JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
26 November 2025 (*)
( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark CEFA EFFAS Certified European Financial Analyst – Earlier EU word mark CFA – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Absence of peaceful coexistence )
In Case T‑632/24,
European Federation of Financial Analysts’ Societies (EFFAS), established in Frankfurt am Main (Germany), represented by E. Manresa Medina, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
CFA Institute, established in Charlottesville, Virginia (United States), represented by W. May and S. Reuvers, lawyers,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of A. Marcoulli, President, L. Spangsberg Grønfeldt and D. Jočienė (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, European Federation of Financial Analysts’ Societies (EFFAS), seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 3 October 2024 (Joined Case R 409/2024‑1 and R 436/2024‑1) (‘the contested decision’).
I.      Background to the dispute
2        On 1 March 2022, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:
3        The mark applied for covered goods and services in Classes 9, 16 and 41 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 9: ‘Electronic publications, downloadable; Publishing software; Downloadable educational course materials; Downloadable electronic books; Educational computer applications’;
–        Class 16: ‘Printed matter; Periodicals; Printed educational materials for teaching and examination purposes; examination paper; textbooks; printed certificates; stationery; Writing instruments; writing materials’;
–        Class 41: ‘Teaching, educational and training services in finance and investments; arranging and conducting conferences, courses, workshops and seminars for educational and training purposes; Production of educational sound and/or video recordings; hire of teaching materials; development of examinations; Providing computer-delivered educational testing and assessments; Provision of educational examinations and tests; Preparation of educational courses and examinations; educational testing for people; information, advisory and consultation services relating to the aforementioned, including services provided on-line or by means of the internet or extranets; Awarding of educational certificates; Organization of exhibitions for educational, instruction and training purposes; edition of books for educational, instruction and training purposes; publication of books and texts for educational, instruction and training purposes other than publicity books and texts; electronic on- line publication of books, magazines and periodicals for educational, instruction and training purposes’.
4        On 12 July 2022, the intervener, CFA Institute, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5        The opposition was based on, inter alia, the earlier EU word mark CFA No 1 448 596, covering, in particular, goods and services in Classes 16, 41 and 42.
6        The grounds relied on in support of the opposition were those set out in Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
7        On 22 December 2023, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in part, on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
8        On 19 and 21 February 2024, the intervener and the applicant each filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld in part the appeals brought by the intervener and the applicant.
10      In essence, the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public, at least in Germany, in respect of all the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above, with the exception of ‘stationery; Writing instruments; writing materials’ in Class 16.
11      The Board of Appeal found that, in the light of the identity or similarity of the goods and services at issue, the average degree of visual similarity, the high degree of phonetic similarity and the absence of conceptual similarity between the marks at issue and the enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark, a likelihood of confusion could not be ruled out in the present case, despite the high level of attention of the relevant public. In its overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal also found that the applicant had failed to prove the peaceful nature of the coexistence of the signs at issue.
II.    Forms of order sought
12      The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision;
–        order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.
13      EUIPO contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
14      The intervener contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
III. Law
A.      Subject matter of the action
15      Although the applicant’s first head of claim is worded as an application for annulment of the contested decision in its entirety, it is apparent from the application that the applicant is in fact seeking the annulment of that decision only in so far as it concerns the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above, with the exception of ‘stationery; Writing instruments; writing materials’ in Class 16.
B.      Substance
16      In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. That plea is divided into two complaints. By the first complaint, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in rejecting its argument alleging peaceful coexistence between the signs at issue and the evidence adduced in support of that argument. By its second complaint, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s findings relating to the similarity of the signs at issue.
1.      Admissibility of the evidence adduced for the first time before the Court
17      The applicant produces, in Annexes A.9 and A.10 to the application, two tables containing various data intended to show that the services offered under the contested mark are aimed at a highly specialised public. In paragraph 36 of the application, the applicant includes two hyperlinks to websites.
18      EUIPO and the intervener contest the admissibility of Annexes A.9 and A.10 to the application on the grounds that they were submitted for the first time before the Court. EUIPO also contests, on the same grounds, the admissibility of the hyperlinks in paragraph 36 of the application.
19      The purpose of actions before the Court under Article 72(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 is to obtain a review of the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal. In the context of that regulation, Article 95 thereof requires that that review must be carried out in the light of the factual and legal context of the dispute as it was brought before the Board of Appeal (see judgment of 1 February 2005, SPAG v OHIM – Dann and Backer (HOOLIGAN), T‑57/03, EU:T:2005:29, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
20      Therefore, it is not the Court’s function to review the facts in the light of documents adduced for the first time before it. To allow the examination of such evidence would be contrary to Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, according to which the parties’ pleadings may not change the subject matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. Accordingly, the evidence submitted for the first time before the Court must be declared inadmissible and there is no need to examine it (see judgment of 14 May 2009, Fiorucci v OHIM – Edwin (ELIO FIORUCCI), T‑165/06, EU:T:2009:157, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
21      In the present case, it is apparent from an examination of the case file that the applicant did in fact produce Annexes A.9 and A.10 to the application for the first time before the Court. Those annexes must therefore be rejected as inadmissible. The same is true of the two hyperlinks in paragraph 36 of the application.
2.      The complaint alleging an error in the assessment of the peaceful coexistence of the signs at issue
22      The applicant claims that, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal infringed Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 by finding that there was no peaceful coexistence between the mark applied for and the earlier mark. In that regard, first, the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having found that the arguments relating to the existence of peaceful coexistence were out of time and for having therefore rejected the annexes to the statement of grounds of appeal of 22 April 2024. The applicant submits that coexistence must be demonstrated ‘during the proceedings before EUIPO’. Secondly, the applicant submits that both the evidence produced in the response to the opposition of 5 April 2023 and that filed with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal of 22 April 2024 make it possible to establish the existence of peaceful coexistence.
23      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
24      In accordance with the case-law, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the coexistence of two marks on a market might, together with other elements, contribute to diminishing the likelihood of confusion between those marks on the part of the relevant public. The absence of a likelihood of confusion may, in particular, be inferred from the peaceful nature of the coexistence of the marks at issue on the market concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2009, Aceites del Sur-Coosur v Koipe, C‑498/07 P, EU:C:2009:503, paragraph 82).
25      However, the possibility that the coexistence of the marks on the market could reduce the likelihood of confusion found to exist can arise only if, at the very least, during the proceedings before EUIPO, the party which is relying on that coexistence duly demonstrated, even if only by means of a body of consistent evidence, that it was based, first, on the lack of any likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public and, secondly, on actual use that was sufficiently longstanding for it to be able to influence the perception of the relevant consumer (see judgment of 20 March 2024, EFFAS v EUIPO – CFA Institute (CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst), T‑213/23, not published, EU:T:2024:189, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
26      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, first, found that the applicant had relied for the first time before it on the peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue and that no evidence to establish such coexistence had been submitted before the Opposition Division. Secondly, the Board of Appeal found, irrespective of the issue of the admissibility of the claim of peaceful coexistence due to its belated character, that the evidence produced for the first time before it in order to establish that coexistence was clearly belated. It found in that regard that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that that evidence was supplementary, within the meaning of Article 27(4) of Council Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1), to the evidence already submitted. Thirdly, the Board of Appeal found that the two items of evidence produced with the response to the opposition, namely a decision of EUIPO and a decision of the Oficina Española de Patentes y Marcas (Spanish Patent and Trade Mark Office; ‘the OEPM’), did not make it possible to establish the peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue. Fourthly, in essence, the Board of Appeal thus found that, irrespective of whether the evidence submitted was out of time, the claim of that coexistence, even if it were accepted as admissible, had to be rejected as unfounded.
27      It should be borne in mind that Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that EUIPO may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned.
28      By contrast, it is apparent from the wording of Article 95 of Regulation 2017/1001 that a party has no unconditional right to have facts and evidence which were invoked or submitted out of time taken into account by EUIPO. In stating that EUIPO ‘may’ decide to disregard such evidence, that provision grants EUIPO a broad discretion to decide, while giving reasons for its decision in that regard, whether or not to take it into account (see judgment of 13 September 2023, Prolactal v EUIPO – Prolàctea (PROLACTAL), T‑549/22, not published, EU:T:2023:538, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
29      However, the exercise of EUIPO’s discretionary power provided for in Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 is circumscribed by Article 27(4) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, which states as follows:
‘In accordance with Article 95(2) of Regulation … 2017/1001, the Board of Appeal may accept facts or evidence submitted for the first time before it only where those facts or evidence meet the following requirements:
(a)      they are, on the face of it, likely to be relevant for the outcome of the case; …
(b)      they have not been produced in due time for valid reasons, in particular where they are merely supplementing relevant facts and evidence which had already been submitted in due time, or are filed to contest findings made or examined by the first instance of its own motion in the decision subject to appeal.’
30      As regards the assessment of the supplementary nature of evidence submitted out of time, provided for in Article 27(4)(b) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, supplementary evidence is that characterised by a link with other evidence which has previously been submitted in due time and which supplements that evidence (see judgment of 13 September 2023, PROLACTAL, T‑549/22, not published, EU:T:2023:538, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
31      In the present case, it is apparent from the documents in the case file that the applicant did not rely, before the Opposition Division, on the peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue, or produce evidence intended to establish such coexistence. It was in the context of its statement lodged before the Board of Appeal on 5 April 2023 that the applicant relied, for the first time, on the peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue and submitted evidence in that regard.
32      First, as the Board of Appeal explained in the contested decision, the mere reference to the term ‘peaceful coexistence’ at pages 5 and 18 of the response to the opposition cannot be interpreted as meaning that the applicant intended to claim the existence of peaceful coexistence within the meaning of the case-law set out in paragraphs 24 and 25 above. The applicant therefore did not put forward any arguments, in its response to the opposition, intended to establish the existence of peaceful coexistence.
33      Thus, the Board of Appeal correctly and for good reason held that it was not required to take into consideration the applicant’s argument relating to the peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue as a relevant factor in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion.
34      Secondly, the Board of Appeal correctly noted that the two decisions of EUIPO and of the OEPM produced before the Opposition Division could not be regarded as evidence produced in its response to the opposition for the purpose of establishing the peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue. It is apparent from pages 21 and 22 of the response to the opposition that those documents were produced only in order to claim that marks containing the acronym ‘CEFA’ had already been registered in favour of the applicant, despite the opposition filed by the intervener. Those decisions therefore seek precisely to establish the absence of peaceful coexistence between the marks at issue in so far as the intervener had already, in the past, opposed the registration of those marks.
35      It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the evidence submitted for the first time before it did not constitute supplementary evidence. Since no evidence relating to the alleged peaceful coexistence between the marks at issue had been submitted during the proceedings before the Opposition Division, the evidence produced for the first time before the Board of Appeal was validly considered by the Board of Appeal to be out of time. Therefore, the Board of Appeal was entitled to reject the evidence submitted for the first time before it.
36      Thirdly, contrary to what the applicant claims, it cannot be inferred from paragraph 63 of the judgment of 20 March 2024, CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst (T‑213/23, not published, EU:T:2024:189), that the evidence of peaceful coexistence may be submitted for the first time before the Board of Appeal. That judgment merely states that peaceful coexistence can be taken into account in the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion only if the party relying on it has demonstrated it during the proceedings before EUIPO. Such a reference cannot be interpreted as calling into question the rules of evidence before EUIPO, as set out in paragraphs 27 to 30 above.
37      Furthermore, and in any event, as regards the two decisions of EUIPO and of the OEPM produced before the Opposition Division and classified by the applicant as evidence of peaceful coexistence, it must be noted that the Board of Appeal nevertheless examined whether they made it possible to establish such peaceful coexistence. The Board of Appeal correctly found that those decisions referred to marks different from the contested mark and did not make it possible to establish the peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue.
38      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the applicant had not succeeded in establishing that the conditions for taking into account peaceful coexistence, set out in paragraph 25 above, were satisfied in the present case and that the applicant had not established the peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue.
39      The first complaint must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
3.      The complaint alleging an error of assessment as regards the likelihood of confusion
40      The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal’s findings regarding the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue are incorrect.
41      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
42      The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).
43      For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
44      The present complaint must be examined in the light of those principles.
(a)    The relevant territory, the relevant public and its level of attention
45      First, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant public in the present case consisted of the general public, interested in education and training in financial analysis, and of the professional public with specific knowledge and expertise in the field of finance and that its level of attention was high in respect of the goods and services at issue.
46      Secondly, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant territory was that of the European Union. However, since the mark applied for contained terms in English, the Board of Appeal chose to focus its examination on the English-speaking part of the relevant public, which would understand the English term ‘Certified European Financial Analyst’, in particular on the English-speaking part of professionals in the financial analysis sector in Germany.
47      There is nothing in the case file that makes it possible to call into question those assessments of the Board of Appeal, assessments which are not, moreover, disputed by the applicant.
(b)    The comparison of the goods and services at issue
48      The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the goods and services covered by the marks at issue were in part identical and in part similar, with the exception of ‘stationery; Writing instruments; writing materials’ in Class 16 covered by the mark applied for.
49      There is no need to call into question those assessments, which, moreover, are not disputed by the applicant.
(c)    The comparison of the signs at issue
50      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
51      In the present case, the signs to be compared are, on the one hand, the earlier word mark CFA and, on the other hand, the figurative mark applied for, as reproduced in paragraph 2 above. The latter is composed of a blue figurative element followed by the word element ‘cefa’ written in blue and the much smaller element ‘effas certified european financial analyst’, also in blue and separated by a vertical line.
52      Before addressing the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, it is necessary to examine the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the mark applied for.
(1)    The dominant and distinctive elements of the mark applied for
53      Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).
54      For the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (judgments of 13 June 2006, Inex v OHIM – Wiseman (Representation of a cowhide), T‑153/03, EU:T:2006:157, paragraph 35, and of 13 December 2007, Cabrera Sánchez v OHIM – Industrias Cárnicas Valle (el charcutero artesano), T‑242/06, not published, EU:T:2007:391, paragraph 51).
55      As regards the assessment of whether one or more given components of a composite trade mark is dominant, account must be taken, in particular, of the intrinsic qualities of each of those components by comparing them with those of other components. In addition and accessorily, account may be taken of the relative position of the various components within the arrangement of the composite mark (judgment of 23 October 2002, Matratzen Concord v OHIM – Hukla Germany (MATRATZEN), T‑6/01, EU:T:2002:261, paragraph 35).
56      Similarly, where a trade mark is composed of word and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, since the average consumer will more easily refer to the product at issue by citing the name of that mark than by describing its figurative element (see judgment of 28 September 2022, Copal Tree Brands v EUIPO – Sumol + Compal Marcas (COPAL TREE), T‑572/21, not published, EU:T:2022:594, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
57      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the element ‘cefa’ was the dominant and most distinctive element of the mark applied for. Furthermore, it explained that the sole element of the earlier mark, namely the word element ‘cfa’, composed of the sequence of upper-case letters ‘C’, ‘F’ and ‘A’, had inherent distinctive character in so far as it was meaningless.
58      Without clearly calling into question the Board of Appeal’s assessments relating to the dominant and distinctive elements of the mark applied for, the applicant submits, in the part of the application relating to visual similarity, that the figurative element in blue occupies a prominent position in the mark applied for. Similarly, it submits that the figurative element, comprising the EFFAS logo, taken together with the term ‘effas’, prevents consumers, who display a high level of attention, from confusing the signs at issue.
59      As regards the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal correctly noted that the sequence of upper-case letters ‘C’, ‘E’, ‘F’ and ‘A’ that make up the word element ‘cefa’ will be perceived, at least for part of the public, as being the acronym of the English terms ‘Certified European Financial Analyst’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2024, CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst, T‑213/23, not published, EU:T:2024:189, paragraph 34). Furthermore, the word element ‘cefa’ is written in larger upper-case letters than the other word elements making up the mark applied for. That element is also darker blue in colour and is preceded by a figurative element that highlights it.
60      As regards the blue figurative element in the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal correctly found that it was essentially decorative. In particular, it found, without making an error of assessment, that that element, although not negligible in terms of its size and position, had the purpose and result of enhancing the importance of the word element ‘cefa’.
61      As regards the sequence ‘Certified European Financial Analyst’, the Board of Appeal stated, without being challenged by the applicant, that it was explanatory and subordinate to the initial acronym ‘CEFA’. As the Board of Appeal pointed out, that word element therefore is of very limited distinctiveness given that it indicates the provider of the goods and services in question.
62      Finally, as regards the word element ‘effas’, the Board of Appeal validly explained, first, that it was meaningless and thus normally distinctive and, secondly, that it was secondary in the overall perception of the mark applied for given its much smaller size and its lighter blue colour compared to the visually eye-catching element ‘cefa’.
63      Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the element ‘cefa’ was the dominant and most distinctive element of the mark applied for.
(2)    The visual comparison
64      The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue were visually similar to an average degree.
65      The applicant submits that the signs at issue are visually dissimilar since, first, the mark applied for contains more words and letters than the earlier mark and has a figurative element and, secondly, the slight coincidence of some of the letters present in the signs at issue does not give rise to confusion on the market concerned.
66      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
67      First, the Board of Appeal found that the element ‘cefa’ of the mark applied for would most likely be perceived as an acronym, as would the element ‘cfa’ of the earlier mark, at least for part of the relevant public. There is nothing in the case file that makes it possible to call into question those assessments, which are not, moreover, disputed by the applicant.
68      Secondly, it is common ground that the sole element ‘cfa’ of the earlier mark is included entirely in the element ‘cefa’, which is the dominant and most distinctive element of the mark applied for. As the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out, the elements ‘cfa’ and ‘cefa’ have three upper-case letters in common, namely ‘C’, ‘F’ and ‘A’, and differ solely in the presence, in the mark applied for, of the additional upper-case capital letter ‘E’, which has no equivalent in the earlier mark. In that regard, it must be stated, on the one hand, that the beginnings and endings of the acronyms in question are identical. On the other hand, the upper-case letters ‘C’, ‘F’ and ‘A’ belonging to the sequences of letters in the signs at issue are placed in the same order, the upper-case letter ‘E’ in the mark applied for merely having been inserted between the first and the last two letters of the earlier mark. Thus, the sole effect of the upper-case letter ‘E’ is to exclude the identity between the earlier mark and the element ‘cefa’ of the mark applied for. By contrast, it does not offset the high degree of visual similarity that is apparent from the identity of the beginning and end of the signs at issue (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 December 2014, DTL Corporación v OHIM – Vallejo Rosell (Generia), T‑176/13, not published, EU:T:2014:1028, paragraph 82, and of 2 February 2017, Mengozzi v EUIPO – Consorzio per la tutela dell'olio extravergine di oliva toscano (TOSCORO), T‑510/15, EU:T:2017:54, paragraph 37). Consequently, contrary to what the applicant submits, there is a high degree of visual similarity between the groups of upper-case letters ‘CFA’ and ‘CEFA’ owing to the presence and the order of the letters concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2024, CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst, T‑213/23, not published, EU:T:2024:189, paragraph 39).
69      Thirdly, the Board of Appeal did not deny the fact that there were differences between the signs at issue linked to the presence of additional elements in the mark applied for.
70      However, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Board of Appeal correctly found, in essence, that those differences would have only a limited impact on the overall visual impression created by the mark applied for and, therefore, on the visual comparison of the signs at issue.
71      The element ‘cefa’ is the dominant and most distinctive element of the mark applied for (see paragraphs 57 to 63 above) and that element is highly similar to the sole element ‘cfa’ making up the earlier mark (see paragraph 68 above).
72      Thus, the Board of Appeal correctly found that, despite the presence of additional elements in the mark applied for, the signs at issue were visually similar to an average degree.
(3)    The phonetic comparison
73      In paragraph 60 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a high degree.
74      Although the applicant admits that there is some phonetic similarity between the signs at issue, it claims that the word elements ‘cefa’ and ‘effas’ of the mark applied for will ‘always’ be pronounced syllable by syllable (that is to say, in the present case, as two syllables each), whereas the element ‘cfa’ of the earlier mark, which is a combination of letters that does not form a legible word, will be spelt out letter by letter. Furthermore, the applicant submits, in essence, that, in view of the presence of the upper-case letter ‘E’ in the mark applied for, the signs at issue have a different rhythm and pronunciation and that they are therefore significantly different phonetically. It also points out that the mark applied for contains the term ‘effas’ and the terms linked to the ‘Certified European Financial Analyst’ certificate.
75      EUIPO and the intervener dispute those arguments.
76      First, the Board of Appeal correctly relied on the General Court’s assessment in paragraph 49 of the judgment of 20 March 2024, CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst (T‑213/23, not published, EU:T:2024:189), according to which a non-negligible part of the relevant public would pronounce the word elements ‘cefa’ and ‘cfa’ by referring to their letters individually, which made them highly similar phonetically.
77      Secondly, as regards the pronunciation of the element ‘effas’, the Board of Appeal correctly found that, on account of its small size and positioning, it was unlikely that that element would be pronounced by the relevant public when it referred to the sign applied for. The same applies to the element ‘certified european financial analyst’, as the Court confirmed in paragraph 45 of the judgment of 20 March 2024, CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst (T‑213/23, not published, EU:T:2024:189).
78      The average consumer will tend to omit certain word elements of a mark comprising a number of elements in order to make it easier to pronounce, in particular, in order to economise on words, if those elements are easily separable (see, to that effect, order of 21 December 2022, Suicha v EUIPO – Michael Kors (Switzerland) International (MK MARKTOMI MARKTOMI), T‑264/22, not published, EU:T:2022:861, paragraphs 56 and 57 and the case-law cited). In the present case, although the mark applied for also contains the elements ‘effas’ and ‘certified european financial analyst’, it cannot be ruled out, in the light of the length of those elements, their separability and the fact that the element ‘cefa’ corresponds to the acronym of the terms ‘Certified European Financial Analyst’, that the average consumer will refer to the mark applied for solely by means of the element ‘cefa’, without pronouncing the other word elements of that mark.
79      In those circumstances, it must be held that the degree of phonetic similarity is, as regards part of the relevant public, high.
80      Consequently, the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal had made any error of assessment in the analysis of the phonetic similarity of the signs at issue.
(4)    The conceptual comparison
81      The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 61 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue were not conceptually similar.
82      The applicant submits that the earlier mark CFA, as an acronym for ‘Chartered Financial Analyst’, and the mark applied for CEFA EFFAS Certified European Financial Analyst convey different meanings. Furthermore, since the level of attention of the relevant public is high, it will be aware of the meaning of both marks.
83      However, in paragraphs 54 to 58 of the judgment of 20 March 2024, CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst (T‑213/23, not published, EU:T:2024:189), the Court previously held, first, that the element ‘certified european financial analyst’ conveyed a clear concept relating to a provider of certain services, namely a qualified expert in financial matters, and, secondly, that the sequence of the upper-case letters ‘C’, ‘F’ and ‘A’ had no semantic content, with the result that the word mark CFA had no meaning. The Court inferred from that that the signs at issue in that case were conceptually dissimilar, since one of the signs at issue had a meaning from the perspective of the relevant public, whereas the other did not.
84      In the present case, the applicant puts forward arguments that are, in essence, the same as those that it had already put forward in the case that gave rise to the judgment of 20 March 2024, CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst (T‑213/23, not published, EU:T:2024:189). Those arguments must be rejected for the same reasons as those put forward by the Court in that judgment and set out in paragraph 83 above.
85      Thus, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the signs at issue were conceptually dissimilar.
86      It follows from all of the foregoing that the signs at issue, considered as a whole, are visually similar to an average degree, phonetically similar to a high degree and conceptually dissimilar.
(d)    The overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion
87      According to settled case-law, the existence of a likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements, in particular the recognition of the trade mark on the market, the association which can be made with the used or registered sign, and the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign and between the goods or services identified. The likelihood of confusion must therefore be assessed globally, taking into account all the relevant factors of the particular case (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson, C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
88      A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
89      In the present case, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 81 of the contested decision, that, in the light of the identity or similarity of the goods and services at issue, the visual and phonetic similarities between the signs at issue, the high level of attention of the relevant public and the enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark, a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue could not, from the outset, be ruled out.
90      Furthermore, in paragraph 89 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that, given that the applicant failed to prove the peaceful nature of the coexistence of the marks at issue on the markets concerned, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public, at least in Germany.
91      The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal did not correctly carry out a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, on the basis of the overall impression created by the signs at issue, and that it erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion. First, the applicant submits, in essence, that the similarities between the signs at issue are insufficient to conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion. Secondly, it submits that the Board of Appeal failed to examine the evidence that it had adduced, in due time, in order to establish the coexistence of the marks at issue on the market concerned.
92      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
93      In the first place, it is apparent from paragraphs 48 to 86 above that the Board of Appeal correctly found that the goods and services covered by the mark applied for and by the earlier mark were identical or similar, with the exception of ‘stationery; Writing instruments; writing materials’ in Class 16 and that the signs at issue were visually similar to an average degree, phonetically similar to a high degree for part of the relevant public and conceptually dissimilar.
94      In the second place, there is nothing in the case file capable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the earlier mark has enhanced distinctiveness on account of its intensive use in Germany for educational and training services for financial analysts in Class 41, a finding that is not, moreover, disputed by the applicant.
95      In the third place, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 26 to 38 above, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment when it found that peaceful coexistence of the signs at issue had not been validly pleaded or proved by the applicant.
96      Consequently, in view of the identity or similarity of the goods at issue, the visual and phonetic similarities between the signs at issue and the enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal, without making an error of assessment, concluded that a likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue could not be excluded from the outset, even taking into consideration the high level of attention of the relevant public.
97      The second complaint must therefore be rejected, as must the single plea in law in its entirety.
98      In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the action is dismissed.
IV.    Costs
99      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
100    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener. By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, in the absence of a hearing, be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders European Federation of Financial Analysts’ Societies (EFFAS) to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by CFA Institute;
3.      Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.
Marcoulli
Spangsberg Grønfeldt
Jočienė
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 26 November 2025.
V. Di Bucci
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.