JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
26 November 2025 (*)
( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU word mark DALL – Earlier EU word mark DALLI – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )
In Case T‑515/24,
Lavrentios Lavrentiadis, residing in Athens (Greece), represented by E. Tsakiri, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Klee, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Dalli-Werke GmbH & Co. KG, established in Stolberg (Germany), represented by U. Lüken, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of M. Brkan (Rapporteur), acting as President, and I. Gâlea and T. Tóth, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Lavrentios Lavrentiadis, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 6 August 2024 (Case R 2552/2023-2) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2        On 13 April 2022, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word sign DALL.
3        The mark applied for covered, inter alia, goods in Class 3 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Household fragrances; vehicle cleaning preparations; laundry preparations; starch for cleaning purposes; canned pressurized air for cleaning and dusting purposes; ammonia [volatile alkali] [detergent]; sugar soap; alcoholic solvents being cleaning preparations; non-slipping wax for floors; non-slipping liquids for floors; degreasers for cleaning purposes; degreasing sprays; detergents; detergents prepared from petroleum; degreasing preparations with a solvent base; ammonia for cleaning purposes; detergents for household use; detergents for machine dishwashing; dishwasher detergents in gel form; dishwashing detergents; dishwashing liquid; toilet bowl detergents; detergents, other than for use in manufacturing operations and for medical purposes; cleaning and fragrancing preparations; solvents for removing paints; solvents for removing varnishes; degreasing solvents, other than for use in manufacturing processes; eyeglass lens cleaning solutions; scouring solutions; cleaning solutions for dental ultrasonic sterilization apparatus; geraniol for fragrancing; emulsifying solvent cleaners; rinse aids; varnish-removing preparations; stain removing benzine; colour-removing preparations; colorants for toilet purposes; foam detergents; floor wax removers [scouring preparations]; perfumes for cardboard; scented linen water; heliotropin fragrancing compounds; geraniol fragrancing compounds; scented fabric refresher sprays; perfumes for ceramics; fragrances for automobiles; oil of turpentine for degreasing; washing-up detergent; detergent compositions for cleaning golf clubs; floor wax; wax for parquet floors; caustic cleaning agents; toilet cleaners; spray cleaners for use on textiles; spray cleaners for freshening athletic mouth guards; spray cleaners for household use; window cleaners in spray form; buffing compounds; household bleach; cloths impregnated with a detergent for cleaning; cloths impregnated with a detergent for cleaning camera lenses; cloths impregnated with polishing preparations for cleaning; window cleaners [polish]; eyeglass wipes impregnated with a detergent; graffiti removing substances; household detergents; drying agents for dishwashing machines; pre-moistened towelettes impregnated with a detergent for cleaning; all-purpose cotton buds for personal use; floor buffing compound; wipes incorporating cleaning preparations; pre-moistened towelettes impregnated with dishwashing detergent; cleaning agents for stone; cleaning agents for metal; cleaning agents for deep freezers; anti-smear agents for cleaning purposes; agents for removing wax; rust removing preparations; stain removing agents; dewaxing agents for cleaning purposes; dishwasher rinsing agents; bleaching preparations for household use; bleaching preparations; bleaching preparations [decolorants] for household purposes; floor cleaning preparations; cleaning agents for household purposes; fruit and vegetable wash; stain removers; preparations for unblocking drain pipes; preparations to make the leaves of plants shiny; cleaning and shining preparations for plant leaves; grease-removing preparations; preparations for unblocking sinks; mould removing preparations; de-greasing preparations for household purposes; salt crystal removers; stain removing preparations for use on household goods; preparations for stripping wax from floors; wax stripping preparations; floor stripping preparations; lime removers; drain and sink unblocking preparations; scouring substances; dewaxing preparations; degreasing preparations for engines; descaling preparations for household purposes; cleaning preparations for cleansing drains; wood treatment preparations for polishing; prepared wax for polishing; drain cleaning preparations; windscreen cleaning preparations; glass cleaning preparations; cleaning preparations for use on tiles; cleaning preparations for plant leaves; cleaning preparations for use on masonry; cleaning preparations for use in livestock farming; cleaning preparations in the form of foams; oven cleaning preparations; washing preparations; shining preparations for fruit; polish for furniture and flooring; cakes of soap for household cleaning purposes; scrubbing powder; furniture cleaner; degreasers, other than for use in manufacturing processes; de-stainers; spirit gum remover; pet stain removers; cleaners for litter trays; whitewall cleaners; cleansers for household purposes; carpet cleaning preparations; chrome cleaners; soda lye; cleaning compositions for spot removal; window cleaning compositions; lavatory cleaning compositions; floor shining compositions; paint removing compositions; chrome polish; spray polish; polishing rouge; polishing preparations for fruits; polishing preparations; metal polishes; furniture polish; floor polish; polishes for guitars; time-release solid drain detergent; shining preparations [polish]; cleaning sprays; dishwasher powder; polishing powders; soaps for household use; soap powder; saddle soap; carpet shampoo; polish for musical instruments; natural oils for cleaning purposes; natural floor waxes; wiping cloth impregnated with a cleaning preparation for cleaning eye glasses; liquid soap for dish washing; liquid floor polishes; washing liquids; cleaning fluids for camera lenses; cleaning fluid for typewriter type; cleaning fluids; scouring liquids; liquid dishwasher detergents; toilet cleaning gels; turpentine for degreasing; wallpaper cleaning preparations; dishwasher tablets; detergent tablets for coffee machines; volcanic ash for cleaning; synthetic detergents for clothes; floor treatment compositions; natural floor polishes; chemical cleaning preparations for household purposes; javelle water; cosmetics; perfumery and fragrances; body cleaning and beauty care preparations; massage oils; massage oils and lotions; oils for toilet purposes; cosmetics for personal use; aloe vera gel for cosmetic purposes; impregnated cleaning pads impregnated with toilet preparations; impregnated cleaning pads impregnated with cosmetics; make-up pads of cotton wool; impregnated cloths for cosmetic use; geraniol for cosmetic use; massage gels, other than for medical purposes; perfumed body lotions [toilet preparations]; perfumed lotions [toilet preparations]; ointments for cosmetic use; coconut oil for cosmetic purposes; amla oil for cosmetic purposes; oils for cosmetic purposes; greases for cosmetic purposes; balms, other than for medical purposes; massage creams, not medicated; castor oil for cosmetic purposes; cosmetics and cosmetic preparations; cosmetic kits; cosmetics in the form of oils; colour cosmetics for children; cosmetics containing hyaluronic acid; cosmetics containing panthenol; cosmetics containing keratin; cosmetic preparations for body care; facial preparations; baby care products (non-medicated -); piperonal for cosmetic use; paper hand towels impregnated with cosmetics; sanitary preparations being toiletries; abrasive preparations for use on the body; aloe vera preparations for cosmetic purposes; cosmetics for children; mineral oils [cosmetic]; non-medicated massage preparations; non-medicated toiletry preparations; non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; non-medicated cosmetics; non-medicated toiletries; tissues impregnated with cosmetics; tissues impregnated with cosmetic lotions; emollient preparations [cosmetics]; seaweed for cosmetology; natural cosmetics; cotton wool for cosmetic purposes; moist wipes impregnated with a cosmetic lotion; cotton balls for cosmetic purposes; essential oils for personal use; distilled oils for beauty care; non-medicated oils; blended essential oils; natural essential oils; natural oils for cosmetic purposes; aromatherapy preparations; skin care oils [non-medicated]’.
4        On 2 August 2022, the intervener, Dalli-Werke GmbH & Co. KG, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods in Class 3 referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5        The opposition was based on the earlier EU word mark DALLI, covering, inter alia, goods in Class 3 corresponding to the following description: ‘Bleaching preparations; bleaching preparations for laundry use; cleaning preparations; polishing preparations; scouring preparations; abrasive preparations; non-medicated soaps; perfumery; essential oils; non-medicated cosmetics; non-medicated hair lotions; non-medicated dentifrices’.
6        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
7        On 30 November 2023, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in its entirety, on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
8        On 21 December 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue on the part of the relevant public, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, for the goods in Class 3, listed in paragraph 3 above.
Form of order sought
10      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        reject the intervener’s opposition;
–        order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs of the present proceedings and those incurred before the Board of Appeal.
11      EUIPO contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
12      The intervener contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
Admissibility of evidence submitted for the first time before the Court
13      The applicant produced,
as Annexes A.15 and A.16 to his application, documents corresponding to research carried out on the impact of the country of origin on goods in Class 3, including cosmetics, in order to demonstrate that the combination of a higher level of attention for goods in that class with the mandatory indication of the country of origin could give rise to a finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.
14      EUIPO argues that those annexes are inadmissible given that they were submitted for the first time before the Court.
15      According to settled case-law, the purpose of actions before the Court under Article 72(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 is to review the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal; pursuant to Article 95 of Regulation 2017/1001, that review must be carried out in the light of the factual and legal context of the dispute as it was brought before the Board of Appeal (see judgment of 1 February 2005, SPAG v OHIM – Dann and Backer (HOOLIGAN), T‑57/03, EU:T:2005:29, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). It follows that the Court may not annul or alter a decision against which an action has been brought on grounds which come into existence subsequent to its adoption (judgments of 11 May 2006, Sunrider v OHIM, C‑416/04 P, EU:C:2006:310, paragraph 55, and of 13 March 2007, OHIM v Kaul, C‑29/05 P, EU:C:2007:162 paragraph 53).
16      Therefore, it is not the Court’s function to review the facts in the light of documents adduced for the first time before it. To allow the examination of such evidence would be contrary to Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, according to which the parties’ pleadings may not change the subject matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. Accordingly, the evidence submitted for the first time before the Court must be declared inadmissible and there is no need to examine it (see judgment of 14 May 2009, Fiorucci v OHIM – Edwin (ELIO FIORUCCI), T‑165/06, EU:T:2009:157, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
17      In the present case, the Court notes that the documents in Annexes A.15 and A.16 to the application were submitted for the first time before the Court. Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 16 above, those documents must be disregarded as inadmissible.
Substance
18      In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law. The first plea alleges infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. Specifically, in the context of that plea, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal made a series of errors, first, in not finding that there was no genuine or properly substantiated likelihood of confusion as regards the origin of the goods at issue and, second, in its assessment of the relevant public, the comparison of the goods and marks at issue, the distinctive character of the earlier mark and in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue. The second plea alleges infringement of Article 33 of Regulation 2017/1001, given that the Board of Appeal took into account the broad nature of the categories of goods covered by the mark applied for and found that the goods at issue were similar. The third plea alleges failure to take into account provisions of EU law requiring manufacturers to indicate the commercial origin of their goods and enabling categories of goods to be clearly distinguished.
19      The Court considers it appropriate to address those pleas raised by the applicant in the context of a single plea, namely a plea alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that, by those pleas, the applicant challenges, in essence, the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.
20      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
21      The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).
22      For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
23      Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods or services in question in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
24      It is in the light of all the foregoing that it is necessary to examine whether, as the applicant submits, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion in accordance with Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
The relevant public
25      The Board of Appeal found that the relevant public for the goods at issue consisted of the general public and professionals with specific professional knowledge or expertise, whose level of attention varied from average to higher than average. In addition, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant territory was that of the European Union and, by
endorsing the approach adopted by the Opposition Division, it assessed the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue from the point of view of the non-German-speaking part of the public. The applicant does not dispute that assessment.
The comparison of the goods
26      In the first place, the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having found that there was a likelihood of confusion despite its goods being manufactured at an entirely different manufacturing site, situated in a different geographical location, namely Greece, and managed and controlled by a separate producer or manufacturer from the goods in Class 3 covered by the earlier mark, which are produced in Germany and are therefore of German origin.
27      In that regard, the applicant submits that manufacturers are required to affix labels to the packaging of their goods in Class 3, in accordance with the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 648/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on detergents (OJ 2004 L 104, p. 1) and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic products (OJ 2009 L 342, p. 59). According to the applicant, those labels must indicate not only the name and trade name of the product but also the full address of its place of manufacture, which is a prime
indicator of the product’s origin, thereby making it possible to rule out any likelihood of confusion between several products. Furthermore, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal did not take into account the European product categorisation system developed by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) in accordance with Article 45 of, and Annex VIII to, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ 2008 L 353, p. 1), which provides detailed descriptions of the individual product categories and clearly distinguishes cleaning, care and maintenance products.
28      In the second place, the applicant argues that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the goods covered by the marks at issue were similar. In his view, the description of the goods covered by the earlier mark, with the exception of ‘bleaching preparations for laundry use’, namely ‘bleaching preparations’, ‘cleaning preparations’, ‘polishing preparations’, ‘scouring preparations’, ‘abrasive preparations’, ‘non-medicated soaps’,
‘perfumery’, ‘essential oils’, ‘non-medicated cosmetics’ and ‘non-medicated hair lotions’ is not sufficiently clear and precise, given that the indications relating to those goods do not refer to their nature, intended purpose or method of use.
29      In the third place, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 33 of Regulation 2017/1001 in that it failed to comply with the requisite criteria of clarity and precision. According to the applicant, when registering the earlier mark, the intervener failed to indicate in its list of goods in Class 3 ‘other substances for laundry use’, whereas that was a general field of goods in that class in accordance with the eleventh edition of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks. Therefore, in the applicant’s view, that general indication, which was not used when the earlier mark was registered, cannot allow those goods to be validly protected by regarding them as identical or similar to other goods covered by the earlier mark.
30      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
31      In the first place, the Board of Appeal found that, in assessing the similarity of the goods at issue, one of the factors to be taken into account could be the usual origin of the goods, which referred, in essence, to the industrial sector or kind of undertaking which produced the goods at issue, and not to the actual origin as indicated on the packaging of the goods. Furthermore, it found that the similarity between the goods at issue had to be analysed in relation to the goods corresponding to the marks and not in relation to the goods actually marketed under those marks. It was not apparent from the list of goods of the marks at issue that those goods were marketed in Greece or Germany. The Board of Appeal added that, even if that were the case, that would not be sufficient to exclude the similarity of the goods in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
32      In the second place, the Board of Appeal found that the mere fact that the list of goods contained general indications was not sufficient to conclude that those indications did not comply with the requirement of clarity and precision arising from Article 33(2) of Regulation 2017/1001. Paragraph 5 of that article provides that ‘the use of general terms, including the general indications of the class headings of the Nice [Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks], shall be interpreted as including all goods or services clearly covered by the literal meaning of the indication or term’ and that ‘the use of such terms or indications shall not be interpreted as comprising a claim to goods or services which cannot be so understood’. Consequently, the Board of Appeal concluded that, even if it were true that most of the goods in Class 3 of the earlier mark had a broad meaning, the fact remains that the general indications or terms mentioned in that list were all identifiable, irrespective of whether they contained sub-categories or goods with their own specific purpose and intended use. In that regard, it noted that ‘bleaching preparations’ in Class 3, covered by the earlier mark, could be used on various materials, namely for laundry use, disinfecting surfaces or hair care, but that, however, the indication ‘bleaching preparations’ was clear and precise in that it concerned chemical formulations designed to remove the colour, stains or discolorations from various materials.
33      In the third place, the Board of Appeal essentially endorsed the Opposition Division’s conclusions, finding that the goods covered by the mark applied for were either identical or similar to the goods covered by the earlier mark. In particular, it found that the ‘cleaning preparations’, ‘polishing preparations’, ‘scouring preparations’ and ‘abrasive preparations’ covered by the earlier mark were identical to certain goods covered by the mark applied for in so far as the former included goods covered by the mark applied for or overlapped with them. That finding concerns ‘cleaning preparations; vehicle cleaning preparations; sugar soap; alcoholic solvents being cleaning preparations; detergents for machine dishwashing; emulsifying solvent cleaners; varnish-removing preparations; stain removing benzine; colour-removing preparations; foam detergents; washing-up detergent; detergent compositions for cleaning golf clubs; caustic cleaning agents; toilet cleaners; spray cleaners for use on textiles; spray cleaners for freshening athletic mouth guards; spray cleaners for household use; window cleaners in spray form; cloths impregnated with a detergent for cleaning camera lenses; window cleaners [polish]; household detergents; pre-moistened towelettes impregnated with a detergent for cleaning; pre-moistened towelettes impregnated with dishwashing detergent; cleaning agents for stone; cleaning agents for metal; cleaning agents for deep freezers; agents for removing wax; rust removing preparations; stain removing agents; floor cleaning preparations; cleaning agents for household purposes; stain removers; preparations to make the leaves of plants shiny; mould removing preparations; de-greasing preparations for household purposes; stain removing preparations for use on household goods; preparations for stripping wax from floors; descaling preparations for household purposes; cleaning preparations for cleansing drains; wood treatment preparations for polishing; drain cleaning preparations; windscreen cleaning preparations; glass cleaning preparations; cleaning preparations for use on tiles; cleaning preparations for plant leaves; cleaning preparations for use on masonry; cleaning preparations for use in livestock farming; cleaning preparations in the form of foams; oven cleaning preparations; washing preparations; shining preparations for fruit; polish for furniture and flooring; furniture cleaner; degreasers, other than for use in manufacturing processes; de-stainers; cleaners for litter trays; whitewall cleaners; cleansers for household purposes; carpet cleaning preparations; chrome cleaners; cleaning compositions for spot removal; window cleaning compositions; lavatory cleaning compositions; floor shining compositions; chrome polish; spray polish; polishing rouge; polishing preparations for fruits; metal polishes; furniture polish; floor polish; polishes for guitars; time-release solid drain detergent; polishing powders; carpet shampoo; polish for musical instruments; natural floor waxes; wiping cloth impregnated with a cleaning preparation for cleaning eye glasses; liquid soap for dish washing; liquid floor polishes; washing liquids; cleaning fluids for camera lenses; cleaning fluid for typewriter type; liquid dishwasher detergents; toilet cleaning gels; dishwasher tablets; detergent tablets for coffee machines; floor treatment compositions; starch for cleaning purposes; degreasers for cleaning purposes; degreasing sprays; detergents prepared from petroleum; degreasing preparations with a solvent base; solvents for removing varnishes; degreasing solvents, other than for use in manufacturing processes; eyeglass lens cleaning solutions; cleaning solutions for dental ultrasonic sterilization apparatus; cleaning and shining preparations for plant leaves; natural floor polishes; chemical cleaning preparations for household purposes; canned pressurized air for cleaning and dusting purposes; ammonia [volatile alkali] [detergent]; detergents, other than for use in manufacturing operations and for medical purposes; oil of turpentine for degreasing; cloths impregnated with a detergent for cleaning; turpentine for degreasing; wallpaper cleaning preparations; volcanic ash for cleaning; javelle water; scouring substances; polishing preparations; shining preparations [polish]; abrasive preparations for use on the body; scouring liquids; eyeglass wipes impregnated with a detergent; wipes incorporating cleaning preparations; anti-smear agents for cleaning purposes; grease-removing preparations; prepared wax for polishing; degreasing preparations for engines; lime removers; scrubbing powder; cleaning sprays’. For the same reasons, the Board of Appeal also found that the ‘laundry preparations’ and ‘detergents’ covered by the mark applied for were identical to the ‘bleaching preparations’ and ‘bleaching preparations for laundry use’ of the earlier mark.
34      According to settled case-law, in assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken), T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
35      Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that goods may be regarded as identical where the goods covered by the trade mark application are included in a more general category covered by the earlier mark (see judgment of 7 September 2006, Meric v OHIM – Arbora & Ausonia (PAM-PIM’S BABY-PROP), T‑133/05, EU:T:2006:247, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
36      Moreover, it must be borne in mind that a Board of Appeal may lawfully adopt the grounds of a decision taken by the Opposition Division, which thus make up an integral part of the reasons for the Board’s own decision (see judgment of 13 September 2010, Inditex v OHIM – Marín Díaz de Cerio (OFTEN), T‑292/08, EU:T:2010:399, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
37      As regards the applicant’s argument concerning the origin of the goods, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal did, that one of the factors to be taken into account in the comparison of the goods for the purposes of assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion between two marks at issue may be the origin referring essentially to the manufacturing sector or the type of undertaking which generally produces the goods in question and not the actual geographical origin as it could be indicated on the packaging of the goods. Furthermore, it should be noted that for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, any similarity between the goods covered by the mark applied for and by the earlier mark respectively must be examined with reference to the goods or services in the classes corresponding to the marks at issue. By contrast, that similarity should not be assessed in the light of the goods or services actually marketed under those marks (see judgment of 29 March 2017, J & Joy v EUIPO – Joy-Sportswear (J&JOY), T‑389/15, not published, EU:T:2017:231, paragraphs 33 and 34 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the existence of labelling rules did not make it possible to exclude the possibility that the relevant consumer would identify the commercial origin of the goods by referring to the trade marks rather than to the mandatory additional information on the product labels.
38      In addition, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging infringement of Article 33 of Regulation 2017/1001, the Court notes that it is true that paragraph 2 of that provision provides that the goods and services for which the protection of the trade mark is sought are to be identified by the applicant with sufficient clarity and precision to enable the competent authorities and economic operators to determine, on that basis alone, the extent of the protection sought. However, Article 33(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that the use of general terms, including the general indications of the class headings of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, is to be interpreted as including all the goods or services clearly covered by the literal meaning of the indication or term (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2023, Crush Series Publishing v EUIPO – Mediaproduccion (The Crush Series), T‑295/22, not published, EU:T:2023:97, paragraph 37). In the present case, the Board of Appeal merely interpreted the terms of the goods at issue in the light of their literal meaning, and did not go beyond that meaning, as the applicant claims. As will be noted in paragraph 39 below, the Board of Appeal correctly included certain goods covered by the mark applied for in the classes of goods covered by the earlier mark, taking into account the literal meaning of the latter.
39      In the light of the foregoing, the Court must hold, as the Board of Appeal did, endorsing the Opposition Division’s findings, that all the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for are included in the more general indications of goods in the same class covered by the earlier mark. Specifically, as regards the goods covered by the mark applied for, referred to in paragraph 33 above, the Court notes that they are included in ‘cleaning preparations’, ‘polishing preparations’, ‘scouring preparations’ and ‘abrasive preparations’ covered by the earlier mark, which are sufficiently clear and precise terms within the meaning of Article 33(2) of Regulation 2017/1001. Furthermore, the Court also notes that all those goods have the same nature, method of use and intended purpose within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 34 above.
40      Consequently, the Board of Appeal was correct in concluding that all the goods in Class 3 covered by the mark applied for were identical or at least similar to the goods in Class 3 covered by the earlier mark even though the indications of the goods covered by that mark were of a more general nature.
The comparison of the signs
41      It should be recalled that the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
–       Visual similarity
42      The Board of Appeal found that the signs in question were visually similar to at least an average degree. According to the Board of Appeal, the sign applied for is included in its entirety in the earlier sign and they differ only in so far as the earlier sign includes the vowel ‘i’. It also notes that the consumer normally attaches more importance to the first part of words given that the marks at issue are short and that what matters in the assessment of the visual similarity of two word signs is the presence, within each of them, of several letters in the same order.
43      The applicant submits that the differences in short signs have a greater impact on the overall impression than in longer signs. According to the applicant, the shorter a sign is, the more easily the public is able to perceive all the individual
elements of which it is composed.
44      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
45      In the present instance, it must be stated that the signs at issue are composed of four letters in the case of the sign applied for and five letters in the case of the earlier sign. Therefore, they can be regarded as short signs. In addition, the Court notes that the sign applied for is included in its entirety in the earlier sign and that the only difference between those two signs is the presence of the vowel ‘i’ in the word element ‘dalli’, which constitutes the entirety of the earlier sign.
46      It follows from the case-law concerning short signs that it is only when the differences between such signs may lead to different overall impressions that the similarity between them is appreciably reduced (see judgment of 6 February 2020, Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals v EUIPO – Dalmat (LaTV3D), T‑135/19, not published, EU:T:2020:36, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
However, that cannot be the case where, as in the present case, the signs at issue differ merely in so far as the earlier sign includes a vowel as its last letter.
47      In addition, it is clear from case-law that, even in respect of short signs, it is the presence, in each of the word marks, of several letters in the same order which is important. Consequently, the fact that the word mark applied for is contained in its entirety in the earlier mark constitutes a significant indication that the marks are similar even though the signs are short (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 February 2020, LaTV3D, T‑135/19, not published, EU:T:2020:36, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). That is the case here, given that the four letters of the mark applied for are contained in their entirety in the earlier mark.
48      The Board of Appeal was therefore correct in finding that the difference in a single letter did not constitute a significant difference and did not give rise to a different overall visual impression, with the result that the signs at issue were, at the very least, visually similar to an average degree.
–       Phonetic similarity
49      The Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to an average degree. It found that, first, the mark applied for appeared in its entirety in the earlier mark and, secondly, the only difference between the signs at issue was the presence of the vowel ‘i’ at the end of the word element ‘dalli’ of the earlier mark, which did not make it possible to distinguish sufficiently between the signs at issue from a phonetic standpoint.
50      The applicant submits that the signs at issue are not pronounced in the same way in that the earlier mark is composed of a word element which consists of two syllables and ends in a single short vowel ‘i’. By contrast, in the applicant’s view, the mark applied for consists of the word element ‘dall’, which is a heavy syllable characterised by the presence of the vowel ‘a’, and ends in a consonant which will be stressed in English. Consequently, the applicant submits that the element ‘dall’ consists of a longer sound than that of the first syllable of the element ‘dalli’ of the earlier mark and that, therefore, the signs at issue are phonetically different.
51      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
52      It should be noted that, in the present case, the difference between the signs at issue relates to only one letter, the last of the earlier mark, namely the vowel ‘i’, and the entirety of the mark applied for is to be found in the earlier mark. Furthermore, such a difference between the signs cannot suffice, from a phonetic standpoint, to distinguish them sufficiently, given that the applicant has not shown that the Board of Appeal’s assessment, according to which part of the relevant public in the European Union would not stress the letter ‘i’ in the earlier mark, is incorrect.
53      As regards the applicant’s argument concerning the fact that the signs at issue have a different number of syllables, it must be held that the fact that the number of syllables is different is not sufficient to rule out the existence of some phonetic similarity between the signs at issue, as the only element of the mark applied for is included in its entirety in the earlier mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2024, SC Certinvest v EUIPO – Kiddinx Studios (Tina), T‑444/23, not published, EU:T:2024:826, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
54      Consequently, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to an average degree.
–       Conceptual similarity
55      The Board of Appeal found that a conceptual comparison was not possible on the ground that the signs had no clear meaning for the non-German-speaking public in the European Union.
56      The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal did not take into account the fact that the word element ‘dalli’ had meaning for the German-speaking part of the public, which would understand it as ‘hurry up’, ‘on the double’ or ‘make it quick’, whereas the word element ‘dall’, which comprised the mark applied for, had no meaning. He adds that it cannot be excluded that the relevant public outside Germany may have some knowledge of the German language. Consequently, the applicant concluded that those marks were conceptually different.
57      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
58      In that regard, in so far as, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 23 above, it is sufficient that there is a likelihood of confusion in part of the European Union, the Board of Appeal was correct to compare the signs at issue by taking into account the part of the relevant public in respect of which a likelihood of confusion was most likely to exist, namely the non-German-speaking part of that public. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that none of the words making up the marks at issue conveyed any meaning for the non-German-speaking public in the European Union. The word elements ‘dall’ and ‘dalli’ are whimsical terms and have no meaning for the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public.
59      In those circumstances, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal did, that, for the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public, a conceptual comparison of the signs at issue is not possible.
The likelihood of confusion
60      The applicant disputes that there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public. He submits that the usual origin, as apparent from the labelling of the packaging on which the information concerning the manufacturer and the place of manufacture appears, is relevant in order to determine whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion and that that is one of the many factors to be taken into account in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, and not in the comparison of the signs at issue.
61      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
62      The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that, in view of the fact that the goods covered by the mark applied for were identical or similar to those covered by the earlier mark, (i) the level of attention of the relevant public varied from average to higher than average, (ii) the signs at issue were visually and phonetically similar to at least an average degree and (iii) a conceptual comparison was impossible for the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public, there was a likelihood of confusion for the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public.
63      A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
64      The relevant factors of the particular case also include the distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark, which determines the extent of protection. The Court has previously stated that the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion will be (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson, C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
65      In addition, according to the case-law of the Court, the extent of the similarity or difference between the signs at issue may depend, in particular, on the inherent qualities of the signs or the conditions under which the goods or services covered by those signs are marketed. If the goods covered by the mark in question are usually sold in self-service stores where consumers choose the goods themselves and must therefore rely primarily on the image of the trade mark applied to the goods, a visual similarity between the signs will as a general rule be more important (see judgment of 13 December 2007, Cabrera Sánchez v OHIM – Industrias Cárnicas Valle (el charcutero artesano), T‑242/06, not published, EU:T:2007:391, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).
66      In the present case, as has been found in paragraphs 41 to 59 above, the Board of Appeal did not make any errors of assessment in finding that the signs at issue were visually and phonetically similar to at least an average degree and that a conceptual comparison was not possible for the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public. In addition, it must be stated that, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 65 above, the signs at issue cover goods intended for mass consumption and that,
accordingly, they are primarily sold in self-service stores where consumers choose the goods themselves, with the result that the visual aspect of the signs at issue will, as a general rule, be of greater importance.
67      The Board of Appeal also correctly found, without that assessment being called into question by the applicant, that the distinctive character of the earlier mark was average for the relevant public given that the word element ‘dalli’ had no meaning in the non-German-speaking part of that public. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was correct in concluding that, taking into account the relevant factors and their mutual interdependence, there was a likelihood that the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public, for whom the marks at issue had no meaning, would be confused, believing that those identical or similar goods covered by those marks came from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
68      As regards the applicant’s claim that the usual origin as shown by the labelling of the packaging on which the information concerning the manufacturer and the place of manufacture appears is one of the many factors to be taken into account in order to determine whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that, according to case-law, there may be a likelihood of confusion even where, for the public, the goods in question have different places of production (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraphs 29 and 30). The existence of labelling rules is not such as to rule out the possibility that the relevant consumer would identify the commercial origin of the goods by referring to the trade marks rather than to the mandatory additional information on the labels of the goods.
69      Consequently, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue for the relevant public within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
70      Accordingly, the single plea in law must be rejected and, as a result, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
71      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
72      Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener. By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is held, EUIPO must, in the absence of a hearing, be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders Mr Lavrentios Lavrentiadis to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by Dalli-Werke GmbH & Co. KG;
3.      Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.
Brkan
Gâlea
Tóth
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 26 November 2025.
V. Di Bucci
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.