OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
RICHARD DE LA TOUR
delivered on 13 May 2026 (1)
Case C‑227/25 P
DR,
DS
v
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)
( Appeal – Civil service – Action to establish non-contractual liability of the European Union brought as a result of failure of an institution in its duty to ensure the protection of personal data – Non-material damage suffered by the member of staff and by his or her spouse – Legal basis of the action brought by the spouse of the member of staff – Inadmissibility of the action based on Articles 268 and 340 TFEU – Right or obligation of the family member to bring his or her action on the basis of Article 270 TFEU )
I.      Introduction
1.        The present appeal has been brought against the order of the General Court of the European Union of 17 January 2025, DR and DS v EIOPA, (2) by which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible the action to establish non-contractual liability of the European Union brought by a member of staff of the European Union, DR, and by his spouse, DS, as a result of the alleged disclosure of their personal data by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) during the ethics review and the administrative investigation to which DR was subject.
2.        This appeal invites the Court of Justice to take a view on the conclusions which the General Court drew from the principles identified by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 5 May 2022, Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, (3) concerning the conditions for the admissibility of actions for damages brought by family members of an official or member of staff in a dispute which has its origin in the employment relationship between the official or member of staff and the institution concerned.
3.        I will propose that the Court of Justice grant the appeal and annul the order under appeal in so far as the General Court declared the action brought by DS to be inadmissible on the ground that it was brought on an incorrect legal basis. I will explain why I consider that order to be based on a misinterpretation of the words of that judgment, since in that order the possibility offered to the family members of an official or member of staff by the Court of Justice to bring proceedings on the basis of Article 270 TFEU is transformed into an obligation, failure to comply with which results in the dismissal of the action as inadmissible.
II.    Background to the dispute
4.        For the purposes of the present appeal, the background to the dispute, which is set out in paragraphs 2 to 30 of the order under appeal, can be summarised as follows.
5.        On 16 September 2017, after completing a declaration of conflict of interest, DR was recruited as a member of staff within the Oversight Department of EIOPA. Following the opening of an ethics review procedure against him on 7 December 2018, DR sent information, by emails of 14 January 2019 and 10 March 2019, concerning companies A, B and C, (4) pointing out the confidential nature of the data transmitted and specifying that they could not be disclosed to anyone else within EIOPA without his prior consent. Further to the screening report sent to EIOPA by the Ethics Officer, on 22 July 2019 the Executive Director of that authority opened an administrative investigation in respect of DR to establish the nature of his outside activities. On 30 September 2019, the external investigator in charge of that investigation sent her report and DR was dismissed from EIOPA by a decision of 17 December 2019.
6.        On 13 January 2020, DR filed a first complaint with the European Ombudsman alleging that his dismissal was unlawful. That complaint was rejected as inadmissible on the ground that he had not completed all the internal appeal stages. On 3 February 2020, DR then lodged a complaint with EIOPA against the dismissal decision in which, first, he disputed the legality of his transfer to another department and the legality of the dismissal decision, second, he claimed various irregularities concerning the processing of his personal data, third, he claimed that he had been subject to harassment and, fourth, he sought payment of financial compensation for the damage he had allegedly suffered.
7.        By a decision of 2 June 2020, EIOPA rejected the complaint concerning the dismissal decision.
8.        On 16 September 2020, DR filed a second complaint with the Ombudsman, who rejected it because she did not have sufficient grounds to open an investigation.
9.        On 30 September 2020, DR lodged a complaint with the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) claiming that EIOPA had unlawfully processed his personal data, those of DS and those of the companies at issue.
10.      On 1 December 2021, DR lodged a third complaint with the Ombudsman.
11.      By a decision of 9 September 2022, the EDPS found that EIOPA had infringed Article 4(1)(a) and Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 (5) in so far as, during the administrative investigation, it had failed properly to inform DR of the legal basis for the processing of his personal data. The EDPS therefore decided to reprimand EIOPA pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) of that regulation.
12.      By decision of 25 May 2023, following DR’s third complaint, the Ombudsman found that, when recruiting him, EIOPA had failed diligently to manage the issue of his conflicts of interest, which had given rise to an instance of maladministration. In addition, the Ombudsman noted that EIOPA had not conducted the ethics review and the administrative investigation carefully and rigorously.
III. Procedure before the Courts of the European Union
A.      Procedure before the General Court and the order under appeal
13.      By an application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 4 April 2024, the applicants brought an action pursuant to Article 268 TFEU and based on the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU seeking compensation for the non-material damage which they claim to have suffered as a result of the unlawful conduct of EIOPA with regard to the processing of their personal data in the ethics review and the administrative investigation to which DR was subject.
14.      By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 2 July 2024, EIOPA submitted a plea of inadmissibility. It argued, in particular, that the action brought by DR and his spouse, DS, has its origin in DR’s employment relationship with the result that the subject matter of that action clearly falls within the scope of Article 270 TFEU and Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, (6) and not Article 268 and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU. In the observations which they submitted on that plea of inadmissibility, the applicants reiterated and expressly defended the choice of that legal basis in the light of the provisions of Regulation 2018/1725.
15.      By the order under appeal, which was adopted under Article 130(1) and (7) of its Rules of Procedure, the General Court dismissed the action brought both by DR and by DS as inadmissible.
B.      Procedure before the Court of Justice and forms of order sought
16.      On 24 March 2025, the applicants lodged an appeal against the order under appeal. In the form of order sought, they claim that the Court of Justice should annul that order, grant them the benefit of their submissions before the General Court, rule that EIOPA has committed a sufficiently serious breach of rules of law conferring rights on individuals, in particular of Articles 8 and 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Regulation 2018/1725, and that they have suffered non-material damage resulting from unlawful conduct on the part of EIOPA, order compensation for that damage, order EIOPA to pay all the costs of both sets of proceedings or, if that is not possible, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.
17.      EIOPA contends that the Court of Justice should dismiss the appeal and order the applicants to pay the costs.
IV.    Analysis
18.      In support of their appeal, the applicants raise two pleas in law alleging, first, a defective statement of grounds in paragraph 74 of the order under appeal and, second, an error in law in relation to the scope of the concept of ‘any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’ for the purposes of Article 91(1) thereof. (7)
19.      Since the operative part of that order, to the extent that it concerns the action brought by DS, is based on her capacity as a ‘person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’, I will begin by examining the second plea in law in the appeal.
A.      The second plea in law, alleging an incorrect interpretation of the scope of the concept of ‘any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply’ for the purposes of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations
1.      The order under appeal
20.      In paragraph 38 of the order under appeal, the General Court held, as a preliminary observation, that the applicants base their action on Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
21.      In paragraphs 39 to 47 of that order, the General Court cited the relevant principles and case-law concerning the scope of Article 270 TFEU, referring in particular to the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano.
22.      Thus, in paragraph 43 of that order, the General Court recalled that it follows from that case-law that, where the dispute has its origin in the employment relationship between an official or member of staff and an institution of the European Union, not only that official or member of staff, but also any other person to whom the Staff Regulations apply, within the meaning of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations, ‘may bring proceedings against an institution of the European Union, on the basis of Article 270 TFEU, to challenge the legality of an act adversely affecting him or her’.
23.      With a view to determining the persons other than officials or members of staff who may be regarded as persons ‘to whom the Staff Regulations apply’, the General Court noted, in paragraph 44 of the order under appeal, that, according to that case-law, the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’) are intended to regulate the legal relations between the EU institutions and their officials or members of staff and that, in order to achieve that aim, the Staff Regulations not only establish a series of reciprocal rights and obligations between those institutions and their officials or members of staff but also confer rights and benefits on certain members of their families.
24.      Accordingly, in paragraph 45 of that order, the General Court noted that, with regard to the spouse of an official or member of staff, Articles 42b and 55a of the Staff Regulations and Article 16 of the CEOS allow him or her, in the event that he or she suffers from a serious illness or a severe disability, to receive the support of the official or member of staff by giving that official or member of staff the possibility of exercising his or her right to family leave or part-time work. In addition, Article 70 of the Staff Regulations and Article 35 of the CEOS grant the surviving spouse, under certain conditions, the right to benefits in the event of the death of the official or member of staff.
25.      In paragraph 46 of that order, the General Court concluded that the spouse of an official or member of staff is a person to whom the Staff Regulations apply within the meaning of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations and that, consequently, according to the case-law referred to, he or she ‘may’, in the same way as the official or member of staff of whom he or she is the spouse, bring an action for compensation against an institution of the European Union on the basis of Article 270 TFEU, where the dispute has its origin in the employment relationship between that official or member of staff and that institution.
26.      In that regard, the General Court stated in paragraph 47 of the order under appeal that, according to that case-law, ‘the right to bring proceedings of any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply on the basis of Article 270 TFEU is not subject to the requirement that those persons must actually have, in each particular case, the rights and benefits which are conferred on them by the Staff Regulations and by the CEOS. It is sufficient, indeed, that, as a result of their ties with that official or member of staff, those persons are referred to in the Staff Regulations’.
27.      In the light of those principles identified in the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano in particular, the General Court concluded, in paragraph 48 of that order, that, ‘where an action for compensation brought by an official or a member of staff and by his or her spouse has its origin in the employment relationship between that official or member of staff and an institution of the European Union, that action falls within the scope of Article 270 TFEU, as implemented by Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations – failing which it will be inadmissible – and cannot be based on the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU’.
28.      Consequently, with a view to assessing the admissibility of the action in relation to both DR and DS, in paragraphs 51 to 61 of the order under appeal the General Court examined the origin of the dispute in order to determine whether it is in the employment relationship between DR and EIOPA. After establishing that this was actually the case, the General Court concluded, in paragraph 62 of that order, that, according to the case-law referred to, the action had to be regarded as inadmissible to the extent that it was based on the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
29.      In paragraph 63 of the order, the General Court held that, ‘in any event’, even if it were possible to consider that the action was based on Article 270 TFEU and even if its subject matter was or was not the same as that of the complaint concerning the decision to dismiss DR, it would be appropriate to declare it inadmissible in so far as the applicants did not initiate a pre-litigation procedure with EIOPA in accordance with Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations.
30.      In paragraph 64 of the order under appeal, the General Court ruled that that finding could not be called into question by the arguments put forward by the applicants in their observations on the plea of inadmissibility.
2.      The arguments of the parties
31.      By their second plea in law, the applicants submit that the General Court erred in law in ruling that DS had to be recognised as a ‘person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’ for the purposes of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations and, in that capacity, had to bring her action for damages on the basis of Article 270 TFEU.
32.      Citing paragraph 52 of the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, the applicants submit that the concept of ‘any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’ for the purposes of Article 91(1) thereof, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, includes family members who are referred to in the Staff Regulations because they have been conferred specific rights and benefits and they are entitled to claim such rights and benefits, irrespective of whether their claim is well founded or not. In the case which gave rise to that judgment, the Staff Regulations thus expressly conferred rights and benefits on members of the family of the deceased official. That is not the case with DS, however. She neither claims nor purports to enjoy a right or benefit conferred on her by the Staff Regulations and her action consists in complaining at the unlawful treatment of her personal data in breach of Regulation 2018/1725.
33.      EIOPA submits that that plea in law is manifestly unfounded. First, as the spouse of a former member of the temporary staff of EIOPA, DS derives a number of financial rights from the Staff Regulations, such as being covered by the common insurance scheme for officials and other servants. Second, it is irrelevant whether in the case at hand DS claims rights and benefits under the Staff Regulations, since Article 13 of the Staff Regulation specifically refers to spouses of officials. (8)
3.      Assessment
34.      I consider this plea in law to be well founded as, in my view, the General Court erred in law in characterising DS as a ‘person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’, which would oblige her to bring her action for liability on the basis of Article 270 TFEU.
35.      I note that, in paragraphs 43, 44 and 47 of the order under appeal, the reference to paragraphs 46 to 48 and 51 to 55 of the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano  is preceded by the words ‘see, to that effect’. I would observe, however, that in the order the General Court goes beyond simply applying that judgment to a particular case, since it extends the concept of ‘any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’ as it had been defined by the Court of Justice and lays down a condition for the admissibility of actions to establish non-contractual liability of the European Union brought by such persons by making it obligatory to bring proceedings before the General Court on the basis of Article 270 TFEU. It is the combined effect of those two aspects of the order that raises a problem, the General Court drawing illogical procedural inferences from that judgment since neither provisions nor case-law require the spouse of an official or member of staff to bring his or her action on that legal basis. Although the applicants do not develop the second of those aspects in support of their second plea in law, that aspect is closely linked to their challenge, as it is indicated in paragraph 47 of their appeal.
36.      As the applicants point out, the situation at issue in the present case differs from the situation which gave rise to the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano. As is evident from paragraphs 48, 51, 52 and 54 of that judgment, the Court of Justice defines the concept of ‘any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’ in the light of, in particular, the ‘rights and benefits’ which the Staff Regulations confer on such persons, the family members of the official enjoying specific financial rights and benefits in the event of that official’s death. The Court of Justice added that it is not necessary to determine whether they do in fact have, in the particular case under consideration, those rights or benefits so as to avoid the need first to examine the merits of the application in order to rule on that jurisdiction of the court. (9) However, it was because they were able, under the Staff Regulations, to enjoy financial benefits as a result of the death of the official that the Court of Justice could treat them as ‘any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’.
37.      In the main proceedings, the Staff Regulations do not confer on the spouse of the official or member of staff any right or benefit in connection with the processing of her personal data. In paragraph 45 of the order under appeal, the General Court refers to the provisions of the Staff Regulations which allow either the official or member of staff to benefit from a right to family leave or part-time work if his or her spouse suffers a serious illness or a severe disability, or the spouse to receive benefits in the event of the death of the official or member of staff. Those provisions are not connected with any right or benefit which the Staff Regulations might confer on the spouse of the official or member of staff in the event of the unlawful processing of his or her personal data. Similarly, in its response, EIOPA refers to Article 13 of the Staff Regulations, under which the official is required to declare if his or her spouse is in gainful employment. However, that article imposes on the official or member of staff an obligation under the Staff Regulations, which must be distinguished from a right or benefit granted to members of his or her family, on which the case-law of the Court of Justice is based.
38.      Such a broad interpretation of the concept of ‘any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’ and the resulting extension of the scope ratione personae of Article 270 TFEU would not necessarily raise particular difficulties if the order under appeal did not also tighten the conditions for the admissibility of actions for damages brought by family members of an official or member of staff. (10) The possibility offered by the Court of Justice to family members of an official or member of staff to bring proceedings on the basis of Article 270 TFEU is transformed by the General Court into an obligation, which means that the order is vitiated by an error in law.
39.      While the General Court rightly noted, in paragraph 46 of the order under appeal, that the spouse of an official or member of staff ‘may’ bring an action for compensation on the basis of Article 270 TFEU where the dispute has its origin in the employment relationship between that official or member of staff and the institution and correctly referred, in paragraph 47 of that order, to the ‘right to bring proceedings of any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply on the basis of Article 270 TFEU’, it immediately went on to hold, in paragraph 48, that that type of action will, in essence, be declared to be inadmissible if it is not brought on the basis of that article. However, those two assertions are contradictory: either it is a possibility or it is an obligation. Since, in the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, the Court of Justice clearly opted in favour of a simple possibility available to the family members of the official, the General Court, which, without giving reasons, turned that possibility into an obligation, failed to have regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice and thus infringed Article 270 TFEU and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations.
40.      That conclusion would seem to be supported by the fact that, in giving a broad interpretation to the standing to bring proceedings of family members of an official or member of staff under Article 270 TFEU, the Court of Justice did not intend to create a condition for the admissibility of actions for damages brought by them. Unless I am mistaken, the words used in paragraphs 55 and 62 of the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano are indicative only of the EU judicature’s wish to offer the family members of an official or member of staff the possibility to bring an action for damages on the basis of Article 270 TFEU where the dispute has its origin in the employment relationship between that official or member of staff and the institution concerned, and not to rule out completely the possibility of bringing such an action on the basis of Article 268 and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
41.      The words used in that judgement are not mandatory, as is shown by the repeatedly used expression ‘may … bring an action’ (‘eine Schadensersatzklage erheben können’ in German, ‘peuvent … introduire un recours’ in French or ‘possono … proporre un ricorso’ in Italian (italics added)). That expression presupposes recognition that there is a choice. If the family members of an official or member of staff have the possibility of bringing an action for damages on the basis of Article 270 TFEU where the dispute has its origin in the employment relationship between the official or member of staff and the institution concerned, bringing such an action on that legal basis does not constitute an obligation in any way, since they enjoy a margin of discretion in that regard. Consequently, they also have the possibility of bringing their action on the basis of Articles 268 and 340 TFEU. As the General Court recently held, the Staff Regulations are themselves an autonomous instrument, whose sole purpose is to regulate the legal relationships between the institutions and their officials or members of staff, by establishing reciprocal rights and obligations between them. (11) In other words, the Staff Regulations have relative effect: they create obligations only as between the parties and prevent third parties who have not consented to the contract from being subject to such obligations under the contract.
42.      The strict interpretation which must be given to the conditions for the admissibility of actions before the Courts, in so far as they determine access to the Courts and the effectiveness of judicial protection, and the overriding need to have clear rules in that regard mean that the verbal form ‘may’ here cannot be treated in the same way as the verbal form ‘must’ or be understood as requiring family members of an official or member of staff to bring their action on the basis of Article 270 TFEU, failing which it will be inadmissible. Such a development of the case-law would have required, at the very least, some explanation in so far as it concerns the interpretation of conditions for the admissibility of actions brought by individuals before the General Court, the correct interpretation of which is essential in order to ensure the effectiveness of judicial protection.
43.      In the specific circumstances of the case which gave rise to the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, that broad interpretation of the jurisdiction of the EU Courts to examine actions for damages brought on the basis of Article 270 TFEU was intended to ensure greater protection for the family members of the official in the light of the duties of diligence and care incumbent on the institution. The aim was also to ensure that actions relating to the same event arising from an employment relationship between an official and the institution to which he or she belongs or belonged could be concentrated in a single set of judicial proceedings before the same Court.
44.      Although I share the concern for centralising all such proceedings, I would nevertheless observe that, in the present case, DS is ultimately deprived, on account of her family status, of the possibility of having her application for compensation for the damage personally suffered by her examined. That approach may seem particularly harsh compared with the procedural treatment which the General Court accorded to the action for damages brought on the same day, due to the commission of the same act, by an undertaking of which DR is the owner, founder, legal representative and managing director and by an undertaking held by it. (12) That action, by which those legal persons sought compensation for the damage allegedly suffered during the ethics review and administrative investigation to which DR was subject under Articles 268 and 340 TFEU, was examined on the merits by the General Court in its judgment of 25 March 2026, DP and DQ v EIOPA. (13)
45.      In the light of those factors, I consider that the order under appeal is vitiated by an error in law in so far as the General Court declared the action brought by DS to be inadmissible on the ground that it was based on the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
46.      In those circumstances, there is therefore no need to examine the first plea in law, alleging a defective statement of grounds for that order in respect of the legal basis of the action brought by DS.
47.      I nevertheless propose to examine that first plea in law not only principally, in so far as it alleges a defective statement of grounds for the order under appeal in respect of the legal basis of the action brought by DR, but also in the alternative, if the Court of Justice were to rule that the second plea in law alleging an incorrect interpretation of the scope of the concept of ‘any person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’ for the purposes of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations was unfounded.
B.      The first plea in law, alleging a defective statement of grounds for the order under appeal relating to the legal basis of the action brought by DR and DS
1.      The order under appeal
48.      In paragraphs 64 to 78 of the order under appeal, the General Court considered the various arguments raised by the applicants in their observations on the plea of inadmissibility.
49.      In particular, in paragraphs 72 to 75 of that order, the General Court examined the second argument, which was based on the existence of precedents in case-law in which the General Court had recognised the admissibility of actions brought for infringement of Regulation 2018/1725, (14) despite the fact that they had not been brought on the basis of Article 270 TFEU.
50.      In paragraph 74 of the order, the General Court ruled that, ‘in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 1 December 2021, JR v Commission (T‑265/20, EU:T:2021:850), the applicant, who had applied for an internal competition within the … Commission and who had not been included on the reserve list, had sought the annulment of the Commission’s decisions refusing him access to information concerning that competition. Accordingly, that judgment concerns an action for annulment brought on the basis of Article 263 TFEU and is irrelevant for assessing whether, in the present case, the applicants have the right to bring proceedings against the EIOPA on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU’.
2.      The arguments of the parties
51.      By their first plea in law, the applicants claim a defective statement of grounds for the order under appeal.
52.      They maintain that paragraph 74 of that order does not enable them to understand the reasons why Article 270 TFEU constitutes, on the basis of the case-law referred to by the General Court in paragraphs 39 to 41 of the order, the means of legal redress for civil service disputes. In that regard, they submit that in the judgment of 1 December 2021, JR v Commission, (15) referred to in that
paragraph 74, the EU judicature recognised the admissibility of an action for annulment based on Article 263 TFEU in a similar dispute which had its origin in the employment relationship between the official and the institution in question and concerned the infringement of Regulation 2018/1725.
53.      In particular, while the applicants state that they do understand that an action for annulment based on Article 263 TFEU is a procedure of a different type and with a different scope from an action for damages based on Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, they consider, on the other hand, that the General Court has not stated sufficient reasons why such a difference of procedures would have distinct procedural consequences in terms of the admissibility of the respective actions, which were both brought for infringement of Regulation 2018/1725 by officials or members of staff in disputes which have their origin in the employment relationship between them and the institution concerned.
54.      The applicants also refer to the judgment of 6 July 2022, OC v EEAS, (16) mentioned in paragraph 70 of the order under appeal, in which, in essence, the General Court found fault with the applicant, an official in European External Action Service (EEAS), for not having brought an action for annulment on the basis of Article 263 TFEU against the Commission’s decision to transmit only a summarised version of some documents containing personal data in breach of Regulation 2018/1725.
55.      EIOPA submits that that plea in law is ineffective and, in any event, manifestly unfounded.
3.      Assessment
56.      I would note as a preliminary point that, according to settled case-law, the obligation of the General Court to state reasons, pursuant to Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 53 thereof, is an essential procedural requirement that must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded. (17) In addition, the statement of the reasons on which the judgment is based must disclose clearly and unequivocally the General Court’s reasoning in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review. (18) I would, however, point out that the obligation to state reasons does not require that the General Court provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case and the reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court did not uphold their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review. (19)
57.      In this case, I consider that the order under appeal is vitiated by an inadequate statement of grounds because it does not specifically take a view on the argument put forward by the applicants in paragraph 42 of their observations on the plea of inadmissibility. They referred to the judgment of 1 December 2021, JR v Commission, (20) precisely because it was delivered in an action for annulment. (21) The brief response to that argument does not make it possible to assess the reasons why, in paragraph 40 of the order under appeal, the General Court raises the principle that Article 270 TFEU constitutes the means of legal redress for civil service disputes distinct from the general remedy in the form of the action for annulment governed by Article 263 TFEU, when there are precedents in case-law demonstrating that that specific means of legal redress is not exclusive. (22)
58.      However, that defect in the statement of grounds does not have any bearing on the operative part of the order under appeal concerning the action brought both by DR and by DS and that plea in law must therefore be declared ineffective.
59.      In accordance with settled case-law, where one of the grounds adopted by the General Court is sufficient to sustain the operative part of its judgment, any defects that might vitiate other grounds given in the judgment concerned in any event have no bearing on that operative part and, accordingly, a plea relying on such defects is ineffective and must be dismissed. (23)
60.      Furthermore, paragraph 74 of the order under appeal forms part of a line of reasoning which the General Court begins in paragraph 63 of the order with the expression ‘in any event’. That expression indicates that that reasoning constitutes grounds included in that order for the sake of completeness, the General Court having based the inadmissibility of the action brought by DR and DS on the legal grounds and factual findings set out, respectively, in paragraphs 39 to 42 and 51 to 61 of the order, which the applicants did not challenge in their appeal.
V.      Conclusion
61.      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice annul the order of the General Court of the European Union of 17 January 2025, DR and DS v EIOPA (T‑182/24, EU:T:2025:62), in so far as the General Court declared the action for damages brought by DS to be inadmissible on the ground that she was required to bring it on the basis of Article 270 TFEU, and refer the case back to the General Court.
1      Original language: French.
2      T‑182/24, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2025:62.
3      C‑54/20 P, ‘the judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano’, EU:C:2022:349.
4      DR was the owner and managing director of A, which held 100% of the capital of B and C, which had merged in the course of 2018.
5      Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39).
6      In the version applicable to the dispute (‘the Staff Regulations’).
7      Article 91(1) of the
Staff Regulations
provides that
‘the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between the Union and any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply regarding the legality of an act affecting such person adversely within the meaning of Article 90(2). In disputes of a financial character the Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction’.
8      Article 13
of the
Staff Regulations
provides, inter alia, that
‘if the spouse of an official is in gainful employment, the official shall inform the appointing authority of his institution’.
9      See
judgment in Commission v Missir Mamachi di Lusignano (paragraphs 52 and 61). Paragraph 52
of that judgment reads as follows: ‘The fact that the Staff Regulations take account of those members of the official’s family in that way means that they are persons “to whom the Staff Regulations apply” for the purposes of Article 91(1) thereof, irrespective of whether an applicant does in fact have, in the particular case under consideration, a right or benefit conferred by the Staff Regulations …
The determination of the jurisdiction ratione personae of the EU Courts under Article 270 TFEU and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations is a matter separate from the actual grant of a right or benefit to the person to whom those regulations apply who brings an action before those courts’. Italics added.
10      I share the concern to ensure that actions relating to the same event arising from the
employment relationship between an official and the institution concerned
can be concentrated in a single set of judicial proceedings
before the same Court.
11      See order of 13 March 2025, RY v Commission (T‑246/24, EU:T:2025:299, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
12      Two actions to establish non-contractual liability were thus brought before the General Court simultaneously on account of the commission of a single act which infringed, on the one hand,
rules relating to the protection of
personal data (T‑182/24) and, on the other, rules relating to the protection of confidential business data (T‑183/24).
13      T‑183/24, EU:T:2026:221.
14      Or in breach of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ 2001 L 8, p. 1), which Regulation 2018/1725 replaced.
15      T‑265/20, EU:T:2021:850.
16      T‑681/20, EU:T:2022:422.
17      See judgment of 4 October 2024, UPL Europe and Indofil Industries (Netherlands) v Commission (C‑262/23 P, EU:C:2024:862, paragraph 134 and the case-law cited).
18      See judgment of 26 February 2026, Martinair Holland v Commission (C‑386/22 P, EU:C:2026:131, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
19      See judgment of 26 February 2026, Martinair Holland v Commission (C‑386/22 P, EU:C:2026:131, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).
20      T‑265/20, EU:T:2021:850.
21      In
paragraph 42
of those observations, the applicants raised the following argument: ‘Also, in [the case which gave rise to the judgment of 1 December 2021, JR v Commission (T‑265/20, EU:T:2021:850)], the Commission was challenged for infringement of several provisions of
Regulation 2018/1725, including
Articles 14 and 17, for failing to communicate personal data relating to marks obtained in a competition. The application for annulment lodged by the applicant, a Commission official, was based on Article 263 TFEU and was not considered inadmissible by the [General Court]’.
22      In its order of 24 February 2026, RY v Commission (C‑336/25 P, EU:C:2026:138), the Court held that ‘in line with [its] case-law, [it] has repeatedly ruled that Article 270 TFEU … creates a means of legal redress for civil service disputes distinct from general remedies such as actions for annulment governed by Article 263 TFEU and actions for damages governed by Article 268 TFEU and the second and third paragraphs of Article 340 TFEU’ (paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
23      See judgment of 13 November 2025, Al-Assad v Council (C‑779/24 P, EU:C:2025:880, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).