62021CJ0521_RES
Case C‑521/21
MJ
v
AA
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Poznań)
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 24 March 2026
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Rule of law – Effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law – Judicial independence – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – National legislation and case-law prohibiting national courts from calling into question the legitimacy of constitutional courts and bodies or from establishing or assessing the lawfulness of the appointment of judges or of their judicial powers – Obligation for a judge hearing an application for the recusal of another judge to ascertain whether the requirement of a ‘tribunal previously established by law’ has been met – Appointment of judges of the ordinary courts in Poland – Lack of independence of the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council of the Judiciary, Poland) – No effective remedy for candidates for the judicial post concerned – Judge not constituting an ‘independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ – Possibility of removing a judge from a panel of judges of the court)
Member States – Obligations – Provision of remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection – Observance of the principle of judicial independence – Primacy – Obligations of national courts – National legislation and case-law prohibiting national courts from calling into question the legitimacy of constitutional courts and bodies or from establishing or assessing the lawfulness of the appointment of judges or of their judicial powers – Not permissible – Obligation, for a judge hearing an application for the recusal of another judge on the basis of the circumstances of his or her appointment, to ascertain whether the requirement of a tribunal previously established by law has been met
(Art. 19(1), second subpara., TEU; Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47)
(see paragraphs 55-66, operative part 1)
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Jurisdiction of the Court – Limits – Application of EU law to the dispute in the main proceedings – Not included – Providing the national court with full guidance on the interpretation of EU law – Included
(Art. 267 TFEU)
(see paragraph 80)
Member States – Obligations – Provision of remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection – Compliance with the requirement of a tribunal established by law – Application for the recusal of a judge – National court hearing such an application ascertaining whether that requirement has been met – Judge appointed to such a post following a procedure involving a body that does not provide guarantees of independence – No effective remedy for candidates for the judicial post in question – No effect of those circumstances on the independence or impartiality of that judge – Condition
(Art. 19(1), second subpara., TEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47)
(see paragraphs 79, 81-94, operative part 2)
Résumé
Ruling on a request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Poznań-Stare Miasto w Poznaniu (District Court, Stare Miasto w Poznaniu, Poznān, Poland), the Court of Justice, sitting as the Grand Chamber, clarifies its case-law relating to the requirement of a ‘tribunal previously established by law’ for the purposes of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). More specifically, it rules on the scope of the examination that must be carried out by the judge called upon to rule on the application for recusal of a judge of an ordinary court on account of irregularities concerning his or her appointment and on the inferences which he or she must draw therefrom.
In a dispute concerning a claim, the defendant in the main proceedings, by letter of 21 May 2021, applied for the recusal of Judge S.C., who is responsible for the examination of that case. The defendant argued that that person had not been validly appointed to the judicial post because the resolution concerning her appointment had been adopted by the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council of the Judiciary, Poland) (‘the KRS’), in its new composition, whose conformity with the Constitution had been called into question by the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court, Poland).
That application for recusal was submitted for examination to the referring court, sitting as a single judge, which has expressed doubts regarding certain factors attending the appointment of Judge S.C.
The referring court, against that background, decided to stay the proceedings in order to put questions to the Court, in essence, regarding the compatibility with EU law, first, of the procedure for the appointment of the judge in question, in particular in view of the composition of the KRS and its role in that procedure and the lack of an effective remedy for the participants in that procedure, and second, of the applicable national provisions, as interpreted by the Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional Court, Poland), under which the examination of the lawfulness of a judicial appointment comes within the limited and exclusive jurisdiction of the Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, Poland) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland). (
1
)
Findings of the Court
As a first step, the Court rules that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of primacy of EU law preclude legislation of a Member State and case-law of that Member State’s constitutional court interpreting the Constitution of that Member State and that legislation that confer exclusive jurisdiction on a body to adjudicate on an application seeking the recusal of a judge on the basis of the circumstances in which that judge was appointed, while depriving that body of the power to examine that application if it challenges the lawfulness of the procedure for the appointment of that judge. The Court specifies that it is for the national court hearing such an application for recusal to disapply that legislation, as interpreted in the case-law of the constitutional court, and itself to examine the lawfulness of that judge’s appointment, in particular by ascertaining whether that judge meets the requirement of a ‘tribunal previously established by law’ and, as the case may be, by ruling that that judge should be recused where any potential irregularities vitiating that appointment entail a failure to meet that requirement.
In the present case, the referring court must therefore disapply the Polish legislation, as interpreted in particular by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 14 July 2021, that prohibits it from examining the lawfulness of the appointment of Judge S.C. and that requires it to leave that examination for the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, in order itself to carry out that examination and draw the appropriate inferences.
In that regard, the Court also notes that, in view of the systemic nature of irregular appointments to judicial posts in Poland, concerning approximately 30% of the judges of that Member State, a case-by-case assessment of compliance with the requirement of a ‘tribunal previously established by law’, in procedures for recusal on the basis of the circumstances in which the judges in question were appointed, cannot, in principle, suffice to ensure full compliance with the requirement, arising from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, that cases coming within the scope of EU law be examined by independent courts or tribunals. The existence of systemic or generalised interferences with the independence of the national judiciary is liable to undermine the proper functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure as well as the uniformity, consistency and full effect of the right to effective judicial protection, of which that procedure is an essential component.
Accordingly, in order, first, to restore public trust in the judicial system and to ensure observance of the principle of the separation of powers, and second, to guarantee the continuity and effectiveness of the functioning of justice, including the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling mechanism, the national legal order must, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, create a legislative framework that enables an assessment of the possibilities for persons irregularly appointed to judicial posts to continue to perform their duties. However, that provision does not impose on the Member States a single model for ensuring effective judicial protection or for restoring the trust that the public has lost in the judicial system. Thus, the Member States have a broad discretion as regards the specific content of the legislative framework established for that purpose, on the condition, however, that that framework ensures that only those irregularly appointed persons who have provided sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality may continue to perform their duties.
As a second step, the Court finds that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter do not preclude classification as an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’ of a judicial panel consisting of a single judge who was appointed to that post following an appointment procedure characterised by the fact that, in the first place, that judge’s candidature was recommended by a body that does not provide sufficient guarantees of independence to dispel all reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the regularity of procedures for the appointment of judges in which that body is involved, and, in the second place, the participants in that appointment procedure did not have a right to an effective judicial remedy, where no other relevant contextual factors attending that procedure exist that are of such a kind and of such gravity, when taken together, as to call into question the independence or impartiality of that judge.
The Court recalls in that regard that an irregularity committed during the appointment of one or more judges within the judicial system concerned entails an infringement of the requirement of a ‘tribunal previously established by law’ particularly when that irregularity is of such a kind and of such gravity as to create a real risk that other branches of the State, in particular the executive, could exercise undue discretion undermining the integrity of the outcome of the appointment procedure and thus give rise to reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and the impartiality of the judge or judges concerned.
It is ultimately for the referring court to assess any irregularities that might have been committed in the procedure for appointing Judge S.C. and the impact that such irregularities are liable to have on her status as a judge who satisfies the conditions under Article 47 of the Charter.
As regards the considerations to be taken into account in that respect, the Court points out that, concerning the circumstance that the candidature of Judge S.C. was recommended by the KRS in its new composition, the fact that that body does not provide sufficient guarantees of independence cannot, in itself, support the conclusion that the requirements inherent in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter have not been met. The same applies as regards the lack of an effective judicial remedy for the participants in the appointment procedure concerned on account of the fact that an appeal may be brought only before the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, which itself does not meet the requirement of ‘tribunal previously established by law’. (
2
) Those two circumstances, taken in isolation, cannot therefore lead to a finding that the judge concerned does not meet that requirement or, accordingly, to a ruling that that judge should be recused.
In order to determine whether judges meet the requirements of independence and impartiality and constitute a ‘tribunal previously established by law’, for the purposes of the provisions cited above, it is necessary not only to examine the factors relating to the procedure for their appointment, but also to take into account other relevant contextual factors, carrying out an overall assessment of all the factors attending their appointment.
In the present case, subject to verification by the referring court, it appears that no other factual and legal circumstance attending the appointment of Judge S.C. is such as to call into question the independence or impartiality of that judge.
(
1
)	In particular, the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 14 July 2021 (Case P 7/20). That judgment was examined by the Court of Justice, after the request for a preliminary ruling in the case at hand had been made, in the judgment of 18 December 2025, Commission v Poland (Ultra vires review of the Court’s case-law – Primacy of EU law) (C‑448/23, EU:C:2025:975).
(
2
)	In its judgment of 21 December 2023, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (Continued holding of a judicial office) (C‑718/21, EU:C:2023:1015), the Court held that that chamber does not have the status of an ‘independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’.