JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
29 April 2026 (*)
( Civil service – Officials – Reports procedure – 2022 appraisal procedure – Staff report – Impartiality – Duty of care – Protection of personal data – Article 43 of the Staff Regulations – Internal rules on staff reports – Manifest error of assessment )
In Case T‑30/25,
HI, represented by S. Rodrigues and A. Champetier, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Parliament, represented by S. Seyr, K. Zejdová and M. Marescaux, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),
composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, I. Reine (Rapporteur) and H. Cassagnabère, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
–        having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By her action based on Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, HI, seeks the annulment, first, of her staff report for the year 2022 (‘the staff report’), secondly, of the decision of the European Parliament of 15 February 2024 to award her one merit point for the year 2022 (‘the award decision’) (together, ‘the contested acts’) and, thirdly, in so far as necessary, of the decision of the Secretary-General of the Parliament of 7 October 2024 rejecting her complaint against the contested acts (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).
Background to the dispute
2        The applicant has been a grade AD 8 official at the Parliament since 2018, working in a unit of the Directorate-General (DG) for Communication.
3        On 27 February 2022, the applicant’s immediate superior sent her an email informing her that, as of 1 March 2022, she would be transferring to another department within the same unit.
4        In 2023, the applicant’s immediate superior, acting as first assessor, initiated the appraisal procedure relating to the applicant for the year 2022.
5        On 10 March 2023, in the context of the appraisal procedure, an interview took place between the applicant and her immediate superior, accompanied by the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s DG for Communication. For her part, the applicant was accompanied by a member of the Staff Committee. During that interview, it was agreed to continue the discussions at a second interview.
6        On 28 March 2023, a second interview took place between the applicant, accompanied by another member of the Staff Committee, and her immediate superior, who was once again accompanied by the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s DG for Communication. On the same day, following that interview, the applicant sent her written comments on the draft staff report to, amongst others, her immediate superior, who made comments in response.
7        On 17 April 2023, the applicant’s immediate superior approved the staff report.
8        On 23 May 2023, the applicant had an interview with the Director of the Directorate for Visitors of the Parliament’s DG for Communication, acting as the final assessor.
9        On 5 June 2023, the final assessor approved the staff report and informed the applicant that he had done so.
10      On 15 June 2023, the applicant referred her staff report to the Reports Committee.
11      On 28 June 2023, the Director-General of the Parliament’s DG for Communication decided to award the applicant one merit point for the year 2022.
12      On 10 October 2023, the Reports Committee rejected the applicant’s challenge.
13      On 15 February 2024, the final version of the staff report was drawn up and notified to the applicant.
14      On the same day, the award decision was adopted by the Director-General of the Parliament’s DG for Communication, replacing the decision of 28 June 2023 referred to in paragraph 11 above.
15      On 27 March 2024, the applicant submitted a request for assistance to the Director-General for Personnel, on the basis of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’), concerning matters relating to her immediate superior.
16      On 14 May 2024, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Secretary-General of the Parliament, pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, against the contested acts.
17      On 8 August 2024, the Reports Committee delivered its opinion on the award decision and concluded that there was no manifest error of assessment or unequal treatment in that regard.
18      On 7 October 2024, the decision rejecting the complaint was adopted.
Forms of order sought
19      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested acts;
–        annul, in so far as necessary, the decision rejecting the complaint; and
–        order the Parliament to pay the costs.
20      The Parliament contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
Subject matter of the dispute
21      By her second head of claim, the applicant seeks annulment, in so far as necessary, of the decision rejecting the complaint.
22      According to settled case-law, where a decision rejecting a complaint lacks any independent content, claims formally directed against that decision have the effect of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted (see judgment of 14 December 2017, RL v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑21/17, EU:T:2017:907, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
23      In the present case, it should be observed that the decision rejecting the complaint, even though it includes additional details, confirms and does not call into question the conclusions and grounds of the contested acts.
24      Accordingly, the action must be regarded as being directed against the contested acts, the legality of which must be examined also taking into account the statement of reasons in the decision rejecting the complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2022, QM v Europol, T‑164/21, EU:T:2022:695, paragraph 40 (not published and the case-law cited)).
Substance
25      In support of her action, the applicant raises, in essence, five pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and of Article 5(8) and Article 6(2) of the internal rules governing the application of the general implementing provisions applicable to Article 43 of the Staff Regulations of Officials and Article 15(2) and Article 87(1) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the internal rules on staff reports’), as regards a lack of constructive dialogue, secondly, infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations on account of a lack of set objectives, thirdly, a manifest error of assessment, fourthly, a lack of impartiality and, fifthly, breach of the duty of care and failure to protect personal data.
26      It is appropriate to examine the pleas raised in the following order: first, the fourth plea, secondly, the fifth plea, thirdly, the first plea, fourthly, the second plea, and fifthly, the third plea.
Fourth plea: lack of impartiality
27      The applicant submits that the staff report was drawn up by her immediate superior even though that superior was, at that time, the subject of an investigation under the assistance procedure provided for in Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. The contested acts are thus vitiated by a lack of impartiality, contrary to Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
28      Furthermore, the applicant states that although, at the time of the appraisal procedure, she had not yet submitted her request for assistance concerning matters relating to her immediate superior, she had already expressed her concerns about bias on the part of her immediate superior, in two emails sent in March 2023 – albeit that, at that time, she had chosen not to follow the official procedure for requesting assistance.
29      The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments.
30      In that regard, it should be recalled that Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states, inter alia, that every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union.
31      It should also be recalled that the duty of impartiality incumbent on officials is enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, under which an official is to carry out the duties assigned to him objectively and impartially.
32      Furthermore, it is apparent from settled case-law that it is incumbent upon the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union to comply with the requirement of impartiality in its two components, which are, on the one hand, subjective impartiality, whereby no member of the institution concerned may show personal bias or prejudice, and, on the other hand, objective impartiality, according to which that institution must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias on the part of the institution concerned. The EU judicature has clarified in that respect that, in order to show that the organisation of an administrative procedure does not ensure sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias, it is not necessary to prove lack of impartiality. It is sufficient for a legitimate doubt to arise which cannot be dispelled (see judgment of 4 December 2024, Colombani v EEAS, T‑158/23, EU:T:2024:876, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
33      As regards subjective lack of impartiality on the part of the applicant’s immediate superior, according to settled case-law, there is a presumption of personal impartiality in the absence of evidence to the contrary (see judgment of 15 June 2022, QI v Commission, T‑122/21, not published, EU:T:2022:361, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited). In order to prove a lack of subjective impartiality, the applicant must adduce sufficiently precise, objective and consistent indicia of the truth or probability of his or her allegations (see judgment of 8 September 2021, AH v Eurofound, T‑630/19, not published, EU:T:2021:538, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).
34      In that regard, in the first place, it is common ground that the applicant submitted her request for assistance on 27 March 2024, that is to say, almost a year after the approval of the staff report (17 April 2023). Therefore, the applicant’s arguments alleging that, at the time when the staff report was drawn up, her immediate superior was the subject of an investigation under the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Staff Regulations have no factual basis and must be rejected.
35      In the second place, it should be observed that the applicant does not put forward any argument relating to the obligation of objective impartiality, under which the Parliament must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias.
36      In the third place, as regards the alleged subjective bias on the part of the applicant’s immediate superior, it is apparent from the documents in the file that, in two emails of 10 March 2023 sent to the head of the medical service and to a member of staff of the Parliament, which appear in Annexes A.16 and A.17 to the application, the applicant expressed concerns, first, as regards the hostile behaviour of her immediate superior at the first interview on 10 March 2023 and, secondly, as regards degrading acts which began shortly after her entry into service.
37      First, as regards the alleged hostile acts on the part of the applicant’s immediate superior observed at the first interview on 10 March 2023, it should be noted that Annexes A.16 and A.17 to the application contain only the applicant’s own statements. It is true that, in a witness statement from a member of the Staff Committee who accompanied the applicant at that interview, which appears in Annex A.13 to the application, reference is made to hostile statements by the immediate superior concerning her mental abilities. However, those allegations are contradicted by the evidence, on the one hand, of the immediate superior, who states that she felt she was under attack because of what she had written in the staff report and that the interview had been postponed due to its slow progress and, on the other hand, of the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication, who accompanied the applicant’s immediate superior at that interview, and who stated that the interview took place in a professional, respectful and non-hostile manner.
38      It follows that the applicant has not adduced sufficiently precise, objective and consistent evidence in that regard to rebut the presumption of her immediate superior’s subjective impartiality, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 33 above.
39      Secondly, the same applies to the allegations concerning degrading acts committed by the applicant’s immediate superior, beginning shortly after the applicant started work, which are not described or substantiated in any way in the applicant’s email of 10 March 2023.
40      In the light of the foregoing, the fourth plea must be dismissed.
Fifth plea: breach of the duty of care and failure to protect personal data
41      Under the fifth plea, the applicant relies on breach of the duty of care and failure to protect personal data.
–       Breach of the duty of care
42      In the application, the applicant refers to the breach of the duty of care in the heading of her fifth plea. In the reply, she claims that the Parliament acted in breach of the duty of care by seeking the views of her work coordinators on the comments she had made on the draft staff report without giving her the opportunity to respond in that regard.
43      The Parliament contends that that claim is inadmissible on the ground that the application lacks precision in that regard and thus does not meet the requirements laid down by Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
44      In that regard, according to the case-law, it follows from Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court pursuant to Article 53 of that statute, and from Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure, that an application initiating proceedings must state clearly and precisely the subject matter of the proceedings, as well as the form of order sought, and must contain a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That summary – albeit concise – must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the action, if necessary, without any further information. Thus, the essential facts and points of law on which an action is based and the pleas in law relied on in support of the action must be apparent, at the very least in summary form, but coherently and intelligibly, from the text of the application itself (see judgment of 29 May 2024, Angelidis v Parliament, T‑49/23, not published, EU:T:2024:335, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
45      In particular, the applicant is required to set out in a sufficiently systematic manner the arguments relating to each plea which he or she puts forward, and the Court cannot be obliged, as a result of a lack of structure in the application or a lack of rigour on the part of the applicant, to reconstruct the legal structure intended to support a plea by bringing together various diffuse elements of the application, at the risk of reconstructing that plea by giving it a scope which it did not have in the mind of that party. To decide otherwise would be contrary to the principle of the sound administration of justice, to the principle that the subject matter of proceedings is defined by the parties and to the defendant’s rights of defence (judgments of 12 November 2020, Fleig v EEAS, C‑446/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:918, paragraph 61, and of 16 June 2021, Lucaccioni v Commission, T‑316/19, EU:T:2021:367, paragraph 85 (not published)).
46      In the present case, it should be noted that, in the application, the applicant has merely claimed breach of the duty of care in the heading to the present plea, without developing any argument in that regard. In the context of that plea, the applicant has put forward, in the application, only arguments relating to the disclosure of personal information to other members of staff in her unit who should not have had access to it under data protection rules. However, whilst those arguments may concern a failure to protect personal data, which is also referred to in the heading to the fifth plea, it must be stated that the applicant does not establish any link between such arguments and the alleged breach of the duty of care.
47      It follows that, having regard to the case-law cited in paragraphs 44 and 45 above, the requirements laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, according to which the application initiating proceedings itself must state clearly and precisely the subject matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas, are not met. Accordingly, the present claim, based on an alleged breach of the duty of care, must be rejected as inadmissible.
–       Breach of the right to protection of personal data
48      The applicant claims that, by sharing the content of the draft staff report with other members of staff in her unit following the second interview with her immediate superior, held on 28 March 2023, the latter infringed the applicable obligations as regards compliance with the principles of necessity, proportionality, transparency and purpose limitation.
49      It appears from the draft staff report that it was read and commented on by an internal group of other team leaders reporting to the applicant’s immediate superior, who, the applicant submits, should not have had access to it, given the personal nature of the draft.
50      In the reply, the applicant states that she is referring, in that regard, to the obligations laid down by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39).
51      In addition, in so far as the impartiality of her immediate superior had been called into question, the applicant expresses doubts as to that superior’s ability to conduct consultations in relation to the applicant’s self-assessment, particularly with regard to allegedly inaccurate information of which that superior had no direct knowledge. Thus, according to the applicant, selective consultations conducted in her absence led to a subjective and unsubstantiated assessment.
52      The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments.
53      In that regard, in the present case, the processing of personal data is covered by the justification in Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725, which concerns the case where that processing is necessary for the performance of a task covered by the legitimate exercise of official authority vested in the EU institution to which the data are disclosed. Since it was carried out in the general context of an appraisal procedure, the processing in question necessarily falls within the legitimate exercise of the mission entrusted to the administration (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 June 2022, Cristescu v Commission, T‑754/20, not published, EU:T:2022:316, paragraph 73, and of 7 September 2022, DD v FRA, T‑470/20, not published, EU:T:2022:511, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).
54      In addition, Article 5(1) of the internal rules on staff reports provides for the possibility of seeking the opinion of work coordinators when drawing up a draft staff report.
55      Furthermore, as regards the arguments concerning lack of impartiality on the part of the applicant’s immediate superior, it should be noted that those were rejected in the context of the fourth plea.
56      The present claim must therefore be rejected as unfounded, and there is no need to rule on its admissibility.
57      Accordingly, the fifth plea must be dismissed in its entirety.
First plea: infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and Article 5(8) and Article 6(2) of the internal rules on staff reports as regards a lack of any constructive dialogue
58      The applicant submits that she did not benefit from the safeguards provided for in the applicable rules that would have enabled her to express, under the best possible conditions, her views on the appraisal report.
–       Admissibility of the first plea in so far as it relates to Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports
59      The Parliament submits that the argument alleging an infringement of Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports is inadmissible in so far as the applicant provides no explanation as to why she considers that provision to have been infringed. Consequently, it does not meet the requirements laid down in Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure.
60      In the reply, the applicant states that, given the conduct of the interviews between her and her hierarchical superiors, it is clear that disparaging remarks were made about her which go beyond the scope of the draft staff report, and that the interviews were not conducted solely on the basis of the draft report.
61      In the present case, it should be observed that, in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the application, first, the applicant submits that the conduct of the interviews of 10 and 28 March 2023 with her immediate superior, as reported by her and confirmed by the two witnesses, was contrary, in particular, to the requirements of Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports. Secondly, she considers that that provision was infringed by reason of the fact that it was not possible to engage in a genuine dialogue at those interviews and to make comments on the draft staff report.
62      In that regard, Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports provides that:
‘Each staff member being assessed shall be forwarded his or her draft staff report for year N-1 electronically at least five days before the date of his or her interview … The interview shall be conducted on the basis of the draft report’.
63      In that context, it is impossible to determine from the application why the applicant considers that, having regard to the arguments set out in paragraph 61 above, Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports has been infringed in the present case.
64      Consequently, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 44 and 45 above, the first plea must be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it relates to infringement of Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports.
–       Substance
65      The applicant submits that, during her first interview, which took place on 10 March 2023, she did not have the opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue with her immediate superior, who subjected her to verbal attacks and personal accusations, which prevented her from presenting the information she had prepared. In that regard, the applicant provides a statement from the member of the Staff Committee who was present at that interview. The applicant states that those events prompted her to contact the Parliament’s DG for Personnel and the head of the medical service, and to submit a formal request for assistance.
66      According to the applicant, because of the conduct of her immediate superior, it became necessary to organise a second interview on 28 March 2023, at which proper discussion again proved impossible, as stated by the member of the Staff Committee who was present at that interview. However, preventive measures intended to ensure that there was no further hostile and inappropriate behaviour on the part of the applicant’s immediate superior were put in place. The applicant adds that, during that interview, the Staff Committee member accompanying her requested that the interview be brought to an end and that further discussions take place in writing regarding all parts of the staff report that had not been addressed in the course of the two interviews.
67      Furthermore, the applicant submits that the conduct of the two interviews on 10 and 28 March 2023, as reported by the applicant and confirmed by the two witnesses, was contrary to the rules set out in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and in Article 6(2) of the internal rules on staff reports, in particular in that she was not given the opportunity to comment on the draft staff report.
68      The applicant also challenges the credibility of the statements made by her immediate superior and the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s DG for Communication concerning the conduct of the two interviews in question.
69      The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments.
70      In that regard, it should be recalled that, under the third paragraph of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations, the staff report is to be communicated to the official, who is entitled to make any comments thereon which he or she considers relevant.
71      Article 6(2) of the internal rules on staff reports provides that ‘the interviews shall be conducted by the first assessor, who shall make sure that they are held in a calm environment in which confidentiality is guaranteed and that no external factors are allowed to disrupt the discussions’.
72      According to the case-law, proper dialogue is imperative during the appraisal procedure since it constitutes a key element to that procedure and requires direct contact between the reporting officer and the official under appraisal, which alone is capable of encouraging a frank and detailed discussion enabling the persons concerned, first, to gauge accurately the nature, reasons for and degree of any differences in opinion between them and, second, to arrive at a better mutual understanding. Without a direct exchange between the reporting officer and the official under appraisal, the staff report cannot entirely fulfil its function as a human resources management tool and as an instrument to accompany the professional development of the official concerned (see judgment of 18 December 2024, TT v Frontex, T‑787/22, not published, EU:T:2024:909, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).
73      In the present case, it is undisputed that the applicant, accompanied by members of the Staff Committee, attended two interviews, on 10 and 28 March 2023, with her immediate superior, who was herself accompanied by the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s DG for Communication, in the context of individual appraisal interviews.
74      According to the applicant, during the interview of 10 March 2023, her immediate superior did not provide any evidence to justify the staff report. In addition, she behaved in a hostile fashion. The applicant adds that she was not given the opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue. In that regard, she provides a statement from the Staff Committee member who accompanied her to that meeting, which refers to hostile statements made by the immediate superior and to the applicant’s inability to present her observations.
75      As regards the interview of 28 March 2023, the applicant maintains once again, producing in support a statement from another member of the Staff Committee who accompanied her to that interview, that it was not possible to hold a proper discussion at that interview.
76      The Parliament, for its part, produces statements from the applicant’s immediate superior and from the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s DG for Communication, who accompanied the latter at the interviews of 10 and 28 March 2023, which contradict the statements produced by the applicant, with a view to demonstrating that those interviews did enable a constructive dialogue to take place in a respectful and professional way.
77      In that regard, it should be noted that the statement from the member of the Staff Committee who accompanied the applicant at the interview of 28 March 2023 observes neither that the atmosphere at that interview was hostile towards the applicant nor that the applicant was unable to comment on the staff report. Furthermore, the contact made with the Parliament’s DG for Personnel and the head of the medical service, and the alleged submission of a formal request for assistance, relied on by the applicant and referred to in paragraph 65 above, do not call that observation into question, in so far as they relate to the interview of 10 March 2023 and not that of 28 March 2023. In addition, according to the applicant, the Staff Committee member who accompanied her at that interview requested that the interview be brought to an end and that all further discussions take place in writing as regards all parts of the staff report that had not been addressed in the course of the two interviews.
78      It follows that, first, at the very least, at the interview of 28 March 2023, discussion of the assessments contained in the staff report was possible in so far as some parts were addressed. Secondly, as requested by the person accompanying the applicant, it was possible for the discussion to continue in writing.
79      In that regard, it is apparent from the file that, on 28 March 2023, following the interview held on that day, the applicant submitted detailed comments on the staff report, to which her immediate superior responded on 17 April 2023. As the Parliament maintains, and as the applicant does not dispute, the staff report was amended to take account of her comments.
80      Furthermore, the applicant submitted her self-assessment.
81      It follows that, first, the applicant attended two interviews with her immediate superior. Even on the assumption that a proper discussion of the draft staff report were not possible at the interview of 10 March 2023, which the Parliament disputes, the fact remains that a second interview took place on 28 March 2023. In relation to that interview, the applicant has not shown that she did not have the opportunity to take a position on the assessments contained in the staff report, in accordance with Article 6(2) of the internal rules on staff reports. Secondly, the applicant was able to make her comments, as provided for in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations.
82      In the light of the foregoing, the first plea must be rejected.
Second plea: infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations as regards a lack of set objectives
83      The applicant alleges an infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations on the basis that no proper objectives were set for the reference period, including in the 2021 staff report, arguing that that prevented assessment of her ability, efficiency and conduct in the service.
–       Admissibility
84      The Parliament contends that the present plea was first raised in the application and is therefore inadmissible for breach of the rule that the application must correspond to the complaint. Neither in her complaint nor in the challenge she submitted to the Reports Committee did the applicant put forward any argument relating to a failure to set objectives in the staff report. On the contrary, in the complaint, she stated that her immediate superior had set her objectives with which she did not agree.
85      The applicant disputes the Parliament’s arguments.
86      In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, there must be correspondence of complaints in respect of the administrative complaint and the application in order inter alia to prevent the official or other staff member from making some, or all, of his or her pleas only at the litigation stage of the proceedings, thereby significantly reducing any possibility of an extra-judicial settlement of the dispute (see judgment of 2 October 2024, IP v Commission, T‑669/22, EU:T:2024:669, paragraph 149 (not published and the case-law cited)).
87      That stated, although an administrative complaint is an indispensable preliminary to bringing an action against an act adversely affecting a person to whom the Staff Regulations apply, it is not the function of that complaint to bind strictly and absolutely the judicial stage of the proceedings, provided that the claims submitted at the latter stage change neither the cause nor the object of the complaint. In addition, since the pre-litigation procedure is an informal procedure and those involved at that stage are generally acting without the assistance of a lawyer, the administration must not interpret complaints restrictively but should, on the contrary, examine them with an open mind (see judgment of 2 October 2024, IP v Commission, T‑669/22, EU:T:2024:669, paragraph 150 (not published and the case-law cited)).
88      However, according to settled case-law, if the pre-litigation procedure provided for in Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations is to achieve its purpose, the administration must be in a position to know with sufficient precision the criticisms made by those involved of the contested decision (see judgment of 13 November 2024, WS v EUIPO, T‑221/23, not published, EU:T:2024:820, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
89      In the present case, it must be stated that, in her complaint, the applicant did not rely on a failure to set objectives. However, she did state that, following the change in her duties, the tasks assigned to her were unrelated to her area of expertise. She added that the targets set for her were impossible to achieve.
90      Accordingly, a claim regarding the objectives set for the applicant was indeed raised in the complaint, as the Parliament acknowledges.
91      Thus, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 87 above, the Parliament’s arguments concerning the breach of the rule of correspondence must be rejected and the present plea must be held to be admissible.
–       Substance
92      In support of her claim that Article 43 of the Staff Regulations was infringed, the applicant submits that, despite several requests on her part, her professional objectives were never set or agreed upon bilaterally, and that that is aggravated by the fact that, following her recruitment, she was assigned to a post different from that to which she had been recruited.
93      The applicant adds that, despite the fact that two meetings were held, on 2 and 12 May 2022, with her immediate superior, no agenda or formal minutes were drawn up. There was no discussion, only a series of ultimatums about the tasks to be performed by the applicant, which were not fully defined or clearly formulated. Furthermore, she never agreed to the change in her post.
94      The applicant states that the tasks communicated by her immediate superior on 28 March 2022 did not correspond to her official job description and had been defined without any discussion or regard for the appropriate procedure.
95      The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments.
96      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, as regards the failure to set objectives for the coming year in the staff report, Article 43 of the Staff Regulations does not require the administration to set each year formal objectives for the purpose of drawing up the annual report on an official’s performance or to appraise that performance on the basis of predetermined objectives. In the absence of such rules, the fact that objectives were not set does not constitute an irregularity of a substantial nature justifying a declaration that the staff report is unlawful (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 February 2025, US v Commission, T‑18/24, not published, EU:T:2025:132, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
97      Furthermore, as regards the internal rules on staff reports relied on by the applicant in the context of the first plea, namely Article 5(8) and Article 6(2), cited in paragraphs 62 and 71 above, it must be stated that those provisions do not lay down any obligation to set objectives either.
98      The applicant’s argument therefore has no basis in law.
99      In addition, the applicant’s argument has no basis in fact.
100    Indeed, it should be observed that, in an email of 16 May 2022, following a meeting held on 12 May 2022 with her immediate superior, the applicant proposed amendments to the objectives which had been proposed by her immediate superior, which the superior accepted by email of 17 May 2022. It follows that, as the Parliament maintains, the applicant’s objectives were in fact communicated to her in writing and she was able to comment on them by submitting her amendments, which her superiors accepted.
101    It is true that the applicant maintains that the meeting which took place on 12 May 2022 was not a formal meeting with her hierarchical superiors, that neither an agenda nor formal minutes were drawn up and that the interview was not recorded in writing. She adds that no agreement on the change to her duties was ever reached and that she never agreed to a change in her duties or her post.
102    However, those arguments do not call into question the conclusion reached in paragraph 100 above. In particular, the alleged lack of minutes or written records of the meeting of 12 May 2022 and the lack of agreement on the change in her duties have no bearing on the fact that her objectives for 2022 were communicated to her, were commented on by her and were accepted by the parties. Furthermore, as the Parliament points out, the objectives in question could not have been set at the time of the 2021 staff report because the applicant’s duties were changing with effect from March 2022.
103    Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that she never agreed to the change in her post, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, the reassignment of an official to another post is not conditional on his or her consent, as that would restrict the institutions’ freedom to organise their departments and to adapt them to changing needs (see judgment of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
104    Having regard to the foregoing, the second plea must be rejected.
Third plea: manifest error of assessment
105    The applicant submits that the contested acts contain several manifestly erroneous statements relating both to the quality of her work and to her conduct.
106    First of all, contrary to the information contained in the staff report, the applicant claims to have received several emails confirming that there were no issues with the quality of her work and that she was responsive, while meeting deadlines.
107    The applicant also states that her immediate superior failed to take into account the fact that the last three months of 2022 had been an extremely stressful period for her, due to a hostile working environment and a difficult personal situation. In particular, her immediate superior contacted her on the very day she returned to Brussels (Belgium), following a period of special leave which she had requested be extended.
108    Furthermore, as regards her conduct at work, the applicant states that she never received formal notification from the Secretary-General or the Director-General of the Parliament’s DG for Communication concerning her removal from her post. Similarly, the applicant states that she complied with the rules on requests for teleworking applicable to the Parliament’s permanent staff and regularly recorded her telework both in the internal file created by her immediate superior and on the human resources portal.
109    Lastly, with regard to the award decision, the applicant claims that she was deprived of certain opportunities, such as the opportunity to attend meetings, in contrast to colleagues who had been awarded two merit points, which meant that she was not in a comparable situation.
110    The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments.
111    In that regard, in the first place, concerning the staff report, it should be noted that, according to the case-law on the appraisal of officials, reporting officers have the broadest discretion when appraising the work of persons upon whom they must report and it is not for the Courts to interfere with their assessments or review the validity thereof, save in the case of error or manifest exaggeration. Indeed, review by the Courts of the content of staff reports is limited to ensuring that the procedure has been conducted in a lawful manner, the facts are materially correct and there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers (see judgment of 18 October 2023, Gómez Calavia v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑336/22, not published, EU:T:2023:652, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
112    Similarly, an error may only be said to be manifest where it may easily be detected in the light of the criteria to which the legislature intended the exercise of decision-making powers to be subject. Consequently, in order to establish that the administration committed a manifest error in assessing the facts such as to justify the annulment of a staff report, the evidence, which it is for the applicant to adduce, must be sufficient to make the findings of the administration implausible. In other words, a plea alleging a manifest error must be rejected if, despite the evidence adduced by the applicant, the contested assessment may still be accepted as true or valid (see judgment of 14 September 2022, QN v Commission, T‑179/21, not published, EU:T:2022:557, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).
113    In the present case, the applicant relies on several emails attesting to the quality of her work and stating that there were no issues with it. Thus, in an email of 5 September 2022, she was thanked and specifically told that ‘[her] instructions [made] the guided tour much more transparent for the visitors’. Similarly, she received thanks on 14 July and 7 November 2022. She was also thanked for her contribution to a permanent exhibition. In addition, the applicant states that she received no indication that her contribution to a travelling exhibition was unsatisfactory.
114    In that regard, however, it must be stated that, first, the emails submitted by the applicant, with the exception of the first one, contain no assessment of the quality of her work, but merely acknowledge receipt of her contributions with a simple expression of thanks.
115    Secondly, the applicant has not produced any additional evidence that might call into question the plausibility of the criticisms and negative remarks made by the reporting officers in relation to her performance at work in 2022. Indeed, it is apparent from the three sections of the staff report containing the detailed assessment, headed ‘Ability’, ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Conduct’, that, first, ‘[the applicant avoids fixing] commitments and deadlines, in spite of numerous attempts of her hierarchy’, secondly, ‘not answering emails and not reacting to reminders led to a lot of frustration in [her various] teams’, thirdly, the applicant adopted an ‘attitude…of obstruction’, fourthly, ‘in 2022, [the applicant] generally displayed a distance and disinterest …, at least in her own contribution’, fifthly, she had shown less availability, reliability and adaptability, and sixthly, the issues identified in the applicant’s 2021 staff report had not been resolved.
116    Those assessments are also corroborated by several exchanges between the applicant and her immediate superior, produced by the Parliament, according to which the applicant had difficulty meeting deadlines and her immediate superior had to follow up with her on several occasions.
117    Furthermore, as the Parliament points out, it appears that the issues identified – namely the applicant’s lack of responsiveness to emails from her immediate superior, her difficulties in meeting deadlines and the need to follow up with her to ensure her work was completed on time – predated the personal difficulties which the applicant says she experienced in the last three months of 2022.
118    In view of the foregoing and in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 111 and 112 above, it must be held that the applicant has not demonstrated that the staff report was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.
119    In the second place, as regards the award decision, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, in assessing the merits to be taken into consideration in a decision on promotion under Article 45 of the Staff Regulations, the appointing authority has a wide discretion. Review by the EU Courts must accordingly be confined to determining whether, regard being had to the various considerations which have influenced the administration in making its assessment, it has not exceeded the proper bounds and has not used its power in a manifestly incorrect way. The EU Courts cannot therefore substitute their assessment of the qualifications and merits of officials for that of the appointing authority. They must confine themselves to verifying that the consideration of comparative merits provided for in Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations was conducted objectively and correctly in the light of the details provided by the appointing authority on the promotion procedure prior to that consideration. Consequently, it is not for the EU Courts to review the merits of the administration’s appraisal of the professional abilities of an official where it involves complex value judgments which, by their very nature, are not amenable to objective verification (see judgment of 6 November 2024, AL v Council, T‑315/23, not published, EU:T:2024:771, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
120    However, the wide discretion thereby conferred on the appointing authority is circumscribed by the need to undertake a consideration of the candidates’ comparative merits with care and impartiality, in the interests of the service and in accordance with the principle of equal treatment. In practice it must be undertaken on a basis of equality, using comparable sources of information (see judgment of 6 November 2024, AL v Council, T‑315/23, not published, EU:T:2024:771, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
121    In the present case, in the light of the conclusion reached in paragraph 118 above, it must be stated that the staff report, on which the award decision is based, contains numerous negative comments. In that context, as is apparent from the decision rejecting the complaint, after a detailed comparative examination of the staff report with those of the other colleagues in the same grade of the Parliament’s DG for Communication to whom two merit points were awarded, it appears that, unlike the applicant’s staff report, the staff reports of the other colleagues did not contain similar negative comments and that those officials had demonstrated a higher level of professional experience.
122    In that regard, it should be recalled that the appointing authority has the power to undertake a consideration of comparative merits according to the procedure or method which it considers most appropriate. As is recognised in the case-law, there is no obligation on the institution concerned to adopt a particular appraisal and promotion system, given the wide discretion which it has to implement the objectives of Article 45 of the Staff Regulations in accordance with its own needs for the organisation and management of its staff (see judgment of 6 November 2024, AL v Council, T‑315/23, not published, EU:T:2024:771, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
123    The applicant does not challenge the comparison made by the administration.
124    As regards the allegations that the applicant was often not invited to meetings at which her presence was necessary, it must be stated that she has produced no evidence to support those allegations. The applicant has not established that her presence was necessary at the meetings in question. In any event, having regard to the negative content of the staff report, those arguments cannot establish that the award decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.
125    It follows that the applicant has not shown that the award decision was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.
126    In the light of the foregoing, the third plea must be rejected as unfounded, and there is no need to rule on its admissibility, which is challenged by the Parliament.
127    Since all the pleas in law have been rejected, the action must be dismissed as unfounded.
Costs
128    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
129    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Parliament.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders HI to pay the costs.
Kowalik-Bańczyk
Reine
Cassagnabère
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 29 April 2026.
V. Di Bucci
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.