62023CJ0600_RES
Case C‑600/23
Royal Football Club Seraing
v
Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA) and Others
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (Belgium))
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 August 2025
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 19(1) TEU – Obligation of Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to an effective remedy – Possibility of recourse to arbitration – Arbitration between individuals – Imposed arbitration – Decision of a body of an international sports federation imposing a sanction – Award by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) upheld by a decision of a court of a third State – Legal remedy against the arbitral award – National legislation conferring on that arbitral award the authority of res judicata between the parties and probative value vis-à-vis third parties – Powers and obligations of the national courts before which that arbitral award is relied on – Effective review of the consistency of such an arbitral award with the principles and provisions falling under EU public policy)
Member States – Obligations – Provision of remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection – Right to an effective remedy – Judicial review of arbitral awards that concern questions relating to EU law – Need for a review to be carried out by a court or tribunal meeting the requirements arising from Article 267 TFEU and to be such as to ensure observance of the principles and provisions forming part of EU public policy
(Art. 19(1), second subpara., TEU; Arts 45, 56, 63, 101, 102 and 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47)
(see paragraphs 69-89)
Member States – Obligations – Provision of remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection – Right to an effective remedy – Award made by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in the context of a dispute relating to the pursuit of a sport as an economic activity – Judicial review of such an arbitral award – Scope – National legislation conferring on that arbitral award, within the territory of a Member State, the authority of res judicata between the parties to the dispute and the probative value that attaches to such authority vis-à-vis third parties – No prior review, by a court or tribunal of that Member State that is authorised to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, of that award for consistency with the principles and provisions forming part of EU public policy – Not permissible
(Art. 19(1), second subpara., TEU; Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47)
(see paragraphs 90-96, 98-125, operative part)
Résumé
Ruling on a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Belgian Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Court of Justice, sitting as the Grand Chamber, delivers a judgment concerning the judicial review to which awards made on the basis of arbitration mechanisms established by international sports associations must be amenable, in the light of EU law, before the courts or tribunals of the Member States. More specifically, the Court of Justice clarifies the relationship between, on the one hand, the system for dispute resolution before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), as established by the Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA), and, on the other, the principle of effective judicial protection, in the context of national legislation conferring on an arbitral award, upheld by a decision of a court of a third State, the authority of res judicata between the parties to the dispute as well as probative value vis-à-vis third parties. RFC Seraing (‘the club’) is a football club that is established in Belgium and is affiliated to the Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL (URBSFA). That club concluded two contracts with Doyen Sports Investment Ltd (‘Doyen’), a company established in Malta, whose economic activity consists in the provision of financial assistance to football clubs in Europe. Under those contracts, Doyen became the owner of a part of the club’s economic rights (
1
) over four specific players.
Disciplinary and arbitration proceedings in Switzerland
On 4 September 2015, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee adopted a decision in which it found, inter alia, that, by entering into the contracts concerned, the club had infringed the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (‘the RSTP’) (
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) and imposed disciplinary sanctions on that club. Since the internal appeal lodged by the club was dismissed, the club brought, on 9 March 2016, an appeal against that rejection decision before the CAS, claiming that the provisions on which that decision was based and the disciplinary sanctions imposed were unlawful. In that regard, the club maintained, inter alia, that the RSTP, in so far as they lay down a total prohibition of the practices known as ‘third-party influence’ and ‘third-party ownership’, attended by disciplinary sanctions, infringe EU law and, more specifically, the freedom of movement for workers, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital, guaranteed by Articles 45, 56 and 63 TFEU, respectively, as well as the competition rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
On 9 March 2017, the CAS made an arbitral award (‘the CAS award’) in which, inter alia, it confirmed that those provisions of EU law were applicable to the dispute and found that they had not been infringed.
On 15 May 2017, the club brought an action against the CAS award before the Tribunal fédéral (Federal Supreme Court, Switzerland), which was dismissed by judgment of 20 February 2018.
The judicial proceedings conducted in Belgium
On 3 April 2015, Doyen and the association governed by Belgian law that runs the club brought proceedings against FIFA, the Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) and the URBSFA before the tribunal de commerce francophone de Bruxelles (Brussels Commercial Court (French-speaking), Belgium). On 8 July 2015, the club intervened voluntarily in the proceedings, requesting, inter alia, that that court find that the total prohibition on the abovementioned practices was incompatible with Articles 45, 56, 63, 101 and 102 TFEU. On 17 November 2016, the tribunal de commerce francophone de Bruxelles (Brussels Commercial Court (French-speaking)) delivered a judgment in which it found that it had no jurisdiction to examine the various requests made by the club.
The club’s appeal against that judgment before the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels, Belgium) was dismissed on 12 December 2019. That court held, first, that the club’s grounds of appeal alleging that the RSTP infringe EU law had already been raised by that club before the CAS in the context of the dispute between the club and FIFA and had been rejected in the CAS award. According to the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels), the CAS award must be regarded, pursuant to the applicable Belgian legislation, (
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) as having the same effects as a decision of a court in the relations between the parties, as having, accordingly, the authority of res judicata as from the day it was made, and as having the force of res judicata as from the day on which the Tribunal fédéral (Federal Supreme Court) dismissed the action brought against that award. Second, the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels) observed, in essence, that, from the time a judicial decision or an arbitral award acquires the authority of res judicata in the relations between the parties to the dispute, it must be regarded as having, vis-à-vis third parties to that dispute, against whom it may be relied on, the probative value which attaches to such authority. In the present case, according to that court, the CAS award has probative value vis-à-vis the URBSFA, which was not a party to the dispute between the club and FIFA before the CAS.
The club brought an appeal on a point of law before the referring court against the judgment of the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels), raising, in particular, a ground of appeal alleging infringement of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
In those circumstances, the referring court asks the Court of Justice whether those provisions of EU law preclude, within the territory of a Member State, first, the authority of res judicata from being conferred on a CAS award, in the relations between the parties to the dispute, where the conformity of that award with EU law has not first been reviewed by a national court or tribunal that is authorised to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, and second, such an award from being regarded as having probative value, as a consequence of that authority of res judicata, in the relations between the parties to that dispute and third parties.
Findings of the Court
Effective judicial protection for individuals within the European Union, including in the event of recourse to arbitration
As a preliminary point, the Court recalls, first, that the obligation laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU means that all bodies within the judicial system of the Member States which may be called upon, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, to interpret or apply that law must meet the requirements essential to effective judicial protection. Second, the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires, in particular, that those courts or tribunals be able to carry out an effective judicial review of the acts, measures or behaviour alleged, in the context of a given dispute, to have infringed the rights or freedoms which EU law confers on individuals. However, neither of those two provisions implies that individuals must have a direct legal remedy the primary object of which is to call into question a given measure, provided that one or more legal remedies also exist, in the national judicial system concerned, enabling those individuals to obtain, indirectly, effective judicial review of that measure, thereby ensuring respect for the rights and freedoms guaranteed to those individuals by EU law.
Furthermore, the legal order established by the Treaties does not preclude, in principle, individuals who are subject to that legal order by virtue of pursuing an economic activity within the territory of the European Union from submitting disputes that may arise between them in the context of that pursuit to an arbitration mechanism. Thus, individuals may conclude an agreement that subjects, in clear and precise terms, all or part of any disputes relating to that agreement to an arbitration body in place of the court or tribunal that would have had jurisdiction to rule on those disputes under the provisions applicable in the absence of such an agreement. However, once the arbitration mechanism established or designated by such an agreement is to be implemented in the territory of the European Union, in the context of disputes relating to the pursuit of an economic activity within that territory, that mechanism must be designed and implemented in such a way as to ensure, first, its compatibility with the principles underlying the judicial architecture of the European Union and, second, effective compliance with EU public policy. To that end, awards made by the arbitration body must be amenable to judicial review such as to guarantee effective judicial protection, (
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) although that review may legitimately be limited in nature.
In that context, it cannot be accepted that, by having recourse to arbitration, individuals may discard the principles and provisions of primary or secondary EU law which are essential to the legal order established by the Treaties or are of fundamental importance for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the European Union. On the contrary, observance of those principles and provisions, which form part of EU public policy, is binding on individuals provided that the respective conditions governing their application are satisfied in a given case. To that extent, consistency with that public policy constitutes an essential complement to the structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations binding the European Union and the Member States and binding the Member States to each other. The freedoms guaranteed by Articles 45, 56 and 63 TFEU form part of EU public policy. Those three articles, which have direct effect, constitute the foundations of the internal market comprising an area without internal frontiers referred to in Article 26 TFEU.
Judicial review of awards made by the CAS in the context of disputes relating to the pursuit of a sport as an economic activity within the territory of the European Union
First of all, the Court states that the arbitration mechanisms to which international sports associations such as FIFA subject the settlement of disputes which may arise between, on the one hand, themselves or their member national associations, and, on the other, individuals subject to their respective jurisdiction, be they undertakings or athletes, are characterised, owing to the statutes and prerogatives of those sports associations, by a number of factors specific to them.
For that reason, where those disputes relate to the pursuit of a sport as an economic activity within the territory of the European Union, the possibility for the individuals concerned to obtain effective judicial review as to whether the awards made in those disputes are consistent with the principles and provisions forming part of EU public policy is particularly important. In the light of the statutes and prerogatives of sports associations such as FIFA, recourse to such arbitration mechanisms must be regarded as being unilaterally imposed by such associations on those individuals. Even though, from a formal point of view, the application of a mechanism of that kind to an individual may require the conclusion of an agreement with that individual, the conclusion of that agreement and the insertion in it of a clause providing for recourse to arbitration are, in reality, imposed beforehand by rules that are adopted by the association concerned and are applicable to its members and to persons affiliated to those members, or to other categories of persons. The mandatory nature of arbitration mechanisms of that type is closely linked to the fact that they are intended to apply to disputes between, on the one hand, a sports association with sui generis and particularly extensive regulatory and oversight powers as well as the power to impose sanctions, and, on the other hand, a general and indeterminate group of legal or natural persons who are subject to the exercise of those powers in the pursuit of their professional activity.
It is true that that imposed recourse to arbitration may be warranted in principle, in the light of the legal autonomy enjoyed by international sports associations and having regard to their responsibilities, by the pursuit of legitimate objectives such as ensuring the uniform handling of disputes relating to the sporting discipline that is within the purview of their jurisdiction or enabling the consistent interpretation and application of the rules applicable to that discipline. Nevertheless, that legal autonomy cannot justify the exercise of the powers held by such associations having the effect of limiting the possibility for individuals to rely on the rights and freedoms conferred on them by EU law which form part of EU public policy. That requirement itself implies that respect for those rights and freedoms may be subject to effective judicial review, a fortiori when recourse to arbitration is imposed on the individuals concerned.
Next, as regards the requirements that judicial review of awards made by an arbitration body must meet, (
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) the Court states, in the first place, that, whenever an award has been made in the context of a dispute relating to the pursuit of a sport as an economic activity within the territory of the European Union and no provision has been made for a direct legal remedy against that award before a court or tribunal of a Member State, a possibility must exist for the individuals concerned to obtain, indirectly, at their request or of the court’s or tribunal’s own motion, from any court or tribunal of a Member State that is liable to examine such an award in any manner whatsoever, effective judicial review as to whether that award is consistent with the principles and provisions forming part of EU public policy.
In the second place, the courts or tribunals of the Member States that are called upon to carry out such a review must, where such an award involves, as in the present case, an interpretation or application of the principles or provisions forming part of EU public policy and conferring rights or freedoms on individuals, be able to review the interpretation of those principles or provisions, the legal consequences attached to that interpretation as regards their application to the case at hand, and the legal classification which was given, in the light of that interpretation, to the facts as established and assessed by the arbitration body.
In the third place, those courts or tribunals cannot confine themselves to finding, as the case may be, that such an award is inconsistent, in full or in part, with the principles or provisions forming part of EU public policy. On the contrary, they must also be able to draw, within the framework of their respective powers and in accordance with the applicable national provisions, all the appropriate legal conclusions where such an inconsistency is found to exist. Failing that, the judicial review carried out would not be effective, inasmuch as it could allow that inconsistency to persist.
In the last place, any national court or tribunal before which a dispute governed by EU law has been brought must have the power to grant interim measures which ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the substance of the case, including where that court or tribunal makes a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice and stays the proceedings pending the reply of the Court of Justice. Furthermore, such a court or tribunal must disapply the rules of national law which preclude that power. Consequently, first, the individuals concerned must have the possibility of applying to any national court or tribunal properly seised of the question whether an arbitral award is consistent with the principles and provisions forming part of EU public policy for interim relief pending the decision on the substance of the case. Second, any national court or tribunal with jurisdiction to rule on such a question must disapply any rule of a Member State or, a fortiori, of a sports association, that prohibits the individuals concerned from requesting that court or tribunal to grant such interim relief or that otherwise precludes it from granting them such relief. Consequently, lastly, where the national provisions applicable to a given dispute may hinder the full effectiveness of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, the national court or tribunal having jurisdiction must, if it is unable to interpret those national provisions in conformity with EU law, disapply them of its own motion. That obligation applies, in particular, where the applicable national provisions prevent the national court or tribunal having jurisdiction from carrying out, indirectly, an effective review as to whether an arbitral award made by the CAS, in the context of a dispute relating to the pursuit of a sport as an economic activity within the territory of the European Union, is consistent with the principles and provisions forming part of EU public policy. Therefore, that obligation applies, in particular, where there are national provisions and rules conferring on such an arbitral award, first, the authority of res judicata in the relations between the parties, and second, probative value in the relations between the parties and third parties, without that arbitral award having first been subject to a review enabling a court or tribunal of the Member State concerned, authorised to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, effectively to ascertain whether the award is consistent with the principles and provisions forming part of EU public policy. In that regard, it is the very conferral of such an authority and, consequently, such a value on that arbitral award that, in such a context, is in breach of the requirement of effective judicial protection referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and in Article 47 of the Charter.
(
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)	Those economic rights are intended to reflect the financial value of players. They are linked to the federative rights that a club acquires by signing on a given player, such as the right to register that player or the right to field him or her. Exercising those rights enables the club holding them to receive the sums due, for example, when that player is loaned out or transferred, when his or her image rights are exploited or transferred, or when there has been a breach of his or her contract.
(
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)	Those regulations, which were adopted by FIFA on 22 March 2014 and entered into force on 1 August 2014, lay down, in Article 18bis, entitled ‘Third-party influence on clubs’, and Article 18ter, entitled ‘Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights’, a prohibition on the practices of third-party influence and third-party ownership.
(
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)	Articles 24 and 28 and Article 1713(9) of the code judiciaire (Belgian Judicial Code), as amended by the loi portant dispositions diverses en matière de justice (Law on various provisions relating to justice) of 21 December 2018 (Moniteur belge of 31 December 2018, p. 106560).
(
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)	To which the individuals concerned are entitled, under Article 47 of the Charter, and which the Member States are required to ensure in the fields covered by EU law, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
(
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)	In order to enable the national courts or tribunals having jurisdiction to guarantee individuals the effective judicial protection to which those individuals are entitled under Article 47 of the Charter, and which the Member States are required to ensure in the fields covered by EU law, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.