62023TJ0379
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber, sitting with five Judges)
4 March 2026 (
*1
)
(Dumping – Imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils consigned from Türkiye – Extension to those imports of the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia – Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/825 – Circumvention – Concept of ‘assembly operation’ – Concept of ‘completion operation’ – Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 – Error of law)
In Case T‑379/23,
Çolakoğlu Metalurji AŞ, established in Istanbul (Türkiye), represented by J. Cornelis and F. Graafsma, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Commission, represented by L. Di Masi, R. Pethke and J. Zieliński, acting as Agents,
defendant,
supported by
Eurofer, European Steel Association, AISBL, established in Brussels (Belgium), represented by O. Prost, C. Bouvarel, M. Parys and O. Chef, lawyers,
intervener,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber, sitting with five Judges),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of G. De Baere (Rapporteur), acting as President, D. Petrlík, K. Kecsmár, S. Kingston and H. Cassagnabère, Judges,
Registrar: I. Kurme, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 11 September 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1
By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Çolakoğlu Metalurji AŞ, seeks annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/825 of 17 April 2023 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1408 on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia to imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils consigned from Türkiye, whether declared as originating in Türkiye or not (OJ 2023 L 103, p. 12; ‘the contested regulation’), in so far as that regulation concerns the applicant.
Background to the dispute
2
The applicant is a Turkish exporting producer of hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils (‘SSHR’). SSHR are produced from stainless steel slabs.
3
On 6 October 2020, the European Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1408 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ 2020 L 235, p. 26; ‘the original regulation’). The definitive anti-dumping duties imposed by the original regulation were set at 17.3% for all Indonesian exporting producers.
4
Following a complaint lodged by the intervener, Eurofer, European Steel Association, AISBL, the Commission adopted, on 26 July 2022, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1310 initiating an investigation concerning possible circumvention of the anti-dumping measures imposed by Implementing Regulation 2020/1408 on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia by imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils consigned from Türkiye, whether declared as originating in Türkiye or not, and making such imports subject to registration (OJ 2022 L 198, p. 8), on the basis of, in particular, Article 13(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21; ‘the basic regulation’).
5
At the end of that investigation, the Commission adopted the contested regulation. In that regulation, it found that the conditions laid down in the third subparagraph of Article 13(1) of the basic regulation, required for a finding of circumvention of the anti-dumping measures in force, were satisfied.
6
As regards more specifically the condition that the change in the pattern of trade between a third country and the European Union must stem from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty, the Commission revealed the existence of a tolling agreement concluded between the applicant and Marcegaglia Specialties SpA, a company incorporated under Italian law. Under that tolling agreement, Marcegaglia Specialties purchased stainless steel slabs in Indonesia, shipped them to Türkiye in order for them to be further processed by the applicant into SSHR, before importing those SSHR into the European Union.
7
The Commission considered that that tolling agreement constituted a completion operation that falls within the concept of an ‘assembly operation’ under Article 13(2) of the basic regulation. In that regard, it stated, in essence, that the concept of ‘assembly operation’ provided for by that provision expressly included completion operations and was meant to cover ‘not only operations that consist of assembling parts of a composite article, but may also involve further processing, i.e. finishing of a product’.
8
The Commission also noted, first, that the stainless steel slabs from Indonesia constituted almost 100% of the total value of the parts of the assembled or completed product and, second, that the value added to the parts brought in during the assembly or completion operation was less than 25% of the manufacturing cost, in accordance with Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation.
9
Taking the view that all the conditions laid down in the third subparagraph of Article 13(1) of the basic regulation were satisfied, the Commission concluded that the anti-dumping duty imposed by the original regulation on imports of SSHR originating in Indonesia was circumvented by the imports of certain SSHR consigned from Türkiye by the applicant.
10
Taking into account the fact that the findings of circumvention practices in respect of the applicant were representative of all the imports from Türkiye, the Commission decided to extend the definitive anti-dumping duty of 17.3%, applicable to ‘all other companies’ in Indonesia, imposed by the original regulation, to imports of certain SSHR consigned from Türkiye, whether declared as originating in Türkiye or not.
Forms of order sought
11
The applicant claims that the Court should:
–
annul the contested regulation in so far as it concerns the applicant;
–
order the Commission to pay the costs.
12
The Commission, supported by the intervener, contends that the Court should:
–
dismiss the action;
–
order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
13
In support of the action, the applicant raises two pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 13(1) and (2) of the basic regulation and, second, infringement of Article 13(1) and (4) of that regulation, breach of the principle of proportionality and fundamental procedural rights and misuse of powers.
14
By the first plea, the applicant claims that the production of SSHR in Türkiye does not constitute an ‘assembly operation’ within the meaning of point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1), and Article 13(2) of the basic regulation. The Commission had not therefore demonstrated the existence of a ‘practice, process or work’ within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 13(1) of the basic regulation. Consequently, one of the cumulative conditions required by that provision for a finding of circumvention of the anti-dumping measures in force is not satisfied.
15
The Commission, supported by the intervener, contends that it was correct to find that the processing of stainless steel slabs into SSHR constituted a completion operation that fell within the concept of an ‘assembly operation’ within the meaning of point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1), and Article 13(2) of the basic regulation.
16
In that regard, according to Article 13(1) of the basic regulation, anti-dumping duties imposed pursuant to that regulation may be extended to imports from third countries of the like product, whether slightly modified or not, or to imports of the slightly modified like product from the country subject to measures, or parts thereof, when circumvention of the measures in force is taking place.
17
Under Article 13(1) of the basic regulation, circumvention of anti-dumping measures is established when four cumulative conditions are satisfied. First, there must be a change in the pattern of trade between a third country and the European Union or between individual companies in the country subject to measures and the European Union. Second, that change must stem from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty. Third, there must be evidence of harm to EU industry or that the remedial effects of the anti-dumping duty are being undermined. Fourth, there must be evidence of dumping (judgment of 21 June 2023, Hangzhou Dingsheng Industrial Group and Others v Commission, T‑748/21, EU:T:2023:346, paragraph 28 (not published); see also, by analogy, judgment of 26 January 2017, Maxcom v Chin Haur Indonesia, C‑247/15 P, C‑253/15 P and C‑259/15 P, EU:C:2017:61, paragraph 55).
18
As regards the second condition recalled in paragraph 17 above, it is apparent from point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1) of the basic regulation that the practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty includes, inter alia, ‘in the circumstances indicated in [Article 13(2) of the basic regulation], the assembly of parts by an assembly operation in the Union or in a third country’.
19
In accordance with Article 13(2) of the basic regulation, an assembly operation in a third country is to be considered to circumvent the measures in force where it satisfies the conditions laid down in that provision. Those conditions include the one, arising from a combined reading of Article 13(2)(a) of that regulation and Article 13(2)(b) thereof, which requires that the parts constituting 60% or more of the total value of the parts of the assembled product be from the country subject to measures (‘the 60% value of parts test’) and the one arising from Article 13(2)(b), in fine, of that regulation, according to which in no case is circumvention to be considered to be taking place where the value added to the parts brought in, during the assembly or completion operation, is greater than 25% of the manufacturing cost (‘the 25% added value test’).
The relevance of the first plea
20
The intervener submits that the first plea is ineffective in so far as, even if the processing of stainless steel slabs into SSHR were not to constitute an assembly or completion operation, it would, in any event, constitute a practice, process or work within the meaning of the second condition laid down in Article 13(1) of the basic regulation.
21
However, as the Commission acknowledged in response to the Court’s measure of organisation of procedure, it is apparent from Implementing Regulation 2022/1310 and the contested regulation, in particular recitals 4, 26 and 44 thereof, that the circumvention investigation was initiated, conducted and concluded on the ground that the operations processing stainless steel slabs into SSHR carried out by the applicant in Türkiye constituted assembly or completion operations for the purposes of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation. It is not apparent from the abovementioned regulations that the Commission considered classifying those operations other than as specifically assembly or completion operations. Therefore, the applicant exercised its procedural rights during the administrative procedure only in respect of that classification.
22
It must therefore be held that, if the first plea in law were upheld, it would be such as to lead to the annulment of the contested regulation in so far as it concerns the applicant. Accordingly, the argument of the intervener alleging that the first plea in law is ineffective must be rejected.
The merits of the first plea
23
The applicant submits that, in order for there to be an assembly operation within the meaning of point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1), and Article 13(2) of the basic regulation, there must be several parts and they must be assembled. However, in the present case, the stainless steel slabs are processed into SSHR without adding other ‘parts’, in only one production stage.
24
In addition, the Commission was wrong to consider that the processing of the stainless steel slabs into SSHR constituted a completion operation that falls within the concept of an ‘assembly operation’ within the meaning of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation. In that regard, the applicant submits that, given that point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1), and Article 13(2) of the basic regulation refer only to assembly operations and that the reference to the assembly or completion operations appears only in the context of the 25% added value test laid down in Article 13(2)(b) of that regulation, it cannot be stated that the abovementioned provisions cover completion operations which do not involve any assembly.
25
First, the applicant adds that the 25% added value test uses the term ‘parts’ in the plural, with the result that, in any event, the completion operation required several parts. Second, as regards the 60% value of parts test, it would be rendered meaningless if it were applied to completion operations which use only one ‘part’, such as the processing of stainless steel slabs into SSHR.
26
According to the applicant, its interpretation of Article 13 of the basic regulation does not undermine the effectiveness of the anti-dumping duties and the aim to prevent their circumvention. Contrary to what the Commission claims, it is the general concept of ‘circumvention’ which, according to the case-law, should be interpreted broadly, and not the concept of ‘assembly operation’.
27
As regards the legislative history of Article 13 of the basic regulation, the applicant submits that if the legislature had intended that the concept of ‘assembly operation’ also covers completion operations which do not involve any assembly, it would have used the expression ‘assembly or completion operation’ also in point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1), and Article 13(2) of the basic regulation.
28
The Commission submits that the concept of ‘assembly operation’ within the meaning of point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1), and Article 13(2) of the basic regulation covers two different scenarios, namely, first, the assembly operation in the strict sense, consisting of a manufacturing process by which different parts are assembled to create a finished product, and, second, the completion operation. The concept of ‘completion’ covers all operations which include further processing, that is to say, the finishing of a product. In other words, that concept covers the operations intended to process a semi-finished product or material, namely a single input, into a finished product.
29
According to the Commission, the fact that point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1) of the basic regulation states that the practice, process or work giving rise to circumvention includes assembly operations ‘in the circumstances indicated in [Article 13(2)]’ of the basic regulation involves searching for the meaning of the concept of ‘assembly operation’ in the wording of Article 13(2) of that regulation. That provision refers specifically to assembly or completion operations in the context of the 25% added value test. The use of the conjunction ‘or’ indicates that a separate meaning should be attributed to assembly operations and completion operations.
30
The concept of ‘parts’ should be regarded as covering both the various components used in an assembly and the semi-finished inputs or the other inputs used during ‘completion’ operations, whether they are single inputs, as in the present case, or multiple inputs.
31
In addition, relying in particular on the judgment of 12 September 2019, Commission v Kolachi Raj Industrial (C‑709/17 P, EU:C:2019:717), the Commission submits that Article 13 of the basic regulation must be interpreted broadly in order to maintain its effectiveness. Its interpretation of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation makes it possible to combat all product manufacturing practices, in particular products of ferrous and non-ferrous metals (iron, steel, aluminium), from semi-finished single inputs which have been rerouted to third countries, while guaranteeing the proportionality of the system and legal certainty of the undertakings.
32
As regards the legislative history of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation, it shows that the concept of ‘assembly’ has always had a broad scope and that the anti-circumvention provision was designed to be flexible and delimited exclusively by quantitative thresholds relating to the proportion of imported parts from the country subject to measures and the value added to those parts by the operation.
33
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the ordinary meaning of ‘assembly’ consists in the action of assembling several parts to form an object. The parties also agree on that definition.
34
It is common ground that the manufacturing of SSHR is carried out in only one production stage consisting in heating and then hot-rolling a single input, namely the stainless steel slabs. Therefore, as the parties confirmed at the hearing, the process of processing the stainless steel slabs into SSHR does not constitute assembly within the meaning of the definition set out in paragraph 33 above.
35
However, it is apparent from recitals 87 and 88 of the contested regulation that the Commission more specifically classified the processing of stainless steel slabs into SSHR as a completion operation that falls within the concept of ‘assembly operation’ within the meaning of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation (see paragraph 7 above).
36
It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the processing of stainless steel slabs into SSHR can be regarded as a completion operation that falls within the concept of ‘assembly operation’ within the meaning of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation.
37
Thus, the parties disagree, in essence, as to whether the concept of ‘completion operation’, which falls within the concept of ‘assembly operation’, must be understood as including processing operations of a single input into a finished product which do not involve any assembly, such as the processing of stainless steel slabs into SSHR, as the Commission, supported by the intervener, contends, or as comprising only operations which involve a form of assembly of several parts, as the applicant submits.
38
It is therefore necessary to determine the scope of the concept of ‘completion operation’ in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation.
39
In that regard, in accordance with settled case-law, the interpretation of a provision of EU law requires account to be taken not only of its wording, but also of its context, and the objectives and purpose pursued by the act of which it forms part. The legislative history of a provision of EU law may also reveal elements that are relevant to its interpretation (see judgments of 3 September 2024, Illumina and Grail v Commission, C‑611/22 P and C‑625/22 P, EU:C:2024:677, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited, and of 8 May 2025, Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen and Sogent, C‑236/24, EU:C:2025:321, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
Literal and contextual interpretations
40
At the outset, as the Commission observed in recital 88 of the contested regulation, it should be stated that the concept of ‘completion operation’ in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation is not defined in that regulation.
41
In addition, it must be stated, as the Commission did, that there are differences in the wording of certain language versions of Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation as regards the expression ‘completion operation’ in the context of the 25% added value test. By way of example, in the English- (completion operation), Italian- (operazione di completamento), Dutch- (voltooiingswerkzaamheden), German- (Fertigstellung) and Greek- (diadikasia symplírosis) language versions of that provision, the terms used refer only to the concept of ‘completion’. By contrast, the French- (opération d’achèvement de la fabrication) and Slovenian- (končne izdelave) language versions of that provision state that it is a ‘manufacturing’ completion. As for the Portuguese- (operação de fabrico), Estonian- (valmistamise) and Finnish- (valmistuksessa) language versions of that provision, they refer to the concept of ‘manufacturing operations’ and not to the idea of completion.
42
It is settled case-law that the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement for uniform application of EU law. Where there is divergence between the various language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see judgment of 4 September 2025, Hakamp, C‑203/24, EU:C:2025:662, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
43
In that regard, as regards the context, the Court has already held that, unlike assembly operations, completion operations were not a practice, process or work, listed in points (a) to (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1) of the basic regulation, that are capable of constituting circumvention within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 13(1) of that regulation. The reference to the concept of ‘completion’ in the part of Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation that specifies the conditions under which an assembly operation is to be regarded as circumventing the measures in force makes it possible, however, to establish that completion operations fall within the scope of Article 13(2) of that regulation. In those circumstances, completion operations can be regarded as a type of assembly operations (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑245/22, EU:T:2024:879, paragraphs 112 to 114, and of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑246/22, EU:T:2024:880, paragraphs 133 to 135).
44
In addition, the Court has held that, while it was true that the concepts of ‘assembly operation’ and ‘completion operation’ were different, as the use of the conjunction ‘or’ between those two concepts in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation confirms, that does not, however, mean that it is impossible to regard the concept of ‘completion’ as capable of being included within the concept of ‘assembly’ and, accordingly, to accept that completion operations may come under assembly operations within the meaning of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑245/22, EU:T:2024:879, paragraph 116, and of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑246/22, EU:T:2024:880, paragraph 137).
45
Given that, according to the case-law cited in paragraphs 43 and 44 above, completion operations are included in assembly operations and form a type of assembly operations, it must be stated, as noted by the applicant, that completion operations cannot include processing operations of a single input into a finished product which do not involve any assembly, understood as assembling several parts to form an object (see paragraph 33 above).
46
In addition, contrary to what the Commission suggests, it cannot be inferred from the fact that the concept of ‘completion operation’ has a distinct meaning from that of ‘assembly operation’ that completion operations may cover the processing operations of a single input into a finished product which do not involve any assembly.
47
As is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 43 and 44 above, even though the concept of ‘completion’ is distinct from that of ‘assembly’, it nevertheless remains included in the latter.
48
In that regard, irrespective of the argument put forward by the applicant that the completion operation takes place after the assembly operation, it should be stated that, according to the case-law, there is a variety of operations that fall within the concept of ‘assembly’ (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑245/22, EU:T:2024:879, paragraph 116, and of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑246/22, EU:T:2024:880, paragraph 137 and the case-law cited).
49
In any event, it is sufficient to note, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 43 and 44 above, that completion operations cannot have a scope which goes beyond that of the category to which they belong, namely assembly operations.
50
First, the conclusion that completion operations constitute a type of assembly operations and cannot therefore include processing operations of a single input which does not involve any assembly is confirmed by recital 20 of the basic regulation, which refers to the ‘mere assembly of goods in the Union or a third country’ as an example of a practice that enables the circumvention of anti-dumping measures, which EU legislation aims to counteract, without mentioning the concept of ‘completion operation’.
51
Second, the conclusion set out in paragraph 50 above is also supported by the use of the word ‘parts’ in the context of the 60% value of parts test and the 25% added value test.
52
As is apparent from paragraph 19 above, according to those conditions, in order to demonstrate that an assembly operation circumvents the anti-dumping measures in force, first, the ‘parts’ from the country subject to measures must constitute 60% or more of the total value of the ‘parts of the assembled product’ and, second, in essence, the value added to the ‘parts brought in’ during the assembly or completion operation must be less than 25% of the manufacturing cost.
53
As the applicant rightly points out, the use of the word ‘parts’ in the plural in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation, in conjunction with the words ‘assembled product’, in the singular, supports the interpretation that that provision refers to assembly or completion operations in which several parts are assembled to form a single object.
54
Therefore, the Commission’s argument that the word ‘parts’ could cover multiple inputs, but also, as in the present case, a single input, must be rejected.
55
In addition, while it is true, as the Commission claims, that the use of the word ‘parts’ in the plural in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation does not necessarily mean that it must be interpreted as referring to parts of a different type, the fact remains that it implies the existence of several parts, irrespective of whether or not they are identical in nature.
56
Furthermore, the use of the words ‘parts brought in’ in the context of the 25% added value test also implies that several parts are added during the completion operation.
57
Third, the conclusion set out in paragraph 50 above is supported by the analysis of the 60% value of parts test, which makes it necessary to ascertain that 60% or more of the total value of the parts of the assembled product come from the country subject to measures.
58
As the applicant rightly submits, that condition loses its effectiveness as regards the processing of a single input, since the 60% value of parts test is necessarily either met in the case of the processing of a single input from the country subject to measures or is not met in the case of the processing of a single input which is not from the country subject to measures. In that case, the lack of assembly of several parts makes it unnecessary to calculate the proportion of parts from the country subject to measures in relation to the total value of the parts of the product concerned.
59
In that regard, it must be recalled that, where a provision of EU law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to that interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (see judgments of 1 August 2025, Tradeinn Retail Services, C‑76/24, EU:C:2025:593, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited, and of 25 June 2025, RWE Supply & Trading v ACER, T‑95/23, EU:T:2025:632, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
60
In addition, the Commission’s argument that the 60% value of parts test could be assessed at the level of the undertaking’s overall production, taking into account all the inputs introduced in the manufacturing process of the product during the period of the circumvention investigation, is undermined by the use of the words ‘total value of the parts of the assembled product’ in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation. Those words involve calculating the proportion of the parts from the country subject to measures in relation to the total value of the parts used for the manufacture of each individual product.
61
Lastly, it should be noted that the Commission’s argument in response to a measure of organisation of procedure of the Court, according to which the judgments of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission (T‑245/22, EU:T:2024:879), and of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission (T‑246/22, EU:T:2024:880), confirm that the processing of inputs falls within the concept of ‘completion operation’, cannot succeed. It is sufficient to note that, in those judgments, the Court did not rule on the question whether that concept could cover processing operations of a single input which did not involve any assembly. In addition, even though, in those judgments, the Court concluded that the Commission could examine the sewing-knitting process of glass fibre rovings, at issue in the cases which gave rise to the abovementioned judgments, through the prism of ‘completion’, it is sufficient to note that, as the Commission acknowledged at the hearing, the sewing-knitting process involves assembling several glass fibre rovings. Since that process involves a form of assembly, no conclusion can be drawn from those judgments as to whether the processing operations of a single input which do not involve any assembly, as in the present case, can be regarded as completion operations that fall within the concept of ‘assembly operation’.
62
It follows from the foregoing that the Commission’s argument that completion operations, which fall within the concept of ‘assembly operation’, can cover processing operations of a single input which do not involve any assembly is not supported by the literal and contextual interpretation of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation.
63
The Commission’s argument is also not supported by the analysis of the purpose of the basic regulation.
Teleological interpretation
64
In accordance with the case-law, the sole purpose of a regulation extending an anti-dumping duty is to ensure that the duty is effective and to prevent its circumvention (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 September 2019, Commission v Kolachi Raj Industrial, C‑709/17 P, EU:C:2019:717, paragraph 96; of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑245/22, EU:T:2024:879, paragraph 46; and of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑246/22, EU:T:2024:880, paragraph 42).
65
In that regard, it should be noted that the globalisation of international trade offers undertakings the opportunity to relocate the production of goods to different countries. It is therefore important for the European Union to have at its disposal trade defence instruments which are able to respond effectively to the challenges presented by that trade environment by ensuring that EU industry has effective protection against imports of dumped products. Of those instruments, the anti-circumvention rules play an essential role in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the anti-dumping measures adopted by the European Union (Opinion of Advocate General Pitruzzella in Commission v Kolachi Raj Industrial, C‑709/17 P, EU:C:2019:303, point 1).
66
However, the need to ensure the effectiveness of the anti-dumping measures in force cannot justify a broad interpretation of the concept of ‘completion operation’, which fall within the concept of ‘assembly operation’ referred to in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation, according to which completion operations can cover processing operations of a single input which do not involve any assembly.
67
Even assuming that the provisions on circumvention were to prove insufficient in order to review certain operations capable of having a significant impact on the effectiveness of the anti-dumping measures, it should be noted that the clear wording of point (d) of the fourth subparagraph of Article 13(1), and Article 13(2) of the basic regulation, referring to assembly operations, which consist in assembly operations involving several parts to form an object (see paragraph 33 above), cannot, in principle, be called into question by a teleological interpretation of the concept of ‘completion operation’, which falls within the concept of ‘assembly operation’, at the risk of expanding the scope of that concept, which is for the EU legislature alone to decide (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 October 2020, Entoma, C‑526/19, EU:C:2020:769, paragraph 42; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2024, Illumina and Grail v Commission, C‑611/22 P and C‑625/22 P, EU:C:2024:677, paragraph 216). Such a teleological interpretation cannot be contra legem (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 October 2020, Entoma, C‑526/19, EU:C:2020:769, paragraph 43).
68
In any event, it should be noted that Article 13(1) of the basic regulation contains a list of a practices, processes and work capable of constituting circumvention, including assembly operations. However, those different sorts of circumvention practices appear only as examples, as illustrated by the words ‘inter alia’ (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 April 2018, Asia Leader International (Cambodia) v Commission, T‑462/15, EU:T:2018:196, paragraphs 56 and 57, and of 4 December 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, T‑246/22, EU:T:2024:880, paragraph 109).
69
In addition, it should be borne in mind that the definition of ‘circumvention’ is set out in Article 13(1) of the basic regulation in very general terms, which leaves a broad discretion to the EU institutions (judgments of 4 September 2014, Simon, Evers & Co., C‑21/13, EU:C:2014:2154, paragraph 48, and of 21 June 2023, Hangzhou Dingsheng Industrial Group and Others v Commission, T‑748/21, EU:T:2023:346, paragraph 44).
70
Therefore, as the applicant rightly points out, it is open to the Commission, in the exercise of its broad discretion, to examine to what extent the processing in a third country of a single input from a country concerned by the anti-dumping measures in force, in order to form a product identical or similar to that subject to those measures, may constitute circumvention, even though such a practice does not correspond to completion operations that fall within the concept of an ‘assembly operation’, provided that the other conditions required by the third subparagraph of Article 13(1) of the basic regulation are satisfied.
71
The Commission is therefore not justified in claiming that the rejection of its interpretation of the concept of ‘completion operation’ would seriously undermine the EU’s ability to effectively combat circumvention.
72
Accordingly, the Commission’s argument that completion operations, which fall within the concept of ‘assembly operation’, can cover processing operations of a single input which do not involve any assembly is not supported by the teleological interpretation of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation.
73
Nor is the Commission’s argument supported by the analysis of the legislative history of that provision.
The historical interpretation
74
It should be noted that, in order to combat the practice of replacing exports of finished goods with exports of parts that were then assembled in the territory of a Member State in ‘screwdriver plants’, Council Regulation (EEC) No 1761/87 of 22 June 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community (OJ 1987 L 167, p. 9), inserted into Article 13 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community (OJ 1984 L 201, p. 1), a paragraph 10 which, subject to certain conditions, made provision for the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on products introduced onto the EU market after having been assembled or produced in the European Union (Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Simon, Evers & Co., C‑21/13, EU:C:2014:261, point 9).
75
More specifically, Regulation No 1761/87 provided for the possibility of imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on products imported into the European Union after having been assembled or produced by a party related or associated to any of the manufacturers whose exports of the like product were subject to a definitive anti-dumping duty, provided, inter alia, that ‘the value of parts or materials used in the assembly or production operation … exceeds the value of all other parts or materials used by at least 50%’.
76
Subsequently, the issue of circumvention of anti-dumping measures was discussed in the context of the negotiations preceding the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 11; ‘the GATT 1994’) and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 103) annexed to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO), approved by Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 1). In particular, the Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the GATT Trade Negotiations Committee of 20 December 1991 (MTN.TNC/W/FA) (‘the Dunkel draft’) contained a provision allowing States to include, within the scope of application of an existing anti-dumping measure on an imported product, the parts or components destined for assembly or completion in the importing country, provided that several conditions are satisfied. However, since no agreement at WTO level could be reached on the issue of circumvention, the GATT 1994 does not ultimately contain any provision in that regard (see, to that effect, Opinions of Advocate General Bot in Simon, Evers & Co., C‑21/13, EU:C:2014:261, point 10, and of Advocate General Pitruzzella in Commission v Kolachi Raj Industrial, C‑709/17 P, EU:C:2019:303, point 37).
77
In those circumstances, by Council Regulation (EC) No 3283/94 of 22 December 1994 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 1994 L 349, p. 1), the European Union decided to adopt new unilateral measures which differ from the earlier measures in that, first, they extend to forms of circumvention other than circumvention by way of assembly operations, and, second, so far as assembly operations are concerned, they are directed at those carried out both in third countries and in Member States (see, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Simon, Evers & Co., C‑21/13, EU:C:2014:261, point 11).
78
Article 13(1) of Regulation No 3283/94 set out a general definition of circumvention and Article 13(2) of that regulation dealt more specifically with assembly operations. Article 13(2) provided that ‘an assembly operation in the Community or a third country [was to] be considered to circumvent the measures in force where: … (ii) the parts [constituted] 60% or more of the total value of the parts of the assembled product except that in no case shall circumvention be considered to be taking place where the value added to the parts brought in, during the assembly or completion operation, [were] greater than 25% of the manufacturing cost’.
79
The wording of Article 13 of Regulation No 3283/94 was then reproduced without any major amendment in the regulations adopted in due course, including in the basic regulation.
80
It must be noted that, contrary to what the Commission contends, it is not apparent from the legislative history of Article 13 of the basic regulation that completion operations, currently contained in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation and that fall within the concept of ‘assembly operation’, can cover processing operations of a single input into a finished product which do not involve any assembly.
81
Admittedly, although the initial provision on circumvention was introduced in order to combat the practice of replacing exports of finished goods with exports of parts to be assembled in the territory of a Member State in ‘screwdriver plants’, it is true that, as is apparent from paragraph 75 above, the words ‘assembly or production’ and ‘parts or materials’ were used in Article 13 of Regulation No 2176/84, as amended by Regulation No 1761/87. As the Commission contends, those words appear to have a broader scope than the words ‘assembly operation’ and ‘parts’ now contained in Article 13 of the basic regulation.
82
However, it is clear, as the applicant submits, that the initial wording of the provision on circumvention changed when Regulation No 3283/94 was adopted. In Article 13(2) of Regulation No 3283/94, laying down the conditions which permit a finding that an assembly operation, carried out in the European Union or in a third country, circumvents the anti-dumping measures in force, the legislature abandoned the words ‘production’ and ‘materials’. Thus, with the exception of the 25% added value test, it merely covers the form of circumvention referred to by that provision as being assembly operations from ‘parts’.
83
As regards, more specifically, the 25% added value test, introduced by Regulation No 3283/94, which refers to the words ‘assembly or completion operation’, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the Commission’s legislative proposal COM(94) 414 final, which gave rise to Regulation No 3283/94, ‘the … provisions [relating to] assembly in the importing country or a third country, are to the degree possible, modelled on the importing country provision set out in the “Dunkel draft”’ (see paragraph 76 above).
84
Under Article 12 of the Dunkel draft, ‘the authorities [could] include within the scope of application of an existing definitive anti-dumping duty on an imported product those parts or components destined for assembly or completion in the importing country’ if several conditions were satisfied. In particular, according to one of those conditions set out in Article 12.1(v) of the Dunkel draft, ‘in no case [were] the parts and components [to] be included within the scope of definitive measures if the value added by the assembly or completion operation [was] greater than 25[%] of the ex-factory cost of the like product assembled or completed in the territory of the importing country’.
85
The introduction of the 25% added value test in Article 13(2) of Regulation No 3283/94, containing the words ‘assembly or completion operation’, may be considered as being inspired by the words ‘assembly or completion operation’ in Article 12.1(v) of the Dunkel draft.
86
However, it is clear that the words ‘assembly or completion operation’ were used together, systematically, in Article 12 of the Dunkel draft. Those words therefore referred to the overall form of circumvention that the Dunkel draft was intended to counteract.
87
By contrast, Article 13(2) of Regulation No 3283/94 did not refer to assembly or completion operations, but only to assembly operations. Only the condition relating to the 25% added value test referred to the words ‘assembly or completion operation’.
88
In the same vein, it should be noted that Article 12.1 of the Dunkel draft provided for the possibility of extending the anti-dumping duties in force to ‘parts or components’ of the product which was the subject of an assembly or completion from those parts or components in the importing country. Only the word ‘parts’ appeared in Article 13(2) of Regulation No 3283/94.
89
There is therefore nothing to indicate that the EU legislature, by drawing inspiration from the Dunkel draft and introducing the condition relating to the 25% added value test in the basic regulation, intended to give the concept of ‘completion operation’ a distinct and broader scope than that of the concept of ‘assembly’.
90
Furthermore, the Commission’s other arguments relating to the historical interpretation of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation cannot succeed.
91
First, the Commission cannot rely on the fact that Regulation No 3283/94 expanded the scope of the anti-circumvention provision in order to find that the concept of ‘assembly’ also has a broad scope. It is true that, by that regulation, the legislature decided to expand the scope of the anti-circumvention provision so that it refers to forms of circumvention other than assembly operations and, as regards the latter operations specifically, that it refers to both those carried out in third countries and those carried out in a Member State. However, as the applicant submits, that does not mean that the definition of assembly operations was also expanded. On the contrary, at the time when Regulation No 3283/94 was adopted, the scope of that concept was limited to the ‘assembly’ of ‘parts’, as is apparent from paragraph 82 above.
92
Second, the Commission cannot rely on the fact that, from the outset, the anti-circumvention provision laid down a quantitative threshold as a condition for finding that an assembly operation circumvented the anti-dumping measures in force and that that threshold was the decisive element of that provision.
93
It is true that the anti-circumvention provision has always laid down a quantitative threshold relating to the proportion of parts from the country subject to anti-dumping measures (see paragraph 75 above) and Article 13(2) of the basic regulation also contains the 60% value of parts test and the 25% added value test.
94
However, a distinction must be drawn between, on the one hand, the stage of classifying a given operation as an assembly or completion operation and, on the other hand, the subsequent stage of verifying that that assembly operation circumvents the anti-dumping measures in force. Contrary to what the Commission suggests, it cannot be held that satisfying the 60% value of parts test and the 25% added value test determines the classification of a given operation as an assembly or completion operation.
95
Therefore, it is not apparent from the legislative history of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation that the EU legislature intended to give a broad scope to the concept of ‘completion operation’ or to that of ‘assembly operation’ so as to include the processing operations of a single input which do not involve any assembly. The Commission's argument is therefore not supported by the historical interpretation of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation.
Conclusion
96
In the light of all of the foregoing, without there being any need to rule on the relevance of the customs law relied on by the applicant as a contextual element for the purpose of interpreting the concept of ‘completion operation’, it must be concluded that the Commission’s argument that ‘completion operations’, which fall within the concept of ‘assembly operation’, can cover processing operations of a single input into a finished product which do not involve any assembly, is not supported by a literal, contextual, teleological and historical interpretation of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation.
97
The Commission was therefore wrong to consider, in the contested regulation, that the processing of stainless steel slabs into SSHR, corresponding to the processing of a single input into a finished product which did not involve any assembly (see paragraph 33 above), constituted a completion operation that falls within the concept of ‘assembly operation’ within the meaning of Article 13(2) of the basic regulation.
98
Consequently, the Commission was wrong to consider that the second condition necessary for a finding of circumvention of the anti-dumping measures in force, referred to in paragraph 17 above, was satisfied.
99
The first plea in law must therefore be upheld and, consequently, the action must be upheld in its entirety, without it being necessary to examine the second plea in law.
100
Accordingly, the contested regulation must be annulled in so far as it concerns the applicant.
Costs
101
Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
102
Since the Commission has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicant, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.
103
In accordance with Article 138(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the intervener must bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber, sitting with five Judges)
hereby:
1.
Annuls Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/825 of 17 April 2023 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1408 on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia to imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils consigned from Türkiye, whether declared as originating in Türkiye or not, in so far as it concerns Çolakoğlu Metalurji AŞ;
2.
Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Çolakoğlu Metalurji;
3.
Orders Eurofer, European Steel Association, AISBL to bear its own costs.
Petrlík
Kecsmár
Kingston
Cassagnabère
De Baere
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 March 2026.
V. Di Bucci
Registrar
S. Papasavvas
President
(
*1
)	Language of the case: English.