Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Ninth Chamber)
23 April 2026 (*)
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to machinery – Technical standards and regulations – Directive
98/37/EC – Machinery fitted with normal and emergency stopping devices – Essential health and safety requirements – Risks for the health and safety of individuals – Inadvertent or deliberate release of one of the stopping devices – Engagement of the emergency stop device – Appropriate operation to disengage the emergency stopping device )
In Case C‑887/24,
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Oberlandesgericht München (Higher Regional Court, Munich, Germany), made by decision of 9 December 2024, received at the Court on 20 December 2024, in the proceedings
YH
v
Widl GmbH,
THE COURT (Ninth Chamber),
composed of M. Condinanzi, President of the Chamber, N. Jääskinen and A. Kornezov (Rapporteur), Judges,
Advocate General: A. Biondi,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the written procedure,
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
–        the European Commission, by T.S. Bohr and M. Owsiany-Hornung, acting as Agents,
having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,
gives the following
Judgment
1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 3 of Directive 98/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to machinery (OJ 1998 L 207, p. 1), and points 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4, 1.2.6, 1.2.7 and 2.3(c) of Annex I thereto.
2        The request has been made in proceedings between YH and Widl GmbH concerning compensation for harm suffered by YH and caused by a machine made by Widl.
Legal context
European Union law
3        Recitals 2, 6, 7 and 9 of Directive 98/37 provide:
‘(2)      Whereas the internal market consists of an area without internal frontiers within which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is guaranteed;
…
(6)      Whereas, in the Member States, the legislative systems regarding accident prevention are very different; whereas the relevant compulsory provisions, frequently supplemented by de facto mandatory technical specifications and/or voluntary standards, do not necessarily lead to different levels of health and safety, but nevertheless, owing to their disparities, constitute barriers to trade within the [European] Community; whereas, furthermore, conformity certification and national certification systems for machinery differ considerably;
(7)      Whereas existing national health and safety provisions providing protection against the risks caused by machinery must be approximated to ensure free movement on the market of machinery without lowering existing justified levels of protection in the Member States; whereas the provisions of this Directive concerning the design and construction of machinery, essential for a safer working environment, shall be accompanied by specific provisions concerning the prevention of certain risks to which workers can be exposed at work, as well as by provisions based on the organisation of safety of workers in the working environment;
…
(9)      Whereas paragraphs 65 and 68 of the White Paper on the completion of the internal market, approved by the European Council in June 1985, [COM(85) 310 final)] provide for a new approach to legislative harmonisation; whereas, therefore, the harmonisation of laws in this case must be limited to those requirements necessary to satisfy the imperative and essential health and safety requirements relating to machinery; whereas these requirements must replace the relevant national provisions because they are essential’.
4        Under Article 3 of that directive:
‘Machinery and safety components covered by this Directive shall satisfy the essential health and safety requirements set out in Annex I.’
5        Point [1.1.2] of Annex I
to that directive, entitled ‘Principles of safety integration’ provides:
‘(a)      Machinery must be so constructed that it is fitted for its function, and can be adjusted and maintained without putting persons at risk when these operations are carried out under the conditions foreseen by the manufacturer.
The aim of measures taken must be to eliminate any risk of accident throughout the foreseeable lifetime of the machinery, including the phases of assembly and dismantling, even where risks of accident arise from foreseeable abnormal situations.
(b)      In selecting the most appropriate methods, the manufacturer must apply the following principles, in the order given:
–        eliminate or reduce risks as far as possible (inherently safe machinery design and construction),
–        take the necessary protection measures in relation to risks that cannot be eliminated,
–        inform users of the residual risks due to any shortcomings of the protection measures adopted, indicate whether any particular training is required and specify any need to provide personal protection equipment.
(c)      When designing and constructing machinery, and when drafting the instructions, the manufacturer must envisage not only the normal use of the machinery but also uses which could reasonably be expected.
The machinery must be designed to prevent abnormal use if such use would engender a risk. In other cases the instructions must draw the user’s attention to ways – which experience has shown might occur – in which the machinery should not be used.
…’
6        Points 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4, 1.2.6 and 1.2.7 of that annex provide:
‘1.2.1.            Safety and reliability of control systems
Control systems must be designed and constructed so that they are safe and reliable, in a way that will prevent a dangerous situation arising. Above all they must be designed and constructed in such a way that:
–        they can withstand the rigours of normal use and external factors,
–        errors in logic do not lead to dangerous situations.
1.2.2.            Control devices
Control devices must be:
–        clearly visible and identifiable and appropriately marked where necessary,
–        positioned for safe operation without hesitation or loss of time, and without ambiguity,
–        designed so that the movement of the control is consistent with its effect,
–        located outside the danger zones, except for certain controls where necessary, such as emergency stop, console for training of robots,
–        positioned so that their operation cannot cause additional risk,
–        designed or protected so that the desired effect, where a risk is involved, cannot occur without an intentional operation,
–        made so as to withstand foreseeable strain; particular attention must be paid to emergency stop devices liable to be subjected to considerable strain.
…
1.2.4.            Stopping device
Normal stopping
Each machine must be fitted with a control whereby the machine can be brought safely to a complete stop.
Each workstation must be fitted with a control to stop some or all of the moving parts of the machinery, depending on the type of hazard, so that the machinery is rendered safe. The machinery’s stop control must have priority over the start controls.
Once the machinery or its dangerous parts have stopped, the energy supply to the actuators concerned must be cut off.
Emergency stop
Each machine must be fitted with one or more emergency stop devices to enable actual or impending danger to be averted. The following exceptions apply:
–        machines in which an emergency stop device would not lessen the risk, either because it would not reduce the stopping time or because it would not enable the special measures required to deal with the risk to be taken,
–        hand-held portable machines and hand-guided machines.
This device must:
–        have clearly identifiable, clearly visible and quickly accessible controls,
–        stop the dangerous process as quickly as possible, without creating additional hazards,
–        where necessary, trigger or permit the triggering of certain safeguard movements.
Once active operation of the emergency stop control has ceased following a stop command, that command must be sustained by engagement of the emergency stop device until that engagement is specifically overridden; it must not be possible to engage the device without triggering a stop command; it must be possible to disengage the device only by an appropriate operation, and disengaging the device must not restart the machinery but only permit restarting.
…
1.2.6.            Failure of the power supply
The interruption, re-establishment after an interruption or fluctuation in whatever manner of the power supply to the machinery must not lead to a dangerous situation.
In particular:
–        the machinery must not start unexpectedly,
–        the machinery must not be prevented from stopping if the command has already been given,
–        no moving part of the machinery or piece held by the machinery must fall or be ejected,
–        automatic or manual stopping of the moving parts whatever they may be must be unimpeded,
–        the protection devices must remain fully effective.
1.2.7.            Failure of the control circuit
A fault in the control circuit logic, or failure of or damage to the control circuit must not lead to dangerous situations.
In particular:
–        the machinery must not start unexpectedly,
–        the machinery must not be prevented from stopping if the command has already been given,
–        no moving part of the machinery or piece held by the machinery must fall or be ejected,
–        automatic or manual stopping of the moving parts whatever they may be must be unimpeded,
–        the protection devices must remain fully effective.’
7        In point 2 of that annex, entitled ‘Essential health and safety requirements for certain categories of machinery’, point 2.3 thereof, entitled ‘Machinery for working wood and analogous material’, provides, in point (c):
‘Machinery for working wood and machinery for working materials with physical and technological characteristics similar to those of wood, such as cork, bone, hardened rubber, hardened plastic material and other similar stiff material must conform to the following essential health and safety requirements:
…
(c)      the machinery must be equipped with an automatic brake that stops the tool in a sufficiently short time if there is a risk of contact with the tool whilst it runs down’.
German law
8        Directive 98/37 was transposed into German law by Paragraphs 1 and 16 of the Gesetz zur Neuordnung der Sicherheit von technischen Arbeitsmitteln und Verbraucherprodukten (Restatement of the Law on the safety of technical work equipment and consumer goods) of 6 January 2004 (BGBl. 2004 I, p. 2).
9        Under Paragraph 1 of that law, the German legislature adopted the Gesetz über technische Arbeitsmittel und Verbraucherprodukte (Geräte- und Produktsicherheitsgesetz – GPSG) (Law on technical work equipment and consumer goods (Law on the safety of equipment and products – GPSG)) of 6 January 2004 (BGBl. 2004 I, p. 2).
10      Under Paragraph 16 of the Restatement of the Law on the safety of technical work equipment and consumer goods, that legislature, first, amended the Neunte Verordnung zum Gerätesicherheitsgesetz (Ninth Regulation relating to the Law on the safety of equipment (Machinery Regulation)) of 12 May 1993 (BGB
l. 1993 I, p. 704) (initially adopted pursuant to Paragraph 1 of the Verordnung zum Gerätesicherheitsgesetz und zur Änderung von Verordnungen zum Gerätesicherheitsgesetz (Regulation relating to the Law on the safety of equipment and the amendment of the Regulations relating to the Law on the safety of equipment) of 12 May 1993 (BGBl. 1993 I, p. 704)) and, second, renamed that ninth regulation ‘Neunte Verordnung zum Geräte- und Produktsicherheitsgesetz (Maschinenverordnung – 9e
GSGV) (Ninth Regulation relating to the Law on the safety of equipment and goods (Machinery Regulation – 9th GSGV)’.
11      Under Paragraph 2 of the Machinery Regulation – 9th GSGV:
‘Machinery may be placed on the market only if it satisfies the essential health and safety requirements set out in Annex I to Directive [98/37] and if, where it is correctly installed and maintained and used in accordance with its intended purpose, it does not put at risk the health and safety of individuals or the safety of domestic animals and property.’
The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
12      In 2009, YH bought, from a distributor, a circular wood saw manufactured by Widl (‘the saw at issue in the main proceedings’).
13      The saw at issue in the main proceedings could operate in table mode and in rocker mode. It was equipped with a green start button and a red stop button (‘the normal stopping device’), both located under a flap, and a red emergency button located above that flap (‘the emergency stop device’).
14      Both the normal stopping device and the emergency stop device operated an electronic brake to stop the blade of the saw at issue in the main proceedings after approximately 10 seconds.
15      On 14 December 2016, YH had an accident with the saw at issue in the main proceedings. He wanted to change that saw from rocker mode to table mode and he stopped that saw’s motor using one of those stopping devices. While loading cut logs into a wheelbarrow, he unintentionally actuated one of those devices, either once for at least four to five seconds or several times consecutively for a total duration of at least four to five seconds.
16      As a result of that action, the braking effect of the blade of the saw at issue in the main proceedings was interrupted with the result that, for approximately 11 minutes, that blade continued to rotate silently, slowing down until it stopped.
17      YH folded down the blade guard of the saw at issue in the main proceedings towards the front without noticing that it was still rotating in silence. His left index finger was then caught and injured by that blade.
18      Following that accident, YH brought an action for damages before the Landgericht Deggendorf (Regional Court, Deggendorf, Germany), against Widl for the serious harm that he had suffered as a result of the use of the saw at issue in the main proceedings.
19      An expert report was drawn up in the proceedings before that court. In that report, the expert found that, although a braking time of thirteen seconds had been set for the blade of the saw at issue in the main proceedings, actuating the emergency stop device enabled that blade to be stopped in eight to nine seconds. He further noted that where the emergency stop device was re-actuated, either once for least four to five seconds or several times consecutively for a total duration of at least four to five seconds, that blade did not stop in the preset braking time, but continued to rotate for approximately eleven minutes.
20      The Landgericht Deggendorf (Regional Court, Deggendorf) dismissed the action for damages brought by YH.
21      YH brought an appeal against that dismissal decision before the Oberlandesgericht München (Higher Regional Court, Munich, Germany), which is the referring court. He claims, in essence, that the saw at issue in the main proceedings did not comply with the safety requirements set out in Directive 98/37.
22      The referring court notes that, while YH contributed significantly to the harm that he suffered, Widl could also be held responsible for part of that harm if the saw at issue in the main proceedings did not comply with the safety requirements set out in Directive 98/37.
23      In that regard, the referring court is of the view that the saw at issue in the main proceedings has a design flaw and does not meet the safety requirements arising from Article 3 of Annex I to Directive 98/37 on the ground, inter alia, that re-actuating the emergency stop device, either once continuously or several times consecutively, would cause the blade of that saw to continue to rotate silently for approximately 11 minutes. That court states that, in an emergency situation, it cannot be ruled out that a user in a state of panic may actuate that device once continuously or several times consecutively and that, in such a case, it should be guaranteed that the blade of that saw stops in order to comply with the safety requirements.
24      However, the referring court has doubts as to the correct interpretation of point 1.2.4 of Annex I to Directive 98/37. In its view, the part of the sentence in that point, which states that ‘once active operation of the emergency stop control has ceased following a stop command, that command must be sustained by engagement of the emergency stop device until that engagement is specifically overridden’, could be interpreted as meaning that if that device is re-actuated, the order to brake should not be maintained. According to such an interpretation, the saw at issue in the main proceedings would meet the safety requirements of Directive 98/37. In addition, that court asks whether such a deliberate or inadvertent operation is an ‘appropriate operation’ to disengage that device within the meaning of point 1.2.4 of Annex I to Directive 98/37.
25      In those circumstances, the Oberlandesgericht München (Higher Regional Court, Munich) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘1.      Must Article 3 of Directive [98/37], in conjunction with Annex I thereto, and in particular points 1.1.2., 1.2.1., 1.2.2., 1.2.4., 1.2.6., 1.2.7. and 2.3.(c) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that the emergency stop device on a circular saw complies with the safety requirements laid down therein if, after an emergency stop command has been triggered, re-actuating the emergency stop device – consciously or unconsciously – repeatedly or continuously, for at least [four] to [five] seconds, interrupts the braking action, with the result that the saw blade does not come to a stop, but runs down silently for approximately [eleven] minutes?
2.      (a)      Must Article 3 of Directive [98/37], in conjunction with point 1.2.4 of Annex I thereto, be interpreted as meaning that unconscious or inadvertent (renewed) triggering of the emergency stop command during the braking period also constitutes an ‘operation’ within the meaning of that [latter] provision?
(b)      If 2(a) is to be answered in the affirmative, does such unconscious or inadvertent actuation constitute an ‘appropriate operation’ for disengaging the device within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive [98/37], in conjunction with point 1.2.4. of Annex I thereto?
3.      (a)      Must Article 3 of Directive [98/37], in conjunction with point 1.2.4 of Annex I thereto, be interpreted as meaning that only conscious and intentional (renewed) actuation of the emergency stop device constitutes an ‘operation’ within the meaning of that [latter] provision?
(b)      If 3(a) is to be answered in the affirmative, does such conscious and intentional actuation constitute an ‘appropriate operation’ for disengaging the device within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive [98/37], in conjunction with point 1.2.4. of Annex I thereto?’
Procedure before the Court
26      By decision of the President of the Court of 3 March 2025, a request for information was sent to the referring court with a view to establishing, first, whether the provisions of Directive 98/37 had been transposed into German law, in the light of the fact that, in a dispute between individuals, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the provisions of that directive cannot in themselves, without transposition into national law, create obligations for the defendant in the main proceedings. Second, the Court of Justice invited that court to make clear whether, at the time of his accident, YH had actuated the normal stopping device or the emergency stop device.
27      On 20 March 2025, the referring court answered that request for information. In the first place, it stated that the provisions of Directive 98/37 had been transposed into the German legal system by the Machinery Regulation – 9th GSGV, Paragraph 2 of which provides that machinery may be placed on the market only if it satisfies the essential health and safety requirements set out in Annex I to Directive [98/37] and if it does not put at risk the health and safety of individuals or the safety of domestic animals or property, where it is correctly installed and maintained and used in accordance with its intended purpose. In the second place, the referring court explained that, before the Landgericht Deggendorf (Regional Court, Deggendorf), YH had stated that, at the time of his accident, he had actuated the normal stopping device whereas, before the referring court, he stated that he had actuated the emergency stop device. However, according to the referring court, it is not necessary to establish which of those devices had been actuated, since each of them was intended to ensure the same braking function of the saw at issue in the main proceedings.
Consideration of the questions referred
28      By its three questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3 of Directive 98/37 and points 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4, 1.2.6, 1.2.7 and 2.3(c) of Annex I to that directive must be interpreted as meaning that a normal stopping device and/or an emergency stop device of a circular wood saw meet the health and safety requirements set out in those provisions where, once the machinery’s stop control is engaged, re-actuating, whether deliberately or not, the stopping device concerned, either once continuously or several times consecutively, interrupts the braking of that saw with the result that the blade of that saw does not stop but continues to rotate silently as it slows down, finally stopping after several minutes.
29      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Directive 98/37 harmonises exhaustively at EU level the rules relating to the essential safety requirements for machinery and certification of conformity with those requirements and the rules concerning the action that may be taken by the Member States with regard to machinery that is presumed to comply with those requirements (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 April 2007, AGM-COS.MET, C‑470/03, EU:C:2007:213, paragraph 53).
30      Pursuant to recitals 2, 6, 7
and 9 thereof, that directive aims to ensure free movement of machinery in the internal market and to satisfy the imperative and essential health and safety requirements relating to that machinery by replacing national certification systems and conformity certification with a harmonised system. To that end, in particular in Article 3 and Annex I, the Directive lists the essential health and safety requirements which must be satisfied by machinery and safety components manufactured in the Member States (judgments of 8 September 2005, Yonemoto,
C‑40/04, EU:C:2005:519, paragraph 31 and of 17 April 2007, AGM-COS.MET, C‑470/03, EU:C:2007:213, paragraph 52).
31      Among those requirements, in the first place, point 1.1.2 of that annex sets out the principles of safety integration with which the machinery and its safety components must comply. In particular, under point 1.1.2(a) machinery must be so constructed that it is fitted for its function, and can be adjusted and maintained without putting persons at risk when these operations are carried out under the conditions foreseen by the manufacturer. That provision also sets out that the aim of measures taken must be to eliminate any risk of accident throughout the foreseeable lifetime of the machinery, including the phases of assembly and dismantling, even where risks of accident arise from foreseeable abnormal situations.
32      In addition, under point 1.1.2(b) of Annex I to Directive 98/37, in selecting the most appropriate methods, the manufacturer must, in the order set out, first, eliminate or reduce risks for health and safety, next, take the necessary protection measures in relation to risks that cannot be eliminated and, finally, inform users of the residual risks due to any shortcomings of the protection measures adopted, indicate whether any particular training is required and specify any need to provide personal protection equipment.
33      Furthermore, the principle set out in point 1.1.2(c) of that annex requires the manufacturer of the machinery concerned, when designing and constructing that machinery and when drafting the instructions for it, to envisage not only the normal use of that machinery but also uses which could reasonably be expected.
34      In the second place, point 1.2.1 of that annex provides that the control systems must be designed and constructed so that they are safe and reliable, in a way that will prevent a dangerous situation arising and, inter alia, that errors in logic do not lead to dangerous situations, while point 1.2.2 of that annex provides, inter alia, that control devices must be designed so that the movement of the control is consistent with its effect.
35      In the third place, point 1.2.4 of the annex to Directive 98/37 requires that each machine is fitted with a control whereby the machine can be brought safely to a complete stop, namely a normal stopping device and, subject to certain exceptions, which are not relevant to the solution of the dispute in the main proceedings, with one or more emergency stop devices to enable actual or impending danger to be averted.
36      As regards, first, a normal stopping device, point 1.2.4 provides that that device must make it possible to stop some or all of the moving parts of the machinery, depending on the type of hazard, so that the machinery is rendered safe. In addition, the stop control must have priority over that machinery’s start controls. Once that machinery or its dangerous parts have stopped, the energy supply to the actuators concerned must be cut off.
37      Second, as regards the emergency stop device, point 1.2.4 provides that that device must have clearly identifiable, clearly visible and quickly accessible controls. It must also stop the hazardous process as quickly as possible, without creating additional risks and, where necessary, trigger or permit the triggering of certain safeguard movements.
38      Point 1.2.4 states, in addition, that, ‘once active operation of the emergency stop control has ceased following a stop command, that command must be sustained by engagement of the emergency stop device until that engagement is specifically overridden’ and that it must not be possible to engage the device without triggering a stop command. Furthermore, it must be possible to disengage the device only by an appropriate operation and disengaging the device must not restart the machinery but only permit restarting.
39      It follows that actuating the emergency stop device must trigger a stop command, which must be maintained by blocking that device. Thus, ceasing to actuate that device must not have the effect of disengaging it, since it must be possible to disengage only by an appropriate operation. The concept of ‘appropriate operation’ within the meaning of point 1.2.4 of Annex I to Directive 98/37 must therefore be understood as referring to a specific and distinct action from actuating that device, which is specifically intended to disengage it.
40      It should be pointed out, in addition, that disengaging the emergency stop device by such an appropriate operation must not in any case restart the machinery concerned. It must be possible to restart that machinery only by a subsequent operation of another control.
41      In the fourth place, points 1.2.6 and 1.2.7 of Annex I to Directive 98/37 provide, in essence, that any fault in the control circuit logic or power supply must not lead to dangerous situations or prevent the machinery concerned from stopping if the command has already been given.
42      In the fifth and last place, it must be noted that point 2.3 of that annex sets out supplementary requirements for machinery for working wood, such as the saw at issue in the main proceedings.
43      As regards, in particular, the braking of such machinery, point 2.3(c) of Annex I to Directive 98/37 provides that the machinery concerned must be equipped with an automatic brake that stops its tool in a sufficiently short time if there is a risk of contact with the tool whilst it runs down.
44      Such a requirement is an additional safety measure for machinery for working wood and seeks to ensure that the health and safety requirements are complied with, in particular by the immobilisation of the tool of the machinery for working wood concerned, for example the blades, the cutters etc., within a sufficiently short time to eliminate the risk of accidental contact while that tool is slowing down.
45      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that, after having triggered a stop command, YH unintentionally actuated the emergency stop device or the normal stop device, either once continuously or several times consecutively, which had the consequence that the braking effect was interrupted and that, for several minutes, the blade of the saw at issue in the main proceedings continued to rotate silently.
46      Even assuming that disengaging the emergency stop device may be possible, in accordance with the instructions for use of the machinery concerned, by actuating that device either once continuously or several times consecutively, which is for the referring court to verify, the fact remains that that disengagement must not in any case restart the machinery but only permit restarting, as is expressly set out in point 1.2.4 of Annex I to Directive 98/37 and as is noted in paragraph 38
of the present judgment.
47      Thus, the fact that the actions, whether deliberate or not, described in paragraph 45
of the present judgment resulted in the brake effect being interrupted and that, for several minutes, the blade of the saw at issue in the main proceedings continued to rotate silently appears contrary to the requirement set out in point 1.2.4 of Annex I to Directive 98/37 and cannot therefore constitute an ‘appropriate operation’ to disengage the emergency stop device within the meaning of point 1.2.4.
48      That conclusion applies mutatis mutandis in a situation where YH actuated the normal stopping device either once continuously or several times consecutively. Even if the normal stopping device and the emergency stop device have some differences as regards their specific essential health and safety requirements, they are subject, in essence, to the same principles of safety integration and share the same essential function, namely stopping the machinery concerned so that it is rendered safe. Thus, actuating the normal stopping device, whether once continuously or several times consecutively, cannot in any case have the effect of interrupting the stop control that that control is supposed to provide or, therefore, of enabling the circular saw concerned to continue to rotate for several minutes.
49      Moreover, such a consequence also appears contrary both to the principles of safety integration with which the machinery and its safety components must comply, set out in point 1.1.2 of Annex I to Directive 98/37 and to the health and safety requirements arising from points 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.6, 1.2.7 and 2.3(c) of that annex, set out in paragraphs 31 to 34 and 41 to 44 of the present judgment, in so far as it puts the health and safety of the persons using the machinery concerned at an increased risk. As the referring court points out, it is entirely foreseeable that, in a state of panic, the person using that machine actuates
the normal stopping device or the emergency stop device of that machinery,
either once continuously or several times consecutively, with a view to stopping it as quickly as possible. However, by enabling, in such circumstances, the blade of the machinery concerned to continue to rotate silently for several minutes, instead of stopping within a sufficiently short time, those devices fail to comply with all of the abovementioned requirements.
50      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 3 of Directive 98/37 and points 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4, 1.2.6, 1.2.7 and 2.3(c) of Annex I
to that directive must be interpreted as meaning that a normal stopping device and/or an emergency stop device of a circular wood saw do not meet the health and safety requirements set out in those provisions where, once the machinery’s stop control is engaged, re-actuating, whether deliberately or not, the stopping device concerned, either once continuously or several times consecutively, interrupts the braking of that saw with the result that the blade of that saw does not stop but continues to rotate silently as it slows down, finally stopping after several minutes.
Costs
51      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Ninth Chamber) hereby rules:
Article 3 of Directive 98/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to machinery and points 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4, 1.2.6, 1.2.7 and 2.3(c) of Annex I thereto
must be interpreted as meaning that a normal stopping device and/or an emergency stop device of a circular wood saw do not meet the health and safety requirements set out in those provisions where, once the machinery’s stop control is engaged, re-actuating, whether deliberately or not, the stopping device concerned, either once continuously or several times consecutively, interrupts the braking of that saw with the result that the blade of that saw does not stop but continues to rotate silently as it slows down, finally stopping after several minutes.
[Signatures]
*      Language of the case: German.