JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)
28 January 2026 (*)
( Civil service – EIB staff – Psychological harassment – Administrative inquiry – Request for assistance – Rejection of the request – Decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings – Action for annulment – Act not open to challenge – Preparatory act – Admissibility – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Liability )
In Case T‑365/24,
LU, represented by B. Maréchal, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Investment Bank (EIB), represented by K. Carr and J. Pawlowicz, acting as Agents, and by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),
composed of S.L. Kalėda, President, M. Jaeger (Rapporteur) and T. Perišin, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By his action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the applicant, LU, seeks, first, the annulment of the decision of the President of the European Investment Bank (EIB) of 19 April 2024 rejecting his complaint of harassment and finding it to be abusive (‘the contested decision’) and of the decision of the President of the EIB of 8 January 2021 initiating disciplinary proceedings against him (‘the decision of 8 January 2021’), and, secondly, compensation for the damage which he claims to have suffered.
Background to the dispute
2        In 2017, the applicant first lodged a complaint with the Investigation Panel appointed under the investigation procedure laid down by the EIB’s Dignity at Work Policy (‘the Dignity at Work Policy’), alleging harassment against him by his line manager.
3        By decision of 31 January 2018, the President of the EIB rejected that complaint, while repeating the Investigation Panel’s recommendation, addressed to the Personnel Directorate of the EIB, that it was important to ensure that the successor of the applicant’s line manager was not influenced negatively against the applicant on account of the investigation procedure which he had initiated in 2017.
4        On 26 July 2018, the Office of the Chief Compliance Officer of the EIB decided to open a formal administrative inquiry against the applicant relating to illegal recordings of professional conversations, threatening behaviour and insubordination towards his supervisors, and false claims regarding his language knowledge. That inquiry led to the submission of a final report on 12 June 2019.
5        By email of 29 August 2018, the applicant lodged a further complaint with the Investigation Panel, which he formalised with the filing of a memorandum on 18 September 2018.
6        That new complaint, relating to events occurring after January 2018, was directed against his former line manager, against a director and against his new line manager.
7        A final report of the Investigation Panel was drawn up on 13 May 2020. It stated that there was no evidence of harassment, found the applicant’s complaint to be malicious and abusive, and recommended that a disciplinary procedure be initiated against him.
8        By decision of 26 May 2020, the President of the EIB endorsed the report of 13 May 2020 (‘the decision of 26 May 2020’).
9        By decision of 8 January 2021, the President of the EIB initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant.
10      The decision of 26 May 2020 was annulled by the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40), on the ground of a breach of the applicant’s right to be heard.
11      By decision of 28 March 2022, the President of the EIB suspended the disciplinary proceedings pending against the applicant.
12      On 28 April 2022, the EIB appointed a new Investigation Panel (‘the second Investigation Panel’) which completed its work on 22 March 2023 by adopting a final report, finding that the facts reported in the complaint lodged by the applicant did not constitute psychological harassment (‘the report at issue’).
13      On 5 May 2023, the applicant sent the President of the EIB his written observations on the report at issue.
14      By decision of 21 December 2023, the President of the EIB adopted a new decision, in which (i) he endorsed the findings of the report at issue and found that the applicant had not been the victim of psychological harassment, (ii) he concluded that the applicant’s complaint was malicious and abusive and (iii) he informed the applicant of his intention to resume the disciplinary proceedings brought against him (‘the decision of 21 December 2023’).
15      By letter of 26 January 2024, the applicant submitted his observations on the EIB’s intention to resume the disciplinary proceedings against him and maintained that he had not been heard as regards the malicious nature and abusive use of his complaint.
16      By a decision contained in a letter of 22 February 2024, the new President of the EIB (i) informed the applicant that, even though she considered that his right to be heard had been fully respected, she would hear him as a precautionary measure regarding the malicious nature and abusive use of his complaint, (ii) explained to the applicant that his file would be reassessed taking into account his observations and (iii) informed the applicant that, pending that reassessment, all the legal effects of the decision of 21 December 2023 were suspended and a new decision would be adopted after having gathered his views.
17      On 11 March 2024, the applicant lodged his observations on the decision of 22 February 2024.
18      On 20 March 2024, the applicant brought an action against the decision of 21 December 2023, registered as Case T‑160/24.
19      On 19 April 2024, the President of the EIB notified the applicant of the contested decision, which concluded, in the first place, that none of the three members of staff referred to in his complaint had committed acts constituting harassment against him and, in the second place, that his complaint had to be regarded as malicious and abusive. The President of the EIB added that that decision replaced the decision of 21 December 2023, which was withdrawn in its entirety and no longer produced legal effects. In addition, the President of the EIB informed the applicant that she intended to resume the disciplinary proceedings which had been suspended since 28 March 2022 and invited him to submit his observations in that regard by 3 May 2024.
Events subsequent to the bringing of the action
20      By order of 13 January 2025, LU v EIB (T‑160/24, not published, EU:T:2025:17), the Court found, in essence, that, since the decision of 21 December 2023 had been withdrawn in its entirety, the applicant no longer had any interest in bringing proceedings against that decision. In those circumstances, the Court decided that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on some of the applicant’s claims and dismissed the action as to the remainder.
Forms of order sought
21      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        declare that his use of the Dignity at Work procedure was legitimate and not malicious;
–        annul the decision of 8 January 2021;
–        order the EIB to pay him the amount of EUR 150 000 in compensation for the non-material damage he has suffered;
–        order the EIB to pay him the amount of EUR 200 000, calculated provisionally, by way of compensation for the material damage he has suffered;
–        order the EIB to pay him the amount of EUR 35 000, corresponding to the legal costs he has incurred in the present proceedings.
22      The EIB contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action in its entirety;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The claim for a declaration that the applicant’s complaint is legitimate and not malicious
23      By his second head of claim, the applicant asks the Court to declare that his use of the Dignity at Work procedure was legitimate and not malicious.
24      In that regard, it suffices to note that, in the context of actions brought under Article 270 TFEU, the Court does not have jurisdiction to make declaratory rulings or to issue directions to the administration (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 June 2002, Mellone v Commission, T‑187/01, EU:T:2002:155, paragraph 16, and of 16 January 2018, SE v Council, T‑231/17, not published, EU:T:2018:3, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
25      In those circumstances, the applicant’s second head of claim must be rejected on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear it.
The claim for annulment of the decision of 8 January 2021
26      By his third head of claim, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of 8 January 2021.
27      According to settled case-law, the existence of an act adversely affecting an official is a necessary condition for any action brought by EIB staff to be admissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2019, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, T‑487/16, not published, EU:T:2019:66, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
28      Only acts producing binding legal effects likely directly and immediately to affect the interests of an applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position as an official or staff member may be the subject of an action for annulment (see judgment of 12 May 2021, DF and DG v EIB, T‑387/19, not published, EU:T:2021:258, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
29      In the case of acts or decisions adopted by a procedure involving several stages, in particular where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, in principle, an act is open to review only if it definitively lays down the position of the institution upon the conclusion of that procedure and not if it is an intermediate measure intended to pave the way for the final decision (see order of 26 June 2018, Kerstens v Commission, T‑757/17, not published, EU:T:2018:391, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
30      Accordingly, acts preparatory to a decision do not adversely affect officials and it is only when an action is brought against a decision adopted upon the conclusion of a procedure that an applicant may challenge the legality of earlier acts that are closely linked to that decision. Although some purely preparatory measures may adversely affect an official inasmuch as they may influence the content of a subsequent challengeable act, those measures cannot be the subject of a separate action and must be challenged in the context of an action brought against that act (order of 26 June 2018, Kerstens v Commission, T‑757/17, not published, EU:T:2018:391, paragraph 27).
31      It is settled case-law that the decision to institute disciplinary proceedings is merely a preparatory procedural step. It is without prejudice to the final position to be adopted by the administration and thus cannot be regarded as an act adversely affecting an official. It may therefore be challenged only incidentally in an action brought against a final disciplinary decision adversely affecting an official (see order of 26 June 2018, Kerstens v Commission, T‑757/17, not published, EU:T:2018:391, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
32      In the present case, the decision of 8 January 2021 is only the first step of the disciplinary procedure, which concludes with a final decision that may, as the case may be, constitute an act adversely affecting the applicant. Therefore, the decision of 8 January 2021 is without prejudice to the final position to be adopted by the administration and thus cannot be regarded as an act adversely affecting the applicant.
33      In those circumstances, the applicant’s third head of claim must be rejected as inadmissible.
The claim for annulment of the contested decision
34      In support of his claim for annulment of the contested decision, the applicant raises four pleas, alleging, in essence, first, a failure to state reasons and a failure to examine the admissibility of his complaint; secondly, defects vitiating the contested decision and the report at issue, in that the investigation procedure on which they are based was conducted in breach of his rights of defence, the right to good administration and the principle of proportionality; thirdly, an error of assessment in that his complaint was rejected; and, fourthly, the incorrect conclusion that his complaint was malicious and abusive under the Dignity at Work Policy.
The first plea, alleging a failure to state reasons and a failure to examine the admissibility of the applicant’s complaint
35      By his first plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the EIB failed to examine the admissibility of his complaint, in breach of Article 22 of the Dignity at Work Policy, and did not provide sufficient reasons for its position in that regard, which prevented him from submitting arguments to challenge the EIB’s erroneous and unfounded assessment.
36      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.
37      In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 22.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy, the EIB’s Director-General for Personnel, after the preliminary assessment of a complaint, considers it to be either admissible or inadmissible or manifestly unfounded and, in the latter case, brings the matter to the attention of the President of the EIB, who assesses it and renders his or her decision on whether the complaint should be rejected as inadmissible or as manifestly unfounded. Article 22.2 of that policy lists the situations in which a complaint is to be considered inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. Moreover, Article 22.3 of that policy provides that the decision of the President of the EIB to reject a complaint as inadmissible or as manifestly unfounded is to state the grounds on which it is based and must be adopted within 20 working days from the filing of that complaint.
38      Under Article 24 of the Dignity at Work Policy, when a complaint is regarded as admissible, a non-confidential version of it is sent to the person concerned, which triggers the procedure for examining the substance of that complaint, as provided for in Articles 26 to 33 of that policy.
39      It follows from the provisions referred to in paragraphs 37 and 38 above that it is only when a complaint is regarded as admissible that the substantive examination of the complaint proceeds and concludes with a final decision on its merits, in accordance with Article 33 of the Dignity at Work Policy. By contrast, according to Article 22 of that policy, a reasoned decision on the admissibility of a complaint is adopted only when, following the preliminary assessment, it is concluded that that complaint is inadmissible.
40      In the present case, the contested decision constitutes a final decision on the applicant’s complaint, adopted in accordance with Article 33.2 of the Dignity at Work Policy, which means, in accordance with the provisions referred to in paragraph 39 above, that the complaint was regarded as admissible.
41      In those circumstances, in so far as the applicant’s arguments are to be understood as claiming that his complaint was regarded as inadmissible, they have no factual basis.
42      In so far as the applicant’s arguments are to be understood as alleging an infringement of Article 22 of the Dignity at Work Policy, in that the contested decision did not examine the question of the admissibility of his complaint, they must be rejected as unfounded, since the adoption of the contested decision implies that the admissibility of his complaint was examined and that, in accordance with the rules of the Dignity at Work Policy, with which the applicant is deemed to be familiar, his complaint was regarded as admissible.
43      The first plea must therefore be rejected.
The second plea, alleging improper conduct of the investigation procedure
44      There are four parts to the applicant’s second plea, concerning, first, infringement of the principles of impartiality and independence in the conduct of the investigation procedure; secondly, failure to implement properly the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40); thirdly, the existence of a conflict of interest within the EIB’s Directorate-General for Personnel; and, fourthly, the unlawful replacement of the decision of 21 December 2023.
–       The first part of the second plea, relating to infringement of the principles of impartiality and independence in the conduct of the investigation procedure
45      The applicant argues that, both in the report at issue and in the contested decision, which validates the former, statements, complaints and evidence submitted by him were not examined, in breach of Articles 22.1 and 27 of the Dignity at Work Policy and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
46      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.
47      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the application initiating proceedings must contain a brief statement of the pleas in law on which the application is based.
48      According to settled case-law, the information given must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to give a ruling, if necessary, without other supporting information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic matters of fact and law relied on appear coherently and intelligibly in the text of the application itself. Whilst specific points in this text can be supported and supplemented by references to specific sections in the documents attached, a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot compensate for the lack of essential information in the application. It is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the pleas and arguments on which it may consider the action to be based, since the annexes have a purely evidential and instrumental function (see judgment of 25 November 2020, UI v Commission, T‑362/19, not published, EU:T:2020:562, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
49      In the present case, it must be noted that the application does not contain sufficiently detailed and specific arguments concerning the infringements alleged in general terms. Accordingly, in essence, apart from a simple reminder of the provisions which he regards as relevant and the case-law which he regards as applicable, the applicant merely refers to Annexes 17, 18, 21 and 34 to the application.
50      Consequently, the applicant cannot validly rely solely on a mere reference to the content of the annexes to the application in order to support his arguments. In those circumstances, the first part of the second plea must be regarded as not satisfying the minimum requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure and must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.
–       The second part of the second plea, relating to a failure to implement properly the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20)
51      First, the applicant complains that the EIB reopened the investigation initiated in 2018 which formed the basis of the decision of 26 May 2020 that was annulled by the Court in its judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40). According to the applicant, in the procedure initiated by the second Investigation Panel, the EIB once again heard the persons in respect of whom the complaint had been made and the witnesses in the 2018 investigation more than three years after it had been initiated, instead of simply reusing the anonymous summaries of the statements made by those persons during that investigation. The applicant therefore submits that the procedure initiated by the second Investigation Panel is flawed.
52      Secondly, the applicant complains that the EIB unlawfully continued the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the decision of 8 January 2021 notwithstanding the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40), which annulled the decision of 26 May 2020 on which the continuation of those proceedings was based.
53      In that regard, the applicant argues that the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the decision of 8 January 2021 should have been declared null and void, since they were based on the decision of 26 May 2020, which was annulled by the Court, in accordance with the general principle accessorium sequitur principale.
54      However, in breach of Article 266 TFEU, under which the EIB was required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40), the EIB allegedly maintained the disciplinary proceedings ‘artificially alive’ by putting them ‘on hold’ and keeping the applicant suspended from his work duties, thus hindering any career progression and adversely affecting his health and psychological well-being.
55      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.
56      In that regard, it should be noted that it follows from Article 266 TFEU that the institution, body, office or agency whose act has been declared void is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment annulling that act and, in order to comply with that judgment and to implement it fully, to have regard not only to its operative part but also to the grounds which constitute its essential basis, in so far as they are necessary to determine the exact meaning of what is stated in that operative part (see judgment of 20 June 2024, EUIPO v Indo European Foods, C‑801/21 P, EU:C:2024:528, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).
57      Since Article 266 TFEU does not specify the nature of the measures to be taken by the author of the annulled act in order to comply with that obligation, it is for the author to identify those measures, whilst having, in the choice of those measures, a wide discretion, provided that it complies with the operative part of the judgment which annulled that act and with the grounds that constitute its essential basis (judgment of 22 September 2022, IMG v Commission, C‑619/20 P and C‑620/20 P, EU:C:2022:722, paragraph 102).
58      More specifically, the procedure for replacing an annulled act must be resumed at the very point at which the illegality occurred, since the annulment of an act does not, in principle, affect the validity of measures preparatory to that act, which were adopted before the stage at which that defect was observed (judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA, C‑587/21 P, EU:C:2024:1017, paragraph 25).
59      It should be noted that, by its judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40), the Court annulled the decision of 26 May 2020 on the ground that since the applicant did not receive, at the very least, an anonymous summary of the statements made by witnesses and by the persons accused of harassment, he had not been put in a position effectively to submit his observations on the content of those statements before the decision was adopted.
60      It is apparent from the file that, following the annulment of the decision of 26 May 2020, the second Investigation Panel was appointed in order to examine the applicant’s complaint. In the context of that new examination, the applicant received summaries of the statements made by the persons referred to in his complaint and by the four witnesses. The applicant submitted his observations on those interview reports on 30 January 2023.
61      Moreover, the applicant submitted his observations on the draft report of the second Investigation Panel on 31 January 2023 and, having received the report at issue on 22 March 2023, also submitted his observations on that report. Furthermore, in so far as the report at issue did not take a position on whether the applicant’s complaint was malicious, the President of the EIB heard the applicant concerning its malicious nature and concerning the abusive use of the Dignity at Work procedure. The applicant submitted his observations in that regard on 11 March 2024.
62      In those circumstances, since the applicant was put in a position effectively to submit his observations on all the statements on which the report of the second Investigation Panel was based, he cannot validly claim that the contested decision, which replaced the decision of 26 May 2020 annulled by the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40), was unlawful, since the investigation procedure was resumed in its entirety and the error which had justified the annulment of the decision of 26 May 2020 was corrected in the course of that new investigation procedure.
63      With regard to the complaint by which the applicant essentially criticises the President of the EIB for having resumed the disciplinary proceedings against him, it should be noted that those disciplinary proceedings, initiated by the decision of 8 January 2021, were suspended on 28 March 2022 following the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40).
64      Indeed, in the decision of the President of the EIB of 28 March 2022, it was stated that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant had been brought on the basis of allegations of illegal recordings, without consent, of professional conversations and meetings, malicious accusations of harassment against his supervisors and inappropriate and occasionally threatening behaviour towards those supervisors. Therefore, in so far as those allegations were partly based on findings contained in the decision of 26 May 2020, which was annulled by the Court, the President of the EIB had decided to suspend the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant pending the report of the second Investigation Panel. However, the President of the EIB had stated that the applicant remained suspended from his duties.
65      Moreover, it should be noted that, in the contested decision, the President of the EIB stated that she intended to resume the disciplinary proceedings which had been suspended since 28 March 2022 and invited the applicant expressly to submit his observations on the resumption of those proceedings by 3 May 2024.
66      In that regard, assuming that the contested decision can be regarded as a decision to resume the disciplinary proceedings, even though the hearing of the applicant, whose observations were requested for 3 May 2024, was still pending on the date of its adoption on 19 April 2024, the following should be noted.
67      The decision concerning the resumption of disciplinary proceedings necessarily constitutes one of the preparatory procedural steps leading to the final disciplinary decision taken at the end of those proceedings. In those circumstances, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 27 above, the contested decision cannot adversely affect the applicant. Therefore, the applicant is not entitled to challenge the resumption of those proceedings in the context of the action for annulment of the contested decision.
68      Moreover, and in any event, it should be noted that, in so far as the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40), annulled the decision of 26 May 2020, which concerned, inter alia, the malicious nature of the applicant’s complaint and the inappropriate or threatening nature of his conduct, and more specifically concerned two of the three allegations which justified the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the EIB was free to decide to suspend those proceedings pending the report of the second Investigation Panel.
69      Accordingly, as in the case of the investigation procedure, which was able to resume at the stage at which the illegality leading to the annulment of the decision of 26 May 2020 had occurred, as observed in paragraph 62 above, the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant could also resume following the conclusion of the investigation in question and the final decision rejecting his complaint.
70      In those circumstances, the second part of the second plea must be rejected.
–       The third part of the second plea, relating to the existence of a conflict of interest within the EIB’s Directorate-General for Personnel
71      The applicant argues that, in the present case, there are objective conflicts of interest within the EIB’s Directorate-General for Personnel. According to the applicant, the persons in that directorate who handled his Dignity at Work case have a conflict of interest.
72      According to the applicant, notwithstanding the detailed objections which he had submitted to the President of the EIB concerning that conflict of interest, in particular with regard to one of the officials attached to the Directorate-General for Personnel handling his case who had put pressure on him (‘the official in question’), the Investigation Panel composed of the same members had continued to examine his complaint.
73      The applicant concludes that the contested decision is flawed because it was taken in the context of a procedure which was itself inherently flawed because the investigation was conducted by an Investigation Panel affected by an objective conflict of interest.
74      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.
75      With regard to the requirement of impartiality, it is apparent from the case-law that it is incumbent upon the administration to comply with that requirement in its two components, which are, on the one hand, subjective impartiality, whereby no member of the institution concerned may show personal bias or prejudice, and, on the other hand, objective impartiality, according to which that institution must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias on the part of the institution concerned (see judgment of 7 September 2022, DD v FRA, T‑470/20, not published, EU:T:2022:511, paragraph 167 and the case-law cited). It also follows from case-law that subjective impartiality is presumed until proof to the contrary is adduced (see judgment of 8 February 2018, Institute for Direct Democracy in Europe v Parliament, T‑118/17, not published, EU:T:2018:76, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
76      In the present case, on the one hand, the applicant is of the view that the fact that his case was handled by officials attached to the EIB’s Directorate-General for Personnel is a source of conflict of interests which calls into question the legality of the contested decision.
77      First of all, it should be borne in mind that the contested decision was adopted by the President of the EIB in the light of the report at issue submitted by the second Investigation Panel.
78      In that regard, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 26.1 of the Dignity at Work Policy, the EIB’s Director-General for Personnel selects the members of the Investigation Panel known as the ‘Dignity at Work Panel’.
79      According to Article 26.3 of the Dignity at Work Policy, the Investigation Panel is to be composed of three members, two of whom have a legal background and the third of whom is specialised in psychiatry, psychology or occupational health, chosen from a diverse list of eligible persons. Moreover, under the Dignity at Work Policy, the EIB, for the purposes of establishing that list, after having consulted staff representatives, is to select up to 30 persons other than active staff members.
80      It is apparent from Article 26.6 of the Dignity at Work Policy that members of the Investigation Panel are to confirm the absence of any conflict of interest upon their appointment and they are to declare conflicts of interest they may have with respect to the complaint as soon as they arise. If a conflict of interest exists, after consulting the EIB Group Chief Compliance Officer, the EIB’s Director-General for Personnel is to replace the conflicted member immediately with another eligible person on the list provided for in Article 26.3 of that policy.
81      According to Article 26.5 of the Dignity at Work Policy, the Investigation Panel is to be assisted by the Dignity at Work Secretariat, which, according to Article 2.2 of that policy, is to be composed of officials from the Personnel Directorate of the EIB and is to include at least one person with a legal qualification.
82      Under Article 27.3 of the Dignity at Work Policy, the Investigation Panel must reach a conclusion, according to Article 32 of that policy, which provides that the investigation is to conclude with a final report from that panel. That report is then forwarded to the President of the EIB who, pursuant to Article 33 of the policy, is to take the final decision on the complaint.
83      In the first place, it must be stated that the applicant has not presented any arguments calling into question the legality of the composition or appointment of the second Investigation Panel. However, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that such a panel is appointed in accordance with pre-established criteria from a list drawn up in agreement with the EIB’s staff representatives.
84      Moreover, it should be noted that, for the purposes of re-examining the applicant’s complaint following the annulment of the decision of 26 May 2020, the second Investigation Panel was established and was composed of members who had not participated in the procedure leading to the adoption of that decision.
85      In the second place, although the applicant submits that his case was handled by officials from the Directorate-General for Personnel, it is clear, as the EIB states, that he does not put forward any specific arguments to establish how that mere fact vitiated the report at issue adopted by the second Investigation Panel, much less the contested decision adopted by the President of the EIB.
86      As is clear from the provisions of the Dignity at Work Policy cited in paragraphs 78 to 82 above, the staff of the EIB’s Directorate-General for Personnel provide assistance and perform secretarial functions for the Investigation Panel, which alone decides on the final investigation report, in accordance with Articles 27 and 32 of that policy.
87      Therefore, the applicant’s arguments do not call into question either the objective impartiality or, a fortiori, the subjective impartiality of the bodies which took decisions relating to his complaint within the EIB, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 75 above.
88      On the other hand, the applicant claims that the official in question exerted pressure on him.
89      It is clear from the file that the official in question is not a member of the Investigation Panel and therefore did not carry out any investigative activities or conduct any interviews in relation to that investigation. The official in question held a position within the Directorate-General for Personnel in the context of which, on 8 April 2022, he sent a letter to the applicant on behalf of the President of the EIB in response to a letter from the applicant dated 24 March 2022 claiming that the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40), had not been complied with.
90      In that regard, it should be recalled that it was the second Investigation Panel which, in the first place, examined the applicant’s complaint and that it was the President of the EIB who, in the second place, by the contested decision, rejected that complaint on the basis of the report at issue.
91      Consequently, the applicant’s arguments disputing the impartiality of the official in question, who did not carry out any investigative activities, cannot call into question the legality of the contested decision, unless it can be shown that that official’s intervention played a decisive role in the adoption of that decision.
92      However, it is not apparent from the file that the fact that the official in question participated, in his capacity as a staff member of the Directorate-General for Personnel, in administrative tasks for the Investigation Panel or for the President of the EIB had any influence on the relevant procedure in the present case, namely the procedure relating to the applicant’s complaint under the Dignity at Work Policy.
93      Moreover, and in any event, the fact, noted by the applicant, that the official in question intervened in an alleged dispute between him and the EIB by forwarding the EIB’s offer to settle the dispute cannot, in itself, constitute evidence calling into question the impartiality of that official, who works in the EIB’s Directorate-General for Personnel and whose specific role is the administrative management of personnel files. The applicant has not provided any arguments or evidence to establish that, by submitting an offer to him to settle his dispute with the EIB, the Directorate-General for Personnel and, more specifically, the official in question had acted unlawfully or exercised a decisive influence over the content of the report at issue or the contested decision. The mere fact that the EIB, represented by the official in question, allegedly made an offer to the applicant subject to conditions which it regarded as appropriate cannot, in itself and in the absence of other arguments and evidence, be regarded as constituting pressure on the applicant, who remained free not to accept that offer, as indeed was the case.
94      In those circumstances, the third part of the second plea must be rejected.
–       The fourth part of the second plea, relating to the unlawful replacement of the decision of 21 December 2023
95      The applicant argues that the contested decision was adopted unilaterally by the President of the EIB on 19 April 2024 to replace, a posteriori, the decision of 21 December 2023, which was a final decision in the Dignity at Work procedure, in accordance with Article 33.2 of the Dignity at Work Policy. However, according to the applicant, that decision could not be revisited, altered, or subject to internal procedures to reopen the formal procedure, which had already been completed.
96      The applicant submits that the contested decision states that it revokes the decision of 21 December 2023 and constitutes a new final decision. However, although it states that it was adopted following a new careful examination of the file and the observations submitted by the parties, the contested decision is based on observations which were not sent to the applicant, thus depriving him of the opportunity to challenge their validity.
97      Moreover, according to the applicant, by revoking the decision of 21 December 2023, the contested decision also renders the Dignity at Work procedure null and void, thereby making it impossible to reopen that procedure or to take new decisions based on other distinct processes conducted unilaterally by the President of the EIB.
98      Accordingly, the applicant claims that the President of the EIB exceeded her powers when she took the contested decision, in so far as no provision authorises her to annul and withdraw an existing final decision and to take a new one without respecting the fundamental rights of the defence and, in particular, the right of the addressee of the decision to be heard.
99      The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.
100    According to settled case-law, while it must be acknowledged that any EU institution, which finds that an act which it has just adopted is vitiated by unlawfulness, has the right to withdraw that act within a reasonable period, with retroactive effect, that right may be restricted by the need to respect the legitimate expectations of a beneficiary of the act, who has been led to rely on the lawfulness thereof (see judgment of 12 February 2020, ZF v Commission, T‑605/18, EU:T:2020:51, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited).
101    Thus, according to the case-law, the withdrawal of an unlawful act which has benefited its recipient is subject to two legal conditions, the first one being that it respects the legitimate expectations of the person concerned, and the second that it takes place within a reasonable period (see judgment of 12 February 2020, ZF v Commission, T‑605/18, EU:T:2020:51, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited).
102    However, it also follows from the case-law that the strict conditions which attach to the retroactive withdrawal of an illegal administrative act creating individual rights are not relevant where the act in question does not, vis-à-vis the person to whom it is addressed, constitute an act giving rise to rights, but an act adversely affecting him (see judgment of 27 June 2017, Ruiz Molina v EUIPO, T‑233/16 P, EU:T:2017:435, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
103    Accordingly, the Court has held that there was nothing to prevent the withdrawal of an illegal or legal administrative act which, vis-à-vis the person to whom it is addressed, was principally an act adversely affecting him, provided that the legitimate expectations of that person were not interfered with and the principle of legal security was not infringed (judgment of 27 June 2017, Ruiz Molina v EUIPO, T‑233/16 P, EU:T:2017:435, paragraph 29).
104    In the present case, following the adoption of the report at issue on 22 March 2023 and the observations on that report submitted by the applicant on 5 May 2023, the President of the EIB adopted the decision of 21 December 2023, in which he endorsed the findings of the report at issue, concluded that the applicant had not been the victim of psychological harassment and rejected the applicant’s complaint. Moreover, the President of the EIB found that that complaint was malicious and constituted an abuse of procedure, and stated that he was considering resuming the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant.
105    Following the decision of 21 December 2023, the applicant sent a letter to the President of the EIB on 26 January 2024, in which he argued that, in adopting that decision, the former President of the EIB had failed to respect his rights of defence in that he had not heard the applicant on the malicious and abusive nature of his complaint and on the resumption of disciplinary proceedings against him, aspects on which the report at issue had not ruled.
106    By the decision contained in the letter of 22 February 2024, the President of the EIB gave the applicant the opportunity to submit his observations on the aspects on which he was of the view that he had not been heard and informed him that, as a matter of prudence, the effects of the decision of 21 December 2023 were suspended pending the adoption of a new decision.
107    On 11 March 2024, the applicant submitted his observations on the alleged malicious and abusive nature of his complaint.
108    In that regard, it should be noted that the decision of 21 December 2023 constituted an act adversely affecting the applicant. In those circumstances, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 102 and 103 above, such an act, whether illegal or legal, could be withdrawn, provided that the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations were respected.
109    However, it must be pointed out that it was because of the intervention of the applicant himself, by his letter of 26 January 2024, that the President of the EIB, in the interests of prudence, took the decision to hear him and to suspend the effects of the decision of 21 December 2023. Following the observations submitted by the applicant on 11 March 2023, the President of the EIB withdrew the decision of 21 December 2023 and adopted the contested decision.
110    Accordingly, in view of the chronology and content of the exchanges between the applicant and the EIB, neither the principle of legal certainty nor that of the protection of legitimate expectations has been infringed. However, the EIB was free to suspend the effects of the decision of 21 December 2023 after having been notified by the applicant that he was of the view that his right to be heard had been disregarded, and to withdraw that decision, replacing it with a new decision adopted after hearing the applicant.
111    The applicant cannot therefore criticise the EIB for having granted his request of 26 January 2024 and for having drawn the appropriate conclusions from the possible infringement of his rights in the decision of 21 December 2023 by suspending the effects of that decision and then withdrawing it.
112    In those circumstances, the fourth part of the second plea must be rejected and, consequently, that plea must be rejected in its entirety.
The third plea, alleging an error of assessment and an error of law in that the contested decision concluded that the facts alleged by the applicant did not constitute psychological harassment
113    By his third plea, the applicant argues, in essence, that the second Investigation Panel did not correctly assess the behaviour and facts alleged in his complaint, which, both individually and as a whole, constituted attacks on his self-esteem, dignity and physical and psychological integrity.
114    Accordingly, it is claimed that the second Investigation Panel misinterpreted the concept of ‘psychological harassment’.
115    According to the applicant, the report at issue and the contested decision are vitiated by an error of law.
116    More specifically, the applicant claims to have been the victim of psychological harassment as a result of the individual and coordinated behaviour of A, B and C.
117    The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.
118    In that regard, it should be noted that, on 1 August 2006, the EIB adopted a Staff Code of Conduct (‘the Code of Conduct’), Article 3.6.1 of which defines psychological harassment as ‘repeatedly hostile or tasteless remarks, acts or behaviour over a fairly long period by one or more members of staff towards another member of staff’.
119    Article 3.6.1 of the Code of Conduct must be read in conjunction with the provision of the Dignity at Work Policy concerning psychological harassment, according to which ‘it is irrelevant whether the behaviour is intentional or not [since t]he key feature is that harassment and bullying is unwelcome and unacceptable behaviour that demeans the self-respect and confidence of the recipient’ (see judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).
120    It follows from those provisions that words, attitudes or acts by a member of staff of the EIB towards another member of staff constitute psychological harassment where they have objectively entailed an attack on the self-esteem and self-confidence of that person (see judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited).
121    The definition of the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ in Article 3.6.1 of the Code of Conduct requires the repetition, and in addition ‘over a fairly long period’, of hostile or tasteless remarks, acts or behaviour. Viewed in that light, the definition bears a similarity to that set out in Article 12a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, which defines psychological harassment, as regards the officials and other members of staff covered by those regulations, as ‘improper conduct’ taking the form of physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts which take place ‘over a period’, and are ‘repetitive or systematic’, which suggests that psychological harassment must be a process that occurs over time and presumes the existence of repetitive or continual conduct that is ‘intentional’ rather than ‘accidental’ (see judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).
122    The reference in the case-law concerning Article 12a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union to a ‘process that occurs over time and presumes the existence of repetitive or continual conduct’ can also apply by analogy for the purpose of applying the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ applicable to members of staff of the EIB (see judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).
123    Moreover, as the conduct in question must, as pointed out in paragraph 121 above, be improper, the classification of such conduct as psychological harassment is subject to the condition of its being sufficient, when viewed objectively, to be considered real, in the sense that an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same situation, would consider it to be excessive and open to criticism (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2021, ZU v Commission, T‑671/18 and T‑140/19, not published, EU:T:2021:715, paragraph 58).
124    Furthermore, psychological harassment may, by definition, be the outcome of a set of different acts by one member of staff of the EIB towards another which, considered in isolation, would not necessarily constitute per se psychological harassment but which, viewed as a whole and in context, including because of their build-up over time, could be regarded as having objectively entailed an attack on the self-esteem and self-confidence of that other member of staff to whom the acts were directed, for the purpose of Article 3.6.1 of the Code of Conduct (judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 93).
125    That is why, when examining whether the acts alleged by the applicant constitute psychological harassment, those facts should be examined both individually and jointly as part of the general working environment created by the behaviour of one member of staff towards another (see judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).
126    Furthermore, according to established case-law, the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ referred to in Article 3.6.1 of the Code of Conduct is based on an objective concept which, although based on a contextual classification of the actions and behaviour of officials and other members of staff, which is not always straightforward, does not, in any event, call for complex assessments to be carried out, such as those that may have to be conducted in respect of economic concepts, scientific concepts or technical concepts, which warrant a degree of discretion being afforded to the administrative body in applying the concept in question. Therefore, where it has been alleged that Article 3.6.1 of the Code of Conduct was misapplied, it is necessary to examine whether the EIB erred in its assessment of the facts in the light of the definition of psychological harassment laid down in that provision, not whether that error is manifest (see judgment of 13 July 2018, SQ v EIB, T‑377/17, EU:T:2018:478, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
127    It is in the light of the foregoing considerations that it is necessary to examine, with regard to the applicant’s claims, whether the President of the EIB, by relying on the report at issue, made an error of assessment in concluding that the applicant had not been the victim of psychological harassment and in dismissing his complaint.
–       The applicant’s claims concerning A’s conduct
128    First, the applicant criticises A, his former supervisor, for unilaterally imposing on him an inappropriate work plan for 2018, which A refused to review, even though, in response to a complaint made by the applicant concerning 2017, an EIB Investigation Panel had recommended resolving the problems between A and him by separating them.
129    In that regard, it should be noted that, at the beginning of 2018, A was the applicant’s acting supervisor until a new supervisor was due to take up his duties in April of that year. It is apparent from the file that, on 5 February 2018, A had asked his entire team to present their work objectives for 2018, adapting the objectives from the previous year. A had stated that he was available to discuss those objectives individually. In response to that request, the applicant had refused to provide his objectives to A, whom he considered to be biased against him following a previous Dignity at Work procedure, and had stated that he would discuss his objectives for 2018 with the new head of division when he took up his duties. In response to that refusal, A had informed the applicant that, according to the EIB’s internal rules, all staff members were required to have annual work objectives, which is why, as his supervisor, A intended to set appropriate objectives for the applicant which he could discuss with the new head of division as soon as he took up his duties.
130    It follows from the foregoing that the arguments put forward by the applicant are not such as to establish that the setting of his work objectives for 2018 had the purpose or effect of undermining his dignity. Similarly, the applicant has failed to provide any objective evidence that the objectives which were assigned to him were set inappropriately.
131    Therefore, neither the second Investigation Panel in the report at issue nor the President of the EIB in the contested decision made an error of assessment in rejecting the applicant’s claims regarding the work objectives for 2018.
132    Secondly, the applicant claims that A removed two Italian projects from him and transferred them to another division with no objective justification.
133    In that regard, it is apparent from the file that, in correspondence between the applicant’s division and another EIB division in February 2018, the applicant himself had stated that he had entered into preliminary discussions with the promoters of the two projects in question and had asked to be appointed as the contact person for those projects. In a subsequent communication, a member of the other EIB division had informed the applicant that, following a discussion with A concerning the workload and the allocation of tasks between the various divisions, it had been decided that those two projects would be managed by that other division. In response to that communication, the applicant had written to A expressing his dissatisfaction. A replied to the applicant, informing him that it was in the context of the ongoing reorganisation of the department that the decision had been made to transfer the projects in question to another division.
134    However, both the section of the report at issue relating to the two Italian projects and paragraphs 48 to 56 of the contested decision recognise the applicant’s interest in being appointed as the contact person for those projects. They note therein, however, that those projects were still at an early stage (in the pipeline), that the steps taken by the applicant on his own initiative were preliminary and that the allocation of projects to the various divisions was carried out at departmental management level. Moreover, the second Investigation Panel noted that it was common practice within the EIB, for reasons of independence and impartiality, to attempt to ensure that each staff member deals with a varied range of projects, avoiding situations where they all relate to the same State, particularly in the case of a staff member who is a national of that State.
135    It should also be noted that, in view of the broad discretion enjoyed by the institutions in the organisation of their departments, neither administrative decisions relating to questions concerning the organisation of departments, even if they are difficult to accept, nor disagreements with the administration on those same questions, can by themselves prove the existence of psychological harassment (see judgment of 6 April 2022, KU v EEAS, T‑425/20, not published, EU:T:2022:224, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
136    In the present case, the correspondence referred to in paragraph 133 above falls, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 135 above, within the framework of the internal organisation of the EIB’s divisions. Accordingly, the conduct of the head of division cannot be regarded as excessive and open to criticism by an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same circumstances.
137    The second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB therefore made no error of assessment in rejecting the applicant’s claims concerning the allocation of the two Italian projects.
138    Thirdly, the applicant criticises A for compelling him to go on a mission to Senegal even though he had neither the necessary vaccinations nor a sufficient level of French.
139    In that regard, it is apparent from the documents in the file that, on 27 February 2018, A, as head of division, had communicated to his team a number of strategic projects for the year, assigning two or three of those projects, as appropriate, to each member of the team. The applicant was assigned two projects, namely a project in Senegal and a project in Cameroon. The applicant then expressed his opposition to working on the project in Senegal, in view of his workload and his poor command of French. On 1 March 2018, when the applicant was informed of a mission for the project in Senegal, scheduled for 11 to 16 March 2018, he informed A that he was unable to participate because he had not had the required vaccinations and that his participation in another mission in Bosnia on the same dates had already been scheduled. It is also apparent from the file that, once A had been informed by the EIB’s medical service that the applicant had not had the required vaccinations for a trip to Senegal, A took note of this and cancelled the applicant’s participation in that trip, while recommending that he prepare himself medically for future missions in sub-Saharan Africa and encouraging him to participate in the scheduled mission to Bosnia. In response to the applicant’s reservations as regards his level of French, A pointed out that the applicant had already worked on projects in French and that, according his EIB profile, he had an excellent command of that language.
140    It follows from the foregoing that the evidence in the file is not capable of establishing that A required the applicant to participate in a mission to Senegal despite his poor level of French and the fact that he had not had the required vaccinations.
141    Moreover, even if the tone used by A in his exchanges with the applicant regarding the mission to Senegal was firm, those exchanges were part of a supervisor’s reprimands concerning behaviour, an action or an omission that he considered not to be consistent with the requirements of the service, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 135 above.
142    Accordingly, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 57 to 67 of the contested decision, were right to conclude that the applicant had not established, in the context of the mission to Senegal, the existence of behaviour constituting psychological harassment on the part of A.
143    Fourthly, the applicant claims that A deliberately delayed the finalisation of a preliminary information note which he had submitted to A on a project in Malawi, with the aim of damaging his professional reputation and hindering his career progression.
144    In that regard, it is clear from the file that no deadline had been set for the submission of that note. Moreover, it is apparent from the correspondence relating to that note that, from 10 January 2018, the applicant had received comments from his supervisors on the draft note so that he could finalise it. First, the applicant himself had communicated those comments to the person responsible for the relevant division. Secondly, it is clear from that correspondence that the applicant had received specific instructions which he had refused to implement, asking his supervisors to amend the note in question themselves. It is also clear from that correspondence that it was the applicant’s attitude, in refusing to follow the instructions of his superiors, which had led to the delay in finalising the note on the project in Malawi.
145    It follows from the foregoing that the evidence in the file is not capable of establishing that A deliberately delayed the approval of the draft note on the project in Malawi submitted by the applicant in order to damage his professional reputation and create a disruptive working environment.
146    Accordingly, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 68 to 84 of the contested decision, were right to conclude that the applicant had not established that A had behaved inappropriately with regard to the approval of the note on the project in Malawi.
147    Fifthly, the applicant claims that, in March 2018, A made biased and defamatory assessments of his professional performance for the year 2017, which damaged his reputation. In support of that claim, the applicant relies, in essence, on the findings of the first Dignity at Work procedure following his complaint of 1 October 2017 and on the findings of the Appeals Committee of the EIB, which upheld his appeal against his staff report for 2017.
148    In that regard, it should be noted that the first Dignity at Work procedure related to events which took place in 2017, whereas the present procedure concerns behaviour alleged against A during the months of January to April 2018.
149    In so far as the applicant’s arguments are to be understood as relying on the findings of the first Dignity at Work procedure relating to A’s conduct in order to argue that A’s assessments in the context of the applicant’s performance appraisal for 2017 were biased, it should be noted that, although the final report of the Investigation Panel appointed in the context of that procedure had found that A had behaved inappropriately, that behaviour was not considered to constitute psychological harassment and the applicant’s complaint was rejected by the decision of the President of the EIB of 31 January 2018. Moreover, the fact that A’s conduct was considered inappropriate in 2017 cannot, in itself, vitiate the impartiality of the appraisal of the applicant’s performance carried out by A.
150    It should be borne in mind that the fact that a staff member has lodged a complaint of harassment against the official who is to assess his or her professional performance cannot of itself, without more, call into question the impartiality of the person against whom the complaint has been lodged (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2015, Z v Court of Justice, F‑64/13, EU:F:2015:72, paragraph 71).
151    Moreover, it is clear from the file that the Appeals Committee of the EIB, in ruling on the applicant’s complaint against his 2017 rating, had considered that A’s assessment of his competences, based on four examples cited in his staff report, was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. That consideration led that committee to replace the initial rating of ‘B’, which corresponded to an overall appraisal of satisfactory, with a rating of ‘B+’, which corresponded to an overall appraisal of very good. In that regard, it should be noted that the fact that A’s assessments of the applicant’s competences were considered to be erroneous cannot in itself be regarded as constituting psychological harassment. According to settled case-law, the fact that an official has difficult, or even conflictual, relations with colleagues or superiors, or considers that his views or advice are wrongly rejected, does not in itself constitute proof of psychological harassment (judgment of 16 April 2008, Michail v Commission, T‑486/04, EU:T:2008:111, paragraph 61; see also, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2024, TO v EUAA, T‑831/22, not published, EU:T:2024:404, paragraph 129). In the present case, it should be noted that, first, the overall appraisal for 2017 was satisfactory and that, secondly, the assessments declared invalid by the Appeals Committee of the EIB were not, contrary to what the applicant claims, ‘defamatory’.
152    Accordingly, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 93 to 99 of the contested decision, were right to conclude that the applicant had not established that A’s assessments in his 2017 staff report constituted inappropriate behaviour or were defamatory and that, consequently, those assessments could not be regarded as constituting psychological harassment.
153    It follows from all of the foregoing that none of the behaviour alleged against A can be characterised as excessive and open to criticism within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 123 above and, therefore, that behaviour does not constitute psychological harassment.
–       The applicant’s claims concerning B’s conduct
154    First, according to the applicant, the involvement of B, the director of the department incorporating the division managed by A, in the approval of his 2017 appraisal, carried out by A in a biased manner in March 2018, was not taken into account.
155    In that regard, it should be recalled, as is apparent from paragraph 152 above, that both the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB rightly rejected the applicant’s accusations against A concerning his 2017 appraisal, in so far as the biased and defamatory nature of the assessments contained therein had not been established. In those circumstances, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB cannot be criticised for not having taken into account the applicant’s arguments concerning B’s involvement in that appraisal.
156    Secondly, according to the applicant, the claims concerning B’s personal and unjustified criticisms of him in front of his colleagues relating to incidents for which he was not responsible were rejected, while the facts and evidence which he had submitted were disregarded.
157    In that regard, first of all, it is clear from the file that the applicant’s responsibilities included the implementation of a system for monitoring his division’s relations with the division responsible for the complaints mechanism relating to the implementation of the EIB’s projects (‘the complaints mechanism division’). Next, it is apparent from the file that, following an incident relating to a project managed by the applicant’s division in Egypt, concerning which the complaints mechanism division had sent a note to the President of the EIB, B had requested additional information from various members of the team to which the applicant was assigned. In the ensuing exchange, the applicant, while providing the requested information, twice questioned B’s assessment of the situation, imitating the expressions used by B and inviting him to deal with the issue himself with the complaints mechanism division. It was because of the applicant’s attitude that B asked him whether he wanted to continue to be responsible for relations with the complaints mechanism division. B then communicated his response to the applicant individually and proposed to him areas for improvement.
158    Therefore, contrary to what the applicant claims, B did not make personal and unjustified criticisms in front of his colleagues. Moreover, although B called the applicant’s role into question, the fact remains that this was in response to the applicant’s negative comments and reluctance to act in accordance with his responsibilities, as shown by the applicant himself in exchanges with several members of the division. That reaction on the part of B to the applicant’s repeated challenges to his hierarchical authority and to the applicant’s reluctance to fulfil his obligations cannot be regarded as conduct constituting psychological harassment.
159    Accordingly, B’s conduct cannot be regarded as excessive and open to criticism by an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same circumstances.
160    In those circumstances, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 102 to 116 of the contested decision, were right to conclude that B’s attitude did not constitute inappropriate behaviour or psychological harassment, but was justified in this case, in the light of the evidence revealing the applicant’s uncooperative attitude and lack of respect towards him.
161    Thirdly, according to the applicant, the contested decision contains no assessment of the acts of intimidation committed by B on 16 May 2018, when he cancelled a meeting with the applicant and rejected the possibility of reconciliation.
162    In that regard, it is apparent from the file that, in parallel with the discussions held between B and the applicant following the latter’s appraisal for 2017, an informal meeting between them had been planned for 16 May 2018. Following their exchanges concerning the incident relating to the project in Egypt, B had suggested that that incident also be discussed at that meeting. For his part, the applicant had requested an agenda for the meeting and the presence of members of the human resources department and a staff representative. Moreover, the applicant had stated to B that the topics to be discussed, including the incident relating to the project in Egypt, were not suitable for discussion in an informal meeting. It was in response to the applicant’s reluctance and requests as a whole that B cancelled the planned informal meeting, stating that he would give his response to the applicant in writing.
163    Furthermore, in his response to the applicant, B had stated that he considered that, first, in delicate situations, the applicant placed himself apart from the team; secondly, he saw his superiors as interfering, and thirdly, he did not show the same consideration towards others as he demanded for himself. B had suggested discussing this with the applicant’s new supervisor in order to help him improve those matters. In a written communication dated 31 May 2018, B had set out his comments on the applicant’s attitude and behaviour, while proposing to meet with him to discuss the matter.
164    It is clear from the foregoing that it was as a result of the applicant’s reluctance to proceed with the informal meeting scheduled for 16 May 2018 that B cancelled it. It is also clear from their exchanges that B was available to give his response to the applicant, which he did in writing following the cancellation of the informal meeting. That response certainly showed B’s dissatisfaction with the applicant’s attitude, but it also indicated a willingness to help him improve and develop his potential within the EIB. The fact that B, as the director of the department, suggested discussing the matter with the applicant’s new line manager cannot be interpreted as an attempt to influence that supervisor, but was rather an expression of the desire of a director exercising ordinary care to ensure that the department for which he is responsible functions properly, following one or more difficulties detected in the handling of a given situation. Accordingly, it is not apparent from the file that B had refused to meet with the applicant. Nor is it apparent from his exchanges with the applicant that B had rejected any reconciliation or that he had behaved in an intimidating manner but, on the contrary, it is clear that he had shown himself to be available and open to helping the applicant develop his potential.
165    Accordingly, B’s conduct, which was certainly firm in tone but remained open to dialogue, cannot be regarded as excessive and open to criticism by an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same circumstances.
166    In those circumstances, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 117 to 125 of the contested decision, were right to conclude that B had not engaged in conduct constituting psychological harassment when he cancelled the informal meeting scheduled with the applicant.
167    Fourthly, the applicant argues that the contested decision disregarded the fact that B had, over an extended period, intentionally maintained his intimidating behaviour towards the applicant.
168    In the first place, the applicant argues, merely referring to annexes, that the contested decision disregarded facts and evidence.
169    However, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above, such arguments, the essential elements of which are not clear from the application, but are limited to a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot be regarded as complying with the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure and are therefore inadmissible.
170    In the second place, the applicant argues that the communication sent to him by B on 31 May 2018 contained false, unfounded or defamatory allegations against him, revealing the existence of prejudicial intimidating behaviour towards him over a prolonged period.
171    In that regard, it is apparent from the file that, in the communication of 31 May 2018, B had sent his response concerning the incident relating to the project in Egypt and had made his comments as an opportunity for improvement for the applicant, making himself available to the applicant to discuss them at a meeting, in the presence of other persons if the applicant so wished. In his comments, B had, in essence, criticised the applicant for his attitude, which he considered to be disrespectful, uncooperative and insubordinate towards his superiors, and had considered that that attitude could negatively affect team spirit and mutual trust between colleagues within the department. In particular, B had criticised the applicant for using the ongoing Dignity at Work procedure in a threatening manner towards his supervisors, even though that procedure was confidential in nature. B had concluded his communication by stating that he believed that it was possible to improve the situation and by making himself available to the applicant to provide him with further explanations.
172    Therefore, contrary to the applicant’s claims, neither the tone nor the content of the communication of 31 May 2018 constituted intimidating or defamatory behaviour. Although B’s comments certainly revealed his dissatisfaction with the applicant’s attitude, they were not worded as unfounded accusations, but specifically concerned, on the one hand, the tense exchanges which had taken place following the incident relating to the project in Egypt and, on the other hand, the applicant’s reference to the Dignity at Work procedure which was underway with his superiors, a reference which has, moreover, not been disputed by the applicant. It is therefore apparent from the file that, even though B addressed negative comments to the applicant, these related to specific events and were expressed in a manner which was constructive and open to dialogue, in so far as B showed that he was available to discuss them with the applicant. In that regard, it has been held that negative comments addressed to a staff member did not necessarily undermine his or her personality, dignity or integrity where they were worded, as in the present case, in measured terms and were not based on allegations that were unfair and unconnected to objective facts (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 February 2010, Menghi v ENISA, F‑2/09, EU:F:2010:12, paragraph 110, and of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 87).
173    In those circumstances, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 126 to 133 of the contested decision, were right to conclude that B had not acted in an intimidating manner towards the applicant, but rather had provided him with constructive information which cannot constitute psychological harassment.
174    It follows from all of the foregoing that none of the behaviour alleged against B can be characterised as excessive and open to criticism within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 123 above.
–       The applicant’s claims concerning C’s conduct
175    First, the applicant argues that the contested decision disregards the refusal of C, the new head of division who replaced A in April 2018, to discuss with the applicant the unachievable objectives of his work programme for 2018.
176    In that regard, it should be noted that those objectives had been set by A on the basis of the objectives for 2017, as stated in paragraph 129 above. It is apparent from the file that the applicant had wanted to review his objectives as soon as C arrived in April 2018 and that it had been agreed to discuss that matter at the half-yearly appraisal meeting scheduled for 6 July 2018. Since it was not possible to discuss that matter at that meeting, written exchanges had taken place, including proposals from the applicant on his objectives for 2018 and comments from C sent on 22 July 2018. After their annual leave, C had proposed to the applicant that they discuss his objectives at a meeting scheduled for 4 September 2018. In his exchanges with C, the applicant had emphasised the unachievable nature of his objectives and the need to amend them, and C had proposed that this be discussed on the basis of the comments which he had sent the applicant on 22 July 2018.
177    In the first place, it should be noted that the annual objectives of EIB staff may be reviewed at any time during the year in agreement with the relevant supervisor. In the second place, it is undisputed that it was the applicant himself who had refused to discuss his objectives with A when they were initially set at the beginning of 2018. In the third place, contrary to what the applicant claims, C had not refused to discuss the applicant’s annual objectives but, when asked to do so by the applicant upon his entry into service, C had informed the applicant that that discussion would take place at the half-yearly appraisal meeting on 6 July 2018. Since this could not take place at that meeting, on 22 July 2018 C had sent the applicant written comments on his objectives and invited the applicant to meet with him to discuss them when they returned from their annual leave.
178    The applicant has therefore failed to establish that C had deliberately refused to review his objectives for 2018 with the aim of causing him harm.
179    In those circumstances, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 136 to 144 of the contested decision, were right to conclude, on the basis of the evidence in the file, that C had not behaved inappropriately towards the applicant but rather had, on several occasions, sought to discuss matters with him and that, consequently, the existence of psychological harassment was not established.
180    Secondly, according to the applicant, the contested decision erred in its assessment of C’s responsibility for the withdrawal of the Italian projects from his portfolio.
181    In that regard, the applicant merely refers to the summary of the statement made by C during the investigation, from which it is clear that, while C had given priority to a project in Malawi, the applicant had wished to participate in a mission and in projects in Italy. However, contrary to the applicant’s claims, it is apparent from the summary of C’s statement that, as head of division, he had set priorities and assigned projects within his division. It is therefore apparent from the file that the fact that C assigned a project in Malawi to the applicant and had considered that project to be a priority over other missions or projects in Italy cannot be regarded as inappropriate behaviour towards the applicant.
182    The circumstances described in paragraph 181 above fall, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 135 above, within the framework of the internal organisation of work within the EIB’s divisions. Accordingly, C’s conduct cannot be regarded as excessive and open to criticism by an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same circumstances.
183    Therefore, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 145 to 157 of the contested decision, were right to conclude, on the basis of the evidence in the file, that C had not engaged in conduct constituting psychological harassment as regards the allocation of projects and the setting of priorities within his division.
184    Thirdly, according to the applicant, the contested decision does not take into account the evidence demonstrating C’s involvement in imposing a mission to Malawi on the applicant, which he considered pointless.
185    In that regard, the applicant merely asserts that his participation in that mission was unnecessary. However, as stated in paragraph 182 above, the fact that a head of division sets priorities and assigns tasks to the members of his team on the basis of those priorities cannot be regarded as constituting an act of retaliation against a subordinate.
186    In those circumstances, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 161 to 164 of the contested decision, were right to conclude, on the basis of the evidence in the file, that C had not behaved inappropriately or engaged in psychological harassment.
187    Fourthly, the applicant submits that the evidence which he provided concerning C’s unsubstantiated defamatory allegations against him is disregarded or distorted in the contested decision.
188    In that regard, in the first place, it should be noted that, in so far as the applicant’s arguments are confined to a mere reference to annexes, they are inadmissible, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above.
189    In the second place, the applicant argues that C, by his comments made in the context of drawing up the report on the project in Malawi, had, without any basis for doing so, accused the applicant of copying an existing report, of sex discrimination and of not accepting a female economist from Malawi onto his team. It is apparent from the file that C, as the supervisor of the report in question, had sent the applicant his comments on the draft report on the project in Malawi which the applicant had prepared. Those comments were the subject of several exchanges between them until the report was finalised.
190    In that regard, in the present case, the applicant does not provide any evidence capable of establishing that C’s allegations were unfounded and intended to intimidate him or to undermine his dignity. Moreover, and in any event, in paragraph 219 of the application, the applicant himself acknowledges that the name linked to the report which he was accused of copying was not his own, but that of a colleague, a fact which could justify the reservations initially expressed by C. With regard to the remarks made by C which the applicant considers defamatory, it is apparent from the documents in the file to which the applicant refers that those comments had been made in the context of exchanges during which the applicant had repeatedly called C’s authority into question, in particular by criticising his management methods as compared with those of his predecessor, and had challenged the appointment of an economist to the project in question and criticised her contributions.
191    In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 135 above, it should be noted that the exchanges between C and the applicant concerning the report on the project in Malawi fall within the competences of a supervisor seeking to give advice to his or her subordinates and to comment on their work. Accordingly, C’s conduct in relation to those exchanges, while admittedly expressed in strong but nevertheless appropriate language for a head of division, cannot be regarded as excessive and open to criticism by an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same circumstances.
192    In those circumstances, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 181 to 188 of the contested decision, were right to conclude, on the basis of the evidence in the file, that the comments made by C in the context of the preparation of the report on the project in Malawi were neither unfounded nor defamatory towards the applicant and did not constitute psychological harassment.
193    Fifthly, according to the applicant, the rejection of his complaints relating to a comment made belatedly by C and to acts of obstruction was not substantiated in the contested decision.
194    However, since the applicant does not put forward any arguments and confines himself to making a general reference to an annex to the application, that argument must be rejected as inadmissible, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above.
195    Sixthly, the applicant submits that the contested decision does not correctly interpret C’s use of the half-yearly review procedure with the aim of destabilising the applicant and preventing a fair appraisal.
196    In that regard, it is apparent from the file that the date set for the meeting relating to the half-yearly review procedure for the applicant, namely 6 July 2018, was linked to the deadline of 15 July 2018 set by the EIB for the finalisation of that procedure for all its staff and that C had been unable to obtain an exemption from that deadline. It is also apparent from the file that the date and time of that meeting, namely 15:30, had been set taking into account, in particular, the applicant’s return from a mission and his schedule constraints concerning, in particular, his leave and teleworking. With regard to the tone used during that meeting and its content, it should be noted that there is nothing in the file to suggest that this did not give rise to an appropriate appraisal of the applicant’s performance or that it was intended to destabilise him. On the contrary, it is apparent from the correspondence following that meeting that C had offered the applicant the opportunity to continue the discussion online and that they had exchanged additional information in order, in particular, to finalise the applicant’s objectives for 2018. Moreover, the fact that C had requested the presence of a representative from the human resources department at the meeting relating to the half-yearly review procedure does not constitute inappropriate behaviour, since the applicant himself had requested the presence of a third party, namely a staff representative.
197    In those circumstances, the second Investigation Panel and the President of the EIB, by endorsing its findings in paragraphs 202 to 213 of the contested decision, were right to conclude, on the basis of the evidence in the file, that C had not behaved inappropriately in relation to the meeting relating to the half-yearly review procedure and that neither the organisation nor the content of that meeting can be regarded as having adversely affected the applicant’s dignity or as having constituted a form of psychological harassment.
198    Seventhly, according to the applicant, the contested decision does not correctly assess his claims concerning micromanagement and the intolerable pressure exerted by C.
199    In that regard, it should be noted that, in the application, the applicant merely makes a general reference to annexes without putting forward any arguments. Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above, the applicant’s complaints must be rejected as inadmissible.
200    It follows from all of the foregoing that none of the behaviour alleged against C, in so far as it has been established, can be characterised as excessive and open to criticism within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 123 above.
–       The applicant’s claims concerning the coordinated nature of the actions of A, B and C
201    The applicant maintains that he submitted specific arguments and factual and contextual evidence relating to the coordinated nature of the harassment by A, B and C, which were disregarded in the contested decision, and refers to the annexes to the application.
202    In that regard, it should be noted that both the second Investigation Panel, in the annex to the report at issue, and the President of the EIB, in paragraphs 229 to 232 of the contested decision, examined the applicant’s arguments in the light of the evidence that he had submitted and concluded that he had not proved the existence of coordinated behaviour. On the contrary, they noted that the various items of evidence in the file established only interactions between B, A and C which were common within an organisation such as the EIB, in particular between a department director and his subordinates or between a new head of division and his predecessor.
203    In any event, since the applicant merely makes a general reference to the annexes to the application, his arguments must be rejected as inadmissible, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above.
204    It follows that, in finding that the applicant had not adduced evidence of acts of psychological harassment committed against him in a coordinated manner by A, B and C, the President of the EIB did not err in her assessment of the facts.
–       Overall and contextual assessment of the disputed behaviour alleged by the applicant
205    It should be noted that the disputed behaviour cannot be assessed in a manner which is purely abstract and, therefore, out of context, but must be assessed specifically and objectively, taking into account the context in which it occurred, as is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraphs 124 and 125 above.
206    In the present case, taking into account the various acts alleged against A, B and C, examined individually above, as well as all the other elements or events described by the applicant in his submissions, in so far as these could be established, it must be concluded that, in view of the style and tone of the exchanges between A, B and C and the applicant, that behaviour, which on several occasions demonstrated their openness to dialogue with the applicant, cannot be described as excessive or open to criticism, in particular in view of the applicant’s defiant attitude and his reluctance to accept the negative comments made by his supervisors.
207    Moreover, in view of the tense relations between, on the one hand, the applicant and, on the other hand, the two successive heads of division who were his direct supervisors and the director of the department concerned, an impartial and reasonable observer could not consider the behaviour of A, B and C, taken as a whole, to be improper within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 121 above.
208    Accordingly, while the disputed behaviour alleged reveals, as a whole, a tense relationship between the applicant and his supervisors in a difficult administrative context, that behaviour cannot nonetheless demonstrate abusive behaviour on the part of A, B or C, whether considered in isolation or as a whole.
209    Accordingly, the President of the EIB did not err in her assessment of the facts when she considered, in the contested decision with reference to the findings of the report at issue, that the behaviour alleged by the applicant, taken as a whole, did not demonstrate the existence of psychological harassment against him on the part of A, B or C.
210    In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the third plea must be rejected.
The fourth plea, alleging that the contested decision erred in finding that the applicant’s complaint under the Dignity at Work Policy was malicious and abusive
211    By his fourth plea, the applicant complains, in essence, that the President of the EIB characterised his complaint as malicious and as an abuse of process and decided to resume the disciplinary proceedings against him, even though they had been suspended on 28 March 2022 and the second Investigation Panel had not ruled on that issue in the report at issue.
212    The applicant argues that the evidence contained in the contested decision to support the assessment that his complaint was malicious and abusive is false and unfounded. This includes the use of the first Dignity at Work procedure to exert pressure on his superiors and the intention to use his complaint to conceal his own inappropriate behaviour, such as alleged recordings of conversations without consent, which are the subject of an ongoing administrative inquiry, and alleged professional shortcomings.
213    Moreover, the applicant disputes that there is a legal basis for the decision of the President of the EIB to resume the disciplinary proceedings against him, which, moreover, was taken without having regard to his right to a fair hearing and in breach of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, in so far as the disciplinary proceedings against him were based on the decision of 26 May 2020, which was annulled by the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40), those proceedings became ineffective as a result of the annulment of that decision. Therefore, according to the applicant, the President of the EIB could not decide, without infringing his rights, to resume the disciplinary proceedings against him without having organised, at the very least, a pre-disciplinary hearing.
214    The EIB disputes the applicant’s arguments.
215    With regard to the applicant’s arguments challenging the legality of the decision to resume the disciplinary proceedings against him, it should be pointed out, as the EIB states, that the applicant is not entitled to challenge such a decision, as noted in paragraph 67 above.
216    Moreover, in so far as the applicant’s arguments alleging an error of assessment, in that the contested decision found that his complaint was malicious and abusive, must be understood as supporting his claim that the Court should declare his complaint to be legitimate and not malicious, it must be noted that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear that head of claim (see paragraph 24 above).
217    Furthermore, those arguments are ineffective in the context of the action seeking annulment of the contested decision in so far as it rejects the applicant’s complaint.
218    The finding in paragraph 293 of the contested decision relating to the malicious and abusive nature of the applicant’s complaint, is based on Part 5 of that decision (paragraphs 233 to 291) and is independent of and without prejudice to the finding in paragraph 292 of that decision rejecting the applicant’s complaint of psychological harassment, which is based on Part 4 of that decision (paragraphs 33 to 232).
219    Accordingly, even if the applicant’s arguments relating to an error of assessment were well founded and the Court were to find such an error, this would not affect the legality of the contested decision in that it rejects the applicant’s complaint after having found that there was no psychological harassment.
220    In those circumstances, the fourth plea must be rejected.
221    Since none of the pleas raised has been upheld, the claims for annulment of the contested decision must be dismissed in their entirety, without it being necessary to rule on the objection of inadmissibility raised by the EIB under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.
The claims for compensation
222    The applicant makes, in essence, two claims for compensation.
223    In the first place, the applicant seeks compensation for the non-material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of the harassment alleged in his complaint and the psychological stress he claims to have suffered for years as a result of the EIB’s actions. In that regard, he seeks compensation in an amount which he estimates, ex aequo et bono, at EUR 150 000.
224    In the second place, the applicant seeks compensation for the material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of being deprived of normal career progression, salary increases, bank and performance bonuses and part of his salary linked to his incapacity for medical reasons. The applicant seeks compensation in an amount which he estimates, ex aequo et bono and provisionally, at EUR 200 000.
225    The EIB contends that the applicant’s claims for compensation should be rejected.
226    In that regard, it should be recalled that, in civil service issues, a claim for compensation for material and non-material damage must be rejected in so far as it is closely linked to the claim for annulment, which itself was dismissed as unfounded (see judgment of 19 December 2019, HK v Commission, C‑460/18 P, EU:C:2019:1119, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).
227    In the present case, it must be held that the claim for damages is closely linked to the claim for annulment of the contested decision, in that they are subject to the premiss of the existence of psychological harassment, which, for the reasons set out above, has not been established.
228    In that context, since the claim for annulment of the contested decision has been rejected as unfounded, the claim for damages must also be rejected.
Costs
229    By his sixth head of claim, the applicant requests, in essence, that the EIB be ordered to pay the costs of the present proceedings and that those costs be fixed at EUR 35 000.
230    In the first place, it must be recalled that, in the decision ending the proceedings, the Court determines exclusively how the costs are to be allocated between the parties, without ruling on the amount of the costs. In the event of a dispute, the amount of the recoverable costs may be the subject of a separate action, governed under Article 170 of the Rules of Procedure, distinct from the decision on the allocation of the costs. Thus, taxation of costs may only take place following the judgment or the order ending the proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 February 2019, Karp v Parliament, T‑580/17, not published, EU:T:2019:62, paragraph 100). The applicant’s request to fix the costs of the present action at a provisional amount of EUR 35 000 must therefore be rejected.
231    In the second place, under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the EIB.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders LU to pay the costs.
Kalėda
Jaeger
Perišin
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 28 January 2026.
V. Di Bucci
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
Table of contents
Background to the dispute
Events subsequent to the bringing of the action
Forms of order sought
Law
The claim for a declaration that the applicant’s complaint is legitimate and not malicious
The claim for annulment of the decision of 8 January 2021
The claim for annulment of the contested decision
The first plea, alleging a failure to state reasons and a failure to examine the admissibility of the applicant’s complaint
The second plea, alleging improper conduct of the investigation procedure
– The first part of the second plea, relating to infringement of the principles of impartiality and independence in the conduct of the investigation procedure
– The second part of the second plea, relating to a failure to implement properly the judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB (T536/20)
– The third part of the second plea, relating to the existence of a conflict of interest within the EIB’s Directorate-General for Personnel
– The fourth part of the second plea, relating to the unlawful replacement of the decision of 21 December 2023
The third plea, alleging an error of assessment and an error of law in that the contested decision concluded that the facts alleged by the applicant did not constitute psychological harassment
– The applicant’s claims concerning A’s conduct
– The applicant’s claims concerning B’s conduct
– The applicant’s claims concerning C’s conduct
– The applicant’s claims concerning the coordinated nature of the actions of A, B and C
– Overall and contextual assessment of the disputed behaviour alleged by the applicant
The fourth plea, alleging that the contested decision erred in finding that the applicant’s complaint under the Dignity at Work Policy was malicious and abusive
The claims for compensation
Costs
*      Language of the case: English.