Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber)
22 January 2026 (*)
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA – Mutual recognition of financial penalties – Article 7(2)(g) – Ground for non-recognition and non-execution – Informing the person concerned of his or her right to contest the case and of the time limits of such a legal remedy – Article 7(3) – Obligation to consult the competent authority of the issuing Member State )
Case C‑453/24 [Hadenov (i)]
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court, Bulgaria), made by decision of 26 June 2024, received at the Court on 26 June 2024, in the criminal proceedings against
BC,
other party:
Sofiyska gradska prokuratura
THE COURT (Second Chamber),
composed of K. Jürimäe (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as Judge of the Second Chamber, F. Schalin, M. Gavalec and Z. Csehi, Judges,
Advocate General: J. Richard de la Tour,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the written procedure,
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
–        the European Commission, by M. Wasmeier and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 3 July 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 6 and Article 7(2)(g) and (3) of Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties (OJ 2005 L 76, p. 16), as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24) (‘Framework Decision 2005/214’).
2        The request has been made in the context of proceedings instituted by the Bezirkshauptmannschaft Neusiedl am See (‘the BHM’; administrative authority of the district of Neusiedl am See, Austria) in order to obtain the recognition and execution, in Bulgaria, of a financial penalty imposed on BC, a Bulgarian national, for failure to pay a motorway toll in Austria.
Legal context
3        Recitals 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Framework Decision 2005/214 are worded as follows:
‘(1)      The European Council meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999 endorsed the principle of mutual recognition, which should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the [European] Union.
(2)      The principle of mutual recognition should apply to financial penalties imposed by judicial or administrative authorities for the purpose of facilitating the enforcement of such penalties in a Member State other than the State in which the penalties are imposed.
…
(4)      This Framework Decision should also cover financial penalties imposed in respect of road traffic offences.
(5)      This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 of the [TEU] and reflected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union …’
4        Article 1 of that framework decision, which is entitled ‘Definitions’, provides:
‘For the purposes of this Framework Decision:
(a)      “decision” shall mean a final decision requiring a financial penalty to be paid by a natural or legal person where the decision was made by:
…
(iii)      an authority of the issuing State other than a court in respect of acts which are punishable under the national law of the issuing State by virtue of being infringements of the rules of law, provided that the person concerned has had an opportunity to have the case tried by a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters;
…
…’
5        Article 4 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Transmission of decisions and recourse to the central authority’, provides:
‘1.      A decision, together with a certificate as provided for in this Article, may be transmitted to the competent authorities of a Member State in which the natural or legal person against whom a decision has been passed has property or income, is normally resident or, in the case of a legal person, has its registered seat.
2.      The certificate, the standard form for which is given in the Annex, must be signed, and its contents certified as accurate, by the competent authority in the issuing State.
…’
6        Article 6 of Framework Decision 2005/214, entitled ‘Recognition and execution of decisions’, provides:
‘The competent authorities in the executing State shall recognise a decision which has been transmitted in accordance with Article 4 without any further formality being required and shall forthwith take all the necessary measures for its execution, unless the competent authority decides to invoke one of the grounds for non-recognition or non-execution provided for in Article 7.’
7        Article 7 of that framework decision, which is entitled ‘Grounds for non-recognition and non-execution’, provides:
‘1.      The competent authorities in the executing State may refuse to recognise and execute the decision if the certificate provided for in Article 4 is not produced, is incomplete or manifestly does not correspond to the decision.
2.      The competent authority in the executing State may also refuse to recognise and execute the decision if it is established that:
…
(g)      according to the certificate provided for in Article 4, the person concerned, in case of a written procedure, was not, in accordance with the law of the issuing State, informed personally or via a representative, competent according to national law, of his/her right to contest the case and of the time limits for such a legal remedy;
…
3.      In the cases referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2(c), (g), (i) and (j), before deciding not to recognise and to execute a decision, either totally or in part, the competent authority in the executing State shall consult the competent authority in the issuing State, by any appropriate means, and shall, where appropriate, ask it to supply any necessary information without delay.’
8        Article 9 of that framework decision, which is entitled ‘Law governing enforcement’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, and to Article 10, the enforcement of the decision shall be governed by the law of the executing State in the same way as a financial penalty of the executing State. The authorities of the executing State alone shall be competent to decide on the procedures for enforcement and to determine all the measures relating thereto, including the grounds for termination of enforcement.’
9        Under Article 12 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Termination of enforcement’:
‘1.      The competent authority of the issuing State shall forthwith inform the competent authority of the executing State of any decision or measure as a result of which the decision ceases to be enforceable or is withdrawn from the executing State for any other reason.
2.      The executing State shall terminate enforcement of the decision as soon as it is informed by the competent authority of the issuing State of that decision or measure.’
10      Article 20 of Framework Decision 2005/214, which is entitled ‘Implementation’, provides, in paragraph 3 thereof:
‘Each Member State may, where the certificate referred to in Article 4 gives rise to an issue that fundamental rights or fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty may have been infringed, oppose the recognition and the execution of decisions. The procedure referred to in Article 7(3) shall apply.’
The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
11      By decision of 24 November 2023, the BHM imposed on BC, a Bulgarian national, a financial penalty in the amount of EUR 350 for having infringed several provisions of the Bundesstraβen Mautgesetz 2002 (Law on federal road tolls), of 16 July 2002 (BGBl. I, 155/2021).
12      The BHM brought a request for recognition and enforcement of the decision of 24 November 2023 before the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court, Bulgaria), which is the referring court, as the authority competent for the enforcement within the meaning of Framework Decision 2005/214.
13      It is apparent from the certificate, adopted in accordance with Article 4 of Framework Decision 2005/214 and transmitted with the decision of 24 November 2023, that the case was dealt with by means of a written procedure and that, in accordance with Austrian law, BC was informed, on 28 December 2023, personally or via a competent representative, of his right to contest the case and of the time limit for doing so. That certificate states that BC did not contest the case within the time limit set and that the decision of 24 November 2023 became final on 12 January 2024.
14      However, that certificate includes the statement ‘without acknowledgement of receipt’, which leads the referring court to question whether service of that decision on BC was effective.
15      The referring court states, in addition, that there is nothing in the file capable of establishing that such service took place. In the context of the procedure for recognition and execution of that decision, it finds, in that regard, that BC does not reside at the address to which that decision was sent, that it has not been established that he resided at the second address provided to the local authorities and that he is not in contact with the lawyer who had been appointed for him by the court.
16      The referring court infers from this that BC was not informed, personally or via an authorised representative, either of the decision of 24 November 2023 or of his right to contest that decision. In those circumstances, the referring court finds that it could, under Article 7(2)(g) of Framework Decision 2005/214, refuse to recognise and execute that decision.
17      Moreover, that court states that that absence of information also implies a failure to observe Article 20(3) of Framework Decision 2005/214.
18      However, since that ground for refusal is optional, the referring court considers that, in practice, it is faced with a choice. It could either refuse to recognise and execute the decision of 24 November 2023, at the risk of undermining the mechanism for judicial cooperation in criminal matters and encouraging impunity, or recognise and execute that decision to the detriment of the rights that BC derives from EU law.
19      In those circumstances, that court contemplates a third approach, which consists of cooperating with the issuing authority in order to verify whether, in the light of the absence of due service of the decision of 24 November 2023, BC still has the right to contest that decision. If the answer is in the affirmative, the referring court intends, using the means available to it under Bulgarian law, itself to effect service of the decision of 24 November 2023 on BC and to inform him of the time limits for contesting that decision.
20      The referring court is uncertain, however, whether Framework Decision 2005/214 can be interpreted in that way.
21      In those circumstances, the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Can the obligation relating to recognition under Article 6 of Framework Decision 2005/214, the power to consult under Article 7(3) of that decision, and the principle of preventing impunity, be interpreted as conferring on the executing authority, where it has established that there is an optional ground for refusal under Article 7(2)(g) of that decision, the power to:
(1)      consult the issuing authority in accordance with Article 7(3) of [that framework decision] to determine whether the [person concerned] has a current possibility of raising an objection to the decision imposing a financial penalty;
(2)      if the answer is in the affirmative, serve the decision imposing a financial penalty on the [person concerned] and inform him or her of the right to object;
(3)      await the outcome of any objection and take it into account in its decision as to the merits [?]’
Consideration of the questions referred
Admissibility
22      The Commission argues that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible because of the hypothetical nature of the first question and submits that it is necessary to reformulate it in order to able to answer the second and third questions.
23      The Commission is of the view, in essence, that the referring court has already found that there is an optional ground for non-execution under Article 7(2)(g) of Framework Decision 2005/214 without first having carried out the mandatory consultation of the competent authority of the issuing State required by
Article 7(3) of that framework decision.
24      It must be borne in mind, in that regard, that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them. The justification for a reference for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute (see judgments of 1 December 1965, Schwarze, 16/65, EU:C:1965:117, p. 886; of 18 October 1990, Dzodzi, C‑297/88 and C‑197/89, EU:C:1990:360, paragraph 33; and of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 44).
25      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the referring court wishes, by its first question, to have clarification as to the purpose and scope of the obligation to consult the competent authority of the issuing Member State laid down in Article 7(3) of Framework Decision 2005/214 so as to be able to decide, once that consultation has taken place, on the possible application of the ground for non-recognition and non-execution set out in Article 7(2)(g) of that framework decision.
26      It follows that the referring court has not yet ruled on the application of that optional ground for refusal and that it intends, before taking a position, to carry out the mandatory consultation of the competent authority of the issuing State. It follows that the first question is not hypothetical.
27      The request for a preliminary ruling is therefore admissible.
The first question
28      By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 6 and Article 7(2)(g) and (3) of Framework Decision 2005/214 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of the obligation to consult prior to a decision not to recognise and not to execute a decision imposing a financial penalty, the competent authority of the executing State is required, in the event of doubt as to whether the information was given effectively to the person concerned regarding his or her right to contest the decision imposing that penalty and on the time limit for doing so, to verify with the competent authority of the issuing State whether it is still possible to contest that decision.
29      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, as is apparent in particular from Articles 1 and 6 and recitals 1 and 2 in the preamble, Framework Decision 2005/214 is intended to establish an effective mechanism for recognition and cross-border execution of final decisions requiring a financial penalty to be paid by a natural person or a legal person following the commission of one of the offences listed in Article 5 of the Framework Decision (judgment of 14 November 2013, Baláž, C‑60/12, EU:C:2013:733, paragraph 27).
30      The principle of mutual recognition, which underpins Framework Decision 2005/214, means that, in accordance with Article 6 of that decision, the Member States are, as a rule, obliged to recognise a decision requiring payment of a financial penalty which has been transmitted in accordance with Article 4 of the Framework Decision without any further formality being required, and to take without delay all the measures necessary for its enforcement, with the result that the grounds for refusal to recognise or enforce such a decision must be interpreted restrictively (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 November 2013, Baláž, C‑60/12, EU:C:2013:733, paragraph 29, and of 6 October 2021, LU (Recovery of road traffic fines), C‑136/20, EU:C:2021:804, paragraph 38).
31      Article 7(1) and (2) of Framework Decision 2005/214 lists the grounds for non-recognition and non-execution of decisions covered by that framework decision.
32      In particular, Article 7(2)(g) of that framework decision provides that the competent authority of the executing Member State may refuse to recognise and execute a decision which imposes the financial penalty if it is established that, according to the certificate provided for in Article 4 of that framework decision, the person concerned – in case of a written procedure – was not, in accordance with the law of the issuing Member State, informed personally or via a representative, competent according to national law, of his or her right to contest the decision imposing the financial penalty on him or her and the time limit for doing so.
33      By referring to the legislation of the Member States, the EU legislature left it to the Member States to decide on the manner in which the person concerned is to be informed of his or her right to contest the decision imposing the financial penalty on him or her, the time limits for such a legal remedy and of when that time limit begins, provided that the notification is effective and that the right to effective judicial protection and the exercise of the rights of the defence are guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties), C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054, paragraph 35).
34      Furthermore, it must be noted that, in accordance with Article 3 of Framework Decision 2005/214, that decision may not have the effect of amending the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU, which is why Article 20(3) of that framework decision also provides that the competent authority of the State of execution may refuse to recognise and execute a decision requiring payment of a financial penalty in the event of infringement of fundamental rights or fundamental legal principles defined by Article 6 TEU (judgment of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties), C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054, paragraph 37).
35      In that regard, the principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and which is now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (judgments of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 35, and of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties), C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054, paragraph 38).
36      The Court has held that the right to effective judicial protection requires the actual and effective receipt of any decision imposing a financial penalty by the person concerned, that is to say that he or she is notified in circumstances which enable that person to ascertain the reasons upon which it is based, the legal remedies available for the purposes of Article 1(a)(iii) of Framework Decision 2005/214, and the time limit for relying on them, so as to allow that person to defend their rights effectively and to decide, in full knowledge of the relevant facts whether there is any point in challenging that decision before the courts (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź-Bałuty, C‑338/20, EU:C:2021:805, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
37      Therefore, it is for the competent authority of the executing State, before recognising and executing a decision imposing a financial penalty, to verify that actual and effective receipt, as described in the preceding paragraph, has taken place.
38      In accordance with the principle of mutual recognition which, as set out in paragraph 30 above, underpins Framework Decision 2005/214, that verification is based on the information contained in the certificate referred to in Article 4 of Framework Decision 2005/214.
39      However, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in points 50 and 52 of his Opinion, where that certificate contains contradictory statements which are likely to raise doubts as regards the notification of the decision in respect of which recognition and execution is sought, the competent authority of the executing State must, before applying the ground for non-recognition and non-execution set out in Article 7(2)(g) of that framework decision, consult the competent authority of the issuing Member State, in accordance with Article 7(3) of that framework decision. In the context of that consultation, the authority of the executing State must seek to obtain information to enable it to remove any uncertainty as to whether the person concerned was effectively informed, in accordance with the national legislation of the issuing State, of his or her right to contest the case and the time limit for doing so.
40      In addition, as the Advocate General noted, in essence, in point 56 of his Opinion, the time limit to contest the case may, in accordance with the legislation of the issuing State, start to run only from the date on which the decision imposing the financial penalty has been effectively notified to the person concerned and on which that that person has been informed of his or her right to contest the case and the time limit for doing so. In such a situation, the failure to inform the person concerned is liable to call into question the finality of that decision.
41      However, the recognition and execution of that decision in the executing State are subject to its being final. In the context of Framework Decision 2005/214, Article 1(a) thereof defines ‘decision’ as ‘a final decision requiring a financial penalty to be paid by a natural or legal person’. The fact that that provision refers to the ‘final’ nature of the decision concerned underlines the particular importance given to the unchallengeable nature of the decision concerned (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 January 2017, van Vemde, C‑582/15, EU:C:2017:37, paragraph 27). Those factors support the interpretation of the consultation obligation set out in paragraph 39 above.
42      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 6 and Article 7(2)(g) and (3) of Framework Decision 2005/214 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of the obligation to consult prior to a decision not to recognise and not to execute a decision imposing a financial penalty, the competent authority of the executing State is required, in the event of doubt as to whether the information was effectively given to the person concerned regarding his or her right to contest the decision imposing on him or her that penalty and on the time limit for doing so, to verify with the competent authority of the issuing State whether it is still possible to contest that decision.
The second and third questions
43      By its second and third questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 6 and Article 7(2)(g) and (3) of Framework Decision 2005/214 must be interpreted as meaning that, where it is apparent from the consultation of the competent authority of the issuing State that the person concerned was not informed of his or her right to contest the decision imposing on him or her a financial penalty or of the time limit for doing so and that it is still possible to contest the decision, the competent authority of the executing State may, first, transmit that information to the person concerned and, second, suspend the procedure for recognition and execution brought before it, pending the outcome of any challenge or the expiry of the time limit prescribed for doing so.
44      In the first place, as regards the transmission of information to the person concerned, it must be stated that no provision of Framework Decision 2005/214 makes clear which authority would be competent to carry out that transmission. By contrast, it is apparent, first, from Article 7(2)(g) of that framework decision that the person concerned must be informed of his or her right to contest the case and of the time limit of such a legal remedy in accordance with the law of the issuing State.
45      It should be noted, second, that Article 6 of Framework Decision 2005/214 requires the competent authorities of the executing Member State to recognise a decision which has been transmitted in accordance with Article 4 of that framework decision and to take all the necessary measures for its execution. In that regard, Article 9(1) of that framework decision provides that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is to be governed by the law of the executing State in the same way as a financial penalty of that State and that the authorities of that State alone are to be competent to decide on the procedures for enforcement and to determine all the measures relating thereto, including the grounds for termination of enforcement.
46      It follows from those provisions that it is necessary, as the Advocate General stated in point 69 of his Opinion, to distinguish the stage of the procedure for imposition of the financial penalty from the stage of the procedure for execution of that penalty. While the authorities of the issuing State are competent for the first of those stages, the authorities of the executing State are competent for the second stage.
47      Since notification of the decision imposing the financial penalty to the person concerned and informing that person of his or her right to contest the decision and the time limit for doing so are part of the stage of the procedure for imposition of the financial penalty, they are the responsibility of the competent authority of the issuing State. It follows that the authority of the executing State does not have any competence under Framework Decision 2005/214 to inform the person concerned of the right to contest the case and the time limit for doing so.
48      In the second place, as regards the possibility of suspending the procedure for recognition and execution of the decision imposing a financial penalty, Framework Decision 2005/214 does not confer on the competent authority of the executing State such a possibility.
49      By contrast, as follows from the answer given to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling, where the consultation carried out under Article 7(3) of that framework decision demonstrates that the person concerned may still contest the decision which imposes on him or her a financial penalty, the procedure for recognition and enforcement cannot continue in the absence of a final decision within the meaning for Article 1(a) of that framework decision.
50      In such a case, a new procedure for recognition and execution can be started only where the decision imposing the financial penalty has become final. It will therefore be for the competent authority of the issuing State, if it intends to obtain the execution of that decision in a Member State, to transmit a new certificate under Article 4 of Framework Decision 2005/214, once the person concerned
has contested the case and that that case has been decided or that the time limit for doing so has expired, as the case may be.
51      That interpretation is confirmed by Article 12(1) of that framework decision which requires the competent authority of the issuing State to inform forthwith the competent authority of the executing State of any decision or measure as a result of which the decision ceases to be enforceable or is withdrawn from the executing State for any other reason. Under paragraph 2 of that article, drafted in the present indicative, the executing State has no choice other than to terminate enforcement of the decision as soon as it is informed by the competent authority of the issuing State of such a decision or measure.
52      It follows that the competent authority of the executing State cannot suspend the procedure for recognition and execution of the decision imposing a financial penalty, pending the outcome of any challenge that the person concerned may bring against that decision or pending the expiry of the time limit for bringing such a challenge.
53      In the light of the reasons set out above, the answer to the second and third questions is that Article 6 and Article 7(2)(g) and (3) of Framework Decision 2005/214 must be interpreted as meaning that where it is apparent from the consultation of the competent authority of the issuing State that the person concerned was not informed of his or her right to contest the decision imposing on him or her a financial penalty or of the time limit for doing so and it is still possible to contest that decision, the competent authority of the executing State cannot itself transmit that information to the person concerned or suspend the procedure for recognition and execution brought before it, pending the outcome of any challenge or the expiry of the time limit prescribed for doing so. That authority is, however, required to terminate that procedure.
Costs
54      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules:
1.      Article 6 and Article 7(2)(g) and (3) of Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009,
must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of the obligation to consult prior to a decision not to recognise and not to execute a decision imposing a financial penalty, the competent authority of the executing State is required, in the event of doubt as to whether the information was effectively given to the person concerned regarding his or her right to contest the decision imposing on him or her that penalty and on the time limit for doing so, to verify with the competent authority of the issuing State whether it is still possible to contest that decision.
2.      Article 6 and Article 7(2)(g) and (3) of Framework Decision 2005/214, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299,
must be interpreted as meaning that where it is apparent from the consultation of the competent authority of the issuing State that the person concerned was not informed of his or her right to contest the decision imposing on him or her a financial penalty or of the time limit for doing so and it is still possible to contest that decision, the competent authority of the executing State cannot itself transmit that information to the person concerned or suspend the procedure for recognition and execution brought before it, pending the outcome of any challenge or the expiry of the time limit prescribed for doing so. That authority is, however, required to terminate that procedure.
[Signatures]
*      Language of the case: Bulgarian.
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.