62014CC0314
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
SZPUNAR
delivered on 6 October 2015 (
1
)
Case C‑314/14
Sanoma Media Finland Oy–Nelonen Media
v
Viestintävirasto
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finland))
‛Television broadcasting — Television advertising — Directive 2010/13/EU — Articles 10(1)(c), 19(1) and 23 — Keeping advertising distinct from other parts of the programme — Split-screen technique — Limitation of the duration of advertising breaks — Information on programme sponsorship — ‘Black seconds’ separating advertising spots’
Introduction
1.
The Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court, Finland) has referred three detailed questions concerning the interpretation of provisions governing television advertising and the sponsorship of television programmes by undertakings.
2.
The provisions forming the subject-matter of the reference for a preliminary ruling have been in force in EU law for a long time (although their wording has evolved in that period), but the previous case-law of the Court does not answer the legal questions asked by the referring court in this case. At the same time, it would appear that the practice of the national administrative authorities and courts in the individual Member States differs in the application of those provisions. The Court will therefore have an opportunity to interpret them and thereby harmonise that practice.
Legal framework
EU law
3.
The questions referred by the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court) for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of several provisions of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive). (
2
)
4.
As provided in Article 10(1)(c) of Directive 2010/13:
‘Audiovisual media services or programmes that are sponsored shall meet the following requirements:
…
(c)
viewers shall be clearly informed of the existence of a sponsorship agreement. Sponsored programmes shall be clearly identified as such by the name, logo and/or any other symbol of the sponsor such as a reference to its product(s) or service(s) or a distinctive sign thereof in an appropriate way for programmes at the beginning, during and/or at the end of the programmes.’
5.
Article 19(1) of that directive provides:
‘Television advertising and teleshopping shall be readily recognisable and distinguishable from editorial content. Without prejudice to the use of new advertising techniques, television advertising and teleshopping shall be kept quite distinct from other parts of the programme by optical and/or acoustic and/or spatial means.’
6.
Finally, Article 23 of that directive provides:
‘1.   The proportion of television advertising spots and teleshopping spots within a given clock hour shall not exceed 20%.
2.   Paragraph 1 shall not apply to announcements made by the broadcaster in connection with its own programmes and ancillary products directly derived from those programmes, sponsorship announcements and product placements.’
Finnish law
7.
Directive 2010/13 was transposed into Finnish law by Law No 744/1998 on television and radio broadcasting (Laki televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta 744/1998; ‘Law No 744/1998’). Articles 10(1)(c), 19(1) and 23(1) of the directive are transposed by Paragraphs 26(2), 22(1) and 29(1) of Law No 744/1998 respectively.
Facts, procedure and questions referred
8.
Sanoma Media Finland Oy–Nelonen Media, a company incorporated under Finnish law (‘Sanoma’), is a television broadcaster under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Finland for the purposes of Article 2 of Directive 2010/13.
9.
On 9 March 2012 the Viestintävirasto (the Finnish regulator of the audiovisual market) issued in relation to Sanoma a decision ordering it to cease the infringements of Law No 744/1998 which that regulator had found. The regulator’s reservations concerned the proportion of advertising and the way in which Sanoma kept advertising distinct from other parts of the programme.
10.
First, Sanoma used a split-screen technique whereby the ‘main’ programme (specifically the closing credits) was broadcast on one part of the screen and the announcement of the upcoming programmes on the other. The Finnish regulator considered that the mere splitting of the screen into a part broadcasting the main programme and a part announcing upcoming programmes is not sufficient in the light of the provisions of Law No 744/1998 that transpose Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13.
11.
Secondly, the Finnish regulator considered that the logo of the programme sponsor broadcast at a time other than that of the sponsored programme does in fact constitute advertising and therefore the time for which it is broadcast must be counted as advertising time. The regulator consequently found that Sanoma had exceeded the maximum permissible advertising time set in Paragraph 29(1) of Law No 744/1998 (Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13).
12.
Thirdly, the Finnish regulator considered that Sanoma had exceeded the abovementioned permissible advertising time since the short gaps (‘black seconds’) which separate individual advertising spots should be included in that maximum permitted time.
13.
Sanoma brought an action against the decision of the Finnish regulator before the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court, Helsinki). That court dismissed the action and upheld the regulator’s decision. Sanoma lodged an appeal on a point of law against that judgment with the referring court.
14.
In those circumstances, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1)
In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, is Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13/EU to be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of national legal provisions to the effect that screen splitting is not regarded as a break-bumper that keeps the audiovisual programme distinct from television advertising, where one part of the screen is reserved for the programme’s closing credits and the other part to a list presenting the upcoming programmes on a broadcaster’s channel and no acoustic or optical signal expressly announcing the start of an advertising break is broadcast either on the split screen or thereafter?
(2)
Taking into account the fact that Directive 2010/13 is in the nature of a minimum standard, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings is Article 23(2) of that directive to be interpreted as meaning that it is not compatible with that provision to classify sponsor idents broadcast in the context of programmes other than the sponsored programmes as “advertising spots” within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the Directive which must be included in the maximum permissible advertising time?
(3)
Taking into account the fact that Directive 2010/13 is in the nature of a minimum standard, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, is the term “advertising spots” in Article 23(1) of that directive in conjunction with the description of the maximum permissible advertising time (“the proportion ... within a given clock hour shall not exceed 20%”) to be interpreted as meaning that it is not compatible with that provision to count the “black seconds” between individual advertising spots and at the end of an advertising break as advertising time?’
15.
Written observations were submitted by the Finnish, Greek, Austrian and Polish Governments and the European Commission. The Court decided pursuant to Article 76(2) of the Rules of Procedure not to hold a hearing.
Analysis
16.
The questions referred should be examined separately in the order in which they were put.
First question
17.
By its first question, the referring court essentially seeks to ascertain whether Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13 is to be interpreted as meaning that the mere splitting of the screen into parts, one of which is given over to advertising, constitutes sufficient distinction between that advertising and the editorial content or whether the part of the screen given over to advertising should also be identified separately.
18.
In the context of the present case it should be noted that, according to the definition contained in Article 1(1)(i) of Directive 2010/13, communications broadcast by a television broadcaster for self-promotional purposes, including promotion of its own programmes, constitutes a particular kind of television advertising. That interpretation is confirmed by recital 96 of the directive. The announcement of upcoming programmes must be regarded as their promotion since it is designed to encourage the viewer to continue watching a particular channel.
19.
Although Article 23(2) of the directive admittedly excludes communications of that kind from the maximum permissible advertising time, they are nevertheless subject in principle to the directive’s other provisions on television advertising, including the obligation, contained in Article 19(1), to keep them quite distinct from the editorial content. In addition, recital 96 of Directive 2010/13 states that trailers consisting of extracts from programmes should be treated as programmes. Conversely, programme announcements not containing such extracts, which, for example, only show the programme’s title, must also be kept quite distinct from the editorial content, and also from other forms of advertising.
20.
Returning to the interpretation of Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13, it should be noted first of all that that provision also expressly permits spatial means of keeping advertising distinct from editorial content (screen splitting), in addition to optical and acoustic signals. However, at the same time the first sentence of that provision requires that television advertising be readily recognisable and distinguishable from editorial content.
21.
The screen-splitting technique nevertheless can be — and very often is — used to broadcast not only advertising but also other content, for example the most important news on a ‘ticker’ at the bottom of the screen, competitions for television viewers, self-promotion of broadcasters and so forth. Therefore, the mere fact that the screen is split does not necessarily mean that advertising will be broadcast on one of its parts.
22.
Therefore, whilst the first sentence of Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13 requires that advertising be readily recognisable and distinguishable from editorial content, it is not sufficient, in my view, for the advertising to be broadcast on part of a split screen. That part must still be identified appropriately so that the television viewer is in no doubt that the communication broadcast on it is of an advertising nature. That identification may take the form of an acoustic or optical signal similar to that which separates full-screen advertising, or of a special sign shown permanently on the part of the screen given over to advertising. It must also indicate clearly the type of commercial message concerned, that is to say, advertising, telesales, self-promotion and so forth. The mere splitting of the screen, with no additional identification, does not ensure that the objective set out in the first sentence of Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13 is attained.
23.
In this context, reference should also be made to Article 20(1) of Directive 2010/13, under which advertising broadcast during a programme is not to prejudice the programme’s integrity. Therefore, signals identifying advertising that is broadcast on part of a split screen must be of such a kind as to satisfy that requirement.
24.
In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the answer that the Court should give to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is that Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13 is to be interpreted as meaning that the mere splitting of the screen into parts, one of which is given over to advertising, does not constitute sufficient distinction of that advertising from the editorial content. The part of the screen given over to advertising must, in addition, be identified by means of an optical or acoustic signal at the beginning or end of the advertising sequence or by means of a sign shown permanently the screen is split. That signal or sign must clearly indicate the nature of the communication being broadcast.
Second question
25.
By its second question, the referring court essentially seeks to ascertain whether Article 23 of Directive 2010/13, in conjunction with Article 10(1)(c) thereof, is to be interpreted as meaning that information relating to a sponsored programme broadcast outside that programme constitutes television advertising.
26.
The provisions of Directive 2010/13 which define sponsorship of television programmes (
3
) are not worded in the most precise of terms. First, under Article 1(1)(k) of that directive sponsorship consists in the contribution made by persons other than programme producers and persons engaged in providing audiovisual media services (‘sponsors’) to the financing of the programmes or services with a view to promoting the sponsors’ name, trade mark, image, activities or products. Secondly, Article 1(1)(h) of the directive regards sponsorship as a form of ‘audiovisual commercial communication’.
27.
Those provisions must be construed as meaning that sponsorship in the strict sense consists in the contribution made by the sponsor to the financing of a television programme, whereas information about that fact which accompanies the broadcast of the sponsored programme is an audiovisual commercial communication. On the one hand, that information serves to attain the objective of sponsorship, which is to promote the sponsor, and, on the other, it is required under Article 10(1)(c) of Directive 2010/13 to inform the viewer that the programme is sponsored. Thus, sponsorship for any purpose other than promoting the sponsor, for example to affect programme content (which Article 10(1)(a) of the directive expressly prohibits), and also secret sponsorship, (
4
) are not permitted.
28.
As is clear from the foregoing, and as the Polish Government rightly noted in its observations in this case, the information that the programme is sponsored serves two purposes. First, it is information for the viewer and prevents secret sponsorship of programmes for purposes other than promotion of the sponsor. Secondly, it specifically serves such promotion by featuring and publicising a name, trade mark or other message associated with the sponsor.
29.
In that second function the information relating to sponsorship is therefore similar to television advertising. Undertakings sponsor television programmes in order to publicise their name or trade mark or to improve their public image. Therefore, this is intended indirectly to increase sales of the goods or services which they offer and thus serves the same purposes as advertising.
30.
It is therefore difficult to concur with the Commission’s contention, contained in its observations in this case, that the sole purpose of sponsorship announcements is to inform television viewers of the existence of a sponsorship agreement. Nor do I share the view expressed in the Austrian Government’s observations that there is a fundamental difference between sponsorship announcements, which serve solely to identify the sponsor, and television advertising, which serves to promote sales of goods and services. The judgment in Österreichischer Rundfunk, (
5
) which the Austrian Government cited in support of that argument in its observations, did not concern the difference between sponsorship and advertising, but whether a game with prizes for television viewers and announcements of that game that are broadcast on television should be regarded as television advertising.
31.
In actual fact it is only the form, and not the objective or substance of the communication, which distinguishes information relating to sponsorship of a programme from advertising. Moreover, that difference in terms of form does not always arise since advertising may also be simply a presentation of a name or trade mark or a product or service of an undertaking, with no additional content. Directive 2010/13 does not introduce any restrictions on the form of television advertising. Such advertising is thus similar to information relating to programme sponsorship (a sponsorship announcement according to the terminology of Article 23(2) of Directive 2010/13).
32.
Therefore, although Article 23(2) of Directive 2010/13 requires sponsorship announcements not to be included in advertising broadcasting time, it does so only on account of their informational function. That function is fulfilled by the obligation under Article 10(1)(c) of the directive to place such announcements at the beginning, at the end or during the sponsored programme. Information on the sponsor which is broadcast at another time does not perform an informational, but rather a purely promotional, function.
33.
In other words, sponsorship announcements within the meaning of Article 23(2) of Directive 2010/13 are those which serve to fulfil the obligation arising from Article 10(1)(c). The latter provision concerns not so much information relating to sponsored programmes as those programmes themselves. It is the sponsored programme which must be identified since such identification ensures that the television viewer is informed to a necessary and sufficient degree. (
6
) Therefore, the exemption contained in Article 23(2) of the directive covers only sponsorship announcements as referred to in Article 10(1)(c) and thus those broadcast at the beginning, at the end or during a sponsored programme. Consequently, it does not cover information relating to the sponsorship of programmes that is broadcast on other occasions, even information associated with sponsored programmes such as, for example, the announcements thereof.
34.
It is true that — as the Commission noted in its observations in this case — the Court has ruled, in relation to Article 17(1)(b) of Directive 89/552/EC (
7
) (the precursor of Article 10(1)(c) of Directive 2010/13), that that provision does not restrict the possibility of broadcasting sponsorship information solely to the beginning or end of the programme. (
8
) However, that case related to the possibility of broadcasting sponsorship information during the sponsored programme. That judgment has now been somewhat ‘overtaken’ by the legislature since Article 10(1)(c) of Directive 2010/13 expressly provides for such a possibility. None the less, in my view that judgment cannot be interpreted as meaning that any information relating to a programme’s sponsorship broadcast at any time whatsoever constitutes a sponsorship announcement within the meaning of Article 23(2) of the directive and is excluded from the maximum permissible advertising time set in Article 23(1).
35.
On account of its promotional function such a communication must, on the contrary, be regarded as television advertising and be subject to all the rules which Directive 2010/13 lays down in relation to such advertising, including the broadcasting time (Article 23(1)) and the keeping of advertising distinct from the other elements of the programme (Article 19(1)). Any other interpretation would make it possible to abuse the exemption laid down in Article 23(2) of the directive since it would be enough to broadcast sufficiently often, for example, an announcement of a sponsored programme containing the relevant information about the sponsor to circumvent easily the maximum permissible advertising time set in Article 23(1) of the directive.
36.
In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the answer that the Court should give to the second question referred for a preliminary ruling is that Article 10(1)(c) and Article 23(2) of Directive 2010/13 are to be interpreted as meaning that information relating to sponsorship broadcast at any time other than at the beginning, during or at the end of the sponsored programme constitutes television advertising and is not covered by the exemption from the maximum permissible advertising time set in Article 23(1) of that directive.
Third question
37.
By its third question, the referring court essentially seeks to ascertain whether Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13 is to be interpreted as meaning that the maximum permissible advertising time which it lays down relates to the actual duration of the advertising spots or the overall period intended for the broadcasting of advertising (other than communications referred to in Article 23(2)), that is to say, taking account of the gaps between the individual advertising spots.
38.
The issue of the method for calculating time for the purposes of applying the provisions on television advertising has already formed the subject-matter of judgments of the Court. In its judgment in ARD (
9
) the Court considered whether rules laying down the frequency with which programmes may be interrupted by advertisements, contained in Article 11(3) of Directive 89/552 (the equivalent of which is now Article 20(2) of Directive 2010/13), relate to the ‘net’ duration of the programme, the actual length of the editorial content, or the ‘gross’ duration, that is to say, taking account of the duration of the advertising breaks.
39.
After first ruling that a literal interpretation does not provide an unequivocal answer to the question, the Court held that the objective of Directive 89/552, which is to guarantee freedom of transmission in cross-border broadcasting, requires an interpretation of that provision which allows the greatest number of interruptions for advertising during programmes, that is to say, the principle of the ‘gross’ duration of the programme. (
10
) If that reasoning were applied to the present case, it would be necessary to place on Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13 the most literal interpretation, that the maximum permissible advertising time which it sets relates only to the duration of the advertising spots themselves and does not cover, for example, ‘black seconds’.
40.
However, in its more recent case-law the Court has also pointed to other objectives which the individual provisions of Directive 89/552 were intended to pursue. In particular, in its judgment in Commission v Spain (
11
) the Court recalled, with direct reference to its judgment in ARD, that the provisions of that directive must be interpreted in such a way as to allow the freedom to advertise to be reconciled with the protection of television viewers from excessive advertising. (
12
)
41.
Ensuring that consumers, as television viewers, are fully and properly protected is also mentioned as one of the objectives of Directive 2010/13, in recital 83. The Court also emphasised the importance of that protection — already on the basis of Directive 2010/13 — in its judgment in Sky Italia. (
13
) Consequently, I consider that Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13 should be interpreted having regard to the objective of protecting television viewers from excessive advertising and in a manner which allows a balance to be struck between the financial interests of television broadcasters and advertisers, on the one hand, and television viewers, on the other. (
14
)
42.
Therefore, although Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13 introduces a maximum permissible time for broadcasting ‘advertising spots’, that provision should not be interpreted literally as meaning that that maximum relates only to the duration of those spots. In my view, the legislature used the term ‘advertising spots’ in that provision in order to distinguish between that kind of advertising and other forms of audiovisual commercial communications, in particular self-promotion, sponsorship announcements and product placement, which are exempt from the maximum permissible broadcasting time by virtue of Article 23(2) of the directive.
43.
Nor is it by chance that the legislature set maximum permissible advertising time as a proportion of overall broadcasting time (20% of each clock hour). Broadcasting time is thus broken down into time for advertising (and telesales) — no more than 20% — and time for editorial content and any commercial communications not covered by the limit — at least 80%.
44.
However, it is clear that part of the broadcasting time comprises, in addition to the basic communication (that is to say, the advertising spots during the period for advertising and programmes during the period for editorial content), elements which are necessary from a technical point of view, such as announcements, programme credits and gaps between them. The ‘black seconds’ separating individual advertising spots also constitute such elements. Although they do not fall within the duration of those spots in the strict sense, they nevertheless do form part of the advertising broadcasting time, as the Finnish and Polish Governments also correctly point out in their observations in this case, since they are necessary to separate one advertising spot from another. For that reason ‘black seconds’ must be included in the maximum permissible advertising time set in Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13.
45.
The same is true of optical or acoustic signals separating advertising communications from editorial content. They do not constitute advertising spots but their broadcast is required under the second sentence of Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13. Therefore, the time for broadcasting those signals is, in the broad sense, advertising time and must also be included in the maximum permissible time set in Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13.
46.
Where the advertising is separated by spatial means, that maximum covers the entire period during which part of the screen is given over to advertising. The maximum permissible advertising time obviously remains unchanged and amounts to 20% of each clock hour, even if the advertising is broadcast on only part of the screen.
47.
In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the answer that the Court should give to the third question referred for a preliminary ruling is that Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13 is to be interpreted as meaning that the maximum permissible broadcasting time set in that provision includes the time from the beginning of the optical or acoustic signal marking the beginning of the advertising break to the end of the optical or acoustic signal marking the end of that break. Where the advertising is separated from the other parts of the programme by spatial means, that maximum covers the entire period during which part of the screen is given over to advertising.
Final observation: minimum harmonisation and transparency of national rules
48.
Under Article 4(1) of Directive 2010/13, the Member States remain free to lay down more detailed or stricter rules in respect of audiovisual media services providers, including television broadcasters, under their jurisdiction. The Court has confirmed that freedom in its case-law, pointing out that the harmonisation of the Member States’ provisions pursuant to Directive 2010/13 is minimum harmonisation. (
15
) Consequently, if the Court were not to concur with my proposed answers to the questions referred in this case and were to place a more liberal interpretation on the provisions of Directive 2010/13 referred to, the question would arise as to whether those provisions preclude the Member States from laying down rules such as those applied by the Finnish regulator in the circumstances of the main proceedings.
49.
In principle I consider that the answer to the question should be in the negative. The requirement that advertising communications kept distinct from the other parts of the programme by spatial means must be clearly identified, the limit on the time and place at which information on programme sponsorship is broadcast and the calculation of the maximum permissible advertising time taking account of ‘black seconds’ fall within the notion of more detailed or stricter rules and are covered by the freedom of the Member States laid down in Article 4(1) of the directive.
50.
Whilst fully respecting the autonomy of the Member States’ legal orders, I consider, however, that such more detailed or stricter rules must be formulated clearly. Provisions of national law couched in terms identical or similar to those of the provisions of Directive 2010/13, without any express departure from them, must be interpreted uniformly throughout the European Union and, where applicable, in accordance with the interpretation which the Court’s case-law requires them to be given. In that situation, persons operating on the audiovisual services market have the right to expect that provisions with a wording similar to that of the provisions of the directive will be interpreted in a uniform and constant manner. Therefore, to apply Article 4(1) of the directive only by means of national administrative and judicial practice would undermine the legal certainty of those persons and also the basic objective of the directive, which is to harmonise the provisions of the Member States.
Conclusion
51.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should give the following answers to the questions referred by the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court):
(1)
Article 19(1) of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) is to be interpreted as meaning that the mere splitting of the screen into parts, one of which is given over to advertising, does not constitute sufficient distinction of that advertising from the editorial content. The part of the screen given over to advertising must, in addition, be identified by means of an optical or acoustic signal at the beginning or end of the advertising sequence or by means of a sign shown permanently when the screen is split. That signal or sign must clearly indicate the nature of the communication being broadcast.
(2)
Article 10(1)(c) and Article 23(2) of Directive 2010/13 are to be interpreted as meaning that information relating to sponsorship broadcast at any time other than at the beginning, during or at the end of the sponsored programme constitutes television advertising and is not covered by the exemption from the maximum permissible advertising time set in Article 23(1) of that directive.
(3)
Article 23(1) of Directive 2010/13 is to be interpreted as meaning that the maximum permissible broadcasting time set in that provision includes the time from the beginning of the optical or acoustic signal marking the beginning of the advertising break to the end of the optical or acoustic signal marking the end of that break. Where the advertising is separated from the other parts of the programme by spatial means, that maximum covers the entire period during which part of the screen is given over to advertising.
(
1
)   Original language: Polish.
(
2
)   OJ 2010 L 95, p. 1.
(
3
)   Under Directive 2010/13, sponsorship may also concern audiovisual media services other than television broadcasting, but for reasons of clarity I will restrict myself in this Opinion to the issue of television programme sponsorship because that is what the questions referred concern. As regards the distinction between television broadcasting and other forms of audiovisual media services, I refer to my Opinion in New Media Online, C‑347/14, EU:C:2015:434.
(
4
)   Article 10 of Directive 2010/13 also contains other restrictions on sponsorship, which, however, are not relevant to the present case.
(
5
)   C‑195/06, EU:C:2007:613.
(
6
)   It should be recalled that under the introductory words of Article 10(1) of Directive 2010/13 ‘… programmes that are sponsored shall meet the following requirements’ (emphasis added).
(
7
)   Council Directive of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting (OJ 1989 L 298, p. 23). Directive 2010/13 constitutes the codification of Directive 89/552.
(
8
)   Judgment in RTI and Others, C‑320/94, C‑328/94, C‑329/94 and C‑337/94 to C‑339/94, EU:C:1996:486, paragraph 43.
(
9
)   C‑6/98, EU:C:1999:532.
(
10
)   Judgment in ARD, C‑6/98, EU:C:1999:532, paragraphs 28 to 32.
(
11
)   C‑281/09, EU:C:2011:767.
(
12
)   Judgment in Commission v Spain, C‑281/09, EU:C:2011:767, paragraphs 48 and 49. See also Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Commission v Spain, C‑281/09, EU:C:2011:216, point 75.
(
13
)   C‑234/12, EU:C:2013:496, paragraph 17.
(
14
)   See, to this effect, judgment in Sky Italia, C‑234/12, EU:C:2013:496, paragraph 18.
(
15
)   See, in particular, judgments in Leclerc-Siplec, C‑412/93, EU:C:1995:26, paragraphs 29 and 44, and Sky Italia, C‑234/12, EU:C:2013:496, paragraph 12.