ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
24 October 2013 (*)
(Community trade mark – Revocation proceedings – Earlier Community word mark STORMBERG – Surrender of the disputed mark by the proprietor – Decision to close the revocation proceedings – Request for restitutio in integrum – Obligation to state reasons – Articles 58(1), 76(1) and 81(1) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law)
In Case T‑451/12,
Stromberg Menswear Ltd, established in Leeds (United Kingdom), represented by A. Tsoutsanis, lawyer, and C. Tulley, Solicitor,
applicant,
v
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), represented by J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court, being
Leketoy Stormberg Inter AS, established in Kristiansand S (Norway), represented initially by T. Mølsgaard, and subsequently by J. Løje, lawyers,
ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 3 August 2012 (Case R 389/2012-4), relating to revocation proceedings between Stromberg Menswear Ltd and Leketoy Stormberg Inter AS,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),
composed, at the time of deliberation, of S. Papasavvas (Rapporteur), President, M. van der Woude and V. Tomljenović, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
having regard to the application lodged at the Court Registry on 15 October 2012,
having regard to the response of OHIM lodged at the Court Registry on 18 April 2013,
having regard to the response of the intervener lodged at the Court Registry on 18 April 2013,
having regard to the decision of 30 May 2013 refusing leave to lodge a reply,
makes the following
Order
Background to the dispute
1        On 25 March 2008, the applicant, Stromberg Menswear Ltd, filed an application for registration of a Community trade mark with the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1), as amended (replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1)).
2        Registration as a mark was sought for the following figurative sign:
3        The goods in respect of which registration was sought are in Class 25 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond to the following description: ‘Stylised clothing’.
4        The Community trade mark application was published in Community Trade Marks Bulletin No 2008/024 of 16 June 2008.
5        On 11 September 2008, the intervener, Leketoy Stormberg Inter AS, filed a notice of opposition pursuant to Article 42 of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 41 of Regulation No 207/2009) against registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
6        The opposition was based on the earlier Community word mark STORMBERG, designating goods in Class 25 corresponding to the following description: ‘Clothing, footwear, headgear’.
7        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that referred to in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009).
8        On 30 October 2009, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition.
9        On 2 December 2009, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with OHIM, under Articles 58 to 64 of Regulation No 207/2009, against the Opposition Division’s decision.
10      On 7 December 2009, the applicant submitted an application for revocation of the Community trade mark on the basis of Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009.
11      On 30 December 2010, the intervener informed OHIM that it wished to surrender the Community trade mark STORMBERG. The surrender was registered on 3 January 2011.
12      On 10 January 2011, the intervener filed a request with OHIM for conversion of its Community trade mark into 8 national trade mark applications.
13      By decision of 11 January 2011 (‘the Cancellation Division’s decision’), the Cancellation Division closed the revocation proceedings for lack of purpose.
14      On 22 March 2011, the First Board of Appeal of OHIM annulled the Opposition Division’s decision of 30 October 2009 and rejected the opposition.
15      On 2 May 2011, the Community trade mark STROMBERG was registered.
16      On 19 December 2011, the intervener submitted an application for a declaration that the Community trade mark STROMBERG is invalid, relying on its national marks.
17      On 17 February 2012, the applicant filed two notices of appeal with OHIM, the first, against the Cancellation Division’s decision of 11 January 2011 and, the second, against the decision by which OHIM accepted the request for conversion filed by the intervener and transmitted that request to the national authorities concerned. In its two appeals, the applicant relied on the provisions of Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 relating to the procedure in respect of restitutio in integrum.
18      By a first decision of 3 August 2012 (‘the contested decision’), the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM, first, rejected the request for restitutio in integrum, secondly, declared that the appeal should be deemed not to have been filed and, lastly, ordered the reimbursement of the appeal fee. In particular, it found that, since the applicant had not established that it was prevented from filing a notice of appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision within the period prescribed by Regulation No 207/2009, that appeal, which was filed out of time, was to be deemed not to have been filed.
19      By a second decision dated the same day, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal relating to the request for conversion filed by the intervener as inadmissible. In particular, it found that no decision concerning that conversion had been notified to the applicant and that the applicant was not a party to those proceedings. The applicant requested that the Court annul that decision by an action registered as Case T‑457/12.
Forms of order sought
20      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        alter the contested decision and grant its request for restitutio in integrum and, primarily, annul the Cancellation Division’s decision and order that division to re-open the revocation proceedings and invite it to submit observations to continue the revocation proceedings, or, in the alternative, allow it to appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision and refer the case back to the Board of Appeal;
–        order OHIM to pay the costs incurred in connection with the present proceedings and the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.
21      OHIM contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
22      The intervener contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        uphold the contested decision;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs or, in the alternative, order OHIM to pay the costs, or, in the further alternative, order the applicant and OHIM to pay the costs.
Law
23      Under Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where an action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the General Court may, by reasoned order and without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action.
24      In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents before it and that there is no need to take further steps in the proceedings.
25      In support of its action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law, alleging, in essence: (i) infringement of the obligation to state reasons; (ii) infringement of Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009; and (iii) infringement of Articles 58(1) and 76(1) of that regulation.
The first plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons
26      The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal did not examine all the arguments which it had put forward and which tended to establish that it had been prevented from bringing an action for annulment of the Cancellation Division’s decision within the period prescribed by Regulation No 207/2009.
27      OHIM and the intervener dispute that argument.
28      It should be noted that, under the first sentence of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009, decisions of OHIM are to state the reasons on which they are based. That duty has the same scope as that enshrined in Article 296 TFEU (see, to that effect, Joined Cases T‑124/02 and T‑156/02 Sunrider v OHIM – Vitakraft‑Werke Wührmann and Friesland Brands (VITATASTE and METABALANCE 44) [2004] ECR II‑1149, paragraph 72).
29      It is settled case-law that the duty to give reasons for a decision has two purposes: to allow interested parties to know the justification for the measure so as to enable them to protect their rights and to enable the Community judicature to exercise its power to review the legality of the decision. Whether a statement of reasons satisfies those requirements is a question to be assessed with reference not only to its wording but also to its context and the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question (see VITATASTE and METABALANCE 44, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
30      In the present case, the Board of Appeal stated that the applicant had received the Cancellation Division’s decision and that it could not see any obstacle that would have prevented it from filing an appeal against that decision. It found that a decision which has become final cannot be called into question months or years later simply because other proceedings between the same parties, which were not duly identified in the present case, had resulted in a decision. It also noted that the applicant had failed to indicate either a reason which would have rendered it ‘unable’ to appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision within the prescribed period or the measures of due care which it took to avoid the non‑observance of that time limit.
31      It must be pointed out that, although it is apparent from the statement of reasons for the contested decision as set out in the preceding paragraph that the Board of Appeal did not reply point by point to all the arguments which the applicant put forward, the fact remains that the Board did, however, state the reasons why it took the view that the request for conversion did not, in the present case, constitute an obstacle that would have prevented the applicant from filing an appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision within the prescribed period. That statement of reasons allowed the applicant to know the justification for the measure so as to enable it to protect its rights, and in particular to file a notice of appeal, and enabled the Courts of the European Union to exercise its power to review the legality of the contested decision. Consequently, the contested decision is sufficiently reasoned. This plea must therefore be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
The second plea, alleging infringement of Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009
32      The applicant submits, in essence, that it does not dispute having filed its notice of appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision after the expiry of the two‑month period laid down in Article 60 of Regulation No 207/2009. It states, however, that it was prevented from bringing that appeal within the prescribed period on account of many deficiencies on the part of the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal.
33      OHIM and the intervener dispute that argument.
34      The Board of Appeal found that the requirements set out in Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 were not satisfied in the present case.
35      Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides that the applicant for or proprietor of a Community trade mark or any other party to proceedings before OHIM who, in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken, was unable to comply with a time limit vis-à-vis OHIM shall, upon application, have his rights re-established if the obstacle to compliance has the direct consequence, by virtue of the provisions of this regulation, of causing the loss of any right or means of redress.
36      It is apparent from that provision that restitutio in integrum is subject to two requirements, the first being that the party has exercised all due care required by the circumstances, and the second that the non-observance by the party has the direct consequence of causing the loss of any right or means of redress (see judgment of 28 June 2012 in Case T‑314/10 Constellation Brands v OHIM (COOK’S), not published in the ECR, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
37      It must then be observed that the words ‘all due care required by the circumstances’ require a system of internal control and monitoring of time limits to be put in place that generally excludes the involuntary non-observance of time limits, as laid down in the OHIM Guidelines. It follows that restitutio in integrum may be granted only in the case of exceptional events, which cannot therefore be predicted from experience (see COOK’s, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
38      Lastly, it must be pointed out that the conditions for the application of Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 must be interpreted strictly. Observance of time limits is a matter of public policy and restitutio in integrum of a time limit after its expiry is capable of undermining legal certainty (see, to that effect, Case T‑267/11 Video Research USA v OHIM (TR) [2012] ECR II‑0000, paragraph 35).
39      It is in the light of those considerations that it must be assessed whether the Board of Appeal was right to find that the requirements set out in Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 were not satisfied in the present case.
40      In the first place, the applicant submits that it was prevented from filing a notice of appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision within the prescribed period on account of a deficiency on the latter’s part. In that regard, it states that the Cancellation Division did not invite it to submit its observations before closing the revocation proceedings by its decision of 11 January 2011.
41      First, it must be pointed out that the applicant received the Cancellation Division’s decision. Consequently, it could have filed a notice of appeal before the Board of Appeal, in which it could have inter alia disputed the fact that the Cancellation Division did not invite it to submit its observations before closing the revocation proceedings. Secondly, the applicant, who was at odds with the intervener in a number of proceedings, should have taken more due care and not excluded the possibility, offered by Regulation No 207/2009, that the intervener would file a request for conversion of its Community trade mark after it had surrendered it. In those circumstances, as OHIM and the intervener rightly submit, the fact that the Cancellation Division did not invite the applicant to submit its observations before closing the revocation proceedings did not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a notice of appeal within the prescribed period for the purposes of Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009.
42      That finding is not called into question by the reference which the applicant made to the First Cancellation Division’s decision No 465/8 of 3 May 2001 in Aromatonic. In any event, although, during the proceedings which preceded that decision, the Cancellation Division invited the party who submitted an application for a declaration that a Community trade mark was invalid to submit its observations following the surrender of that mark by its proprietor, that decision does not in any way state that the absence of such an invitation constitutes an obstacle for the purposes of Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009.
43      In the second place, the applicant submits that the Cancellation Division should have referred, in its decision of 11 January 2011, to the request for conversion filed by the intervener on 10 January 2011 in order to enable it to become aware of that request, appeal and possibly preclude the Cancellation Division from finding that the revocation proceedings had become devoid of purpose.
44      In that regard, first, it must be noted that no provision of Regulation No 207/2009 requires the Cancellation Division to make such a reference in one of its decisions. Secondly, as is stated by OHIM, the request for conversion was received by OHIM on 10 January 2011 and was recorded in the register the following day by the competent department. The Registry file does not contain either a copy sent to the Cancellation Division or any evidence of its having being communicated to that division. In addition, it is not apparent from the documents in the file that the Cancellation Division was aware that the request for conversion had been filed before it adopted its decision. Lastly, the applicant does not explain how the absence of a reference, in the Cancellation Division’s decision, to the request for conversion filed by the intervener would have prevented it from filing a notice of appeal against that decision within the period prescribed by Regulation No 207/2009.
45      In the third place, the applicant submits that OHIM did not inform it of the filing, by the intervener, of a request for conversion of its Community trade mark into a national trade mark. In support of its statements, it relies on Article 79 of Regulation No 207/2009 under which OHIM is, as a matter of course, to notify those concerned of decisions and summonses and of any notice or other communication from which a time limit is reckoned, or of which those concerned must be notified under other provisions of that regulation or of the implementing regulation, or of which notification has been ordered by the President of OHIM.
46      However, although the applicant relies on Article 79 of Regulation No 207/2009, it does not state how the request for conversion filed by the intervener is one of the measures referred to in that article and on what grounds that request should have been notified to it. Although the applicant maintains that it had a right to that notification in its capacity as an interested party, it does not establish how it is an interested party in the conversion procedure initiated by the intervener for the purposes of that article. Furthermore, it is apparent from Rules 46 and 47 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Regulation No 40/94 (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1), that OHIM is only required to publish admissible requests for conversion in the Community Trade Marks Bulletin and to transmit them to the central industrial property offices of the Member States concerned. Furthermore, the applicant does not state how the fact that the request for conversion was not notified to it prevented it from filing a notice of appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision within the prescribed period.
47      In the fourth place, the applicant submits that the Cancellation Division adopted its decision precipitously. It submits, in that regard, that the intervener’s surrender of its Community trade mark was entered in the register on 3 January 2011, that it was published on 5 January 2011, that the request for conversion was filed on 10 January 2011 and that the revocation proceedings were closed on 11 January 2011. The applicant submits that that precipitous timetable did not allow the Cancellation Division to determine whether the surrender would be followed by a conversion and whether it was necessary to allow it to submit observations, as was the case in the procedure followed by OHIM in the case which resulted in the First Cancellation Division’s decision in Aromatonic, referred to in paragraph 42 above.
48      First, it must be stated that the applicant does not specify how the brevity of the periods observed by the Cancellation Division prevented it from filing a notice of appeal against that division’s decision. Secondly, it must be pointed out that Regulation No 207/2009 does not prescribe any minimum period in which the Cancellation Division must adopt its decisions. Thirdly, the applicant cannot reasonably maintain that, as it was not informed that the intervener had filed a request for conversion, it did not suspect that it had a legitimate interest in continuing the revocation proceedings. As OHIM correctly points out, a party who applies for revocation of a Community trade mark on the grounds of non-use has a legitimate interest in continuing the revocation proceedings in spite of the surrender of the Community trade mark by its proprietor. The continuation of the revocation proceedings may result in a declaration of non-use preventing, pursuant to Article 112(2)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, the proprietor of the Community trade mark from requesting the conversion of his mark. Fourthly, it must be noted that, contrary to what the applicant submits, the necessity to adopt a slower timetable is in no way dictated by Article 112(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, pursuant to which, where a Community trade mark ceases to have effect as a result of a surrender being recorded, the request for conversion is to be filed within three months after the date on which the Community trade mark ceases to have effect. On the contrary, the existence of such a possibility should have encouraged the applicant to exercise more due care and, therefore, to file, by way of precaution, a notice of appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision. Fifthly, the fact that the Cancellation Division adopted a slower timetable in Aromatonic is irrelevant in the present case.
49      In the fifth place, the applicant submits that OHIM did not publish the request for conversion in accordance with the provisions of Rule 46 of Regulation No 2868/95. It states, in that regard, that the publication of that request in the Community Trade Marks Bulletin was too late since it took place after the expiry of the prescribed period for challenging the Cancellation Division’s decision. Furthermore, it submits that the publication was not in compliance with the rules set out in the Vademecum to the Community Trade Marks Bulletin since the codes used were incorrect and the request was published in the wrong section of that bulletin.
50      However, the fact, even were it assumed to be established, that the request for conversion was not published in accordance with the provisions of Article 46 of Regulation No 2868/95 cannot be regarded as an obstacle to the filing of a notice of appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision within the prescribed period. Those two procedures are separate and do not directly affect each other. Furthermore, it must be noted that the applicant was not, contrary to what it seems to suggest, a party to the conversion proceedings.
51      In the sixth place, the applicant maintains that, since it was not aware of the request for conversion filed by the intervener, it had no interest in requesting the annulment of the Cancellation Division’s decision.
52      Such an argument has no factual basis. First, the intervener’s surrender of its Community trade mark was not, in itself, capable of rendering the appeal lodged by the applicant devoid of purpose. The applicant retained an interest in appealing against the Cancellation Division’s decision in so far as the effects of a surrender and those of a revocation are not the same. That is to say, whereas a Community trade mark which has been surrendered ceases to have effect only as from the registration of that surrender, the rights of the proprietor of a Community trade mark are declared to be revoked as from the date of the application for revocation or, at the request of one of the parties, as at an earlier date on which one of the grounds for revocation occurred (see, by analogy, Case C‑552/09 P Ferrero v OHIM [2011] ECR I‑2063, paragraphs 42 and 43). Secondly, as OHIM correctly states, the applicant could not be unaware that there was a possibility, provided for by Regulation No 207/2009, that the intervener would file a request for conversion. It has been pointed out in paragraph 48 above that, by filing a notice of appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision in good time, the applicant could have brought about a decision declaring the rights of the trade mark proprietor to be revoked and, therefore, have prevented a request for conversion from being filed pursuant to Article 112(2) of Regulation No 207/2009.
53      In the seventh place, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that it had failed to indicate, in its request for restitutio in integrum, which measures of due care it took to avoid the non-observance of the time limit laid down in Article 60 of Regulation No 207/2009 for filing a notice of appeal against a decision of a Cancellation Division. In that regard, the applicant states that the non-observance of that time limit did not result from its own failure to exercise due care, but from many deficiencies on the part of the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal.
54      It is apparent from all of the foregoing that the request for restitutio in integrum is not due to alleged deficiencies on the part of OHIM, but to a lack of due care on the part of the applicant, who did not, within the period specified, file a notice of appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision although nothing was preventing it from doing so. Consequently, the Board of Appeal was right to find, in paragraph 11 of the contested decision, that the applicant had not indicated the measures of due care it took to avoid the non-observance of the time limit.
55      Lastly, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the existence of other proceedings between the same parties, which were not duly identified or explained, was irrelevant in the present case. The applicant adds that the Board of Appeal erred in taking the view that a decision which has become final could not be called into question months or years later simply because other proceedings had resulted in a later decision.
56      Contrary to what the applicant submits, those findings on the part of the Board of Appeal are not erroneous. Since the applicant does not satisfy the requirements set out in Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, it cannot call into question a decision which has become final, notwithstanding the fact that another decision resulting from other proceedings was adopted after that decision.
57      It follows from all of those considerations that the second plea must be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
The third plea, alleging infringement of Articles 58(1) and 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009
58      In the first place, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in refusing to examine its arguments relating to the acceptance, by OHIM, of the request for conversion of the Community trade mark on the ground that that dispute is the subject matter of another application submitted by the applicant. The applicant takes the view that the conversion procedure was an integral part of its request for restitutio in integrum. It adds that, by not dealing with that point in its decision, the Board of Appeal infringed Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 under which OHIM is to examine the facts of its own motion.
59      OHIM and the intervener dispute those arguments.
60      In the present case, although it is common ground that the Board of Appeal did not deal with the applicant’s submissions seeking the withdrawal of an alleged decision of OHIM accepting the request for conversion filed by the intervener, the fact remains that, in the statement of reasons for its decision as set out in paragraph 30 above, the Board referred to the applicant’s reasoning relating to the conversion procedure, but took the view that those arguments did not show that there was an obstacle for the purposes of Article 81(1) of Regulation No 207/2009. Consequently, contrary to what the applicant submits, the Board of Appeal took its argument connected with the procedure for conversion of the Community trade mark into a number of national marks into account. That head of claim must therefore be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
61      In the second place, the applicant submits, first, that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 58(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 pursuant to which an appeal lies from decisions of the Cancellation Divisions. The applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal erred in declaring that it was not competent to rule on its requests for the correction of certain errors and for the revocation of the decision by which OHIM accepted and transmitted the intervener’s request for conversion.
62      OHIM and the intervener dispute those arguments.
63      It is apparent from the documents in the file, and in particular from the appeal before the Board of Appeal, that the applicant was requesting, first, the correction of the error of accepting the request for conversion filed by the intervener on the basis of Rule 53 of Regulation No 2868/95 and, secondly, the revocation of the decision by which OHIM accepted the conversion of the Community trade mark on the basis of Article 80 of Regulation No 207/2009 and of Rule 53a of Regulation No 2868/95.
64      In the present case, it must be pointed out that, contrary to what the applicant suggests, there is no decision subject to appeal by which the Cancellation Division authorised the conversion of the Community trade mark into national marks and the transmission of that request. In addition, it must be noted that no decision of OHIM to that effect even exists. Neither Regulation No 207/2009 nor Regulation No 2868/95 provides for the adoption of a decision by OHIM in a situation where a request for conversion satisfies the requirements laid down by Articles 112 and 113 of Regulation No 207/2009. Consequently, in such a case, those regulations provide that the role of OHIM is limited to examining the request in order to satisfy itself that it is admissible, publishing it, where appropriate, in the Community Trade Marks Bulletin and, lastly, transmitting it to the national offices concerned. In the present case, it is common ground that the request for conversion filed by the intervener satisfied the conditions set out in those articles. Consequently, the applicant cannot reasonably invoke infringement of Article 58(1) of Regulation No 207/2009. Such a plea is ineffective and must be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
65      The applicant submits, secondly, that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 by declaring that it was not competent to rule on its requests for the correction of certain errors and for the revocation of the alleged decision by which OHIM accepted and transmitted the abovementioned request for conversion. It adds that the Board of Appeal also infringed general principles of procedural law, such as the right to a judicial review, the right to be heard, the principle of legal certainty and its legitimate expectations that its requests for the correction of errors and revocation would be reviewed.
66      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that under Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure the application must contain a summary of the pleas in law on which it is based. That summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any other supporting information. The applicant must, accordingly, specify the nature of the grounds on which it is based, so that a mere abstract statement of the grounds does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure. Similar requirements are called for where a submission is made in support of a plea in law (judgment in Case T‑352/94 Mo och Domsjö v Commission [1998] ECR II‑1989, paragraph 333).
67      It must be stated that the extremely laconic and summary nature of the way the head of claim referred to in paragraph 65 above is presented does not make it possible to identify how OHIM infringed the rules invoked, in such a way as to enable the Court to exercise its power of review (see, to that effect, Case T‑131/99 Shaw and Falla v Commission [2002] ECR II‑2023, paragraph 172). That head of claim must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.
68      It follows from all of the foregoing that the third plea and also the action in its entirety must be rejected as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly lacking any foundation in law without there being any need to examine the head of claim with a view to alteration put forward by the applicant.
Costs
69      Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with form of order sought by OHIM and the intervener.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1.      The action is dismissed.
2.      Stromberg Menswear Ltd shall pay the costs.
Luxembourg, 24 October 2013.
E. Coulon
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
* Language of the case: English.