Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
BIONDI
delivered on 26 February 2026 (1)
Case C‑802/24
NV Reibel
v
JSC VO Stankoimport
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea hovrätt (Svea Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Sweden))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Restrictive measures relating to Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Ban on exporting dual-use items – Refusal to grant an export licence affecting the performance of a contract – Refusal to repay the advance payment – Bringing of proceedings before an arbitration tribunal – Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended – Concept of a claim that cannot be satisfied – Arbitrability of disputes relating to restrictive measures – Judicial review of arbitration awards – Intensity – EU public policy – Fundamental importance for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the European Union )
Table of contents
I.
The dispute in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court
II.
Analysis
A.
Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, the possibility of having recourse to out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms in general and to arbitration in particular
1.
The need to refocus the first question referred for a preliminary ruling on the concept of ‘arbitrability’
2.
Literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended
(a)
Literal interpretation of the no claims clause
(b)
Contextual interpretation of the no claims clause
(c)
Teleological interpretation of the no claims clause
3.
Preservation of the specific characteristics of the EU legal order
4.
Conclusion of the analysis
B.
Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, and EU public policy
1.
Public policy as a limit on the free will of parties
2.
The fundamental nature of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, for the EU legal order and the enhancement of EU public order provided by Article 11(1) of that regulation
3.
The intensity of the review of arbitration awards carried out by national courts or tribunals
C.
The concept of a ‘claim’ within the meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended
1.
Revisiting Article 11(1) of Regulation No°833/2014, as amended
2.
Application to the present case
III.
Conclusion
1.        This reference for a preliminary ruling offers the Court the opportunity to write a new chapter in the relationship, sometimes perceived as tortuous, between EU law and out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms. The questions raised are hugely important, given that they arise here in the particular context of restrictive measures adopted against Russia following its actions to destabilise and its subsequent invasion of Ukraine, which constitute both a flagrant infringement of international law and the United Nations Charter and one of the most serious threats to European security and the international order since the end of the Second World War.
2.        The relation between EU law and arbitration, in particular, is often described by reference to the metaphor of two ships passing in the night, (2) in which they barely glimpse one another in the darkness, yet constantly ensure
that they navigate at a safe distance to avoid any collision, limit their communication to what is strictly necessary and leave behind them wakes which never cross as they sail for opposing headlands.
3.        And yet, to reject nuance is to impoverish reality. That reality, any misunderstanding of which I would like to dispel, also has points of intersection and shared values. The EU legal order does not preclude, in principle, individuals who are subject to that legal order by virtue of pursuing an economic activity, within the territory of the European Union, from submitting disputes that may arise between them in the context of that pursuit to an arbitration mechanism. (3) The role of arbitration, as an expression of the will of the parties and as a tool that allows disputes to be resolved quickly and efficiently, (4) is highly valued. The case-law of the Court is indeed firmly based on acknowledging the significance of an arbitration agreement, which reflects the freely expressed wishes of the parties. (5) I would add that commercial arbitration today represents one of the few effective forms of international cooperation, because it seeks to ensure that uniform rules are applied and to facilitate legal transplants and cross-border enforcement.
4.        Establishing a relationship based on a mutual enrichment between EU law and arbitration is achieved by striving for an essential balance between, on the one hand, the versatility and the flexibility provided by that method of dispute resolution and, on the other hand, the preservation of the integrity of the EU legal order and its fundamental features.
5.        This case will further allow the Court to rule on the delineation of EU public policy as a limit on the freedom of choice of the parties and on the determination of the intensity of the – supposedly effective – judicial review of arbitration awards.
I.      The dispute in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court
6.        NV Reibel is a Belgian company operating in the fields of logistics and the international transportation of goods. On 8 December 2015, Reibel concluded an agreement with the Russian company JSC VO Stankoimport, which imports metal products and machinery into Russia. Under that agreement, Reibel was inter alia to sell and supply goods to Stankoimport. The agreement contained an arbitration clause under which all disputes, other than those falling within the jurisdiction of national courts, would be subject to arbitration and, in the event of arbitration, Swedish law would apply. It also provided that the sanctions adopted by the European Union against Russia would be considered neither to constitute force majeure nor as releasing the parties from their obligations under the agreement.
7.        Following the decision of the Belgian authorities of 23 March 2017, the goods which Reibel was to deliver to Stankoimport could not be exported, as those authorities had found that those goods were intended for the production of helicopter parts and had, therefore, classified them as ‘dual-use items’ within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, (6) the sale of which is prohibited by Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. (7) The action brought by Reibel against that decision before the Conseil d’État (Council of State, Belgium) was dismissed.
8.        However, Stankoimport had paid in advance part of the amount payable for that supply of goods which never, therefore, took place. As Reibel did not repay the advance received, Stankoimport terminated the agreement and filed a request for arbitration.
9.        In an arbitration award made on 5 December 2021, the arbitration tribunal upheld Stankoimport’s claim for repayment of the advance paid to Reibel, plus interest, and ordered Reibel to pay part of the costs. As to the remainder, the arbitration tribunal dismissed the claim for Reibel to be ordered to pay compensation in respect of breaches of the agreement and other losses, plus interest. The arbitration tribunal found that Stankoimport’s claim for repayment, plus interest, did not fall within the scope of the ‘claims’ which are not to be satisfied pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, (8) a concept which does not therefore cover a claim for repayment of an amount paid for goods which were never supplied. In the arbitration tribunal’s view, the sole aim of Stankoimport’s claim was to restore the parties to the position they were in before the agreement was concluded. By contrast, as regards Stankoimport’s other claims, the arbitration tribunal took the view that they fell within the scope of Article 11, as Stankoimport was attempting to obtain a financial advantage from Reibel’s failure to perform the prohibited transaction.
10.      Reibel brought an action seeking to have the arbitration award set aside before the Svea hovrätt (Svea Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Sweden), the referring court. Under Swedish law, disputes concerning matters which the parties may settle by agreement may be submitted to one or more arbiters for examination. (9) Furthermore, an arbitration award is null and void, inter alia, if it involves the examination of a question which, under Swedish law, may not be decided by arbiters, or where the award or the manner in which it was made is manifestly incompatible with Swedish public policy. (10)
11.      Furthermore, as required by Regulation No 833/2014, Swedish law provides for a system of sanctions which lays down rules on penalties, prosecution, confiscation and coercive measures in the event of non-compliance with the obligations under that regulation. (11)
12.      First of all, given how the provisions of Swedish law stand on matters of arbitrability, the referring court has to determine whether the parties to a transaction such as that forming the subject of the agreement between Reibel and Stankoimport which was affected by measures adopted pursuant to Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, are entitled to reach an amicable settlement on claims such as those referred to in Article 11(1) of that regulation. This thus involves determining the potential effects in civil law of that no claims clause. (12) A broad interpretation of that provision, dictated in particular by the essential requirement recognised by the Court (13) of preventing the circumvention of restrictive measures, could support the interpretation that civil sanctions, such as nullity, should likewise be imposed.
13.      Secondly, the referring court asks whether Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, comes under EU public policy. That determination is decisive because it follows from Swedish law that arbitration awards may be declared null and void where they prove to be manifestly incompatible with Swedish public policy. Such a solution must be extended to cover cases of incompatibility with EU public policy. (14)
14.      Thirdly and lastly, the referring court seeks clarification of the scope and the interpretation of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, with a view to determining whether a claim for repayment of an advance payment relating to an agreement the performance of which was prevented by that regulation as well as the interest claimed on that basis fall within the scope of claims which are not to be satisfied within the meaning of Article 11(1) of that
regulation.
15.      It is in those circumstances that the Svea hovrätt (Svea Court of Appeal, Stockholm) decided to stay the proceedings and, by order received at the Court Registry on 20 November 2024, to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)      Must Regulation [No 833/2014] be interpreted as meaning that parties to an agreement are precluded from reaching an agreement out of court on claims which, under Article 11(1) of that regulation, are not to be satisfied and that amicable settlements reached by the parties to an agreement on claims covered by Article 11(1) are null and void in civil law?
(2)      Must Article 11 of [Regulation No 33/2014] be interpreted as meaning that a national court hearing an application for setting aside or annulment of an arbitration award in which that article has been applied must determine of its own motion whether the arbitration tribunal’s application of the law is compatible with [Regulation No 833/2014] and, in such a case, must the national court annul or set aside the arbitration award in whole or in part if the arbitration tribunal’s application of the law was contrary to the regulation?
(3)      Must Article 11(1) of [Regulation No 833/2014] be interpreted as not precluding satisfaction of a claim if the claim concerns
(a)      repayment of an advance payment in respect of goods which were never supplied on account of measures under [Regulation No 833/2014]?
(b)      interest on a claim mentioned in (a)?’
16.      Written observations were lodged by Stankoimport, the Swedish, Belgian, Estonian, Spanish, French and Polish Governments, and the European Commission.
17.      Reibel, Stankoimport and the Swedish, Estonian, Spanish, French, Netherlands and Polish Governments, together with the Commission, attended the hearing held before the Court on 28 October 2025.
II.    Analysis
18.      It must be stated at the outset that the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the referring court are admissible, contrary to what Stankoimport contends. It is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. (15) In addition, the questions referred to the Court differ quite significantly from those submitted in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Rosneft. (16)
A.      Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, the possibility of having recourse to out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms in general and to arbitration in particular
19.      By its first question referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring court asks the Court to establish whether it is compatible with Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, for two parties to have recourse to an out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism, including in respect of claims which are not to be satisfied within the meaning of Article 11(1) of that regulation. If not, that court asks whether agreements concluded outside the State court system and relating to such claims must be declared null and void.
20.      The Court is thus asked to define the scope of the prohibition on satisfying a claim, within the meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, and to determine whether it extends as far as preventing any recourse to an out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism.
21.      The line of reasoning that I will set out below proposes following three successive stages. First of all, I will have to explain why the analysis of the first question must be refocused on the issue of the arbitrability of disputes. The next stage will involve interpreting Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, adopting the traditional interpretative approach. Finally, it must be ensured that the interpretation proposed does not threaten the specific characteristics and the autonomy of the EU legal order. (17)
1.      The need to refocus the first question referred for a preliminary ruling on the concept of ‘arbitrability’
22.      That first question seeks to determine whether Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, allows recourse to an agreement out of court on claims which are not to be satisfied. However, that question appears to be closely linked to the arbitrability of such claims.
23.      Arbitrability is an ‘abstract, intricate, ill-defined and elusive matter which gives rise to quite a few misunderstandings, if not contradictions’. (18) It has almost as many definitions as there are Member States. (19) Member States are free to determine when recourse may be made to arbitration and to define, as a reflection, their own concept of the limits on the free will of parties. Arbitrability is regarded as objective where it refers to the possibility of the matter in question being submitted to arbitration. It can also be subjective where it refers to the possibility of compromise by the party concerned. (20)
24.      The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in New York on 10 June 1958 (‘the New York Convention’), (21) which is not binding on the European Union but to which all Member States are parties, (22) states, with regard to arbitrability, that ‘each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration’. (23) Arbitrability is defined in that convention solely in the negative, since ‘recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may … be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: … the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country’. (24)
25.      In Swedish law, the arbitrability of a dispute is determined by whether the parties are permitted to reach a settlement outside the judicial system in respect of the claim at issue. If so, the dispute is arbitrable; if not, the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration. Therefore, if Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, were to be interpreted as precluding out-of-court settlement, (25) the arbitrability of the dispute between Reibel and Stankoimport would be affected in accordance with the applicable national law. Under that same law, the arbitration clause contained in the agreement between Reibel and Stankoimport would have to be declared null and void by the referring court without any need for judicial review of the arbitration award, which would then lack any legal basis.
26.      Answering the first question referred for a preliminary ruling as it is worded would put the Court in a delicate position, as the concept of the ‘out-of-court settlement of claims’ is too broad. There are many forms of out-of-court settlement and each of those forms has different operating rules and safeguards. In addition, the dispute in the main proceedings raises the very specific question of recourse to arbitration, which is not just any method of dispute resolution and which is governed by specific features, which must necessarily be taken into account in the analysis. The conclusions to be drawn from the interpretation of EU law provided by the Court have previously led to a finding of non-arbitrability. (26)
27.      It is for that reason that I propose the first question be refocused on the question of whether Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, allows the parties to an agreement to have recourse to arbitration in respect of claims which are not to be satisfied within the meaning of that provision.
2.      Literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended
28.      In accordance with established case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must be established according to its usual meaning in everyday language, taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part. (27)
(a)    Literal interpretation of the no claims clause
29.      First, with regard to the wording of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, I note that it lays down a no claims clause, which is frequently inserted into EU acts introducing restrictive measures. The scope of that provision covers, inter alia, claims submitted by any Russian person, entity or body (28) for compensation or any other claim of that type (29) on the basis of a contract or a transaction being affected by the restrictive measures laid down by Regulation No 833/2014, as amended.
30.      Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 is addressed to the person who receives the claim in question, who is obliged not to satisfy it. Not satisfying a claim means, as the French Government has observed, that a favourable response must not be given to it.
31.      It is apparent from the literal analysis of that article that its wording appears not to contain any reference to the body – in the broad sense of the term – before which the ‘claims’ to which it refers would be brought. Such a conclusion is further borne out by the statement that the claim is not to be satisfied regardless of the form of that claim.
32.      It also follows from the foregoing that the drafting and the submission of claims are not, as such, prohibited. (30) Furthermore, the mere provision, in an agreement, for recourse to out-of-court settlement, including arbitration, is without prejudice to the potential outcome of its provision, that is to say, to what will be the fate of the ‘claim’.
33.      The fact that Article 11(2) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, refers to the ‘proceedings for the enforcement of a claim’ and specifies that proof that satisfying the claim is not prohibited must be produced by the person seeking the enforcement of that claim does not, in my view, demonstrate that the claim in question must necessarily be part of a judicial process. It is true that that provision does borrow from the lexicon traditionally used to describe what happens before a court. However, that cannot be the decisive factor, as ‘proceedings’ and ‘proof’ are also elements of out-of-court dispute resolution methods. That provision necessarily implies that the question of whether a claim is caught by the prohibition in paragraph 1 may be debated, without confining that debate to judicial bodies only. (31)
34.      It does not therefore follow from the literal interpretation of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, that persons falling within its scope are prohibited from submitting a claim in connection with any contract or transaction which they allege is affected by the measures imposed by that regulation before non-judicial bodies and from seeking settlement of that claim.
(b)    Contextual interpretation of the no claims clause
35.      Analysis of the context surrounding Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, brings to light two key factors. First, the free will of the parties to seek a settlement of their disputes outside the State justice system appears to be delineated by a number of safeguards. Secondly, that context shows that the EU legislature has not undertaken any action in relation to the content of agreements as regards recourse to arbitration.
36.      Thus, first, Article 12 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, lays down a very clear prohibition on participating, knowingly and intentionally, in the circumvention of the prohibitions laid down in that regulation, including those under Article 2 of that
regulation. That prohibition is accompanied by a system of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties which Member States are required to implement under Article 8(1) of that same regulation.
37.      In addition, Article 13 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, provides for a broad scope of application since that regulation applies within the territory of the Union as well as to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State, to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State and to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union. (32)
38.      Secondly, it is likewise apparent from the contextual analysis that the EU legislature did not lay down, in Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, any obligation to amend existing agreements in order to exclude any arbitration clause. Nor did it require that contracts concluded after that regulation entered into force do not contain any clause providing for recourse to arbitration or, more broadly, to an out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism.
39.      However, with the adoption of Article 12g(1), which was inserted into Regulation No 833/2014 in 2023, (33) the EU legislature did intervene directly in the content of contracts by laying down the obligation on exporters to prohibit contractually, as of 20 March 2024, re-exportation to Russia and re-exportation for use in Russia. (34)
40.      While it follows from the literal and contextual analysis of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, that it appears permissible for a party to make a claim which is not to be satisfied before an arbitration tribunal, it remains to be determined whether such an interpretation does not threaten the purpose of that provision.
(c)    Teleological interpretation of the no claims clause
41.      The purpose of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, is to prevent those targeted or impacted by restrictive measures from ‘being able to obtain compensation for the adverse effects [of those measures], and to protect economic operators from claims which may be made against them by … counterparts on the basis of contracts the performance of which has been affected by those measures or in relation to them’. (35)
42.      Such an objective can be ensured only if, I recall unequivocally, arbitration bodies may receive ‘claims’ but must not satisfy them. That clarification is significant in the light of the broader purpose of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, which consists in ‘increasing the costs of Russia’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and [in] promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis’. (36)
43.      It therefore appears that the purpose of the no claims clause can therefore be achieved even if recourse is had to arbitration and provided that any negligence or complicity on the part of the EU operator that results in a breach of the prohibition laid down in Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, is subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. (37)
3.      Preservation of the specific characteristics of the EU legal order
44.      The Court has already held that ‘the legal order established by the Treaties does not preclude, in principle, individuals who are subject to that legal order by virtue of pursuing an economic activity, within the territory of the European Union, from submitting disputes that may arise between them in the context of that pursuit to an arbitration mechanism’. (38) Individuals can, in principle, have recourse to arbitration. (39) They may therefore conclude an agreement that subjects, in clear and precise terms, all or part of any disputes relating to that agreement to an arbitration tribunal in place of the court or tribunal that would normally have had jurisdiction in the absence of an arbitration clause. (40)
45.      The European Union’s choice to adopt restrictive measures with a view to meeting its objectives in the field of the common foreign and security policy has not, under Regulation No 833/2014, as currently amended, (41) adversely affected the possibility of recourse to arbitration.
46.      Nevertheless, I consider it necessary to recall the requirements of EU law with regard to arbitration.
47.      Thus, the arbitration bodies before which a claim, within the meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, could be submitted (42) are not only bound by EU law but also, at their level, are the guarantors that EU law will be applied correctly and observed. (43) Although set apart from the State court system, and therefore having no dialogue with the Court, they do not however sit outside the scope of EU law.
48.      Arbitration bodies are therefore required to perform their duties with due diligence. It falls to them to ensure that a fair balance is struck between the parties’ ‘right to autonomy’ and the Member States’ interest in preserving and safeguarding the fundamental values that are a matter of its public policy. Those bodies are therefore obliged to consider how to make an award that should be incapable of being challenged before the courts or tribunals of the place of arbitration on public policy grounds. In the specific context of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union, they must be particularly vigilant with respect to arrangements that could be used to circumvent such measures, such as the choice of the applicable law or consent agreements, the purpose of which is to get around the prohibitions imposed by the restrictive measures. The arbiter’s flexibility in the application of the law is therefore limited by the obligation to apply the public policy grounds of the country of the place of arbitration (lex arbitri).
49.      If the arbitration tribunal chosen has its seat in the European Union, it will be required to comply with the public policy of the Member State of its seat, which is expanded by EU public policy – as I will demonstrate in my analysis of the second question referred for a preliminary ruling – and judicial review of the arbitration award is possible. (44) This is the case in the context of the dispute in the main proceedings.
50.      Although this is not necessary for the resolution of the dispute, I would add that, if that arbitration tribunal chosen is located outside the European Union, first, that choice, assuming it was freely agreed to, could potentially expose the EU operator concerned to penalties imposed on account of the circumvention of the measures laid down by Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, if it were to result in a breach of the prohibition laid down in Article 11(1) of that regulation.
51.      Secondly, I do not rule out that EU public policy may have extraterritorial effects by virtue of Article 13(e) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, which provides that that regulation is to apply to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.
52.      Thirdly, since arbitration awards are not directly enforceable, a procedure of recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitration award would have to be undertaken before a court or tribunal in the European Union. In that context, recognition and enforcement will be ordered only if that award is in line with the public policy of the Member State concerned, and therefore with EU public policy.
53.      In any case, the voluntary enforcement of an arbitration award which would infringe the prohibition laid down in Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, should entail the imposition of penalties on the EU operator concerned on account of its participation in circumventing the restrictive measures imposed by that regulation. (45)
4.      Conclusion of the analysis
54.      It follows from the foregoing that Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, must be interpreted as not precluding two parties to an agreement from having recourse to arbitration in relation to a claim that is not to be satisfied within the meaning of that provision, it being understood that, in any event, first, satisfaction cannot be obtained, in the course or on completion of such arbitration, in respect of a claim which is contrary to that provision and, secondly, the arbitration award must always be open to judicial review in order to guarantee compliance with EU public policy.
B.      Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, and EU public policy
1.      Public policy as a limit on the free will of parties
55.      The dispute in the main proceedings concerns an arbitration award in which the arbitration tribunal ruled inter alia on the question of whether Stankoimport’s claim fell within the scope of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended. For its part, an action has been brought before the referring court by Reibel asking that the arbitration award be set aside. Under national law, such an award must be set aside in the event of a breach of public policy.
56.      It follows from its recent case-law that the Court acknowledges that the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings, which must be preserved, means that the review of arbitration awards is specific in nature. (46) However, from the point at which an arbitration mechanism is to be implemented in the European Union, in particular in the context of disputes related to the pursuit of an economic activity within its territory, such implementation must necessarily ensure the compatibility of that mechanism with the structural principles of the EU judicial architecture as well as effective compliance with EU public policy. (47)
57.      While the requirement of a review of the compliance of arbitration awards with EU public policy appeared in the past to be heavily dependent on national law, (48) supplemented by the international obligations of the Member States, (49) it now appears to have become an autonomous requirement, on the basis of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’)
and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in more recent case-law. (50)
58.      Though specific, the judicial
review of arbitration awards is no less effective. (51) Within that framework, the path of arbitration therefore cannot be chosen by a person wishing to ‘discard the principles and provisions of primary or secondary EU law which are essential to the legal order established by the Treaties or are of fundamental importance for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the European Union’, as those principles and provisions form part of EU public policy. (52) Such judicial review, drawing on considerations of public policy, is therefore fundamental to preserving the characteristics of the EU legal order at the same time as addressing the specific nature of arbitration.
59.      EU public policy therefore operates, as such, as a limit on the free will of parties: observance of such policy is mandatory for individuals. (53) As the Court has held, it constitutes ‘an essential complement to the structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations binding the European Union and the Member States and binding the Member States to each other’. (54)
2.      The fundamental nature of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, for the EU legal order and the enhancement of EU public order provided by Article 11(1) of that regulation
60.      EU public policy, like that of the Member States, is a shifting concept. The criteria for a principle or a provision to fall within its scope are not clearly defined by the Court. However, what the case-law of the Court does teach us is that those principles or provisions must be so significant that any breach of them would be so unacceptable for the legal order concerned that it could not be tolerated. (55)
61.      Thus, provisions such as Article 11 of the Charter, (56) Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, (57) the free movement of workers, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital within the European Union, (58) or even Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC (59) are part of EU public policy.
62.      EU public policy is also defined negatively. Thus, the Court has held that an error in law as to the application of the provisions under the first Directive 89/104/EEC (60) vitiating a judicial decision recognition of which was sought did not constitute a breach of an essential rule of law in the EU legal order. (61)
63.      In the light of the conditions recently recalled by the Court, (62) there can be no doubt, in my view, that Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, is essential and/or of fundamental importance to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the European Union.
64.      I note that one of those tasks, to which Article 3 TEU refers, is the promotion of peace, the first of the aims mentioned in that provision. (63) Paragraph 5 of that article states that, in its relations with the wider world, the Union is to uphold and promote its values and that it is to contribute to peace and security, mutual respect among peoples, the protection of human rights and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
65.      Article 21 TEU reiterates the Union’s commitment, on the international scene, to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for human dignity and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. (64) The Union’s policies and actions in the field of the common foreign and security policy are to be guided by the objectives of safeguarding its values and fundamental interests and consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security. (65)
66.      Based on Article 215 TFEU, Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, builds upon those objectives, as the restrictive measures which it imposes stem from the CFSP decision to interrupt or curtail economic and financial relations with Russia. It follows from recital 2 of that regulation that those measures are aimed at ‘increasing the costs of Russia’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and [at] promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis’. The Court has already acknowledged that such objectives are of utmost importance and in line with the – no lesser – objective of preserving peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s external action stated in Article 21 TEU, to which I have just referred. (66)
67.      In addition, since it is settled case-law that the importance of the objectives pursued by acts imposing restrictive measures in general, and by Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, in particular, is such as to justify the possibility that, for certain operators, the consequences may be negative, even significantly so, (67) it is my view that those consequences can also take the form of a limit on the contractual autonomy of individuals, a limit (68) which necessarily stems from the fact that EU public policy also consists of the restrictive measures adopted against Russia.
68.      That said, I also note that the Court has always acted selectively and that,
essentially, it has assigned public policy status to the principles or provisions distinctly. For example, as Directive 93/13 was held to be a measure that is essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the European Union, it is ultimately for the national courts or tribunals to ensure that an arbitration award is compatible simply with Article 6(1) of that directive. (69)
69.      I therefore consider it necessary, and sufficient in the light of the precise nature of the provisions recognised as public policy provisions, to find that Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, is part of EU public policy. In that way, it is ensured that public policy is focused on essential provisions of EU law without undermining to an excessive degree the functioning of mechanisms such as arbitration, whilst preserving an adequate level of protection of the rights derived from EU law.
70.      Such an approach also ensures that EU public policy is actually composed of provisions which have direct effect and create rights for individuals that national courts or tribunals must protect. (70)
71.      Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014 seeks to ensure that EU operators will not be exposed to adverse consequences resulting from the change in their legal position following the entry into force of the restrictive measures in respect of Russia. In other words, a co-contracting party of a Russian entity which can no longer comply with its contractual obligations on account of the measures laid down by Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, can rely on the right under that provision not to satisfy that entity’s claims, and it falls to the national courts and tribunals to protect that right. However, not all the provisions of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, necessarily create rights for individuals. (71) It is for that reason that, in my view, it is sufficient to adhere to the statement adopted in 2025 by the EU legislature that ‘the effective implementation of the no claims clause [is] the public policy of the Union and the Member States’. (72)
3.      The intensity of the review of arbitration awards carried out by national courts or tribunals
72.      The review of arbitration awards can be tailored to allow arbitration mechanisms to be developed within the flexible framework that characterises such mechanisms. However, judicial review of such awards must be effective. (73) As a result, Member States are free to choose the means but have an obligation as to the end result.
73.      The Court has already clearly set out what it expects of such a review in its judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing. (74) Although, in that judgment, the Court had to deal with a different type of arbitration mechanism from that at issue in the case in the main proceedings, (75) it is inconceivable to me that the effective judicial protection of individuals who hold rights conferred by EU law that form part of public policy can be variable in its scope.
74.      Therefore, first, ‘the courts or tribunals of the Member States that are called upon to carry out such a review must, where such an award involves, as in the present case, an interpretation or application of the principles or provisions which form part of EU public policy and which confer rights or freedoms on individuals, be able to review the interpretation of those principles or provisions, the legal consequences attached to that interpretation as regards their application to the case at hand, and the legal classification which was given, in the light of that interpretation, to the facts as established and assessed by the arbitration body’. (76) The judicial review is therefore targeted solely at those provisions that form part of EU public policy. As far as the remainder of the provisions is concerned, it is presumed that the arbitration bodies are performing their duties entirely responsibly. (77)
75.      Secondly, ‘those courts or tribunals cannot confine themselves to finding, as the case may be, that such an award is inconsistent, in full or in part, with the principles or provisions which form part of EU public policy. … On the contrary, those courts or tribunals must also be able to draw, within the framework of their respective powers and in accordance with the applicable national provisions, all the appropriate legal conclusions where such an inconsistency is found to exist. Failing that, the judicial review carried out would not be effective, inasmuch as it could allow that inconsistency to persist’. (78) I would add that the respect and the primacy which must be afforded to EU public policy would not be ensured if the inconsistency were to persist. (79)
76.      The effectiveness of judicial review that is centred on the fundamentals of the EU legal order requires, lastly, national courts or tribunals to address, where appropriate of their own motion, (80) the question of the compatibility of arbitration awards with EU public policy. (81)
77.      I note that, in the case of the dispute in the main proceedings, Swedish law appears to ensure an effective review of arbitration awards, since the Swedish courts responsible for that review are required to declare those awards null and void if they are manifestly incompatible with Swedish public policy, of which EU public policy forms part, or if they were rendered in a manner that was manifestly inconsistent with Swedish and EU public policy. (82)
78.      It follows from the reasoning set out above that Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, is part of EU public policy. A national court or tribunal before which an action for an arbitration award to be set aside is brought must ensure, where appropriate of its own motion, that the application of that provision by the arbitration body is consistent with that provision. If an incompatibility with that provision is found to exist, the court or tribunal concerned must draw all the appropriate conclusions, in accordance with its national law, and grant the application to have the award set aside based on the breach of EU public policy in order to remove the incompatibility from the EU legal order.
C.      The concept of a ‘claim’ within the meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended
79.      Under the arbitration award at issue in the main proceedings, Stankoimport obtained, first, the repayment of the advance paid to Reibel for the supply of goods the exportation of which was ultimately not authorised and, secondly, the payment of interest. The referring court, which is responsible for the review of that award, asks the Court to establish whether Stankoimport’s claim for repayment of the advance plus interest falls within the scope of the ‘claims’ which are not to be satisfied within the meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended.
80.      In order to answer that question, it is necessary, first, to revisit the analysis of that provision, before, subsequently, applying the lessons learned from that analysis in order to categorise the claim submitted by Stankoimport to the arbitration tribunal.
1.      Revisiting Article 11(1) of Regulation No°833/2014, as amended
81.      Interpreting that concept means adopting the same analytical approach as that set out in point 28 of this Opinion.
82.      Accordingly, in the light of the wording of that article, its context, its purpose and the system established by Regulation No 833/2014,
as amended,
taken as a whole, it is my view that the claim for repayment submitted by Stankoimport does come under the concept of a ‘claim’ which is not to be satisfied.
83.      Thus, first, Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014,
as amended,
is worded in very broad terms: (83) the claims covered by that provision relate to ‘any contract’ or ‘any transaction’, whatever its form, provided that their performance has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under that regulation. (84) It provides a list of claims purely for illustrative purposes. Introduced by the word ‘notably’, that list is therefore not exhaustive. It includes claims for indemnity or any other claim of that type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, without being restricted to such claims. (85) Lastly, Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014,
as amended,
covers not only claims made by natural and legal persons to whom the restrictive measures are of individual concern, but also those made by any other Russian person, entity or body.
84.      Secondly, from a contextual and systemic perspective, the no claims clause is intended to head off the consequences arising from the fact that, once it has entered into force, Regulation No 833/2014 overrides all incompatible contractual provisions. (86) It is apparent from Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014,
as amended,
that, where the claim relates to a contract or a transaction the performance of which has been affected by the measures laid down by that regulation, the non-satisfaction of that claim is automatic, irrespective of whether satisfying the claim would entail infringement of the other measures provided for in that regulation, that is to say, a prohibited transaction. Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014,
as amended,
is therefore an autonomous provision which contains all the conditions required for its application.
85.      Thirdly, as for the purpose of the no claims clause, that type of clause was introduced into an EU act, for the first time, by Regulation (EEC) No 3541/92. (87) The preamble to that regulation stated that, as a consequence of the embargo against Iraq, ‘economic operators in the Community and third countries are exposed to the risk of claims by the Iraqi side … It is necessary to protect operators permanently against such claims and to prevent Iraq from obtaining compensation for the negative effects of the embargo’. (88) In the context of restrictive measures and as I have already established, (89) the purpose of the no claims clause is to protect EU economic operators who have been placed in an ‘untenable situation’ (90) from the claims which may be made against them by counterparts on the basis of contracts or transactions the performance of which has been affected by those measures. (91)
86.      Taking a view on the question of the validity of Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014 (92) in the light of the principle of proportionality, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, the Court has held that ‘the importance of the objectives pursued by [Regulation No 833/2014], namely the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in that country, the achievement of which … is part of the wider objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s external action stated in Article 21 TEU, is such as to justify the possibility that, for certain operators, the consequences may be negative, even significantly so. In those circumstances, and having regard, inter alia, to the fact that the restrictive measures adopted by the Council in reaction to the crisis in Ukraine have become progressively more severe, interference with [the] freedom to conduct a business and [the] right to property cannot be considered to be disproportionate.’ (93)
87.      The fact that the claim at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings was submitted by a person falling within the scope of Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014,
as amended,
does not appear to me to be such as to alter that conclusion. (94)
88.      It follows from the case-law of the Court that the negative consequences, even those of a substantial nature, to which I have just referred, must be borne, inter alia, by those who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the measures in question, but who find themselves affected, particularly as regards their property rights. (95)
89.      In any event, as regards the potential adverse effect on Stankoimport’s right to property, I would point out that the finding that that company has a claim against Reibel could absolutely be made by a decision the enforcement of which is suspended (96) or by a declaratory judgment protecting that claim. Since the restrictive measures are temporary and reversible, (97) payment of the amount claimed should be made once the measures are lifted.
2.      Application to the present case
90.      Stankoimport’s claim for repayment of the advance paid falls, in my view, within the scope of the claims which are not to be satisfied within the meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended. In line with the principle that the accessory follows the principal, the same goes for the claim for payment of interest.
91.      First, the claim is submitted by Stankoimport, a Russian operator.
92.      Secondly, the claim is undeniably submitted on account of, and therefore in connection with, the agreement between Stankoimport and Reibel for the supply of goods.
93.      Lastly, the performance of that agreement was prevented by virtue of the prohibition on the exportation of ‘dual-use items’ under Article 2 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended. (98) Its performance does indeed therefore appear to be directly affected, at least in part, by the measures imposed by that regulation. (99) In referring the matter to the arbitration tribunal, Stankoimport necessarily intended to rely on the non-supply of the goods, and therefore not on Reibel’s failure to comply with contractual obligations, to obtain repayment of the advance paid.
94.      It follows from the foregoing that Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014,
as amended,
must be interpreted as precluding the satisfaction of a claim for repayment of an advance, plus interest, paid in respect of goods the supply of which has been prevented on the basis of that regulation.
III. Conclusion
95.      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Svea hovrätt (Svea Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Sweden) as follows:
Article 11(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, in the version thereof applicable on the date of the arbitration award at issue in the main proceedings
must be interpreted as:
–         not precluding two parties to an agreement from having recourse to arbitration in relation to a claim that is not to be satisfied within the meaning of that provision, it being understood that, in any event, first, satisfaction cannot be obtained, in the course or on completion of such arbitration, in respect of a claim which is contrary to that provision and, secondly, the arbitration award must always be open to judicial review in order to guarantee compliance with EU public policy;
–        being part of EU public policy. A national court or tribunal before which an action for an arbitration award to be set aside is brought must ensure, where appropriate of its own motion, that the application of that provision by the arbitration tribunal is compatible with that provision. If that application is found to be incompatible with that provision, the court or tribunal concerned must draw all the appropriate conclusions, in accordance with its national law, and grant the application to have the award set aside based on the breach of EU public policy in order to remove the incompatibility from the EU legal order;
–        precluding the satisfaction of a claim for repayment of an advance, plus interest, paid in respect of goods the supply of which has been prevented on the basis of Regulation No 833/2014.
1      Original language: French.
2      The inspiration coming from the famous poem by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Theologian’s Tale; Elizabeth.
3      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 78).
4      Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (OJ 2013 L 165, p. 63).
5      Judgment of 22 February 2024, Mytilinaios v DEI and Commission and Commission v DEI (C‑701/21 P and C‑739/21 P, EU:C:2024:146, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).
6      Council Regulation of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ 2009 L 134, p. 1).
7      Council Regulation of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), cited here in the version thereof resulting from its amendment by Council Regulation (EU) No 1290/2014 of 4 December 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, and amending Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (OJ 2014 L 349, p. 20). See, in particular, Article 1(a) and Article 2 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended.
8      For the remainder of my analysis, and unless otherwise stated, I will refer to ‘Regulation No 833/2014, as amended’ in so far as it concerns the version of that regulation applicable on the date of the arbitration award at issue in the main proceedings, that is to say, as it read following Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1163 of 5 July 2019 amending and setting out a single list for the Annexes containing contact details of Member States competent authorities and address for notifications to the European Commission to certain Regulations concerning restrictive measures (OJ 2019 L 182, p. 33).
Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, reads as follows:
‘1.      No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:
(a)      entities referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 5(1) and in points (c) and (d) of Article 5(2), or listed in Annexes III, IV, V and VI;
(b)      any other Russian person, entity or body;
(c)      any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b) of this paragraph.
2.      In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3.      This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.’
9      Under the first subparagraph of Paragraph 1 of Lag (1999:116) om skiljeförarande (Law No 116 of 1999 on arbitration proceedings; ‘the Law on arbitration’).
10      Under the first subparagraph of Paragraph 33 of the Law on arbitration.
11      Lagen (1996:95) om vissa internationella sanktioner (Law No 95 of 1996 on certain international sanctions).
12      The referring court observes that a request for a preliminary ruling is currently before the Court regarding Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6) which raises similar questions, namely the case of Čiekuri-Shishki (C‑480/24, EU:C:2025:672).
13      The referring court relies here on the judgment of 11 November 2021, Bank Sepah (C‑340/20, EU:C:2021:903, paragraph 56), and the judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council (T‑715/14, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 206).
14      The referring court relies here on the judgment of 26 October 2006, Mostaza Claro (C‑168/05, EU:C:2006:675, paragraph 35).
15      See, from amongst a wealth of case-law, judgment of 30 October 2025, Attal et
Associés (C‑321/24, EU:C:2025:836, paragraph 19).
16      Judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236). As a reminder, those questions concerned the jurisdiction of the Court to rule on the validity of a CFSP decision and, subsequently, on the validity of certain provisions of such a decision and of Regulation No 833/2014, including Article 11 thereof, as well as on the interpretation of certain provisions of that regulation. In that judgment, the Court therefore examined the validity of Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014 in the light of the principle of proportionality and of interference with its freedom to conduct business and the right to property (see paragraphs 143 to 151 of that judgment).
17      See judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 35).
18      Jarrosson, C., ‘L’arbitrabilité: présentation méthodologique’, Revue de jurisprudence commerciale, No 1, 1996, p. 1.
19      Arbitrability is not a uniform concept in the Member States. In France, Spain and Italy, disputes concerning available rights are ‘arbitrable’ (see, respectively, Article 2059 of the French Civil Code, Article 2(1) of Spanish Law 60/2003 of 23 December 2003 on arbitration and Article 806 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure). In Germany, arbitrability is determined by the ownership of the rights relied on (first subparagraph of Paragraph 1030 of the German Code of Civil Procedure). A similar principle is laid down in Polish law (see Article 1157 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure).
20      Ravillon, L., ‘Que reste-t-il du concept d’inarbitrabilité?’ in Manciaux, S. and Loquin, E. (eds.), L’ordre public et l’arbitrage, Actes du colloque des 15 et 16 mars 2013, organised by CREDIMI, LexisNexis 2014, p. 57.
21      United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3.
22      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 116).
23      Article II(1) of the New York Convention.
24      Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention.
25      A broader concept than arbitration alone.
26      See judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 60).
27      See,
for a recent illustration, judgment of 15 January 2026, Wunner (C‑77/24, EU:C:2026:1, paragraph 35).
28      See Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended.
29      With regard to the interpretation of the concept of ‘claims’ within the meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, I refer to my analysis of the third question referred for a preliminary ruling.
30      Such a conclusion appears consistent with the definition provided by Regulation No 269/2014 of the concept of a ‘claim’, which makes clear that it covers ‘any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not’ (see Article 1(a) of Regulation No 269/2014), although it is regrettable that Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, does not contain a similar provision.
31      Contrary to what follows from Article 11(3) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, which expressly refers to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations.
32      See, respectively, Article 13(a) and then (c) to (e) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended.
33      See recital 23 and Article 1(28) of Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2023/2878).
34      It is interesting to note that the obligation introduced by Article 12g of Regulation No 833/2014 is accompanied by the injunction to exporters to ensure ‘that the agreement with the third-country counterpart contains adequate remedies in the event of a breach of a contractual obligation concluded in accordance with paragraph 1’ (see Article 12g(3) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended). In addition, those exporters are also obliged to inform the competent national authority in the event of breaches of contractual obligations by their co-contractor (see Article 12g(4) of that regulation).
35      In connection with the restrictive measures concerning the Libyan regime, see Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in SH (C‑168/17, EU:C:2018:798, point 50).
36      See recital 2 of Regulation No 833/2014 in its original version.
37      As provided for in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended.
38      Judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 78).
39      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 80).
40      See, by analogy, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).
41      With the adoption of Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/1494), the EU legislature did insert a new paragraph into Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014 to address the issue of the recognition and enforcement by Member States of arbitral decisions, but solely from the perspective of the arbitration of investments in connection with the restrictive measures (see recital 22 of Regulation 2025/1494 and Article 11(2a) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended). Furthermore, and although this is not relevant for the case in hand, I also note that Regulation No 833/2014 provides for a derogation from the prohibition on engaging directly or indirectly in any transaction with a Russian legal person, entity or body that is listed or owned or acting on behalf of listed legal persons, entities or bodies for transactions which are strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a Member State, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a Member State and if such transactions are consistent with the objectives of Regulation No 833/2014 and Regulation No 269/2014 (see Article 5aa(3)(g) of Regulation No 833/2014 introduced by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1269 of 21 July 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 193, p. 1)).
42      I would add that the search by co-contracting parties for an amicable solution does not fall outside the remit of EU law, by virtue of Article 12 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended: in all circumstances and regardless of the form of settlement agreed upon, Reibel would be obliged not to satisfy a claim prohibited under Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, including of its own free will.
43      A reasonably vigilant EU operator should ensure that such bodies are located within the territory of the European Union. However, Article 13(e) of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, could also form the basis of an obligation to ensure that EU law is observed for such a body which is not within the territory of the European Union. The question does not arise, however, in the context of the dispute in the main proceedings as the arbiter is Swedish.
44      I will also determine the intensity of such a review as part of my examination of the second question referred for a preliminary ruling.
45      In that regard, EU economic operators must be duly warned of the risks of agreeing to sign a clause such as that inserted into the contract between Reibel and Stankoimport, the content of which is recalled in point 6 of this Opinion.
46      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 84).
47      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 82).
48      See judgments of 1 June 1999, Eco Swiss (C‑126/97, EU:C:1999:269, paragraph 37), and of 26 October 2006, Mostaza Claro (C‑168/05, EU:C:2006:675, paragraph 35).
49      At the forefront is the New York Convention which provides for judicial review of arbitral awards as regards consistency with public policy: see Article V of that convention and judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 116).
50      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 83). That autonomous nature had previously been set out in the judgment of 21 December 2023, International Skating Union v Commission (C‑124/21 P, EU:C:2023:1012, paragraph 193).
51      The Court sets out a broad scope of judicial review in paragraph 86 of the judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617).
52      Judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 87).
53      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 87).
54      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 87).
55      In other words, according to Advocate General Ćapeta, ‘the need to review the conformity of an award with public policy exists because those rules may be of such a public interest that their application cannot be excluded by the will of the parties’ (Opinion of the Advocate General in Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:24, point 72)).
56      See judgment of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraphs 66 and 67).
57      See judgment of 21 December 2023, International Skating Union v Commission (C‑124/21 P, EU:C:2023:1012, paragraphs 192 and 193 and the case-law cited).
58      Judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).
59      Council Directive of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29). See judgment of 26 October 2006, Mostaza Claro (C‑168/05, EU:C:2006:675, paragraphs 36 to 38). See also judgment of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones (C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraphs 51 and 52).
60      First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1).
61      See judgment of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands (C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 52).
62      See point 58 of this Opinion.
63      See Article 3(1) TEU.
64      See Article 21(1) TEU.
65      See Article 21(2)(a), (b) and (c) TEU.
66      See judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 115 and 150), and of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council (C‑732/18 P, EU:C:2020:727, paragraph 115).
67      See judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150).
68      Respect for public policy is not the only limit on the free will of parties within the EU legal order: see judgments of 6 June 2000, Angonese (C‑281/98, EU:C:2000:296, paragraph 34); of 20 September 2001, Courage and Crehan (C‑453/99, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 24); or even of 11 December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union (C‑438/05, EU:C:2007:772, paragraphs 33 and 34).
69      See judgment of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones (C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraphs 51 and 53).
70      See, by analogy, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 88 and 89).
71      See, in comparison with Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, Articles 1, 6, 7, 9 or even 14 of that regulation.
72      See recital 22 of Regulation 2025/1494.
73      See judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).
74      Judgment of 1 August 2025 (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617).
75      One unilaterally imposed on the individuals concerned: see judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 92 and the case-law cited, 93, 96 and 106).
76      Judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 101).
77      I refer here to points 47 and 48 of this Opinion.
78      Judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 102 and 103).
79      The national courts or tribunals may be assisted by the Court in identifying such an inconsistency in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure, which is ‘an essential component of the system established by the Treaties in order to enable [those courts] to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive from EU law’ (judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 77)).
80      See, by analogy, judgment of 14 September 2023, Tuk Tuk Travel (C‑83/22, EU:C:2023:664, paragraph 45).
81      See, in the same vein, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 115).
82      The ‘manifest’ nature of the incompatibility should not, however, be interpreted too narrowly, having regard to the requirement recalled in point 75 of this Opinion and the declared objective of eliminating any incompatibility with EU public policy. It thus appears impossible to reconcile the effectiveness of the rights conferred on individuals by EU law with a censure of only manifestly incompatible situations.
83      As the Commission also pointed out in its working document entitled ‘Commission consolidated FAQs on the implementation of Council Regulation No 833/2014 and Council Regulation No 269/2014’, most recently updated on 23 January 2026 (see footnote 87 to and
at page 420 of that document).
84      Emphasis added.
85      Seeking the extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form.
86      See paragraph 33 of the document ‘Update of the EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures’ (Council document of 27 June 2022, 10572/22). See also Opinion of Advocate General Norkus in Čiekuri-Shishki (C‑480/24, EU:C:2025:672, point 68).
87      Council Regulation of 7 December 1992 prohibiting the satisfying of Iraqi claims with regard to contracts and transactions, the performance of which was affected by United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions (OJ 1992 L 361, p. 1).
88      Fourth and fifth recitals of Regulation No 3541/92.
89      See point 41 of this Opinion.
90      According to the expression used by Advocate General Norkus in his Opinion in Čiekuri-Shishki (C‑480/24, EU:C:2025:672, point 70).
91      Where the no claims clause applies to claims made by the persons and entities referred to in Article 11(1)(a) and (c) of Regulation No 833/2014, the objective pursued is also to prevent those persons from obtaining compensation for the adverse effects of the measures adopted against them (see, by analogy, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in SH (C‑168/17, EU:C:2018:798, point 50)).
92      The Court was, in that instance, ruling on the version of Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, by Regulation No 1290/2014 (see footnote 7
to
the present Opinion).
93      Judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150).
94      In the judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), the applicant in the main proceedings was an entity specifically concerned by some of the restrictions imposed by Regulation No 833/2014, as amended, by Regulation No 1290/2014, and fell within the scope of Article 11(1)(a) of that regulation.
95      See judgment of 11 November 2021, Bank Sepah (C‑340/20, EU:C:2021:903, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).
96      See, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Norkus in Čiekuri-Shishki (C‑480/24, EU:C:2025:672, point 61 et seq.).
97      See judgments of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 78) and of 5 February 2026, VEB.RF v Council (C‑572/24 P, EU:C:2026:74, paragraph 138).
98      I note that the Belgian authorities classified the goods in question as ‘dual-use items’ within the meaning of Regulation No 428/2009 (see point 7 of this Opinion).
99      It is true that the agreement was concluded in 2015 when the prohibition on the sale and exportation of dual-use items was still in force. However, Article 11(1) of Regulation No 833/2014,
as amended,
does not restrict the non-satisfaction of claims only to those related to contracts already existing on the date on which that regulation entered into force, which clearly provides greater protection of the interests of EU operators.