62025CO0411
ORDER OF THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed)
18 November 2025 (
*1
)
(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request demonstrating that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Appeal allowed to proceed)
In Case C‑411/25 P,
APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 20 June 2025,
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Gája, D. Hanf and D. Stoyanova-Valchanova, acting as Agents,
appellant,
the other parties to the proceedings being:
Versiontech Inc., established in Brooklyn (United States),
applicant at first instance,
Verizon Trademark Services LLC, established in Washington DC (United States),
intervener at first instance,
THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed)
composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, M. Gavalec and Z. Csehi (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, A. Rantos,
makes the following
Order
1
By its appeal, the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) asks the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 30 April 2025, Versiontech v EUIPO – Verizon Trademark Services (VersionTech) (T‑242/24, EU:T:2025:422; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court annulled the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 March 2024 (Case R 31/2023-1) (‘the decision at issue’), concerning invalidity proceedings between Verizon Trademark Services LLC and Versiontech Inc.
The request that the appeal be allowed to proceed
2
Under the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so.
3
In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
4
Under Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court to rule on that request.
5
In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court is to rule as soon as possible on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, in the form of a reasoned order.
Arguments of the appellant
6
In support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, EUIPO claims that the single ground of its appeal, alleging infringement of Article 72(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in combination with Article 8(1)(b) and Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1), raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law.
7
In the first place, EUIPO claims that the General Court erred, in paragraph 69 of the judgment under appeal, in finding that the conditions for exercising its power to alter the Board of Appeal’s decision under Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 were satisfied. In that regard, it criticises the General Court for finding that the Board of Appeal had taken a position on whether there is a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, between the marks at issue, whereas the Board of Appeal had examined that question, as is apparent from paragraphs 22 and 60 of the judgment under appeal, exclusively in relation to the perception of the German-speaking part of the relevant public of the European Union without carrying out a factual or legal assessment of that question as regards the non-German-speaking part of that public.
8
In the second place, according to EUIPO, the General Court consequently exercised, in paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, its power to alter decisions in breach of Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001. Indeed, in the absence of any matters of fact and of law having been established as to the likelihood of confusion for the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public, the General Court was not in a position to determine that the Board of Appeal was required to find that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue in the European Union.
9
In that regard, EUIPO points out that, whilst the finding of the existence of a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 in the decision at issue could be validly based exclusively on the perception of the German-speaking public as a non-negligible part of the relevant public, the same is not true of the General Court’s determination, in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, that there is no likelihood of confusion, since such a determination requires first that such a likelihood is ruled out for all of the relevant public in the European Union. In that regard, EUIPO refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 September 2008, Armacell v OHIM (C‑514/06 P, EU:C:2008:511, paragraphs 54 to 57), and to the judgment of the General Court of 25 October 2023, Quantic Dream v EUIPO – Quentia (Q) (T‑458/21, EU:T:2023:671, paragraph 73). EUIPO is of the view that the fact that the application for a declaration of invalidity of the VersionTech mark was rejected, without it having been established that there was no likelihood of confusion between that mark and the earlier EU trade mark VERIZON throughout the territory in which the latter is protected, deprives the earlier mark of the protection conferred by Regulation No 207/2009.
10
EUIPO adds that, even if the General Court’s finding in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal were to be understood as meaning that the General Court had, implicitly yet necessarily, also considered the perception of the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public, the alteration of the decision at issue by the judgment under appeal results in the replacement of that decision on the basis of a factual and legal assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue as regards the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public, whereas such an assessment had not yet been carried out by the Board of Appeal.
11
In the light of those factors, EUIPO argues that the power of alteration cannot lead the General Court to assess for the first time facts or evidence that the Board of Appeal has not yet examined (see, inter alia, judgment of 23 January 2025, EUIPO v Neoperl, C‑93/23 P, EU:C:2025:33, paragraph 70) nor, a fortiori, to alter a decision of the Board of Appeal which does not include an examination of such facts or evidence, such as those relating, in the present case, to the perception of the marks at issue by the relevant non-German-speaking public in the European Union.
12
Furthermore, EUIPO submits, first, that the judgment under appeal undermines one of EUIPO’s legally protected interests, since the General Court, by altering the decision at issue, disregards and definitively deprives the Board of Appeal of the exercise of its exclusive and specific power to review the decision of the Cancellation Division as regards the latter’s finding that there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue for the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public. EUIPO argues, second, that that judgment also undermines the effective and specific legal protection conferred by trade mark law on the intervener at first instance, since the alteration of the decision at issue deprives that party of an independent review by the Board of Appeal.
13
As regards the significance of the issue raised by its appeal, within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, EUIPO recalls, as a preliminary point, that, by the order of 11 July 2023, EUIPO v Neoperl (C‑93/23 P, EU:C:2023:601, paragraphs 24 to 38), the Court of Justice held that the determination of the scope of, and the conditions for, exercising the General Court’s jurisdiction to alter decisions under Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 constitutes an issue that goes beyond the scope of the judgment under appeal and, ultimately, that of the appeal, in so far as it raises ‘an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law’.
14
In that regard, EUIPO claims, first, that the appeal raises a procedural issue of horizontal nature which concerns all cases in which decisions of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO regarding trade marks and designs are subject to a review of legality by the General Court.
15
Second, according to EUIPO, that issue is of a constitutional nature. The General Court, in exercising the powers allocated to it in accordance with Article 13(2) TEU, is legally bound to act within the limits of the powers conferred on it by Article 263 TFEU and Article 72 of Regulation 2017/1001.
16
Third, EUIPO is of the view that the issue raised concerns the specific role of the independent Boards of Appeal in the system of comprehensive, effective and multi-level legal protection against decisions of EUIPO.
17
Fourth, EUIPO claims that that issue is of structural importance to the specific system of legal protection against its decisions. Indeed, the fact that the General Court exceeded its jurisdiction to alter decisions undermines the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO to review EUIPO decisions. Moreover, that fact restricts the legal protection of the individuals concerned by EUIPO’s decisions by depriving them of a specific review body.
18
Fifth, EUIPO considers that the approach adopted by the General Court in the judgment under appeal entails a risk of legal uncertainty, in that that judgment was delivered despite the recent and explicit clarification provided by the Court of Justice in paragraphs 70 and 71 of the judgment of 23 January 2025, EUIPO v Neoperl (C‑93/23 P, EU:C:2025:33). The Court of Justice held that the power of alteration under Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 cannot, without manifestly disregarding the binding institutional framework in which that power occurs, lead the General Court to assess, for the first time, facts or evidence that the Board of Appeal had not yet examined.
19
Sixth, EUIPO claims that the issue raised is significant in relation to legal protection against decisions of other EU agencies for which the EU legislature, for the purposes of the fifth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, has made mandatory provision for specific, comprehensive and prior review by an independent board of appeal.
Findings of the Court
20
As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by its appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 20, and of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 14).
21
Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to specify, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of that statute whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 21, and of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 15).
22
Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the judgment or order under appeal, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the judgment or order under appeal. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the judgment or order under appeal which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 22, and of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 16).
23
In accordance with the principle that the burden of proof lies with the appellant requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant must demonstrate that, independently of the issues of law invoked in its appeal, the appeal raises one or more issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, and which go beyond the judgment under appeal and, ultimately, its appeal (see, inter alia, orders of 30 January 2023, bonnanwalt v EUIPO, C‑580/22 P, EU:C:2023:126, paragraph 15, and of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 17).
24
In order to demonstrate that that is the case, it is necessary to establish both the existence and significance of such issues by means of concrete evidence specific to the particular case, and not simply by means of arguments of a general nature (orders of 30 January 2023, bonnanwalt v EUIPO, C‑580/22 P, EU:C:2023:126, paragraph 16, and of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 18).
25
In the present case, it should be noted, in the first place, that the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed sets out precisely and clearly the single ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) and Article 1(2) of Regulation No 207/2009.
26
In particular, in its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, EUIPO identifies the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal which it calls into question, the provisions of EU law allegedly infringed and the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court.
27
As noted in paragraph 7 of this order, EUIPO criticises the General Court for finding, in paragraph 69 of the judgment under appeal, that the conditions for exercising its power to alter the decision at issue under Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 were satisfied, finding that the Board of Appeal had taken a position, in the decision at issue, on whether there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 between the marks at issue, whereas that Board had examined that question, as is apparent from paragraphs 22 and 60 of the judgment under appeal, exclusively in relation to the perception of the German-speaking part of the relevant public in the European Union, without carrying out a factual or legal assessment of that question in respect of the non-German-speaking part of that public.
28
Moreover, EUIPO criticises the General Court, as set out in paragraphs 8 to 11 of this order, for having, as a result, altered, in paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, the decision at issue in breach of Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001.
29
In that regard, EUIPO notes that in the absence of the parties concerned having established any matters of fact and of law as to the likelihood of confusion as regards the non-German-speaking part of the relevant public in the European Union, the General Court was not in the position to determine that the Board of Appeal was required to find that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.
30
In addition, EUIPO points out, referring to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 September 2008, Armacell v OHIM (C‑514/06 P, EU:C:2008:511, paragraphs 54 to 57), that, whilst the finding of the existence of a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 in the decision at issue could be validly based exclusively on the perception of the German-speaking public as a non-negligible part of the relevant public in the European Union, the same is not true of the General Court’s determination, in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, that there is no likelihood of confusion, since such a determination requires first that such a likelihood is ruled out in respect of all of the relevant public in the European Union.
31
In the second place, EUIPO identifies the issue raised by its single ground of appeal, which consists, in essence, of determining the scope of, and the conditions for, exercising the power to alter decisions conferred on the General Court by Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, and correctly submits that that issue concerns, beyond the present case, the determination of the power of review carried out by the EU judicature and the intensity of that review.
32
In the third place, EUIPO sufficiently sets out the specific reasons why it considers that the issue of law raised by its appeal is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law.
33
First, EUIPO emphasises the horizontal nature of the procedural issue of whether the General Court exceeded its power to alter decisions of the Board of Appeal under Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, as well as the relevance of that issue to all cases concerning the review by the EU judicature of the legality of a decision of the Board of Appeal relating to the registration of EU trade marks and designs.
34
Second, it rightly notes that the issue of the conferral of powers is a significant constitutional issue, since the General Court is legally bound to act within the limits of the powers conferred on it.
35
Third, it states that the issue of the conditions and scope of the jurisdiction to alter decisions conferred on the General Court is of particular significance, in so far as the fact of exceeding that jurisdiction has an impact on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Boards of Appeal, on the legal protection of the individuals affected by EUIPO decisions and, generally, on effective judicial protection.
36
In that regard, EUIPO recalls that the General Court’s approach in the judgment under appeal gives rise to a risk of legal uncertainty since it disregards the case-law of the Court of Justice on that issue, as set out in paragraphs 70 and 71 of the judgment of 23 January 2025, EUIPO v Neoperl (C‑93/23 P, EU:C:2025:33).
37
Fourth, EUIPO emphasises that the issue of the conditions and scope of the jurisdiction to alter decisions conferred on the General Court is a significant issue in so far as it is not limited to intellectual property law but may also concern the decisions of other EU agencies that are subject to a review of legality by the EU judicature.
38
In the light of the matters set out by EUIPO, it must be held that this request that the appeal be allowed to proceed demonstrates to the requisite legal standard that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law.
39
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal should be allowed to proceed.
Costs
40
Under Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, where an appeal is allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, having regard to the criteria set out in the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the proceedings are to continue in accordance with Articles 171 to 190a of those rules.
41
Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the judgment or order which closes the proceedings.
42
Accordingly, since the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must be granted, the costs must be reserved.
On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders:
1.
The appeal is allowed to proceed.
2.
The costs are reserved.
Luxembourg, 18 November 2025.
A. Calot Escobar
Registrar
T. von Danwitz
President of the Chamber determiningwhether appeals may proceed
(
*1
)	Language of the case: English.