufficient evidence substantiating the need for such an interim review.
54      According to the case-law, for the purposes of a review of anti-dumping measures which are about to expire, carried out under Article 11(2) of the basic regulation, the institutions have only to establish whether the expiry of the measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury, so that those measures would be maintained. If not, the anti-dumping measures are to be repealed. Consequently, a review of measures about to expire cannot lead to the amendment of the measures in force. By contrast, as regards an interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of that regulation, the Commission may, inter alia, consider whether the circumstances with regard to dumping and injury have changed significantly and it may not only repeal or maintain the anti-dumping measures, but also amend them (see judgment of 14 July 2021, Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsky Tube Rolling Plant v Commission, T‑716/19, EU:T:2021:457, paragraph 200 and the case-law cited).
55      In the present case, since the original measures were due to expire, Article 11(2) of the basic regulation constituted the appropriate legal basis on which the Commission could initiate and conduct the review procedure in order to determine whether the expiry of the measure would be likely to result in a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
56      Furthermore, the purpose of the investigation carried out under Article 11(2) of the basic regulation is precisely to verify whether the repeal of the measures would lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
57      Therefore, the applicants cannot criticise the Commission for having chosen an inappropriate legal basis. On the contrary, the Commission was required, after receiving the request for a review submitted by Eurofer, to carry out the expiry review on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic regulation.
58      As regards the argument alleging that Article 11(3) of the basic regulation was not applied, first, it must be noted that the applicants essentially allege a failure to initiate an interim review. In the present case, the argument put forward does not therefore concern the legality of the contested regulation, but the Commission’s failure to act. Therefore, it does not fall within the scope of an action for annulment based on Article 263 TFEU and cannot succeed in that context (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2013, EuroChem MCC v Council, T‑459/08, not published, EU:T:2013:66, paragraph 35).
59      Thus, the applicants have not shown that the absence of an interim review is likely to affect the legality of the contested regulation and, consequently, have not established the impact the non-application of Article 11(3) of the basic regulation could have on the contested regulation, adopted pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic regulation.
60      It is also apparent from the contested regulation that, in the context of the expiry review, the Commission took into account the circumstances put forward by the applicants, such as the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the termination of the investigation concerning Ukraine or the safeguard measure covering hot-rolled flat products from Brazil.
61      The applicants further argue that, in certain previous cases, the Commission simultaneously conducted an expiry review and an interim review in similar circumstances. However, it is settled case-law that the legality of a regulation imposing or extending anti-dumping duties must be assessed in the light of the applicable legal rules, not on the basis of alleged previous practice in taking decisions (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 9 June 2021, Roland v Commission, T‑132/18, not published, EU:T:2021:329, paragraph 110 and the case-law cited).
62      Secondly, it should be noted that the applicants did not lodge any request for the initiation of an interim review, even though that possibility is expressly provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 11(3) of the basic regulation. Only if such a request were made, or if the Commission itself considered it justified, could the Commission consider initiating an interim review.
63      In those circumstances, and since no formal request was made, the Commission was in no way required to justify, in the contested regulation, the reasons why it did not use the procedure laid down in Article 11(3) of the basic regulation.
64      Furthermore, the reference made by the applicants to Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, which merely defines the concept of ‘fundamental change of circumstances’ within the meaning of that convention and does not in itself concern the conditions under which a treaty may be terminated, does not call that conclusion into question. In the field of anti-dumping policy, it is Article 11(3) of the basic regulation that envisages the possibility of a change in circumstances, without, however, requiring the Commission necessarily to initiate an interim review procedure.
65      As regards the alleged failure to observe the principle of good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it should be borne in mind that the Commission and the Council are required to respect fundamental rights in all administrative proceedings relating to trade defence (see judgment of 12 December 2014, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, T‑643/11, EU:T:2014:1076, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). According to the case-law relating to the principle of good administration, where the EU institutions have discretion, respect for the rights guaranteed by the EU legal order in administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (judgment of 21 November 1991, Technische Universität München, C‑269/90, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 14).
66      However, the right to good administration does not mean, in the present case, that the Commission is required to justify, in the contested regulation, the fact that it did not carry out an interim review, in particular in the absence of a request to that effect from an interested party.
67      Consequently, the first plea in law must be rejected.
The first, second and fourth to seventh parts of the second plea, alleging manifest errors of assessment in the Commission’s examination of the conditions for an extension of the original measures
68      By the first part of the second plea, the applicants claim that the Commission incorrectly concluded that there was a significant increase in Brazilian imports of hot-rolled flat products into the European Union. They maintain that the Commission placed a disproportionate amount of importance on the temporary increase in Brazilian import volumes in June 2022 (that is to say, the final month of the RIP), which was the result of the void left by the abrupt discontinuation of Russian and Ukrainian imports into the European Union following the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
69      In that regard, the applicants argue that the monthly average volume of imports of hot-rolled flat products from Brazil between July 2021 and June 2022 amounted to 32 610 tonnes (t), except in June 2022, when the import volume reached 122 837 t. The monthly average volume of those imports between July 2021 and May 2022 was 24 407 t. Furthermore, they assert that the forward-looking assessment required under the expiry review, and which the Commission disregarded, indicates that the monthly average import volume between July 2022 and June 2023, namely in the year following the RIP, amounted to 24 468 t. Indeed, the peak of July 2022 is not representative of overall import volumes of hot-rolled flat products from Brazil during the RIP and over the long term.
70      Thus, the applicants submit that, in order to determine whether there was a material increase in import volumes from Brazil during the RIP as regards injury, the Commission should have considered that the imports in July 2022 were uncharacteristically high due to exceptional circumstances. In that context, they note that the Commission did not even refer to the energy crisis in the investigation, in the general disclosure document or in the contested regulation.
71      The applicants claim that, while information relating to a period subsequent to the RIP is not, normally, to be taken into account, the use of the word ‘normally’ in Article 6(1) of the basic regulation implies that, in abnormal or exceptional circumstances, the Commission can take into account developments that occurred thereafter.
72      The applicants add that the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) require that the continuation of an anti-dumping duty after five years is based on an analysis based on positive evidence establishing the actual likelihood, and not the mere possibility, of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
73      By the second part of the second plea, the applicants argue that Brazilian exporting producers do not have spare capacity to increase their sales to the European Union. They claim that the Commission confirmed that the sampled producers in Brazil, which account for approximately 90% of total export sales to the European Union, operated almost at full capacity during the RIP. However, it did not draw the appropriate conclusion from that finding.
74      By the fourth part of the second plea, the applicants submit that the Commission incorrectly concluded that the EU industry was ‘fragile’ and that, during the RIP, that industry did not suffer any material injury. According to them, it is clear that the original measures had a positive impact on the EU industry, allowing it to recover from past dumping.
75      By the fifth part of the second plea, the applicants submit that the EU sanctions against the Russian Federation prevent any likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by Russian imports.
76      By the sixth part of the second plea, the applicants submit that the EU steel safeguard measure prevents any likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by Brazilian imports.
77      According to the applicants, the safeguard measure undeniably has an impact on the assessment of the likelihood of recurrence of injury due to an increase of imports into the European Union. It is because of the 25% safeguard duty applicable since June 2023 to Brazilian imports of hot-rolled flat products that Brazilian import volumes into the European Union are very unlikely to increase. Furthermore, the safeguard duty of 25% is higher than both the dumping and injury margin established in the expiry review investigation. That means that the EU industry is already sufficiently protected with the 25% safeguard measure against any alleged injury caused by imports of hot-rolled flat products.
78      Lastly, by the seventh part of the second plea, the applicants submit, as regards the alleged temporary nature of the safeguard measure, that the duration of that measure had been five years by the time it expired on 30 June 2024 and, on 9 February 2024, the Commission initiated an investigation to assess its further extension. In the 2018 interim review concerning ammonium nitrate from Russia, the Commission considered that ‘[those] global changes in the [ammonium nitrate] market [were] of a lasting nature and [could] impact the injury situation, including on likelihood of recurrence of injury’.
79      The Commission disputes that line of argument.
80      As a preliminary point it should be noted that, by reason of the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, in the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the EU institutions enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic and political situations which they have to examine (judgment of 10 July 2019, Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission, C‑345/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:589, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
81      That broad discretion covers, inter alia, the determination of the existence of injury caused to the EU industry in the context of anti-dumping proceedings. The judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts relied on have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers. That is particularly the case as regards the determination of the factors injuring the EU industry in an anti-dumping investigation (judgment of 10 July 2019, Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission, C‑345/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:589, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).
82      The Court of Justice has also held that the General Court’s review of the evidence on which the EU institutions based their findings did not constitute a new assessment of the facts replacing that made by the institutions. That review does not encroach on the broad discretion of the institutions in the field of commercial policy, but is restricted to showing whether that evidence was able to support the conclusions reached by the institutions. The General Court must therefore not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also ascertain whether that evidence contained all the relevant information which had to be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it was capable of substantiating the conclusions reached (judgment of 10 July 2019, Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission, C‑345/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:589, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
83      That is particularly the case as regards the determination of the existence of injury caused to the EU industry, which requires an appraisal of complex economic situations (see judgment of 10 September 2015, Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
84      Consequently, whilst, in the sphere of measures to protect trade, in particular anti-dumping measures, the EU judicature cannot interfere in the assessment reserved to the competent EU authorities, its task is nevertheless to satisfy itself that the institutions have taken account of all the relevant circumstances and appraised the facts of the matter with all due care (see judgment of 18 September 2012, Since Hardware (Guangzhou) v Council, T‑156/11, EU:T:2012:431, paragraph 184 and the case-law cited).
85      By contrast, as regards questions of law, the Court carries out a comprehensive review, which includes the interpretation to be made of legal provisions on the basis of objective factors and verification of whether or not the conditions for the application of such a provision are satisfied (see judgment of 11 September 2024, Vyatsky Plywood Mill v Commission, T‑32/22, not published, EU:T:2024:617, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
86      By the first part of the second plea, the applicants claim that June 2022 represented an exceptional peak in Brazilian imports of hot-rolled flat products into the European Union and that the Commission placed ‘a disproportionate level of importance on the temporary increase of Brazilian import volumes’ observed at that time.
87      It should be recalled that, according to recital 9 of the contested regulation, the RIP was determined as follows:
‘The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 …’
88      According to the contested regulation, one of the main reasons for the increase in imports of hot-rolled flat products from Brazil, subject to the anti-dumping measures, was, inter alia, the increase in the prices of energy and raw materials and the increase in demand for those products during the post-COVID‑19 period. Recital 169 of the contested regulation sets out the reasons for that increase as follows:
‘The unit cost of production surged in 2021 due to a jump in energy and commodity prices. This trend continued throughout the review investigation period, where Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine exacerbated the energy crisis already ongoing since 2021. However, due to the post-[COVID‑19] recovery, demand surged as well and consequently, prices also increased significantly (almost doubling between 2020 and the review investigation period), even more than the increase in production costs in the same period.’
89      It follows that the applicants’ argument that the Commission did not refer to the energy crisis in the investigation or in the contested regulation must be rejected.
90      Furthermore, the Commission notes that, according to the data on which the applicants themselves rely, total imports of hot-rolled flat products into the European Union from Brazil amounted to 91 725 t in 2019, 174 104 t in 2020, 185 506 t in 2021 and 478 692 t in the RIP. This shows that imports increased during the RIP.
91      The peak observed in June 2022, although exceptional, could therefore, correctly, be interpreted by the Commission as confirming a trend that had already begun, and not as an isolated episode. It was therefore open to the Commission to consider that the substantial increase in imports recorded that month, included in the RIP, was sufficient to support the conclusion of a ‘significant increase’, relevant for establishing the likely continuation of dumping and the likely recurrence of injury.
92      The applicants nevertheless maintain that, since the increase in imports in June 2022 was disproportionate by comparison with the other months, the Commission should also have taken into account the months after the RIP. They claim that while, according to the contested regulation, ‘information relating to a period subsequent to the investigation shall, normally, not be taken into account, … the use of the word “normally” implies that, in abnormal or exceptional circumstances, the Commission can take into account developments that occurred thereafter’.
93      In that regard, it should be noted that the word ‘normally’ does not appear in Article 11(2) of the basic regulation, which governs the expiry review procedure.
94      Furthermore, it is apparent from the case-law that the EU institutions are not required to take into account evidence which post-dates the investigation period unless that evidence discloses new developments which make the planned imposition of an anti-dumping duty manifestly inappropriate (judgments of 11 July 1996, Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council, T‑161/94, EU:T:1996:101, paragraph 88, and of 20 June 2001, Euroalliages v Commission, T‑188/99, EU:T:2001:166, paragraph 75).
95      In any event, even if the Commission had taken those subsequent data into account, it should be noted, as the Commission maintains, that the data produced by the applicants confirm that, following a decrease between June and August 2022, imports of hot-rolled flat products from Brazil increased overall between September 2022 and July 2023. After the RIP, that increase brought Brazilian imports to a level comparable to, or even higher than, that of July 2021, which was the starting point for the applicants’ analysis. The Commission was therefore not required to take that fact into account in its analysis.
96      It is therefore apparent from the foregoing that, even if the increase in imports in June 2022 could be explained by the ‘result of the void left by the abrupt discontinuation of Russian and Ukrainian imports into the [European Union] following the Russian aggression against Ukraine’, the increase in imports of the products covered by the contested regulation was already significant throughout the duration of the RIP, as the applicants themselves confirmed, and also remained visible after that period.
97      Thus, the post-RIP data do not invalidate the Commission’s findings on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. On the contrary, they tend to confirm them.
98      Lastly, as regards the applicants’ argument concerning an alleged infringement of WTO rules, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, given their nature and structure, the WTO Agreements are not, in principle, among the rules in the light of which the EU judicature is to review the legality of acts of the institutions of the European Union. It is only where the European Union intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the EU act refers expressly to specific provisions of the WTO Agreements, that it is for the EU judicature to review the legality of that act in the light of the WTO rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2023, Venezuela v Council, T‑65/18 RENV, EU:T:2023:529, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited).
99      By the second part of the second plea, the applicants submit that the Brazilian exporting producers have no spare capacity to increase their sales to the European Union because they operate almost at full capacity. They conclude that the Commission should have determined that an increase in exports to the European Union was not likely.
100    In that regard, it should be noted that the applicants have not provided any concrete evidence showing that the Brazilian producers were unable to redirect their exports to the European Union.
101    In the contested regulation, the Commission acknowledged that the sampled Brazilian producers operated almost at full capacity during the investigation period. Nevertheless, it considered that the spare capacity, although limited, did not prevent an increase in exports to the European Union. It explained that, due to the attractiveness of the EU market, Brazilian exporting producers could shift their exports from other third markets to the European Union without increasing their total production, even in the presence of the anti-dumping measures in force (recital 189 thereof). In addition, the Commission pointed out that Brazilian producers could improve their existing capacity utilisation rates or invest in increasing their production capacity if the EU market became sufficiently attractive. When comparing the focus markets with the available spare capacity, it appeared that the EU market was more attractive than other export markets for Brazilian producers. Consequently, the limited spare capacity in Brazil would not have constituted an obstacle to a further increase in exports to the European Union (see recital 87 of that regulation).
102    Furthermore, as is apparent from the Commission’s line of argument, an increase in Brazilian exports to the European Union actually took place in 2022, which shows that the Brazilian producers had spare capacity to increase their sales in the European Union.
103    In the light of the analysis set out above, it must be concluded that the evidence available to the Commission enabled it to consider, correctly, that, despite a high-capacity utilisation rate, Brazilian exporting producers were in a position to increase their sales to the European Union, in particular by shifting their exports from other third markets or by investing in increasing their capacity.
104    By the fourth part of the second plea, the applicants submit that the Commission incorrectly concluded that the EU industry was ‘fragile’, even though the economic indicators showed a significant improvement in its situation.
105    According to Article 11(2) of the basic regulation, the purpose of the review is to determine whether the expiry of the anti-dumping measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury (see paragraph 54 above).
106    In the present case, it is apparent from the contested regulation that the Commission identified two main factors supporting the conclusion that the EU industry was in a fragile position. In the first place, the Commission stated that, despite increased profitability during the RIP, the improvement of the situation of the EU industry was a result of market conditions that were described as ‘exceptionally favourable’. In the second place, the Commission noted that the EU industry was not far removed from a ‘turbulent and economically difficult’ period, in particular linked to the COVID‑19 pandemic, a period during which numerous losses had accumulated (recitals 203 and 204 of the contested regulation).
107    In that context, the applicants’ argument that the increase in profitability to 18.3% during the RIP precludes any risk of future injury is unfounded. It is apparent from the contested regulation that that profitability was to a large extent fuelled by the very high post-COVID‑19 demand and by disrupted international supply, which could have led to a significant increase in sales prices. Furthermore, in the contested regulation, the Commission argued that the return to profitability was relatively recent and that past losses had affected the overall financial situation of the industry. Therefore, the possible resumption of undervalued imports from the countries concerned, in potentially significant volumes and at lower prices, would have been likely to have an immediate effect on the EU industry’s market shares and profitability (recital 202 of the contested regulation).
108    The Commission’s analysis also relied on the evidence collected concerning the pricing behaviour of the Brazilian exporting producers on their export markets to third countries. As stated in recital 204 of the contested regulation, that analysis revealed that Brazilian exporters were able to undercut the EU industry’s prices, thus increasing the likelihood of downward pressure on EU prices in the absence of measures. In those circumstances, the fact, alleged by the applicants, that profitability may have exceeded the 7.9% target during the RIP does not eliminate the serious risk of a rapid deterioration of that profitability on the expiry of the original measures.
109    The Commission’s conclusion that the EU industry remains ‘fragile’ must therefore be assessed in the light of the very purpose of the review, which is to determine whether the removal of the anti-dumping duties is likely to lead to a recurrence of injury. In the present case, the Commission took into account the objective data that, in its view, could support the claims relating to the profitability of the EU industry, while noting the exceptional and cyclical nature of the situation.
110    In the light of those elements, the Commission was able to consider that, despite the good performance observed during the RIP, the EU industry remained exposed to the risks of a resumption of dumped imports on a large scale and at low prices.
111    By the fifth part of the second plea, the applicants claim that, because of the EU sanctions against the Russian Federation, there is no reasonably foreseeable likelihood of recurrence of injury linked to imports of hot-rolled flat products from Russia. They maintain that those sanctions, which relate in particular to the prohibition on importing those products into the European Union and to the freezing of the assets of several major Russian steel companies, are sustainable and render the extension of the anti-dumping measures unnecessary, since they affect the main Russian steel groups.
112    In the present case, the Commission relied, first, on the very nature of the EU sanctions, which are inseparable from the geopolitical situation, and, secondly, on past experience showing that Russian imports of hot-rolled flat products have historically been able to reach significant volumes on the EU market, in particular when they were not subject to sanctions. It also noted, in recital 14 of the contested regulation, that there was no evidence that a possible resumption of trade would require an extraordinary amount of time or effort for Russian exporting producers.
113    It is not disputed that, at the time of adoption of the contested regulation, the ban on imports into the European Union of hot-rolled flat products from Russia concerned almost all of the relevant Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes. Nor is it disputed that certain Russian steel undertakings are subject to an asset freeze and prohibitions on the direct or indirect supply of steel products in the European Union.
114    In that regard, it is important to note that the restrictive measures imposed on Russia, to which the applicants refer, are temporary and reversible (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 154).
115    In addition, Article 9 of Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13), as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/327 of 25 February 2022 (OJ 2022 L 48, p. 1), provides that the application of the restrictive measures is limited in time, with the possibility of regular review and new Council decisions for the extension or adaptation of those measures.
116    As regards the anti-dumping measure, the first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the basic regulation provides that it is to expire five years after introduction ‘unless it is determined in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury’.
117    It follows that retention of a measure depends on the result of an assessment of the consequences of its expiry, that is, on a forecast based on hypotheses regarding future developments in the situation on the market concerned. It is also clear that the mere possibility that injury might continue or recur is insufficient to justify retaining a measure; that is dependent on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury being established (see judgment of 30 April 2015, VTZ and Others v Council, T‑432/12, not published, EU:T:2015:248, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
118    It should also be recalled that, following a review relating to the expiry of anti-dumping measures, the institutions are to establish that the expiry of such measures would encourage the recurrence of injury, by demonstrating only the likelihood of such recurrence, in the light, in particular, of a prospective assessment of imports from the country or countries concerned by that review (see judgment of 30 April 2015, VTZ and Others v Council, T‑432/12, not published, EU:T:2015:248, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
119    Contrary to what the applicants maintain, the Commission did not disregard the fact that the ban on imports of most CN codes had effectively applied since spring 2022. It merely considered that that fact, although relevant at the date of adoption of the contested regulation, did not constitute a lasting factor definitively eliminating the risk of recurrence of dumping. To that end, the Commission stressed that sanctions were subject to regular review by the Council and that the evolution of the armed conflict in Ukraine could lead to a revision of those measures at any time.
120    Lastly, as regards the argument that the restrictions on steel imports and the asset freeze render the extension of the anti-dumping measures unnecessary, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of anti-dumping measures, namely to combat dumping and to protect the EU industry on a lasting basis from the resulting injury, is specific. The sanctions, which may be amended or abolished irrespective of any development in the steel market, pursue an objective relating to the common foreign and security policy.
121    Consequently, the Commission was entitled to consider that, at the time of the review, the sanctions did not constitute a sufficiently stable and reliable element to rule out the likelihood of recurrence of injury in relation to Russian imports.
122    By the sixth part of the second plea, the applicants submit that the safeguard measure adopted by the European Union in the steel sector prevents any likelihood of recurrence of injury that may have been caused by Brazilian imports of hot-rolled flat products.
123    The Commission contends, as a preliminary point, that the sixth part of the second plea lacks clarity and should be declared inadmissible, in accordance with Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, because the pleas in law and the matters of fact and law on which it is based are inadequate.
124    In that connection, it must be recalled that, under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain, inter alia, the subject matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law relied upon. It is clear from the case-law that that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his or her defence and for the Court to exercise its power of review. It follows that the essential elements of fact and law on which an action is based must be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. The application must, therefore, specify the nature of the plea in law on which the action is based, so that a mere abstract reference to that plea does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure (order of 18 September 2018, eSlovensko v Commission, T‑664/17, not published, EU:T:2018:559, paragraph 29).
125    It should also be recalled that, according to the case-law, the application must be interpreted with a view to giving it practical effect by carrying out an overall assessment of the application (see, to that effect, order of 28 June 2011, Verein Deutsche Sprache v Council, C‑93/11 P, not published, EU:C:2011:429, paragraphs 20 and 21).
126    In the present case, as is apparent from the presentation of the applicants’ arguments (see paragraphs 76 and 77 above), the applicants set out in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the reasons why they consider that the safeguard measure of 25% prevents the recurrence of injury linked to Brazilian imports.
127    In those circumstances, it must be held that the sixth part of the second plea is sufficiently substantiated and comprehensible to enable the Commission to respond in full knowledge of the facts and the Court to exercise its power of review. Consequently, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be rejected.
128    As to the substance, it should be noted that, according to recital 5 of Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures (OJ 2015 L 83, p. 11), the importation of certain goods may be subject to both anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures on the one hand and safeguard tariff measures on the other. The objectives of the former are to remedy market distortions created by unfair trading practices, whilst the objectives of the latter are to protect the European Union against greatly increased imports.
129    It should also be noted that the Commission expressly commented on the impact of the safeguard measure in the contested regulation, in particular in recital 211. It explained that that measure, introduced in 2019 and lawfully adopted, had not prevented the rise of Brazilian imports throughout the RIP, including a sudden increase in June 2022. It considered that the temporary nature of that measure and its overall scope did not support the conclusion that there was no likelihood of recurrence of injury.
130    It is also apparent from recitals 210 and 211 of the contested regulation that the rate of 25% mentioned by the applicants is not based solely on the safeguard measure. That percentage may be influenced by other factors that may increase the cost of imports, such as the gradual implementation of the CBAM. The Commission pointed out that, until 2026, that mechanism involved only an obligation for importers to report, at no immediate cost, and that its future effect on import flows remained largely uncertain. The applicants fail to demonstrate convincingly that the combination of the safeguard measure and the CBAM already deterred or is likely to deter any Brazilian exports at dumped prices.
131    Furthermore, the applicants rely on the argument that the safeguard measure, coupled with the CBAM, further discourages import flows of hot-rolled flat products at dumped prices. However, the Commission considered, in recital 211 of the contested regulation, that it was premature to draw conclusions as to the actual impact of the CBAM, since it did not entail any mandatory financial burden before 2026 and was not specifically designed to combat dumping. The applicants do not effectively dispute that analysis or explain how, from 2023, the CBAM and the safeguard measure interacted to eliminate the risk of dumping practices.
132    It follows that the Commission was entitled to conclude, in the light of the abovementioned factors, that the maintenance of anti-dumping measures remained necessary to prevent the resumption of Brazilian imports at dumped prices and to protect the EU industry from the resulting injury.
133    By the seventh part of the second plea, the applicants submit that, far from being ‘temporary’, the safeguard measure demonstrates a lasting nature that justifies taking it into account in order to conclude that there is no likelihood of recurrence of injury.
134    The Commission contends, first of all, that the seventh part of the second plea lacks clarity and must be rejected as inadmissible.
135    As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, even if the present plea is presented succinctly, its scope may be understood without the need for further elaboration. It must also be stated that the Commission was able effectively to defend itself on the substance. Consequently, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be rejected and the substance of that part must be examined.
136    In that regard, the applicants refer to other review procedures, but carried out in the context of safeguard measures. However, those measures have different objectives from those of the anti-dumping measures in dispute in the present case. The objectives, legal criteria and conditions of application of those two types of measures differ (see paragraph 128 above).
137    Similarly, the analogy drawn by the applicants with the investigation carried out in 2018 concerning ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, which concerned the existence of anti-dumping measures in several third countries, is not relevant, since it was precisely a question of finding that, worldwide, several States imposed anti-dumping measures targeted at a particular product with the same origin, which could affect the ability of Russian exporters to sell. That is not the case with EU safeguard measures, which are intended to apply to steel imports irrespective of their origin and the possible extension of which meets legal criteria other than those applicable to the extension of anti-dumping measures.
138    Consequently, following the analysis of the arguments raised by the applicants in the context of the first, second and fourth to seventh parts of the second plea, it must be held that the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in its examination of the likelihood of recurrence of injury in the contested regulation.
139    Accordingly, the first, second and fourth to seventh parts of the second plea must be rejected.
The third part of the second plea and the third plea, alleging a manifest error in the Commission’s assessment of captive sales and failure to observe the principle of non-discrimination
140    By the third part of the second plea, the applicants claim that captive sales do not cause injury to the EU industry. During the RIP, all hot-rolled flat products exported by CSN were for use by Lusosider, its related company in the European Union, for further processing. The Commission found that, during the RIP, no sales were made to unrelated customers in the European Union and Lusosider did not purchase hot-rolled flat products from any supplier other than CSN.
141    They maintain that the Commission acknowledged that captive sales are not in competition with non-captive sales. Following that reasoning, the Commission should have concluded that CSN’s sales to the European Union could not cause injury to the EU industry.
142    Furthermore, the applicants submit that the Commission ignored the fact that Lusosider is de facto unable to purchase any hot-rolled flat products from EU producers, as they refused to supply to Lusosider.
143    By their third plea, the applicants submit that the Commission conducted an asymmetric assessment of Brazilian captive and non-captive sales in relation to EU non-captive sales, which artificially inflates the market share of Brazilian hot-rolled flat products in the European Union. They maintain that that mistake led the Commission to conclude that there was a likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by Brazilian imports. In doing so, the Commission unjustifiably discriminates between Brazilian hot-rolled flat products and those manufactured by EU producers.
144    The applicants do not dispute the Commission’s approach of assessing, where possible, the captive market and the free market separately. However, they dispute the asymmetric treatment of captive sales of EU producers and captive sales of Brazilian producers on the EU market.
145    The applicants claim that Brazilian import volumes were determined by adding import volumes from the responses to CSN’s questionnaire to import volumes from the rest of Brazil on the basis of Eurostat data. EU free market consumption was established by adding free market sales of EU producers with imports to the European Union of both captive and free market sales from all third countries as reported by Eurostat. In other words, the Commission unjustifiably excluded captive sales by EU producers, which account for more than 50% of total sales by EU producers on the EU market during the RIP, from the total EU consumption.
146    The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments.
147    According to recital 121 of the contested regulation, the distinction between the captive market and the free market is relevant for the injury analysis because products destined for the captive market are not exposed to direct competition from imports, and transfer prices are set within the groups according to various price policies. By contrast, production destined for the free market is in direct competition with imports of the product concerned, and prices are set according to market conditions. The total free market includes sales of EU producers to unrelated customers and non-captive sales to related companies.
148    In recital 137 of the contested regulation, the Commission recalls that captive sales and sales to related parties are two different concepts. For sales to be considered captive, the (related) buyer must not have a free choice of supplier.
149    The Commission therefore considered that, in the present case, there was no indication or evidence that the sales between the applicants were exclusive. In fact, the applicants seemed capable of sourcing from third parties in the original investigation, and did so (recital 137 of the contested regulation).
150    The applicants dispute the Commission’s position by stating that Lusosider was not able to purchase from other EU suppliers and that the sales between CSN and Lusosider were therefore to be regarded as captive sales.
151    The applicants present a series of emails between Lusosider and other potential suppliers in order to show that Lusosider could not obtain supplies other than from CSN. Those exchanges show that several EU suppliers reported production limitations, reducing their supply capacity and increasing their prices. Other suppliers offered non-EU hot-rolled coils due to the unavailability of EU products during that period.
152    In that context, the Commission correctly points out that the steps taken by Lusosider are spot requests rather than requests indicative of a desire to establish lasting business relationships with EU producers. Those requests, often limited to small quantities with short deadlines, were probably aimed at meeting temporary needs. The replies received were not outright refusals, but rather reflected logistical adjustments. Furthermore, the fact that Lusosider nevertheless succeeded in obtaining supplies from the EU industry, including during the same year as that in which some of the refusals on which it relies occurred, shows that it had actual alternatives to CSN and that it was operating in an open market.
153    It follows that, without it being necessary to rule on the alleged ineffectiveness of the applicants’ argument in that regard, the Commission was entitled to take the view that the sales between CSN and Lusosider could not be classified as captive sales within the meaning of paragraphs 147 and 148 above and that they were rather to be regarded as sales to related parties operating on the free market.
154    In any event, it should be noted that, even if the sales made between the applicants were to be classified as ‘captive’, the applicants themselves acknowledge that, in the review, the Commission applied the same methodology as that used in the original investigation.
155    It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, compliance with the principles of equality and non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 20 March 2019, Foshan Lihua Ceramic v Commission, T‑310/16, EU:T:2019:170, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).
156    In the present case, the captive sales of the EU industry are not exposed to any external competition as long as they remain internal and thus escape the impact of imports, while imports, whether captive or not, are in direct competition with the free sales of the EU industry and may cause injury to them, as each import represents a potentially lost sale. Therefore, the difference in treatment consisting in excluding captive sales of the EU industry from the calculation of consumption while including purchases made by related companies in the volume of imports is justified by the very logic of anti-dumping investigations.
157    As regards the applicants’ argument that it incorrectly excluded captive sales from total consumption, even though it combined Eurostat data with questionnaires to calculate Brazilian imports, the Commission correctly argues that two separate issues are conflated here. First, as noted in footnote 38 to the contested regulation, Eurostat data were adjusted on the basis of the verified volumes of the two sampled companies, through the Surveillance system and Integrated Tariff of the European Union (TARIC) codes, on account of discrepancies. Secondly, the consumption used to calculate the market share is that of the free market, in accordance with the method already applied in the original investigation, in accordance with Article 11(9) of the basic regulation.
158    In the light of the foregoing, the third part of the second plea and the third plea must be rejected.
159    Accordingly, the present action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
160    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional and Lusosider-Aços Planos S. A. to pay the costs.
da Silva Passos
Półtorak
Pynnä
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 November 2025.
V. Di Bucci
M. van der Woude
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.