OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
RICHARD DE LA TOUR
delivered on 12 June 2025 (1)
Case C‑8/24
D. d.o.o.,
Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu
Criminal proceedings
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Visoki kazneni sud (High Criminal Court, Croatia))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 – Article 1(1) and (4) – Article 2(2) and (3)(d) – Confiscation without a final conviction – Confiscation order issued in the context of criminal proceedings concluded with a judgment of acquittal, in relation to a criminal offence other than the offence of which the defendants were acquitted and in relation to which the defendants were not involved, but rather persons against whom no indictment was issued – Article 19(1)(h) – Grounds for non-recognition and non-execution of confiscation orders – Exceptional situations where there are substantial grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of the confiscation order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a fundamental right as set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – The rights of the defence and the right to an effective remedy )
I.      Introduction
1.        In the context of the interpretation of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (2) according to which that framework decision ‘shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the [TEU]’, the Court has developed in its case-law a ‘two-step examination’ in order to assess, during a procedure for the execution of a European arrest warrant, whether there is real risk of a breach of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). (3)
2.        The present request for a preliminary ruling, which concerns the interpretation of several provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders, (4) and of Article 47 of the Charter, raises the question whether that case-law should be extended to that regulation.
3.        The request has been made in criminal proceedings brought against the undertaking D. d.o.o., whose registered office is in Croatia, by the Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu (County Public Prosecutor’s Office, Zagreb, Croatia) (‘the Zagreb Public Prosecutor’s Office’) concerning the recognition and execution of a confiscation order issued by the Slovenian authorities to the Croatian authorities in respect of the shares in the undertaking L.Z. d.d. held by the undertaking D.
4.        The present case asks, in essence, to what extent the executing authority of one Member State may refuse to recognise and execute a confiscation order issued in another Member State in the context of criminal proceedings which resulted in the acquittal of the defendants, on the ground that that order either falls outside the scope of Regulation 2018/1805 or infringes the fundamental rights of the person concerned by that order.
5.        This case raises, more specifically, the question of the scope of the grounds for non-recognition and non-execution of confiscation orders, set out in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, where, in exceptional situations, there are substantial grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of a confiscation order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right as set out in the Charter, in particular the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial or the right of defence.
6.        Within that context, in the present case, it is necessary inter alia, to determine the extent to which the two-step examination developed by the Court in the context of the interpretation of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, subsequently extended to Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, (5) is relevant for the purposes of implementing a specific provision such as that laid down in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805. More specifically, it will be necessary to decide whether the refusal to recognise and execute a confiscation order under that provision requires proof that there is a real risk of breach of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Charter on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the issuing Member State as regards respect for fundamental rights.
7.        The Court must therefore clarify whether the framework for analysing exceptions to the mutual recognition and trust which form the basis of the area of freedom, security and justice is identical for all instruments of mutual recognition in criminal matters, or whether that framework may vary according to the specific features of each of those instruments.
II.    The facts in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
8.        On the basis of an indictment drawn up by the specializirano državno tožilstvo Republike Slovenije (Specialised Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Slovenia) on 29 May 2017, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor, Slovenia) brought criminal proceedings against four persons (‘the four defendants’) suspected of having committed the criminal offence of abuse of position or of power. They were accused of having, between 11 and 25 July 2007, obtained an unlawful economic advantage for the undertaking I.J.S. d.d. when they purchased shares in L.Z.
9.        That court established that all the statutory criteria of the criminal offence of acting to the detriment of creditors and money laundering had been fulfilled in respect of persons other than the four defendants, on account of I.J.S.’ sale, in June 2013, of, inter alia, shares in L.Z., for which no actual payment was made, to the undertaking V.K. d.o.o., followed by the conclusion, in July 2013, of an agreement whereby V.K. d.o.o. sold those shares to D. through one of its directors in order to conceal the origin of the shares.
10.      The criminal offence of acting to the detriment of creditors was the subject of a preliminary investigation in the context of which the shares in L.Z. were subject to interim measures to secure a request for the confiscation of proceeds. (6) Despite those interim measures, on 13 October 2014, those shares were transferred to escrow accounts, making it impossible to identify their beneficial owners. However, no indictment was drawn up in respect of the two criminal offences of acting to the detriment of creditors and money laundering.
11.      Through its representative Z. Z., the undertaking D. brought an action before the Županijski sud u Zagrebu (County Court, Zagreb, Croatia) challenging the recognition and execution of those interim measures in Croatia. That action was dismissed by that court.
12.      On 27 January 2020, Z. Z. was heard by the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor). At that hearing, that court advised Z. Z., in accordance with Article 500 of the Zakon o kazenskem postopku (Slovenian Code of Criminal Procedure) (‘the ZKP’) that he had the opportunity to testify in the context of the possible confiscation of the proceeds of crime in respect of D., and that he had the right to submit evidence and ask questions. That court also informed him about the possible confiscation of the shares in L.Z. For his part, Z. Z. stated that he was aware of the temporary freeze, that he considered the temporary freeze to be unjustified, and that for that reason had already brought an appeal through his lawyer before the Županijski sud u Zagrebu (County Court, Zagreb). He also stated that he would appeal if those shares were confiscated.
13.      On 22 May 2020, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) held the main hearing in the presence of the public prosecutor, the four defendants and their lawyers. In his closing speech, the public prosecutor requested that D. be subject to confiscation of the shares in L.Z. as the proceeds of a criminal offence.
14.      By judgment of 27 May 2020, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) acquitted the four defendants, while issuing, on the basis of Article 498a(1)(1) of the ZKP, (7) a confiscation order relating to the shares in L.Z. held by D., in relation to the criminal offence of acting to the detriment of creditors and the criminal offence of money laundering (‘the confiscation order’). Since the appeal brought against that judgment by the public prosecutor was dismissed by the Višje sodišče v Mariboru (Court of Appeal, Maribor, Slovenia), by judgment of 24 November 2021, that confiscation order became final on 22 December 2021.
15.      On 17 February 2022, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) issued a confiscation certificate, in accordance with Article 14 of Regulation 2018/1805, describing the shares in L.Z. as the proceeds of a criminal offence, within the meaning of Article 2(3)(a) of that regulation, and as being subject to confiscation without a final conviction following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence, in accordance with Article 2(3)(d) of that regulation.
16.      That court transmitted that certificate to the Zagreb Public Prosecutor’s Office, together with a translation, first, of the introduction, operative part, part of the statement of reasons relating to the confiscation order and information on the legal remedies contained in the judgment of 27 May 2020 and, second, of the introduction and operative part of the judgment of the Višje sodišče v Mariboru (Court of Appeal, Maribor) of 24 November 2021 dismissing the appeal brought against the confiscation order, with a view to the recognition and execution of that order.
17.      By judgment of 25 November 2022, the Županijski sud u Zagrebu (County Court, Zagreb), hearing the case brought by the Zagreb Public Prosecutor’s Office, recognised the confiscation order.
18.      The Public Prosecutor and D. brought appeals against that judgment before the Visoki kazneni sud (High Criminal Court, Croatia), the referring court. That referring court has doubts as to whether the property subject to the confiscation order falls within the scope of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2018/1805. It also has doubts as to whether the fundamental rights which the person affected by that order derives from the Charter were respected in the proceedings which gave rise to that order, in circumstances where failure to respect those rights may, in exceptional situations, constitute grounds for non-recognition and non-execution of a confiscation order under Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation.
19.      First of all, the referring court asks two questions concerning the interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2018/1805. It asks whether criminal proceedings which, on the one hand, are concluded with a judgment of acquittal and, on the other, result in a confiscation order based on findings relating to a criminal offence other than that in respect of which that judgment was delivered, committed by perpetrators other than the four defendants, may be regarded as ‘proceedings in relation to a criminal offence’ that may result in ‘confiscation [of property] without a final conviction’.
20.      Next, the referring court, recalling that the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions constitutes the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which means that non-recognition of such judgments is possible only in exceptional situations, in accordance with Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, raises the question as to whether the fundamental rights of D. were respected in the context of the issuing of the confiscation order.
21.      That court notes, first, that at the hearing on 27 January 2020, the person in charge at D. was questioned as a witness – a point which has yet to be established – and was advised of the possibility of the shares being confiscated and about his right to submit evidence and ask questions during the proceedings. However, he was not advised of the right of access to a lawyer throughout the confiscation proceedings, enshrined in Article 8 of Directive 2014/42/EU. (8)
22.      Second, that court points out that, at that hearing, the request for confiscation of property had not yet been made, since the public prosecutor made such a request only in his closing speech in May 2020. The Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) therefore held a hearing on the basis of the indictment drawn up in 2017.
23.      Third, D. was provided with the translation only of excerpts from the judgment delivered by that court, whereas, according to the referring court, the entire judgment is an essential document (9) and the standards of access to an impartial court require that the entire judgment be served.
24.      The referring court notes that the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) stated that excerpts from the judgment were served on D., which did not appeal against that judgment. By contrast, D. asserts that it did not receive those excerpts from the judgment and proposes that this can be proven by means of a report from a handwriting expert on the proof of service. Those claims give rise to questions on the part of the referring court as to the verifications and consultations with the issuing authority. In that regard, the referring court emphasises the importance of the principle of mutual recognition and of Article 33 of Regulation 2018/1805, which provides that the substantive reasons for issuing the confiscation order cannot be challenged before a court in the executing Member State.
25.      In those circumstances, the Visoki kazneni sud (High Criminal Court) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)      Does the term “proceedings in relation to a criminal offence that may result in confiscation of property, including confiscation without a conviction” within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2018/1805 also include criminal proceedings concluded with an acquittal?
(2)      Does the term “proceedings in relation to a criminal offence that may result in confiscation of property, including confiscation without a conviction” within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2018/1805 also include criminal proceedings concluded with a judgment of acquittal that includes an order to confiscate property as undue proceeds derived from another criminal offence, which is not the criminal offence of which the defendants were acquitted, and in whose commission the defendants were not involved, but rather persons against whom no indictment was brought?
(3)      Is it contrary to Regulation 2018/1805, Article 1(2) thereof, and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to recognise a confiscation order issued in criminal proceedings in which an affected person, within the meaning of Article 2(10) of the regulation:
–        was not summoned to participate in all stages of the criminal proceedings;
–        was not advised of his or her right to a lawyer throughout the proceedings;
–        did not receive the full text of the judgment containing the confiscation order in a language he or she understood, but only excerpts from that judgment, and did not appeal against the judgment thus served.’
26.      The Zagreb Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Croatian and Slovenian Governments and the European Commission submitted written observations and, with the exception of the Zagreb Public Prosecutor’s Office, participated in the hearing held on 3 February 2025, in the course of which they responded to questions for an oral answer put by the Court.
III. Analysis
A.      The first and second questions referred for a preliminary ruling
27.      By those questions, which, in my view, should be examined together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether criminal proceedings concluded with an acquittal, in which a confiscation order is issued in relation to a criminal offence other than the offence of which the defendants were acquitted and involving a person other than the defendants, against whom no indictment was issued, fall within the scope of Regulation 2018/1805.
28.      In my view, those questions should be answered in the affirmative.
29.      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that Regulation 2018/1805 pursues the objective of maintaining and developing an area of security and justice, by strengthening judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions. (10)
30.      In view of the fact that, first, the freezing and the confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime are among the most effective means of combating crime (11) and, second, the transnational nature of crime requires effective cross-border cooperation in that field, (12) the EU legislature has stressed the importance of facilitating the mutual recognition and execution of freezing orders and confiscation orders by establishing rules that oblige a Member State to recognise, without further formalities, such orders when they are issued by another Member State within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters and to execute those orders within its territory. (13)
31.      Accordingly, Article 1(1) of Regulation 2018/1805 provides that that regulation lays down the rules under which a Member State recognises and executes in its territory freezing orders and confiscation orders issued by another Member State within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters.
32.      By contrast, under Article 1(4) of that regulation, it does not apply to freezing orders and confiscation orders issued within the framework of proceedings in civil or administrative matters. (14) However, it is not disputed that the confiscation order at issue in the main proceedings was issued within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters.
33.      In that regard, Article 2(2) of Regulation 2018/1805 states that the concept of ‘confiscation order’ refers to a final penalty or measure, imposed by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence, resulting in the final deprivation of property of a natural or legal person. In addition, Article 2(3)(d) of that regulation defines the concept of ‘property’ as including, inter alia, any property which the issuing authority considers to be subject to confiscation, including without a final conviction, under the law of the issuing State, following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence.
34.      Those various provisions must be read in the light of recital 13 of Regulation 2018/1805, from which it is apparent that the scope of that regulation must be regarded as very broad, since it is intended to apply to all types of freezing orders and confiscation orders issued following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence. Thus, that recital states that that regulation covers not only orders covered by Directive 2014/42, but also other types of order issued without a final conviction, including criminal investigations by the police and other law enforcement authorities. (15) From that point of view, while such orders might not exist in the legal system of a Member State, the Member State concerned should be able to recognise and execute such an order issued by another Member State. (16)
35.      In the present case, the court which issued the confiscation order found that, within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters, the confiscated property constituted the proceeds of the criminal offence of acting to the detriment of creditors and the criminal offence of money laundering. Those factors make it possible to bring that order within the scope of Regulation 2018/1805. The fact that those offences were not set out in an indictment and that other defendants were acquitted in those proceedings in relation to another criminal offence is irrelevant in that regard.
36.      It may, in my view, be inferred from the foregoing that, as all the participants in the present proceedings have argued, Article 1(1) and (4) and Article 2(2) and (3)(d) of Regulation 2018/1805, read in conjunction with recital 13 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that that regulation applies to a confiscation order, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, issued within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters concluded with an acquittal, in relation to a criminal offence other than the offence of which the defendants were acquitted and involving a person other than the defendants, against whom no indictment was issued.
B.      The third question referred for a preliminary ruling
37.      By that question, the referring court asks the Court, in essence, whether the competent authority of the executing Member State may refuse to recognise, on account of the alleged infringement of certain fundamental rights in the issuing Member State, a confiscation order, on the grounds that the person subject to that order, first, was not summoned to participate in all stages of the criminal proceedings, second, was not informed of his or her right to a lawyer throughout those proceedings and, third, was not served the full text of the judgment containing the confiscation order in a language he or she understood, even though he or she did not bring an appeal against that judgment. (17)
38.      In order to answer that question, it should be recalled that, like other instruments of mutual recognition in criminal matters concerning other types of decisions, Regulation 2018/1805 lays down the rule that a Member State is required to recognise and execute in its territory a confiscation order issued by another Member State within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters.
39.      Thus, Article 18(1) of Regulation 2018/1805 provides that the executing authority is to recognise a confiscation order transmitted in accordance with Article 14 of that regulation and is to take the measures necessary for its execution in the same way as for a domestic confiscation order issued by an authority of the executing State, unless the executing authority invokes one of the grounds for non-recognition and non-execution provided for in Article 19 of that regulation or one of the grounds for postponement provided for in Article 21 of that regulation. As stated in recital 31 of Regulation 2018/1805, the recognition and execution of a confiscation order should not be refused on grounds other than those provided for in that regulation.
40.      Furthermore, it must be stated that the obligation to comply with the Charter is binding on the Member States when they decide on an application for recognition and execution of a confiscation order, given that such a decision constitutes an implementation of Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. The competent authorities of the executing Member State are therefore required, when adopting a decision on such an application, to ensure respect for the fundamental rights afforded by the Charter to the person subject to the confiscation order in respect of which recognition and execution are sought. (18)
41.      Those rights include, in particular, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, and the rights of the defence guaranteed by Article 48(2) thereof.
42.      To that end, Article 1(2) of Regulation 2018/1805 provides that that regulation does not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and legal principles enshrined in Article 6 TEU. (19)
43.      In addition, Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation provides that the executing authority may decide not to recognise or execute a confiscation order only where, in exceptional situations, there are substantial grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of that confiscation order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right as set out in the Charter, in particular the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial or the right of defence. (20)
44.      In the light of the concerns expressed by the referring court in its request for a preliminary ruling, it is the latter provision which should, in my view, be interpreted by the Court when examining the third question.
45.      At the hearing, the participants were invited to express their views on whether the implementation by the executing authority of the ground for non-recognition and non-execution referred to in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805 requires it to carry out the same two-step examination as that developed by the Court in the context of the interpretation of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584.
46.      That provision establishes, according to wording similar to that of Article 1(2) of Regulation 2018/1805, that that framework decision cannot have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU.
47.      It is on the basis of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 that the Court has held that the existence of a risk of a breach of the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter is capable of permitting the executing judicial authority to refrain, exceptionally and following an appropriate examination, from giving effect to a European arrest warrant. (21)
48.      As regards the manner in which such an examination is carried out, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law on Framework Decision 2002/584 that the assessment, during a procedure for the execution of a European arrest warrant, of whether there is real risk of a breach of the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 4, 7, 24 and 47 of the Charter must, in principle, be carried out by means of an examination in two separate steps which cannot overlap with one another, in so far as they involve an analysis on the basis of different criteria, and which must therefore be carried out in turn. (22)
49.      To that end, the executing judicial authority must, as a first step, determine whether there is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated information to demonstrate that there is a real risk of infringement, in the issuing Member State, of one of those fundamental rights on account of either systemic or generalised deficiencies, or deficiencies affecting more specifically an objectively identifiable group of persons. (23)
50.      In the context of a second step, the executing judicial authority must determine, specifically and precisely, to what extent the deficiencies identified in the first step of the examination are liable to have an impact on the person who is the subject of a European arrest warrant and whether, having regard to his or her personal situation, there are substantial grounds for believing that that person will run a real risk of a breach of those fundamental rights if surrendered to the issuing Member State. (24)
51.      In order to justify the requirement to carry out such a two-step examination, the Court has stated that the simplified and effective system for the surrender of convicted or suspected persons established by Framework Decision 2002/584 has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States and on the principle of mutual recognition which, according to recital 6 of that framework decision, constitutes the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation between Member States in criminal matters. (25)
52.      In that regard, the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law. (26)
53.      Thus, when Member States implement EU law, they may, under that law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law, but also, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union. (27)
54.      In that context, the obligation to find that there are deficiencies such as those referred to in point 49 of this Opinion before being able to verify, specifically and precisely, whether the person who is the subject of a European arrest warrant runs a real risk of a breach of a fundamental right is precisely aimed at preventing such an investigation from being conducted outside exceptional cases and is thus the consequence of the presumption of respect for fundamental rights by the issuing Member State which stems from the principle of mutual trust. (28)
55.      The Court has explained that compliance with that obligation makes it possible, in particular, to ensure the division of responsibilities between the issuing Member State and the executing Member State as regards safeguarding the requirements inherent in the fundamental rights arising from the full application of the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition which underpin the operation of the European arrest warrant mechanism. (29)
56.      On the basis of that case-law, it seems legitimate to consider whether it is appropriate, with regard to the mutual recognition of confiscation orders, to impose on the executing authority the obligation to establish the existence either of systemic or generalised deficiencies, or of deficiencies affecting more specifically an objectively identifiable group of persons before being able to verify, specifically and precisely, whether the person subject to a confiscation order runs a real risk of a breach of a fundamental right.
57.      In reply to that question, the participants in the hearing put forward two opposing arguments. The Croatian and Slovenian Governments argued that a two-step examination should be applied with regard to the mutual recognition of confiscation orders. The Commission, on the other hand, was not in favour of the application of such an examination.
58.      I share the Commission’s view.
59.      I note that the two-step examination is the result of a body of case-law intended to ensure the effectiveness of the surrender mechanism established by Framework Decision 2002/584, taking into account the specific objective of that framework decision, (30) while ensuring that that mechanism is not implemented to the detriment of the protection of fundamental rights. That body of case-law was developed on the basis of a general fundamental rights clause, set out in Article 1(3) of that framework decision, even though that framework decision does not expressly mention any ground for non-execution of a European arrest warrant based on a risk of a breach of fundamental rights in the issuing Member State.
60.      Given the lack of detail in the wording of Framework Decision 2002/584 as to the method and criteria to be applied in order to examine whether there is a risk of a breach of fundamental rights in the issuing Member State, the Court has had to clarify that method and those criteria itself, taking particular care not to bring the operation of the surrender mechanism, provided for by that framework decision, to a standstill. From that perspective, the Court was not starting from scratch, since it had already set out the essence of its case-law when it held, in paragraph 192 of Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014, (31) that it is not possible for a Member State, save in exceptional cases, to check whether another Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union.
61.      That said, I would point out that the Court does not seem to me to have imposed a general rule, that is to say, in the context of the application of all instruments of mutual recognition in criminal matters, that the definition of exceptional cases in which a Member State is permitted to check whether fundamental rights have been observed in another Member State always requires a prior finding of systemic or generalised deficiencies, or deficiencies affecting more specifically an objectively identifiable group of persons, before it is possible to verify, specifically and precisely, whether the person subject to an order in respect of which recognition is sought runs a real risk of a breach of a fundamental right.
62.      Admittedly, the Court has answered in the affirmative the question whether the two-step examination required under Framework Decision 2002/584 could be applied to a case involving a request seeking not the surrender to the issuing authorities of a person who is the subject of a European arrest warrant, on the basis of that framework decision, but the recognition of a judgment and the enforcement in the executing State, on the basis of Framework Decision 2008/909, of a criminal sentence handed down in another Member State, where there is evidence that the conditions prevailing in that latter Member State on the date of the adoption of the decision to be enforced or of related subsequent decisions are incompatible with the fundamental right to a fair trial laid down in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter. (32)
63.      However, in reaching that conclusion, which gave rise to certain questions in academic circles, (33) the Court relied on a number of provisions of Framework Decision 2008/909 relating to respect of fundamental rights which are also contained in Framework Decision 2002/584, (34) emphasising the close connection between those two framework decisions. (35) That applies, in particular, to Article 3(4) of Framework Decision 2008/909, which provides that that framework decision is not to have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU. That general clause on respect for fundamental rights corresponds to the clause referred to in Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584. (36)
64.      It is true that, as I stated above, such a general clause on respect for fundamental rights also appears in Article 1(2) of Regulation 2018/1805.
65.      It might therefore be conceivable, in the context of the application of that regulation, to require the executing authority to carry out a two-step examination in the event of an alleged risk of breach of fundamental rights in the issuing Member State.
66.      However, I consider that that requirement is not self-evident because of the existence in Regulation 2018/1805 of a specific ground for non-recognition and non-execution, such as that referred to in Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation.
67.      I note that, unlike in Framework Decisions 2002/584 and 2008/909, the EU legislature did not merely lay down a general clause on respect for fundamental rights in Regulation 2018/1805, but also provided for a specific ground for non-recognition and non-execution, (37) specifying the method and criteria to be used by the executing authority in order to assess a risk of a breach of fundamental rights. Reference should therefore be made to that method and to those criteria, which are set out in what may be regarded as a lex specialis in relation to the general clause on respect for fundamental rights in Article 1(2) of Regulation 2018/1805. (38)
68.      In that regard, it should be noted that, as regards a risk of a ‘manifest breach’ of a fundamental right ‘in the particular circumstances of the case’, Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation unequivocally requires an individual examination of the existence of such a risk. I note that neither that provision nor any other provision of that regulation requires that, before that individual examination can be carried out, there must be a finding of systemic or generalised deficiencies, or deficiencies affecting more specifically an objectively identifiable group of persons. (39) When adopting Regulation 2018/1805, the Court had already formulated the requirement for a two-step examination in relation to the European arrest warrant, (40) including in order to check whether there is a risk of a breach the fundamental right to a fair trial, as set out in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, (41) so it was, in my view, a conscious and deliberate choice on the part of the EU legislature not to impose such a two-step examination in the context of that regulation. Therefore, although a finding of such deficiencies may of course enable the finding of a breach of a fundamental right in the circumstances of the present case, it is not a mandatory step if the wording used by the EU legislature in Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation is taken into account.
69.      A different approach cannot, in my view, be inferred from an application by analogy of Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 on European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings. (42) Article 12(1)(b) of that regulation contains a ground for refusal of which the wording is similar to that used in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805. (43) However, recital 64 of Regulation 2023/1543, which clarifies the scope of that ground for refusal, may be interpreted as meaning that, in order to implement that ground for refusal, a two-step examination must be carried out. (44) Nonetheless, I believe that, by citing the specific example of a reasoned proposal adopted under Article 7(1) TEU, the EU legislature has merely emphasised the need for the enforcing authority to carry out an individual examination where systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary have been identified.
70.      I note, moreover, that the examination of other instruments of mutual recognition in criminal matters does not support the view that a general obligation should be imposed on the executing authority to carry out a two-step examination in order to check whether there is a risk of infringement of fundamental rights.
71.      Thus, Article 20(3) of Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA (45) provides that each Member State may, where the certificate referred to in Article 4 of that framework decision gives rise to an issue that fundamental rights or fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty may have been infringed, oppose the recognition and the execution of decisions. I note that the implementation of that ground for non-recognition and non-execution of a decision imposing a financial penalty is in no way subject to a two-step examination in the Court’s case-law, (46) it being specified that, in so far as it constitutes an exception to the principle of mutual recognition, that ground must be interpreted restrictively. (47)
72.      Furthermore, when it was called upon to consider the ground for non-execution of a European Investigation Order, provided for in Article 11(1)(f) of Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, (48) the Court did not mention the requirement for a two-step examination. (49)
73.      I would also point out that it is necessary, in my view, to eliminate the possibility of a double standard in the review of respect for fundamental rights, under Regulation 2018/1805, depending on the nature of the fundamental right at issue and the applicable clause. Thus, the existence of the general clause in Article 1(2) of Regulation 2018/1805 does not, in itself, mean that a two-step examination should be carried out in order to determine whether the recognition and execution of a confiscation order must be refused on the ground of the alleged breach of fundamental rights in the issuing Member State.
74.      Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805 provides for a specific ground for non-recognition and non-execution of a confiscation order where there is a risk of a manifest breach of fundamental rights, so that there is no need to rely on the general clause in Article 1(2) of that regulation in order to assess whether such a risk exists. The sole purpose of that general clause is, in that context, to recall the Member States’ obligation to respect the fundamental rights and legal principles enshrined in Article 6 TEU. I would also point out that the specific ground laid down in Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation cannot be limited to the fundamental rights to which it refers, namely the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial or the right of defence. The fact that those fundamental rights are referred to ‘in particular’ indicates that that list is not exhaustive, with the result that the specific ground for non-recognition and non-execution set out in that provision is intended to apply to alleged infringements of other fundamental rights.
75.      I also understand the argument that it might seem paradoxical to apply a test as strict as the two-step examination in relation to a European arrest warrant, where the right to liberty is directly affected, when there is no such test for confiscation, where such a right is not at stake.
76.      That said, it must be stated that that paradox is the result of the choice made by the EU legislature to draft clauses relating to respect for fundamental rights differently according to the instrument of mutual recognition in criminal matters under consideration.
77.      In that regard, I would point out that Framework Decision 2002/584 does not contain any specific ground for non-execution of a European arrest warrant worded in the same terms as Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805.
78.      Having made those clarifications, the fact remains that, by limiting the executing authority’s power to invoke the ground for non-recognition and non-execution provided for in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805 to ‘exceptional situations’ where there is a ‘manifest breach’ of a fundamental right protected by the Charter, the EU legislature intended to require the executing authority to exercise that power only where such a breach reaches a particularly high level of severity, in line with what the Court held in paragraph 192 of Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR), of 18 December 2014. (50)
79.      Although such an assessment is ultimately a matter for the referring court, I consider, in the light of the evidence submitted to the Court, that such a level does not appear to have been exceeded in the context of the present case.
80.      I would point out, in that regard, that the referring court raises the question of whether the fundamental rights of a legal person subject to the confiscation order have been respected in the issuing Member State in view of a number of factors, namely first, that that person supposedly did not participate in all the stages of the criminal proceedings which led to the issuing of that order, second, that that person was supposedly not advised of the right of access to a lawyer and, third, that that person was supposedly not served the full text of the judgment containing the confiscation order in a language he or she understood, even though that person did not bring an appeal against the confiscation order. Thus, the rights at issue are the right to an effective remedy and the right of defence, which are expressly referred to in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805.
81.      As regards those fundamental rights, I note, in the first place, that Directive 2014/42 and Framework Decision 2005/214, which that directive partially replaced, oblige Member States to establish common minimum rules for confiscation of crime-related instrumentalities and proceeds, in order, inter alia, to facilitate the mutual recognition of judicial confiscation decisions adopted in criminal proceedings. (51)
82.      Accordingly, Article 8(1) of Directive 2014/42 provides that Member States are to take the necessary measures to ensure that the persons affected by the measures provided for under that directive have the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in order to uphold their rights. (52) In particular, under Article 8(6) of that directive, Member States are to take the necessary measures to ensure that reasons are given for any confiscation order and that the order is communicated to the person affected. They must also provide for the effective possibility for a person in respect of whom confiscation is ordered to challenge the order before a court. In addition, Article 8(7) of that directive provides that, without prejudice to Directive 2012/13/EU (53) and Directive 2013/48/EU, (54) persons whose property is affected by a confiscation order are to have the right of access to a lawyer throughout the confiscation proceedings relating to the determination of the proceeds and instrumentalities in order to uphold their rights, and that the persons concerned are to be informed of that right.
83.      In so far as a confiscation order falls within the scope of Directive 2014/42, (55) the person subject to that order may therefore claim protection of the procedural rights conferred on him or her by that directive. (56)
84.      In the second place, recital 18 of Regulation 2018/1805 states that the procedural rights set out in a number of directives (57) should apply, within the scope of those directives, to criminal proceedings covered by that regulation as regards the Member States bound by those directives.
85.      It follows that, where a confiscation order falls within the scope of one or other of the directives referred to in recital 18 of that regulation, the person subject to that order may rely on the procedural rights conferred on him or her by those directives.
86.      In the third place, recital 18 of Regulation 2018/1805 states that, in any event, the safeguards under the Charter should apply to all proceedings covered by that regulation. In particular, that recital states that the essential safeguards for criminal proceedings set out in the Charter should apply to proceedings in criminal matters that are not criminal proceedings but which are covered by that regulation.
87.      In that regard, it should be recalled that, under the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter, everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the European Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article and, in particular, is entitled to a fair hearing. (58) Thus, the principle of effective judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive from EU law, which is reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter, comprises various elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a tribunal and the right to be advised, defended and represented. (59) It is also appropriate to cite Article 48(2) of the Charter, the aim of which is to guarantee respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged.
88.      It follows from the foregoing that, at the very least and even if his or her situation does not fall within the scope of the various directives relating to procedural rights in the criminal proceedings to which I have referred above, a person who is subject, in one Member State, to a confiscation order the recognition and execution of which are sought in another Member State, on the basis of Regulation 2018/1805, must have been placed in a position to benefit in the issuing Member State from the essential safeguards for criminal proceedings set out in the Charter.
89.      In particular, it is essential that the person in respect of whom confiscation has been ordered has been afforded an effective remedy enabling him or her to have a court review compliance with those essential safeguards.
90.      I note, in that regard, that such safeguards appear to be provided for in the ZKP. First, Article 500 of the ZKP provides, in the case of confiscation, for the right of legal persons to be heard, through their representative, both during the preliminary proceedings and at the main hearing, (60) and for the right to submit evidence and ask questions. (61) Secondly, Article 498a(4) of the ZKP provides that the owner of confiscated property has a right of appeal against any confiscation measure. (62)
91.      It is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the person subject to the confiscation order the recognition and execution of which are sought did not bring an appeal before the courts against the judgment of 27 May 2020 which contains that order, even though an effective remedy was available to that person in the issuing Member State.
92.      In those circumstances, that person cannot, at the stage of recognition and execution of the confiscation order at issue, claim before the court of the executing Member State which has jurisdiction to recognise and execute that order that its fundamental rights were infringed during the proceedings which led to the issuing of that order, relying on the ground for non-recognition and non-execution set out in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805.
93.      A situation in which the person affected by a confiscation order seeks a declaration by a court of the executing Member State that such rights have been infringed, even though he or she is afforded an effective remedy to that end in the issuing Member State, cannot, in my view, meet the particularly high level of severity required by that provision. In other words, I cannot identify any element capable of demonstrating the existence of an ‘exceptional situation’ characterised by the presence of ‘specific and objective evidence’ capable of constituting ‘substantial grounds’ to believe that the execution of the confiscation order at issue would, ‘in the particular circumstances of the case’, entail a ‘manifest breach’ of a fundamental right set out in the Charter, within the meaning of Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/185.
94.      To hold otherwise would, in my view, run counter to the logic underlying the system of judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Member States, which is based on the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition, (63) which the Court has pointed out are of fundamental importance in allowing an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. (64)
95.      Thus, the Court has held that the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions implies that there is mutual trust as to the fact that each Member State accepts the application of the criminal law in force in the other Member States, even though the implementation of its own national law might produce a different outcome. (65) That principle is implemented by various instruments falling within the scope of judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Member States, such as Framework Decision 2002/584 and Directive 2014/41. The system of judicial cooperation provided for by those instruments is based on a division of competences between the issuing judicial authority and the executing judicial authority, in the context of which it is for the issuing judicial authority to review compliance with the conditions necessary for issuing the decision recognition of which is sought, and that assessment cannot, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition, subsequently be reviewed by the executing judicial authority. (66)
96.      Consequently, in the context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Member States based on the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition, the executing authority is not supposed to review compliance by the issuing authority with the conditions for issuing the judicial decision which it must execute. (67)
97.      As is shown, in particular, by Article 18(1), (68) Article 23(1) (69) and Article 33(2) (70) of Regulation 2018/1805, the system of judicial cooperation established by that regulation is also based on a distinction between responsibilities relating to the justification and issuing of a confiscation order, which fall within the remit of the issuing authority, and those relating to the execution of that order, which fall within the remit of the executing authority. In that context, it is primarily the responsibility of the issuing Member State to ensure that a confiscation order observes the rights which the person affected by that order derives from EU law, which include the fundamental rights protected by the Charter. (71) It is therefore only exceptionally that the executing authority may refrain, under Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation, from recognising and executing a confiscation order transmitted to it. Only a division of responsibilities of that nature is capable of ensuring effective cross-border cooperation in order to freeze and confiscate the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime. (72)
98.      In accordance with its primary responsibility to guarantee fundamental rights in the context of proceedings leading to the adoption of a confiscation order, the issuing Member State must guarantee effective judicial protection to the person subject to such an order, in particular by putting in place legal remedies so that respect for those rights may be reviewed. If it is common ground that there was a legal remedy available to that person in that Member State and he or she did not pursue it, although by pursuing that legal remedy, he or she could have had any infringement of his or her fundamental rights, such as those guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, established and, where appropriate, rectified or penalised, there is no reason for the executing authority to call into question the presumption that the confiscation order to which that person is subject was issued in accordance with those fundamental rights. (73) In accordance with the principle of mutual trust, that approach prohibits a court of the executing Member State, hearing claims such as those at issue in the main proceedings, from monitoring the application by a court of the issuing Member State of its rules of procedure in criminal matters in an individual case.
99.      In short, it seems to me to be crucial that a person who fails to exercise his or her right to bring legal proceedings in the issuing Member State against the confiscation order to which he or she is subject be prevented from challenging, at the stage of the procedure for the recognition and execution of that order in the executing Member State, any infringements of his or her procedural rights allegedly committed in the issuing Member State.
100. On that point, even though the areas of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and of judicial cooperation in civil matters each have their own characteristics and objectives, it seems to me interesting to refer, for the purpose of feeding into the discussion in that regard, to the case-law of the Court relating to the infringement of the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought in the area of judicial cooperation in civil matters. The public policy clause provided for in Article 34(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (74) must be interpreted strictly and may be relied on only in exceptional cases. (75)
101. In that regard, according to that case-law, recourse to that public policy clause may be justified where there is a manifest and disproportionate breach of the defendant’s right to a fair trial referred to in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter. (76) In particular, as regards the circumstances in which the fact that a judgment of a court of a Member State was delivered in breach of procedural safeguards may constitute a ground for refusal of recognition under Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, the Court has held that the public policy clause in that article would apply only where such a breach means that the recognition of the judgment concerned in the Member State in which recognition is sought would result in the manifest breach of an essential rule of law in the EU legal order and therefore in the legal order of that Member State. (77) I would also point out that, according to the Court, it is that trust which the Member States accord to one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions which permits the inference that, in the event of the misapplication of national law or EU law, the system of legal remedies in each Member State, together with the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, affords a sufficient guarantee to individuals. (78) Thus, Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as being based on the fundamental idea that individuals are required, in principle, to use all the legal remedies made available by the law of the Member State of origin. Save where specific circumstances make it too difficult or impossible to make use of the legal remedies in the Member State of origin, the individuals concerned must avail themselves of all the legal remedies available in that Member State with a view to preventing a breach of public policy before it occurs. (79) When determining whether there is a manifest breach of public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought, the court of that Member State must take account of that fact. (80)
102. In the context of the present case, in order to determine whether there is a manifest breach of a fundamental right as set out in the Charter, pursuant to Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, the competent court of the executing Member State should therefore take account of the fact that D. did not avail itself of the legal remedies available in the issuing Member State in order to prevent a breach of its fundamental rights, such as those guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, before it occurred. If D. has referred to particular circumstances which made it too difficult or impossible to make use of the legal remedies in that Member State, that court should take them into consideration.
103. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that respect for the right to effective judicial protection requires, inter alia, the guarantee of actual and effective receipt of decisions, that is to say, the notification of those decisions to the addressee thereof. (81)
104. I note that D. appears to be challenging the service of the confiscation order before the referring court. It asserts that it did not receive the excerpts from the judgment containing that order or information on the legal remedies available. That undertaking proposes that this can be proven by means of a report from a handwriting expert on the proof of service. I note, however, that it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the confiscation certificate states that the excerpts from the judgment of 27 May 2020 containing the confiscation order (namely the introduction, the operative part, part of the statement of reasons concerning the confiscated proceeds and the available remedies), together with a translation into Croatian, were served on D., which received those excerpts from the judgment on 13 October 2020 but did not bring an appeal against that judgment. In so far as such a certificate is intended to facilitate the mutual recognition of confiscation orders and taking into account the mutual trust which must exist between the judicial authorities of the Member States, (82) I consider that the executing authority should rely on the information contained in that certificate.
105. Thus, the executing authority should not be able to disregard the facts as stated by the competent Slovenian court, as the issuing authority, in a confiscation certificate unless there is sufficiently concrete and objective evidence capable of casting doubt on the credibility of those facts. If the claims made by D. lead that authority to doubt that the confiscation order was served, or that it was served lawfully, it will have to consult the issuing authority on that point. I would point out, in that regard, that, in accordance with Article 19(2) of Regulation 2018/1805, as regards the grounds for non-recognition and non-execution mentioned in Article 19(1) of that regulation, before deciding not to recognise or execute the confiscation order, whether wholly or partially, the executing authority must consult the issuing authority by any appropriate means and, where appropriate, must request the issuing authority to supply any necessary information without delay.
106. I would also point out that the checks which should, where appropriate, be carried out by the executing authority in the context of the implementation of Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805 are without prejudice to the possible application of another ground for non-recognition and non-execution provided for in paragraph 1 of that article.
107. Thus, Article 19(1)(c) of that regulation provides that the executing authority may decide not to recognise or execute a confiscation order where the confiscation certificate is incomplete or manifestly incorrect and has not been completed following the consultation referred to in Article 19(2) of that regulation.
108. At the hearing, the Commission stated that it found, after consulting the national file, that some parts of the judgment transmitted were illegible.
109. The first sentence of Article 14(1) of Regulation 2018/1805 provides that a confiscation order is to be transmitted by means of a confiscation certificate, the template of which is set out in Annex II to that regulation.
110. In accordance with Article 14(2) of that regulation, Member States may make a declaration stating that, when a confiscation certificate is transmitted to them with a view to the recognition and execution of a confiscation order, the issuing authority is to transmit the original confiscation order or a certified copy thereof together with the confiscation certificate. (83)
111. In that regard, I note that, on 8 December 2020, the Republic of Croatia made such a declaration. (84)
112. It is clear, in my view, that the transmission of the original confiscation order or a certified copy thereof presupposes that the document transmitted is legible.
113. If that is not the case, the executing authority might have to refuse to recognise and execute the confiscation order transmitted to it. I recall, in that regard, that Article 18(1) of Regulation 2018/1805 provides that the executing authority is to recognise a confiscation order transmitted in accordance with Article 14 of that regulation.
114. However, if it transpires that the confiscation order which was transmitted with the certificate is in fact illegible in whole or in part and that the executing authority is therefore relying, pursuant to Article 19(1)(c) of Regulation 2018/1805, on the incompleteness of that certificate, that authority should, pursuant to Article 19(2) of that regulation, consult the issuing authority so that the issuing authority can transmit to it a legible version of that order.
115. It is only in the absence of such transmission that the executing authority could, where appropriate, refuse to recognise and execute the confiscation order.
116. In the light of all the foregoing, I suggest that the Court’s answer to the third question referred for a preliminary ruling should be that Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805 must be interpreted as meaning that the recognition and execution of a confiscation order may not be refused by the executing authority under that provision in a situation where the person affected by that order, which was duly served on that person, did not avail him or herself of an effective remedy which was available in the issuing Member State, although by pursuing that remedy, that person could have had a court of that Member State review the observance of his or her fundamental rights, in particular those guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, by alleging before that court, first, that he or she did not participate in all the stages of the criminal proceedings which led to the issuing of that order, second, that he or she was not advised of the right of access to a lawyer and, third, that he or she was not served the full text of the judgment containing the confiscation order in a language he or she understood.
IV.    Conclusion
117. Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred by the Visoki kazneni sud (High Criminal Court, Croatia) for a preliminary ruling as follows:
(1)      Article 1(1) and (4) and Article 2(2) and (3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders, read in conjunction with recital 13 thereof,
must be interpreted as meaning that that regulation applies to a confiscation order issued within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters concluded with an acquittal, in relation to a criminal offence other than the offence of which the defendants were acquitted and involving a person other than the defendants, against whom no indictment was issued.
(2)      Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805
must be interpreted as meaning that the recognition and execution of a confiscation order may not be refused by the executing authority under that provision in a situation where the person affected by that order, which was duly served on that person, did not avail him or herself of an effective remedy which was available in the issuing Member State, although by pursuing that remedy, that person could have had a court of that Member State review the observance of his or her fundamental rights, in particular those guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by alleging before that court, first, that he or she did not participate in all the stages of the criminal proceedings which led to the issuing of that order, second, that he or she was not advised of the right of access to a lawyer and, third, that he or she was not served the full text of the judgment containing the confiscation order in a language he or she understood.
1      Original language: French.
2      Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).
3      See, inter alia, judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian (C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraphs 38 and 77 to 79 and the case-law cited).
4      OJ 2018 L 303, p. 1.
5      Council Framework Decision of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 27).
6      It is apparent from the observations of the Slovenian Government that that freezing order, issued on 16 June 2014 for a period of three months, prohibited the holder of the shares in L.Z., namely D., from disposing of them. D. did not lodge an objection against that order. It is apparent, moreover, from those observations that the same order was extended several times between 9 September 2014 and 28 November 2019. D. appealed against two of those extensions. Those appeals were dismissed.
7      Under that provision, in addition to cases where criminal proceedings are concluded with a judgment finding the accused person guilty, monies or property of illegal origin as referred to in Article 245 of the Kazenski zakonik (Criminal Code) and bribes unlawfully given or accepted as referred to in Articles 151, 157, 241, 242, 261, 262, 263 and 264 of that code are also to be confiscated if the statutory criteria of a criminal offence under Article 245 thereof have been fulfilled, indicating that the monies or property referred to in that article are proceeds of crime.
8      Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (OJ 2014 L 127, p. 39, and corrigendum OJ 2014 L 138, p. 114).
9      The referring court refers, in that regard, to Article 3(2) of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings (OJ 2010 L 280, p. 1).
10      See recitals 1 and 2 of Regulation 2018/1805.
11      See recital 3 of Regulation 2018/1805.
12      See recital 4 of Regulation 2018/1805.
13      See recital 12 of Regulation 2018/1805.
14      See also recital 13 of Regulation 2018/1805.
15      For a detailed study, see Maugeri, A.M., ‘Regulation (EU) 2018/1805: Mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders between efficiency and safeguards. “Proceedings in criminal matters” and non-conviction based confiscation’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 15, No 2, Intersentia, Mortsel, 2024, pp. 164 to 208. See also Oliveira e Silva, S., ‘Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders: A headlong rush into Europe-wide harmonisation?’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 13, No 2, Intersentia, Mortsel, 2022, pp. 198 to 215.
16      Thus, the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions implies that there is mutual trust as to the fact that each Member State accepts the application of the criminal law in force in the other Member States, even though the implementation of its own national law might produce a different outcome: see, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2023, G.K. and Others (EPPO) (C‑281/22, EU:C:2023:1018, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
17      In my view, the objections raised by the Slovenian Government concerning the admissibility of the third question, based on an allegedly incorrect presentation of the facts by the referring court, should be rejected, in the light of the presumption of relevance attaching to the questions referred by that court, which is responsible for establishing, inter alia, the factual context (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2024, Sozialministeriumservice (C‑116/23, EU:C:2024:292, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
18      See, by analogy, judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster (C‑202/24, ‘the judgment in Alchaster’, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 49).
19      See, in connection with that general clause, recitals 16 and 17 of Regulation 2018/1805.
20      See also recital 34 of Regulation 2018/1805.
21      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
22      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
23      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
24      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
25      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
26      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
27      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
28      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
29      See, inter alia, the judgment in Alchaster (paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
30      As regards the distinct objective pursued by the European arrest warrant as compared with that pursued by other instruments of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, see, regarding a European investigation order, judgment of 8 December 2020, Staatsanwaltschaft Wien (Falsified transfer orders) (C‑584/19, EU:C:2020:1002, paragraphs 72 and 73).
31      EU:C:2014:2454.
32      See judgment of 9 November 2023, Staatsanwaltschaft Aachen (C‑819/21, EU:C:2023:841, paragraphs 24, 27 to 30 and 42).
33      See, inter alia, Ouwerkerk, J.W., ‘The Missing Link in CJEU Staatsanwaltschaft Aachen (C‑891/21) and the argument for humanitarian considerations in prison transfer proceedings’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 32, No 3, Wolters Kluwer, The Hague, 2024, pp. 181 to 195; Romero Candau, S., ‘Deficiencias sistémicas y reconocimiento de sentencias privativas de libertad. A propósito de la sentencia de 9 de noviembre de 2023, Staatsanwaltschaft Aachen’, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Vol. 78, Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2024, pp. 217 to 235, and Montaldo, S., ‘Intersections among EU judicial cooperation instruments and the quest for an advanced and consistent European judicial space: The case of the transfer and surrender of convicts in the EU’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 13, No 3, Intersentia, Mortsel, 2022, pp. 252 to 269, in particular pp. 264 to 268.
34      See judgment of 9 November 2023, Staatsanwaltschaft Aachen (C‑819/21, EU:C:2023:841, paragraphs 25 and 26).
35      See judgment of 9 November 2023, Staatsanwaltschaft Aachen (C‑819/21, EU:C:2023:841, paragraph 19).
36      The same is true of recital 13 of Framework Decision 2008/909, which corresponds to recital 12 of Framework Decision 2002/584.
37      That ground for non-recognition and non-execution was added during the legislative procedure on the initiative of the European Parliament (see the Report of 12 January 2018 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders (document A8-0001/2018) and the note of 9 October 2018 from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Permanent Representatives Committee/Council concerning the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders – Outcome of the European Parliament’s first reading (Strasbourg, 1 to 4 October 2018) (document 12697/18)) and following a declaration from the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the need for clear and transparent wording emphasising compliance with fundamental rights in the recognition and enforcement of confiscation orders, taking into account the most recent case-law of the Court on respect for fundamental rights (note of 15 December 2017 from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Delegations concerning the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders – Outcome of the discussions within the JHA Council on 8 December 2017 (document 15451/17)).
38      See Montaldo, S., ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the protection of the best interests of the child: The Court’s last word on the limits of mutual recognition and the evolving obligations of national judicial authorities in Case C‑261/22 GN’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 31, No 1, Sage Publications, London, 2024, pp. 106 to 123, in particular pp. 115 and 117.
39      The Court cannot, therefore, make the same finding as it did in relation to the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31), namely that it unequivocally follows from that provision that only ‘systemic flaws’, ‘resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the [Charter]’, make the transfer of an applicant for international protection to the responsible Member State impossible. That provision thus sets out two cumulative conditions: see, inter alia, judgment of 19 December 2024, Tudmur (C‑185/24 and C‑189/24, EU:C:2024:1036, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). Such a finding cannot be made in relation to Regulation 2018/1805, from which it certainly does not follow that only the existence of general or systemic deficiencies would allow the executing authority to rely on the ground for non-recognition and non-execution set out in Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation.
40      See judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru (C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198).
41      See judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) (C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586).
42      OJ 2023 L 191, p. 118.
43      It is a ground for refusal of European Production Orders where, in exceptional situations, there are substantial grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of the order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right as set out in Article 6 TEU and in the Charter.
44      That recital states, in particular, that when assessing the ground for refusal referred to in Article 12(1)(b) of Regulation 2023/1543, where the enforcing authority has at its disposal evidence or material such as that set out in a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the Parliament or by the Commission, adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, indicating that there is a clear risk, if the order were executed, of a serious breach of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial under Article 47 of the Charter, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the independence of the issuing State’s judiciary, the enforcing authority should determine specifically and precisely whether, having regard to the personal situation of the person concerned, as well as to the nature of the offence for which the criminal proceedings are conducted, and the factual context that forms the basis of the order, and in the light of the information provided by the issuing authority, there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a risk of a breach of a person’s right to a fair trial.
45      Council Framework Decision of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties (OJ 2005 L 76, p. 16).
46      See, inter alia, judgments of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties) (C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054), and of 6 October 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź-Bałuty (C‑338/20, EU:C:2021:805).
47      See, inter alia, judgments of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties) (C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited), and of 6 October 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź-Bałuty (C‑338/20, EU:C:2021:805, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
48      OJ 2014 L 130, p. 1.
49      See judgment of 11 November 2021, Gavanozov II (C‑852/19, EU:C:2021:902). See, on the absence of a requirement for a two-step examination in that field, Mancano, L., ‘The Systemic and the Particular in European Law – Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’, German Law Journal, Vol. 24, No 6, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2023, pp. 962 to 981, in particular, p. 976. See also Hernandez Weiss, A., ‘Effective protection of rights as a precondition to mutual recognition: Some thoughts on the CJEU’s Gavanozov II decision’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 13, No 2, Intersentia, Mortsel, 2022, pp. 180 to 197, in particular, pp. 190 and 191.
50      EU:C:2014:2454. I would also point out that, like all grounds for non-recognition and non-execution, the ground provided for in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805 must be interpreted strictly: see, inter alia, by analogy, judgments of 29 April 2021, X (European arrest warrant – Ne bis in idem) (C‑665/20 PPU, EU:C:2021:339, paragraph 39); of 14 July 2022, Procureur général près la cour d’appel d’Angers (C‑168/21, EU:C:2022:558, paragraph 40); and of 6 June 2023, O. G. (European arrest warrant issued against a third-country national) (C‑700/21, EU:C:2023:444, paragraph 33).
51      See, inter alia, judgment of 4 October 2024, 1Dream and Others (C‑767/22, C‑49/23 and C‑161/23, EU:C:2024:823, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
52      See, inter alia, judgment of 21 October 2021, Okrazhna prokuratura – Varna (C‑845/19 and C‑863/19, EU:C:2021:864, paragraphs 75 to 82), in which the Court held that, on account of the general nature of the wording of Article 8(1) of Directive 2014/42, the persons for whom the Member States must guarantee effective remedies and a fair trial are not only those convicted of an offence but also third parties whose property is affected by the confiscation order (paragraph 76 and the case-law cited). See also judgment of 12 May 2022, RR and JG (Freezing of third-party property) (C‑505/20, EU:C:2022:376, paragraphs 24 and 33 to 38).
53      Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (OJ 2012 L 142, p. 1).
54      Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty (OJ 2013 L 294, p. 1).
55      See, in that regard, judgment of 4 October 2024, 1Dream and Others (C‑767/22, C‑49/23 and C‑161/23, EU:C:2024:823). I would point out that Directive 2014/42 was replaced by Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery and confiscation (OJ L 2024/1260). Article 15 of that directive deals with non-conviction-based confiscation.
56      See, on the rights of defence in the context of the application of Regulation 2018/1805, Brandão, N., ‘The right of defence under Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 13, No 1, Intersentia, Mortsel, 2022, pp. 28 to 41.
57      Directives 2010/64, 2012/13 and 2013/48 and Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1), Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 132, p. 1), Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings (OJ 2016 L 297, p. 1).
58      See judgment of 21 October 2021, Okrazhna prokuratura – Varna (C‑845/19 and C‑863/19, EU:C:2021:864, paragraph 75).
59      See, inter alia, judgment of 26 July 2017, Sacko (C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
60      Under Article 500(1) of the ZKP, where confiscation of the proceeds of crime of another beneficiary is applicable, the latter must be invited to be heard in the preliminary proceedings and at the main hearing. In the case of a legal person, its representative must be invited. In the invitation, it should be mentioned that the proceedings will be conducted even in his or her absence. In accordance with Article 500(2) of the ZKP, the legal person’s representative is to be heard at the main hearing after the accused person. The same applies to another beneficiary, if he or she has not been called as a witness. Furthermore, Article 500(5) of the ZKP provides that, if the court discovers only during the main hearing that confiscation of the proceeds of crime is applicable, it must suspend the main hearing and invite the beneficiary or the representative of the legal person.
61      In accordance with Article 500(3) of the ZKP, the beneficiary and the representative of the legal person have the right, in connection with the determination of the proceeds of crime, to present evidence and, with the authorisation of the President of the Chamber, to put questions to the accused person, witnesses and experts.
62      That article thus provides that the owner of the confiscated money or property, or of the confiscated bribe, has the right to appeal against the confiscation order referred to in Article 498a(2) of the ZKP if he or she considers that there is no legal basis for the confiscation.
63      See judgment of 21 December 2023, G.K. and Others (EPPO) (C‑281/22, EU:C:2023:1018, paragraph 55).
64      See, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2023, G.K. and Others (EPPO) (C‑281/22, EU:C:2023:1018, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
65      See, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2023, G.K. and Others (EPPO) (C‑281/22, EU:C:2023:1018, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
66      See, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2023, G.K. and Others (EPPO) (C‑281/22, EU:C:2023:1018, paragraphs 61 and 63 and the case-law cited).
67      See judgment of 21 December 2023, G.K. and Others (EPPO) (C‑281/22, EU:C:2023:1018, paragraph 64).
68      See point 39 of this Opinion.
69      That article provides that the execution of the freezing order or confiscation order is to be governed by the law of the executing Member State and its authorities are to be solely competent to decide on the procedures for its execution and to determine all the measures relating thereto.
70      Under that provision, the substantive reasons for issuing the freezing order or confiscation order cannot be challenged before a court in the executing Member State.
71      See, inter alia, with regard to Framework Decision 2002/584, judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian (C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). See also, as regards Directive 2014/41, judgment of 11 November 2021, Gavanozov II (C‑852/19, EU:C:2021:902, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
72      See recital 4 of Regulation 2018/1805.
73      A contrario, the Court stated in its judgment of 11 November 2021, Gavanozov II (C‑852/19, EU:C:2021:902), that the fact that it is impossible to contest, in the issuing Member State, the need for, and lawfulness of, an EIO, the purpose of which is the carrying out of searches and seizures as well as the hearing of a witness by videoconference, constitutes an infringement of the right to an effective remedy, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, such as to rule out the possibility of mutual recognition being implemented and benefiting that Member State (paragraph 56). In the light, in particular, of the essential role of the principle of mutual recognition in the system established by Directive 2014/41, it is for the issuing Member State to create the conditions under which the executing authority may usefully grant its assistance in accordance with EU law (paragraph 58). Furthermore, the Court took account of Article 11(1)(f) of that directive, which, in its view, permits the executing authorities to derogate from that principle, exceptionally, following an assessment on a case-by-case basis, where there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of an EIO would be incompatible with the fundamental rights guaranteed, in particular, by the Charter. It pointed out that, in the absence of any legal remedy in the issuing Member State, the application of that provision would become automatic, which would be contrary both to the general scheme of that directive and to the principle of mutual trust (paragraph 59). The Court concluded that Article 6 of that directive, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and Article 4(3) TEU, must be interpreted as precluding the issuing, by the competent authority of a Member State, of an EIO, the purpose of which is the carrying out of searches and seizures as well as the hearing of a witness by videoconference, where the legislation of that Member State does not provide any legal remedy against the issuing of such an EIO (paragraph 62).
74      OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1.
75      See, inter alia, judgments of 7 September 2023, Charles Taylor Adjusting (C‑590/21, EU:C:2023:633, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited), and of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). See also, in that regard, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:127, point 44).
76      See, inter alia, judgment of 6 September 2012, Trade Agency (C‑619/10, EU:C:2012:531, paragraph 62). See also, in that regard, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:127, point 75).
77      See judgments of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands (C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 50), and of 25 May 2016, Meroni (C‑559/14, EU:C:2016:349, paragraph 46). See, more generally, on the need for a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the Member State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order, judgment of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 37). In that judgment, the Court stated that it is only if the enforcement of a judgment in the Member State in which enforcement is sought would give rise to a manifest breach of a fundamental right as enshrined in the Charter, that a court of that Member State is required, under Article 34(1) and Article 45 of Regulation No 44/2001, to refuse to enforce that judgment or, as the case may be, revoke the declaration of enforceability pertaining to that judgment (paragraph 44).
78      See judgments of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands (C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraphs 49 and 63); and of 25 May 2016, Meroni (C‑559/14, EU:C:2016:349, paragraph 47); and of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 38).
79      See judgments of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands (C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 64), and of 25 May 2016, Meroni (C‑559/14, EU:C:2016:349, paragraph 48). See also, as regards Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1), which repealed Regulation No 44/2001, judgment of 7 April 2022, H Limited (C‑568/20, EU:C:2022:264, paragraphs 44 to 46). In that judgment, the Court stated that a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order may, inter alia, lie in the fact that the party against whom enforcement is sought was not able to defend him or herself effectively before the court of origin and to challenge the decision sought to be enforced in the Member State of origin (paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
80      See judgment of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands (C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 68).
81      See, inter alia, judgment of 6 October 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź-Bałuty (C‑338/20, EU:C:2021:805, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). In that paragraph, the Court also stated that such notification must allow the person concerned to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, as well as the legal remedies against such a decision and the time limit prescribed to that end, so as to allow him or her to defend his or her rights effectively and to decide, in full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in challenging that decision before the courts.
82      See, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian (C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 115).
83      That provision also states that only the confiscation certificate has to be translated, in accordance with Article 17(2) of Regulation 2018/1805.
84      See declaration available at the following internet address: https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/libdocumentproperties/EN/3304.