ORDER OF THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed)
11 November 2025 (*)
( Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed )
In Case C‑303/25 P,
APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 24 April 2025,
May OOO, established in Fryazino (Russia), represented by M. Knitter, Rechtsanwältin,
appellant,
the other parties to the proceedings being:
Schweppes International Ltd, established in London (United Kingdom),
applicant at first instance,
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),
defendant at first instance,
THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed),
composed of T. von
Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, S. Rodin and N. Piçarra (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, M. Szpunar,
makes the following
Order
1        By its appeal, May OOO seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 26 February 2025, Schweppes International v EUIPO –
May (MAY TEA) (T‑1066/23 to T‑1069/23, EU:T:2025:181; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court annulled the decisions of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 29 August 2023 (Cases R 72/2022-1, R 77/2022-1, R 75/2022-1 and R 73/2022-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between May and Schweppes International Ltd.
The request that the appeal be allowed to proceed
2        Under the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent Board of Appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so.
3        In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
4        Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure provides that, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court of Justice to rule on that request.
5        In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court of Justice is to give a ruling as soon as possible on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, in the form of a reasoned order.
Arguments of the appellant
6        In support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant submits that the single ground of its appeal, alleging that the General Court misinterpreted
Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) thereof, which led it to conclude that there was no ‘likelihood of confusion’ with the earlier marks within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation, raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
7        By the first part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court misinterpreted the role of the visual differences regarding everyday food products when assessing whether there was such a likelihood of confusion, by holding, in paragraph 68 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the context of such an assessment, the presence of those differences automatically outweighed other factors, in particular the conceptually identical nature of the marks and the identity of the goods. The General Court thus failed to have regard to the case-law arising, in particular, from the judgment of 26 February 2016,
Mederer v OHIM –
Cadbury Netherlands International Holdings (Gummi Bear-Rings) (T‑210/14, EU:T:2016:105), from which it is apparent that differences in the visual appearance of marks cannot preclude a likelihood of confusion where those marks are conceptually identical, in particular when ‘the meaning of the word – the concept – is the dominant element’, as is the situation in the present case.
8        The appellant thus asks the Court of Justice to clarify the criteria for assessing the likelihood of confusion between two marks which are conceptually identical but visually different because of the use of different alphabets.
9        By the second part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, in paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court misinterpreted the applicable provisions of EU law, by underestimating the degree of conceptual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue. None of those provisions implies that the role of the conceptually identical nature of signs in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion is automatically reduced where the signs at issue have a term in common with a lesser distinctive character. This would be in disregard of the General Court’s own case-law, in particular the judgment of 15 October 2020, Rothenberger v EUIPO – Paper Point (ROBOX) (T‑49/20, EU:T:2020:492).
10      The appellant thus relies on the need to align the criteria for assessing the conceptual similarity of signs which share a term with a weak distinctive character.
11      By the third part of that ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having disregarded, in paragraph 71 of the judgment under appeal, the arguments of the parties based on references to decisions of the General Court and of EUIPO. All of those decisions invariably concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion in situations where the signs at issue, consisting, as in the present case, of Latin and Cyrillic letters, conveyed the same meaning or were perceived in a similar way by Russian- and English-speaking communities within the European Union, that is to say, by the relevant public.
12      In that regard, the appellant asks the Court of Justice to clarify, taking those arguments into account, whether and in what circumstances the representation of conceptually identical signs in Cyrillic and Latin characters may give rise to a likelihood of confusion.
Findings of the Court
13      As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by its appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 20, and of 25 June 2025, Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists v EUIPO, C‑6/25 P, EU:C:2025:494, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).
14      Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to specify, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of the Statute of the Court whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 21, and of 25 June 2025, Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists v EUIPO, C‑6/25 P, EU:C:2025:494, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited).
15      Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the judgment or order under appeal, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the judgment or order under appeal. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the judgment or order under appeal which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 22, and of 25 June 2025,
Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists v EUIPO, C‑6/25 P, EU:C:2025:494, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).
16      A request that an appeal be allowed to proceed which does not contain the information mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present order cannot, from the outset, be capable of demonstrating that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that justifies the appeal being allowed to proceed (orders of 24 October 2019, Porsche v EUIPO, C‑613/19 P, EU:C:2019:905, paragraph 16, and of 25 June 2025, Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists v EUIPO, C‑6/25 P, EU:C:2025:494, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
17      In the present case, as regards, in the first place, the arguments summarised in paragraphs 7 to 10 of the present order, concerning the first and second parts of the single ground of appeal, alleging, in essence, an error of law resulting from the General Court disregarding its own case-law, it should be recalled at the outset that such a line of argument is not, in itself, sufficient to establish, in accordance with the burden of proof which lies with the person requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, that that appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law; to that end, that person must comply with all the requirements set out in paragraph 15 of the present order (order of 11 February 2025, W.B. Studio v EUIPO, C‑608/24 P, EU:C:2025:77, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
18      Although the appellant refers to the paragraphs of the rulings of the General Court allegedly infringed by the judgment under appeal, it does not explain, with the requisite precision, the reasons why there is a contradiction between, on the one hand, the earlier case-law on which it relies and, on the other, the findings of the General Court, which, as the appellant itself states, are expressly based on its own case-law. Moreover, the appellant does not explain, with the requisite precision, why such a contradiction, assuming it to be established, raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
19      In the second place, as regards the line of argument set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the present order concerning the third part of the single ground of appeal, relating to the General Court’s failure to have regard to the arguments of the parties based on decisions of the General Court and of EUIPO, it must be stated that the appellant does not identify, in its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the decisions the disregard of which led to the error of law for which it criticises the General Court, and that it does not demonstrate, in a manner that complies with all the requirements set out in paragraph 15 of the present order, how such an error of law, assuming it to be established, raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that would justify the appeal being allowed to proceed (order of 11 May 2023, Heinze v L’Oréal and EUIPO, C‑15/23 P, EU:C:2023:407, paragraph 18).
20      In those circumstances, it must be held that the request submitted by the appellant is not capable of establishing that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
21      In the light of all of the foregoing, the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.
Costs
22      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.
23      Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties to the proceedings and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs.
On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders:
1.      The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
2.      May OOO shall bear its own costs.
Luxembourg, 11 November 2025.
A. Calot Escobar
T. von Danwitz
Registrar
President of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed
*      Language of the case: English.