JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)
11 June 2025 (*)
( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Word mark OSPW System – Absolute ground for invalidity – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) – Obligation to state reasons – Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001 )
In Case T‑352/24,
CeramicSpeed Sport A/S, established in Holstebro (Denmark), represented by K. Kvistgaard‑Aaholm, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Marcin Golec, residing in London (United Kingdom), represented by K. Muraro, G. Russo and C. Comolli Acquaviva, lawyers,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),
composed of M.J. Costeira, President, M. Kancheva (Rapporteur) and P. Zilgalvis, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, CeramicSpeed Sport A/S, seeks the partial annulment and alteration of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 10 May 2024 (Case R 1782/2023‑5) (‘the contested decision’).
I.      Background to the dispute
2        On 30 June 2017, the applicant designated the European Union in its international registration No 1 381 429 of the word mark OSPW System.
3        The mark applied for covered goods in Classes 7 and 12 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
–        Class 7: ‘Pulleys, including pulley wheels (not for land vehicles); bearings, including ceramic bearings; bearings, including ball bearings; roller bearings; anti-friction bearings for machines; ball bearings for machines; ball bearings for motors; axial ball bearings; ball bearing rings’;
–        Class 12: ‘Parts and fittings for land vehicles, including pulley wheels and anti-friction bearings for bicycles; ball bearings for land vehicles, including ceramic bearings; axle ball bearings for land vehicles; pulley wheels for land vehicles; bicycles; gears (parts for bicycles); bicycle structural parts; bicycle wheels; gears for land vehicles and bicycles; bicycle chains; brackets as structural parts of bicycles; gear wheels for bicycles; rear derailleurs; ball bearings for land vehicles’.
4        On 24 September 2021, the intervener, Mr Marcin Golec, filed with EUIPO an application for a declaration of invalidity of that mark in respect of all the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5        The grounds relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity were those referred to in Article 52(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b), (c) and (d) of that regulation (now Article 59(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of that regulation).
6        On 20 June 2023, the Cancellation Division rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity, in essence, on the ground that the intervener had not shown that the relevant public recognised the term ‘ospw’ as a descriptive reference to a type of product at the time of designation (‘the Cancellation Division’s decision’).
7        On 21 August 2023, the intervener filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Cancellation Division’s decision.
8        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal in part and, consequently, annulled the Cancellation Division’s decision in part. In the first place, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the evidence adduced by the intervener demonstrated the descriptive character of the word sign OSPW System for bicycle parts and fittings under Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation. The Board of Appeal therefore concluded that that sign was not descriptive exclusively for the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above not related to bicycles, namely ‘pulleys, including pulley wheels (not for land vehicles); anti-friction bearings for machines; ball bearings for machines’ in Class 7, and that it was descriptive for all the other goods referred to in paragraph 3 above inasmuch they relate to bicycles or goods that are part of bicycles. In the second place, the Board of Appeal found, essentially for the same reasons, that the contested sign was devoid of distinctive character for the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above, with the exception of ‘pulleys, including pulley wheels (not for land vehicles); anti-friction bearings for machines; ball bearings for machines’ in Class 7, pursuant to Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.
II.    Forms of order sought
9        The applicant claims that the Court should:
–        annul the contested decision in so far as it annulled the Cancellation Division’s decision in part;
–        alter the contested decision so as to uphold the Cancellation Division’s decision;
–        order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs, including the costs incurred before the Board of Appeal.
10      EUIPO contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
11      The intervener contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the action;
–        uphold the contested decision;
–        order the applicant to pay the costs.
III. Law
12      As a preliminary point, as regards the determination of the law applicable ratione temporis, in view of the date on which the application for registration at issue was filed, namely 30 June 2017, which is decisive for the purposes of identifying the applicable substantive law, the facts of the present case are governed by the substantive provisions of Regulation No 207/2009 (see, to that effect, order of 5 October 2004, Alcon v OHIM, C‑192/03 P, EU:C:2004:587, paragraphs 39 and 40, and judgment of 23 April 2020, Gugler France v Gugler and EUIPO, C‑736/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:308, paragraph 3 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, in so far as, according to settled case-law, procedural rules are generally held to apply on the date on which they enter into force (see judgment of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited), the dispute is governed by the procedural provisions of Regulation 2017/1001.
13      Consequently, in the present case, as regards the substantive rules, the references made by EUIPO and the intervener in their pleadings to Article 59(1)(a) and to Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001 must be understood as referring to Article 52(1)(a) and Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009, the terms of which are identical.
14      The applicant relies on three pleas in law alleging, first, infringement of Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(c) thereof; secondly, infringement of Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) thereof; and, thirdly, infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001.
The first plea, alleging infringement of Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(c) thereof
15      By its first plea, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the contested mark was descriptive of the goods covered, within the meaning of Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation. That plea is divided, in essence, into two parts, which it is appropriate to examine separately.
The first part of the first plea, alleging an incorrect legal analysis of the descriptive character of the contested mark
16      By the first part of its first plea, the applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal based its assessment of the descriptive character of the contested mark on an incorrect legal analysis of that character, since that analysis was based, inter alia, on case-law that is not applicable in the present case. In that regard, the applicant relies, in essence, on multiple errors of law and assessment of the facts.
17      In the first place, the applicant submits that, when, in paragraphs 65 and 78 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that an acronym having a non-descriptive character considered in isolation could acquire a distinctive character when it was perceived as an abbreviation of a descriptive expression, relying on the judgment of 15 March 2012, Strigl and Securvita
(C‑90/11 and C‑91/11, EU:C:2012:147), it misconstrued the scope of that judgment, thereby committing an error of law. That judgment concerns, in particular, the descriptive character of two marks on account of the combination of an abbreviation and words referred to by that abbreviation. In the present case, however, that reasoning could not apply, since the contested sign did not include the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’. Similarly, the applicant submits that, according to the case-law, the fact that an abbreviation is derived from a descriptive term is not sufficient to render the abbreviation descriptive. In any event, the applicant submits that, even assuming that the reasoning of that judgment was applicable by analogy to the situation in the present case, the evidence does not demonstrate that its conditions are satisfied in the present case, by referring to the second part of the first plea (see paragraph 64 below).
18      In the second place, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment of the facts in so far as it found, in paragraphs 48 and 49 of the contested decision, that the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ was descriptive and that, as a result, the relevant public was able immediately and without further thought to establish a link between the group of letters ‘ospw’ and the goods at issue. First, the applicant states that the goods at issue relate to a type of oversized derailleur and that the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ is merely a name invented by the applicant. Secondly, the group of letters ‘ospw’ is not the most natural abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’; ‘OPW’, which uses the initials of each word of that expression, would seem more logical.
19      In the third place, in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal also erred in law in that it misconstrued the scope of the judgment of 8 September 2015, Gold Crest v OHIM (MIGHTY BRIGHT) (T‑714/13, not published, EU:T:2015:600). The Board of Appeal relied on that case-law in order to maintain that it was not particularly relevant whether the website printouts referred to the applicant’s goods. However, the applicant submits that the situation in that case is different from that in the present case, given that the exclusive use of the mark MIGHTY BRIGHT was linked to a grammatical error, whereas the sign in the present case would be perceived by the relevant public as an indicator of the origin of the goods in question, by analogy with the case that gave rise to the judgment of 7 June 2011, Psytech International v OHIM – Institute for Personality & Ability Testing (16PF) (T‑507/08, not published, EU:T:2011:253).
20      EUIPO and the intervener dispute those arguments.
21      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, under Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, an EU trade mark is to be declared invalid on application to EUIPO where the EU trade mark has been registered contrary to the provisions of Article 7 of that regulation.
22      Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides that trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service are not to be registered.
23      According to settled case-law, Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 pursues an aim which is in the public interest, namely that descriptive signs or indications relating to the characteristics of goods or services in respect of which registration is sought may be freely used by all. That provision accordingly prevents such signs and indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they have been registered as trade marks (see judgment of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley, C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited; judgment of 27 June 2017, Jiménez Gasalla v EUIPO (B2B SOLUTIONS), T‑685/16, not published, EU:T:2017:438, paragraph 23).
24      By using, in that provision, the terms ‘the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service’, the EU legislature made it clear, first, that those terms must all be regarded as corresponding to characteristics of goods or services and, secondly, that that list is not exhaustive, since any other characteristics of goods or services may also be taken into account (see judgment of 6 December 2018,
J. Portugal Ramos Vinhos, C‑629/17, EU:C:2018:988, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
25      On that basis, the fact that the EU legislature chose to use the word ‘characteristic’ highlights the fact that the signs referred to in that provision are merely those which serve to designate a property, easily recognisable by the relevant class of persons, of the goods or the services in respect of which registration is sought (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 50, and of 6 December 2018, J. Portugal Ramos Vinhos, C‑629/17, EU:C:2018:988, paragraph 19).
26      Therefore, a sign can be refused registration on the basis of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 only if it is reasonable to believe that it will actually be recognised by the relevant class of persons as a description of one of those characteristics (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2014, BSH v OHIM, C‑126/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2065, paragraph 22, and of 1 February 2023, Krematorium am Waldfriedhof Schwäbisch Hall v EUIPO (aquamation), T‑319/22, not published, EU:T:2023:30, paragraph 33).
27      It follows, first of all, that, for the purposes of applying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009, it is necessary to examine, in the light of the relevant meaning of the contested word sign, whether, from the point of view of the relevant public, whether there exists a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between that sign and the goods or services in question, such as to enable that public immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or one of their characteristics (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 January 2005, Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM), T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB), T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
28      Next, a sign’s descriptiveness cannot be assessed other than by reference to the goods or services concerned, on the one hand, and by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of it, on the other (see judgment of 25 October 2005, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM (Cloppenburg), T‑379/03,
EU:T:2005:373, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
29      Last, it is not necessary that the signs and indications composing the mark that are referred to in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 actually be in use at the time of the application for registration in a way that is descriptive of goods or services such as those in relation to which the application is filed, or of characteristics of those goods or services. It is sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself indicates, that such signs and indications may be used for such purposes. A sign must therefore be refused registration under that provision if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley, C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 32, and of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
30      The applicant’s arguments must be examined in the light of those considerations.
31      At the outset, it should be noted that the relevant date for the purpose of assessing the descriptive character of the contested mark for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 is that on which the application for registration of the contested mark was filed (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 March 2022, Perry Street Software v EUIPO – Toolstream (SCRUFFS), T‑720/20, not published, EU:T:2022:189, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited, and of 10 July 2024, Bartex Bartol v EUIPO – Grupa Chorten (duch puszczy), T‑473/23, not published, EU:T:2024:458, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited), namely in the present case 30 June 2017, as the Board of Appeal noted in paragraph 34 of the contested decision.
32      It is therefore necessary to assess whether, on that date, the word sign OSPW System could be regarded, on the basis of the Court’s case-law concerning marks composed of a group of letters, as having a descriptive character, where that sign was perceived, from the point of view of the relevant public, as an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’.
33      First of all, as regards the composition of the relevant public in the present case, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding, in paragraph 43 of the contested decision, that the goods at issue were aimed at both cycling enthusiasts and professionals, including mechanics, engineers and professional cyclists, whose level of attention varied from average to high. It should also be borne in mind that the relevant public includes the English-speaking public and the public in the Scandinavian countries, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal and Finland, as the Board of Appeal noted in paragraphs 44 and 46 of the contested decision.
34      Next, as regards the meaning of the contested mark, as the Board of Appeal found in paragraphs 47 and 84 of the contested decision, without being challenged on that point by the parties, the expression ‘ospw system’ means, in the context of the contested mark, namely in the cycling sector, ‘oversized pulley wheel system’. That expression consists of three elements, namely the adjective ‘oversized’ describing the size of the pulley wheels, the expression ‘pulley wheels’ designating a type of component specific to bicycles, and the term ‘system’ meaning a group of interacting or interrelated elements or components. Furthermore, since the term ‘system’ is a generic word often accompanied by other terms, it indicates to the relevant public that the group of letters ‘ospw’ must be understood as the main term describing the type of system at issue. In the light of those factors, it is necessary to uphold the Board of Appeal’s finding, in paragraphs 49 and 84 of the contested decision, that the expression described a category of oversized pulley cage for bicycle derailleurs and was therefore descriptive of bicycle parts and fittings.
35      Given that the contested mark comprises only the terms ‘ospw’ and ‘system’, the main question referred to by the applicant’s arguments is whether, on the relevant date, the relevant public perceived the group of letters ‘ospw’ with regard to the goods at issue as an abbreviation of the descriptive expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’.
36      In that regard, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal correctly found, in paragraphs 65 and 78 of the contested decision, that the group of letters ‘ospw’ was not considered, in the abstract, as descriptive, but that it could nevertheless acquire a descriptive character, when it was perceived, in the context of the contested sign, as an abbreviation of the descriptive words ‘oversized pulley wheels’. None of the applicant’s arguments referred to in paragraphs 17 to 19 above is capable of calling that conclusion into question.
37      In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the reasoning of the judgment of 15 March 2012, Strigl and Securvita (C‑90/11 and C‑91/11, EU:C:2012:147), cannot apply in the present case, there is nothing to support the conclusion that the Board of Appeal erred in law in relying on that judgment. As regards the marks Multi Markets Fund MMF and NAI – Der Natur-Aktien-Index, which contain the abbreviations MMF and NAI respectively, the Court of Justice held in paragraph 40 of that judgment that ‘a word mark which consists of the juxtaposition of a descriptive word combination and a letter sequence which is non-descriptive in itself, if the relevant public perceives that sequence as being an abbreviation of that word combination by reason of the fact that it reproduces the first letter of each word of that combination, and that the mark in question, considered as a whole, can thus be understood as a combination of descriptive indications or abbreviations which is therefore devoid of distinctive character’. In essence, according to the Court of Justice, it is by taking the first letter of each of word of the word combination that the public perceives the letter sequence as an abbreviation of that word combination.
38      In the present case, it is true that the contested mark uses the group of letters ‘ospw’ without including the expression that that group of letters shortens and means, namely, ‘oversized pulley wheels’, unlike the two marks at issue in the judgment of 15 March 2012, Strigl and Securvita (C‑90/11 and C‑91/11, EU:C:2012:147). However, that difference did not prevent the Board of Appeal from relying on the reasoning of that judgment.
39      First, the group of letters ‘ospw’ is a letter sequence that includes, inter alia, the first letter of each word making up the word combination ‘oversized pulley wheels’, and that may therefore be perceived by the public as an abbreviation of that word combination. The fact that the adjective ‘oversized’ is abbreviated to two letters, namely ‘o’ and ‘s’, does not prevent the relevant public from recognising that adjective, particularly since it seems plausible, as the intervener submits, that that abbreviation may be used customarily in the field of cycling. It is sufficient that the group of letters ‘ospw’ may be, in at least one of its possible meanings, an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ and, accordingly, designate a characteristic of the goods concerned (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2020, achtung! v EUIPO, C‑214/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:632, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited; of 13 July 2017, LG Electronics v EUIPO (QD), T‑650/16, not published, EU:T:2017:489, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited; and of 31 January 2024, IU Internationale Hochschule v EUIPO (IU International University of Applied Sciences), T‑188/23, not published, EU:T:2024:46, paragraph 38).
40      Secondly, the fact that the contested mark does not contain the word combination ‘oversized pulley wheels’ is not sufficient to call into question the possibility that the relevant public might perceive the group of letters ‘ospw’ as an abbreviation of that expression. On the one hand, as is apparent from paragraph 34 above, the expression ‘oversized pulley wheel system’, which the contested sign means, is clearly descriptive. On the other hand, the Board of Appeal correctly found, in paragraphs 77 to 79 of the contested decision, that the documentation showed that the group of letters ‘ospw’ at issue had been systematically used in connection with the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ in various media in the cycling sector already before the relevant date (see paragraphs 81 and 82 below). As a result, the target public of those media displaying a level of attention varying from average to high could, at least potentially, recognise the term ‘ospw’ as an abbreviation of that expression.
41      Thirdly, the context of the contested mark also confirms the fact that, on the relevant date, the group of letters ‘ospw’ could be recognised as an abbreviation of the descriptive expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’. As is apparent from some of the evidence, a type of product similar to that of the applicant could already be observed for the first time during the Tour de France in 2010 (see paragraphs 74 and 75 below). Therefore, the relevant public could potentially have been familiar with that type of product from 2010, which may have facilitated its association with that expression. In any event, the applicant’s clarifications concerning the goods covered by the contested sign lead to the conclusion that they correspond to all the elements of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheel system’. In particular, it concerns a product for bicycles that allows for shifting between gears comprising pulley wheels of a larger size than the standard size. Therefore, from the point of view of the relevant public, there is a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the group of letters ‘ospw’ and the characteristics of the goods covered by the contested mark.
42      In the light of all the factors referred to in paragraphs 39 to 41 above, the Board of Appeal did not therefore err in law in finding that the contested mark, considered as a whole and in the context of the goods at issue, could thus be understood as a descriptive indication, on the basis of the judgment of 15 March 2012, Strigl and Securvita (C‑90/11 and C‑91/11, EU:C:2012:147).
43      Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that an abbreviation of a descriptive term is not sufficient for that abbreviation to be regarded as descriptive, it should be noted that the case-law to which the applicant refers, namely the judgment of 13 June 2014, Grupo Flexi de León v OHIM (FLEXI) (T‑352/12, not published, EU:T:2014:519), does not in any way lead to that conclusion. On the contrary, the Court, in paragraphs 26 and 30 of that judgment, found that the sign FLEXI was the reproduction of an abbreviation that was descriptive by designating a characteristic of the goods marketed by the applicant in that case, namely their flexibility. Therefore, the Court concluded that that sign referred at least potentially to a characteristic of the goods covered by the mark concerned.
44      Consequently, the applicant’s first argument set out in paragraph 17 above, concerning an error of law, must be rejected as unfounded.
45      In the second place, as regards an error of assessment of the facts alleged by the applicant in that the Board of Appeal did not take into account the origin of the contested sign, namely an expression created by the applicant (see paragraph 18 above), the arguments put forward in that regard must be rejected.
46      First, contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that the contested sign may have been created by the applicant itself to designate its own goods is irrelevant since it is apparent from paragraphs 39 to 41 above that that sign may generally be recognised by the relevant public as an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheel system’ (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 1 February 2023, aquamation, T‑319/22, not published, EU:T:2023:30, paragraph 37).
47      In applying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009, account must be taken only of the point of view of the relevant public (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 December 2003, Audi v OHIM (TDI), T‑16/02, EU:T:2003:327, paragraph 33, and of 27 April 2017, BASF v EUIPO – Evonik Industries (DINCH), T‑721/15, not published, EU:T:2017:286, paragraph 48).
48      Secondly, for essentially the same reasons, the applicant’s arguments relating to the possibility that other signs may describe the characteristics of the goods at issue more naturally must also be rejected. The fact that other abbreviations may also be conceivable, or even more well known, for that complex expression as a whole or for some of its constituent elements is not decisive (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2024, IU International University of Applied Sciences, T‑188/23, not published, EU:T:2024:46, paragraph 38). It follows from paragraphs 39 to 41 above that one of the possible meanings of the group of letters ‘ospw’ is precisely an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’, which designates parts and fittings of bicycles.
49      In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments, set out in paragraph 18 above, concerning an error of assessment of the facts in that the Board of Appeal did not take sufficient account of the origin of the contested sign, must therefore be rejected.
50      In the third place, as regards the applicant’s complaints relating to the misapplication of the judgment of 8 September 2015, MIGHTY BRIGHT (T‑714/13, not published, EU:T:2015:600), when taking into account evidence referring to the applicant’s goods in the contested decision (see paragraph 19 above), they are in no way convincing.
51      It is true that, in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal referred to paragraph 21 of the judgment of 8 September 2015, MIGHTY BRIGHT (T‑714/13, not published, EU:T:2015:600), in order to support the assertion that what matters is not whether the annexes refer to the applicant’s goods, but rather whether the use of the contested sign could have been perceived as descriptive of a type of product.
52      In the judgment of 8 September 2015, MIGHTY BRIGHT (T‑714/13, not published, EU:T:2015:600), the Court stated, in paragraph 21, in essence, that the fact that results relating to the applicant’s goods appear first when the English expression ‘mighty bright’ is searched for online could be linked to a grammatical error, since the adjective ‘mighty’ cannot be used, according to English grammatical rules, to qualify the adjective ‘bright’.
53      Contrary to what the applicant claims, the present case is not fundamentally different from that which gave rise to the judgment of 8 September 2015, MIGHTY BRIGHT (T‑714/13, not published, EU:T:2015:600). First, that judgment confirms that the fact that the online search for the contested mark shows results in relation to the applicant’s goods is not sufficient to rule out the relevance of those results. Secondly, the applicant itself claims that the group of letters ‘ospw’ was not the most natural abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ (see paragraph 18 above). It cannot therefore be ruled out that the relevant public may perceive that group of letters, by analogy with that judgment, as an incorrect abbreviation of that expression.
54      In addition, the case that gave rise to the judgment of 7 June 2011, 16PF (T‑507/08, not published, EU:T:2011:253), also referred to by the applicant (see paragraph 19 above), cannot be used to support the argument that the contested sign will be perceived by the relevant public as an indicator of the origin of the applicant’s goods.
55      The facts of the present case differ from those of the judgment of 7 June 2011, 16PF (T‑507/08, not published, EU:T:2011:253), on essential points. In paragraph 41 of that judgment, the Court held, inter alia, first, that since the sign 16PF refers to Dr Cattell’s 16-factor personality test, it enabled the relevant public to understand that sign as an identification of commercial origin. However, unlike the present case, the exclusive use of the sign 16PF was linked to the existence of copyright. Secondly, the Court held that the sign 16PF would be perceived by the parts of the relevant public that did not have a very good knowledge of behavioural studies as a sign that is devoid of any meaning and, therefore, as non-descriptive, whereas the contested mark in the present case, considered from the point of view of the relevant public displaying a level of attention varying from average to high, could be understood as a descriptive indication (see paragraph 42 above).
56      In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal was therefore correct also to rely on documents referring to the applicant’s goods.
57      Consequently, the first part of the first plea must be rejected.
The second part of the first plea, alleging incorrect assessment of the evidence relating to the descriptive character of the contested sign
58      By the second part, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal made, in essence, multiple errors of law and assessment by taking into account evidence submitted to it by the intervener and by concluding on the basis of that evidence that the sign OSPW System was, on the relevant date, understood by the relevant public in a descriptive manner as being an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheel system’.
59      In the first place, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal should not have taken into account evidence that was undated or dated after the filing date of the contested mark.
60      In that regard, as regards Annexes 1 to 58 to the Board of Appeal’s file, the applicant disputes, inter alia, the Board of Appeal’s finding in paragraph 67 of the contested decision that many of those annexes referred to the group of letters ‘ospw’ as ‘oversized pulley wheels system’ before the relevant date, given that a large part of those annexes was undated, and that of those that were dated, all related to a period subsequent to the date of filing.
61      Similarly, as regards Annex 23 to the Board of Appeal’s file, namely an article published on the website ‘www.cyclist.co.uk’ dated 27 April 2021, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal’s finding, in paragraph 70 of the contested decision, as to the relevance of that annex is incorrect. Although that article refers to the 2010 cycling season, it does not demonstrate that the group of letters ‘ospw’ was in fact used in a descriptive manner in that year. Moreover, the applicant states that that article mentions that, during the Tour de France in 2010, fans of bicycling were asking what ‘this rear derailleur thingy’ was, which supported the conclusion that the term ‘ospw’ was not known during that period.
62      Furthermore, as regards Annexes 72 and 73 to the Board of Appeal’s file, namely two articles published, respectively, on the websites ‘www.mondotriathlon.it’ dated 28 November 2017, and on the website ‘www.velonews.com’ dated 23 July 2018, the applicant submits that those annexes do not fall within the relevant period and that the Board of Appeal therefore incorrectly took those documents into account.
63      In the second place, the applicant disputes the relevance of the annexes taken into account by the Board of Appeal in paragraph 68 of the contested decision and intended for markets outside the European Union, namely Annexes 1, 12, 14, 17, 20, 27, 39 and 46 to the Board of Appeal’s file. In the applicant’s view, there was no risk of the relevant European public being influenced by technology designed outside the European Union, given that the goods at issue had already been developed in the European Union and, consequently, the annexes aimed at the public of third countries should not have been taken into account.
64      In the third place, as regards the overall assessment of the evidence taken into account, the Board of Appeal based the contested decision on limited evidence that was not sufficient to demonstrate, on the relevant date, the relevant public’s perception of the descriptive character of the contested sign. The applicant submits that only five annexes to the Board of Appeal’s file fell within the relevant period and were drafted in the language of the proceedings, but they all referred to the applicant’s goods. Moreover, the evidence, in particular Annexes 63 and 73 to the Board of Appeal’s file, did not show that the group of letters ‘ospw’ was systematically used in relation to the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ (see paragraph 17 above).
65      In addition, the applicant refers to several extracts from online dictionaries and websites dedicated to acronyms submitted in its pleadings of 5 July 2022 and 11 January 2023 before the Cancellation Division that prove that the relevant public did not recognise the group of letters ‘ospw’ as an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ on the relevant date.
66      Last, the Board of Appeal did not provide any evidence as to the relevant public’s knowledge of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’, by analogy with the judgment of 28 February 2024, BIW Invest v EUIPO – New Yorker Marketing & Media International (COMPTON) (T‑746/22, not published, EU:T:2024:134), nor any figures for visits to the websites referred to in the annexes it had taken into account. In that context, the applicant also claims that the impact on the perception of the relevant English-speaking public was not demonstrated for Annexes 68 and 72, given that they were not drafted in the language of the proceedings.
67      EUIPO and the intervener dispute those arguments.
68      As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, for the adjudicating bodies of EUIPO, the date on which the application for registration of the contested mark was filed is the relevant date for the assessment of whether the absolute grounds referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 preclude the registration of a mark or must result in a previously registered mark being declared invalid. Such an obligation, however, does not preclude the adjudicating bodies of EUIPO from taking into account, where appropriate, evidence subsequent to the application for registration, provided that it enables conclusions to be drawn with regard to the situation as it was on that that date (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 March 2014, Pi-Design and Others v Yoshida Metal Industry, C‑337/12 P to C‑340/12 P, not published, EU:C:2014:129, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited, and of 5 October 2022, the airscreen company v EUIPO – Moviescreens Rental (airframe), T‑539/21, not published, EU:T:2022:597, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
69      The applicant’s arguments must be examined in the light of those considerations.
70      In essence, it is therefore necessary to determine whether EUIPO could validly take into account, first, evidence that is undated or dated outside the relevant period and, secondly, evidence relating to markets outside the European Union. Thirdly, it must be determined whether the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that the evidence adduced established the descriptive character of the contested mark.
71      In the first place, as regards the first group of arguments relating to the temporal aspect of the evidence, in so far as the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal took into account evidence that is undated or dated after the relevant date for the purposes of assessing the descriptive character of the contested sign (see paragraphs 59 to 62 above), that line of argument must be rejected, since it is based on a misreading of the contested decision.
72      In the present case, the Board of Appeal based its finding on the descriptive character of the contested sign by taking into account a body of evidence submitted by the intervener and listed in Annex A.4 to the application, which can be classified as follows:
–        (1) Annexes 1 to 58 to the Board of Appeal’s file, comprising 13 videos on the YouTube website containing opinions and demonstrations of ‘OSPW’ goods that appear to have been downloaded after the relevant date (namely Annexes 2 to 5, 11, 12, 14 to 16, 20, 22, 26 and 56), and 46 documents from websites such as YouTube, Aliexpress, Amazon, Facebook, Walmart, eBay, reddit and websites specialising in cycling, some of which are intended for a public outside the European Union; in that context, the Board of Appeal found that many of those annexes referred to the group of letters ‘ospw’ as ‘oversized pulley wheel system’ before the relevant date and emphasised, inter alia, the relevance of Annex 23 to the Board of Appeal’s file, namely an article dated 27 April 2021 published on the website ‘www.cyclist.co.uk’, containing the following passage: ‘The oversize pulley wheel (OSPW) system was pioneered by engineer Wolfgang Berner, and it set internet forums ablaze when it was first spotted on the Sram Red rear derailleurs of Fabian Cancellara, the Schleck brothers and Lance Armstrong during the 2010 season’;
–        (2) Annexes 63, 64, 65, 68, 69 and 70 to the Board of Appeal’s file, concerning articles specialised in the field of cycling published in 2016 and referring to the applicant’s goods, namely a bike review on the website ‘www.bicycling.com’ dated 23 June 2016 (Annex 63) referring to the expression ‘Oversized Pulley Wheel System (OSPW)’ and to the group of letters ‘ospw’; an article on the Tour de France published on the website ‘www.cyclingtips.com’ dated 15 July 2016 (Annex 64) referring to ‘Ceramic
Speeds OSPW (Oversized Pulley Wheel) system’ and a second article from the same website relating to Eurobike 2016 dated 3 September 2016 (Annex 65) stating that ‘Ceramic Speed OSPW Oversized Pulley Wheels’ would soon be available for those on SRAM derailleurs; and three articles all referring to the terms ‘ospw’, ‘oversized pulley wheels’ and ‘oversized pulley wheel system’, namely a review of the applicant’s products published on the website ‘www.inbici.net’ dated 20 August 2016 (Annex 68), an article published on the website ‘https://wolfisbikeshop.wordpress.com’ dated 7 September 2016 (Annex 69) and an article published on the website ‘https://bikerumor.com’ dated 7 November 2016 (Annex 70);
–        (3) Annexes 72 and 73 to the Board of Appeal’s file, concerning articles published after the relevant period, namely an article published on the website ‘www.mondotriathlon.it’ dated 28 November 2017 (Annex 72) and an article published on the website ‘www.velonews.com’ dated 23 July 2018 (Annex 73) referring both to the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ and to the applicant’s ‘OSPW’ product;
–        (4) Annex 1.2 to the Board of Appeal’s file, namely an undated document bearing the applicant’s name accompanied by a copyright sign ‘©’ and the year 2018, which defines the word ‘system’ as ‘the pulleys, the pulley bearings, and the derailleur cage’.
73      As is apparent from paragraph 72 above, the Board of Appeal took into account, inter alia, Annexes 63, 64, 65, 68, 69 and 70, namely specialist articles in the field of cycling published prior to the relevant date, namely 30 June 2017, and systematically using the group of letters ‘ospw’ in connection with the expression that it signifies.
74      As regards Annexes 1 to 58, while it is true that they post-date the relevant date and that the Board of Appeal therefore incorrectly found in paragraph 67 of the contested decision that many of them referred to the group of letters ‘ospw’ as ‘oversized pulley wheel system’ before the relevant date, that is not a circumstance that renders the Board of Appeal’s finding relating to the descriptive character of the contested sign unlawful. The Board of Appeal was correct to point out, in paragraph 70 of the contested decision, that the article in Annex 23 concerned facts prior to the relevant date, since it referred to 2010. That article merely confirms the perception established by Annexes 63, 64, 65, 68, 69 and 70, which predate the relevant date. More specifically, it uses on several occasions the group of letters ‘ospw’, which is defined as the abbreviation of the expression ‘oversize pulley wheel’. Moreover, that expression is mentioned in connection with the system introduced, according to the article, by Wolfgang Berner for the first time in connection with the Tour de France in 2010. Thus, contrary to what the applicant claims (see paragraph 61 above), that article rather confirms the fact that the oversized pulley wheel system could be observed for the first time in 2010, that is to say, seven years before the relevant date.
75      Similarly, as regards Annexes 72 and 73, it is also necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the relevance of those annexes should be rejected on account of their dates, which are subsequent to the date on which the application for registration was filed. In that regard, it should be noted that those annexes confirm the perception of the contested mark among the relevant public, as demonstrated by Annexes 63, 64, 65, 68, 69 and 70 (see paragraph 72 above) for a period subsequent to the relevant date. The article in Annex 73 dated 23 July 2018 uses the terms ‘ospw’ and ‘ospw system’ on several occasions to describe oversized derailleur cages, emphasising in particular that the first ‘OSPW system’ product was invented by the German company Berner, which corresponds, in essence, to the presentation of the development of that type of product in Annex 23 (see paragraph 74 above). Therefore, as EUIPO maintains, it follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 68 above that the Board of Appeal was entitled to take that evidence into account in order to support the conclusions drawn from all the evidence relating to the relevant period.
76      It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to take into account Annexes 1 to 58, 72 and 73 for the purposes of confirming the assessment of the descriptive character of the contested sign in respect of the relevant period.
77      In the second place, as regards the second group of arguments relating to markets outside the European Union targeted by certain items of evidence, which, according to the applicant, should not be taken into account (see paragraph 63 above), it should be borne in mind that the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the contested decision, that even though certain annexes did not target the public in the European Union, they could nevertheless have an impact on the perception of the relevant public in the European Union, in particular where it can reasonably be envisaged that a new technology developed outside the European Union will spread throughout the European Union in the near future.
78      That finding is correct.
79      In that regard, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that it cannot be ruled out that EUIPO may take into account sources from territories outside the European Union in order to assess the influence of technology that is likely to spread on the perception of the relevant public. Thus, if EUIPO were to disregard such evidence on the basis of its origin outside the European Union, it would risk hindering the attainment of the objective of public interest pursued by Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 21 January 2009, Hansgrohe v OHIM (AIRSHOWER), T‑307/07, not published, EU:T:2009:13, paragraph 31, and of 1 February 2023, aquamation, T‑319/22, not published, EU:T:2023:30, paragraph 34).
80      Therefore, the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to take into account the evidence targeting markets outside the European Union for the purposes of confirming the assessment of the descriptive character of the contested sign.
81      In the third place, as regards the third group of arguments concerning the overall assessment of the documentation, the applicant’s main argument that the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate, on the relevant date, the relevant public’s perception of the descriptive character of the contested sign (see paragraphs 64 to 66 above), cannot succeed. It should be noted, as is apparent from paragraphs 72 and 73 above, that the overall assessment of the evidence in the present case makes it possible to conclude that, even before the filing of the application for registration of the contested sign, there was a tendency to use the group of letters ‘ospw’ systematically as an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ on various specialised websites in the field of cycling. In that regard, as far as concerns Annex 63, it should be noted that, contrary to what the applicant claims (see paragraph 64 above), that article presents at the beginning of the description of the applicant’s goods the expression ‘Oversized Pulley Wheel System’ accompanied by the group of letters ‘ospw’ in parentheses as an abbreviation of that expression, and that expression appears a second time in the article. Similarly, the article in Annex 73 uses the terms ‘ospw’ and ‘ospw system’ to describe the goods in question (see paragraph 75 above).
82      It should be noted that the specialised websites referred to in paragraphs 72 and 73 above are consulted by cycling enthusiasts and, as the case may be, by professionals, who form part of the relevant public. The latter are more well-versed in the technical terms of cycling and have been able, at least potentially, to recognise the group of letters ‘ospw’ as an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheel system’, which is descriptive of bicycle parts and fittings. That finding is also confirmed by the document under the applicant’s name in Annex 1.2, which defines the system at issue as ‘the pulleys, the pulley bearings, and the derailleur cage’.
83      Furthermore, as regards the dictionary extracts submitted by the applicant before the Cancellation Division (see paragraph 65 above), it follows that the abbreviation ‘ospw’ in the cycling sector was added only after the relevant date, as stated in paragraph 66 of the contested decision. However, that fact cannot call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding as to the descriptive character of the contested mark. As the Board of Appeal pointed out in paragraph 55 of the contested decision, it is clear from the case-law that EUIPO is under no obligation to prove that the contested sign is included in dictionaries (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 July 2017, QD, T‑650/16, not published, EU:T:2017:489, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited, and of 23 October 2017, Barmenia Krankenversicherung v EUIPO (Mediline), T‑810/16, not published, EU:T:2017:749, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
84      Last, as regards the arguments relating to the exposure of the relevant public to the documentation and the meaning of the contested sign, the applicant’s claim that the Board of Appeal’s assessments are incorrect, since it did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the relevant public had been exposed to the annexes taken into account or that the relevant public was aware of the meaning of the contested sign (see paragraph 66 above) must also be rejected.
85      In that regard, it must be borne in mind, as is clear from the case-law cited in paragraph 29 above, that, for the purposes of applying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009, it is sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself indicates, that signs and indications making up the mark that are referred to in that article may be used for descriptive purposes. Accordingly, the possibility of consulting websites, such as those referred to in the annexes to EUIPO’s file, and the potential knowledge on the part of the relevant public of the type of goods at issue well before the relevant date were sufficient to enable the Board of Appeal to conclude that that sign could, at least potentially, be regarded as being, on the relevant date, descriptive of bicycle parts and fittings.
86      As regards the applicant’s argument concerning the applicability by analogy of the judgment of 28 February 2024, COMPTON (T‑746/22, not published, EU:T:2024:134) (see paragraph 66 above), it must be stated that the examination of the evidence relating to the descriptive character of the contested mark can be carried out only on a case-by-case basis and, consequently, that judgment cannot have any bearing on the assessment of the evidence produced in the present case in order to determine the relevant public’s perception of the descriptive character of the contested sign.
87      Similarly, as regards the arguments by which the applicant disputes the taking into account of Annexes 68 and 72 referred to in paragraphs 75 and 76 of the contested decision, given that those annexes are drafted in Italian and that the intervener has not submitted a translation of their content into the language of the proceedings, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, where the documents used in the proceedings before EUIPO are drafted in a language that is not the language of the proceedings, EUIPO may require that a translation be produced in that language, within a time limit specified by it. It follows that the intervener was not required to translate the evidence unless a specific request to that effect had been sent to him by EUIPO (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 8 March 2023, Sympatex Technologies v EUIPO – Liwe Española (Sympathy Inside), T‑372/21, not published, EU:T:2023:111, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). However, that is not the case here. It should also be noted that the relevant English-speaking public was able to recognise the expression in English ‘oversized pulley wheels’ and the group of letters ‘ospw’ used in Annexes 68 and 72. In any event, it should be borne in mind that, in the present case, the probative value of the evidence was assessed cumulatively and as a whole. The applicant’s argument cannot therefore succeed.
88      In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal correctly concluded that the contested mark was descriptive of bicycle parts and fittings, without it being necessary to demonstrate that the relevant public was exposed to the annexes taken into account or that the relevant public was aware of the meaning of the contested sign, since the potential meaning of the group of letters ‘ospw’ as an abbreviation of the descriptive expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’ is sufficient.
89      In the light of the foregoing, the second part of the first plea must be dismissed as unfounded.
The second plea, alleging infringement of Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) thereof
90      By the second plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the contested mark was devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 for the same reasons as those set out in the first plea.
91      According to settled case-law, it is evident from the wording of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 that, if one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed in that provision applies, that suffices for the sign at issue not to be registrable as an EU trade mark (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 October 2014, Larrañaga Otaño v OHIM (GRAPHENE), T‑458/13, EU:T:2014:891, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and of 28 April 2021, Freistaat Bayern v EUIPO (GEWÜRZSOMMELIER), T‑348/20, not published, EU:T:2021:228, paragraph 62).
92      In the present case, since it has been found that the contested mark was descriptive of the goods covered for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 and that that ground alone justifies a declaration of invalidity of the mark, it is not necessary to examine the merits of the plea alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.
93      The second plea must therefore be rejected.
The third plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons under Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001
94      By its third plea, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001. More specifically, in the first place, the Board of Appeal did not specify which annexes among Annexes 1 to 58 to which it referred, in paragraph 67 of the contested decision, predate the relevant date, given that all of those annexes post-date the relevant date.
95      In the second place, the applicant submits that it was also not specified, in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the contested decision, which of Annexes 1 to 58 targeting a public outside the European Union were taken into account and the significance afforded to them. As a result, the applicant was prevented from defending itself against them.
96      In the third place, the Board of Appeal incorrectly stated, in paragraph 71 of the contested decision, that the applicant had pointed out that the use of the term ‘ospw’ in a descriptive way before the relevant date was confirmed by several more website printouts.
97      EUIPO and the intervener dispute those arguments.
98      It must be borne in mind at the outset that, under the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, decisions of EUIPO must state the reasons on which they are based. That obligation to state reasons has the same scope as that under Article 296 TFEU, pursuant to which the reasoning of the author of the act must be shown clearly and unequivocally. It has two purposes: to allow interested parties to know the justification for the measure taken so as to enable them to protect their rights, and to enable the Courts of the European Union to exercise their power to review the legality of the decision. It is not necessary for the reasoning to address all relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 12 March 2020, Maternus v EUIPO – adp Gauselmann (Jokers WILD Casino), T‑321/19, not published, EU:T:2020:101, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).
99      First of all, the obligation to state reasons does not require the Boards of Appeal to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the lines of reasoning articulated by the parties before them. It is sufficient if it sets out the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (see judgment of 15 January 2015, MEM v OHIM (MONACO), T‑197/13, EU:T:2015:16, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
100    Next, the reasoning may be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know the reasons for the Board of Appeal’s decision and provides the competent Court with sufficient material for it to exercise its review (see judgment of 12 March 2020, Jokers WILD Casino, T‑321/19, not published, EU:T:2020:101, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
101    Last, the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasons given are correct, the latter being a matter going to the substantive legality of the contested measure. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 26 September 2017, La Rocca v EUIPO (Take your time Pay After), T‑755/16, not published, EU:T:2017:663, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
102    The applicant’s arguments must be examined in the light of those considerations.
103    In the present case, contrary to the applicant’s submission, the Board of Appeal set out, in accordance with the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, the reasons why the group of letters ‘ospw’ could be perceived by the relevant public as an abbreviation of the expression ‘oversized pulley wheels’, thus constituting a descriptive indication of bicycle parts and fittings.
104    In the first place, while it is true that the Board of Appeal did not specify, in paragraph 67 of the contested decision, which annexes predating the relevant date among Annexes 1 to 58 it was referring to, that fact cannot constitute, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 99 above, a failure to state reasons. As is apparent from paragraph 70 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal expressly took into account, among Annexes 1 to 58, Annex 23 in particular (see paragraph 74 above). In any event, it is also apparent from paragraphs 72 to 77 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal also relied on Annexes 63, 64, 65, 68, 69 and 70 relating to the relevant period, and on Annexes 72 and 73 relating to a period that was subsequent but close to the relevant date (see paragraph 75 above).
105    In the second place, the applicant’s argument concerning a failure to state reasons for the assessment of Annexes 1 to 58 targeting a public outside the European Union cannot succeed either. While it is true that the Board of Appeal did not specify, in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the contested decision, which annexes targeting a public outside the European Union it was referring to, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal set out the reasons why it took into account the annexes that do not target the public of the European Union. In so far as the applicant disputes the significance afforded to Annexes 1 to 58, that argument concerns the merits of the statement of reasons and should be rejected as ineffective, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 101 above.
106    In the third place, it is clear from the case-law cited in paragraph 101 above that the applicant’s argument concerning the existence of an inconsistent finding in paragraph 71 of the contested decision must be dismissed as ineffective in so far as it criticises the merits of the contested decision and not its statement of reasons. Moreover, it should be noted that that is a clerical error, since the statement at issue was made by the intervener and not by the applicant. In any event, that error does not alter the Board of Appeal’s analysis of the evidence.
107    The third plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
108    It follows from all the foregoing that none of the pleas in law put forward by the applicant can be upheld and that the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
IV.    Costs
109    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
110    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter. By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, as a hearing has not been organised, bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)
hereby:
1.      Dismisses the action;
2.      Orders CeramicSpeed Sport A/S, in addition to bearing its own costs, to pay those incurred by Mr Marcin Golec;
3.      Declares that the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) is to bear its own costs.
Costeira
Kancheva
Zilgalvis
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 11 June 2025.
V. Di Bucci
S. Papasavvas
Registrar
President
*      Language of the case: English.